

**KARL
MARX
FREDERICK
ENGELS**

**Collected
Works**



**Volume 5
Marx and Engels
1845 -1847**

Contents

Preface	XIII
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KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS WORKS

April 1845-April 1847

<i>Karl Marx</i> . Theses on Feuerbach [Original version]	3
<i>Karl Marx</i> . Theses on Feuerbach [Edited by Engels]	6
<i>Frederick Engels</i> . Feuerbach	11
<i>Karl Marx and Frederick Engels</i> . A Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique	15
<i>Karl Marx and Frederick Engels</i> . The German Ideology. Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets	19
<i>Volume I</i> . Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner	21
Preface	23
I. Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks	27
[I]	27
[1.] Ideology in General, German Ideology in Particular	28
[2. Premises of the Materialist Conception of History]	31
[3. Production and Intercourse. Division of Labour and Forms of Property—Tribal, Ancient, Feudal]	32
[4. The Essence of the Materialist Conception of History. Social Being and Social Consciousness]	35
[II]	38
[1. Preconditions of the Real Liberation of Man]	38
[2. Feuerbach's Contemplative and Inconsistent Materialism]	38

[3. Primary Historical Relations, or the Basic Aspects of Social Activity: Production of the Means of Subsistence, Production of New Needs, Reproduction of Men (the Family), Social Intercourse, Consciousness]	41
[4. Social Division of Labour and Its Consequences: Private Property, the State, "Estrangement" of Social Activity]	46
[5. Development of the Productive Forces as a Material Premise of Communism]	48
[6. Conclusions from the Materialist Conception of History: History as a Continuous Process, History as Becoming World History, the Necessity of Communist Revolution]	50
[7. Summary of the Materialist Conception of History]	53
[8. The Inconsistency of the Idealist Conception of History in General and of German post-Hegelian Philosophy in Particular]	55
[9. Idealist Conception of History and Feuerbach's Quasi-Communism]	57
[III]	59
[1. The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas. How the Hegelian Conception of the Domination of the Spirit in History Arose]	59
[IV]	63
[1. Instruments of Production and Forms of Property]	63
[2. The Division of Material and Mental Labour. Separation of Town and Country. The Guild-System]	64
[3. Further Division of Labour. Separation of Commerce and Industry. Division of Labour between the Various Towns. Manufacture]	66
[4. Most Extensive Division of Labour. Large-Scale Industry]	72
[5. The Contradiction between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse as the Basis of Social Revolution]	74
[6. Competition of Individuals and the Formation of Classes. Contradiction between Individuals and Their Conditions of Life. The Illusory Community of Individuals in Bourgeois Society and the Real Union of Individuals under Communism. Subordination of the Social Conditions of Life to the Power of the United Individuals]	75
[7. Contradiction between Individuals and Their Conditions of Life as Contradiction between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse. Development of the Productive Forces and the Changing Forms of Intercourse]	81
[8. The Role of Violence (Conquest) in History]	84
[9. Contradiction between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse under the Conditions of Large-Scale Industry and Free Competition. Contradiction between Labour and Capital]	85
[10. The Necessity, Preconditions and Consequences of the Abolition of Private Property]	87
[11.] The Relation of State and Law to Property	89
[12. Forms of Social Consciousness]	92

The Leipzig Council	94
II. Saint Bruno	97
1. "Campaign" against Feuerbach	97
2. Saint Bruno's Views on the Struggle between Feuerbach and Stirner	105
3. Saint Bruno versus the Authors of <i>Die Heilige Familie</i>	107
4. Obituary for "M. Hess"	114
III. Saint Max	117
1. The Unique and His Property	119
The Old Testament: Man	121
1. The Book of Genesis, i. e., A Man's Life	121
2. The Economy of the Old Testament	130
3. The Ancients	136
4. The Moderns	144
A. The Spirit (Pure History of Spirits)	148
B. The Possessed (Impure History of Spirits)	152
a) The Apparition	157
b) Whimsy	160
C. The Impurely Impure History of Spirits	163
a) Negroes and Mongols	163
b) Catholicism and Protestantism	170
D. Hierarchy	172
5. "Stirner" Delighted in His Construction	185
6. The Free Ones	193
A. Political Liberalism	193
B. Communism	205
C. Humane Liberalism	232
The New Testament: "Ego"	240
1. The Economy of the New Testament	240
2. The Phenomenology of the Egoist in Agreement with Himself, or the Theory of Justification	242
3. The Revelation of John the Divine, or "The Logic of the New Wisdom"	272
4. Peculiarity	301
5. The Owner	315
A. My Power	315
I. Right	315
A. Canonisation in General	315
B. Appropriation by Simple Antithesis	319
C. Appropriation by Compound Antithesis	321
II. Law	327
III. Crime	336

A. Simple Canonisation of Crime and Punishment	337
a. Crime	337
b. Punishment	339
B. Appropriation of Crime and Punishment Through Antithesis	340
C. Crime in the Ordinary and Extraordinary Sense	343
[B. My Intercourse]	346
[I. Society]	346
5. Society as Bourgeois Society	348
II. Rebellion	377
III. Union	389
1. Landed Property	389
2. Organisation of Labour	391
3. Money	395
4. State	399
5. Rebellion	402
6. Religion and Philosophy of the Union	403
A. Property	403
B. Wealth	407
C. Morality, Intercourse, Theory of Exploitation	408
D. Religion	414
E. Supplement to the Union	415
C. My Self-Enjoyment	417
6. Solomon's Song of Songs or the Unique	427
2. Apologetical Commentary	444
Close of the Leipzig Council	451
Volume II. Critique of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets	453
True Socialism	455
I. <i>Die Rheinischen Jahrbücher</i> or the Philosophy of True Socialism	458
A. "Communismus, Socialismus, Humanismus"	458
B. "Socialistische Bausteine"	470
First Cornerstone	474
Second Cornerstone	477
Third Cornerstone	480
IV. Karl Grün: <i>Die Soziale Bewegung in Frankreich und Belgien</i> (Darmstadt, 1845) or the Historiography of True Socialism	484
Saint-Simonism	493
1. <i>Lettres d'un habitant de Genève à ses Contemporains</i>	498
2. <i>Catéchisme politique des Industriels</i>	500

3. <i>Nouveau christianisme</i>	503
4. The School of Saint-Simon	504
Fourierism	510
The "Limitations of Papa Cabet" and Herr Grün	519
Proudhon	529
V. "Doctor Georg Kuhlmann of Holstein" or the Prophecies of True Socialism	531
<i>Frederick Engels</i> . The True Socialists	540

NOTES AND INDEXES

<i>Notes</i>	585
<i>Name Index</i>	609
<i>Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature</i>	627
<i>Index of Periodicals</i>	641
<i>Subject Index</i>	645

ILLUSTRATIONS

Facsimile of Thesis 11 on Feuerbach. From Marx's notebook	9
First page of the Preface to <i>The German Ideology</i> in Marx's handwriting	25
A page of the manuscript of <i>The German Ideology</i> . From the chapter "Feuerbach" (Discovered in the early 1960s)	34-35
A page of the manuscript of <i>The German Ideology</i> . From the chapter "Feuerbach"	34-35
A page of the manuscript of <i>The German Ideology</i> . From the chapter "Saint Max"	226-227
Max Stirner. Drawing by Engels	267
First page of Chapter IV (Volume II) of <i>The German Ideology</i> as published in the <i>Westphälische Dampfboot</i> No. 8, 1847	487

TRANSLATORS:

CLEMENS DUTT: *The German Ideology* (Volume I, "The Leipzig Council") and "The True Socialists"

W. LOUGH: *The German Ideology* (Volume I, Chapter I, "Feuerbach")

C. P. MAGILL: *The German Ideology* (Volume II)

Preface

The fifth volume of the *Collected Works* of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels contains a major joint work of the founders of Marxism, *The German Ideology*, together with the writings immediately connected with it.

They were all written between the spring of 1845 and the spring of 1847, during Marx's stay in Brussels, where he moved in February 1845 following his deportation from France by the Guizot government. Engels came to Brussels from Barmen in April 1845 and remained till August 1846. This was the period when Marxism was finally evolved as the scientific world outlook of the revolutionary proletariat. Marx and Engels had arrived at the decisive stage in working out the philosophical principles of scientific communism.

It was in *The German Ideology* that the materialist conception of history, historical materialism, was first formulated as an integral theory. Engels said later that this theory, which uncovered the genuine laws of social development and revolutionised the science of society, embodied the first of Marx's great discoveries (the second being the theory of surplus value) which played the main role in transforming socialism from a utopia into a science. *The German Ideology* is in effect the first mature work of Marxism. It immediately preceded the first published mature Marxist writings—*The Poverty of Philosophy* and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.

During the period when *The German Ideology* and the works closely connected with it were being written, Marx and Engels devoted their main efforts to joint theoretical and practical work aimed at setting out the revolutionary communist teaching and rallying around it the progressive elements of the proletariat and the revolutionary intelligentsia. Summing up the tasks they set themselves at that time,

Engels wrote later, in his work "On the History of the Communist League": "We were both already deeply involved in the political movement, and possessed a certain following in the educated world, especially of Western Germany, and abundant contact with the organised proletariat. It was our duty to provide a scientific foundation for our view, but it was equally important for us to win over the European and in the first place the German proletariat to our conviction."

Early in 1846, Marx and Engels founded the Brussels Communist Correspondence Committee, which took steps to establish international contacts between the participants in the working-class movement, to spread the new communist ideas and to prepare the ground for the creation of a revolutionary proletarian party. In August 1846, Engels, on the Committee's instructions, moved to Paris to develop revolutionary propaganda among the German and French workers.

The new revolutionary outlook of Marx and Engels was hampered out in struggle with bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. They directed their criticism in the first place against the idealist conception of history inherent in German post-Hegelian philosophy, including that of Ludwig Feuerbach, whose materialist views were inconsistent and essentially metaphysical.

The volume opens with Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach", of which Engels wrote in 1888 that they are "invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook" (Foreword to *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*).

The "Theses on Feuerbach" were written in connection with the project of *The German Ideology* and represent the initial draft of a number of general ideas for the first chapter of this work. Nearly all the basic propositions of the "Theses" were further developed in *The German Ideology*. Essentially, they counterpose against contemplative and passive pre-Marxian materialism the dialectical materialist conception of the decisive role of material practice in human cognition. Practice, Marx stressed, is the starting point, the basis, the criterion and the purpose of all cognition, including philosophical theory. And in order to become an effective and active factor of social development, theory must be embodied in living revolutionary practical activity.

In the "Theses on Feuerbach" Marx put forward the materialist conception of "the essence of man". In opposition to Feuerbach, who had only an abstract conception of "man" in isolation from social relations and historical reality, Marx emphasised that real

men could only be understood as products of social relations. Marx then went much further than Feuerbach in the critical comprehension of religion and the ways of overcoming it. He pointed out that it was not enough to understand the earthly basis of religion. The condition for eliminating religion, the "Theses" underline, is the revolutionary elimination of the social contradictions which give rise to it.

Particularly important is the eleventh thesis, which says: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it" (see this volume, p. 5). Marx himself separated this thesis from the preceding ten, as though underlining its summarising character. We must understand the world in order to change it, instead of interpreting it one way or another in order to reconcile ourselves with what exists. Such in substance is the true meaning of this thesis. Organically connected with it is another thought. The world cannot be changed by merely changing our notions of it, by theoretically criticising what exists; it must be understood, and then, proceeding from this, transformed by effective action, material revolutionary practice. This thesis concisely formulates the fundamental difference of Marxist philosophy from all earlier philosophy, including pre-Marxian materialism. It concentrates into a single sentence the effective, transforming character of the revolutionary theory created by Marx and Engels, its inseparable connection with revolutionary practice.

The basic principles of the new scientific world outlook, which Marx had formulated in the "Theses on Feuerbach", were developed in *The German Ideology*. This work comprises two volumes. Volume I is devoted to criticism of the views of Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner, and Volume II to criticism of "true socialism". Despite all the efforts of Marx and Engels to have *The German Ideology* published, it did not appear in print during their lifetime, except for one chapter of Volume II. This circumstance does not, however, diminish its significance. In working on *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels first and foremost clarified to themselves the basic aspects of the new world outlook. "We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification," Marx wrote in 1859 in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. The conclusions Marx and Engels reached constituted the theoretical basis for all their further scientific and political activity. They were able to impart them to their closest associates—future prominent proletarian revolu-

tionaries. And they soon found an opportunity of making their conclusions public after giving them a more finished and perfect form. This was done in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, by Marx, and the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, by Marx and Engels.

The German Ideology is remarkable for the great wealth and variety of its content, since the ideas developed in it relate to many aspects of the revolutionary teaching which was taking shape. Thus profound thoughts were expressed on questions pertaining to the theory and history of the state and of law, to linguistics, aesthetics and literary criticism. Not only were post-Hegelian philosophy and "true socialism" subjected to a detailed critical analysis, but digressions were also made into the history of philosophy and of socialist theories. And the new materialist interpretation of the history of social thought was in particular reflected in the positive treatment of the great social thinkers of the past.

The German Ideology is the continuation of previous works by Marx and Engels, mainly of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The Holy Family*, and in a sense synthesises the ideas contained in them. At the same time, an immense step forward was made to a qualitatively new stage in the development of the philosophical foundations of the revolutionary proletarian outlook. It was in this work that for the first time the materialist way of understanding history became an integral conception of the structure of society and of historical periodisation. By virtue of the general dialectical law of the transformation of theory into method and of the unity of world outlook and method, organically inherent in the new revolutionary teaching, this conception appears in *The German Ideology* not only as the *theory* of society, but also as the *method* of understanding social and historical phenomena. Marx and Engels gave science a powerful weapon for the knowledge of social life, a means of elucidating both the general course of social development and the existing social relations. Thus they made possible the comprehension of social processes which is necessary for active and revolutionary interference in them. Marx himself saw in this work the methodological prerequisite for a new political economy. In a letter to the German publisher Leske on August 1, 1846, he pointed out that the publication of a polemical work against the German philosophers was necessary in order to prepare readers for his point of view in the field of economic science.

The German Ideology is a polemical work. Criticism of views hostile to the proletarian world outlook occupies a predominant place in it, often couched in a biting satirical form which gives it particular force and expressiveness. In the course of their attacks,

Marx and Engels continually counterposed their own point of view to the views they were criticising.

Chapter I of Volume I of *The German Ideology* occupies a special place in the work as a whole. Unlike the other chapters, which are mainly polemical, it was conceived as a general introduction expounding the materialist conception of history. The basic theoretical content of the whole work is indeed concentrated in this chapter.

First of all Marx and Engels formulate the “premises” of the materialist conception of history. These premises are the real living people, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both the conditions which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. Thus, what is underlined here is the historical character of the material conditions themselves, which are increasingly influenced by people’s activity. And there are two sides to it. First, production (people’s active relation to nature, their influence on it), and, secondly, intercourse (people’s relations to one another in their activity). Production and intercourse determine each other, but the decisive side of this mutual action is production. Subsequently, Marx and Engels introduced the term “relations of production” to distinguish the social relations people enter into in production, which are the basic relations underlying everything included under the term “intercourse”.

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels not only developed in all its aspects the thesis of the decisive role of material production in the life of society, which they had already formulated in their previous works, they also revealed for the first time the dialectics of the development of the productive forces and the relations of production. This most important discovery was formulated here as the dialectics of the productive forces and the form of intercourse. It illuminated the whole conceptual system of historical materialism and made it possible to expound the substance of the materialist way of understanding history as an integral scientific conception.

This discovery can be reduced to the following propositions. The productive forces determine the form of intercourse (social relations). At a certain stage of their development, the productive forces come into contradiction with the existing form of intercourse. This contradiction is resolved by social revolutions. In the place of the previous form of intercourse, which has become a fetter, a new one is evolved which corresponds to the more developed productive forces. Subsequently, this new form of intercourse in its turn ceases to correspond to the developing productive forces, turns into their fetter and is replaced by an ensuing, historically more progressive

form of intercourse. Thus, in the course of the entire historical development a link of continuity is established between successive stages. In disclosing the laws of social development, Marx and Engels arrived at a conclusion of immense significance: "... All collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse" (see this volume, p. 74).

The discovery of the laws of social development provided the key to the scientific understanding of the entire historical process. It served as the point of departure for the scientific periodisation of history. Thus, as Lenin commented: "His [Marx's] historical materialism was a great achievement in scientific thinking. The chaos and arbitrariness that had previously reigned in views on history and politics were replaced by a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how, in consequence of the growth of the productive forces, out of one system of social life another and higher system develops—how capitalism, for instance, grows out of feudalism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 25).

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels investigated the basic determinants of the sequence of phases in the historical development of social production. They showed that the outward expression of the level of development of the productive forces is always to be found in that of the division of labour. Each stage in the division of labour determines a corresponding form of property and, as Marx subsequently pointed out, the property relations are but "the legal expression" of the relations of production. The transition from primary historical relations to the ensuing stage in social development was determined by the development of the productive forces, resulting in the transition from an initial, natural division of labour to the social division of labour in the form which is expressed in the division of society into classes. This was the transition from pre-class to class society.

Along with the social division of labour there develop such derivative historical phenomena as private property, the state and the "estrangement" of social activity. Just as the natural division of labour in primitive society determines the first, tribal (family) form of property so the increasing social division of labour determines the further development and change of the forms of property. The second form of property is the "ancient communal and state property", the third form is "feudal or estate property" and the fourth is "bourgeois property". The singling out and analysis of forms of property which successively replace one another and dominate at different stages of historical development provided the

basis for the scientific Marxist theory of the social formations, the successive replacement of which is the principal feature of the whole historical process.

Marx and Engels examined the last, the bourgeois, form of private property in greater detail than the other historical forms of property, tracing its transition from the guild-system to manufacture and large-scale industry. This was the first time that these two principal stages in the development of bourgeois society, the manufacture period and the period of large-scale industry, had been singled out and analysed. Marx had already demonstrated in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* that the emergence of private property was historically conditioned, that it must necessarily come into being at a certain stage in the development of human society, and also that it must inevitably be subsequently abolished. It was proved in *The German Ideology* that it is only with the development of large-scale industry that the material conditions are created for the abolition of private property in the means of production. And it becomes evident that this abolition is necessary.

Proceeding from production to the sphere of intercourse, i.e., of social relations, the social system, Marx and Engels gave a materialist interpretation of the class structure of society and demonstrated the role of classes and the class struggle in social life. In *The German Ideology*, as compared with the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The Holy Family*, the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle acquired mature features—those very features which, as Marx noted in his letter to Weydemeyer of March 5, 1852, distinguished this theory from the progressive bourgeois historians' understanding of class struggle. It was demonstrated that the division of society into antagonistic classes and the existence of classes are connected with definite stages in the development of production, that the development of the class struggle must necessarily lead to a communist revolution carried out by the proletariat, and that this revolution will result in the abolition of classes and the creation of a classless society.

In *The German Ideology* considerable attention is devoted to the political superstructure, and in particular to the relation of the state and law to property. For the first time the essence of the state in general and the bourgeois state in particular was revealed. "... The state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised" (see this volume, p. 90). In analysing the class nature and the main functions of the state at the capitalist stage of development,

Marx and Engels pointed out that the bourgeois state “is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests” (see this volume, p. 90).

In dealing with the various forms of social consciousness, the ideological superstructure, Marx and Engels made clear the general correlation between the material sphere and the sphere of consciousness. Of particular importance is the classical formulation of the materialist solution to this basic question of philosophy: “Consciousness [*das Bewusstsein*] can never be anything else than conscious being [*das bewusste Sein*], and the being of men is their actual life-process.... It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (see this volume, pp. 36-37). The formation of consciousness is immensely influenced by the class structure of society. In their work Marx and Engels disclosed the class origins of the various forms of consciousness and showed that in a class society the dominating consciousness is the consciousness of the ruling class.

Summing up the substance of the materialist conception of history, Marx and Engels wrote: “This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production—starting from the material production of life itself—and comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their formation from that basis; thus the whole thing can, of course, be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealist view of history, to look for a category in every period, but remains constantly on the real *ground* of history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice, and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that ... not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other kinds of theory” (see this volume, pp. 53-54).

In their subsequent scientific work, Marx and Engels constantly developed and deepened their materialist conception of history and perfected the method of historical materialism by applying it in the various fields of the social sciences. The whole system of concepts—which in *The German Ideology* still bears the stamp of the

formation process of the conception itself—was thus elaborated and made more precise, and the basic explanatory ideas of historical materialism were expressed in a more adequate terminology. In later works of Marx and Engels the various aspects of the concept “mode of production”, a basic term in historical materialism, were expounded; the internal law of development of the modes of production began to be formulated in terms of the dialectical interaction of productive forces and relations of production, and the latter were shown to play the main, decisive role—as was made clear already in *The German Ideology*—in the system of social relations. The term “social formation” first appeared in Marx’s economic manuscript of 1857-58, *Critique of Political Economy* (the so-called *Grundrisse*), and the concept “social-economic formation” was first thoroughly expounded in the preface to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), thus providing for the better understanding of the successive replacement of social formations, the general outline of which was given in *The German Ideology*. It should be noted, too, that in the light of the subsequent development of the theory of scientific communism it becomes evident that, in speaking in *The German Ideology* of the “abolition of the division of labour”, and even of the “abolition of labour”, in communist society, Marx and Engels had in mind only the division of labour in the conditions of class-divided society—with its antithesis between mental and physical labour and people being tied down to certain occupations and professions—and, in particular, the capitalist form of the exploitation of labour, not work and its organisation in general.

The classical formulation of the basic propositions of the materialist conception of history was later set down by Marx in the already-mentioned preface to his book *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.

This scientific materialist theory of social development served Marx and Engels as the theoretical foundation for their conclusions about the communist transformation of society. The principal conclusion from the materialist conception of history, already substantiated in *The German Ideology*, is the historical necessity of a proletarian, communist revolution. Marx and Engels stressed that “for the practical materialist, i.e., the communist, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in existence” (see this volume, pp. 38-39).

The development of the productive forces within bourgeois society, Marx and Engels pointed out, provides the two basic material premises of a communist revolution. These are: first, a high

level of production, which is incompatible with private property and at the same time is necessary for the organisation of society on a communist basis; and, secondly, mass proletarianisation, the formation of the proletariat, the most revolutionary class in modern society. This definition of the premises of a communist revolution is one of the fundamental conclusions of scientific communism contained in *The German Ideology*.

It was in *The German Ideology* that Marx and Engels first spoke of the necessity for the proletariat to conquer political power as the only way of carrying out a communist revolution. They pointed out: "... Every class which is aiming at domination, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, leads to the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of all domination, must first conquer political power" (see this volume, p. 47). Thus we find expressed for the first time the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, though as yet only in a most general form.

Marx and Engels stressed that a communist revolution is a dual process: a change in people's conditions of life, and at the same time a change in the people themselves who carry out the revolution. This thought, already contained in the "Theses on Feuerbach", was given its classical formulation in *The German Ideology*: "... The revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew" (see this volume, p. 53).

The German Ideology expounds the basic features of future communist society—the abolition of private property, of the class division of labour and of classes themselves, the transformation of production and all the social relations, and the disappearance of the state, the instrument of class domination. People's own activity will cease to confront them as a power alien to them. The antagonism between town and country and between mental and physical labour will be eliminated. Labour will be transformed from activity people perform under compulsion into the genuine self-activity of free people. The real liberation and all-round development of every individual will be the highest aim of the communist organisation of society.

This view of the future communist society is presented in *The German Ideology* for the first time as an integral theory, free from all the artificial, dogmatic construing of the future system which was typical of the utopian Socialists despite all the brilliant conjectures they made. The foresight of Marx and Engels was based on an

analysis of the real tendencies of social development and was the result of comprehension of its real laws. By expounding the specific features of future communism, Marx and Engels were laying the foundations of the scientific forecasting of social processes.

Not only the positive aspect of *The German Ideology*, the exposition of the authors' views, but also the critical content of this work was of great significance in shaping the new revolutionary world outlook. This criticism was mainly directed against the idealist conceptions of German post-Hegelian philosophy. And by subjecting the views of the German philosophers to a critical analysis, Marx and Engels in fact presented a radical and scientifically based criticism of previous philosophical thought as a whole. They demonstrated the untenability of the idealist interpretations of history inherent in all previous philosophy, sociology and historiography. The thinkers working in these fields could never understand the real social processes and their true character. At best they could grasp and more or less correctly describe only individual aspects of these processes without seeing the general connections determining them. The idealist interpretation of history, *The German Ideology* underlined, leads to only a superficial and illusory perception of the historical process, and explains it in an illusory way. The socialist theories based on a similar interpretation were likewise incapable of going beyond the bounds of fantastic notions and utopias.

A large part of *The German Ideology* is occupied by criticism of the Young Hegelians Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner. The need for such criticism arose, as Engels pointed out, from the fact that Bauer and Stirner were "the representatives of the ultimate consequences of *abstract* German philosophy, and therefore the only important philosophical opponents of Socialism—or rather Communism ..." (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 241).

The German Ideology completes the criticism, begun in *The Holy Family*, of the subjective-idealist views of Bruno Bauer, with their mystification of the historical process and contraposition of the outstanding individuals, who were supposed to be the sole makers of history, to the "passive and inert" masses. By citations from the latest writings of Bruno Bauer and other Young Hegelians, Marx and Engels drove home their characterisation, given in *The Holy Family*, of Young Hegelian ideas as unscientific and anti-revolutionary. In this respect there is partial textual coincidence between the corresponding chapter in *The German Ideology* and the article "A Reply to Bruno Bauer's Anti-Critique" written by Marx and Engels in refutation of the Young Hegelian leader's attempt to dispute their criticism of his views in *The Holy Family*.

Most of the first volume of *The German Ideology* is taken up by a critical examination of the philosophical and sociological views of Max Stirner, formulated in his book *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (*The Unique and His Property*). Stirner was a typical exponent of individualism and one of the first ideologists of anarchism. His views, reflecting a petty-bourgeois protest against the bourgeois system, enjoyed a considerable success among petty-bourgeois intellectuals and to some extent influenced the immature outlook of craftsmen who were becoming proletarians, while his failure to understand the role of the proletariat, whom he identified with paupers, and also his attacks on communism, made a resolute exposure of his views indispensable.

Marx and Engels demonstrated the artificial and far-fetched character of Stirner's philosophical and sociological constructions and the fallacy of his theory that the way to the liberation of the individual lay through the destruction of the state and the implementation of every individual's egoistic right to self-assertion. They pointed out that Stirner's voluntaristic appeals to the rights of the individual did not in any way affect the existing social relations and their economic basis, and so, in effect, continued to sanction the preservation of the bourgeois social conditions which are the main source of inequality and oppression of the individual. Stirner's seemingly revolutionary phrases were in fact a disguise for an apologia of the bourgeois system.

The exposure of Stirner's anarchist views in *The German Ideology* was essentially a criticism of all such individualistic theories which substitute fruitless rebellion by isolated individuals for participation in the real revolutionary movement and preach total negation and destruction instead of the positive communist aims of struggle. Marx and Engels pointed out that the path outlined by Stirner and his like could by no means lead to the liberation of the individual. Only a communist revolution, carried out by the working class in the interests of all the working people, can break the fetters with which the individual is shackled by the existing capitalist system, and can lead to the genuine freedom and free development of the individual, to harmonious unity of public and personal interests.

The second volume of *The German Ideology* and Engels' manuscript "The True Socialists", which is its direct continuation, further show that, in substance, German "true socialism" was only a philistine variety of earlier petty-bourgeois social utopianism and that, under the pretence of "universal love for man", the "true socialists" were spreading ideas of class peace, renouncing the struggle for democratic freedoms and revolutionary change. This was particular-

ly dangerous at the time in Germany, where the struggle of all the democratic forces against absolutism and feudal relations was growing sharper while at the same time the contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were becoming more and more acute. Marx and Engels likewise subjected to devastating criticism the German nationalism of the “true socialists” and their arrogant attitude to other nations. They criticised in detail the philosophical views of the “true socialists”, their aesthetic views, and the tendency of some of them to give socialism a religious tinge and to impart to it the character of a religious prophecy.

Both by its positive ideas and by its criticism of ideological trends hostile to the proletarian world outlook, including those couched in pseudo-revolutionary and socialist phrases, *The German Ideology* represented an important landmark in the development of Marxism. This work signified a decisive stage in the philosophical and sociological grounding of the theory of scientific communism, in the scientific demonstration of the world-historic role of the working class as the social force whose historical mission is to overthrow the exploiting capitalist system and create the new communist society.

* * *

The works contained in this volume have been translated from the original German text. *The German Ideology*, which forms the greater part of this volume, was never published in the authors' lifetimes, except for one chapter, nor arranged by them for publication, and has come down to us incomplete. The text of *The German Ideology* has been re-checked and re-arranged in accordance with the researches of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with a view to presenting it in a form corresponding as closely as possible to the layout and content of the manuscript. In particular, Chapter I, “Feuerbach”, which was not finished by the authors and has reached us only in the form of several separate manuscripts, is presented in accordance with the new arrangement and subdivision of the text prepared by Georgi Bagaturia and edited by Vladimir Brushlinsky (first published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, Vol. 1, and also separately under the title Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks*, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1973).

The whole work on this volume has been finalised by Lev Churbanov. He also prepared the Preface, the Notes and the Subject

Index, which have been edited by Lev Golman (both of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism).

The Name Index, the Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature and the Index of Periodicals were prepared by Nina Loiko, of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

The English translation of the bulk of *The German Ideology*, i.e., “The Leipzig Council”, and also Engels’ essay “The True Socialists”, was made by Clemens Dutt. The translation of Chapter I, “Feuerbach”, Volume I, was made by W. Lough, and that of Volume II by C. P. Magill, these two sections having been edited by Roy Pascal for the English edition published by Lawrence & Wishart, London, in 1938.

The English translations were edited for this volume by Maurice Cornforth, E. J. Hobsbawm and Margaret Mynatt for Lawrence & Wishart, and Salo Ryazanskaya, for Progress Publishers, and finally passed for the press by the editors Lydia Belyakova, Nadezhda Rudenko and Victor Schnittke, Progress Publishers.

The scientific editing was done by Georgi Bagaturia and Norair Ter-Akopyan (Institute of Marxism-Leninism).

KARL MARX
and
FREDERICK ENGELS

WORKS

April 1845-April 1847

Karl Marx

[THESES ON FEUERBACH^a]

1) *ad* FEUERBACH¹

1

The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things [*Gegenstand*], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the *active* side was set forth abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. In *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance.² Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.

2

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question.

^a Original version.—*Ed.*

3

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*.

4

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.

5

Feuerbach, not satisfied with *abstract thinking*, wants [*sensuous contemplation*]; but he does not conceive sensuousness as *practical*, human-sensuous activity.

6

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of *man*. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment [*Gemüt*] by itself, and to presuppose an abstract—*isolated*—human individual.

2. Essence, therefore, can be regarded only as “species”, as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals *in a natural way*.

7

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual which he analyses belongs to a particular form of society.

8

All social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

9

The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.

10

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.

11

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it.

Written in the spring of 1845

Printed according to the manuscript

This version was first published in 1924—in German and in Russian—by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in *Marx-Engels Archives*, Book I, Moscow

Karl Marx

[THESES ON FEUERBACH^a]

MARX ON FEUERBACH

(Written in Brussels in the spring of 1845)

1

The chief defect of all previous materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that things [*Gegenstand*], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity*, *practice*, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. In *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of practical-critical, activity.

2

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which isolates itself from practice is a purely scholastic question.

^a Edited by Engels.—*Ed.*

3

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for example).

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice.

4

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be criticised in theory and transformed in practice.

5

Feuerbach, not satisfied with *abstract thinking*, appeals to *sensuous contemplation*; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.

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1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment [*Gemüt*] regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract—*isolated*—human individual.

2. The essence of man, therefore, can with him be regarded only as “species”, as an inner, mute, general character which unites the many individuals only *in a natural way*.

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Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a *social product*, and that the abstract individual which he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society.

8

Social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

9

The highest point attained by *contemplative* materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals in “civil society”.

10

The standpoint of the old materialism is “*civil*” society; the standpoint of the new is *human* society, or associated humanity.

11

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it.

Written in the spring of 1845

Printed according to the book

First published by Engels
in the Appendix to the separate
edition of his *Ludwig Feuerbach
und der Ausgang der klassischen
deutschen Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1888

11
2. Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur
verschieden interpretiert, es kommt
darauf an sie zu verändern.

11

Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden *interpretiert*,
es kommt drauf an sie zu *verändern*.

Frederick Engels

FEUERBACH³

a) The entire philosophy of Feuerbach amounts to 1. philosophy of nature—passive adoration of nature and enraptured kneeling down before its splendour and omnipotence. 2. Anthropology, namely α) physiology, where nothing new is added to what the materialists have already said about the unity of body and soul, but it is said less mechanically and with rather more exuberance, β) psychology, which amounts to dithyrambs glorifying love, analogous to the cult of nature, apart from that nothing new. 3. Morality, the demand to live up to the concept of “man”,^a *impuissance mise en action*.^b Compare §54, p. 81: “The ethical and rational attitude of man to his stomach consists in treating it not as something bestial but as something human.”—§61: “Man ... as a moral being” and all the talk about morality in *Das Wesen des Christenthums*.

b) The fact that at the present stage of development men can satisfy their needs only within society, that in general from the very start, as soon as they came into existence, men needed one another and could only develop their needs and abilities, etc., by entering into intercourse^c with other men, this fact is expressed by Feuerbach in the following way:

^a Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, § 52.—Ed.

^b Powerlessness set in motion. Charles Fourier, *Théorie des quatre mouvements, et des destinées générales*, deuxième partie. Epilogue.—Ed.

^c See Note 11.—Ed.

“Isolated man *by himself* has *not* the *essence* of man *in himself*”; “the *essence* of man is contained only in the community, in the *unity of man and man*, a unity, however, which depends only on the *reality* of the *difference* between I and you.—Man by himself is man (in the ordinary sense), man *and* man, the unity of *I and you*, is *God*” (i.e., man in the supraordinary sense) (§§ 61, 62, p. 83).

Philosophy has reached a point when the trivial fact of the necessity of intercourse between human beings—a fact without a knowledge of which the second generation that ever existed would never have been produced, a fact already involved in the sexual difference—is presented by philosophy at the end of its entire development as the greatest result. And presented, moreover, in the mysterious form of “the unity of I and you”. This phrase would have been quite impossible had Feuerbach not *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*^a thought of the sexual act, the conjugal act, the community of I and you.* And insofar as his community becomes *real* it is moreover limited to the sexual act and to arriving at an understanding about philosophical ideas and problems, to “true dialectics” (§ 64), to dialogue, to “the *procreation* of man, both spiritual and physical man” (p. 67). What this “*procreated*” man does afterwards, apart from again “spiritually” and “physically” “procreating men”, is not mentioned. Feuerbach only knows intercourse between *two beings*,

“the truth that no being on its own is a true, perfect, absolute being, that truth and perfection is only the association, the unity of *two* beings that are essentially alike” (pp. 83, 84).

c) The beginning of the *Philosophie der Zukunft* immediately shows the difference between us and him:

§ 1: “The task of modern times was the realisation and humanisation of God, the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology.” Cf. “The negation of theology is the *essence* of modern times” (*Philosophie der Zukunft*, p. 23).

* For, since the human being = brain + heart, and two are necessary to represent the human being, one of them personifies the *brain* in their intercourse, the other the *heart*—*man* and *woman*. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand why *two* persons are more human than one.^b Saint-Simonist individual.⁴

^a Mainly.—*Ed.*

^b Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, § 58.—*Ed.*

d) The distinction that Feuerbach makes between Catholicism and Protestantism in § 2—Catholicism: “theology” “is concerned with what God is in himself”, it has a “tendency towards speculation and contemplation”; Protestantism is merely Christology, it leaves God to himself and speculation and contemplation to philosophy—this distinction is nothing but a division of labour arisen from a need appropriate to immature science. Feuerbach explains Protestantism merely from this need *within theology*, whereupon an independent history of philosophy naturally follows.

e) “Being is not a general concept which can be separated from things. It is *identical* with the things that exist.... Being is posited by essence. *What my essence is, is my being*. The fish is in the water, but its essence cannot be separated from this being. Even language identifies being and essence. It is only in human life that being is divorced from essence—but only in *exceptional, unfortunate cases*—only there is it possible that a person’s essence is not in the place where he is, but it is precisely because of this division that his spirit is not truly in the place where his body actually is. Only where your heart is, there *you are*. But all things—*apart from abnormal cases*—like to be in the place where they are, and like to be what they are” (p. 47).

A fine panegyric upon the existing state of things! Apart from abnormal cases, a few exceptional cases, you like to work from your seventh year as a door-keeper in a coal-mine, remaining alone in the dark for fourteen hours a day, and because it is your being therefore it is also your essence. The same applies to a piecer^a at a self-actor.^a It is your “essence” to be subservient to a branch of labour. Cf. *Das Wesen des Glaubens*, p. 11, “unsatisfied hunger” [...] ^b

f) § 48, p. 73. “Time is the only *means* that makes it possible without contradiction to combine opposite or contradictory determinations in a single being. This applies at all events to living beings. Only thus does here—for example in man—the *contradiction* make its appearance that now *this* determination, this resolution, dominates and occupies me, and then a quite different and diametrically opposed determination.”

Feuerbach describes this as 1) a contradiction, 2) a combination of contradictions, and 3) alleges that time brings this about. Indeed time

^a This word is in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

^b Engels did not finish this sentence. A similar idea is expressed in Chapter I of *The German Ideology* (cf. p. 58 of this volume).—*Ed.*

“filled” with events, but still time, and not that which takes place during this time.^a The proposition amounts to the statement: it is only in time that change is possible.

Written probably in the autumn
of 1845

Printed according to the manu-
script

First published in German in 1932
in Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*,
Erste Abteilung, Bd. 5

^a Ludwig Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft*, § 12.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
[A REPLY TO BRUNO BAUER'S ANTI-CRITIQUE⁵]

Brussels, November 20. In *Wigand's Vierteljahrsschrift*, Vol. III, p. 138 ff., *Bruno Bauer* stammers out a few words in answer to *Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik*, 1845, by *Engels* and *Marx*.^a At the outset *Bruno Bauer* declares that *Engels* and *Marx* have misunderstood him; with unaffected naïveté he repeats his old pretentious phrases, which have long since been reduced to nothing, and regrets that these writers do not know his catchwords about “the constant struggle and victory, the destruction and creation of criticism”, which is the “only historical force”, his assertions that “the critic and only the critic has *smashed* religion in its entirety and the state in its various manifestations”, that “the critic has worked and still works”, and similar high-sounding protestations and lofty effusions. In his reply *Bauer* immediately provides new and striking proof of “*how the critic has worked and still works*”. For the “hard-working” critic considers that it serves his *purpose* better not to make the book by *Engels* and *Marx* the object of his exclamations and quotations, but a mediocre and confused *review of this book* published in the *Westphälische Dampfboot* (May issue, p. 206 ff.)⁶—a *conjuring trick*, which, with critical prudence, he conceals from the reader.

While *Bauer* is *copying* from the *Dampfboot*, he interrupts his “*arduous work*” only with laconic, but highly ambiguous shrugging of his shoulders. Critical criticism has limited itself to shrugging its shoulders since it has no more to say. It finds salvation in the *shoulder-blades* despite its hatred of the *sensuous world*, which it can

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 3-211.—*Ed.*

only conceive in the shape of a “stick” (see *Wigand’s Vierteljahrsschrift*, p. 130), an instrument for chastising its theological bareness.

In his superficial haste the Westphalian reviewer gives a ridiculous summary which is utterly at variance with the book he is reviewing. The “hard-working” critic copies the fabrications of the reviewer, attributes them to *Engels* and *Marx* and triumphantly shouts to the uncritical mass—which he annihilates with one eye, while with the other he flirtatiously invites it to come nearer—see, these are my opponents!

Let us now place side by side the words of these documents.

The reviewer writes in the *Westphälische Dampfboot*:

“In order to kill the Jews he” (*Bruno Bauer*) “transforms them into theologians, and the problem of political emancipation into that of human emancipation; to annihilate *Hegel* he transforms him into Herr *Hinrichs*; to get rid of the French Revolution, communism and Feuerbach he shouts ‘mass, mass, mass!’ and again ‘mass, mass, mass!’ and crucifies it to the glory of the spirit, which is criticism, the true incarnation of the absolute idea in Bruno of Charlottenburg” (*Das Westphälische Dampfboot*, l. c., p. 212).

The “hard-working” critic writes:

“The critic of critical criticism” becomes “in the end childish”, “plays the Harlequin on the *theatro mundi*” and “would have us believe”, “asserting in all seriousness, that *Bruno Bauer* in order to kill the Jews”, etc., etc.—there follows *verbatim* the whole passage from the *Westphälische Dampfboot*, which is nowhere to be found in *Die heilige Familie* (*Wigand’s Vierteljahrsschrift*, p. 142).

Compare this with the attitude of critical criticism to the Jewish question and to political emancipation in *Die heilige Familie, inter alia*, pp. 163-85; regarding its attitude to the French Revolution cf. pp. 185-95; and its attitude to socialism and communism, pp. 22-74, p. 211 ff., pp. 243-44 and the whole chapter on critical criticism in the person of Rudolph, Prince of Geroldstein, pp. 258-333.^a Regarding the attitude of critical criticism to *Hegel* see the mystery of “speculative construction” and the following explanation on p. 79 ff., also pp. 121 and 122, 126-28, 136-37, 208-09, 215-27 and 304-08; on the attitude of critical criticism to *Feuerbach* see pp. 138-41, and finally on the result and the trend of the critical fight against the French Revolution, materialism and socialism see pp. 214-15.^b

One can see from these quotations that the Westphalian reviewer has given a completely distorted and only imaginary summary

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 106-18, 118-24, 23-72, 134 ff., 151-53, 162-209.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, pp. 57 ff., 82 and 83, 85-87, 91-92, 131-32, 136-43, 191-93, 92-94, 135-36.—*Ed.*

showing that he has absurdly misunderstood the arguments. It is this summary which with “creative and devastating” agility the “*pure*” and “*hard-working*” critic *substitutes* for the original.

Furthermore.

The reviewer writes in the Westphälische Dampfboot:

“To his” (that is, *Bruno Bauer’s*) “*silly self-apotheosis*, in which he seeks to prove that wherever he was formerly in thrall to the prejudices of the mass, this enthrallment was merely a necessary guise of criticism, *Marx* replies by offering to provide the following *little scholastic treatise*: ‘Why the conception of the Virgin Mary had to be proved by no other than Herr *Bruno Bauer*’” etc., etc. (*Dampfboot*, p. 213).

The “hard-working” critic:

“He” (the critic of critical criticism) “wants to *make us believe*, and in the end himself *believes* his humbug, that wherever *Bauer* was formerly in thrall to the prejudices of the mass he wants to present this enthrallment merely as a necessary guise of criticism and not on the contrary as the result of the necessary development of criticism; in *reply* to this ‘*silly self-apotheosis*’ he therefore offers the following *little scholastic treatise*: ‘Why the conception of the Virgin Mary’” etc., etc. (*Wigand’s Vierteljahrsschrift*, pp. 142-43).

The reader will find in *Die heilige Familie*, pp. 150-63,^a a special section on *Bruno Bauer’s self-apology*, but unfortunately *nothing* is written there about the *little scholastic treatise*, which is therefore by no means offered in reply to *Bruno Bauer’s self-apology*, as the Westphalian reviewer writes; and the obliging *Bruno Bauer* copies this—even enclosing some words in *inverted commas*—assuming it to be a quotation from *Die heilige Familie*. The *little treatise* is mentioned in a different section and in a different context (see *Die heilige Familie*, pp. 164 and 165^b). What it signifies there the reader may find out for himself and again admire the “*pure*” cunning of the “*hard-working critic*”.

In the end the “*hard-working*” critic exclaims:

“*This*” (namely the quotations which *Bruno Bauer* has borrowed from the *Westphälische Dampfboot* and attributed to the authors of *Die heilige Familie*) “has of course reduced *Bruno Bauer* to silence and brought criticism to its senses. *On the contrary*, *Marx* has presented us with a spectacle by finally himself appearing in the role of the amusing comedian” (*Wigand’s Vierteljahrsschrift*, p. 143).

To understand this “*on the contrary*” one has to know that the *Westphalian reviewer*, for whom *Bruno Bauer* works as a *copyist*, dictates the following to his critical and *hard-working scribe*:

“The world-historic drama” (that is, the fight of *Bauer’s criticism* against the mass) “quite simply disintegrates into the *most amusing comedy*” (*Das Westphälische Dampfboot*, p. 213).

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 99-106.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, pp. 106-08.—*Ed.*

Here the hapless copyist jumps to his feet: to transcribe his own condemnation is beyond his power. “*On the contrary*,” he cries interrupting the dictation of the Westphalian reviewer, “*on the contrary ... Marx ... is the most amusing comedian!*” and he wipes the cold sweat from his brow.

By resorting to incompetent *jugglery*, to the most deplorable conjuring trick, *Bruno Bauer* has in the final analysis confirmed the death sentence passed upon him by *Engels* and *Marx* in *Die heilige Familie*.

Written on November 20, 1845

Printed according to the journal

Published in *Gesellschaftsspiegel*,
Heft VII, Januar 1846

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY

CRITIQUE OF MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
ACCORDING TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES
FEUERBACH, B. BAUER AND STIRNER,
AND OF GERMAN SOCIALISM
ACCORDING TO ITS VARIOUS PROPHETS⁷

Written between November 1845
and August 1846
First published in full in 1932
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Volume I

CRITIQUE

OF MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
ACCORDING TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES
FEUERBACH, B. BAUER AND STIRNER

Preface

Hitherto men have always formed wrong ideas about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged their relations according to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The products of their brains have got out of their hands. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let us revolt against this rule of concepts. Let us teach men, says one,^a how to exchange these imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of man; says another,^b how to take up a critical attitude to them; says the third,^c how to get them out of their heads; and existing reality will collapse.

These innocent and child-like fancies are the kernel of the modern Young-Hegelian philosophy, which not only is received by the German public with horror and awe, but is announced by our *philosophic heroes* with the solemn consciousness of its world-shattering danger and criminal ruthlessness. The first volume of the present publication has the aim of uncloaking these sheep, who take themselves and are taken for wolves; of showing that their bleating merely imitates in a philosophic form the conceptions of the German middle class; that the boasting of these philosophic commentators only mirrors the wretchedness of the real conditions in Germany. It is its aim to ridicule and discredit the philosophic struggle with the

^a Ludwig Feuerbach.— *Ed.*

^b Bruno Bauer.— *Ed.*

^c Max Stirner.— *Ed.*

shadows of reality, which appeals to the dreamy and muddled German nation.

Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water only because they were possessed with the *idea of gravity*. If they were to get this notion out of their heads, say by avowing it to be a superstitious, a religious concept, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from water. His whole life long he fought against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful consequences all statistics brought him new and manifold evidence. This valiant fellow was the type of the new revolutionary philosophers in Germany.*

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] There is no specific difference between German idealism and the ideology of all the other nations. The latter too regards the world as dominated by ideas, ideas and concepts as the determining principles, and certain notions as the mystery of the material world accessible to the philosophers.

Hegel completed positive idealism. He not only turned the whole material world into a world of ideas and the whole of history into a history of ideas. He was not content with recording thought entities, he also sought to describe the act of creation.

Roused from their world of fancy, the German philosophers protest against the world of ideas to which they [...] the conception of the real, material [...]

All the German philosophical critics assert that the real world of men has hitherto been dominated and determined by ideas, images, concepts, and that the real world is a product of the world of ideas. This has been the case up to now, but it ought to be changed. They differ from each other in the manner in which they intend to deliver mankind, which in their opinion is groaning under the weight of its own fixed ideas; they differ in respect of what they proclaim to be fixed ideas; they agree in their belief in the hegemony of ideas, they agree in the belief that the action of their critical reason must bring about the destruction of the existing order of things: whether they consider their isolated rational activity sufficient or want to conquer universal consciousness.

The belief that the real world is the product of the ideal world, that the world of ideas [...]

Having lost their faith in the Hegelian world of ideas, the German philosophers protest against the domination of thoughts, ideas, and concepts which, according to their opinion, i.e., according to *Hegel's illusion*, have hitherto produced, determined and dominated the real world. They make their protest and expire [...]

According to the Hegelian system ideas, thoughts and concepts have produced, determined, dominated the real life of men, their material world, their actual relations. His rebellious disciples take this [...]

Grundriss

Die deutsche Geschichte ist eine Geschichte der Kämpfe um die Freiheit und die Einheit des Vaterlandes. Die deutsche Nation hat sich durch Jahrhunderte hindurch als ein Volk von Kämpfern und Märtyrern bewiesen. Die deutsche Geschichte ist eine Geschichte der Kämpfe um die Freiheit und die Einheit des Vaterlandes. Die deutsche Nation hat sich durch Jahrhunderte hindurch als ein Volk von Kämpfern und Märtyrern bewiesen.

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First page of the Preface to *The German Ideology* in Marx's handwriting

I

FEUERBACH

OPPOSITION OF THE MATERIALIST AND IDEALIST OUTLOOKS^b

[I]

[sh.1] According to German ideologists, Germany has in the last few years gone through an unparalleled revolution. The decomposition of the Hegelian system, which began with Strauss,⁹ has developed into a universal ferment into which all the "powers of the past" are swept. In the general chaos mighty empires have arisen only to meet with immediate doom, heroes have emerged momentarily to be again hurled into obscurity by bolder and stronger rivals. It was a revolution beside which the French Revolution was child's play, a world struggle beside which the struggles of the Diadochi¹⁰ appear insignificant. Principles ousted one another, intellectual heroes overthrew each other with unheard-of rapidity, and in the three years 1842-45 more was cleared away in Germany than at other times in three centuries.

All this is supposed to have taken place in the realm of pure thought.

Certainly it is an interesting event we are dealing with: the putrescence of the absolute spirit. When the last spark of its life had failed, the various components of this *caput mortuum*^a began to decompose, entered into new combinations and formed new substances. The industrialists of philosophy, who till then had lived on the exploitation of the absolute spirit, now seized upon the new combinations. Each with all possible zeal set about retailing his apportioned share. This was bound to give rise to competition, which, to start with, was carried on in moderately civil and staid

^a Literally: dead head; a term used in chemistry for the residuum left after distillation; here: remainder, residue.— *Ed.*

fashion. Later, when the German market was glutted, and the commodity in spite of all efforts was not favourably received in the world market, the business was spoiled in the usual German manner by cheap and spurious production, deterioration in quality, adulteration of the raw materials, falsification of labels, fictitious purchases, bill-jobbing and a credit system devoid of any real basis. The competition turned into a bitter struggle, which is now being extolled and interpreted to us as an upheaval of world significance, the begetter of the most prodigious results and achievements.

If we wish to rate at its true value this philosophic charlatantry, which awakens even in the breast of the righteous German citizen a glow of patriotic feeling, if we wish to bring out clearly the pettiness, the parochial narrowness of this whole Young-Hegelian movement and in particular the tragicomic contrast between the illusions of these heroes about their achievements and the actual achievements themselves, we must look at the whole spectacle from a standpoint beyond the frontiers of Germany.*

[1.] IDEOLOGY IN GENERAL, GERMAN IDEOLOGY
IN PARTICULAR

[sh.2] German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never left the realm of philosophy. It by no means examines its general philosophic premises, but in fact all its problems originate in a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in its answers, even in its questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even

* [In the first version of the clean copy there follows a passage, which is crossed out:] [p. 2]

We preface therefore the specific criticism of individual representatives of this movement with a few general observations, elucidating the ideological premises common to all of them. These remarks will suffice to indicate the standpoint of our criticism insofar as it is required for the understanding and the motivation of the subsequent individual criticisms. We oppose these remarks [p. 3] to *Feuerbach* in particular because he is the only one who has at least made some progress and whose works can be examined *de bonne foi*.

1. Ideology in General, and Especially German Philosophy

A. We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men exist. The history of nature, called natural

attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel. Their polemics against Hegel and against one another are confined to this—each takes one aspect of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the aspects chosen by the others. To begin with they took pure, unaltered Hegelian categories such as “substance” and “self-consciousness”,^a later they secularised these categories by giving them more profane names such as “species”, “the unique”, “man”,^b etc.

The entire body of German philosophical criticism from Strauss to Stirner is confined to criticism of *religious* conceptions.* The critics started from real religion and theology proper. What religious consciousness and religious conception are was subsequently defined in various ways. The advance consisted in including the allegedly dominant metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other conceptions under the category of religious or theological conceptions; and similarly in declaring that political, juridical, moral consciousness was religious or theological consciousness, and that the political, juridical, moral man—“Man” in the last resort—was religious. The dominance of religion was presupposed. Gradually every dominant relationship was declared to be a religious relationship and transformed into a cult, a cult of law, a cult of the state, etc. It was throughout merely a question of dogmas and belief in dogmas. The world was sanctified to an ever-increasing extent till at last the venerable Saint Max^c was able to canonise it *en bloc* and thus dispose of it once for all.

The Old Hegelians had *understood* everything as soon as it was

science, does not concern us here; but we will have to examine the history of men, since almost the whole ideology amounts either to a distorted conception of this history or to a complete abstraction from it. Ideology is itself only one of the aspects of this history.

[There follows a passage dealing with the premises of the materialist conception of history. It is not crossed out and in this volume it is reproduced as Section 2; see pp. 31-32.]

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] claiming to be the absolute redeemer of the world from all evil. Religion was continually regarded and treated as the arch-enemy, as the ultimate cause of all relations repugnant to these philosophers.

^a The basic categories of David Friedrich Strauss and Bruno Bauer.—*Ed.*

^b The basic categories of Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner.—*Ed.*

^c Max Stirner.—*Ed.*

reduced to a Hegelian logical category. The Young Hegelians *criticised* everything by ascribing religious conceptions to it or by declaring that it is a theological matter. The Young Hegelians are in agreement with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of concepts, of a universal principle in the existing world. Except that the one party attacks this rule as usurpation, while the other extols it as legitimate.

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declare them the true bonds of human society), it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relations of men, all their doings, their fetters and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness,^a and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret the existing world in a different way, i.e., to recognise it by means of a different interpretation. The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering”^b phrases, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against “*phrases*”. They forget, however, that they themselves are opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are combating solely the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism was able to achieve were a few (and at that one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of world-historic importance.

It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the connection of their criticism with their own material surroundings.^c

^a A reference to Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner, whose basic categories were, respectively, “man”, “criticism” and “ego”.—*Ed.*

^b Cf. “Ueber das Recht des Freigesprochenen ...” published anonymously in *Wigand's Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1845, Bd. IV.—*Ed.*

^c The rest of this page of the manuscript is left blank. The text following on the next page of the manuscript is reproduced in this volume as Section 3; see pp. 32-35.—*Ed.*

[2. PREMISES OF THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY^a]

[p. 3] The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be [p. 4] verified in a purely empirical way.

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.* Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, oro-hydrographical, climatic and so on.** All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their material life.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the means of subsistence they actually find in existence and have to reproduce.

[p. 5] This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] The first *historical* act of these individuals distinguishing them from animals is not that they think, but that they begin to *produce their means of subsistence*.

** [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] These conditions determine not only the original, spontaneous organisation of men, especially racial differences, but also the entire further development, or lack of development, of men up to the present time.

^a The text of the following section has been taken from the first version of the clean copy.—*Ed.*

with *how* they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.

This production only makes its appearance with the *increase of population*. In its turn this presupposes the *intercourse* [*Verkehr*]¹¹ of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production.

[3. PRODUCTION AND INTERCOURSE.
DIVISION OF LABOUR
AND FORMS OF PROPERTY—TRIBAL, ANCIENT, FEUDAL]

[sh.3] The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour and internal intercourse. This proposition is generally recognised. But not only the relation of one nation to others, but also the whole internal structure of the nation itself depends on the stage of development reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse. How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known (for instance, the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the division of labour.

The division of labour inside a nation leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of *town* and *country* and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labour. At the same time through the division of labour inside these various branches there develop various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the way work is organised in agriculture, industry and commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same conditions are to be seen (given a more developed intercourse) in the relations of different nations to one another.

The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of property, i.e., the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument and product of labour.

The first form of property is tribal property [*Stammeigentum*].¹²

It corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by cattle-raising or, at most, by agriculture. In the latter case it presupposes a great mass of uncultivated stretches of land. The division of labour is at this stage still very elementary and is confined to a further extension of the natural division of labour existing in the family. The social structure is, therefore, limited to an extension of the family: patriarchal chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, finally slaves. The slavery latent in the family only develops gradually with the increase of population, the growth of wants, and with the extension of external intercourse, both of war and of barter.

The second form is the ancient communal and state property, which proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a *city* by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied by slavery. Beside communal property we already find movable, and later also immovable, private property developing, but as an abnormal form subordinate to communal property. The citizens hold power over their labouring slaves only in their community, and even on this account alone they are bound to the form of communal property. It constitutes the communal private property of the active citizens who, in relation to their slaves, are compelled to remain in this spontaneously derived form of association. For this reason the whole structure of society based on this communal property, and with it the power of the people, decays in the same measure in which immovable private property evolves. The division of labour is already more developed. We already find the opposition of town and country; later the opposition between those states which represent town interests and those which represent country interests, and inside the towns themselves the opposition between industry and maritime commerce. The class relations between citizens and slaves are now completely developed.

With the development of private property, we find here for the first time the same relations which we shall find again, only on a more extensive scale, with modern private property. On the one hand, the concentration of private property, which began very early in Rome (as the Licinian agrarian law proves) and proceeded very rapidly from the time of the civil wars and especially under the emperors¹³; on the other hand, coupled with this, the transformation of the plebeian small peasantry into a proletariat, which, however, owing to its intermediate position between propertied citizens and slaves, never achieved an independent development.

The third form is feudal or estate property. If antiquity started out

from the *town* and its small territory, the Middle Ages started out from the *country*. This different starting-point was determined by the sparseness of the population at that time, which was scattered over a large area and which received no large increases from the conquerors. In contrast to Greece and Rome, feudal development, therefore, begins over a much wider territory, prepared by the Roman conquests and the spread of agriculture at first associated with them. The last centuries of the declining Roman Empire and its conquest by the barbarians destroyed a considerable part of the productive forces; agriculture had declined, industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out or been violently interrupted, the rural and urban population had decreased. These conditions and the mode of organisation of the conquest determined by them, together with the influence of the Germanic military constitution, led to the development of feudal property. Like tribal and communal property, it is also based on a community; but the directly producing class standing over against it is not, as in the case of the ancient community, the slaves, but the enserved small peasantry. As soon as feudalism is fully developed, there also arises antagonism to the towns. The hierarchical structure of landownership, and the armed bodies of retainers associated with it, gave the nobility power over the serfs. This feudal organisation was, just as much as the ancient communal property, an association against a subjected producing class; but the form of association and the relation to the direct producers were different because of the different conditions of production.

This feudal structure of landownership had its counterpart in the *towns* in the shape of corporative property, the feudal organisation of trades. Here property consisted [sh.4] chiefly in the labour of each individual. The necessity for associating against the association of the robber-nobility, the need for communal covered markets in an age when the industrialist was at the same time a merchant, the growing competition of the escaped serfs swarming into the rising towns, the feudal structure of the whole country: these combined to bring about the *guilds*. The gradually accumulated small capital of individual craftsmen and their stable numbers, as against the growing population, evolved the relation of journeyman and apprentice, which brought into being in the towns a hierarchy similar to that in the country.

Thus property during the feudal epoch primarily consisted on the one hand of landed property with serf labour chained to it, and on the other of the personal labour of the individual who with his small capital commands the labour of journeymen. The organisation of

materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.*

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men—the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.** Consciousness [*das Bewusstsein*] can never be anything else than conscious being [*das bewusste Sein*], and the being of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] The ideas which these individuals form are ideas either about their relation to nature or about their mutual relations or about their own nature. It is evident that in all these cases their ideas are the conscious expression — real or illusory — of their real relations and activities, of their production, of their intercourse, of their social and political conduct. The opposite assumption is only possible if in addition to the spirit of the real, materially evolved individuals a separate spirit is presupposed. If the conscious expression of the real relations of these individuals is illusory, if in their imagination they turn reality upside-down, then this in its turn is the result of their limited material mode of activity and their limited social relations arising from it.

** [The manuscript originally had:] Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., and precisely men conditioned by the mode of production of their material life, by their material intercourse and its further development in the social and political structure.

retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness. For the first manner of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; for the second manner of approach, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as *their* consciousness.

This manner of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts, as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.

Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science, the expounding of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty phrases about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take their place. When the reality is described, a self-sufficient philosophy [*die selbständige Philosophie*] loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which are derived from the observation of the historical development of men. These abstractions in themselves, divorced from real history, have no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, the difficulties begin only when one sets about the examination and arrangement of the material—whether of a past epoch or of the present—and its actual presentation. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which certainly cannot be stated here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident. We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use in contradistinction to ideology, and shall illustrate them by historical examples.^a

^a The clean copy ends here. The text that follows in this edition are the three parts of the rough copy of the manuscript.—*Ed.*

[II]

[1. PRECONDITIONS OF THE REAL LIBERATION OF MAN]

[1] We shall, of course, not take the trouble to explain to our wise philosophers that the “liberation” of “man” is not advanced a single step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance and all the rubbish to “self-consciousness” and by liberating “man” from the domination of these phrases, which have never held him in thrall.* Nor shall we explain to them that it is possible to achieve real liberation only in the real world and by real means, that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. “Liberation” is a historical and not a mental act, and it is brought about by historical conditions, the [level] of industry, com[merce], [agri]culture, [intercourse...]ª [2] then subsequently, in accordance with the different stages of their development, [they make up] the nonsense of substance, subject, self-consciousness and pure criticism, as well as religious and theological nonsense, and later they get rid of it again when their development is sufficiently advanced.** In Germany, a country where only a trivial historical development is taking place, these mental developments, these glorified and ineffective trivialities, naturally serve as a substitute for the lack of historical development, and they take root and have to be combated. But this fight is of *local* importance.***

[2. FEUERBACH'S CONTEMPLATIVE AND INCONSISTENT MATERIALISM]

[...]ª [8] in reality and for the *practical* materialist, i.e., the *communist*, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in

* [Marginal notes by Marx:] Philosophic liberation and real liberation.—*Man*. The *unique*. The *individual*.—Geological, hydrographical, etc., conditions. The human body. Needs and labour.

** [Marginal note by Marx:] Phrases and real movement. The importance of phrases in Germany.

*** [Marginal note by Marx:] Language is the language of re[ality].

^a The manuscript is damaged here: the lower part of the sheet is torn off; one line of the text is missing.—*Ed.*

^b Five pages of the manuscript are missing.—*Ed.*

existence. When occasionally we find such views with Feuerbach, they are never more than isolated surmises and have much too little influence on his general outlook to be considered here as anything but embryos capable of development. Feuerbach's "conception" of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he posits "Man" instead of "real historical man".¹⁴ "Man" is really "the German". In the first case, the *contemplation* of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of man and nature.* To remove this disturbance, he must take refuge in a double perception, a profane one which perceives "only the flatly obvious" and a higher, philosophical, one which perceives the "true essence" of things. He does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed [a product] in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest "sensuous certainty" are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by *commerce* into our zone, and therefore only [9] by this action of a definite society in a definite age has it become "sensuous certainty" for Feuerbach.

Incidentally, when things are seen in this way, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved, as will be seen even more clearly later, quite simply into an empirical fact. For instance, the important question of the relation of man to nature (Bruno goes so far as to speak of "the antitheses in nature and history" (p. 110),^a as though these were two separate "things" and man did not always have before him an historical nature and a

* NB. F[euferbach's] error is not that he subordinates the flatly obvious, the sensuous *appearance* to the sensuous reality established by detailed investigation of the sensuous facts, but that he cannot in the last resort cope with the sensuous world except by looking at it with the "eyes", i.e., through the "spectacles", of the *philosopher*.

^a Bruno Bauer, "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs".— *Ed.*

natural history), which gave rise to all the “unfathomably lofty works”^a on “substance” and “self-consciousness”, crumbles of itself when we understand that the celebrated “unity of man with nature” has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, and so has the “struggle” of man with nature, right up to the development of his productive forces on a corresponding basis. Industry and commerce, production and the exchange of the necessities of life in their turn determine distribution, the structure of the different social classes and are, in turn, determined by it as to the mode in which they are carried on; and so it happens that in Manchester, for instance, Feuerbach sees only factories and machines, where a hundred years ago only spinning-wheels and weaving-looms were to be seen, or in the Campagna di Roma he finds only pasture lands and swamps, where in the time of Augustus he would have found nothing but the vineyards and villas of Roman capitalists. Feuerbach speaks in particular of the perception of natural science; he mentions secrets which are disclosed only to the eye of the physicist and chemist; but where would natural science be without industry and commerce? Even this “pure” natural science is provided with an aim, as with its material, only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men. So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labour and creation, this production, the foundation of the whole sensuous world as it now exists that, were it interrupted only for a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of men and his own perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing. Of course, in all this the priority of external nature remains unassailed, and all this has no [10] application to the original men produced by *generatio aequivoca*^b; but this differentiation has meaning only insofar as man is considered to be distinct from nature. For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin) and which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach either.

[9] Certainly Feuerbach has [10] a great advantage over the “pure” materialists since he realises that man too is an “object of the

^a Paraphrase of a line from Goethe's *Faust*, “Prolog im Himmel”.—*Ed.*

^b Spontaneous generation.—*Ed.*

senses". But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as an "object of the senses", not as "sensuous activity", because he still remains in the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing conditions of life, which have made them *what* they are, he never arrives at the actually existing, active men, but stops at the abstraction "man", and gets no further than recognising "the actual, individual, corporeal man" emotionally, i.e., he knows no other "human relations" "of man to man" than love and friendship, and even then idealised. He gives no criticism of the present conditions of life. Thus he never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous *activity* of the individuals composing it; therefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the "higher perception" and in the ideal "compensation in the species", and thus to relapse into idealism at the very point where the communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the same time the condition, of a transformation both of industry and of the social structure.

As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely, a fact which incidentally already follows from what has been said.*

[3. PRIMARY HISTORICAL RELATIONS,
OR THE BASIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY:
PRODUCTION OF THE MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE,
PRODUCTION OF NEW NEEDS, REPRODUCTION OF MEN (THE FAMILY),
SOCIAL INTERCOURSE, CONSCIOUSNESS]

[11]** Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to "make history".^a But life involves before everything else eating and

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] The reason why we nevertheless discuss history here in greater detail is that the words "history" and "historical" usually mean everything possible to the Germans except reality, a brilliant example of this is in particular Saint Bruno with his "pulpit eloquence".

** [Marginal note by Marx:] *History*.

^a See this volume, pp. 56-57.—*Ed.*

drinking, housing, clothing and various other things.* The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick^a as with Saint Bruno, it presupposes the action of producing this stick. Therefore in any conception of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an *earthly* basis for history and consequently never a historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, especially since they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry.¹⁶

The second point is [12] that the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs; and this creation of new needs is the first historical act. Here we recognise immediately the spiritual ancestry of the great historical wisdom of the Germans who, when they run out of positive material and when they can serve up neither theological nor political nor literary rubbish, assert that this is not history at all, but the “prehistoric age”. They do not, however, enlighten us as to how we proceed from this nonsensical “prehistory” to history proper; although, on the other hand, in their historical speculation they seize upon this “prehistory” with especial eagerness because they imagine themselves safe there from interference on the part of “crude facts”, and, at the same time, because there they can give full rein to their speculative impulse and set up and knock down hypotheses by the thousand.

The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily re-create their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation

* [Marginal note by Marx:] *Hegel*. Geological, hydrographical, etc., conditions.¹⁵ Human bodies. Needs, labour.

^a See Bruno Bauer's article “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”. Cf. this volume, pp. 94, 104.—*Ed.*

between man and woman, parents and children, the *family*. The family, which to begin with is the only social relation, becomes later, when increased needs create new social relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one (except in Germany), and must then be treated and analysed according to the existing empirical data, not according to “the concept of the family”, as is the custom in Germany.

These three aspects of social activity are not of course to be taken as three different stages, but just as three aspects or, to make it clear to the Germans, three “moments”, which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men, and which still assert themselves in history today.

The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a twofold |13| relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation—social in the sense that it denotes the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a “productive force”. Further, that the aggregate of productive forces accessible to men determines the condition of society, hence, the “history of humanity” must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange. But it is also clear that in Germany it is impossible to write this sort of history, because the Germans lack not only the necessary power of comprehension and the material but also the “sensuous certainty”, for across the Rhine one cannot have any experience of these things since there history has stopped happening. Thus it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialist connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves. This connection is ever taking on new forms, and thus presents a “history” irrespective of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which would especially hold men together.

Only now, after having considered four moments, four aspects of primary historical relations, do we find that man also possesses “consciousness”.* But even from the outset this is not “pure” consciousness. The “mind” is from the outset afflicted with |14| the

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Men have history because they must *produce* their life, and because they must produce it moreover in a *certain* way: this is determined by their physical organisation; their consciousness is determined in just the same way.

curse of being “burdened” with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.* Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not “relate” itself to anything, it does not “relate” itself at all. For the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the *immediate* sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious. At the same time it is consciousness of nature, which first confronts men as a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force, with which men’s relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion) precisely because nature is as yet hardly altered by history—on the other hand, it is man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him, the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is distinguished from sheep only by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.** This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, |15| the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour, which was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then the division of labour which develops spontaneously or “naturally” by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g., physical strength), needs, accidents, etc., etc.*** Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment

* [The following words are crossed out in the manuscript:] My relation to my surroundings is my consciousness.

** [Marginal note by Marx:] We see here immediately: this natural religion or this particular attitude to nature is determined by the form of society and vice versa. Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature and man also appears in such a way that the restricted attitude of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted attitude to one another determines men’s restricted relation to nature.

*** [Marginal note by Marx, which is crossed out in the manuscript:] Men’s consciousness develops in the course of actual historical development.

when a division of material and mental labour appears.* From this moment onwards consciousness *can* really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it *really* represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc., come into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing productive forces; moreover, in a particular national sphere of relations this can also occur through the contradiction, arising not within the national orbit, but between this national consciousness and the practice of other nations,** i.e., between the national and the general consciousness of a nation (as is happening now in Germany); but since this contradiction appears to exist only as a contradiction within the national consciousness, it seems to this nation that the struggle too is confined to this |16| national muck, precisely because this nation represents this muck as such.

Incidentally, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all this trash we get only the one inference that these three moments, the productive forces, the state of society and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the *division of labour* implies the possibility, nay the fact, that intellectual and material activity,*** that enjoyment and labour, production and consumption, devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in negating in its turn the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that “spectres”, “bonds”, “the higher being”, “concept”, “scruple”, are merely idealist, speculative, mental expressions, the concepts apparently of the isolated individual, the mere images of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which move the mode of production of life, and the form of intercourse coupled with it.****

* [Marginal note by Marx:] The first form of ideologists, *priests*, is coincident

** [Marginal note by Marx:] *Religions*. The Germans and *ideology* as such.

*** [Marginal note by Marx, which is crossed out in the manuscript:] activity and thinking, i.e., action without thought and thought without action.

**** [The following sentence is crossed out in the manuscript:] This idealist expression of actually present economic limitations exists not only purely theoretically but also in the practical consciousness, i.e., consciousness which emancipates itself and comes into contradiction with the existing mode of production devises not only religions and philosophies but also states.

[4. SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES:
PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE STATE,
"ESTRANGEMENT" OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY]

The division of labour in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, simultaneously implies the *distribution*, and indeed the *unequal* distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property, [17] the nucleus, the first form of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first form of property, but even at this stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists, who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and private property are, after all, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.

Further, the division of labour also implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the common interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another. And indeed, this common interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the "general interest", but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided.^a

Out of this very contradiction between the particular and the common interests, the common interest assumes an independent form as the *state*, which is divorced from the real individual and collective interests, and at the same time as an illusory community, always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family conglomeration and tribal conglomeration—such as flesh and blood, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests—and especially, as we shall show later, on the classes, already implied by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and one of which dominates all the others. It follows from this that all struggles within the state, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc., etc., are merely the illusory forms—altogether the general

^a The following two paragraphs are written in the margin: the first by Engels and the second by Marx.— *Ed.*

interest is the illusory form of common interests—in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another (of this the German theoreticians have not the faintest inkling, although they have received a sufficient initiation into the subject in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*¹⁷ and *Die heilige Familie*). Further, it follows that every class which is aiming at domination, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, leads to the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination in general, must first conquer political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do.

Just because individuals seek *only* their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their common interest, the latter is asserted as an interest “alien” [*fremd*] to them, and [18] “independent” of them, as in its turn a particular and distinctive “general” interest; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the *practical* struggle of these particular interests, which *actually* constantly run counter to the common and illusory common interests, necessitates *practical* intervention and restraint by the illusory “general” interest in the form of the state.

[17] And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.

[18] This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up

till now.^a The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action¹⁸ of man, nay even being the prime governor of these. How otherwise could for instance property have had a history at all, have taken on different forms, and landed property, for example, according to the different premises given, have proceeded in France from parcellation to centralisation in the hands of a few, in England from centralisation in the hands of a few to parcellation, as is actually the case today? Or how does it happen that trade, which after all is nothing more than the exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the whole world through the relation of supply and demand—a relation which, as an English economist says, hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires [19] and wrecks empires, causes nations to rise and to disappear—whereas with the abolition of the basis, private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and, implicit in this, the abolition of the alien attitude [*Fremdheit*] of men to their own product), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men once more gain control of exchange, production and the way they behave to one another?

[5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES
AS A MATERIAL PREMISE OF COMMUNISM]

[18] This “estrangement” [*Entfremdung*] (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two *practical* premises. In order to become an “unendurable” power, i.e., a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity “propertyless”, and moreover in contradiction to an existing world of wealth and culture; both these premises presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development.

^a Here Marx added a passage in the margin which is given in this edition as the first two paragraphs of Section 5.—*Ed.*

And, on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which at the same time implies the actual empirical existence of men in their *world-historical*, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise, because without it privation, *want* is merely made general, and with *want* the struggle for necessities would begin again, and all the old filthy business would necessarily be restored; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a *universal* intercourse between men established, which on the one side produces in *all* nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the “propertyless” mass (universal competition), making each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally puts *world-historical*, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, 1) communism could only exist as a local phenomenon; 2) the *forces* of intercourse themselves could not have developed as *universal*, hence unendurable powers: they would have remained home-bred “conditions” surrounded by superstition; and 3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples “all at once” and simultaneously,¹⁹ which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with them.*

[19] Moreover, the mass of workers who are *nothing but workers*—labour-power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction [of their needs] and, hence, as a result of competition their utterly precarious position, the no longer merely temporary loss of work as a secure source of life—presupposes the *world market*. The proletariat can thus only exist *world-historically*, just as communism, its activity, can only have a “world-historical” existence. World-historical existence of individuals, i.e., existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history.

[18] Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise.^a

* * *

* [Above the continuation of this passage, which follows on the next page of the manuscript, Marx wrote:] *Communism*.

^a In the manuscript this paragraph was written down by Marx in a free space above the paragraph starting with the words: This “estrangement”.—*Ed.*

[19] The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is *civil society*. The latter, as is clear from what we have said above, has as its premise and basis the simple family and the multiple, called the tribe, and the more precise definition of this society is given in our remarks above. Already here we see that this civil society is the true focus and theatre of all history, and how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real relations and confines itself to spectacular historical events.²⁰

In the main we have so far considered only one aspect of human activity, the *reshaping of nature* by men. The other aspect, the *reshaping of men by men*....*

Origin of the state and the relation of the state to civil society.^a

[6. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION
OF HISTORY: HISTORY AS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS,
HISTORY AS BECOMING WORLD HISTORY,
THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNIST REVOLUTION]

[20] History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier history, e.g., the goal ascribed to the discovery of America is to further the eruption of the French Revolution. Thereby history receives its own special goals and becomes "a person ranking with other persons" (to wit: "self-consciousness, criticism, the unique", etc.), while what is designated with the words "destiny", "goal", "germ", or "idea" of earlier history is nothing more than an abstraction from later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history.

The further the separate spheres, which act on one another, extend in the course of this development and the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the advanced

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Intercourse and productive power.

^a The end of this page of the manuscript is left blank. The next page begins with an exposition of the conclusions from the materialist conception of history.—Ed.

mode of production, by intercourse and by the natural division of labour between various nations arising as a result, the more history becomes world history. Thus, for instance, if in England a machine is invented which deprives countless workers of bread in India and China, and overturns the whole form of existence of these empires, this invention becomes a world-historical fact. Or again, take the case of sugar and coffee, which have proved their world-historical importance in the nineteenth century by the fact that the lack of these products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System,²¹ caused the Germans [21] to rise against Napoleon, and thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of Liberation of 1813. From this it follows that this transformation of history into world history is by no means a mere abstract act on the part of "self-consciousness", the world spirit, or of any other metaphysical spectre, but a quite material, empirically verifiable act, an act the proof of which every individual furnishes as he comes and goes, eats, drinks and clothes himself.

In history up to the present it is certainly likewise an empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them (a pressure which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called world spirit, etc.), a power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the *world market*. But it is just as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of society by the communist revolution (of which more below) and the abolition of private property which is identical with it, this power, which so baffles the German theoreticians, will be dissolved; and that then the liberation of each single individual will be accomplished in the measure in which history becomes wholly transformed into world history.* From the above it is clear that the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only this will liberate the separate individuals from the various national and local barriers, bring them into practical connection with the production (including intellectual production) of the whole world and make it possible for them to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man). *All-round* dependence, this primary natural form of the *world-historical* co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by [22] this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have

* [Marginal note by Marx:] *On the production of consciousness.*

till now overawed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them. Now this view can be expressed again in a speculative-idealistic, i.e., fantastic, way as “self-generation of the species” (“society as the subject”), and thereby the consecutive series of interrelated individuals can be regarded as a single individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself. In this context it is evident that individuals undoubtedly make *one another*, physically and mentally, but do not make themselves, either in the nonsense of Saint Bruno, or in the sense of the “unique”, of the “made” man.

Finally, from the conception of history set forth by us we obtain these further conclusions: 1) In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being which, under the existing relations, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which is ousted from society and [23] forced into the sharpest contradiction to all other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of this class. 2) The conditions under which definite productive forces can be applied are the conditions of the rule of a definite class of society, whose social power, deriving from its property, has its *practical-idealistic* expression in each case in the form of the state and, therefore, every revolutionary struggle is directed against a class which till then has been in power.* 3) In all previous revolutions the mode of activity always remained unchanged and it was only a question of a different distribution of this activity, a new distribution of labour to other persons, whilst the communist revolution is directed against the hitherto existing *mode* of activity, does away with *labour*** and abolishes the rule of all classes with the classes themselves, because it is carried through by the class which no longer counts as a class in society, which is not recognised as a class, and is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc., within present society; and 4) Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness,

* [Marginal note by Marx:] These men are interested in maintaining the present state of production.

** [The following words are crossed out in the manuscript:] the modern form of activity under the rule of [...].

and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a *revolution*; the revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the *ruling* class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class *overthrowing* it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.*

[7. SUMMARY OF THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION
OF HISTORY]

[24] This conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production—starting from the material production of life itself—and comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their formation from that basis; thus the whole thing can, of course, be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealist view of history, to look for a category in every period, but remains constantly on the real *ground* of

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Whereas all communists in France as well as in England and Germany have long since agreed on the necessity of the revolution, Saint Bruno quietly continues to dream, opining that “real humanism”, i. e., communism, is to take “the place of spiritualism” (which has no place) only in order that it may gain respect. Then, he continues in his dream, “salvation” would indeed “be attained, the earth becoming heaven, and heaven earth”. (The theologian is still unable to forget heaven.) “Then joy and bliss will resound in celestial harmonies to all eternity” (p. 140).^a The holy father of the church will be greatly surprised when judgment day overtakes him, the day when all this is to come to pass—a day when the reflection in the sky of burning cities will mark the dawn, when together with the “celestial harmonies” the tunes of the *Marseillaise* and *Carmagnole* will echo in his ears accompanied by the requisite roar of cannon, with the guillotine beating time; when the infamous “masses” will shout *ça ira, ça ira* and suspend “self-consciousness” by means of the lamp-post.²² Saint Bruno has no reason at all to draw an edifying picture “of joy and bliss to all eternity”. We forego the pleasure of *a priori* forecasting Saint Bruno’s conduct on judgment day. Moreover, it is really difficult to decide whether the *prolétaires en révolution* have to be conceived as “substance”, as “mass”, desiring to overthrow criticism, or as an “emanation” of the spirit which is, however, still lacking the consistency necessary to digest Bauer’s ideas.

^a Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice, and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by resolution into "self-consciousness" or transformation into "apparitions", "spectres", "whimsies",^a etc., but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other kinds of theory. It shows that history does not end by being resolved into "self-consciousness" as "spirit of the spirit",^b but that each stage contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and circumstances, which on the one hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make [25] men just as much as men make circumstances.

This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and every generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as "substance" and "essence of man", and what they have deified and attacked: a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact that these philosophers revolt against it as "self-consciousness" and the "unique". These conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, determine also whether or not the revolutionary convulsion periodically recurring in history will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of everything that exists. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present—namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of the existing society, but against the existing "production of life" itself, the "total activity" on which it was based—then it is absolutely immaterial for practical development whether the *idea* of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves.

^a These terms are used by Max Stirner in *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*. Cf. pp. 157-63 of this volume.—*Ed.*

^b The terms are used by Bruno Bauer in "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs".—*Ed.*

[8. THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION
OF HISTORY IN GENERAL AND OF GERMAN POST-HEGELIAN
PHILOSOPHY IN PARTICULAR]

In the whole conception of history up to the present this real basis of history has either been totally disregarded or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history. History must, therefore, always be written according to an extraneous standard; the real production of life appears as non-historical, while the historical appears as something separated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial. With this the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created. The exponents of this conception of history have consequently only been able to see in history the spectacular political events and religious and other theoretical struggles, and in particular with regard to each historical epoch they were compelled to *share the illusion of that epoch*. For instance, if an epoch imagines itself to be actuated by purely "political" or "religious" motives, although "religion" and "politics" are only forms of its true motives, the historian accepts this opinion. The "fancy", the "conception" of the people in question about their real practice is transformed into the sole determining and effective force, which dominates and determines their practice. When the crude form of the division of labour which is to be found among the Indians and Egyptians calls forth the caste-system in their state and religion, the historian believes that the caste-system [26] is the power which has produced this crude social form.

While the French and the English at least stick to the political illusion, which is after all closer to reality, the Germans move in the realm of the "pure spirit", and make religious illusion the driving force of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history is the last consequence, reduced to its "clearest expression", of all this German historiography for which it is not a question of real, nor even of political, interests, but of pure thoughts, which must therefore appear to Saint Bruno as a series of "thoughts" that devour one another and are finally swallowed up in "self-consciousness"*; and even more consistently the course of history must appear to Saint Max Stirner, who knows not a thing about real history, as a mere "tale of knights, robbers and ghosts",²⁴ from whose visions he can, of course, only save himself by "unholiness". This conception is truly religious: it postulates religious man as the primitive man, the starting-point of

* [Marginal note by Marx:] So-called *objective* historiography²³ consisted precisely in treating the historical relations separately from activity. Reactionary character.

history, and in its imagination puts the religious production of fancies in the place of the real production of the means of subsistence and of life itself.

This whole conception of history, together with its dissolution and the scruples and quaims resulting from it, is a purely *national* affair of the Germans and has merely *local* interest for Germany, as for instance the important question which has been under discussion in recent times: how exactly one “passes from the realm of God to the realm of Man”^a—as if this “realm of God” had ever existed anywhere save in the imagination, and the learned gentlemen, without being aware of it, were not constantly living in the “realm of Man” to which they are now seeking the way; and as if the learned pastime (for it is nothing more) of explaining the mystery of this theoretical bubble-blowing did not on the contrary lie in demonstrating its origin in actual earthly relations. For these Germans, it is altogether simply a matter of resolving the ready-made nonsense they find into [27] some other freak, i.e., of presupposing that all this nonsense has a special *sense* which can be discovered; while really it is only a question of explaining these theoretical phrases from the actual existing relations. The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the removal of these notions from the consciousness of men, will, as we have already said, be effected by altered circumstances, not by theoretical deductions. For the mass of men, i.e., the proletariat, these theoretical notions do not exist and hence do not require to be dissolved, and if this mass ever had any theoretical notions, e.g., religion, these have now long been dissolved by circumstances.

The purely national character of these questions and solutions is moreover shown by the fact that these theorists believe in all seriousness that chimeras like “the God-Man”, “Man”, etc., have presided over individual epochs of history (Saint Bruno even goes so far as to assert that only “criticism and critics have made history”,^b and when they themselves construct historical systems, they skip over all earlier periods in the greatest haste and pass immediately from “Mongolism”^c to history “with meaningful content”, that is to say, to the history of the *Hallische* and *Deutsche Jahrbücher* and the dissolution of the Hegelian school into a general squabble. They forget all other nations, all real events, and the *theatrum mundi* is

^a Ludwig Feuerbach, “Ueber das ‘Wesen des Christenthums’...”—*Ed.*

^b Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

^c Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*. Cf. this volume, pp. 130-36. and pp. 163-70.—*Ed.*

confined to the Leipzig book fair and the mutual quarrels of "criticism", "man", and "the unique".^a If for once these theorists treat really historical subjects, as for instance the eighteenth century, they merely give a history of ideas, separated from the facts and the practical development underlying them; and even that merely in order to represent that period as an imperfect preliminary stage, the as yet limited predecessor of the truly historical age, i.e., the period of the German philosophic struggle from 1840 to 1844. As might be expected when the history of an earlier period is written with the aim of accentuating the brilliance of an unhistoric person and his fantasies, all the really historic events, even the really historic interventions of politics in history, receive no mention. Instead we get a narrative based not on research but on arbitrary constructions and literary gossip, such as Saint Bruno provided in his now forgotten history of the eighteenth century.^b These pompous and arrogant hucksters of ideas, who imagine themselves infinitely exalted above all national prejudices, are thus in practice far more national than the beer-swilling philistines who dream of a united Germany. They do not recognise the deeds of other nations as historical; they live in Germany, within Germany [28] and for Germany; they turn the Rhine-song²⁵ into a religious hymn and conquer Alsace and Lorraine by robbing French philosophy instead of the French state, by Germanising French ideas instead of French provinces. Herr Venedey is a cosmopolitan compared with the Saints Bruno and Max, who, in the universal dominance of theory, proclaim the universal dominance of Germany.

[9. IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY
AND FEUERBACH'S QUASI-COMMUNISM]

It is also clear from these arguments how grossly Feuerbach is deceiving himself when (*Wigand's Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1845, Band 2) by virtue of the qualification "common man" he declares himself a communist,²⁶ transforms the latter into a predicate of "Man", and thinks that it is thus possible to change the word "communist", which in the real world means the follower of a definite revolutionary party, into a mere category. Feuerbach's whole deduction with regard to the relation of men to one another is only aimed at proving that men need and *always have needed* each other. He wants to

^a I. e., Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach and Max Stirner.—Ed.

^b Bruno Bauer, *Geschichte der Politik, Cultur und Aufklärung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*.—Ed.

establish consciousness of this fact, that is to say, like the other theorists, he merely wants to produce a correct consciousness about an *existing* fact; whereas for the real Communist it is a question of overthrowing the existing state of things. We fully appreciate, however, that Feuerbach, in endeavouring to produce consciousness of just *this* fact, is going as far as a theorist possibly can, without ceasing to be a theorist and philosopher. It is characteristic, however, that Saint Bruno and Saint Max immediately put in place of the real communist Feuerbach's conception of the communist; they do this partly in order to be able to combat communism too as "spirit of the spirit", as a philosophical category, as an equal opponent and, in the case of Saint Bruno, also for pragmatic reasons.

As an example of Feuerbach's acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existing reality, which he still shares with our opponents, we recall the passage in the *Philosophie der Zukunft* where he develops the view that the being of a thing or a man is at the same time its or his essence,^a that the determinate conditions of existence, the mode of life and activity of an animal or human individual are those in which its "essence" feels itself satisfied. Here every exception is expressly conceived as an unhappy chance, as an abnormality which cannot be altered. Thus if millions of proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their "being" [29] does not in the least correspond to their "essence", then, according to the passage quoted, this is an unavoidable misfortune, which must be borne quietly. These millions of proletarians or communists, however, think quite differently and will prove this in time, when they bring their "being" into harmony with their "essence" in a practical way, by means of a revolution. Feuerbach, therefore, never speaks of the world of man in such cases, but always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in *nature* which has not yet been subdued by men. But every new invention, every advance made by industry, detaches another piece from this domain, so that the ground which produces examples illustrating such Feuerbachian propositions is steadily shrinking. The "essence" of the fish is its "being", water—to go no further than this one proposition. The "essence" of the freshwater fish is the water of a river. But the latter ceases to be the "essence" of the fish and is no longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the

^a Cf. this volume, p. 13.—*Ed.*

fish of its medium of existence. The explanation that all such contradictions are inevitable abnormalities does not essentially differ from the consolation which Saint Max Stirner offers to the discontented, saying that this contradiction is their own contradiction and this predicament their own predicament, whereupon they should either set their minds at ease, keep their disgust to themselves, or revolt against it in some fantastic way. It differs just as little from Saint Bruno's allegation that these unfortunate circumstances are due to the fact that those concerned are stuck in the muck of "substance", have not advanced to "absolute self-consciousness", and do not realise that these adverse conditions are spirit of their spirit.^a

[III]

[1. THE RULING CLASS AND THE RULING IDEAS. HOW THE HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF THE DOMINATION OF THE SPIRIT IN HISTORY AROSE]

[30] The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an historical epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for domination and where, therefore, domination is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law".

The division of labour, which we already saw above (pp. [15-18])^b as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in

^a Bruno Bauer, "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs".—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 44-48.—*Ed.*

the ruling class as the division of mental and [31] material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, but whenever a practical collision occurs in which the class itself is endangered they automatically vanish, in which case there also vanishes the appearance of the ruling ideas being not the ideas of the ruling class and having a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class; about the premises of the latter sufficient has already been said above (pp. [18-19, 22-23]).^a

If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, then we can say, for instance, that during the time the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against [32] the phenomenon that ever more abstract ideas hold sway, i.e., ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a *class*, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.* It can do this

* [Marginal note by Marx:] (Universality corresponds to 1) the class versus the estate, 2) the competition, world intercourse, etc., 3) the great numerical strength

^a See this volume, pp. 48-49 and 52-53.—*Ed.*

because initially its interest really is as yet mostly connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now enables these individuals to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the rule of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only insofar as they became bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves domination only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously; on the other hand the opposition of the non-ruling class to the new ruling class then develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, has as its aim a more decisive and more radical negation of the previous conditions of society than [33] all previous classes which sought to rule could have.

This whole appearance, that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the "general interest" as ruling.

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relations which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the Idea", the thought, etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to consider all these separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" of the Concept developing in history. It follows then naturally, too, that all the relations of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by speculative philosophy. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the *Geschichtsphilosophie*² that he "has considered the progress of the concept only" and has represented in history the "true theodicy" (p. 446). Now one can go back again to the producers of "the con-

of the ruling class, 4) the illusion of the common interests, in the beginning this illusion is true, 5) the delusion of the ideologists and the division of labour.)

² G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*.—Ed.

cept", to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see,²⁷ already expressed by Hegel.

The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confined to the following three attempts.

[34] No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as corporeal individuals, from these rulers, and thus recognise the rule of ideas or illusions in history.

No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical connection among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by regarding them as "forms of self-determination of the concept" (this is possible because by virtue of their empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as *mere* ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought).

No. 3. To remove the mystical appearance of this "self-determining concept" it is changed into a person—"self-consciousness"—or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the "concept" in history, into the "thinkers", the "philosophers", the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the "council of guardians", as the rulers.* Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been eliminated from history and now full rein can be given to the speculative steed.

This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be explained from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g., the illusions of the jurists, politicians (including the practical statesmen), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.

[35] Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper^a is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historiography has not yet won this trivial insight. It takes every epoch at its word and believes that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Man=the "thinking human spirit".

^a This word is in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

[IV]

[I. INSTRUMENTS OF PRODUCTION
AND FORMS OF PROPERTY]

[...]a [40] From the first point, there follows the premise of a highly developed division of labour and an extensive commerce; from the second, the locality. In the first case the individuals must have been brought together, in the second they are instruments of production alongside the given instrument of production.

Here, therefore, emerges the difference between natural instruments of production and those created by civilisation. The *field* (water, etc.) can be regarded as a natural instrument of production. In the first case, that of the natural instrument of production, individuals are subservient to nature; in the second, to a product of labour. In the first case, therefore, property (landed property) appears as direct natural domination, in the second, as domination of labour, particularly of accumulated labour, capital. The first case presupposes that the individuals are united by some bond: family, tribe, the land itself, etc.; the second, that they are independent of one another and are only held together by exchange. In the first case, what is involved is chiefly an exchange between men and nature in which the labour of the former is exchanged for the products of the latter; in the second, it is predominantly an exchange of men among themselves. In the first case, average human common sense is adequate—physical activity and mental activity are not yet separated; in the second, the division between physical and mental labour must already have been effected in practice. In the first case, the domination of the proprietor over the propertyless may be based on personal relations, on a kind of community; in the second, it must have taken on a material shape in a third party—money. In the first case, small-scale industry exists, but determined by the utilisation of the natural instrument of production and therefore without the distribution of labour among various individuals; in the second, industry exists only in and through the division of labour.

[41] Our investigation hitherto started from the instruments of production, and it has already shown that private property was a necessity for certain industrial stages. In *industrie extractive*²⁸ private property still coincides with labour; in small-scale industry and all agriculture up till now property is the necessary consequence of the existing instruments of production; the contradiction between the instrument of production and private property is only the product of

^a Four pages of the manuscript are missing.—Ed.

large-scale industry, which, moreover, must be highly developed to produce this contradiction. Thus only with large-scale industry does the abolition of private property become possible.

[2. THE DIVISION OF MATERIAL AND MENTAL LABOUR.
SEPARATION OF TOWN AND COUNTRY.
THE GUILD-SYSTEM]

The most important division of material and mental labour is the separation of town and country. The contradiction between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilisation, from tribe to state, from locality to nation, and runs through the whole history of civilisation to the present day (the Anti-Corn Law League²⁹).

The advent of the town implies, at the same time, the necessity of administration, police, taxes, etc., in short, of the municipality [*des Gemeindewesens*], and thus of politics in general. Here first became manifest the division of the population into two great classes, which is directly based on the division of labour and on the instruments of production. The town is in actual fact already the concentration of the population, of the instruments of production, of capital, of pleasures, of needs, while the country demonstrates just the opposite fact, isolation and separation. The contradiction between town and country can only exist within the framework of private property. It is the most crass expression of the subjection of the individual under the division of labour, under a definite activity forced upon him—a subjection which makes one man into a restricted town-animal, another into a restricted country-animal, and daily creates anew the conflict between their interests. Labour is here again the chief thing, power *over* individuals, and as long as this power exists, private property must exist. The abolition of the contradiction between town and country is one of the first conditions [42] of communal life, a condition which again depends on a mass of material premises and which cannot be fulfilled by the mere will, as anyone can see at the first glance. (These conditions have still to be set forth.) The separation of town and country can also be understood as the separation of capital and landed property, as the beginning of the existence and development of capital independent of landed property—the beginning of property having its basis only in labour and exchange.

In the towns which, in the Middle Ages, did not derive ready-made from an earlier period but were formed anew by the serfs who had

become free, the particular labour of each man was his only property apart from the small capital he brought with him, consisting almost solely of the most necessary tools of his craft. The competition of serfs constantly escaping into the town, the constant war of the country against the towns and thus the necessity of an organised municipal military force, the bond of common ownership in a particular kind of labour, the necessity of common buildings for the sale of their wares at a time when craftsmen were also traders, and the consequent exclusion of the unauthorised from these buildings, the conflict among the interests of the various crafts, the necessity of protecting their laboriously acquired skill, and the feudal organisation of the whole of the country: these were the causes of the union of the workers of each craft in guilds. In this context we do not have to go further into the manifold modifications of the guild-system, which arise through later historical developments. The flight of the serfs into the towns went on without interruption right through the Middle Ages. These serfs, persecuted by their lords in the country, came separately into the towns, where they found an organised community, against which they were powerless and in which they had to subject themselves to the station assigned to them by the demand for their labour and the interest of their organised urban competitors. These workers, entering separately, were never able to attain to any power, since, if their labour was of the guild type which had to be learned, the guildmasters bent them to their will and organised them according to their interest; or if their labour was not such as had to be learned, and therefore not of the guild type, they were day-labourers, never managed to organise, but remained an unorganised rabble. The need for day-labourers in the towns created the rabble.

These towns were true “unions”,³⁰ called forth by the direct [43] need of providing for the protection of property, and of multiplying the means of production and defence of the separate members. The rabble of these towns was devoid of any power, composed as it was of individuals strange to one another who had entered separately, and who stood unorganised over against an organised power, armed for war, and jealously watching over them. The journeymen and apprentices were organised in each craft as it best suited the interest of the masters. The patriarchal relations existing between them and their masters gave the latter a double power—on the one hand because of the direct influence they exerted on the whole life of the journeymen, and on the other because, for the journeymen who worked with the same master, it was a real bond which held them together against the journeymen of other masters and separated

them from these. And finally, the journeymen were bound to the existing order even by their interest in becoming masters themselves. While, therefore, the rabble at least carried out revolts against the whole municipal order, revolts which remained completely ineffective because of its powerlessness, the journeymen never got further than small acts of insubordination within separate guilds, such as belong to the very nature of the guild-system. The great risings of the Middle Ages all radiated from the country, but equally remained totally ineffective because of the isolation and consequent crudity of the peasants.³¹—

Capital in these towns was a naturally evolved capital, consisting of a house, the tools of the craft, and the natural, hereditary customers; and not being realisable, on account of the backwardness of intercourse and the lack of circulation, it had to be handed down from father to son. Unlike modern capital, which can be assessed in money and which may be indifferently invested in this thing or that, this capital was directly connected with the particular work of the owner, inseparable from it and to this extent *estate* capital.—

In the towns, the division of labour between the [44] individual guilds was as yet very little developed and, in the guilds themselves, it did not exist at all between the individual workers. Every workman had to be versed in a whole round of tasks, had to be able to make everything that was to be made with his tools. The limited intercourse and the weak ties between the individual towns, the lack of population and the narrow needs did not allow of a more advanced division of labour, and therefore every man who wished to become a master had to be proficient in the whole of his craft. Medieval craftsmen therefore had an interest in their special work and in proficiency in it, which was capable of rising to a limited artistic sense. For this very reason, however, every medieval craftsman was completely absorbed in his work, to which he had a complacent servile relationship, and in which he was involved to a far greater extent than the modern worker, whose work is a matter of indifference to him.—

[3. FURTHER DIVISION OF LABOUR,
SEPARATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY,
DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN THE VARIOUS TOWNS,
MANUFACTURE]

The next extension of the division of labour was the separation of production and intercourse, the formation of a special class of merchants; a separation which, in the towns bequeathed by a former

period, had been handed down (among other things with the Jews) and which very soon appeared in the newly formed ones. With this there was given the possibility of commercial communications transcending the immediate neighbourhood, a possibility the realisation of which depended on the existing means of communication, the state of public safety in the countryside, which was determined by political conditions (during the whole of the Middle Ages, as is well known, the merchants travelled in armed caravans), and on the cruder or more advanced needs (determined by the stage of culture attained) of the region accessible to intercourse.

With intercourse vested in a particular class, with the extension of trade through the merchants beyond the immediate surroundings of the town, there immediately appears a reciprocal action between production and intercourse. The towns enter into relations *with one another*, new tools are brought from one town into the other, and the separation between production and intercourse soon calls forth a new division of production between [45] the individual towns, each of which is soon exploiting a predominant branch of industry. The local restrictions of earlier times begin gradually to be broken down.—

It depends purely on the extension of intercourse whether the productive forces evolved in a locality, especially inventions, are lost for later development or not. As long as there exists no intercourse transcending the immediate neighbourhood, every invention must be made separately in each locality, and mere chances such as irruptions of barbaric peoples, even ordinary wars, are sufficient to cause a country with advanced productive forces and needs to have to start right over again from the beginning. In primitive history every invention had to be made daily anew and in each locality independently. That even with a relatively very extensive commerce, highly developed productive forces are not safe from complete destruction, is proved by the Phoenicians, whose inventions were for the most part lost for a long time to come through the ousting of this nation from commerce, its conquest by Alexander and its consequent decline. Likewise, for instance, glass staining in the Middle Ages. Only when intercourse has become world intercourse and has as its basis large-scale industry, when all nations are drawn into the competitive struggle, is the permanence of the acquired productive forces assured.—

The immediate consequence of the division of labour between the various towns was the rise of manufactures, branches of production which had outgrown the guild-system. Intercourse with foreign nations was the historical premise for the first flourishing of manufactures, in Italy and later in Flanders. In other countries,

England and France for example, manufactures were at first confined to the home market. Besides the premises already mentioned manufactures presuppose an already advanced concentration of population, particularly in the countryside, and of capital, which began to accumulate in the hands of individuals, partly in the guilds in spite of the guild regulations, partly among the merchants.

[46] The kind of labour which from the first presupposed machines, even of the crudest sort, soon showed itself the most capable of development. Weaving, earlier carried on in the country by the peasants as a secondary occupation to procure their clothing, was the first labour to receive an impetus and a further development through the extension of intercourse. Weaving was the first and remained the principal manufacture. The rising demand for clothing materials, consequent on the growth of population, the growing accumulation and mobilisation of natural capital through accelerated circulation, and the demand for luxuries called forth by this and favoured generally by the gradual extension of intercourse, gave weaving a quantitative and qualitative stimulus, which wrenched it out of the form of production hitherto existing. Alongside the peasants weaving for their own use, who continued, and still continue, with this sort of work, there emerged a new class of weavers in the towns, whose fabrics were destined for the whole home market and usually for foreign markets too.

Weaving, an occupation demanding in most cases little skill and soon splitting up into countless branches, by its whole nature resisted the trammels of the guild. Weaving was, therefore, carried on mostly in villages and market centres, without guild organisation, which gradually became towns, and indeed the most flourishing towns in each land.

With guild-free manufacture, property relations also quickly changed. The first advance beyond naturally derived estate capital was provided by the rise of merchants, whose capital was from the beginning movable, capital in the modern sense as far as one can speak of it, given the circumstances of those times. The second advance came with manufacture, which again mobilised a mass of natural capital, and altogether increased the mass of movable capital as against that of natural capital.

At the same time, manufacture became a refuge of the peasants from the guilds which excluded them or paid them badly, just as earlier the guild-towns had served the peasants as a refuge [47] from the landlords.—

Simultaneously with the beginning of manufactures there was a period of vagabondage caused by the abolition of the feudal bodies

of retainers, the disbanding of the armies consisting of a motley crowd that served the kings against their vassals, the improvement of agriculture, and the transformation of large strips of tillage into pasture land. From this alone it is clear that this vagabondage is strictly connected with the disintegration of the feudal system. As early as the thirteenth century we find isolated epochs of this kind, but only at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth does this vagabondage make a general and permanent appearance. These vagabonds, who were so numerous that, for instance, Henry VIII of England had 72,000 of them hanged,³² were only prevailed upon to work with the greatest difficulty and through the most extreme necessity, and then only after long resistance. The rapid rise of manufactures, particularly in England, absorbed them gradually.—

With the advent of manufacture the various nations entered into competitive relations, a commercial struggle, which was fought out in wars, protective duties and prohibitions, whereas earlier the nations, insofar as they were connected at all, had carried on an inoffensive exchange with each other. Trade had from now on a political significance.

With the advent of manufacture the relations between worker and employer changed. In the guilds the patriarchal relations between journeyman and master continued to exist; in manufacture their place was taken by the monetary relations between worker and capitalist—relations which in the countryside and in small towns retained a patriarchal tinge, but in the larger, the real manufacturing towns, quite early lost almost all patriarchal complexion.

Manufacture and the movement of production in general received an enormous impetus through the extension of intercourse which came with the discovery of America and the sea-route to the East Indies. The new products imported thence, particularly the masses of gold and silver which came into circulation, had totally changed the position of the classes towards one another, dealing a hard blow to feudal landed property and to the workers; the expeditions of adventurers, colonisation, and above all the extension of markets into a world market, which had now become possible and was daily becoming more and more a fact, called forth a new phase [48] of historical development, into which in general we need not here enter further. Through the colonisation of the newly discovered countries the commercial struggle of the nations against one another was given new fuel and accordingly greater extension and animosity.

The expansion of commerce and manufacture accelerated the accumulation of movable capital, while in the guilds, which were not

stimulated to extend their production, natural capital remained stationary or even declined. Commerce and manufacture created the big bourgeoisie; in the guilds was concentrated the petty bourgeoisie, which no longer was dominant in the towns as formerly, but had to bow to the might of the great merchants and manufacturers.* Hence the decline of the guilds, as soon as they came into contact with manufacture.

The relations between nations in their intercourse took on two different forms in the epoch of which we have been speaking. At first the small quantity of gold and silver in circulation occasioned the ban on the export of these metals; and industry, made necessary by the need for employing the growing urban population and for the most part imported from abroad, could not do without privileges which could be granted not only, of course, against home competition, but chiefly against foreign. The local guild privilege was in these original prohibitions extended over the whole nation. Customs duties originated from the tributes which the feudal lords exacted from merchants passing through their territories as protection money against robbery, tributes later imposed likewise by the towns, and which, with the rise of the modern states, were the Treasury's most obvious means of raising money.

The appearance of American gold and silver on the European markets, the gradual development of industry, the rapid expansion of trade and the consequent rise of the non-guild bourgeoisie and the increasing importance of money, gave these measures another significance. The state, which was daily less and less able to do without money, now retained the ban on the export of gold and silver out of fiscal considerations; the bourgeois, for whom these quantities of money which were hurled on to the market became the chief object of speculative buying, were thoroughly content with this; privileges established earlier became a source of income for the government and were sold for money; in the customs legislation there appeared export duties which, since they only hampered industry, [49] had a purely fiscal aim.—

The second period began in the middle of the seventeenth century and lasted almost to the end of the eighteenth. Commerce and navigation had expanded more rapidly than manufacture, which played a secondary role; the colonies were becoming considerable consumers; and after long struggles the various nations shared out the opening world market among themselves. This period begins with the Navigation Laws³³ and colonial monopolies. The competi-

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Petty bourgeoisie—Middle class—Big bourgeoisie.

tion of the nations among themselves was excluded as far as possible by tariffs, prohibitions and treaties; and in the last resort the competitive struggle was carried on and decided by wars (especially naval wars). The mightiest maritime nation, the English, retained preponderance in commerce and manufacture. Here, already, we find concentration in one country.

Manufacture was all the time sheltered by protective duties in the home market, by monopolies in the colonial market, and abroad as much as possible by differential duties. The working-up of home-produced material was encouraged (wool and linen in England, silk in France), the export of home-produced raw material forbidden (wool in England), and the [working-up] of imported raw material neglected or suppressed (cotton in England). The nation dominant in maritime trade and colonial power naturally secured for itself also the greatest quantitative and qualitative expansion of manufacture. Manufacture could not be carried on without protection, since, if the slightest change takes place in other countries, it can lose its market and be ruined; under reasonably favourable conditions it may easily be introduced into a country, but for this very reason can easily be destroyed. At the same time through the mode in which it is carried on, particularly in the eighteenth century in the countryside, it is to such an extent interwoven with the conditions of life of a great mass of individuals, that no country dare jeopardise their existence by permitting free competition. Consequently, insofar as manufacture manages to export, it depends entirely on the extension or restriction of commerce, and exercises a relatively very small reaction [on the latter]. Hence its secondary [role] and the influence of [the merchants] in the eighteenth century. [50] It was the merchants and especially the shipowners who more than anybody else pressed for state protection and monopolies; the manufacturers also demanded and indeed received protection, but all the time were inferior in political importance to the merchants. The commercial towns, particularly the maritime towns, became to some extent civilised and acquired the outlook of the big bourgeoisie, but in the factory towns an extreme petty-bourgeois outlook persisted. Cf. Aikin, etc.^a The eighteenth century was the century of trade. Pinto says this expressly: "*Le commerce fait la marotte du siècle*";^b

^a John Aikin, *A Description of the Country from Thirty to Forty Miles round Manchester*.—Ed.

^b "Commerce is the rage of the century." Isaac Pinto, "Lettre sur la jalousie du commerce" (published in Pinto's book *Traité de la circulation et du crédit*).—Ed.

and: "*depuis quelque temps il n'est plus question que de commerce, de navigation et de marine.*"^a

The movement of capital, although considerably accelerated, still remained, however, relatively slow. The splitting-up of the world market into separate parts, each of which was exploited by a particular nation, the prevention of competition between the different nations, the clumsiness of production and the fact that finance was only evolving from its early stages, greatly impeded circulation. The consequence of this was a haggling, mean and niggardly spirit which still clung to all merchants and to the whole mode of carrying on trade. Compared with the manufacturers, and above all with the craftsmen, they were certainly big bourgeois; compared with the merchants and industrialists of the next period they remain petty bourgeois. Cf. Adam Smith.^b—

This period is also characterised by the cessation of the bans on the export of gold and silver and the beginning of money trade, banks, national debts, paper money, speculation in stocks and shares, stockjobbing in all articles and the development of finance in general. Again capital lost a great part of the natural character which had still clung to it.

[4. MOST EXTENSIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR. LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY]

The concentration of trade and manufacture in one country, England, developing irresistibly in the seventeenth century, gradually created for this country a relative world market, and thus a demand for the manufactured products of this country which could no longer be met by the industrial productive forces hitherto existing. This demand, outgrowing the productive forces, was the motive power which, by producing large-scale industry—the application of elemental forces to industrial ends, machinery and the most extensive division of labour—called into existence the third [51] period of private property since the Middle Ages. There already existed in England the other preconditions of this new phase: freedom of competition inside the nation, the development of theoretical mechanics, etc. (indeed, mechanics, perfected by Newton, was altogether the most popular science in France and England in the eighteenth century). (Free competition inside the nation itself had

^a "For some time now people have been talking only about commerce, navigation and the navy" (*ibid.*).—*Ed.*

^b Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.*—*Ed.*

everywhere to be won by a revolution—1640 and 1688 in England, 1789 in France.)

Competition soon compelled every country that wished to retain its historical role to protect its manufactures by renewed customs regulations (the old duties were no longer any good against large-scale industry) and soon after to introduce large-scale industry under protective duties. In spite of these protective measures large-scale industry universalised competition (it is practical free trade; the protective duty is only a palliative, a measure of defence *within* free trade), established means of communication and the modern world market, subordinated trade to itself, transformed all capital into industrial capital, and thus produced the rapid circulation (development of the financial system) and the centralisation of capital. By universal competition it forced all individuals to strain their energy to the utmost. It destroyed as far as possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and, where it could not do this, made them into a palpable lie. It produced world history for the first time, insofar as it made all civilised nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations. It made natural science subservient to capital and took from the division of labour the last semblance of its natural character. It altogether destroyed the natural character, as far as this is possible with regard to labour, and resolved all natural relations into money relations. In the place of naturally grown towns it created the modern, large industrial cities which have sprung up overnight. It destroyed the crafts and all earlier stages of industry wherever it gained mastery. It completed the victory of the town over the country. Its [basis] is the automatic system. It produced a mass of productive forces, for which private property became just as much a fetter [52] as the guild had been for manufacture and the small, rural workshop for the developing handicrafts. These productive forces receive under the system of private property a one-sided development only, and for the majority they become destructive forces; moreover, a great many of these forces can find no application at all within the system of private property. Generally speaking, large-scale industry created everywhere the same relations between the classes of society, and thus destroyed the peculiar features of the various nationalities. And finally, while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate national interests, large-scale industry created a class which in all nations has the same interest and for which nationality is already dead; a class which is really rid of all the old world and at the same time stands pitted

against it. For the worker it makes not only his relation to the capitalist, but labour itself, unbearable.

It is evident that large-scale industry does not reach the same level of development in all districts of a country. This does not, however, retard the class movement of the proletariat, because the proletarians created by large-scale industry assume leadership of this movement and carry the whole mass along with them, and because the workers excluded from large-scale industry are placed by it in a still worse situation than the workers in large-scale industry itself. The countries in which large-scale industry is developed act in a similar manner upon the more or less non-industrial countries, insofar as the latter are swept by world intercourse into the universal competitive struggle.

* * *

These different forms [of production] are just so many forms of the organisation of labour, and hence of property. In each period a unification of the existing productive forces takes place, insofar as this has been rendered necessary by needs.

[5. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES
AND THE FORM OF INTERCOURSE AS THE BASIS
OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION]

The contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse, which, as we saw, has occurred several times in past history, without, however, endangering its basis, necessarily on each occasion burst out in a revolution, taking on at the same time various subsidiary forms, such as all-embracing collisions, collisions of various classes, contradictions of consciousness, battle of ideas, political struggle, etc. From a narrow point of view one may isolate one of these subsidiary forms and consider it as the basis of these revolutions; and this is all the more easy as the individuals who started the revolutions had illusions about their own activity according to their degree of culture and the stage of historical development.

Thus all collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form [53] of intercourse. Incidentally, to lead to collisions in a

country, this contradiction need not necessarily have reached its extreme limit in that particular country. The competition with industrially more advanced countries, brought about by the expansion of international intercourse, is sufficient to produce a similar contradiction in countries with a less advanced industry (e.g., the latent proletariat in Germany brought into more prominence by the competition of English industry).

[6. COMPETITION OF INDIVIDUALS
AND THE FORMATION OF CLASSES.
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR CONDITIONS
OF LIFE. THE ILLUSORY COMMUNITY
OF INDIVIDUALS IN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY AND THE REAL UNION
OF INDIVIDUALS UNDER COMMUNISM.
SUBORDINATION OF THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF LIFE
TO THE POWER OF THE UNITED INDIVIDUALS]

Competition separates individuals from one another, not only the bourgeois but still more the workers, in spite of the fact that it brings them together. Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite, apart from the fact that for the purpose of this union—if it is not to be merely local!—the necessary means, the big industrial cities and cheap and quick communications, have first to be produced by large-scale industry. Hence every organised power standing over against these isolated individuals, who live in conditions daily reproducing this isolation, can only be overcome after long struggles. To demand the opposite would be tantamount to demanding that competition should not exist in this definite epoch of history, or that the individuals should banish from their minds conditions over which in their isolation they have no control.

The building of houses. With savages each family has as a matter of course its own cave or hut like the separate family tent of the nomads. This separate domestic economy is made only the more necessary by the further development of private property. With the agricultural peoples a communal domestic economy is just as impossible as a communal cultivation of the soil. A great advance was the building of towns. In all previous periods, however, the abolition [*Aufhebung*]^a of individual economy, which is inseparable from the

^a *Aufhebung*—a term used by Hegel to denote the negation of an old form while preserving its positive content in the new, which supersedes it.—*Ed.*

abolition of private property, was impossible for the simple reason that the material conditions required were not present. The setting up of a communal domestic economy presupposes the development of machinery, the use of natural forces and of many other productive forces—e.g., of water-supplies, [54] gas-lighting, steam-heating, etc., the supersession [*Aufhebung*] of town and country. Without these conditions a communal economy would not in itself form a new productive force; it would lack material basis and rest on a purely theoretical foundation, in other words, it would be a mere freak and would amount to nothing more than a monastic economy.—What was possible can be seen in the towns brought into existence by concentration and in the construction of communal buildings for various definite purposes (prisons, barracks, etc.). That the supersession of individual economy is inseparable from the supersession of the family is self-evident.

(The statement which frequently occurs with Saint Sancho that each man is all that he is through the state^a is fundamentally the same as the statement that the bourgeois is only a specimen of the bourgeois species; a statement which presupposes that the bourgeois class existed before the individuals constituting it.*)

In the Middle Ages the citizens in each town were compelled to unite against the landed nobility to defend themselves. The extension of trade, the establishment of communications, led separate towns to establish contacts with other towns, which had asserted the same interests in the struggle with the same antagonist. Out of the many local communities of citizens in the various towns there arose only gradually the middle class. The conditions of life of the individual citizens became—on account of their contradiction to the existing relations and of the mode of labour determined by this—conditions which were common to them all and independent of each individual. The citizens created these conditions insofar as they had torn themselves free from feudal ties, and were in their turn created by them insofar as they were determined by their antagonism to the feudal system which they found in existence. With the setting up of intercommunications between the individual towns, these common conditions developed into class conditions. The same conditions, the same contradiction, the same interests were bound to call forth on the

* [Marginal note by Marx:] With the philosophers *pre-existence* of the class.

^a Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*.—Ed.

whole similar customs everywhere. The bourgeoisie itself develops only gradually together with its conditions, splits according to the division of labour into various sections and finally absorbs all propertied classes it finds in existence* (while it develops the majority of the earlier propertyless and a part of the hitherto propertied classes into a new class, the proletariat) in the measure to which all property found in existence is transformed into industrial or commercial capital.

The separate individuals form a class only insofar as [55] they have to carry on a common battle against another class; in other respects they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in its turn assumes an independent existence as against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of life predetermined, and have their position in life and hence their personal development assigned to them by their class, thus becoming subsumed under it. This is the same phenomenon as the subjection of the separate individuals to the division of labour and can only be removed by the abolition of private property and of labour^a itself. We have already indicated several times that this subsuming of individuals under the class brings with it their subjection to all kinds of ideas, etc.

If this development of individuals, which proceeds within the common conditions of existence of estates and classes, historically following one another, and the general conceptions thereby forced upon them—if this development is considered from a *philosophical* point of view, it is certainly very easy to imagine that in these individuals the species, or man, has evolved, or that they evolved man—and in this way one can give history some hard clouts on the ear. One can then conceive these various estates and classes to be specific terms of the general expression, subordinate varieties of the species, or evolutionary phases of man.

This subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished until a class has evolved which has no longer any particular class interest to assert against a ruling class.

The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relations) into material powers, cannot be dispelled by

* [Marginal note by Marx:] To begin with, it absorbs the branches of labour directly belonging to the state and then all[±][more or less] ideological professions.

^a Regarding the meaning of "abolition of labour" (*Aufhebung der Arbeit*) see this volume, pp. 52-53, 80, 85-89.—Ed.

dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labour.* This is not possible without the community. Only within the community has each individual [56] the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community. In the previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc., personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed under the conditions of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community in which individuals have up till now combined always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and since it was the combination of one class over against another, it was at the same time for the oppressed class not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.

Individuals have always proceeded from themselves, but of course from themselves within their given historical conditions and relations, not from the "pure" individual in the sense of the ideologists. But in the course of historical development, and precisely through the fact that within the division of labour social relations inevitably take on an independent existence, there appears a cleavage in the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labour and the conditions pertaining to it. (We do not mean it to be understood from this that, for example, the rentier, the capitalist, etc., cease to be persons; but their personality is conditioned and determined by quite definite class relations, and the cleavage appears only in their opposition to another class and, for themselves, only when they go bankrupt.) In the estate (and even more in the tribe) this is as yet concealed: for instance, a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always a commoner, a quality inseparable from his individuality irrespective of his other relations. The difference between the private individual and the class individual, the accidental nature of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. This accidental character as such is only engendered and developed [57] by competition and the struggle of individuals among themselves. Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the

* [Marginal note by Engels:] (Feuerbach: being and essence). [Cf. this volume, pp. 58-59.]—*Ed.*

bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces. The difference from the estate comes out particularly in the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. When the estate of the urban burghers, the corporations, etc., emerged in opposition to the landed nobility, their condition of existence—movable property and craft labour, which had already existed latently before their separation from the feudal institutions—appeared as something positive, which was asserted against feudal landed property, and, therefore, in its own way at first took on a feudal form. Certainly the fugitive serfs treated their previous servitude as something extraneous to their personality. But here they only were doing what every class that is freeing itself from a fetter does; and they did not free themselves as a class but individually. Moreover, they did not break loose from the system of estates, but only formed a new estate, retaining their previous mode of labour even in their new situation, and developing it further by freeing it from its earlier fetters, which no longer corresponded to the development already attained.

For the proletarians, on the other hand, the condition of their life, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence of modern society, have become something extraneous, something over which they, as separate individuals, have no control, and over which no *social* organisation can give them control. The contradiction between the individuality of each separate proletarian and labour, the condition of life forced upon him, becomes evident to him, for he is sacrificed from youth onwards and, within his own class, has no chance of arriving at the conditions which would place him in the other class.—

[58] NB. It must not be forgotten that the serf's very need of existing and the impossibility of a large-scale economy involved the distribution of allotments^a among the serfs and very soon reduced the services of the serfs to their lord to an average of payments in kind and labour-services. This made it possible for the serf to accumulate movable property and hence facilitated his escape from his lord and gave him the prospect of making his way as a townsman; it also created gradations among the serfs, so that the runaway serfs were already half burghers. It is likewise obvious that the serfs who were versed in a craft had the best chance of acquiring movable property.—

^a This word is in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

Thus, while the fugitive serfs only wished to have full scope to develop and assert those conditions of existence which were already there, and hence, in the end, only arrived at free labour, the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, have to abolish the hitherto prevailing condition of their existence (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to then), namely, labour. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the state; in order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the state.

It follows from all we have been saying up till now that* the communal relation into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests as against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged only as average individuals, only insofar as they lived within the conditions of existence of their class—a relation in which they participated not as individuals but as members of a class. With the community of revolutionary proletarians, on the other hand, who take their conditions [59] of existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. For it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control—conditions which were previously left to chance and had acquired an independent existence over against the separate individuals precisely because of their separation as individuals and because their inevitable association, which was determined by the division of labour, had, as a result of their separation, become for them an alien bond. Up till now association (by no means an arbitrary one, such as is expounded for example in the *Contrat social*,^a but a necessary one) was simply an agreement about those conditions, within which the individuals were free to enjoy the freaks of fortune (compare, e.g., the formation of the North American state and the South American republics). This right to the undisturbed enjoyment,

* [The following is crossed out in the manuscript:] the individuals who freed themselves in any historical epoch merely developed further the conditions of existence which were already present and which they found in existence.

^a Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social*.—Ed.

within certain conditions, of fortuity and chance has up till now been called personal freedom.—These conditions of existence are, of course, only the productive forces and forms of intercourse at any particular time.

Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals. Its organisation is, therefore, essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality which communism creates is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals. Thus the Communists in practice treat the conditions created up to now by production and intercourse as inorganic conditions, without, however, imagining that it was the plan or the destiny of previous generations to give them material, and without believing that these conditions were inorganic for the individuals creating them.

[7. CONTRADICTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
AND THEIR CONDITIONS OF LIFE AS CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES AND THE FORM
OF INTERCOURSE. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES
AND THE CHANGING FORMS OF INTERCOURSE]

[60] The difference between the individual as a person and whatever is extraneous to him is not a conceptual difference but a historical fact. This distinction has a different significance at different times—e.g., the estate as something extraneous to the individual in the eighteenth century, and so too, more or less, the family. It is not a distinction that we have to make for each age, but one which each age itself makes from among the different elements which it finds in existence, and indeed not according to any idea, but compelled by material collisions in life.

What appears accidental to a later age as opposed to an earlier—and this applies also to the elements handed down by an earlier age—is a form of intercourse which corresponded to a definite

stage of development of the productive forces. The relation of the productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or activity of the individuals. (The fundamental form of this activity is, of course, material, on which depend all other forms—mental, political, religious, etc. The different forms of material life are, of course, in every case dependent on the needs which are already developed, and the production, as well as the satisfaction, of these needs is an historical process, which is not found in the case of a sheep or a dog (Stirner's refractory principal argument^a *adversus hominem*), although sheep and dogs in their present form certainly, but in spite of themselves, are products of an historical process). The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other, so long as this contradiction is absent, are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which alone these definite individuals, living under definite relations, can produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity.* The definite condition under which they produce thus corresponds, as long as [61] the contradiction has not yet appeared, to the reality of their conditioned nature, their one-sided existence, the one-sidedness of which only becomes evident when the contradiction enters on the scene and thus exists solely for those who live later. Then this condition appears as an accidental fetter, and the consciousness that it is a fetter is imputed to the earlier age as well.

These various conditions, which appear first as conditions of self-activity, later as fetters upon it, form in the whole development of history a coherent series of forms of intercourse, the coherence of which consists in this: an earlier form of intercourse, which has become a fetter, is replaced by a new one corresponding to the more developed productive forces and, hence, to the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals—a form which in its turn becomes a fetter and is then replaced by another. Since these conditions correspond at every stage to the simultaneous development of the productive forces, their history is at the same time the history of the evolving productive forces taken over by each new generation, and is therefore the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Production of the form of intercourse itself.

^a Cf. Max Stirner. "Recensenten Stirners", and also this volume, pp. 95-96.—*Ed.*

Since this development takes place spontaneously, i.e., is not subordinated to a general plan of freely combined individuals, it proceeds from various localities, tribes, nations, branches of labour, etc., each of which to start with develops independently of the others and only gradually enters into relation with the others. Furthermore, this development proceeds only very slowly; the various stages and interests are never completely overcome, but only subordinated to the prevailing interest and trail along beside the latter for centuries afterwards. It follows from this that even within a nation the individuals, even apart from their pecuniary circumstances, have quite diverse developments, and that an earlier interest, the peculiar form of intercourse of which has already been ousted by that belonging to a later interest, remains for a long time afterwards in possession of a traditional power in the illusory community (state, law), which has won an existence independent of the individuals; a power which in the last resort can only be broken by a revolution. This explains why, with reference to individual points [62] which allow of a more general summing-up, consciousness can sometimes appear further advanced than the contemporary empirical conditions, so that in the struggles of a later epoch one can refer to earlier theoreticians as authorities.

On the other hand, in countries like North America, which start from scratch in an already advanced historical epoch, the development proceeds very rapidly. Such countries have no other natural premises than the individuals who have settled there and were led to do so because the forms of intercourse of the old countries did not correspond to their requirements. Thus they begin with the most advanced individuals of the old countries, and, therefore, with the correspondingly most advanced form of intercourse, even before this form of intercourse has been able to establish itself in the old countries. This is the case with all colonies, insofar as they are not mere military or trading stations. Carthage, the Greek colonies, and Iceland in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, provide examples of this. A similar relationship issues from conquest, when a form of intercourse which has evolved on another soil is brought over complete to the conquered country: whereas in its home it was still encumbered with interests and relations left over from earlier periods, here it can and must be established completely and without hindrance, if only to assure the conquerors' lasting power. (England and Naples after the Norman conquest,³⁴ when they received the most perfect form of feudal organisation.)

[8. THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE (CONQUEST) IN HISTORY]

This whole conception of history appears to be contradicted by the fact of conquest. Up till now violence, war, pillage, murder and robbery, etc., have been accepted as the driving force of history. Here we must limit ourselves to the chief points and take, therefore, only the most striking example—the destruction of an old civilisation by a barbarous people and the resulting formation of an entirely new organisation of society. (Rome and the barbarians; feudalism and Gaul; the Byzantine Empire and the Turks.)

[63] With the conquering barbarian people war itself is still, as indicated above,^a a regular form of intercourse, which is the more eagerly exploited as the increase in population together with the traditional and, for it, the only possible crude mode of production gives rise to the need for new means of production. In Italy, on the other hand, the concentration of landed property (caused not only by buying-up and indebtedness but also by inheritance, since loose living being rife and marriage rare, the old families gradually died out and their possessions fell into the hands of a few) and its conversion into grazing-land (caused not only by the usual economic factors still operative today but by the importation of plundered and tribute corn and the resultant lack of demand for Italian corn) brought about the almost total disappearance of the free population; the slaves died out again and again, and had constantly to be replaced by new ones. Slavery remained the basis of the entire production process. The plebeians, midway between freemen and slaves, never succeeded in becoming more than a proletarian rabble. Rome indeed never became more than a city; its connection with the provinces was almost exclusively political and could, therefore, easily be broken again by political events.

Nothing is more common than the notion that in history up till now it has only been a question of *taking*. The barbarians *take* the Roman Empire, and this fact of taking is made to explain the transition from the old world to the feudal system. In this taking by barbarians, however, the question is whether the nation which is conquered has evolved industrial productive forces, as is the case with modern peoples, or whether its productive forces are based for

^a Probably a reference to one of the missing pages of the manuscript (see this volume, p. 63). A similar idea is expressed in the clean copy; see this volume, p. 34.—*Ed.*

the most part merely on their concentration and on the community. Taking is further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune, consisting of paper, cannot be taken at all without the taker's submitting to the conditions of production and intercourse of the country taken. Similarly the total industrial capital of a modern industrial country. And finally, everywhere there is very soon an end to taking, and when there is nothing more to take, you have to set about producing. From this necessity of producing, which very soon asserts itself, it follows [64] that the form of community adopted by the settling conquerors must correspond to the stage of development of the productive forces they find in existence; or, if this is not the case from the start, it must change according to the productive forces. This, too, explains the fact, which people profess to have noticed everywhere in the period following the migration of the peoples, namely that the servant was master, and that the conquerors very soon took over language, culture and manners from the conquered.

The feudal system was by no means brought complete from Germany, but had its origin, as far as the conquerors were concerned, in the martial organisation of the army during the actual conquest, and this evolved only after the conquest into the feudal system proper through the action of the productive forces found in the conquered countries. To what an extent this form was determined by the productive forces is shown by the abortive attempts to realise other forms derived from reminiscences of ancient Rome (Charlemagne, etc.).

To be continued.—

[9. CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES
AND THE FORM OF INTERCOURSE UNDER THE CONDITIONS
OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY AND FREE COMPETITION.
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN LABOUR AND CAPITAL]

In large-scale industry and competition the whole mass of conditions of existence, limitations, biases of individuals, are fused together into the two simplest forms: private property and labour. With money every form of intercourse, and intercourse itself, becomes fortuitous for the individuals. Thus money implies that all intercourse up till now was only intercourse of individuals under particular conditions, not of individuals as individuals. These conditions are reduced to two: accumulated labour or private

property, and actual labour. If both or one of these ceases, then intercourse comes to a standstill. The modern economists themselves, e.g., Sismondi, Cherbuliez, etc., oppose *association des individus* to *association des capitaux*.^a On the other hand, the individuals themselves are entirely subordinated to the division of labour and hence are brought into the most complete dependence on one another. Private property, insofar as within labour it confronts labour, evolves out of the necessity of accumulation, and is in the beginning still mainly a communal form, but in its further development it approaches more and more the modern form of private property. The division of labour implies from the outset the division of the *conditions* of labour, of tools and materials, and thus the fragmentation of accumulated capital among different owners, and thus, also, the fragmentation between capital and labour, and the different forms of property itself. The more the division of labour develops [65] and accumulation grows, the further fragmentation develops. Labour itself can only exist on the premise of this fragmentation.

(Personal energy of the individuals of various nations—Germans and Americans—energy even as a result of miscegenation—hence the cretinism of the Germans; in France, England, etc., foreign peoples transplanted to an already developed soil, in America to an entirely new soil; in Germany the indigenous population quietly stayed where it was.)

Thus two facts are here revealed.* First the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals; the reason for this is that the individuals, whose forces they are, exist split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the other hand, these forces are only real forces in the intercourse and association of these individuals. Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a material form and are for the individuals themselves no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property, and hence of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property. Never, in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the

* [Marginal note by Engels:] Sismondi.

^a Antoine Elvisée Cherbuliez, *Riche ou Pauvre*.—Ed.

intercourse of individuals *as* individuals, because their intercourse itself was still a restricted one. On the other hand, standing against these productive forces, we have the majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away, and who, robbed thus of all real life-content, have become abstract individuals, who are, however, by this very fact put into a position to enter into relation with one another *as individuals*.

Labour, the only connection which still links them with the productive forces and with their own existence, has lost all semblance of self-activity and only sustains their [66] life by stunting it. While in the earlier periods self-activity and the production of material life were separated since they devolved on different persons, and while, on account of the narrowness of the individuals themselves, the production of material life was considered a subordinate mode of self-activity, they now diverge to such an extent that material life appears as the end, and what produces this material life, labour (which is now the only possible but, as we see, negative form of self-activity), as the means.

[10. THE NECESSITY, PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE ABOLITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY]

Thus things have now come to such a pass that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence.

This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. Even from this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.

This appropriation is further determined by the persons appropriating. Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the development of a totality of capacities entailed by this. All earlier revolutionary

appropriations were restricted; individuals, whose self-activity was restricted by a crude instrument of production and a limited intercourse, appropriated this crude instrument [67] of production, and hence merely achieved a new state of limitation. Their instrument of production became their property, but they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production. In all appropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all.

This appropriation is further determined by the manner in which it must be effected. It can only be effected through a union, which by the character of the proletariat itself can again only be a universal one, and through a revolution, in which, on the one hand, the power of the earlier mode of production and intercourse and social organisation is overthrown, and, on the other hand, there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, which are required to accomplish the appropriation, and the proletariat moreover rids itself of everything that still clings to it from its previous position in society.

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations. The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the previously limited intercourse into the intercourse of individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces by the united individuals, private property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and each person's particular way of gaining his livelihood have themselves become accidental.

The individuals, who are no longer [68] subject to the division of labour, have been conceived by the philosophers as an ideal, under the name "man", and the whole process which we have outlined has been regarded by them as the evolutionary process of "man", so that at every historical stage "man" was substituted for the individuals existing hitherto and shown as the motive force of history. The whole process was thus conceived as a process of the self-estrangement [*Selbstentfremdungsprozess*] of "man",* and this was essentially

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Self-estrangement.

due to the fact that the average individual of the later stage was always foisted on to the earlier stage, and the consciousness of a later age on to the individuals of an earlier. Through this inversion, which from the first disregards the actual conditions, it was possible to transform the whole of history into an evolutionary process of consciousness.

* * *

Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the state and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its external relations as nationality and internally must organise itself as state. The term "civil society"³⁵ emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relations had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval community. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and intercourse, which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the rest of the idealistic^a superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name.

[11.] THE RELATION OF STATE AND LAW TO PROPERTY

The first form of property, in the ancient world as in the Middle Ages, is tribal property, determined with the Romans chiefly by war, with the [69] Germans by the rearing of cattle. In the case of the ancient peoples, since several tribes live together in one city, tribal property appears as state property, and the right of the individual to it as mere "possession" which, however, like tribal property as a whole, is confined to landed property only. Real private property began with the ancients, as with modern nations, with movable property. (Slavery and community) (*dominium ex jure Quiritum*^b).—In the case of the nations which grew out of the Middle Ages, tribal property evolved through various stages—feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture—to modern capital, determined by large-scale industry and universal competition, i.e., pure private property, which has cast

^a I. e., ideal, ideological.—*Ed.*

^b Ownership in accordance with the law applying to full Roman citizens.—*Ed.*

off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the state from any influence on the development of property. To this modern private property corresponds the modern state, which, purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of government securities on the stock exchange. By the mere fact that it is a *class* and no longer an *estate*, the bourgeoisie is forced to organise itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its average interests. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the state has become a separate entity, alongside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests. The independence of the state is only found nowadays in those countries where the estates have not yet completely developed into classes, where the estates, done away with in more advanced countries, still play a part and there exists a mixture, where consequently no section of the population can achieve dominance over the others. This is the case particularly in Germany. The most perfect example of the modern state is North [70] America. The modern French, English and American writers all express the opinion that the state exists only for the sake of private property, so that this view has also been generally accepted by the average man.

Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised, it follows that all common institutions are set up with the help of the state and are given a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis—on *free* will. Similarly, justice is in its turn reduced to statute law.

Civil law develops simultaneously with private property out of the disintegration of the natural community. With the Romans the development of private property and civil law had no further industrial and commercial consequences, because their whole mode of production did not alter.* With modern peoples, where the feudal community was disintegrated by industry and trade, there began with the rise of private property and civil law a new phase, which was capable of further development. The very first town which carried

* [Marginal note by Engels:] (Usury!)

on an extensive maritime trade in the Middle Ages, Amalfi, also developed maritime law.³⁶ As soon as industry and trade developed private property further, first in Italy and later in other countries, the highly developed Roman civil law was immediately adopted again and raised to authority. When later the bourgeoisie had acquired so much power that the princes took up its interests in order to overthrow the feudal nobility by means of the bourgeoisie, there began in all countries—in France in the sixteenth century—the real development of law, which in all [71] countries except England proceeded on the basis of the Roman code of laws. In England, too, Roman legal principles had to be introduced to further the development of civil law (especially in the case of movable property). (It must not be forgotten that law has just as little an independent history as religion.)

In civil law the existing property relations are declared to be the result of the general will. The *jus utendi et abutendi*^a itself asserts on the one hand the fact that private property has become entirely independent of the community, and on the other the illusion that private property itself is based solely on the private will, the arbitrary disposal of the thing. In practice, the *abuti* has very definite economic limitations for the owner of private property, if he does not wish to see his property and hence his *jus abutendi* pass into other hands, since actually the thing, considered merely with reference to his will, is not a thing at all, but only becomes a thing, true property, in intercourse, and independently of the law (*a relationship*, which the philosophers call an *idea**). This juridical illusion, which reduces law to the mere will, necessarily leads, in the further development of property relations, to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing. If, for instance, the income from a piece of land disappears owing to competition, then the proprietor has certainly his legal title to it along with the *jus utendi et abutendi*. But he can do nothing with it: he owns nothing as a landed proprietor if he has not enough capital elsewhere to cultivate his land. This illusion of the jurists also explains the fact that for them, as for every code, it is altogether fortuitous that individuals enter into relations among themselves (e.g., contracts); it explains why they consider that these relations [can] be entered into or not at will,

* [Marginal note by Marx:] For the *philosophers relationship* = *idea*. They only know the relation of "Man" to himself and hence for them all real relations become ideas.

^a The right of use and of disposal.—*Ed.*

[72] and that their content [rests] purely on the individual free will of the contracting parties.

Whenever, through the development of industry and commerce, new forms of intercourse have been evolved (e.g., insurance companies, etc.), the law has always been compelled to admit them among the modes of acquiring property.^a

[12. FORMS OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS]

The influence of the division of labour on science.

The role of *repression* with regard to the state, law, morality, etc.

It is precisely because the bourgeoisie rules as a class that in the law it must give itself a general expression.

Natural science and history.

There is no history of politics, law, science, etc., of art, religion, etc.*

Why the ideologists turn everything upside-down.

Clerics, jurists, politicians.

Jurists, politicians (statesmen in general), moralists, clerics.

For this ideological subdivision within a class: 1) *The occupation assumes an independent existence owing to division of labour.* Everyone believes his craft to be the true one. Illusions regarding the connection between their craft and reality are the more likely to be cherished by them because of the very nature of the craft. In consciousness—in jurisprudence, politics, etc.—relations become concepts; since they do not go beyond these relations, the concepts of the relations also become fixed concepts in their mind. The judge, for example, applies the code, he therefore regards legislation as the real, active driving force. Respect for their goods, because their craft deals with general matters.

Idea of law. Idea of state. The matter is turned upside-down in *ordinary* consciousness.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] To the “community” as it appears in the ancient state, in feudalism and in the absolute monarchy, to this bond correspond especially the religious conceptions.

^a The following notes, written by Marx, were intended for further elaboration.—*Ed.*

Religion is from the outset *consciousness of the transcendental* arising from *actually existing* forces.

This more popularly.

Tradition, with regard to law, religion, etc.

* * *

[73]^a Individuals always proceeded, and always proceed, from themselves. Their relations are the relations of their real life-process. How does it happen that their relations assume an independent existence over against them? and that the forces of their own life become superior to them?

In short: *division of labour*, the level of which depends on the development of the productive power at any particular time.

Landed property. Communal property. Feudal. Modern.
Estate property. Manufacturing property. Industrial capital.

^a This, the last, page is not numbered in the manuscript. It contains notes relating to the beginning of the authors' exposition of the materialist conception of history. The ideas outlined here are set forth in the clean copy, Section 3 (see this volume, pp. 32-35).—Ed.

THE LEIPZIG COUNCIL ³⁷

In the third volume of the *Wigand'sche Vierteljahrsschrift* for 1845 the battle of the Huns, prophetically portrayed by Kaulbach,³⁸ actually takes place. The spirits of the slain, whose fury is not appeased even in death, raise a hue and cry, which sounds like the thunder of battles and war-cries, the clatter of swords, shields and iron waggons. But it is not a battle over earthly things. The holy war is being waged not over protective tariffs, the constitution, potato blight,³⁹ banking affairs and railways, but in the name of the most sacred interests of the spirit, in the name of "substance", "self-consciousness", "criticism", the "unique" and the "true man". We are attending a council of church fathers. As these church fathers are the last specimens of their kind, and as here, it is to be hoped, the cause of the Most High, alias the Absolute, is being pleaded for the last time, it is worth while taking a verbatim report of the proceedings.

Here, first of all, is *Saint Bruno*, who is easily recognised by his *stick* ("become sensuousness, become a *stick*", *Wigand*, p. 130).^a His head is crowned with a halo of "pure criticism" and, full of contempt for the world, he wraps himself in his "self-consciousness". He has "*smashed* religion in its entirety and the state in its manifestations" (p. 138), by violating the concept of "substance" in the name of the most high self-consciousness. The ruins of the church and "debris" of the state lie at his feet, while his glance "strikes down" the "masses" into the dust. He is like God, he has neither father nor mother, he is "his own creation, his own product" (p. 136). In short, he is the "Napoleon" of the spirit, in spirit he is "Napoleon". His spiritual exercises consist in constantly "examining himself, and in this self-examination he finds the impulse to self-determination"

^a Bruno Bauer, "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs".— *Ed.*

(p. 136); as a result of such wearisome self-recording he has obviously become emaciated. Besides "examining" himself—from time to time he "examines" also, as we shall see, the *Westphälische Dampfboot*.^a

Opposite him stands *Saint Max*, whose services to the Kingdom of God consist in asserting that he has established and proved—on approximately 600 printed pages^b—his identity, that he is not just anyone, not some "Tom, Dick or Harry", but precisely Saint Max and no other. About his halo and other marks of distinction only one thing can be said: that they are "his object and thereby his property", that they are "unique" and "incomparable" and that they are "inexpressible" (p. 148).^c He is simultaneously the "phrase" and the "owner of the phrase", simultaneously Sancho Panza and Don Quixote. His ascetic exercises consist of sour thoughts about thoughtlessness, of considerations throughout many pages about inconsiderateness and of the sanctification of unholiness. Incidentally, there is no need for us to elaborate on his virtues, for concerning all the qualities ascribed to him—even if there were more of them than the names of God among the Muslims—he is in the habit of saying: I am all this and something more, I am the all of this nothing and the nothing of this all. He is favourably distinguished from his gloomy rival in possessing a certain solemn "*light-heartedness*" and from time to time he interrupts his serious ponderings with a "*critical hurrah*".

These two grand masters of the Holy Inquisition summon the heretic Feuerbach, who has to defend himself against the grave charge of gnosticism. The heretic Feuerbach, "thunders" Saint Bruno, is in possession of *hyle*,^d substance, and refuses to hand it over lest my infinite self-consciousness be reflected in it. Self-consciousness has to wander like a ghost until it has taken back into itself all things which arise from it and flow into it. It has already swallowed the whole world, except for this *hyle*, substance, which the gnostic Feuerbach keeps under lock and key and refuses to hand over.

Saint Max accuses the gnostic of doubting the dogma revealed by the mouth of Saint Max himself, the dogma that "every goose, every dog, every horse" is "the perfect, or, if one prefers the superlative degree, the most perfect, man". (*Wigand*, p. 187: "The aforesaid does not lack a tittle of what makes man a man. Indeed, the *same* applies also to every goose, every dog, every horse.")

^a See this volume, pp. 112-13.—*Ed.*

^b Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*.—*Ed.*

^c See Max Stirner, "Recensenten Stirners".—*Ed.*

^d Matter, substance.—*Ed.*

Besides the hearing of these important indictments, sentence is also pronounced in the case brought by the two saints against Moses Hess and in the case brought by Saint Bruno against the authors of *Die heilige Familie*. But as these accused have been busying themselves with “worldly affairs” and, therefore, have failed to appear before the Santa Casa,⁴⁰ they are sentenced in their absence to eternal banishment from the realm of the spirit for the term of their natural life.

Finally, the two grand masters are again starting some strange intrigues among themselves and against each other.*

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] On the plea that he is an “unusually cunning and politic mind” (*Wigand*, p. 192) *Dottore Craziano*, alias Arnold Ruge, appears in the background. [This seems to indicate that originally a chapter on Ruge was also planned (see Note 7).]

II SAINT BRUNO

I. "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST FEUERBACH

Before turning to the solemn discussion which Bauer's self-consciousness has with itself and the world, we should reveal one secret. Saint Bruno uttered the battle-cry and kindled the war only because he had to "safeguard" himself and his stale, soured criticism against the ungrateful forgetfulness of the public, only because he had to show that, in the changed conditions of 1845, criticism always remained itself and unchanged. He wrote the second volume of the "good cause and his own cause"^a: he stands his ground, he fights *pro aris et focis*.^b In the true theological manner, however, he conceals this aim of his by an appearance of wishing to "characterise" Feuerbach. Poor Bruno was quite forgotten, as was best proved by the polemic between Feuerbach and Stirner,^c in which no notice at all was taken of him. For just this reason he seized on this polemic in order to be able to proclaim himself, as the antithesis of the antagonists, their higher unity, the Holy Spirit.

Saint Bruno opens his "campaign" with a burst of artillery fire against Feuerbach, that is to say, with a revised and enlarged reprint of an article which had already appeared in the *Norddeutsche Blätter*.^d Feuerbach is made into a knight of "*substance*" in order that Bauer's "*self-consciousness*" shall stand out in stronger relief. In this tran-

^a Bruno Bauer's article "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs" is here ironically called the second volume of Bauer's book *Die gute Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene Angelegenheit* (The Good Cause of Freedom and My Own Cause).—*Ed.*

^b Literally: for altars and hearths, used in the sense of: for house and home—that is, pleading his own cause.—*Ed.*

^c Feuerbach, "Ueber das 'Wesen des Christenthums' in Beziehung auf den 'Einzigen und sein Eigenthum'".—*Ed.*

^d I. e., Bruno Bauer's article "Ludwig Feuerbach".—*Ed.*

substantiation of Feuerbach, which is supposed to be proved by all the writings of the latter, our holy man jumps at once from Feuerbach's writings on Leibniz and Bayle^a to the *Wesen des Christenthums*, leaving out the article against the "positive philosophers"⁴¹ in the *Hallische Jahrbücher*.^b This "oversight" is "in place". For there Feuerbach revealed the whole wisdom of "self-consciousness" as against the positive representatives of "substance", at a time when Saint Bruno was still indulging in speculation on the immaculate conception.

It is hardly necessary to mention that Saint Bruno still continues to prance about on his old-Hegelian war horse. Listen to the first passage in his latest revelations from the Kingdom of God:

"Hegel combined into one Spinoza's substance and Fichte's ego; the unity of both, the combination of these opposing spheres, etc., constitutes the peculiar interest but, at the same time, the weakness of Hegel's philosophy. [...] This contradiction in which Hegel's system was entangled had to be resolved and destroyed. But he could only do this by making it impossible for all time to put the question: what is the relation of *self-consciousness* to the *absolute spirit*.... This was possible in two ways. Either self-consciousness had to be burned again in the flames of substance, i.e., the pure substantiality relation had to be firmly established and maintained, or it had to be shown that personality is the creator of its own attributes and essence, that it belongs to the *concept* of personality *in general* to posit itself" (the "concept" or the "personality"?) "as limited, and again to abolish this limitation which it posits by its *universal essence*, for precisely this essence is *only the result* of its *inner self-distinction*, of its activity" (Wigand, pp. 86, 87, 88).^c

In *Die heilige Familie* (p. 220)^d Hegelian philosophy was represented as a union of Spinoza and Fichte and at the same time the contradiction involved in this was emphasised. The specific peculiarity of Saint Bruno is that, unlike the authors of *Die heilige Familie*, he does not regard the question of the relation of self-consciousness to substance as "a point of controversy within Hegelian speculation", but as a world-historic, even an absolute question. This is the sole form in which he is capable of expressing the conflicts of the present day. He really believes that the triumph of self-consciousness over substance has a most essential influence not only on European equilibrium but also on the whole future development of the Oregon problem. As to the extent to which the abolition of the Corn Laws in England depends on it, very little has so far transpired.⁴²

^a The reference is to the following works of Feuerbach: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnitz'schen Philosophie* and *Pierre Bayle*.—Ed.

^b Ludwig Feuerbach, "Zur Kritik der 'positiven Philosophie'".—Ed.

^c Bruno Bauer, "Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs".—Ed.

^d See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 139.—Ed.

The abstract and nebulous expression into which a real collision is distorted by Hegel is held by this "critical" mind to be the real collision itself. Bruno accepts the *speculative* contradiction and upholds one part of it against the other. A philosophical *phrase* about a real question is for him the real question itself. Consequently, on the one hand, instead of real people and their real consciousness of their social relations, which apparently confront them as something independent, he has the mere abstract expression: *self-consciousness*, just as, instead of real production, he has the *activity of this self-consciousness, which has become independent*. On the other hand, instead of real nature and the actually existing social relations, he has the philosophical summing-up of all the philosophical categories or names of these relations in the expression: *substance*; for Bruno, along with all philosophers and ideologists, erroneously regards thoughts and ideas—the independent intellectual expression of the existing world—as the basis of this existing world. It is obvious that with these two abstractions, which have become senseless and empty, he can perform all kinds of tricks without knowing anything at all about real people and their relations. (See, in addition, what is said about substance in connection with Feuerbach and concerning "humane liberalism"^a and the "holy" in connection with Saint Max.) Hence, he does not forsake the speculative basis in order to solve the contradictions of speculation; he manoeuvres while remaining on that basis, and he *himself* still stands so much on the specifically Hegelian basis that the relation of "self-consciousness" to the "absolute spirit" still gives him no peace. In short, we are confronted with the *philosophy of self-consciousness* that was announced in the *Kritik der Synoptiker*, carried out in *Das entdeckte Christenthum* and which, unfortunately, was long ago anticipated in Hegel's *Phänomenologie*. This new philosophy of Bauer's was completely disposed of in *Die heilige Familie* on page 220 et seq. and on pages 304-07.^b Here, however, Saint Bruno even contrives to caricature himself by smuggling in "personality", in order to be able, with *Stirner*, to portray the single individual as "his own product", and *Stirner* as *Bruno's product*. This step forward deserves a brief notice.

First of all, let the reader compare this caricature with the original, the explanation given of self-consciousness in *Das entdeckte Christenthum*, page 113, and then let him compare this explanation with its prototype, with Hegel's *Phänomenologie*, pages 575, 583 and so on. (Both these passages are reproduced in *Die heilige Familie*, pages

^a See this volume, pp. 40, 54, 232-39, 282-301.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 139 et seq. and 191-93.—*Ed.*

221, 223, 224.) But now let us turn to the caricature! “Personality in general”! “Concept”! “Universal essence”! “To posit itself as limited and again to abolish the limitation”! “Inner self-distinction”! What tremendous “results”! “Personality in general” is either nonsense “in general” or the abstract concept of personality. Therefore, it is part of the “concept” of the concept of personality to “posit itself as limited”. This limitation, which belongs to the “concept” of its concept, personality directly afterwards posits “by its universal essence”. And after it has again abolished this limitation, it turns out that “precisely this essence” is “the *result* of its inner self-distinction”. The entire grandiose result of this intricate tautology amounts, therefore, to Hegel’s familiar trick of the self-distinction of man in thought, a self-distinction which the unfortunate Bruno stubbornly proclaims to be the sole activity of “personality in general”. A fairly long time ago it was pointed out to Saint Bruno that there is nothing to be got from a “personality” whose activity is restricted to these, by now trivial, logical leaps. At the same time the passage quoted contains the naive admission that the essence of Bauer’s “personality” is the concept of a concept, the abstraction of an abstraction.

Bruno’s criticism of Feuerbach, insofar as it is new, is restricted to hypocritically representing Stirner’s reproaches against Feuerbach and Bauer as Bauer’s reproaches against Feuerbach. Thus, for example, the assertions that the “essence of man is essence in general and something holy”, that “man is the God of man”, that the human species is “the Absolute”, that Feuerbach splits man “into an essential and an inessential ego” (although Bruno always declares that the abstract is the essential and, in his antithesis of criticism and the mass, conceives this split as far more monstrous than Feuerbach does), that a struggle must be waged against the “predicates of God”, etc. On the question of selfish and selfless love, Bruno, polemising with Feuerbach, copies Stirner almost word for word for three pages (pp. 133-35) just as he very clumsily copies Stirner’s phrases: “every man is his own creation”, “truth is a ghost”, and so on. In addition, in Bruno the “creation” is transformed into a “product”. We shall return to this exploitation of Stirner by Saint Bruno.

Thus, the first thing that we discovered in Saint Bruno was his continual dependence on Hegel. We shall not, of course, dwell further on the remarks he has copied from Hegel, but shall only put together a few more passages which show how firmly he believes in the power of the philosophers and how he shares their illusion that a

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 139-41.—*Ed.*

modified consciousness, a new turn given to the interpretation of existing relations, could overturn the whole hitherto existing world. Imbued with this faith, Saint Bruno also has one of his pupils certify—in issue IV of Wigand’s quarterly, p. 327—that his phrases on personality given above, which were proclaimed by him in issue III, were “world-shattering ideas”.^a

Saint Bruno says (*Wigand*, p. 95)^b:

“Philosophy has never been anything but theology reduced to its most general form and given its most rational expression.”

This passage, aimed *against* Feuerbach, is copied almost word for word from Feuerbach’s *Philosophie der Zukunft* (p. 2):

“Speculative philosophy is true, consistent, *rational* theology.”

Bruno continues:

“Philosophy, in alliance with religion, has always striven for the absolute dependence of the individual and has *actually achieved this* by demanding and causing the absorption of the individual life in universal life, of the accident in substance, of man in the absolute spirit.”

As if Bruno’s “philosophy”, “in alliance with” Hegel’s, and his still continuing forbidden association with theology, did not “demand”, if not “cause”, the “absorption of man” in the idea of one of his “accidents”, that of self-consciousness, as “substance”! Moreover, one sees from this whole passage with what joy the church father with his “pulpit eloquence” continues to proclaim his “world-shattering” faith in the mysterious power of the holy theologians and philosophers. Of course, in the interests of the “good cause of freedom and his own cause”.^c

On page 105 our godfearing man has the insolence to reproach Feuerbach:

“Feuerbach *made* of the individual, of the depersonalised man of Christianity, not a man, not a true” (!) “real” (!!) “personal” (!!!) “man” (these predicates owe their origin to *Die heilige Familie* and Stirner), “but an emasculated man, a slave”—

and thereby utters, *inter alia*, the nonsense that he, Saint Bruno, can *make* people by means of the *mind*.

Further on in the same passage he says:

“According to Feuerbach the individual has to subordinate himself to the species, serve it. The species of which Feuerbach speaks is Hegel’s Absolute, and it, too, exists nowhere.”

^a “Ueber das Recht des Freigesprochenen...”.—*Ed.*

^b Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

^c An ironical allusion to Bauer’s book *Die gute Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene Angelegenheit*.—*Ed.*

Here, as in all the other passages, Saint Bruno does not deprive himself of the glory of making the actual relations of individuals dependent on the philosophical interpretation of these relations. He has not the slightest inkling of the correlation which exists between the concepts of Hegel's "absolute spirit" and Feuerbach's "species" on the one hand and the existing world on the other.

On page 104 the holy father is mightily shocked by the heresy with which Feuerbach transforms the holy trinity of reason, love and will into something that "is *in* individuals and *over* individuals", as though, in our day, every inclination, every impulse, every need did not assert itself as a force "in the individual and *over* the individual", whenever circumstances hinder their satisfaction. If the holy father Bruno experiences hunger, for example, without the means of appeasing it, then even his stomach will become a force "*in* him and *over* him". Feuerbach's mistake is not that he stated this fact but that in idealistic fashion he endowed it with independence instead of regarding it as the product of a definite and surmountable stage of historical development.

Page 111: "Feuerbach is a slave and his servile nature does not allow him to fulfil the work of a *man*, to recognise the essence of religion" (what a fine "work of a man"!)... "He does not perceive the essence of religion because he does not know the *bridge* over which he can make his way to the *source* of religion."

Saint Bruno still seriously believes that religion has its own "essence". As for the "bridge", "*over which*" one makes one's way to the "*source* of religion", this asses' bridge^a must certainly be an *aqueduct*. At the same time Saint Bruno establishes himself as a curiously modernised Charon who has been retired owing to the building of the bridge, becoming a tollkeeper^b who demands a halfpenny^b from every person crossing the bridge to the spectral realm of religion.

On page 120 the saint remarks:

"How could Feuerbach exist if there were no *truth* and truth were only a *spectre*" (Stirner, help!) "of which hitherto man has been afraid?"

The "man" who fears the "spectre" of "truth" is no other than the worthy Bruno himself. Ten pages earlier, on p. 110, he had already let out the following world-shattering cry of terror at the sight of the "spectre" of truth:

^a A pun in the original: *Eselsbrücke* (asses' bridge)—an expedient used by dull or lazy people to understand a difficult problem.—*Ed.*

^b This word is in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

^c A paraphrase of the expression "Samuel, hilf!" (Samuel, help!) from Carl Maria von Weber's opera *Der Freischütz* (libretto by Friedrich Kind), Act II, Scene 6.—*Ed.*

“Truth which is never of itself encountered as a ready-made object and which develops *itself* and reaches unity only in the unfolding of personality.”

Thus, we have here not only truth, this spectre, transformed into a person which develops itself and reaches unity, but in addition this trick is accomplished in a third personality outside it, after the manner of the tapeworm. Concerning the holy man's former love affair with truth, when he was still young and the lusts of the flesh still strong in him—see *Die heilige Familie*, p. 115 et seq.^a

How purified of all fleshly lusts and earthly desires our holy man now appears is shown by his vehement polemic against Feuerbach's *sensuousness*. Bruno by no means attacks the highly restricted way in which Feuerbach recognises *sensuousness*. He regards Feuerbach's unsuccessful attempt, since it is an attempt to escape ideology, as—a *sin*. Of course! Sensuousness is lust of the eye, lust of the flesh and arrogance^b—horror and abomination^c in the eyes of the Lord! Do you not know that to be fleshly minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is life and peace; for to be fleshly minded is hostility to criticism, and everything of the flesh is of this world. And do you not know that it is written: the works of the flesh are manifest, they are adultery, fornication, uncleanness, obscenity, idolatry, witchcraft, enmity, strife, envy, anger, quarrelsomeness, discord, sinful gangs, hatred, murder, drunkenness, gluttony and the like.^d I prophesy to you, as I prophesied before, that those who do such works will not inherit the kingdom of criticism; but woe to them for in their thirst for delights they are following the path of Cain and are falling into the error of Balaam, and will perish in a rebellion, like that of Korah. These lewd ones feast shamelessly on your alms, and fatten themselves. They are clouds without water driven by the wind; bare, barren trees, twice dead and uprooted; wild ocean waves frothing their own shame; errant stars condemned to the gloom of darkness for ever.^e For we have read that in the last days there will be terrible times, people will appear who think much of themselves, lewd vilifiers who love voluptuousness^f more than criticism, makers of sinful gangs, in short, slaves of the flesh. Such people are shunned by Saint Bruno, who is spiritually minded and loathes the stained covering of the flesh^g and for this reason he condemns Feuerbach, whom he re-

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 79 et seq.—*Ed.*

^b Cf. 1 John 2 : 16.—*Ed.*

^c Cf. Ezekiel 11 : 18.—*Ed.*

^d Cf. Galatians 5:19-21.—*Ed.*

^e Cf. Jude 11-13.—*Ed.*

^f Cf. 2 Timothy 3 : 1-4.—*Ed.*

^g Cf. Jude 23.—*Ed.*

guards as the Korah of the gang, to remain outside together with the dogs, the magicians, the debauched and the assassins.^a “Sensuousness”—ugh! Not only does it throw the saintly church father into the most violent convulsions, but it even makes him sing, and on page 121 he chants the “song of the end and the end of the song”. Sensuousness—do you know, unfortunate one, what sensuousness is? Sensuousness is—a “stick” (p. 130). Seized with convulsions, Saint Bruno even wrestles on one occasion with one of his own theses, just as Jacob of blessed memory wrestled with God, with the one difference that God twisted Jacob’s thigh, while our saintly epileptic twists all the limbs and ties of his own thesis, and so, by a number of striking examples, makes clear the identity of subject and object:

“Feuerbach may say what he likes ... all the same he *destroys*” (!) “*man* ... for he transforms the *word* man into a mere *phrase* ... for he *does not wholly make*” (!) “*and create*” (!) “*man*, but raises the whole of mankind to the Absolute, for *in addition* he declares *not* mankind, *but rather* the senses to be the organ of the Absolute, and stamps the sensuous—the object of the senses, of perception, of sensation—as the Absolute, the indubitable and the immediately certain. Whereby Feuerbach—such is Saint Bruno’s opinion—“can undoubtedly shake layers of the air, but he cannot *smash the phenomena of human essence*, because his *innermost*” (!) “*essence and his vitalising spirit* [...] already destroys the *external*” (!) “*sound and makes it empty and jarring*” (p. 121).

Saint Bruno himself gives us mysterious but decisive disclosures about the causes of his nonsensical attitude:

“As though my ego does not also possess just this particular *sex, unique, compared with all others*, and these particular, unique sex organs.” (Besides his “unique sex organs”, this noble-minded man also possesses a special “unique sex”!)

This unique sex is explained on page 121 in the sense that:

“sensuousness, like a vampire, sucks all the marrow and blood from the *life* of man; it is the insurmountable barrier against which man has to deal himself a mortal *blow*”.

But even the saintliest man is not pure! They are all sinners and lack the glory that they should have before “self-consciousness”. Saint Bruno, who in his lonely cell at midnight struggles with “substance”, has his attention drawn by the frivolous writings of the heretic Feuerbach to women and female beauty. Suddenly his sight becomes less keen; his pure self-consciousness is besmirched, and a reprehensible, sensuous fantasy plays about the frightened critic with lascivious images. The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak.^b Bruno stumbles, he falls, he forgets that he is the power that “with its strength binds, frees and dominates the world”,^c he forgets that these products of his imagination are “spirit of his spirit”, he loses all

^a Cf. Revelation 22:15.—*Ed.*

^b Cf. Matthew 26:41.—*Ed.*

^c Cf. *ibid.* 16:19.—*Ed.*

“self-control” and, intoxicated, stammers a dithyramb to female beauty, to its “tenderness, softness, womanliness”, to the “full and rounded limbs” and the “surging, undulating, seething, rushing and hissing, wave-like structure of the body”^a of woman. Innocence, however, always reveals itself—even where it sins. Who does not know that a “*surging, undulating, wave-like structure of the body*” is something that no eye has ever seen, or ear heard? Therefore—hush, sweet soul, the spirit will soon prevail over the rebellious flesh and set an insurmountable “barrier” to the overflowing, seething lusts, “against which” they will soon deal themselves a “mortal blow”.

“Feuerbach”—the saint finally arrives at this through a critical understanding of *Die heilige Familie*—“is a materialist tempered with and corrupted by humanism, i.e., a materialist who is unable to endure the earth and its being” (Saint Bruno knows the being of the earth as distinct from the earth itself, and knows how one should behave in order to “*endure the being of the earth*”!) “but wants to spiritualise himself and rise into heaven; and at the same time he is a humanist who cannot think and build a spiritual world, but one who is impregnated with materialism”, and so on (p. 123).

Just as for Saint Bruno humanism, according to this, consists in “thinking” and in “building a spiritual world”, so materialism consists in the following:

“The materialist recognises only the existing, actual being, *matter*” (as though man with all his attributes, including thought, were not an “*existing, actual being*”), “and recognises *it* as actively extending and realising *itself* in multiplicity, *nature*” (p. 123).

First, *matter* is an existing, actual being, but only in itself, concealed; only when it “actively extends and realises itself in multiplicity” (an “existing, *actual being*” “*realises itself*”!), only then does it become *nature*. First there exists the *concept* of matter, an abstraction, an idea, and this latter realises itself in actual nature. Word for word the Hegelian theory of the pre-existence of the creative categories. From this point of view it is understandable that Saint Bruno mistakes the philosophical phrases of the materialists concerning matter for the actual kernel and content of their world outlook.

2. SAINT BRUNO'S VIEWS ON THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FEUERBACH AND STIRNER

Having thus admonished Feuerbach with a few weighty words, Saint Bruno takes a look at the struggle between Feuerbach and the unique. The first evidence of his interest in this struggle is a methodical, triple smile.

^a Marx and Engels have inserted the words “seething, rushing and hissing”—which occur in Schiller’s poem *Der Taucher* (“The Diver”)—into the passage they quote from Bruno Bauer’s article “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

"The critic pursues his path irresistibly, confident of victory, and victorious. He is slandered—he *smiles*. He is called a heretic—he *smiles*. The old world starts a crusade against him—he *smiles*."

Saint Bruno—this is thus established—pursues his path but he does not pursue it like other people, he follows a critical course, he accomplishes this important action with a *smile*.

"He does smile his face into more lines than are in the new map, with the augmentation of the Indies. I know my lady will strike him: if she do, he'll smile and take't for a great art"^a—like Shakespeare's Malvolio.

Saint Bruno himself does not lift a finger to refute his two opponents, he knows a better way of ridding himself of them, he leaves them—*divide et impera*—to their own quarrel. He confronts Stirner with Feuerbach's man (p. 124), and Feuerbach with Stirner's unique (p. 126 et seq.); he knows that they are as incensed against each other as the two Kilkenny cats in Ireland, which so completely devoured each other that finally only their tails remained.⁴³ And Saint Bruno passes sentence on these tails, declaring that they are "*substance*" and, consequently, condemned to eternal damnation.

In confronting Feuerbach with Stirner he repeats what Hegel said of Spinoza and Fichte, where, as we know, the punctiform ego is represented as one, and moreover the most stable, aspect of substance. However much Bruno formerly raged against egoism, which he even considered the *odor specificus* of the masses, on page 129 he accepts egoism from Stirner—only this should be "not that of Max Stirner", but, of course, that of Bruno Bauer. He brands Stirner's egoism as having the moral defect "that his ego for the support of its egoism requires hypocrisy, deception, external violence". For the rest, he believes (see p. 124) in the critical miracles of Saint Max and sees in the latter's struggle (p. 126) "a real effort to radically destroy substance". Instead of dealing with Stirner's criticism of Bauer's "pure criticism", he asserts on p. 124 that Stirner's criticism could affect him just as little as any other, "because *he himself is the critic*".

Finally Saint Bruno refutes both of them, Saint Max and Feuerbach, applying almost literally to Feuerbach and Stirner the antithesis drawn by Stirner between the critic Bruno Bauer and the dogmatist.

Wigand, p. 138: "Feuerbach puts himself in opposition to, and *thereby*" (!) "*stands in opposition to*, the unique. He is a *communist* and wants to be one. The unique is an *egoist*

^a Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act III, Scene 2. Marx and Engels quote these lines from the German translation by August Wilhelm von Schlegel. But they have substituted the word *Kunst* (art) for the word *Gunst* (favour).—Ed.

and has to be one; he is the *holy one*, the other the *profane one*, he is the *good one*, the other the *evil one*, he is God, the other is man. Both are *dogmatists*."

The point is, therefore, that he accuses both of dogmatism.

Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, p. 194: "The critic is afraid of becoming dogmatic or of putting forward dogmas. Obviously, he would then become the opposite of a critic, a dogmatist; he who as a critic was *good*, would now become *evil*, or from being *unselfish*" (a Communist) "would become an *egoist*, etc. Not a single dogma!—that is his dogma."

3. SAINT BRUNO VERSUS THE AUTHORS OF *DIE HEILIGE FAMILIE*

Saint Bruno, who has disposed of Feuerbach and Stirner in the manner indicated and who has "cut the unique off from all progress", now turns against the apparent "consequences of Feuerbach", the German Communists and, especially, the authors of *Die heilige Familie*. The expression "real humanism", which he found in the preface to this polemic treatise,^a provides the main basis of his hypothesis. He will recall a passage from the Bible:

"And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal" (in our case it was just the opposite), "even as unto babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto ye were not able to bear it" (1 Corinthians, 3: 1-2).

The first impression that *Die heilige Familie* made on the worthy church father was one of profound distress and serious, respectable sorrow. The one good side of the book is that it

"showed what Feuerbach *had* to become, and the position his philosophy *can* adopt, if it *desires* to fight against criticism" (p. 138),

that, consequently, it combined in an easy-going way "desiring" with "what can be" and "what must be", but this good side does not outweigh its many distressing sides. Feuerbach's philosophy, which strangely enough is presupposed here,

"*dare not* and *cannot* understand the critic, *dare not* and *cannot* know and perceive criticism in its development, *dare not* and *cannot* know that, in relation to all that is transcendental, criticism is a constant struggle and victory, a continual destruction and creation, the *sole*" (!) "creative and productive principle. It *dare not* and *cannot* know how the critic has worked, and still works, to posit and to *make*" (!) "the transcendental forces, which up to now have suppressed mankind and not allowed it to breathe and live, into what they *really are*, the spirit of the spirit, the innermost of the innermost, a native thing" (!) "out of and in the native soil, products and creations of self-consciousness. It *dare not* and *cannot* know that the critic and only the critic has smashed religion in its entirety, and the state in its various manifestations, etc." (pp. 138, 139).

^a See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 7.—*Ed.*

Is this not an exact copy of the ancient Jehovah, who runs after his errant people who found greater delight in the cheerful pagan gods, and cries out:

“Hear me, Israel, and close not your ear, Judah! Am I not the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt into the land flowing with milk and honey, and behold, from your earliest youth you have done evil in my sight and angered me with the work of my hands and turned your back unto me and not your face towards me, though I invariably tutored you; and you have brought abominations into my house to defile it, and built the high places of Baal in the valley of the son of Himmon, which I did not command, and it never entered my head that you should do such abominations; and I have sent to you my servant Jeremiah, to whom I did address my word, beginning with the thirteenth year of the reign of King Josiah, son of Amon, unto this day—and for twenty-three years now he has been zealously preaching to you, but ye have not hearkened. Therefore says the Lord God: Who has ever heard the like of the virgin of Israel doing such an abomination. For rain water does not disappear so quickly as my people forgets me. O earth, earth, earth, hear the word of the Lord!”^a

Thus, in a lengthy speech on “to dare” and “to be able”, Saint Bruno asserts that his communist opponents have misunderstood him. The way in which he describes criticism in this recent speech, the way in which he transforms the former forces that suppressed “the life of mankind” into “transcendental forces”, and these transcendental forces into the “spirit of the spirit”, and the way in which he presents “criticism” as the sole branch of production proves that the apparent misconception is nothing but a disagreeable conception. We proved that Bauer’s criticism is beneath all criticism, owing to which we have inevitably become dogmatists. He even in all seriousness reproaches us for our insolent disbelief in his ancient phrases. The whole mythology of independent concepts, with Zeus the Thunderer—self-consciousness—at the head, is paraded here once again to the “jingling of hackneyed phrases of a whole janissary band of current categories”. (*Literatur-Zeitung*, cf. *Die heilige Familie*, p. 234^b). First of all, of course, the myth of the creation of the world, i.e., of the hard “*labour*” of the critic, which is “the sole creative and productive principle, a constant struggle and victory, a continual destruction and creation”, “working” and “having worked”. Indeed, the reverend father even reproaches *Die heilige Familie* for understanding “criticism” in the same way as he understands it himself in the present rejoinder. After taking back “substance” “into the land of its birth, self-consciousness, the criticising and” (since *Die heilige*

^a Cf. Jeremiah 2 : 6, 32 : 22, 30, 33-35, 25 : 3, 19 : 3, 18 : 13, 14, 22 : 29.—*Ed.*

^b The passage from “Correspondenz aus der Provinz” published in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* was quoted in *The Holy Family* (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 148).—*Ed.*

Familie also) “the criticised man, and *discarding* it” (self-consciousness here seems to take the place of an ideological lumber-room), he continues:

“It” (the alleged philosophy of Feuerbach) “dare not know that criticism *and* the critics, as long as they have existed” (!) “have guided and made history, that even their opponents and all the movements and agitations of the present time are their creation, that it is they alone who hold *power in their hands, because strength is in their consciousness*, and because they derive power *from themselves*, from their deeds, *from criticism*, from their opponents, from their creations; that only by the act of criticism is man freed, and thereby men also, and man is *created*” (!) “and thereby mankind as well”.

Thus, criticism *and* the critics are first of all two wholly different subjects, existing and operating apart from each other. The critic is a subject different from criticism, and criticism is a subject different from the critic. This personified criticism, criticism as a subject, is precisely that “critical criticism” against which *Die heilige Familie* was directed. “Criticism and the critics, as long as they have existed, have guided and made history.” It is clear that they could not do so “as long as they” did not “exist”, and it is equally clear that “as long as they have existed” they “made history” in their own fashion. Finally, Saint Bruno goes so far as to “dare and be able” to give us one of the most profound explanations about the state-shattering power of criticism, namely, that “criticism and the critics hold *power in their hands, because*” (a fine “because”!) “*strength is in their consciousness*”, and, secondly, that these great manufacturers of history “hold power in their hands”, because they “derive power from themselves and from criticism” (i.e., again from themselves)—whereby it is still, unfortunately, not proven that it is possible to “derive” anything at all from there, from “themselves”, from “criticism”. On the basis of criticism’s own words, one should at least believe that it must be difficult to “derive” from there anything more than the category of “substance” “discarded” there. Finally, criticism also “derives” “from criticism” “power” for a highly monstrous oracular dictum. For it reveals to us a secret that was hidden^a from our fathers and unknown to our grandfathers, the secret that “only by the act of criticism is man created, and thereby mankind as well”—whereas, up to now, criticism was erroneously regarded as an act of people who existed prior to it owing to quite different acts. Hence it seems that Saint Bruno himself came “into the world, from the world, and to the world” through “criticism”, i.e., by *generatio aequivoca*.^b All this is, perhaps, merely another interpretation of the following passage

^a Cf. Colossians 1 : 26.—*Ed.*

^b Spontaneous generation.—*Ed.*

from the Book of Genesis: And Adam *knew*, i.e., criticised, Eve his wife: and she conceived,^a etc.

Thus we see here the whole familiar critical criticism, which was already sufficiently characterised in *Die heilige Familie*, confronting us again with all its trickery as though nothing had happened. There is no need to be surprised at this, for the saint himself complains, on page 140, that *Die heilige Familie* “cuts criticism off from all progress”. With the greatest indignation Saint Bruno reproaches the authors of *Die heilige Familie* because, by means of a chemical process, they evaporated Bauer’s criticism from its “fluid” state into a “crystalline” state.

It follows that “institutions of mendicancy”, the “baptismal certificate of adulthood”, the “regions of pathos and thunder-like aspects”, the “Mussulman conceptual affliction” (*Die heilige Familie*, pp. 2, 3, 4^b according to the critical *Literatur-Zeitung*)—all this is nonsense only if it is understood in the “crystalline” manner. And the twenty-eight historical howlers of which criticism was proved guilty in its excursion on “Englische Tagesfragen”^c—are they not errors when looked at from the “fluid” point of view? Does criticism insist that, from the fluid point of view, it prophesied *a priori* the Nauwerck conflict⁴⁴—long after this had taken place before its eyes—and did not construct it *post festum*?^d Does it still insist that the word *maréchal* could mean “farrier” from the “crystalline” point of view, but from the “fluid” point of view at any rate must mean “marshal”? Or that although in the “crystalline” conception “*un fait physique*” may mean “a physical fact”, the true “fluid” translation should be “a fact of physics”? Or that “*la malveillance de nos bourgeois juste-milieux*”^e in the “fluid” state still means “the carefreeness of our good burghers”? Does it insist that, from the “fluid” point of view, “a child that does not, in its turn, become a father or mother is *essentially a daughter*”? That someone can have the task “of representing, as it were, the last tear of grief shed by the past”? That the various concierges, lions, grisettes, marquises, scoundrels and wooden doors in Paris in their “fluid” form are nothing but phases

^a Cf. Genesis 4:1.—*Ed.*

^b The expressions quoted are from Carl Reichardt’s reviews, published in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, of the following books: Karl Heinrich Brüggemann, *Preussens Beruf in der deutschen Staats-Entwicklung...*, and Daniel Benda, *Katechismus für wahlberechtigte Bürger in Preussen*. They are also quoted in *The Holy Family* (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 10).—*Ed.*

^c An article by Julius Faucher.—*Ed.*

^d An allusion to the article by [E.] J[ungnitz] “Herr Nauwerk und die philosophische Facultät” published in *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

^e The ill will of our middle-of-the-road bourgeois.—*Ed.*

of the mystery “in whose concept in general it belongs to posit itself as limited and again to abolish this limitation which is posited by its universal essence, for precisely this essence is only the result of its inner self-distinction, its activity”^a? That critical criticism in the “fluid” sense “pursues its path irresistibly, victorious and confident of victory”, when in dealing with a question it first asserts that it has revealed its “true and general significance” and then admits that it “had neither the will nor the right to go beyond criticism”, and finally admits that “it had still to take one step but that step was impossible because—it was impossible” (*Die heilige Familie*, p. 184^b)? That from the “fluid” point of view “the future is still the work” of criticism, although “fate may *decide* as it will”^c? That from the fluid point of view criticism achieved nothing superhuman when it “came into *contradiction* with its *true elements*—a *contradiction* which had *already* found its *solution* in *these same elements*”^d?

The authors of *Die heilige Familie* have indeed committed the frivolity of conceiving these and hundreds of other statements as statements expressing firm, “crystalline” *nonsense*—but the synoptic gospels should be read in a “fluid” way, i.e., according to the sense of their authors, and on no account in a “crystalline” way, i.e., according to their actual nonsense, in order to arrive at true faith and to admire the harmony of the critical household.

“Engels and Marx, therefore, know only the criticism of the *Literatur-Zeitung*”^e

—a deliberate lie, proving how “fluidly” our saint has read a book in which his latest works are depicted merely as the culmination of all the “work he has done”. But the church father lacked the calm to read in a crystalline way, for he fears his opponents as rivals who contest his canonisation and “want to deprive him of his sanctity, in order to make *themselves* sanctified”.

Let us, incidentally, note the fact that, according to Saint Bruno’s present statement, his *Literatur-Zeitung* by no means aimed at founding “social society” or at “representing, as it were, the last tear of grief” shed by German ideology, nor did it aim at putting mind in the sharpest opposition to the mass and developing critical criticism in all its purity, but only—at “depicting the liberalism and radicalism of 1842 and their echoes in their half-heartedness and phrase-mongering”, hence at combating the “echoes” of what has long disap-

^a Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 4, p. 118.—*Ed.*

^c B. Bauer, “Neueste Schriften über die Judenfrage”.—*Ed.*

^d B. Bauer, “Was ist jetzt der Gegenstand der Kritik?”—*Ed.*

^e Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs”.—*Ed.*

peared. *Tant de bruit pour une omelette!*^a Incidentally, it is just here that the conception of history peculiar to German theory is again shown in its “purest” light. The year 1842 is held to be the period of the greatest brilliance of German liberalism, because at that time philosophy took part in politics. Liberalism vanishes for the critic with the cessation of the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* and the *Rheinische Zeitung*, the organs of liberal and radical theory. After that, apparently, there remain only the “echoes”—whereas in actual fact only now, when the German bourgeoisie feels a real need for political power, a need produced by economic relations, and is striving to satisfy it, has liberalism in Germany an actual existence and thereby the chance of some success.

Saint Bruno’s profound distress over *Die heilige Familie* did not allow him to criticise this work “out of himself, through himself and with himself”. To be able to master his pain he had first to obtain the work in a “fluid” form. He found this fluid form in a confused review, teeming with misunderstandings, in the *Westphälische Dampfboot*, May issue, pp. 206-14.^b All his quotations are taken from passages quoted in the *Westphälische Dampfboot* and he quotes nothing that is not quoted there.

The language of the saintly critic is likewise determined by the language of the Westphalian critic. In the first place, all the statements from the Foreword which are quoted by the Westphalian (*Dampfboot*, p. 206) are transferred to the *Wigand’sche Vierteljahrsschrift* (pp. 140, 141). This transference forms the chief part of Bauer’s criticism, according to the old principle already recommended by Hegel:

“To trust common sense and, moreover, in order to keep up with the times and advance with philosophy, to read *reviews* of philosophical works, perhaps even their *prefaces* and introductory paragraphs; for the latter give the general principles on which everything turns, while the former give, along with the historical information, also an appraisal which, because it is an appraisal, even goes beyond that which is appraised. This beaten track can be followed in one’s dressing-gown; but the elevated feeling of the eternal, the sacred, the infinite, pursues its path in the vestments of a high priest, a path” which, as we have seen, Saint Bruno also knows how to “pursue” while “striking down” (Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, p. 54).

The *Westphalian* critic, after giving a few quotations from the preface, continues:

“Thus the preface itself leads to the *battlefield* of the book”, etc. (p. 206).

^a Much ado about an omelette! An exclamation which Jacques Vallée, Sieur des Barreaux, is supposed to have made when a thunderstorm occurred while he was eating an omelette on a fast-day.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 15.—*Ed.*

The *saintly* critic, having transferred these quotations into the *Wigand'sche Vierteljahrsschrift*, makes a more subtle distinction and says:

"Such is the *terrain* and the *enemy* which Engels and Marx have created for *battle*."

From the discussion of the critical proposition: "the worker creates nothing", the *Westphalian* critic gives only the summarising *conclusion*.

The *saintly* critic actually believes that this is all that was said about the proposition, copies out the Westphalian quotation on page 141 and rejoices at the discovery that only "assertions" have been put forward in opposition to criticism.

Of the examination of the critical outpourings about love, the *Westphalian* critic on page 209 first writes out the *corpus delicti* in part and then a few disconnected sentences from the refutation, which he desires to use as an authority for his nebulous, sickly-sweet sentimentality.

On pages 141-42 the *saintly* critic copies him out word for word, sentence by sentence, in the same order as his predecessor quotes.

The *Westphalian* critic exclaims over the corpse of Herr Julius Faucher: "Such is the fate of the beautiful on earth!"^a

The *saintly* critic cannot finish his "hard work" without appropriating this exclamation to use irrelevantly on page 142.

The *Westphalian* critic on page 212 gives a would-be summary of the arguments which are aimed against Saint Bruno himself in *Die heilige Familie*.

The *saintly* critic cheerfully and literally copies out all this stuff together with all the Westphalian exclamations. He has not the slightest idea that *nowhere* in the whole of this polemic discourse does anyone reproach him for "transforming the problem of political emancipation into that of human emancipation", for "wanting to kill the Jews", for "transforming the Jews into theologians", for "transforming Hegel into Herr Hinrichs", etc. Credulously, the *saintly* critic repeats the *Westphalian* critic's allegation that in *Die heilige Familie* Marx volunteers to provide some sort of little scholastic treatise "in reply to Bauer's *silly self-apotheosis*". Yet the words "silly self-apotheosis", which Saint Bruno gives as a *quotation*, are nowhere to be found in the whole of *Die heilige Familie*, but they do occur with the Westphalian critic. Nor is the little treatise offered as a reply to the "*self-apology*" of criticism on pages 150-63 of *Die heilige Familie*, but only in the following section on page 165,^b in

^a Schiller, *Wallenstein's Tod*, Act IV, Scene 12.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 99-106 and 107.—*Ed.*

connection with the world-historic question: “Why did Herr Bauer *have to* engage in politics?”

Finally on page 143 Saint Bruno presents Marx as an “*amusing comedian*”, here again following his Westphalian model, who resolved the “world-historic drama of critical criticism”, on page 213, into a “*most amusing comedy*”.

Thus one sees how the opponents of critical criticism “dare and can” “*know how the critic has worked, and still works!*”

4. OBITUARY FOR “M. HESS”

“What Engels and Marx could *not yet* do, M. Hess has accomplished.”

Such is the great, divine transition which—owing to the relative “can” and “cannot” be done of the evangelists—has taken so firm a hold of the holy man’s fingers that it has to find a place, relevantly or irrelevantly, in every article of the church father.

“What Engels and Marx could not yet do, M. Hess has accomplished.” But what is this “what” that “Engels and Marx could not yet do”? Nothing more nor less, indeed, than—to criticise Stirner. And why was it that Engels and Marx “could *not yet*” criticise Stirner? For the sufficient reason that—Stirner’s book *had not yet appeared* when they wrote *Die heilige Familie*.

This speculative trick—of joining together everything and bringing the most diverse things into an apparent causal relation—has truly taken possession not only of the head of our saint but also of his fingers. With him it has become devoid of any contents and degenerates into a burlesque manner of uttering tautologies with an important mien. For example, already in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (I, 5) we read:

“The difference between my work and the pages which, for example, a Philippon covers with writing” (that is, the *empty* pages on which, “for example, a Philippon” writes) “*must, therefore, be so constituted as in fact it is!*”^a

“M. Hess”, for whose writings Engels and Marx take absolutely no responsibility, seems such a strange phenomenon to the saintly critic that he is only capable of copying long excerpts from *Die letzten Philosophen* and passing the judgment that “on some points this criticism has not understood Feuerbach *or also*” (O theology!) “the vessel wishes to rebel against the potter”. Cf. Epistle to the Romans, 9: 20-21. Having once more performed the “hard work” of quoting, our saintly critic finally arrives at the conclusion that Hess copies

^a B. Bauer, “Neueste Schriften über die Judenfrage”.—Ed.

from *Hegel*, since he uses the two words “united” and “development”. Saint Bruno, of course, had in a round-about way to try to turn against Feuerbach the proof given in *Die heilige Familie* of his own complete dependence on Hegel.

“See, that is how Bauer had to end! He fought as best he could against all the Hegelian categories”, with the exception of self-consciousness — particularly in the glorious struggle of the *Literatur-Zeitung* against Herr Hinrichs. How he fought and conquered them we have already seen. For good measure, let us quote *Wigand*, page 110, where he asserts that

the “true” (1) “solution” (2) “of contradictions” (3) “in nature and history” (4), the “true unity” (5) “of separate relations” (6), the “genuine” (7) “basis” (8) “and abyss” (9) “of religion, the truly *infinite*” (10), “irresistible, self-creative” (11) “personality” (12) “has not yet been found”.

These three lines contain not two doubtful Hegelian categories, as in the case of Hess, but a round dozen of “true, infinite, irresistible” Hegelian categories which reveal themselves as such by “the true unity of separate relations”—“see, that is how Bauer had to end”! And if the holy man thinks that in Hess he has discovered a Christian believer, not because Hess “hopes”—as Bruno says—but because he does *not* hope and because he talks of the “resurrection”, then our great church father enables us, on the basis of this same page 110, to demonstrate his very pronounced *Judaism*. He declares there

“that the *true, living man in the flesh has not yet been born*”!!! (a new elucidation about the determination of the “unique sex”) “and the mongrel produced” (*Bruno Bauer*!?) “is not yet able to master all *dogmatic formulas*”, etc.

That is to say, the *Messiah* is not yet born, the *son of man* has first to come into the world and this world, being the world of the Old Testament, is still under the rod of the *law*, of “dogmatic formulas”.

Just as Saint Bruno, as shown above, made use of “Engels and Marx” for a transition to Hess, so now the latter serves him to bring Feuerbach finally into causal connection with his excursions on Stirner, *Die heilige Familie* and *Die letzten Philosophen*.

“See, that is how Feuerbach had to end!” “Philosophy had to end *picusly*”, etc. (*Wigand*, p. 145.)

The true causal connection, however, is that this exclamation is an imitation of a passage from Hess’ *Die letzten Philosophen* aimed against Bauer, among others (Preface, p. 4):

“Thus [...] and in no other way had the last offspring of the Christian ascetics [...] to take farewell of the world.”

Saint Bruno ends his speech for the prosecution against Feuerbach and his alleged accomplices with the reproach to Feuerbach that all he can do is to “trumpet”, to “blow blasts on a trumpet”, whereas Monsieur B. Bauer or Madame la critique, the “mongrel produced”, to say nothing of the continual “destruction”, “*drives forth in his triumphal chariot and gathers new triumphs*” (p. 125), “hurls down from the throne” (p. 119), “slays” (p. 111), “strikes down like thunder” (p. 115), “destroys once and for all” (p. 120), “shatters” (p. 121), allows nature merely to “vegetate” (p. 120), builds “stricter” (!) “prisons” (p. 104) and, finally, with “crushing” pulpit eloquence expatiates, on p. 105, in a brisk, pious, cheerful and free^a fashion on the “stably-strongly-firmly-existing”, hurling “rock-like matter and rocks” at Feuerbach’s head (p. 110) and, in conclusion, by a side thrust vanquishes Saint Max as well, by adding “the most abstract abstractness” and “the hardest hardness” (on p. 124) to “critical criticism”, “social society” and “rock-like matter and rocks”.

All this Saint Bruno accomplished “through himself, in himself and with himself”, because he is “He himself”; indeed, he is “himself always the greatest and can always be the greatest” (*is and can be!*) “through himself, in himself and with himself” (p. 136). That’s that.

Saint Bruno would undoubtedly be dangerous to the female sex, for he is an “irresistible personality”, if “in the same measure on the other hand” he did not fear “sensuousness as the barrier against which man has to deal himself a mortal *blow*”. Therefore, “through himself, in himself and with himself” he will hardly pluck any flowers but rather allow them to wither in infinite longing and hysterical yearning for the “irresistible personality”, who “possesses this unique sex and these unique, particular sex organs”.*

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:]

5. Saint Bruno in His “Triumphal Chariot”

Before leaving our church father “victorious and confident of victory”, let us for a moment mingle with the gaping crowd that comes up running just as eagerly when he “drives forth in his triumphal chariot and gathers new triumphs” as when General Tom Thumb with his four ponies provides a diversion. It is not surprising that we hear the humming of street-songs, for to be welcomed with street-songs “belongs after all to the concept” of triumph “in general”.

^a “Brisk, pious, cheerful and free” (“*frisch, fromm, fröhlich und frei*”)—the initial words of a students’ saying, which were turned by Ludwig Jahn into the motto of the sport movement he initiated.—Ed.

III

SAINT MAX⁴⁵

“Was jehen mir die jrinen Beeme an?”^a

Saint Max exploits, “employs” or “uses” the Council to deliver a long apologetic commentary on “*the book*”, which is none other than “*the book*”, the book as such, the book pure and simple, i.e., the perfect book, the Holy Book, the book as something holy, the book as the holy of holies, the book in heaven, viz., *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*. “The book”, as we know, fell from the heavens towards the end of 1844 and took on the shape of a servant with O. Wigand in Leipzig.⁴⁶ It was, therefore, at the mercy of the vicissitudes of terrestrial life and was attacked by three “unique ones”, viz., the mysterious personality of *Szeliga*, the gnostic *Feuerbach* and *Hess*.^b However much at every moment Saint Max as creator towers over himself as a creation, as he does over his other creations, he nevertheless took pity on his weakly offspring and, in order to defend it and ensure its safety, let out a loud “critical hurrah”. In order to fathom in all their significance both this “critical hurrah” and *Szeliga*’s mysterious personality, we must here, to some extent, deal with church history and look more closely at “the book”. Or, to use the language of Saint Max: we “shall episodically put” “into this passage” a church-historical “meditation” on *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum* “simply because” “it seems to us that it could contribute to the elucidation of the rest”.

^a “What are the green trees to me?”—a paraphrase (in the Berlin dialect) of a sentence from Heine’s work *Reisebilder*, Dritter Teil “Die Bäder von Lucca”, Kapitel IV.—Ed.

^b *Szeliga*, “Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum”; *Feuerbach*, “Über das ‘Wesen des Christenthums’ in Beziehung auf den ‘Einigen und sein Eigenthum’”; *Hess*, *Die letzten Philosophen*.—Ed.

“Lift up your heads, O ye gates; and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of Glory shall come in.

“Who is this King of Glory? The War-Lord strong and mighty, the War-Lord mighty in battle.

“Lift up your heads, O ye gates; even lift them up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of Glory shall come in.

“Who is this King of Glory? The Lord Unique,^a he is the King of Glory,” (Psalms, 24:7-10).

^a In the Bible “The Lord of Hosts”.— *Ed.*

1. THE UNIQUE AND HIS PROPERTY

The man who “has based his cause on nothing”^a begins his lengthy “critical hurrah” like a good German, straightway with a jeremiad: “Is there anything that is not to be my cause?” (p. 5 of the “book”). And he continues lamenting heart-rendingly that “everything is to be his cause”, that “God’s cause, the cause of mankind, of truth and freedom, and in addition the cause of his people, of his lord”, and thousands of other good causes, are imposed on him. Poor fellow! The French and English bourgeois complain about lack of markets, trade crises, panic on the stock exchange, the political situation prevailing at the moment, etc.; the German petty bourgeois, whose active participation in the bourgeois movement has been merely an ideal one, and who for the rest exposed only himself to risk, sees his own cause simply as the “good cause”, the “cause of freedom, truth, mankind”, etc.

Our German school-teacher simply believes this illusion of the German petty bourgeois and on three pages he provisionally discusses all these good causes.

He investigates “God’s cause”, “the cause of mankind” (pp. 6 and 7) and finds these are “purely egoistical causes”, that both “God” and “mankind” worry only about what is *theirs*, that “truth, freedom, humanity, justice” are “only interested in themselves and not in us, only in their own well-being and not in ours”—from which

^a Here and below Marx and Engels paraphrase the first lines of Goethe's poem *Vanitas! Vanitatum vanitas!*: “Ich hab' mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestellt.” (“I have based my cause on nothing.”) “Ich hab' mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestellt” is the heading of Stirner's preface to his book.—*Ed.*

he concludes that all these persons “are thereby exceptionally well-off”. He goes so far as to transform these idealistic phrases—God, truth, etc.—into prosperous burghers who “are exceptionally well-off” and enjoy a “*profitable* egoism”. But this vexes the holy egoist: “And I?” he exclaims.

“I, for my part, draw the lesson from this and, instead of continuing to serve these great egoists, I should rather be an egoist myself!” (p. 7)

Thus we see what holy motives guide Saint Max in his transition to egoism. It is not the good things of this world, not treasures which moth and rust corrupt, not the capital belonging to his fellow unique ones, but heavenly treasure, the capital which belongs to God, truth, freedom, mankind, etc., that gives him no peace.

If it had not been expected of him that he should serve numerous good causes, he would never have made the discovery that he also has his “own” cause, and therefore he would never have based this cause of his “on nothing” (i.e., the “book”).

If Saint Max had looked a little more closely at these various “causes” and the “owners” of these causes, e.g., God, mankind, truth, he would have arrived at the opposite conclusion: that egoism based on the egoistic mode of action of these persons must be just as imaginary as these persons themselves.

Instead of this, our saint decides to enter into competition with “God” and “truth” and to base his cause on himself—

“on myself, on the I that is, just as much as God, the nothing of everything else, the I that is everything for me, the I that is the unique.... I am nothing in the sense of void, *but* the creative nothing, the nothing from which I myself, as creator, create everything.”

The holy church father could also have expressed this last proposition as follows: I am everything in the void of nonsense, “*but*” I am the nugatory creator, the all, from which I myself, as creator, create nothing.

Which of these two readings is the correct one will become evident later. So much for the preface.

The “book” itself is divided like the book “of old”, into the Old and New Testament—namely, into the unique history of man (the Law and the Prophets) and the inhuman history of the unique (the Gospel of the Kingdom of God). The former is history in the framework of logic, the logos confined in the past; the latter is logic in history, the emancipated logos, which struggles against the present and triumphantly overcomes it.

THE OLD TESTAMENT: MAN⁴⁷1. *The Book of Genesis, i.e., A Man's Life*

Saint Max pretends here that he is writing the *biography* of his mortal enemy, "man", and not of a "unique" or "real individual". This ties him up in delightful contradictions.

As becomes every normal genesis "a man's life" begins *ab ovo*, with the "child". As revealed to us on page 13, the child

"from the outset lives a life of struggle against the entire world, it resists everything and everything resists it". "Both remain enemies" but "with awe and respect" and "are constantly on the watch, *looking for each other's weaknesses*".

This is further amplified, on page 14:

"we", as children, "try to find out the *basis of things* or what lies behind them; *therefore*" (so no longer out of enmity) "*we are trying to discover everybody's weaknesses*". (Here the finger of Szeliga, the mystery-monger, is evident.^a)

Thus, the *child* immediately becomes a *metaphysician*, trying to find out the "*basis of things*".

This *speculating* child, for whom "the nature of things" lies closer to his heart than his toys, "sometimes" in the long run, succeeds in coping with the "world of things", conquers it and then enters a new phase, the *age of youth*, when he has to face a new "arduous struggle of life", the struggle against reason, for the "*spirit means the first self-discovery*" and: "We are above the world, we are spirit" (p. 15). The point of view of the *youth* is a "heavenly one"; the child merely "*learned*", "he did not dwell on purely logical or theological problems"—*just as* (the child) "Pilate" hurriedly passed over the question: "What is truth?"^b (p. 17). The youth "tries to master thoughts", he "understands ideas, the *spirit*" and "seeks ideas"; he "is engrossed in thought" (p. 16), he has "absolute thoughts, i.e., *nothing but thoughts*, logical thoughts". The youth who thus "deports himself", instead of chasing after young women and other earthly things, is no other than the young "Stirner", the studious Berlin youth, busy with Hegel's logic and gazing with amazement at the great Michelet. Of *this* youth it is rightly said on page 17:

"to bring to light *pure thought*, to devote oneself to it—in this is the *joy of youth*, and all the bright images of the world of thought—truth, freedom, mankind, *Man*, etc.—illuminate and inspire the youthful soul."

This youth then "throws aside" the "object" as well and "occupies himself" exclusively "with his thoughts";

^a An allusion to Szeliga's article "Eugen Sue: Die Geheimnisse von Paris. Kritik". Cf. present edition, Vol. 4, p. 55.—*Ed.*

^b John 18:38.—*Ed.*

“he includes all that is not spiritual under the contemptuous name of *external things*, and if, all the same, he does cling to such external things as, for example, students’ customs, etc., it happens only when and because he *discovers* spirit in them, i.e., when they become *symbols* for him”. (Who will not “*discover*” “*Szeliga*” here?)

Virtuous Berlin youth! The beer-drinking ritual of the students’ association was for him only a “symbol” and only for the sake of the “symbol” was he after a drinking bout many a time found under the table, where he probably also wished to “discover spirit”—How virtuous is this good youth, whom old *Ewald*, who wrote two volumes on the “virtuous youth”,^a could have taken as a model, is seen also from the fact that it was “made known” to him (p. 15): “Father and mother should be abandoned, all natural authority should be considered broken.” For him, “the rational man, the family as a natural authority does not exist; there follows a renunciation of parents, brothers and sisters, etc.”—But they are all “re-born as *spiritual, rational* authority”, thanks to which the good youth reconciles obedience and fear of one’s parents with his speculating conscience, and everything remains as before. Likewise “it is said” (p. 15): “We ought to obey God rather than men.”^b Indeed, the good youth reaches the highest peak of morality on page 16, where “it is said”: “One should obey one’s conscience rather than God.” This moral exultation raises him even above the “revengeful Eumenides” and even above the “anger of Poseidon”—he is afraid of nothing so much as his “conscience”.

Having discovered that “the spirit is the essential” he no longer even fears the following perilous conclusions:

“If, *however*, the spirit is recognised as the essential, *nevertheless* it makes a difference *whether* the spirit is poor or rich, and *therefore*” (!) “one strives to become rich in spirit; the *spirit* wishes to expand, to establish its realm, a realm not of this world, which has just been overcome. *In this way*, the spirit strives to become all in all”^c (*what way* is this?), “i.e., *although* I am spirit, *nevertheless* I am not perfect spirit *and must*” (?) “first seek the perfect spirit” (p. 17).

“Nevertheless *it* makes a difference.”—“*It*”, what is this? What is the “*It*” that makes the difference? We shall very often come across this mysterious “*It*” in our holy man, and it will then turn out that it is the unique from the standpoint of *substance*, the beginning of “unique” logic, and as such the true identity of Hegel’s “being” and “nothing”. Hence, for everything that this “*It*” does, says or

^a Johann Ludwig Ewald, *Der gute Jüngling, gute Gatte und Vater, oder Mittel, um es zu werden.*—*Ed.*

^b The Acts of the Apostles 5:29.—*Ed.*

^c 1 Corinthians 15:28.—*Ed.*

performs, we shall lay the responsibility on our saint, whose relation to it is that of its creator. First of all, this "It", as we have seen, makes a difference between poor and rich. And why? Because "the spirit is recognised as the essential". Poor "It", which without this recognition would never have arrived at the difference between poor and rich! "And therefore *one* strives", etc. "*One!*" We have here the second impersonal person which, together with the "It", is in Stirner's service and must perform the heaviest menial work for him. How these two are accustomed to support each other is clearly seen here. Since "It" makes a difference whether the spirit is poor or rich, "one" (could anyone but Stirner's faithful servant^a have had this idea!)—"one, therefore, strives to become rich in spirit". "It" gives the signal and immediately "one" joins in at the top of its voice. The division of labour is classically carried out.

Since "one strives to become *rich in spirit, the spirit* wishes to expand, to establish *its realm*", etc. "If however" a connection is present here "it still makes a difference" whether "one" wants to become "*rich in spirit*" or whether "*the spirit* wants to establish its realm". Up to now "*the spirit*" has *not* wanted *anything*, "*the spirit*" has not yet figured as a *person*—it was only a matter of the spirit of the "youth", and not of "*the spirit*" as such, of the spirit as *subject*. But our holy writer now needs a spirit different from that of the youth, in order to place it in opposition to the latter as a foreign, and in the last resort, as a holy spirit. *Conjuring trick* No. 1.

"In this way the spirit strives to become all in all", a somewhat obscure statement, which is then explained as follows:

"Although I am spirit, nevertheless I am not perfect spirit and must first seek the perfect spirit."

But if Saint Max is the "imperfect spirit", "nevertheless it makes a difference" whether he has to "*perfect*" his spirit or seek "*the perfect spirit*". A few lines earlier he was in fact dealing only with the "*poor*" and "*rich*" spirit—a quantitative, profane distinction—and now there suddenly appears the "*imperfect*" and "*perfect*" spirit—a qualitative, mysterious distinction. The striving towards the development of one's own spirit can now be transformed into the hunt of the "imperfect spirit" for "*the perfect spirit*". The holy spirit wanders about like a ghost. *Conjuring trick* No. 2.

The holy author continues:

"But thereby" (i.e., by the transformation of the striving towards "perfection" of *my* spirit into the search for "*the perfect spirit*") "I, who have only just found myself

^a An ironical allusion to F. Szeliga. See this volume, p. 149.—Ed.

as spirit, at once lose myself again, in that I bow down before the perfect spirit, as a spirit which is not my own, but a spirit of the *beyond*, and I feel my emptiness" (p. 18).

This is nothing but a further development of conjuring trick No. 2. After the "perfect spirit" has been *assumed* as an *existing being* and opposed to the "imperfect spirit", it becomes obvious that the "imperfect spirit", the youth, painfully feels his "emptiness" to the depths of his soul. Let us go on!

"True, it is all a matter of spirit, *but* is every spirit the right spirit? The right and true spirit is the ideal of the spirit, the 'holy spirit'. It is not my or your spirit but *precisely*" (!)—"an ideal spirit, a spirit of the beyond—'God'. 'God is spirit'"^a (p. 18).

Here the "perfect spirit" has been suddenly transformed into the "right" spirit, and immediately afterwards into the "right and true spirit". The latter is more closely defined as the "ideal of the spirit, the holy spirit" and this is proved by the fact that it is "not my or your spirit but *precisely*, a spirit of the beyond, an ideal spirit—God". The true spirit is the *ideal* of the spirit, "precisely" because it is *ideal*! It is the holy spirit "precisely" because it is—God! What "virtuosity of thought"! We note also in passing that up to now nothing was said about "your" spirit. Conjuring trick No. 3.

Thus, if I seek to train myself as a mathematician, or, as Saint Max puts it, to "perfect" myself as a mathematician, then I am seeking the "perfect" mathematician, i.e., the "right and true" mathematician, the "ideal" of the mathematician, the "holy" mathematician, who is distinct from me and you (although in my eyes you may be a perfect mathematician, just as for the Berlin youth his professor of philosophy is the perfect spirit); but a mathematician who is "precisely ideal, of the beyond", the mathematician in the heavens, "God". God is a mathematician.

Saint Max arrives at all these great results because "it makes a difference whether the spirit is rich or poor"; i.e., in plain language, it makes a difference whether anyone is rich or poor in spirit, and because his "youth" has discovered this remarkable fact.

On page 18 Saint Max continues:

"It divides the *man* from the youth that the former takes the world as it is", etc.

Consequently, we do not learn how the youth arrives at the point where he suddenly takes the world "as it is", nor do we see our holy dialectician making the transition from youth to man, we merely learn that "*It*" has to perform this service and "*divide*" the youth from the man. But even this "It" by itself does not suffice to bring the cumbersome waggonload of unique thoughts into motion. For

^a John 4:24.—*Ed.*

after “*It*” has “divided the man from the youth”, the man all the same relapses again into the youth, begins to occupy himself afresh “exclusively with the spirit” and does not get going until “one” hurries to his assistance with a change of horses. “Only when *one* has grown fond of oneself *corporeally*, etc.” (p. 18), “only then” everything goes forward smoothly again, the man discovers that he has a personal interest, and arrives at “the *second self-discovery*”, in that he not only “finds himself as spirit”, like the youth, “and then at once loses himself again in the universal spirit”, but finds himself “as *corporeal spirit*” (p. 19). This “corporeal spirit” finally arrives at having an “interest not only in its own spirit” (like the youth), “but in total satisfaction, in the satisfaction of the whole fellow” (an interest in the satisfaction of the whole fellow!)—he arrives at the point where “he is pleased with himself exactly as he is”. Being a German, Stirner’s “man” arrives at everything very late. He could see, sauntering along the Paris boulevards or in London’s Regent Street, hundreds of “young men”, fops and dandies who have not yet found themselves as “corporeal spirits” and are nevertheless “pleased with themselves exactly as they are”, and whose main interest lies in the “satisfaction of the whole fellow.”

This second “self-discovery” fills our holy dialectician with such enthusiasm that he suddenly forgets his role and begins to speak not of the *man*, but of *himself*, and reveals that he himself, he the unique, is “the man”, and that “the man” = “the unique”. A new conjuring trick.

“How I find myself” (it should read: “how the youth finds himself”) “behind the *things*, and indeed as *spirit*, so subsequently, too, I must find myself” (it should read: “the man must find himself”) “behind the *thoughts*, i.e., as their creator and owner. In the period of spirits, thoughts outgrew me” (the youth), “although they were the offspring of my brain; like delirious fantasies they floated around me and agitated me greatly, a dreadful power. The thoughts became themselves *corporeal*, they were spectres like God, the Emperor, the Pope, the Fatherland, etc.; by destroying their corporeality, I take them back into my own corporeality and *announce*: I alone am corporeal. And now I take the world as it is for me, as *my* world, as my property: I relate everything to myself.”

Thus, the man, identified here with the “unique”, having first given thoughts corporeality, i.e., having transformed them into spectres, now destroys this corporeality again, by taking them back into his own body, which he thus makes into a body of spectres. The fact that he arrives at his own corporeality only through the negation of the spectres, shows the nature of this constructed corporeality of the man, which he has first to “announce” to “himself”, in order to believe in it. But what he “announces to himself” he does not even “announce” correctly. The fact that apart from his “unique” body

there are not also to be found in his head all kinds of independent bodies, spermatozoa, he transforms into the “*fable*”^a: I *alone* am corporeal. Another conjuring trick.

Further, the man who, as a youth, stuffed his head with all kinds of nonsense about existing powers and relations such as the Emperor, the Fatherland, the State, etc., and knew them only as his own “delirious fantasies”, in the form of his conceptions—this man, *according to Saint Max, actually destroys all these powers* by getting out of his head his false opinion of them. On the contrary: now that he no longer looks at the world through the spectacles of his fantasy, he has to think of the practical interrelations of the world, to get to know them and to act in accordance with them. By destroying the *fantastic corporeality* which the world had for him, he finds its real corporeality outside his fantasy. With the disappearance of the *spectral corporeality* of the Emperor, what disappears for him is not the corporeality, but the *spectral character* of the Emperor, the actual power of whom he can now at last appreciate in all its scope. Conjuring trick No. 3[a].

The youth as a man does not even react critically towards ideas which are valid also for others and are current as categories, but is critical only of those ideas that are the “mere offspring of his brain”, i.e., general concepts about existing conditions reproduced in his brain. Thus, for example, he does not even resolve the *category* “Fatherland”, but only his personal opinion of this category, after which the *generally valid* category still remains, and even in the sphere of “philosophical thought” the work is only just beginning. He wants, however, to make us believe that he has destroyed the category itself because he has destroyed his emotional personal relation to it—exactly as he has wanted to make us believe that he has destroyed the power of the Emperor by giving up his fantastic conception of the Emperor. Conjuring trick No. 4.

“*And now,*” continues Saint Max, “I take the world as it is for me, as my world, as my property.”

He takes the world as it is for him, i.e., *as he is compelled to take it*, and thereby he has *appropriated* the world for himself, has made it his property—a mode of acquisition which, indeed, is not mentioned by any of the economists, but the method and success of which will be the more brilliantly disclosed in “the book”. Basically, however, he “takes” not the “world”, but only his “delirious fantasy” about the world as his own, and makes it his property. He takes the world as his

^a In German a play on words: *Ich sage*—I say, I announce and *die Sage*—fable, myth, saga.—*Ed.*

conception of the world, and the world as his conception is his imagined property, the property of his conception, his conception as property, his property as conception, his own peculiar conception, or his conception of property; and all this he expresses in the incomparable phrase: "I relate everything to myself."

After the man has recognised, as the saint himself admits, that the world was only populated by spectres, because the youth saw spectres, after the *illusory world* of the youth has disappeared for the man, the latter finds himself in a *real* world, independent of youthful fancies.

And so, it should therefore read, I take the world as it is *independently of myself*, in the form in which it *belongs to itself* ("the man takes"—see page 18—"the world as it is", and not as he would like it to be), in the first place as my non-property (hitherto it was my property only as a spectre); I relate myself to everything and only to that extent do I relate everything to myself.

"If I as spirit rejected the world with the deepest contempt for it, then I as proprietor reject the spectres or ideas into their emptiness. They no longer have power over me, just as no 'earthly force' has power over the spirit" (p. 20).

We see here that the proprietor, Stirner's man, at once enters into possession, *sine beneficio deliberandi atque inventarii*,^a of the inheritance of the youth which, according to his own statement, consists only of "delirious fantasies" and "spectres". He believes that in the process of changing from a child into a youth he had truly coped with the world of things, and in the process of changing from a youth into a man he had truly coped with the world of the spirit, that now, as a man, he has the whole world in his pocket and has nothing more to trouble him. If, according to the words of the youth which he repeats, no earthly force outside him has any power over the spirit, and hence the spirit is the supreme power on earth—and he, the man, has forced this omnipotent spirit into subjection to himself—is he not then completely omnipotent? He forgets that he has only destroyed the fantastic and spectral form assumed by the idea of "Fatherland", etc., in the brain of the "youth", but that he has still *not touched* these ideas, insofar as they express *actual* relations. Far from having become the master of ideas—he is only now capable of arriving at "ideas".

"Now, let us say in conclusion, it can be clearly seen" (p. 199) that the holy man has brought his interpretation of the different stages of

^a Without the advantage of deliberation and inventory—the right of deliberation and inventory is an old principle of the law of inheritance, which grants the heir time to decide whether he wants to accept or to reject a legacy.—*Ed.*

life to the desired and predestined goal. He informs us of the result achieved in a thesis that is a spectral shade which we shall now confront with its lost body.

Unique thesis, p. 20.

“The child was *realistic*, in thrall to the *things of this world*, until little by little he succeeded in penetrating *behind these very things*. The youth was *idealistic*, inspired by thoughts, until he worked his way up to become a man, the egoistic man, who deals with things and thoughts as he pleases and puts his personal interest above everything. Finally, the old man? It will be time enough to speak of this when I become one.”

Owner of the accompanying liberated shade.

The child was *actually* in thrall to the *world of his things*, until *little by little* (a borrowed conjuring trick standing for development) he succeeded in leaving *these very things behind him*. The youth was *fanciful* and was made thoughtless by his enthusiasm, until he was brought down by the man, the egoistic *burgher*, with whom things and thoughts deal as they please, because his personal interest puts everything above him. Finally, the old man? — “Woman, what have I to do with thee?”^a

The entire history of “a man’s life” amounts, therefore, “let us say in conclusion”, to the following:

1. Stirner regards the various stages of life only as “self-discoveries” of the individual, and these “self-discoveries” are moreover always reduced to a definite relation of consciousness. Thus the variety of *consciousness* is here the life of the individual. The physical and social changes which take place in the individuals and produce an altered consciousness are, of course, of no concern to Stirner. In Stirner’s work, therefore, child, youth and man always find the world ready-made, just as they merely “find” “themselves”; absolutely nothing is done to ensure that there should be something which can in fact be found. But even the relation of *consciousness* is not correctly understood either, but only in its speculative distortion. Hence, too, all these figures have a philosophical attitude to the world — “the child is *realistic*”, “the youth is *idealistic*”, the man is the negative unity of the two, absolute negativity, as is evident from the above-quoted final proposition. Here the secret of “a man’s life” is revealed, here it becomes clear that the “*child*” was only a disguise of “*realism*”, the “*youth*” a disguise of “*idealism*”, the “*man*” of an attempted *solution* of this *philosophical antithesis*. This solution, this “*absolute negativity*”, is arrived at — it is now seen — only thanks to the man blindly taking on trust the illusions both of the child and

^a John 2:4.—Ed.

of the youth, *believing* thus to have overcome the world of things and the world of the spirit.

2. Since Saint Max pays no attention to the physical and social "life" of the individual, and says nothing at all about "life", he quite consistently abstracts from historical epochs, nationalities, classes, etc., or, which is the *same thing*, he inflates the *consciousness* predominant in the class nearest to him in his immediate environment into the normal consciousness of "a man's life". In order to rise above this local and pedantic narrow-mindedness he has only to confront "his" youth with the first young clerk he encounters, a young English factory worker or young Yankee, not to mention the young Kirghiz-Kazakhs.

3. Our saint's enormous gullibility—the true spirit of his book—is not content with causing his youth to believe in his child, and his man to believe in his youth. The illusions which some "youths", "men", etc., have or claim to have about themselves, are without any examination accepted by Stirner himself and confused with the "*life*", with the *reality*, of these highly ambiguous youths and men.

4. The prototype of the entire structure of the stages of life has already been depicted in the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopädie*^a and "in various transformations" in other passages in Hegel as well. Saint Max, pursuing "his own" purposes, had, of course, to undertake certain "transformations" here also. Whereas Hegel, for example, is still to such an extent guided by the empirical world that he portrays the German burgher as the servant of the world around him, Stirner has to make him the master of this world, which he is not even in imagination. Similarly, Saint Max pretends that he does not speak of the old man for empirical reasons; he wishes to wait until he becomes one himself (here, therefore, "a man's life" = his unique life). Hegel briskly sets about constructing the four stages of the human life because, in the real world, the negation is posited twice, i.e., as moon and as comet (cf. Hegel's *Naturphilosophie*^b), and therefore the quaternity here takes the place of the trinity. Stirner finds his own uniqueness in making moon and comet coincide and so abolishes the unfortunate old man from "a man's life". The reason for this conjuring trick becomes evident as soon as we examine the construction of the unique history of man.

^a G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. C. Die Philosophie des Geistes.*—Ed.

^b G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Naturphilosophie.*—Ed.

2. *The Economy of the Old Testament*

We must here, for a moment, jump from the “Law” to the “Prophets”, since at this point already we reveal the secret of unique domestic economy in heaven and on earth. In the Old Testament, too—where the law, man, still is a school-master of the unique (Galatians 3:24)—the history of the kingdom of the unique follows a wise plan fixed from eternity. Everything has been foreseen and preordained in order that the unique could appear in the world, when the time had come^a to redeem holy people from their holiness.

The first book, “A Man’s Life”, is also called the “Book of Genesis”, because it contains in embryo the entire domestic economy of the unique, because it gives us a prototype of the whole subsequent development up to the moment when the time comes for the end of the world. The entire unique history revolves round three stages: child, youth and man, who return “in various transformations” and in ever widening circles until, finally, the entire history of the world of things and the world of the spirit is reduced to “child, youth and man”. Everywhere we shall find nothing but disguised “child, youth and man”, just as we already discovered in them three disguised categories.

We spoke above of the German philosophical conception of history. Here, in Saint Max, we find a brilliant example of it. The speculative idea, the abstract conception, is made the driving force of history, and history is thereby turned into the mere history of philosophy. But even the latter is not conceived as, according to existing sources, it actually took place—not to mention how it evolved under the influence of real historical relations—but as it was understood and described by recent German philosophers, in particular Hegel and Feuerbach. And from these descriptions again only that was selected which could be adapted to the given end, and which came into the hands of our saint by tradition. Thus, history becomes a mere history of illusory ideas, a history of spirits and ghosts, while the real, empirical history that forms the basis of this ghostly history is only utilised to provide bodies for these ghosts; from it are borrowed the names required to clothe these ghosts with the appearance of reality. In making this experiment our saint frequently forgets his role and writes an undisguised ghost-story.

In his case we find this method of making history in its most naive, most classic simplicity. Three simple categories—realism, idealism

^a Galatians 4:4.—*Ed.*

and absolute negativity (here named “*egoism*”) as the unity of the two—which we have already encountered in the shape of the child, youth and man, are made the basis of all history and are embellished with various historical signboards; together with their modest suite of auxiliary categories they form the content of all the allegedly historical phases which are trotted out. Saint Max once again reveals here his boundless faith by pushing to greater extremes than any of his predecessors faith in the speculative content of history dished up by German philosophers. In this solemn and tedious construction of history, therefore, all that matters is to find a pompous series of resounding names for three categories that are so hackneyed that they no longer dare to show themselves publicly under their own names. Our anointed author could perfectly well have passed from the “man” (p. 20) immediately to the “ego” (p. 201) or better still to the “unique” (p. 485); but that would have been too simple. Moreover, the strong competition among the German speculative philosophers makes it the duty of each new competitor to offer an ear-splitting historical advertisement for his commodity.

“The force of true development”, to use *Dottore Graziano’s* words, “proceeds most forcibly” in the following “transformations”:

Basis:

- I. Realism.
- II. Idealism.
- III. The negative unity of the two. “*One*” (p. 485).

First nomenclature:

- I. *Child*, dependent on things (realism).
- II. *Youth*, dependent on ideas (idealism).
- III. *Man*—(as the negative unity)

expressed positively:	}	(egoism)
the owner of ideas and things		
expressed negatively:		
free from ideas and things		

Second, historical nomenclature:

- I. *Negro* (realism, child).
- II. *Mongol* (idealism, youth).
- III. *Caucasian* (negative unity of realism and idealism, man).

Third, most general nomenclature:

- I. Realistic egoist (egoist in the ordinary sense)—child, Negro.
- II. Idealist egoist (devotee)—youth, Mongol.
- III. True egoist (the unique)—man, Caucasian.

Fourth, historical nomenclature. Repetition of the preceding stages within the category of the Caucasian.

I. The *Ancients*. Negroid Caucasians—childish men—pagans—dependent on things—realists—the world.

Transition (child penetrating behind the “things of this world”): Sophists, Sceptics, etc.

II. The *Moderns*. Mongoloid Caucasians—youthful men—Christians—dependent on ideas—idealists—spirit.

1. Pure history of spirits,^a Christianity as spirit. “The spirit.”

2. Impure history of spirits. Spirit in relation to others. “The Possessed”.

A. Purely impure history of spirits.

a) *The apparition*, the ghost, the spirit in the Negroid state, as thing-like spirit and spiritual thing—objective being for the Christian, spirit as child.

b) *The whimsy*, the fixed idea, the spirit in the Mongolian condition, as spiritual in the spirit, determination in consciousness, conceptual being in the Christian—spirit as youth.

B. Impurely impure (historical) history of spirits.

a) Catholicism—Middle Ages (the Negro, child, realism, etc.).

b) Protestantism—modern times in modern times—(Mongol, youth, idealism, etc.).

Within Protestantism it is possible to make further subdivisions, for example:

α) English philosophy—realism, child, Negro.

β) German philosophy—idealism, youth, Mongol.

3. *The Hierarchy*—negative unity of the two within the Mongoloid-Caucasian point of view. Such unity appears where historical relations are changed into actually existing relations or where opposites are presented as existing side by side. Here, therefore, we have two co-existing stages:

A. *The “uneducated”*^b (evil ones, bourgeois, egoists in the ordinary sense)=Negroes, children, Catholics, realists, etc.

B. *The “educated”* (good ones, *citoyens*, devotees, priests, etc.)=Mongols, youths, Protestants, idealists.

^a In the German original *Geistergeschichte*, that is, “ghost-story” (*Geister*—ghosts or spirits; *Geschichte*—story or history). In this volume, however, it has usually been rendered as “history of spirits” to bring out more clearly the connection with the words that precede or follow it.—*Ed.*

^b Here and later the authors ironically use Berlin dialect words for uneducated (*Unjebildete*) and educated (*Jebildete*).—*Ed.*

These two stages exist side by side and hence it follows “easily” that the “educated” rule over the “uneducated”—this is the *hierarchy*. In the further course of historical development there arises then

the non-Hegelian from the “uneducated”,
the Hegelian from the “educated”,*

from which it follows that the Hegelians rule over the non-Hegelians. In this way Stirner converts the speculative notion of the domination of the speculative idea in history into the notion of the domination of the speculative philosophers themselves. The view of history hitherto held by him—the domination of the idea—becomes in the hierarchy a relation actually existing at present; it becomes the world domination of ideologists. This shows how deeply Stirner has plunged into speculation. This domination of the speculative philosophers and ideologists is finally developing, “for the time has come” for it, into the following, concluding nomenclature:

- a) *Political liberalism*, dependent on things, independent of persons—realism, child, Negro, the ancient, apparition, Catholicism, the “uneducated”, masterless.
- b) *Social liberalism*, independent of things, dependent on the spirit, without object—idealism, youth, Mongol, the modern, whimsy, Protestantism, the “educated”, propertyless.
- c) *Humane liberalism*, masterless and propertyless, that is godless, for God is simultaneously the supreme master and the supreme possession, hierarchy—negative unity in the sphere of liberalism and, as such, domination over the world of things and thoughts; at the same time the perfect egoist in the abolition of egoism—the perfect hierarchy. At the same time, it forms the

Transition (youth penetrating behind the world of thoughts) to

- III. the “*ego*”—i.e., the perfect Christian, the perfect man, the Caucasian Caucasian and true egoist, who—just as the Christian became spirit through the supersession of the ancient world—becomes a corporeal being^a through the dissolution of the realm of spirits, by entering, *sine beneficio deliberandi et inventarii*, into the inheritance of idealism, the

* “The shaman and the speculative philosopher denote the lowest and the highest point in the scale of the *inner* man, the Mongol” (p. 453).

^a In German a pun on *der Leibhaftige*, which can mean corporeal being or the devil.—Ed.

youth, the Mongol, the modern, the Christian, the possessed, the whimsical, the Protestant, the “educated”, the Hegelian and the humane liberal.

NB. 1. “At times” Feuerbachian and other categories, such as reason, the heart, etc., may be also “included episodically”, should a suitable occasion arise, to heighten the colour of the picture and to produce new effects. It goes without saying that these, too, are only new disguises of the ever present idealism and realism.

2. The very pious Saint Max, *Jacques le bonhomme*, has nothing real and mundane to say about real mundane history, except that under the name of “nature”, the “world of things”, the “world of the child”, etc., he always opposes it to consciousness, as an object of speculation of the latter, as a world which, in spite of its continual annihilation, continues to exist in a mystical darkness, in order to reappear on every convenient occasion—probably because children and Negroes continue to exist, and hence also their world, the so-called world of things, “easily” continues to exist. Concerning such historical and non-historical constructions, good old *Hegel* wrote with regard to Schelling—the model for all constructors—that one can say the following in this context:

“It is no more difficult to handle the instrument of this monotonous formalism than a painter’s palette which has only two colours, say black” (realistic, childish, Negroid, etc.) “and yellow”^a (idealist, youthful, Mongolian, etc.), “in order to use the former to paint a surface when something historical” (the “world of things”) “is required, and the latter when a landscape” (“heaven”, spirit, holiness, etc.) “is needed” (*Phänomenologie*, p. 39).

“Ordinary consciousness” has even more pointedly ridiculed constructions of this kind in the following song:

The master sent out John
 And told him to cut the hay;
 But John did not cut the hay
 Nor did he come back home.

Then the master sent out the dog
 And told him to bite John;
 But the dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

Then the master sent out the stick
 And told it to beat the dog;
 But the stick did not beat the dog,
 The dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

^a Hegel mentions red and green as examples.—*Ed.*

Then the master sent out fire
 And told it to burn the stick;
 But the fire did not burn the stick,
 The stick did not beat the dog,
 The dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

Then the master sent out water
 And told it to put out the fire;
 But the water did not put out the fire,
 The fire did not burn the stick,
 The stick did not beat the dog,
 The dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

Then the master sent out the ox
 And told it to drink the water;
 But the ox did not drink the water,
 The water did not put out the fire,
 The fire did not burn the stick,
 The stick did not beat the dog,
 The dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

Then the master sent out the butcher
 And told him to slaughter the ox;
 But the butcher did not slaughter the ox,
 The ox did not drink the water,
 The water did not put out the fire,
 The fire did not burn the stick,
 The stick did not beat the dog,
 The dog did not bite John,
 John did not cut the hay
 And they did not come back home.

Then the master sent out the hangman
 And told him to hang the butcher;
 The hangman did hang the butcher,
 The butcher slaughtered the ox,
 The ox drank the water,
 The water put out the fire,
 The fire burnt the stick,
 The stick beat the dog,
 The dog bit John,
 John cut the hay,
 And they all came back home.^a

^a A German nursery rhyme.— *Ed.*

We shall now see with what “virtuosity of thought” and with what schoolboyish material Jacques le bonhomme elaborates on this scheme.

3. *The Ancients*

Properly speaking we ought to begin here with the Negroes; but Saint Max, who undoubtedly sits in the “Council of Guardians”, in his unfathomable wisdom introduces the Negroes only later, and even then “without any claim to thoroughness and authenticity”. If, therefore, we make Greek philosophy precede the Negro era, i.e., the campaigns of Sesostris and Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt,⁴⁸ it is because we are confident that our holy author has arranged everything wisely.

“Let us, therefore, take a look at the activities which tempt” Stirner’s ancients.

“‘For the ancients, the world was a truth,’ says Feuerbach; but he forgets to make the important addition: a truth, the untruth of which they sought to penetrate and, finally, did indeed penetrate” (p. 22).

“For the ancients”, *their* “world” (not *the* world) “was a truth”—whereby, of course, no truth about the ancient world is stated, but only that the ancients did not have a Christian attitude to their world. As soon as *untruth* penetrated their world (i.e., as soon as this world itself disintegrated in consequence of practical conflicts—and to demonstrate this materialistic development empirically would be the only thing of interest), the ancient philosophers sought to penetrate the world of truth or the truth of their world and then, of course, they found that it had become untrue. Their very search was itself a symptom of the internal collapse of this world. Jacques le bonhomme transforms the idealist symptom into the material cause of the collapse and, as a German church father, makes antiquity itself seek its own negation, Christianity. For him this position of antiquity is inevitable because the ancients are “*children*” who seek to penetrate the “world of things”. “And that is fairly easy too”: by transforming the ancient world into the later consciousness regarding the ancient world, Jacques le bonhomme can, of course, jump in a single leap from the materialistic ancient world to the world of religion, to Christianity. Now the “word of God” immediately emerges in opposition to the real world of antiquity; the Christian conceived as the modern sceptic emerges in opposition to the ancient man conceived as philosopher. His Christian “is never convinced of the vanity of the word of God” and, in consequence of this lack of

conviction, he “believes” “in its eternal and invincible truth” (p. 22). Just as Stirner’s ancient is ancient because he is a non-Christian, not yet a Christian or a hidden Christian, so his primitive Christian is a Christian because he is a non-atheist, not yet an atheist or a hidden atheist. Stirner, therefore, causes Christianity to be negated by the ancients and modern atheism by the primitive Christians, instead of the reverse. Jacques le bonhomme, like all other speculative philosophers, seizes everything by its philosophical tail. A few more examples of this child-like gullibility immediately follow.

“The Christian must consider himself a ‘stranger on the earth’ (Epistle to the Hebrews 11:13)” (p. 23).

On the contrary, the strangers on earth (arising from extremely natural causes e.g., the colossal concentration of wealth in the whole Roman world, etc., etc.) had to consider themselves Christians. It was not their Christianity that made them vagrants, but their vagrancy that made them Christians.

On the same page the holy father jumps straight from Sophocles’ *Antigone* and the sacredness of the burial ceremonial connected with it to the Gospel of Matthew, 8:22 (let the dead bury their dead), while Hegel, at any rate in the *Phänomenologie*, gradually passes from the *Antigone*, etc., to the Romans. With equal right Saint Max could have passed at once to the Middle Ages and, together with Hegel, have advanced this biblical statement against the Crusaders or even, in order to be quite original, have contrasted the burial of Polynices by Antigone with the transfer of the ashes of Napoleon from St. Helena to Paris. It is stated further:

“In Christianity the inviolable truth of family ties” (which on page 22 is noted as one of the “truths” of the ancients) “is depicted as an untruth which should be got rid of as quickly as possible (Mark, 10:29) and so in everything” (p. 23).

This proposition, in which reality is again turned upside-down, should be put the right way up as follows: the actual untruth of family ties (concerning which, *inter alia*, the still existing documents of pre-Christian Roman legislation should be examined) is depicted in Christianity as an inviolable truth, “and so in everything”.

From these examples, therefore, it is superabundantly evident how Jacques le bonhomme, who strives to “get rid as quickly as possible” of empirical history, stands facts on their heads, causes material history to be produced by ideal history, “and so in everything”. At the outset we learn only the alleged attitude of the ancients to their world; as dogmatists they are put in opposition to the ancient world, their own world, instead of appearing as its creators; it is a question only of the relation of consciousness to the

object, to truth; it is a question, therefore, only of the philosophical relation of the ancients to their world—ancient history is replaced by the history of ancient philosophy, and this only in the form in which Saint Max imagines it according to Hegel and Feuerbach.

Thus the history of Greece, from the time of Pericles inclusively, is reduced to a struggle of abstractions: reason, spirit, heart, worldliness, etc. These are the Greek parties. In this ghostly world, which is presented as the Greek world, allegorical persons such as Madame Purity of Heart “machinate” and mythical figures like Pilate (who must never be missing where there are children) find a place quite seriously side by side with Timon of Phlius.

After presenting us with some astounding revelations about the Sophists and Socrates, Saint Max immediately jumps to the Sceptics. He discovers that they completed the work which Socrates began. Hence the positive philosophy of the Greeks that followed immediately after the Sophists and Socrates, especially Aristotle’s encyclopaedic learning, does not exist at all for Jacques le bonhomme. He strives “to get rid as quickly as possible” of the past and hurries to the transition to the “moderns”, finding this transition in the Sceptics, Stoics and Epicureans. Let us see what our holy father has to reveal about them.

“The Stoics wish to realise the ideal of the wise man ... the man who knows how to live ... they find this ideal in contempt for the world, in a life without living development [...] without friendly intercourse with the world, i.e., in a life of isolation [...] not in a life in common with others; the Stoic alone lives, for him everything else is dead. The Epicureans, on the other hand, demand an active life” (p. 30).

We refer Jacques le bonhomme—the man who wants to realise himself and who knows how to live—to, *inter alia*, Diogenes Laertius: there he will discover that the wise man, the *sophos*, is nothing but the idealised Stoic, not the Stoic the realised wise man; he will discover that the *sophos* is by no means only a Stoic but is met with just as much among the Epicureans, the Neo-academists and the Sceptics. Incidentally, the *sophos* is the first form in which the Greek *philosophos* confronts us; he appears mythologically in the seven wise men, in practice in Socrates, and as an ideal among the Stoics, Epicureans, Neo-academists⁴⁹ and Sceptics. Each of these schools, of course, has its own *σοφός*,^a just as Saint Bruno has his own “unique sex”. Indeed, Saint Max can find “*le sage*” again in the eighteenth century in the philosophy of Enlightenment, and even in Jean Paul in the shape of the “wise men” like Emanuel,^b etc. The Stoical wise man by no means

^a Wise man.— *Ed.*

^b Jean Paul, *Hesperus oder 45 Hundsposttage*.— *Ed.*

has in mind “life without living development”, but an *absolutely active* life, as is evident even from his concept of nature, which is Heraclitean, dynamic, developing and living, while for the Epicureans the principle of the concept of nature is the *mors immortalis*,^a as Lucretius says, the atom, and, in opposition to Aristotle’s divine energy, divine leisure is put forward as the ideal of life instead of “active life”.

“The ethics of the Stoics (their only science, for they were unable to say anything about the spirit except what its relation to the world should be; and about nature—physics—they could say only that the wise man has to assert himself against it) is not a doctrine of the spirit, but merely a doctrine of rejection of the world and of self-assertion against the world” (p. 31).

The Stoics were able to “say about nature” that physics is one of the most important sciences for the philosopher and consequently they even went to the trouble of further developing the physics of Heraclitus; they were “further able to say” that the *ὤρα*, masculine beauty, is the highest that the individual could represent, and glorified life in tune with nature, although they fell into contradictions in so doing. According to the Stoics, philosophy is divided into three doctrines: “physics, ethics, logic”.

“They compare philosophy to the animal and to the egg, logic—to the bones and sinews of the animal, and to the outer shell of the egg, ethics—to the flesh of the animal and to the albumen of the egg, and physics—to the *soul* of the animal and to the yolk of the egg” (Diogenes Laertius, *Zeno*).

From this alone it is evident how little true it is to say that “ethics is the only science of the Stoics”. It should be added also that, apart from Aristotle, they were the chief founders of formal logic and systematics in general.

That the “Stoics were unable to say anything about the spirit” is so little true that even *seeing spirits* originated from them, on account of which Epicurus opposes them, as an Enlightener, and ridicules them as “old women”,^b while precisely the Neo-Platonists borrowed part of their tales about spirits from the Stoics. This spirit-seeing of the Stoics arises, on the one hand, from the impossibility of achieving a dynamic concept of nature without the material furnished by empirical natural science, and, on the other hand, from their effort to interpret the ancient Greek world and even religion in a speculative manner and make them analogous to the thinking spirit.

The “ethics of the Stoics” is so much a “doctrine of world rejection and of self-assertion against the world” that, for example, it was

^a Immortal death. Lucretius, *De rerum natura libri sex*, Book 3, Verse 882.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 1, p. 43.—*Ed.*

counted a Stoical virtue to “have a sound fatherland, a worthy friend”, that “the beautiful alone” is declared to be “the good”, and that the Stoical wise man is allowed to mingle with the world in every way, for example, to commit incest, etc., etc. The Stoical wise man is to such an extent caught up “in a life of isolation and not in a life in common with others” that it is said of him in *Zeno*:

“Let not the wise man wonder at anything that seems wonderful—but neither will the worthy man live in *solitude*, for he is *social* by nature and *active in practice*” (Diogenes Laertius, Book VII, 1).

Incidentally, it would be asking too much to demand that, for the sake of refuting this schoolboyish wisdom of Jacques le bonhomme, one should set forth the very complicated and contradictory ethics of the Stoics.

In connection with the Stoics, Jacques le bonhomme has to note the existence of the *Romans* also (p. 31), of whom, of course, he is unable to say anything, since they have no philosophy. The only thing we hear of them is that *Horace* (!) “did not go beyond the Stoics’ worldly wisdom” (p. 32). *Integer vitae, scelerisque purus!*^a

In connection with the Stoics, *Democritus* is also mentioned in the following way: a muddled passage of Diogenes Laertius (*Democritus*, Book IX, 7, 45), which in addition has been inaccurately translated, is copied out from some textbook, and made the basis for a lengthy diatribe about Democritus. This diatribe has the distinguishing feature of being in direct contradiction to its basis, i.e., to the above-mentioned muddled and inaccurately translated passage, and converts “peace of mind” (Stirner’s translation of εὐθυμία, in Low German *Wellmuth*) into “rejection of the world”. The fact is that Stirner imagines that Democritus was a Stoic, and indeed of the sort that the unique and the ordinary schoolboyish consciousness conceive a Stoic to be. Stirner thinks that “his whole activity amounts to an endeavour to detach himself from the world”, “hence to a rejection of the world”, and that in the person of Democritus he can refute the Stoics. That the eventful life of Democritus, who had wandered through the world a great deal, flagrantly contradicts this notion of Saint Max’s; that the real source from which to learn about the philosophy of Democritus is Aristotle and not a couple of anecdotes from Diogenes Laertius; that Democritus, far from rejecting the world, was, on the contrary, an empirical natural scientist and the first encyclopaedic mind among the Greeks; that his almost unknown ethics was limited to a few remarks which he is

^a He of life without flaw, pure from sin. Horace, *The Odes*, Book 1—Ode XXII. Verse 1.—*Ed.*

alleged to have made when he was an old, much-travelled man; that his writings on natural science can be called philosophy only *per abusum*,^a because for him, in contrast to Epicurus, the atom was only a physical hypothesis, an expedient for explaining facts, just as it is in the proportional combinations of modern chemistry (Dalton and others)—all this does not suit the purpose of Jacques le bonhomme. Democritus must be understood in the “unique” fashion, Democritus speaks of euthymia, hence of peace of mind, hence of withdrawal into oneself, hence of rejection of the world. Democritus is a Stoic, and he differs from the Indian fakir mumbling “Brahma” (the word should have been “Om”),⁵⁰ only as the comparative differs from the superlative, i.e., “only *in degree*”.

Of the Epicureans our friend knows exactly as much as he does of the Stoics, viz., the unavoidable schoolboy’s minimum. He contrasts the Epicurean “hedone”^b with the “ataraxia”^c of the Stoics and Sceptics, not knowing that this “ataraxia” is also to be found in Epicurus and, moreover, as something placed higher than the “hedone”—in consequence of which his whole contrast falls to the ground. He tells us that the Epicureans “teach *only a different attitude to the world*” from that of the Stoics; but let him show us the (non-Stoic) philosopher of “ancient or modern times” who does not do “only” the same. Finally, Saint Max enriches us with a new dictum of the Epicureans: “the world must be deceived, for it is my enemy”. Hitherto it was only known that the Epicureans made statements in the sense that the world must be *disillusioned*, and especially freed from fear of gods, for the world is my *friend*.

To give our saint some indication of the real base on which the philosophy of Epicurus rests, it is sufficient to mention that the idea that the state rests on the mutual agreement of people, on a *contract social* (συνθήκη^d), is found for the first time in Epicurus.

The extent to which Saint Max’s disclosures about the Sceptics follow the same line is already evident from the fact that he considers their philosophy more radical than that of Epicurus. The Sceptics reduced the theoretical relation of people to things to *appearance*, and in practice they left everything as of old, being guided by this appearance just as much as others are guided by actuality; they merely gave it another name. Epicurus, on the other hand, was the true radical Enlightener of antiquity; he openly attacked the ancient religion, and it was from him, too, that the atheism of the Romans,

^a By abuse, i. e., improperly, wrongly.—*Ed.*

^b Pleasure.—*Ed.*

^c Equanimity, imperturbability, intrepidity.—*Ed.*

^d Contract (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 409-10).—*Ed.*

insofar as it existed, was derived. For this reason, too, Lucretius praised Epicurus as the hero who was the first to overthrow the gods and trample religion underfoot; for this reason among all church fathers, from Plutarch to Luther, Epicurus has always had the reputation of being the atheist philosopher *par excellence*, and was called a swine; for which reason, too, Clement of Alexandria says that when Paul takes up arms against philosophy he has in mind Epicurean philosophy alone. (*Stromatum*, Book I [chap. XI], p. 295, Cologne edition, 1688.^a) Hence we see how “cunning, perfidious” and “clever” was the attitude of this open atheist to the world in directly attacking its religion, while the Stoics adapted the ancient religion in their own speculative fashion, and the Sceptics used their concept of “appearance” as the excuse for being able to accompany all their judgments with a *reservatio mentalis*.

Thus, according to Stirner, the Stoics finally arrive at “contempt for the world” (p. 30), the Epicureans at “the same worldly wisdom as the Stoics” (p. 32), and the Sceptics at the point where they “let the world alone and do not worry about it at all”. Hence, according to Stirner, all three end in an attitude of indifference to the world, of “contempt for the world” (p. 485). Long before him, Hegel expressed it in this way: Stoicism, Scepticism, Epicureanism “aimed at making the mind indifferent towards everything that actuality has to offer” (*Philosophie der Geschichte*,^b p. 327).

“The ancients,” writes Saint Max, summing up his criticism of the ancient world of ideas, “it is true, had ideas, but they did not know *the idea*” (p. 30). In this connection, “one should recall what was said earlier about our childhood ideas” (*ibid.*).

The history of ancient philosophy has to conform to Stirner’s design. In order that the Greeks should retain their role of children, Aristotle ought not to have lived and his thought in and for itself (ἡ νόησις ἢ καθ’ αὐτήν), his self-thinking reason (αὐτόν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς) and his self-thinking intellect (ἡ νόησις τῆς νοήσεως) should never have occurred; and in general his *Metaphysics* and the third book of his *Psychology*^c ought not to have existed.

With just as much right as Saint Max here recalls “what was said earlier about our childhood”, when he discussed “our childhood” he could have said: let the reader look up what will be *said* below about the ancients and the Negroes and will *not* be said about Aristotle.

^a See present edition, Vol. 1, p. 488.—Ed.

^b G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*.—Ed.

^c Aristoteles, *De anima*.—Ed.

In order to appreciate the true meaning of the last ancient philosophies during the dissolution of the ancient world, Jacques le bonhomme had only to look at the real situation in life of their adherents under the world dominion of Rome. He could have found, *inter alia*, in Lucian a detailed description of how the people regarded them as public buffoons, and how the Roman capitalists, proconsuls, etc., hired them as court jesters for their entertainment, so that after squabbling at the table with slaves for a few bones and a crust of bread and after being given a special sour wine, they would amuse the master of the house and his guests with delightful words like “ataraxia”, “aphasia”,^a “hedone”, etc.*

Incidentally, if our good man wanted to make the history of ancient philosophy into a history of antiquity, then as a matter of course he ought to have merged the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics in the Neo-Platonists, whose philosophy is nothing but a fantastic combination of the Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptical doctrine with the content of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Instead of that, he merges these doctrines directly in Christianity.**

It is not “Stirner” that has left Greek philosophy “behind him”, but Greek philosophy that has “Stirner” behind it (cf. *Wigand*, p. 186^b). Instead of telling us *how* “antiquity” arrives at a world of things and “copes” with it, this ignorant school-master causes antiquity blissfully to vanish by means of a quotation from Timon; whereby antiquity the more naturally “arrives at its final goal” since, according to Saint Max, the ancients “found themselves placed by *nature*” in the ancient “communality”, which, “let us say in conclusion”, “can be understood” the more easily because this communality, the family, etc., are dubbed “the so-called *natural ties*” (p. 33). By means of nature the ancient “world of things” is created, and by means of Timon and Pilate (p. 32) it is destroyed. Instead of describing the “world of things” which provides the material basis of

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] ... just as after the Revolution the French aristocrats became the dancing instructors of the whole of Europe, and the English lords will soon find their true place in the civilised world as stable-hands and kennel-men.

** [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] On the contrary, Stirner should have shown us that Hellenism even after its disintegration still continued to exist for a long time; that next to it the Romans gained world domination, what they really did in the world, how the Roman world developed and declined, and finally how the Hellenic and Roman world perished, spiritually in Christianity and materially in the migration of the peoples.

^a Refusal to express any definite opinion.—*Ed.*

^b Max Stirner, “Recensenten Stirners”.—*Ed.*

Christianity, he causes this "world of things" to be annihilated in the world of the spirit, in Christianity.

The German philosophers are accustomed to counterpose antiquity, as the epoch of realism, to Christianity and modern times, as the epoch of idealism, whereas the French and English economists, historians and scientists are accustomed to regard antiquity as the period of idealism in contrast to the materialism and empiricism of modern times. In the same way antiquity can be considered to be idealistic insofar as in history the ancients represent the "*citoyen*", the idealist politician, while in the final analysis the moderns turn into the "bourgeois", the realist *ami du commerce*^a—or again it can be considered to be realistic, because for the ancients the communality was a "truth", whereas for the moderns it is an idealist "lie". All these abstract counterposings and historical constructions are of very little use.

The "unique thing" we learn from this whole portrayal of the ancients is that, whereas Stirner "knows" very few "things" about the ancient world, he has all the "better seen through" them (cf. *Wigand*, p. 191).

Stirner is truly that same "man child" of whom it is prophesied in the Revelation of St. John, 12:5, that he "was to rule all nations with a rod of iron". We have seen how he sets about the unfortunate heathen with the iron rod of his ignorance. The "moderns" will fare no better.

4. The Moderns

"Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new" (2 Corinthians 5:17) (p. 33).

By means of this biblical saying the ancient world has now indeed "passed away" or, as Saint Max really wanted to say, "all gone",^b and with one leap^c we have jumped over to the new, Christian, youthful, Mongoloid "world of the spirit". We shall see that this, too, will have "all gone" in a very short space of time.

"Whereas it was stated above 'for the ancients, the world was a truth', we must say here 'for the moderns the spirit was a truth', but in neither case should we forget the important addition: 'a truth, the untruth of which they sought to penetrate and, finally, did indeed penetrate'" (p. 33).

^a An expression of Fourier (see Ch. Fourier, *Des trois unités externes*).—*Ed.*

^b Here the authors ironically use the Berlin dialect words *alle jeworden*.—*Ed.*

^c In German a pun on the word *Satz*, which means a leap, a jump and also a sentence, a proposition.—*Ed.*

While we do not wish to devise any Stirner-like constructions, “we must say here”: for the moderns truth was a spirit, namely the holy spirit. Jacques le bonhomme again takes the moderns not in their actual historical connection with the “world of things”—which, despite being “all gone”, nevertheless continues to exist—but in their theoretical, and indeed religious, attitude. For him the history of the Middle Ages and modern times again exists only as the history of religion and philosophy; he devoutly believes all the illusions of these epochs and the philosophical illusions about these illusions. Thus, having given the history of the moderns the same turn as he gave that of the ancients, Saint Max can then easily “demonstrate” in it a “similar course to that taken by antiquity”, and pass from the Christian religion to modern German philosophy as rapidly as he passed from ancient philosophy to the Christian religion. On page 37 he himself gives a characterisation of his historical illusions, by making the discovery that “the ancients have nothing to offer but *worldly wisdom*” and that “the moderns have never gone, and do not go, beyond *theology*”, and he solemnly asks: “What did the *moderns* seek to penetrate?” The ancients and moderns alike do nothing else in history but “seek to penetrate something”—the ancients try to find out what is behind the world of things, the moderns behind the world of the spirit. In the end the ancients are left “without a world” and the moderns “without a spirit”; the ancients wanted to become idealists, the moderns to become realists (p. 485), but both of them were only occupied with the divine (p. 488)—“history up to now” is only the “history of the spiritual man” (what faith!) (p. 442)—in short we have again the child and the youth, the Negro and the Mongol, and all the rest of the terminology of the “various transformations”.

At the same time we see a faithful imitation of the speculative manner, by which children beget their father, and what is earlier is brought about by what is later. From the very outset Christians must “seek to penetrate the untruthfulness of their truth”, they must immediately be hidden atheists and critics, as was already indicated concerning the ancients. But not satisfied with this, Saint Max gives one more brilliant example of his “virtuosity in” (speculative) “thought” (p. 230):

“Now, *after* liberalism has acclaimed *man*, one can state that thereby *only the last consequence of Christianity has been drawn* and that Christianity *originally set itself no other task than that of ... realising man.*”

Since allegedly the last consequence of Christianity has been drawn, “*one*” can state that it has been drawn. As soon as the later

ones have transformed what was earlier “one can state” that the earlier ones “originally”, namely “*in truth*”, in essence, in heaven, as hidden Jews, “set themselves no other task” than that of being transformed by the later ones. *Christianity*, for Jacques le bonhomme, is a self-positing subject, the absolute spirit, which “originally” posits its end as its beginning. Cf. Hegel’s *Encyclopädie*, etc.

“Hence” (namely because one can attribute an imaginary task to Christianity) “there follows the delusion” (of course, before Feuerbach it was impossible to know what task Christianity “had originally set itself”) “that Christianity attaches infinite value to the ego, as revealed, for example, in the theory of immortality and pastoral work. No, it attaches this value to *man* alone, *man* alone is immortal, and only because I am a *man*, am I also immortal.”

If, then, from the whole of Stirner’s scheme and formulation of tasks it emerges, already sufficiently clearly, that Christianity can lend immortality only to Feuerbach’s “man”, we learn here in addition that this comes about also because Christianity does not ascribe this immortality—to *animals* as well.

Let us now also draw up a scheme à la Saint Max.

“Now, after” modern large-scale landownership, which has arisen from the process of parcellation, has actually “proclaimed” primogeniture, “one can state that thereby only the last consequence” of the parcellation of landed property “has been drawn” “and that” parcellation “*in truth originally set itself no other task than that of realising*” primogeniture, true primogeniture. “Hence there follows the delusion” that parcellation “attaches infinite value” to equal rights of members of the family, “as revealed, for example”, in the laws of inheritance of the *Codé Napoléon*. “No, it attaches this value solely” to the eldest son; “only” the eldest son, the future owner of the entailed estate, will become a large landowner, “and only because I am” the eldest son “I will also be” a large landowner.

In this way it is infinitely easy to give history “unique” turns, as one has only to describe its very latest result as the “task” which “in truth originally it set itself”. Thereby earlier times acquire a bizarre and hitherto unprecedented appearance. It produces a striking impression, and does not require great production costs. As, for instance, if one says that the real “task” which the institution of landed property “originally set itself” was to replace people by sheep—a consequence which has recently become manifest in Scotland, etc., or that the proclamation of the Capet dynasty⁵¹ “originally in truth set itself the task” of sending Louis XVI to the guillotine and M. Guizot into the Government. The important thing is to do it in a solemn, pious, priestly way, to draw a deep breath, and then suddenly to burst out: “Now, at last, one can state it.”

What Saint Max says about the moderns in the above section (pp. 33-37) is only the prologue to the spirit history which is in store for us. Here, too, we see how he tries "to rid himself as quickly as possible" of empirical facts and parades before us the same categories as in the case of the ancients—*reason, heart, spirit*, etc.—only they are given different names. The Sophists become sophistical scholastics, "humanists, Machiavellism (the art of printing, the New World", etc.; cf. Hegel's *Geschichte der Philosophie*,^a III, p. 128) who represent reason; Socrates is transformed into Luther, who extols the heart (Hegel, l.c., p. 227), and of the post-Reformation period we learn that during that time it was a matter of "empty cordiality" (which in the section about the ancients was called "purity of heart", cf. Hegel, l.c., p. 241). All this on page 34. In this way Saint Max "proves" that "Christianity takes a course similar to that of antiquity". After Luther he no longer even troubles to provide names for his categories; he hurries in seven-league boots to modern German philosophy. Four appositions ("until nothing remains but empty cordiality, all the universal love of mankind, love of *man*, consciousness of freedom, 'self-consciousness'", p. 34; Hegel, l.c., pp. 228, 229), four words fill the gulf between Luther and Hegel and "only thus is Christianity completed". This whole argument is achieved in one masterly sentence, with the help of such levers as "at last"—"and from that time"—"since *one*"—"also"—"from day to day"—"until finally", etc., a sentence which the reader can verify for himself on the classic page 34 already mentioned.

Finally Saint Max gives us a few more examples of his faith, showing that he is so little ashamed of the Gospel that he asserts: "We really are nothing but spirit", and maintains that at the end of the ancient world "after long efforts" the "spirit" has really "rid itself of the world". And immediately afterwards he once more betrays the secret of his scheme, by declaring of the Christian spirit that "*like a youth* it entertains plans for improving or saving the world". All this on page 36.

"So he carried me away in the spirit into the wilderness: and I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet-coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy.... And upon her forehead was a name written, Mystery, Babylon the Great ... and I saw the woman drunken with the blood of the saints", etc. (Revelation of St. John, 17, Verses 3, 5, 6).

The apocalyptic prophet did not prophesy accurately this time. Now at last, after Stirner has acclaimed *man*, one can state that he ought to have said: So he carried me into the wilderness of the spirit. And I saw a man sit upon a scarlet-coloured beast, full of blasphemy

^a G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*.—Ed.

of names ... and upon his forehead was a name written, Mystery, the unique ... and I saw the man drunken with the blood of holy, etc.
So we now enter the wilderness of the spirit.

A. *The Spirit (Pure History of Spirits)*

The first thing we learn about the “spirit” is that it is not the spirit but “the *realm* of spirits” that “is immensely large”. Saint Max has nothing to say immediately of the spirit except that “an immensely large realm of spirits” exists—just as all he knows of the Middle Ages is that this period lasted for “a long time”. Having presupposed that this “realm of spirits” exists, he subsequently proves its existence with the help of ten theses.

1. The spirit is not a free spirit until it is not occupied *with itself alone*, until it is not “solely concerned” *with its own* world, the “spiritual” world (first with itself alone and then with its own world).
2. “It is a *free* spirit only *in* a world of its own.”
3. “Only *by means of* a spiritual world is the spirit really spirit.”
4. “Before the spirit has created its world of spirits, it is not spirit.”
5. “Its creations make it spirit.”...
6. “Its creations are its world.” ...
7. “The spirit is the creator of a spiritual world.” ...
8. “The spirit exists only when it creates the spiritual.” ...
9. “Only together with the spiritual, which is its creation, is it real.”...
10. “*But* the works or offspring of the spirit are nothing but—spirits” (pp. 38-39).

In thesis 1 the “spiritual world” is again immediately presupposed as existing, instead of being deduced, and this thesis 1 is again preached to us in theses 2-9 in eight new transformations. At the end of thesis 9 we find ourselves exactly where we were at the end of thesis 1—and then in thesis 10 a “*but*” suddenly introduces us to “*spirits*”, about whom so far nothing has been said.

“*Since* the spirit exists only by creating the spiritual, *we look* around for its first creations” (p. 41).

According to theses 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9, however, the spirit is its own creation. This is now expressed thus, the spirit, i.e., the first creation of the spirit,

“must arise out of nothing” ... “it must first create itself” ... “its first creation is itself, the spirit” (*ibid.*). “When it has accomplished this creative act there follows from then on a natural reproduction of creations *just as, according to the myth*, only the first human beings had to be created and the rest of the human race was reproduced of itself” (*ibid.*).

“However mystical this may sound, we nevertheless experience this daily. Are you a thinking person before you think? In creating your *first thought*, you create *yourself*,

the thinker, for you do not think until you think, i.e.”—i.e.,—“*have* some thought. Is it not your singing alone that makes you a singer, your speech that makes you a speaking person? Well, in the same way only the creation of the spiritual makes you spirit.”

Our saintly conjurer assumes that the spirit creates the spiritual in order to draw the conclusion that the spirit creates itself *as spirit*; on the other hand, he assumes it *as spirit* in order to allow it to arrive at its spiritual creations (which, “according to the myth, are reproduced of themselves” and become spirits). So far we have the long-familiar orthodox-Hegelian phrases. The genuinely “unique” exposition of what Saint Max wants to say only begins with the example he gives. That is to say, if Jacques le bonhomme cannot get any further, if even “One” and “It” are unable to float his stranded ship, “Stirner” calls his third serf to his assistance, the “You”, who never leaves him in the lurch and on whom he can rely in extremity. This “You” is an individual whom we are not encountering for the first time, a pious and faithful servant,^a whom we have seen going through fire and water, a worker in the vineyard of his lord, a man who does not allow anything to terrify him, in a word he is: *Szeliga*.^{*} When “Stirner” is in the utmost plight in his exposition he cries out: *Szeliga*, help!—and trusty Eckart *Szeliga* immediately puts his shoulder to the wheel to get the cart out of the mire. We shall have more to say later about Saint Max’s relation to *Szeliga*.

It is a question of spirit which creates *itself out of nothing*, hence it is a question of *nothing*, which *out of nothing* makes itself *spirit*. From this Saint Max derives the creation of *Szeliga*’s spirit from *Szeliga*. And who else if not *Szeliga* could “Stirner” count on allowing himself to be put in the place of nothing in the manner indicated above? Who could be taken in by such a trick but *Szeliga*, who feels highly flattered at being allowed to appear at all as one of the *dramatis personae*? What Saint Max had to prove was not that a given “you”, i.e., the given *Szeliga*, becomes a thinker, speaker, singer from the moment when he begins to think, speak, sing—but that the *thinker* creates *himself out of nothing* by beginning to think, that the *singer* creates *himself out of nothing* by beginning to sing, etc., and it is not even the thinker and the singer, but the *thought* and the *singing* as subjects that create *themselves out of nothing* by beginning to think and to sing. For the rest, “Stirner makes only the extremely simple

^{*} Cf. *Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik*, where the earlier exploits of this man of God have already been set forth.^b

^a Matthew 25:21.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 55-77.—*Ed.*

reflection” and states only the “extremely popular” proposition (cf. *Wigand*, p. 156) that Szeliga develops one of his qualities by developing it. There is, of course, absolutely nothing “to be wondered at” in the fact that Saint Max does not even “make” correctly “such simple reflections”, but expresses them incorrectly in order thereby to prove a still much more incorrect proposition with the aid of the most incorrect logic in the world.

Far from it being true that “out of nothing” I make myself, for example, a “speaker”, the nothing which forms the basis here is a very manifold something, the real individual, his speech organs, a definite stage of physical development, an existing language and dialects, ears capable of hearing and a human environment from which it is possible to hear something, etc., etc. Therefore, in the development of a property something is created by something out of something, and by no means comes, as in Hegel’s *Logik*, from nothing, through nothing to nothing.^a

Now that Saint Max has his faithful Szeliga close at hand, everything goes forward smoothly again. We shall see how, by means of his “you”, he again transforms the spirit into the youth, exactly as he earlier transformed the youth into the spirit; here we shall again find the whole history of the youth repeated almost word for word, only with a few camouflaging alterations—just as the “immensely large realm of spirits” mentioned on page 37 was nothing but the “realm of the spirit”, to found and enlarge which was the “aim” of the spirit of the youth (p. 17).

“*Just as you, however, distinguish yourself from the thinker, singer, speaker, so you distinguish yourself no less from the spirit and are well aware that you are something else as well as spirit. However, just as in the enthusiasm of thinking it may easily happen that sight and hearing fail the thinking ego, so the enthusiasm of the spirit has seized you too, and you now aspire with all your might to become wholly spirit and merged in spirit. The spirit is your ideal, something unattained, something of the beyond: spirit means your—God, ‘God is spirit’.... You inveigh against yourself, you who cannot get rid of a relic of the non-spiritual. Instead of saying: I am more than spirit, you say contritely: I am less than spirit, and I can only envisage spirit, pure spirit, or the spirit which is nothing but spirit, but I am not it, and since I am not it, then it is an other, it exists as an other, whom I call ‘God’.*”

After previously for a long time occupying ourselves with the trick of making something out of nothing, we now suddenly, perfectly “naturally”, come to an individual who is something else as well as spirit, consequently is something, and wants to become pure spirit,

^a Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Th. 1, Abt. 2.—Ed.

^b John 4:24.—Ed.