

**KARL
MARX
FREDERICK
ENGELS**

**Collected
Works**



**Volume 20
Marx and Engels
1864 -1868**

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KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

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Preface

Volume 20 of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels contains works written between September 1864 and July 1868. It is the first in a group of volumes that reflect the activity of Marx and Engels as the leaders of the International Working Men's Association (the First International). The volume includes documents of the International drawn up by them, reports, pamphlets, articles, statements, records of speeches, drafts, etc., written up to November 1867, the period of the setting up of the international proletarian organisation and the beginning of the struggle to establish socialist principles in its programme. Extending slightly beyond this chronological framework are the notes and reviews written by Marx and Engels in connection with the publication of the first volume of *Capital* in September 1867, and also Engels' synopsis of this volume, which are published in a special section.

The founding of the Association, the first mass international organisation of the proletariat, heralded a new stage in the development of the working-class movement and in the history of Marxism. It marked the beginning of the international proletarian movement and created new conditions and opportunities for the broad dissemination of the ideas of scientific communism. "It is unforgettable, it will remain for ever in the history of the workers' struggle for their emancipation," Lenin wrote of the First International (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Moscow, 1980, p. 240).

The International was set up when the working-class movement began to gain momentum in the late 1850s. The world economic crisis of 1857 and the growing strike movement that followed it

were awakening in the workers' consciousness an understanding of the importance of their fraternal solidarity in the struggle against capital. The activity of the working class was also stimulated by the revolutionary events of the time: the struggle for the unification of Italy, the Civil War in the United States of America, the Polish national liberation uprising of 1863-64, and others. All this drew broad masses of workers into political life and strengthened the desire for concerted action by the proletariat of the different countries.

However, the spontaneous urge to establish international connections was not in itself enough for the creation of an independent international working-class organisation. Of decisive importance for its formation and activity was the participation of Marx and his supporters, including former members of the Communist League. It was the influence of Marx and the proletarian revolutionaries who managed to express the vital interests of the workers of all countries, that ensured the development of the International Working Men's Association as a truly proletarian association, and made it possible to overcome such obstacles to this as the ideological dependence of many workers on bourgeois democracy, the widespread nationalistic prejudices among them, and the reformist and sectarian dogmas of petty-bourgeois socialism.

The works published in this and the three subsequent volumes, and the relevant correspondence volumes, illustrate clearly the leading role which Marx played in the International Working Men's Association. He was the author of all its programmatic documents and most of its addresses and statements. Personally or through his colleagues he guided the work of the congresses and conferences of the International Association and drafted their most important resolutions. He was in fact the head of the Central (General) Council of the International, the headquarters of the international proletarian organisation, and directed the activity of its executive body, the Standing Committee or Sub-Committee. On behalf of the General Council Marx drew up the political programme of the International, thereby outlining the strategy and tactics of the whole international working-class movement.

Marx was greatly assisted by Engels in the guidance of the International. Until his move from Manchester to London in the autumn of 1870 Engels could not participate directly in the work of the General Council, but even before then he assisted with all its main undertakings, explaining in the press and in letters to active members of the working-class movement, particularly in

Germany, the position of the International Working Men's Association on many theoretical and tactical questions.

In guiding the International Marx had to take into account the differing conditions for the struggle of the proletariat and the varying degrees of its organisation and ideological level in the individual countries. He saw the prime task of the international organisation as being to unite the different streams of the proletarian movement, and to single out the proletariat from the general democratic camp and to ensure its class independence. Marx sought step by step to bring the workers to accept a common theoretical programme and general tactical principles, thus promoting the combination of scientific communism and the mass working-class movement. "In uniting the labour movement of various countries, striving to channel into joint activity the various forms of non-proletarian, pre-Marxist socialism (Mazzini, Proudhon, Bakunin, liberal trade-unionism in Britain, Lassallean vacillations to the right in Germany, etc.), and in combating the theories of all these sects and schools, Marx hammered out a uniform tactic for the proletarian struggle of the working class in the various countries" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, 1977, p. 49).

Marx's consistently revolutionary and at the same time flexible line as leader of the International manifested itself already in the drafting of the organisation's first programme documents—the "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association" and the "Provisional Rules of the Association", with which the present volume opens. Here Marx succeeded in resisting attempts to impose on the Association a declaration of principles written in a bourgeois-democratic spirit and Mazzini's rules for Italian working-men's mutual aid societies that were full of sectarian-conspiratorial tendencies. Thanks to his efforts the International Working Men's Association based its programme and rules according to the theoretical and organisational principles of scientific socialism.

Working on the Inaugural Address and Rules Marx sought to reflect in them the sum total of social development since the Revolution of 1848 and the further development of revolutionary theory, particularly his economic teaching. In this respect the inaugural documents of the International are a step forward from the first programmatic work—the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. On the other hand, not all the propositions of the *Communist Manifesto* could be reproduced in the new documents, and Marx

had to expound some of its ideas in a form comprehensible to the members of the proletarian movement of his day. International unification of the various detachments of the working class, and ensurance of the mass nature of the organisation being set up, were possible at that time only on a platform which, without making any concessions to reformist and sectarian trends, did not simultaneously close the door on British trade-unionists, French, Belgian and Swiss Proudhonists, and German Lassalleans. "It was very difficult to frame the thing so that our view should appear in a form which would make it acceptable to the present outlook of the workers' movement," Marx wrote to Engels in this connection on November 4, 1864. "It will take time before the revival of the movement allows the old boldness of language to be used. We must be *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo* [forcible in deed, gentle in manner]." Marx believed that as the influence of reformist and sectarian trends was overcome and the working class accumulated practical experience, the programme of the International would be extended and, first and foremost, supplemented by propositions concretising the socialist aims of the working-class movement and ways of achieving them.

The first programmatic documents of the International stressed that the contradictions between labour and capital would inevitably deepen as capitalism developed. Hence the conclusion that the radical transformation of society was the only way to free the proletariat and all working people from oppression. The abolition of all class rule was proclaimed as the aim of the working-class movement. "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves" (this volume, p. 14). These opening words of the preamble to the Provisional Rules express the idea that the political and ideological independence of the working-class movement is the most important condition for the successful outcome of the proletariat's struggle against capitalism.

In the Inaugural Address Marx noted two great victories won by the working class: the passing of the Ten-Hours' Bill in Britain and the development of the co-operative movement. However, he pointed out that neither legislative restriction of the working day nor experiments with the creation of workers' cooperatives could lead to a transformation of the economic foundations of bourgeois society under capitalism. An insuperable obstacle to this is the exploiting classes—the magnates of land and the magnates of capital—monopoly of political power. "To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes" (this

volume, p. 12). Pointing out that the workers possessed one of the elements of success—numbers—Marx emphasised that “numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combination and led by knowledge” (ibid.). This idea helped members of the working-class movement to understand the importance of creating a proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory.

The principles of proletarian internationalism were profoundly substantiated in the first documents of the International. “Past experience has shown,” wrote Marx in the Inaugural Address, “how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts” (this volume, p. 12). The summons “Proletarians of all countries, Unite!” put forward by Marx and Engels on the founding of the Communist League, became the new organisation’s watchword. As one of the International’s main tasks the Inaugural Address put forward the struggle against the aggressive foreign policy of the ruling classes, calling on workers “to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations” (this volume, p. 13).

In working out the organisational structure of the International Marx also took account of the historically developed forms of the working-class movement. The International Working Men’s Association did not oppose existing workers’ organisations, but sought to base itself on them and lead their activity to a common goal. The Rules provided for both individual membership of the Association and collective membership by craft, trade, co-operative, educational and other societies and unions. The truly democratic structure of the organisation, recognition of congresses as the supreme bodies, in the intervals between which leadership was concentrated in the hands of the Central Council, the elective nature of all posts, accountability, collective decision-taking, the granting of extensive rights to local sections with observance of a certain degree of centralisation necessary for unity of action—all these propositions in the Rules were in keeping with the truly emancipatory nature of the struggle of the working class and with the task of drawing the broad proletarian masses into this struggle.

The resolutions on the composition of the Provisional Central Council, the records of a number of speeches delivered by Marx at meetings of the Council, and also of proposals made by his

colleagues on his initiative, the English text of the General Rules and Administrative Regulations passed at the Geneva Congress in 1866 and prepared for publication with Marx's assistance, and other documents, testify to the attention which he devoted to perfecting the structure and organisational forms of the activity of the International Working Men's Association.

The new organisation became the centre of the international mutual assistance of the proletariat in the struggle for its economic interests. "It is one of the great purposes of the Association," Marx stated, "to make the workmen of different countries not only *feel* but *act* as brethren and comrades in the army of emancipation" (this volume, p. 186). Already in the early years of the Association's existence its support enabled the workers of a number of countries to hold successful strikes. The leaders of the Association frequently succeeded in thwarting factory owners' plans to use foreign workers as strike-breakers. A characteristic document in this respect is the Central Council's appeal, written by Marx, entitled "A Warning". Addressing German tailors whom employers were trying to recruit for work in Scotland so as to break strikes, Marx urged them not to become the "*obedient mercenaries of capital*" (this volume, p. 163).

Marx devoted a special paper to the theoretical substantiation of the importance of the economic struggle. He considered it essential to refute mistaken views on this subject, including those of the Lassalleans and Proudhonists who denied the role of strikes and trade unions. In the Central Council itself the Owenist John Weston tried to argue the futility of the workers' struggle for higher wages. In reply to this attempt Marx presented a report on June 20 and 27, 1865 to the Central Council, which is published in this volume under the title of *Value, Price and Profit* (also known under the title of *Wages, Price and Profit*). In this report Marx demonstrated most convincingly the invalidity of Weston's arguments. The tendency of capital, Marx explained, to make the working day as long as possible and reduce wages to a minimum, that is, to the cost of the means of subsistence physically necessary for the worker and his family to stay alive, is by no means a kind of fatal, "iron" law. The cost of labour power, he noted, is variable, and depends not only on physical, but also on social factors, the standard of living in this or that country, the different phases of the economic cycle and, in particular, the degree of resistance offered by the workers to the capitalists. Without this resistance, which stimulates the workers to organise themselves for struggle, "they would be degraded to one level mass of broken

wretches past salvation" (this volume, p. 148). However, the proletariat cannot be content with mere improvements in the conditions for selling labour power, Marx stressed, and also attacked the British trade-unionists' attempts to limit the working-class movement to achieving economic concessions. The daily "guerilla war" against the consequences and not the causes of the exploitation of the workers must, he taught, be subordinated to the final aim of the working class—to overthrow the exploitative system, destroy the system of wage labour itself (*ibid.*, p. 149).

Marx's report did not contain only his polemic with Weston and those who supported his views. In it, two years before the publication of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx set out in popular form some of the main propositions of his economic teaching, revealing, first and foremost, how surplus value, the source of all types of unearned income, is formed and thereby explaining the true nature of the relations between capitalists and wage workers. *Value, Price and Profit* is one of the most important works of Marxist political economy.

A splendid example of how revolutionary theory can be used to define the practical tasks of the working-class movement is the document entitled "Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council. The Different Questions", drawn up by Marx, which served as the basis for the work and resolutions of the Geneva Congress of the International Working Men's Association in 1866. Developing and expanding the first programmatic documents of the International, the Instructions concretised the broad programme of its activity.

The Instructions orientated members of the working-class movement to all-round international mutual assistance in the economic struggle. Marx endeavoured to give the highly important task of strengthening international proletarian solidarity a concrete content, by searching at each stage of the activity of the International for new ways of uniting the proletariat of different countries. In order to put the struggle for the workers' economic interests on a scientific basis, Marx advanced the idea of a statistical inquiry into the condition of the working class and outlined a general scheme for such an inquiry. The Instructions attached special importance to the restriction of the working day. Having substantiated the demand for an eight-hour working day, Marx turned this demand into a common slogan for the proletariat of the whole capitalist world.

Outlining measures against the capitalist exploitation of female and child labour, Marx at the same time showed the progressive

nature of drawing women and adolescents into material production. He advanced a number of propositions concerning the education and upbringing of the younger generation which served as a point of departure for the development of the theory and practice of socialist education. The main thing here was the idea of polytechnical training, the combining of the mental and physical education of children and adolescents with a study of the main principles of production, and the initiation in productive labour. Marx saw this as a means of raising the intellectual level of the working class and, in future socialist society, as a way for ensuring the formation of the harmoniously developed individual.

In the section of the Instructions on co-operative labour, Marx, unlike the Proudhonists and other petty-bourgeois reformers, showed that the co-operative movement in itself could not transform the capitalist social system. Radical changes in the social system could never "be realised save by the transfer of the organised forces of society, viz., the state power, from capitalists and landlords to the producers themselves" (this volume, p. 190).

Of particular importance is the section on trades' unions. Here thoughts concerning the place and role of the trade-union movement in the revolutionary emancipatory process expressed by Marx at different times, and his ideas on the need to combine the economic and political struggle of the working class, were systematised and developed. Lenin subsequently remarked that, after the Geneva Congress adopted the resolution on trade unions reproducing the corresponding propositions in the Instructions, "the conviction that the class struggle must necessarily combine the political and the economic struggle into one integral whole has entered into the flesh and blood of international Social-Democracy" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1977, p. 177). Outlining the ways of turning the trade unions into schools of revolutionary education for the proletarian masses and training them for decisive battles with capital, Marx pointed out that professional organisations should not limit themselves to the narrow everyday requirements of their members, and that they were obliged to take part in any social and political movement aimed at the emancipation of the working class.

A considerable number of works and documents included in this volume reflect the position of the International, led by Marx, on the most important political questions of the day. Marx believed that the consistent carrying out of urgent bourgeois-democratic transformations would facilitate the task of organising the forces of the proletariat and be a step towards its emancipation.

Therefore, unlike the supporters of Proudhon and other petty-bourgeois utopians who maintained that intervention in politics distracts the workers from the solution of social problems, Marx sought to turn the International Working Men's Association into an influential political force, a vanguard fighter for democracy, peace between peoples and the liberation of oppressed nations.

In the congratulatory address of the Central Council to Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, on the occasion of his re-election to this post in autumn 1864, drafted by Marx, the International expressed its solidarity with the struggle of the revolutionary-democratic forces of the United States against the Southern slave-holders (see this volume, pp. 19-21). Marx was also the author of the address of the International Working Men's Association to President Andrew Johnson in May 1865 in connection with the murder of Lincoln by an agent of the slave-holders (*ibid.*, pp. 99-100). Marx orientated his supporters in Germany towards unification of the country by democratic, revolutionary means. He regarded the struggle against the Bonapartist regime as the most important task of the International in France. In reply to the obstacles which the French authorities raised to the activity of the International Working Men's Association, Marx suggested intensifying the denunciatory campaign against the Bonapartist regime (see his speech on this question at the meeting of the General Council on November 27, 1866, this volume, p. 414).

The note to Hermann Jung about Ernest Jones' letter, and the brief records of speeches at meetings of the Central Council, in particular, those of January 24, February 14 and 28 and April 25, 1865, testify to the efforts which Marx was making to induce the leading body of the International to assume the role of organiser of a mass movement for democratic parliamentary reform in Britain and to exert an influence on the activity of the Reform League, founded in spring 1865, as a centre of this movement. Under the influence of Marx and the Central Council, the League advanced the demand for universal male suffrage. The movement for reform did not live up to Marx's expectations, however. The trade-union leaders, who were members of the Council of the League and inclined to compromise, renounced the platform which the Central Council of the International had outlined for the League. Taking advantage of the League's weakness, the government passed a moderate reform in 1867, leaving most of the workers without the right to vote.

Already in the early years of the activity of the International Working Men's Association Marx and Engels devoted considerable attention to substantiating the internationalist position of the working class in relation to the national liberation movement. In this period they spoke out with particular frequency on the Polish question. Marx and Engels regarded support of the fighters for the freedom of the Polish people and other oppressed nations as a most important task of the proletarian organisation, proceeding from the conviction that the solution of urgent national problems in a revolutionary-democratic manner was a condition of the successful development of the working-class movement. This idea runs through the Central Council's "Correction", written by Marx in April 1865, in connection with the silence of the British liberal press concerning the position of the International on the Polish question, and Marx's speech at a meeting in London on January 22, 1867 to mark the anniversary of the Polish insurrection of 1863-64 (see this volume, pp. 97-98, 196-201).

Marx was compelled to defend the internationalist line with respect to Poland in a struggle against the Proudhonists, who had inherited from their teacher a nihilistic attitude to the national liberation movements and denied their progressive nature. He also had to contend with the misunderstanding about the real ways of liberating Poland, with the allegation made by the right wing of the Polish emigration, that the policy of the ruling classes of the Western powers, in particular bourgeois France, was in keeping with the national aspirations of the Poles. On the Central Council the English democrat Peter Fox sought to defend this point of view. It was refuted in a number of speeches by Marx at meetings of the Standing Committee and Central Council in December 1864-January 1865 (see this volume, pp. 311-27, 354-56). On the matter of liberating Poland Marx took the view that one should look not to the so-called "help" of the Western powers, but to internal revolutionary-democratic forces, a union of the popular masses of Poland and Russia (he had already expressed this idea in letters to Engels during the Polish insurrection of 1863-64) and support from the European proletariat.

Engels also criticised Proudhonist views on the Polish question. In a series of articles entitled *What Have the Working Classes to Do with Poland?* he showed that in the interests of its own emancipation the working class should irreconcilably oppose the policy of national oppression and be at the forefront of the struggle for the national independence of enslaved peoples. At the same time Engels warned of the danger of reactionary forces

making use of national movements, especially those of small peoples, an example of which was the speculation of ruling circles in the Bonapartist Second Empire on the "principle of nationalities".

Marx regarded the international solidarity of the proletariat as a powerful means of combating militarism, the unleashing of bloody wars by the ruling classes. He stressed that "the union of the working classes of the different countries must ultimately make international wars impossible" (this volume, p. 426). At the same time Marx sought to teach the working-class movement to combine the struggle for peace with the class approach to war, with an ability to analyse the nature of this or that military conflict. This aspect of Marx's activity was seen during the discussion in the Central Council on the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, an analysis of which from the military strategic point of view was provided by Engels in the series of articles entitled *Notes on the War in Germany*. In spite of their laconic nature, the notes in the Council Minute Book give an idea of the active part which Marx took in this discussion. The resolution passed by the Council under his influence shows his deep understanding of the contradictory nature of the war in which objectively progressive aims—the unification of Germany—were intertwined with the dynastic and territorial claims of the ruling classes of the belligerent states. The International recommended workers to adopt a neutral stand, and at the same time placed responsibility for the military conflict on the governments of the belligerent parties (*ibid.*, p. 411).

In the Resolution on the Attitude of the International Working Men's Association to the Congress of the League of Peace and Freedom and the speech on this subject at the meeting of the General Council on August 13, 1867, Marx formulated a number of propositions concerning joint action by workers and members of the bourgeois pacifist movement (see this volume, pp. 204, 426-27). While supporting in principle collaboration with all progressive forces in the struggle against the growing military danger, Marx stressed that this collaboration should take forms which did not threaten the working class with the loss of its own independent, class line and with ideological submission to bourgeois democracy. The proletarian organisation could not assume responsibility for all the weaknesses and illusions of the pacifist movement, which, although it really did reflect the anti-military mood of the broad masses, was characterised by an abstract approach to war, a reluctance to see the capitalist system as its source, and a tendency

to replace real struggle for peace by high-flown declarations.

The materials and documents published in the volume reflect the intense activity of Marx and Engels to create and strengthen local organisations of the International and to draw into its ranks the workers of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the USA.

In Britain Marx sought to make such mass working-class organisations as the trade unions a bulwark for the International. To this end he drafted the resolutions on terms for the admission of workers' organisations to membership of the International Working Men's Association and the Address of the Central Council to working men's societies, based on these resolutions (see this volume, pp. 18, 372-73). The Minute Book of the General Council contains a report of a speech by Marx on July 23, 1867, from which it is clear that he played an active part in defending trade unions against attacks by reactionary forces trying to ban or restrict their activity (see this volume, pp. 424-25).

In seeking to use the organisational experience and influence among the masses of trade-union leaders of the day in the interests of strengthening the position of the International, Marx did not overlook their characteristic reformist interpretation of the aims of the working-class movement, their respect for bourgeois authorities, their uncritical acceptance of pacifist rhetoric, and their compliance with respect to bourgeois radicals. Marx considered it his duty to combat the manifestation of such tendencies. Thus, on his initiative, the General Council dissociated itself from the panegyric of Bismarck made by George Odger, an eminent trade unionist (see this volume, p. 416).

The Central Council's resolutions on the conflict in the Paris section and a number of preparatory materials for this document (see present volume, pp. 82-83, 329-36) throw light on Marx's endeavours to strengthen the International's sections in France. Rejecting in these resolutions the claims of bourgeois democrats to a leading role in the French sections of the International Working Men's Association and denying their ill-founded accusations levelled at members of the Paris Administration (Proudhonist workers), Marx at the same time sought to complement it with revolutionary-proletarian elements. He hoped to induce the Administration to turn from propagating utopian Proudhonist projects of social reform to organisational work among the proletarian masses.

Marx showed constant concern for the creation of a massive base for the International in Germany. This task could be solved

by the affiliation to the International Working Men's Association of the General Association of German Workers, the foundation of which in 1863 was an important step towards emancipating German workers from the political tutelage of the liberal bourgeoisie. However, the General Association's programme, drawn up by its first president Ferdinand Lassalle, contained utopian dogmas (in particular, on solving the social question by setting up producer associations with state help) diametrically opposed to the principles of the International. Lassalle oriented the Association towards support of the Prussian government's policy of uniting Germany under the aegis of Prussia in return for the promise of universal suffrage.

By drawing the General Association of German Workers into the ranks of the International Marx hoped to influence the former and bring about a revision of its reformist programme and a change in its tactics. Not possessing at that time any means for the wide propagation of their own ideas and for their criticism of Lassalle's views in Germany, Marx and Engels agreed to collaborate on the *Social-Demokrat*, a newspaper founded by one of the leaders of the General Association of German Workers Johann Baptist von Schweitzer. The newspaper published the authorised translation of the "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association", and also the German text of the Association's Provisional Rules.

In connection with the death of Proudhon in January 1865, Marx wrote an article about him for the *Social-Demokrat*. He paid tribute to Proudhon's services—his attack on capitalist property, his critique of religion and the church, and his courageous defence of the June insurgents in 1848. At the same time he exposed the petty-bourgeois essence of Proudhon's views, the contradictory, utopian nature of the projects for social transformations advanced by him. In Proudhon's writings and ideas Marx detected features characteristic also of other reformist and sectarian trends of petty-bourgeois socialism, including Lassalleanism—superficial playing with philosophical and economic categories instead of the scientific analysis of reality, apriori formulae for solving social questions, which were dogmatically presented as universal panaceas for social ills (see this volume, p. 29). Without mentioning Lassalle's name, he suggested that, like Proudhon's proposals, Lassalle's recipes were also the result of indulging in hare-brained social schemes. Marx's sharp criticism in this article of Proudhon's attempts to justify the coup d'état of 1851 and the Bonapartist regime in France contain a direct

condemnation of the flirting by Lassalle and his supporters with Bismarck.

Publishing in the *Social-Demokrat* a translation of the old Danish folk song "Herr Tidmann" with a commentary (see this volume, pp. 34-35), Engels stressed the importance of the revolutionary traditions of the peasant movement, unlike the Lassalleans who regarded peasantry as "one reactionary mass".

The collaboration on the *Social-Demokrat* did not last for long. The paper's content soon convinced Marx and Engels that Schweitzer and Lassalle's other successors had no intention of renouncing Lassallean doctrines and tactics of accommodation to the Bismarck regime. It became clear to Marx and Engels that the Lassallean leaders were preventing the German workers from joining the International. This induced Marx and Engels not only to break off relations with the *Social-Demokrat*, but also to make the breach public. In their statement of February 23, 1865, to the editors, contained in this volume, they strongly criticised the tenor that the Lassalleans had given the newspaper, and characterised Lassalleanism itself as "royal Prussian governmental socialism" (this volume, p. 80). A number of other letters by Marx to the press published in this volume (his "Statement regarding the causes of the breach with the *Social-Demokrat*", "To the Editor of the *Berliner Reform*", and "The 'President of Mankind'") also denounced the paper's editor, Schweitzer, and other Lassallean leaders.

Engels' pamphlet *The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party* which substantiates the tactics of the German proletariat on the major questions of political life in Germany, was also full of criticism of Lassalleanism. The pamphlet analysed the alignment of class forces in the constitutional conflict that had arisen between the Prussian government and the liberal bourgeoisie in connection with the government's proposals for reorganising the army. In the prevailing circumstances, the pamphlet's author made it clear, the need to create an independent workers' party in Germany was most acute. Outlining its tactical line, Engels, unlike the Lassalleans, argued the need not only to criticise the inconsistency and cowardice of the bourgeois Party of Progress, but also to wage an unrelenting battle against the military-bureaucratic monarchy and its social bulwark—the reactionary class of Junker landowners.

In the struggle against Junker-monarchistic forces, the workers' party, Engels stressed, must be able to expose the social demagoguery of the head of the Prussian state, Bismarck, his feigned willingness

to grant concessions to the working class, which concealed his intention to use it to put pressure on the bourgeois opposition. Comparing Bismarck's actions with the political methods of the bourgeois ruling circles in the Second Empire in France, Engels reveals the reactionary nature of Bonapartism, pointing out such characteristic features of it as manoeuvring between classes with the aim of suppressing all resistance to the reactionary regime, savage repression of the workers' movement under the pretence of protecting the workers, the transformation of a democratic institution, universal suffrage, into a means of deceiving the masses, and consolidating the military-police dictatorship (*ibid.*, pp. 72-73). In so doing Engels warned German workers against the Lassallean idealisation of universal suffrage, showing that its real value for the working class was determined by the social and political conditions under which it took effect.

The writings of Marx and Engels promoted the disillusionment of the German workers with Lassallean dogmas and the tactics of the leaders of the General Association of German Workers. Opposition to the Lassallean leaders grew within the organisation itself. The workers became increasingly drawn to the International, to creating its sections in Germany. Marx followed these changes in the German working-class movement closely. At the meeting of the General Council on October 8, 1867 he reported as a great victory for the German working class the election to the North German Imperial Diet of Wilhelm Liebknecht who, together with August Bebel, supported the policies of the International (see this volume, p. 438). On October 22, 1867, Marx considered it necessary to acquaint members of the Council with extracts from Liebknecht's speech in the Imperial Diet, in which he criticised Bismarck's foreign policy (*ibid.*).

In September 1867 a great event took place in the history of social thought and the international working-class movement: the publication of Volume One of Marx's main work, *Capital*. "As long as there have been capitalists and workers on earth," Engels wrote, "no book has appeared which is of as much importance for the workers as the one before us. The relation between capital and labour, the axis on which our entire present system of society turns, is here treated scientifically for the first time" (this volume, p. 231). By revealing in *Capital* the laws of development of the capitalist mode of production, Marx made a revolution in economic science. His work was a tremendous step forward in the

development of other component parts of Marxist teaching also—dialectical and historical materialism and the theory of scientific communism. *Capital* was a theoretical weapon for the working class in its struggle against capitalist slavery.

Marx's book played an exceptionally important role in the activity of the International. In *Capital* the international proletarian organisation acquired an ideological source for elucidating the revolutionary aims of its struggle, and an indispensable guide for determining its position on many questions of vital importance for the working-class movement. The propaganda of the ideas contained in *Capital*, in which eminent members of the International Association joined, accelerated the development of the class consciousness of participants in the working-class movement and their liberation from the influence of petty-bourgeois utopians, helping the proletarian masses to master revolutionary socialist teaching and turn to scientific communism. For Marx and his colleagues this process helped to solve the task which they had set at this stage of the International's activity, namely, that of bringing the workers in its ranks to a clear understanding of the need for socialist revolution and the communist transformation of society and inserting corresponding propositions in the programme of the international proletarian organisation.

The works by Marx and Engels, published in a special section of this volume and dealing with the publication of Volume One of *Capital*, reflect the initial stage of the popularisation of this work and also the ideological struggle around it, when bourgeois ideologists abandoned their tactics of silence and sought to belittle its importance and distort its content.

A great role was played by Engels in breaking the "conspiracy of silence" with which official academic circles and the bourgeois press met the appearance of *Capital*. He wrote a number of reviews for liberal and democratic newspapers as if considering the book from the viewpoint of a bourgeois scholar sufficiently objective, however, to assess its scientific merits. "The studies made in this book are of the greatest scientific subtlety," Engels wrote in a review for the *Zukunft* newspaper (this volume, p. 208). "... it is a most scholarly work which has a claim to be regarded as most strictly scientific," he remarked in a review for the *Elberfelder Zeitung* (ibid., pp. 214-215). One of the devices that Engels used in his reviews was to compare the theoretical level of Marx's work with the academic level of bourgeois, particularly German, economists, in order under the guise of lamenting the deplorable state of official economic thought in Germany to show the

superiority of Marxist political economy to bourgeois political economy.

Addressing himself in the above-mentioned reviews primarily to a bourgeois audience, Engels sought to dispel the idea widespread among it that Marx's teaching was a type of utopian socialism. He emphasised that by his economic theory Marx had provided "the scientific basis for socialist aspirations which neither Fourier nor Proudhon nor even Lassalle had been able to do" (ibid., p. 215). In a review for the *Beobachter* Engels described the basic difference between the Marxist and the Lassallean approach to the major questions of the day as follows: "If Lassalle had big ideas about Bismarck's fitness to introduce the socialist Millennium, Herr Marx refutes his wayward pupil loudly enough" (ibid., p. 225).

Engels frequently drew attention to Marx's application of the dialectical method, and his consistent historical approach to events, hailing this as a great scientific achievement of the author of *Capital*. "We must confess," he wrote, "that we are much impressed by the sense of history which pervades the whole book and forbids the author to take the laws of economics for eternal truths, for anything but the formulations of the conditions of existence of certain transitory states of society" (this volume, p. 208). Thus Engels led the reader to the conclusion that from the scientific point of view the capitalist system was just as historically transient as the feudal and slave-owning systems before it, and that it would inevitably be succeeded by a different, higher organisation of society. In his review for the liberal *Rheinische Zeitung* Engels states unambiguously in this connection that the representatives of revolutionary Social-Democracy should see Marx's work as "their *theoretical bible*, as the armoury from which they will take their most telling arguments" (ibid., p. 210). It was evidently no accident that the editors of this newspaper refused to publish it. Engels' long article for the British journal *The Fortnightly Review* was not published either (ibid., pp. 238-59).

Engels' review for the workers' newspaper *Demokratisches Wochenblatt* was of a different nature. Here he could express openly his solidarity with the author's views. In his exposition of the fundamentals of Marx's economic teaching he laid emphasis on the pinpointing of the exploitative nature of the relations between capitalists and workers, the mechanism of extracting surplus value by entrepreneurs, the inevitable aggravation of the class antagonisms inherent in bourgeois society and the growing struggle between labour and capital. Engels expounded clearly

Marx's idea that the very development of capitalism creates the material prerequisites for the revolutionary transition to a communist system. "Capitalist production is the first to create the wealth and the productive forces necessary for this, but at the same time it also creates, in the numerous and oppressed workers, the social class which is compelled more and more to claim the utilisation of this wealth and these productive forces for the whole of society—instead of their being utilised, as they are today, for a monopolist class" (this volume, p. 237).

The synopsis of Volume One of Marx's *Capital* which Engels may have written as an outline for a special pamphlet, covers the content of almost four of the six chapters in the first edition of the book (see this volume, pp. 263-308). This work is a fine example of the popular exposition of the complex economic problems examined in Marx's work.

The volume also contains Marx's article "Plagiarism" and the manuscript outline of his article "My Plagiarism of F. Bastiat". The first of these works criticises the misuse and crude distortion by Lassallean leaders and publicists of individual propositions of *Capital* (see this volume, pp. 219-23). In this article Marx warns against the danger of debasing Marxist political economy. In the second work, having refuted the assertion by bourgeois reviewers of *Capital* that he had borrowed his theory of value from Bastiat, one of the French vulgar economists (*ibid.*, pp. 260-62). Marx refuted attempts by his opponents to belittle the scientific value of his economic teaching by false references to its alleged lack of originality.

The section "From the Preparatory Materials" contains drafts and notes by Marx that show his preparations for various speeches in the Central Council of the International Working Men's Association and other aspects of his activity as a leader of the Council, and Marx's minutes of the Central Council meeting on January 16, 1866. It also contains notes made by Engels during his travels round Sweden and Denmark in July 1867.

The Appendices contain records of Marx's speeches published according to the Minute Book of the General Council or newspaper reports, and also extracts from the Minute Book that throw light on the discussion of various matters in the Council in which Marx took part. Here too are extracts from the minutes of the London Conference of the International in 1865 which was held under Marx's leadership, and also documents of the Central (later General) Council drawn up with his assistance, including the

Council Report to the Lausanne Congress of the International. The Appendices also include some contributions by Marx's associates edited by him and letters from Jenny Marx to Johann Philipp Becker with information that came from Marx and was intended for publication. Also published here are circulars from the Schiller Institute in Manchester, of which Engels was Chairman at the time.

* * *

This volume contains 55 works by Marx and Engels, of which 21 are published in English for the first time, among them the statement by Marx and Engels to the *Social-Demokrat* of February 6, 1865, a number of other statements and letters from Marx to the editors of German newspapers, and also his articles "The 'President of Mankind'", "Plagiarism" and "My Plagiarism of F. Bastiat". Of Engels' works the pamphlet *The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party* and most of the reviews of Volume One of *Capital* are published in English for the first time. Of the documents contained in the Appendices nine are appearing in English for the first time.

In cases where documents of the International written by Marx or with his participation have survived in more or less authentic versions in several languages, the English version—manuscript or printed—is reproduced in this volume. Significant differences in reading with versions in other languages are indicated in the footnotes.

All the texts have been translated from the German except where otherwise stated. Headings supplied by the editors where none existed in the original are given in square brackets. The asterisks indicate footnotes by the author; the editors' footnotes are indicated by index letters.

Misprints in quotations, proper and geographical names, figures, dates, and so on, have been corrected with reference to the sources used by Marx and Engels. The known literary and documental sources are referred to in footnotes and in the index of quoted and mentioned literature. Words written in English in the original are given in small caps.

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KARL MARX
and
FREDERICK ENGELS

WORKS

September 1864-July 1868

ADDRESS
AND
PROVISIONAL RULES
OF THE
WORKING MEN'S
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 28, 1864,

AT A PUBLIC MEETING HELD AT ST. MARTIN'S
HALL, LONG ACRE, LONDON.

PRICE ONE PENNY.

PRINTED AT THE "BEE-HIVE" NEWSPAPER OFFICE,
10, BOLT COURT, FLEET STREET.

1864.

Title page of the first edition
of the Inaugural Address and Provisional Rules
of the Working Men's International Association

Karl Marx

INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF THE WORKING MEN'S INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

ESTABLISHED SEPTEMBER 28, 1864
AT A PUBLIC MEETING HELD
AT ST. MARTIN'S HALL, LONG ACRE, LONDON¹

Working Men,^a

It is a great fact that the misery of the working masses has not diminished from 1848 to 1864, and yet this period is unrivalled for the development of its industry and the growth of its commerce. In 1850, a moderate organ of the British middle class, of more than average information, predicted that if the exports and imports of England were to rise 50 per cent, English pauperism would sink to zero.² Alas! on April 7th, 1864, the Chancellor of the Exchequer^b delighted his Parliamentary audience by the statement that the total import and export trade of England had grown in 1863

"to £443,955,000! that astonishing sum [...] about three times the trade of the [...] comparatively recent epoch of 1843!"

With all that, he was eloquent upon "poverty".

"Think," he exclaimed, "of those who are on the border of that region", upon "wages ... not increased"; upon "human life ... in nine cases out of ten but a struggle for existence!"

He did not speak of the people of Ireland, gradually replaced by machinery in the north, and by sheep-walks in the south, though even the sheep in that unhappy country are decreasing, it is true, not at so rapid a rate as the men. He did not repeat what then had been just betrayed by the highest representatives of the upper ten thousand in a sudden fit of terror. When the garotte³

^a The pamphlet published in London in 1866 has "Fellow Working Men".—*Ed.*

^b William Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons on April 7, 1864, *The Times*, No. 24841, April 8, 1864.—*Ed.*

panic had reached a certain height, the House of Lords caused an inquiry to be made into, and a report to be published upon, transportation and penal servitude. Out came the murder in the bulky Blue Book⁴ of 1863,^a and proved it was, by official facts and figures, that the worst of the convicted criminals, the penal serfs of England and Scotland, toiled much less and fared far better than the agricultural labourers of England and Scotland. But this was not all. When, consequent upon the Civil War in America, the operatives of Lancashire and Cheshire were thrown upon the streets,⁵ the same House of Lords sent to the manufacturing districts a physician commissioned to investigate into the smallest possible amount of carbon and nitrogen, to be administered in the cheapest and plainest form, which on an average might just suffice to "avert starvation diseases". Dr. Smith, the medical deputy, ascertained that 28,000 grains of carbon, and 1,330 grains of nitrogen were the weekly allowance that would keep an average adult ... just over the level of starvation diseases, and he found furthermore that quantity pretty nearly to agree with the scanty nourishment to which the pressure of extreme distress had actually reduced the cotton operatives.* But now mark! The same learned Doctor was later on again deputed by the medical officer of the Privy Council to inquire into the nourishment of the poorer labouring classes. The results of his researches are embodied in the "Sixth Report on Public Health", published by order of Parliament in the course of the present year.^b What did the Doctor discover? That the silk weavers, the needle women, the kid glovers, the stocking weavers, and so forth, received,^c on an average, not even the distress pittance of the cotton operatives, not even the amount of carbon and nitrogen "just sufficient to avert starvation diseases".

"Moreover," we quote from the report, "as regards the examined families of the agricultural population, it appeared that more than a fifth were with less than the

* We need hardly remind the reader that, apart from the elements of water and certain inorganic substances, carbon and nitrogen form the raw materials of human food. However, to nourish the human system, those simple chemical constituents must be supplied in the form of vegetable or animal substances. Potatoes, for instance, contain mainly carbon, while wheaten bread contains carbonaceous and nitrogenous substances in a due proportion.

^a The reference is to the *Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the operation of the acts (16 & 17 Vict. c. 99 and 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3) relating to transportation and penal servitude*, vols. I-II, London, 1863.—*Ed.*

^b *Public Health. Sixth Report of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council with Appendix*. 1863, London, 1864.—Below Marx quotes this report, pp. 13-15.—*Ed.*

^c In the German text the words "year after year" have been added.—*Ed.*

estimated sufficiency of carbonaceous food, that more than one-third were with less than the estimated sufficiency of nitrogenous food, and that in three counties (Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and Somersetshire) insufficiency of nitrogenous food was the average local diet." "It must be remembered," adds the official report, "that privation of food is very reluctantly borne, and that, as a rule, great poorness of diet will only come when other privations have preceded it... Even cleanliness will have been found costly or difficult, and if there still be self-respectful endeavours to maintain it, every such endeavour will represent additional pangs of hunger." "These are painful reflections, especially when it is remembered that the poverty to which they advert is not the deserved poverty of idleness; in all cases it is the poverty of working populations. Indeed, [...] the work which obtains the scanty pittance of food is for the most part excessively prolonged."

The report brings out the strange, and rather unexpected fact, "That of the divisions of the United Kingdom", England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, "the agricultural population of England", the richest division, "is considerably the worst fed"; but that even the agricultural labourers of Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and Somersetshire, fare better than great numbers of skilled indoor operatives of the East of London.

Such are the official statements published by order of Parliament in 1864, during the millennium of free trade, at a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the House of Commons that:

"The average condition of the British labourer has [...] improved [...] in a degree [...] we know to be extraordinary and [...] unexampled [...] in the history of any country or any age."^a

Upon these official congratulations jars the dry remark of the official Public Health Report:

"The public health of a country means the health of its masses, and the masses will scarcely be healthy unless, to their very base, they be at least moderately prosperous."

Dazzled by the "Progress of the Nation" statistics dancing before his eyes, the Chancellor of the Exchequer exclaims in wild ecstasy:

"From 1842 to 1852 the taxable income of the country [...] increased by 6 per cent; [...] in the eight years from 1853 to 1861, it has increased from the basis taken in 1853 20 per cent! the fact is so astonishing to be almost incredible!... This intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power," adds Mr. Gladstone, "is entirely confined to classes of property!"⁶

If you want to know under what conditions of broken health, tainted morals, and mental ruin, that "intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power entirely confined to classes of property" was,

^a Here and below Marx quotes Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons on April 16, 1863.—*Ed.*

and is being, produced by the classes of labour, look to the picture hung up in the last "Public Health Report" of the workshops of tailors, printers, and dressmakers!^a Compare the "Report of the Children's Employment Commission" of 1863, where it is stated, for instance, that:

"The potters as a class, both men and women, [...] represent a much degenerated population, both physically and mentally", that "the unhealthy child is an unhealthy parent in his turn", that "a progressive deterioration of the race must go on", and that "the degenerescence of the population of Staffordshire would be even greater were it not for the constant recruiting from the adjacent country, and the intermarriages with more healthy races."^b

Glance at Mr. Tremenheere's Blue Book on the "Grievances complained of by the Journeymen Bakers"^c! And who has not shuddered at the paradoxical statement made by the inspectors of factories, and illustrated by the Registrar General, that the Lancashire operatives, while put upon the distress pittance of food, were actually improving in health, because of their temporary exclusion by the cotton famine from the cotton factory, and that the mortality of the children was decreasing, because their mothers were now at last allowed to give them, instead of Godfrey's cordial, their own breasts.

Again reverse the medal! The Income and Property Tax Returns laid before the House of Commons on July 20, 1864, teach us that the persons with yearly incomes, valued by the tax-gatherer at £50,000 and upwards, had, from April 5th, 1862, to April 5th, 1863, been joined by a dozen and one, their number having increased in that single year from 67 to 80. The same returns disclose the fact that about 3,000 persons divide amongst themselves a yearly income of about £25,000,000 sterling, rather more than the total revenue doled out annually to the whole mass of the agricultural labourers of England and Wales. Open the census of 1861, and you will find that the number of the male landed proprietors of England and Wales had decreased from 16,934 in 1851, to 15,066 in 1861, so that the concentration of land had grown in 10 years 11 per cent. If the concentration of the soil of the country in a few hands proceeds at the same rate, the land question will become singularly simplified, as it has

^a The reference is to the above quoted *Sixth Report*, pp. 25-27.—*Ed.*

^b *Children's Employment Commission (1862). First Report of the Commissioners*, London, 1863, p. 24.—*Ed.*

^c *Report addressed to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, relative to the Grievances complained of by the Journeymen Bakers*, London, 1862.—*Ed.*

become in the Roman Empire, when Nero grinned at the discovery that half the Province of Africa was owned by six gentlemen.

We have dwelt so long upon these "facts so astonishing to be almost incredible", because England heads the Europe of commerce and industry.^a It will be remembered that some months ago one of the refugee sons of Louis Philippe publicly congratulated the English agricultural labourer on the superiority of his lot over that of his less florid comrade on the other side of the Channel. Indeed, with local colours changed, and on a scale somewhat contracted, the English facts reproduce themselves in all the industrious and progressive countries of the Continent. In all of them there has taken place, since 1848, an unheard-of development of industry, and an undreamed-of expansion of imports and exports. In all of them "the augmentation of wealth and power entirely confined to classes of property" was truly "intoxicating". In all of them, as in England, a minority of the working classes got their real wages^b somewhat advanced; while in most cases the monetary rise of wages denoted no more a real access of comforts than the inmate of the metropolitan poor-house or orphan asylum, for instance, was in the least benefited by his first necessaries costing £9 15s. 8d. in 1861 against £7 7s. 4d. in 1852. Everywhere the great mass of the working classes were sinking down to a lower depth, at the same rate, at least, that those above them were rising in the social scale. In all countries of Europe it has now become a truth demonstrable to every unprejudiced mind, and only denied by those, whose interest it is to hedge other people in a fool's paradise, that no improvement of machinery,^c no appliance of science to production, no contrivances of communication, no new colonies, no emigration, no opening of markets, no free trade, nor all these things put together, will do away with the miseries of the industrious masses; but that, on the present false base, every fresh development of the productive powers of labour must tend to deepen social contrasts and point social antagonisms. Death of starvation rose almost to the rank of an institution, during this "intoxicating" epoch of economical progress, in the metropolis of the British Empire. That epoch is

^a In the German text the following words have been added: "and in fact represents it on the world market".—*Ed.*

^b In the German text the following words been added: "i.e. the foodstuffs bought with money wages".—*Ed.*

^c In the German text the following words have been added: "no chemical discoveries".—*Ed.*

marked in the annals of the world by the quickened return, the widening compass, and the deadlier effects of the social pest called a commercial and industrial crisis.

After the failure of the revolutions of 1848, all party organisations and party journals of the working classes were, on the Continent, crushed by the iron hand of force, the most advanced sons of labour fled in despair to the Transatlantic Republic, and the short-lived dreams of emancipation vanished before an epoch of industrial fever, moral marasme, and political reaction. The defeat of the continental working classes, partly owed to the diplomacy of the English Government, acting then as now in fraternal solidarity with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, soon spread its contagious effects on this side of the Channel. While the rout of their continental brethren unmanned the English working classes, and broke their faith in their own cause, it restored to the landlord and the money-lord their somewhat shaken confidence. They insolently withdrew concessions already advertised. The discoveries of new goldlands led to an immense exodus, leaving an irreparable void in the ranks of the British proletariat. Others of its formerly active members were caught by the temporary bribe of greater work and wages, and turned into "political blacks". All the efforts made at keeping up, or remodelling, the Chartist Movement, failed signally; the press organs of the working class died one by one of the apathy of the masses, and, in point of fact, never before seemed the English working class so thoroughly reconciled to a state of political nullity. If, then, there had been no solidarity of action between the British and the continental working classes, there was, at all events, a solidarity of defeat.

And yet the period passed since the revolutions of 1848 has not been without its compensating features. We shall here only point to two great facts.

After a thirty years' struggle, fought with most admirable perseverance, the English working classes, improving a momentaneous split between the landlords and money-lords, succeeded in carrying the Ten Hours' Bill.⁷ The immense physical, moral, and intellectual benefits hence accruing to the factory operatives, half-yearly chronicled in the reports of the inspectors of factories, are now acknowledged on all sides. Most of the continental governments had to accept the English Factory Act in more or less modified forms, and the English Parliament itself is every year compelled to enlarge its sphere of action. But besides its practical import, there was something else to exalt the marvellous success of this working men's measure. Through their most notorious organs

of science, such as Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and other sages of that stamp, the middle class had predicted, and to their heart's content proved, that any legal restriction of the hours of labour must sound the death knell of British industry, which, vampire like, could but live by sucking blood, and children's blood, too. In olden times, child murder was a mysterious rite of the religion of Moloch, but it was practised on some very solemn occasions only, once a year perhaps, and then Moloch had no exclusive bias for the children of the poor. This struggle about the legal restriction of the hours of labour raged the more fiercely since, apart from frightened avarice, it told indeed upon the great contest between the blind rule of the supply and demand laws which form the political economy of the middle class, and social production controlled by social foresight, which forms the political economy of the working class. Hence the Ten Hours' Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.

But there was in store a still greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of property.^a We speak of the co-operative movement, especially the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold "hands". The value of these great social experiments cannot be over-rated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands; that to bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of dominion over, and of extortion against, the labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory and inferior^b form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its toil with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart. In England, the seeds of the co-operative system were sown by Robert Owen; the working men's experiments, tried on the Continent, were, in fact, the practical upshot of the theories, not invented, but loudly proclaimed, in 1848.

At the same time, the experience of the period from 1848 to 1864 has proved^c beyond doubt that, however excellent in

^a The German text reads: "the political economy of capital".—*Ed.*

^b In the German text the word "social" has been added.—*Ed.*

^c In the German text the following has been added: "what the most intelligent leaders of the working class asserted about the co-operative movement in England already in 1851 and 1852".⁸—*Ed.*

principle, and however useful in practice, co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the casual efforts of private workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of monopoly, to free the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of their miseries. It is perhaps for this very reason that plausible noblemen, philanthropic middle-class spouters, and even keen political economists, have all at once turned nauseously complimentary to the very co-operative labour system they had vainly tried to nip in the bud by deriding it as the Utopia of the dreamer, or stigmatising it as the sacrilege of the Socialist. To save the industrious masses, co-operative labour ought to be developed by national dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means. Yet, the lords of land and the lords of capital will always use their political privileges for the defence and perpetuation of their economical monopolies. So far from promoting, they will continue to lay every possible impediment in the way of the emancipation of labour. Remember the sneer with which, last session, Lord Palmerston put down the advocates of the Irish Tenants' Right Bill. The House of Commons, cried he, is a house of landed proprietors.^{a9}

To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes. They seem to have comprehended this, for in England, Germany, Italy, and France there have taken place simultaneous revivals, and simultaneous efforts are being made at the political reorganisation of the working men's party.

One element of success they possess—numbers; but numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combination and led by knowledge. Past experience has shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts. This thought prompted the working men of different countries assembled on September 28, 1864, in public meeting at St. Martin's Hall, to found the International Association.

Another conviction swayed that meeting.

If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence,^b how are they to fulfil that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon

^a John Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on June 23, 1863, *The Times*, No. 24593, June 24, 1863.—*Ed.*

^b The German text reads: "requires fraternal concurrence of different nations".—*Ed.*

national prejudices, and squandering in piratical wars the people's blood and treasure? It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes, but the heroic resistance to their criminal folly by the working classes of England that saved the West of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic.¹⁰ The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling a prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia; the immense and unresisted encroachments of that barbarous power, whose head is at St. Petersburg, and whose hands are in every Cabinet of Europe, have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective Governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations.

The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes.

Proletarians of all countries, Unite!

Written between October 21 and 27, 1864

First published in *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 160, November 5, 1864 and in the pamphlet *Address and Provisional Rules of the Working Men's International Association...*, London, November 1864. Author's translation into German was published in *Der Social-Demokrat*, Nos. 2 and 3, December 21 and 30, 1864

Reproduced from the text of the pamphlet checked with that in *Der Social-Demokrat*

Karl Marx

PROVISIONAL RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION¹¹

Considering,

That the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves; that the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes means not a struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal rights and duties, and the abolition of all class rule;

That the economical subjection of the man of labour to the monopoliser of the means of labour, that is, the sources of life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence;

That the economical emancipation of the working classes is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means;

That all efforts aiming at that great end have hitherto failed from the want of solidarity between the manifold divisions of labour in each country, and from the absence of a fraternal bond of union between the working classes of different countries;

That the emancipation of labour is neither a local nor a national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in which modern society exists, and depending for its solution on the concurrence, practical and theoretical, of the most advanced countries;

That the present revival of the working classes in the most industrious countries of Europe, while it raises a new hope, gives solemn warning against a relapse into the old errors and calls for the immediate combination of the still disconnected movements;

For these reasons—

The undersigned members of the committee, holding its powers by resolution of the public meeting held on Sept. 28, 1864, at St. Martin's Hall, London, have taken the steps necessary for founding the Working Men's International Association;

They declare that this International Association and all societies and individuals adhering to it, will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality, as the basis of their conduct towards each other, and towards all men, without regard to colour, creed, or nationality;

They hold it the duty of a man to claim the rights of a man and a citizen, not only for himself, but for every man who does his duty. No rights without duties, no duties without rights¹²;

And in this spirit they have drawn up the following Provisional Rules of the International Association:—

1. This Association is established to afford a central medium of communication and co-operation between Working Men's Societies existing in different countries, and aiming at the same end, viz., the protection, advancement, and complete emancipation of the working classes.

2. The name of the Society shall be: "The Working Men's International Association".

3. In 1865 there shall meet in Belgium a General Working Men's Congress, consisting of representatives of such working men's societies as may have joined the International Association. The Congress will have to proclaim before Europe the common aspirations of the working classes, decide on the definitive rules of the International Association, consider the means required for its successful working, and appoint the Central Council of the Association.¹³ The General Congress is to meet once a year.

4. The Central Council shall sit in London, and consist of working men belonging to the different countries represented in the International Association. It shall from its own members elect the officers necessary for the transaction of business, such as a president, a treasurer, a general secretary, corresponding secretaries for the different countries, &c.

5. On its annual meetings, the General Congress shall receive a public account of the annual transactions of the Central Council. The Central Council, yearly appointed by the Congress, shall have power to add to the number of its members. In cases of urgency, it may convoke the General Congress before the regular yearly term.

6. The Central Council shall form an international agency between the different co-operating associations, so that the working men in one country be constantly informed of the

movements of their class in every other country; that an inquiry into the social state of the different countries of Europe be made simultaneously, and under a common direction; that the questions of general interest mooted in one society be ventilated by all; and that when immediate practical steps should be needed, as, for instance, in case of international quarrels, the action of the associated societies be simultaneous and uniform. Whenever it seems opportune, the Central Council shall take the initiative of proposals to be laid before the different national or local societies.

7. Since the success of the working men's movement in each country cannot be secured but by the power of union and combination, while, on the other hand, the usefulness of the International Central Council must greatly depend on the circumstance whether it has to deal with a few national centres of working men's associations, or with a great number of small and disconnected local societies; the members of the International Association shall use their utmost efforts to combine the disconnected working men's societies of their respective countries into national bodies, represented by central national organs. It is self-understood, however, that the appliance of this rule will depend upon the peculiar laws of each country, and that, apart from legal obstacles, no independent local society shall be precluded from directly corresponding with the London Central Council.

8. Until the meeting of the first Congress, the committee chosen on September 28th, 1864, will act as a Provisional Central Council, try to connect the different national working men's associations, enlist members in the United Kingdom, take the steps preparatory to the convocation of the General Congress, and discuss with the national and local societies the main questions to be laid before that Congress.

9. Each member of the International Association, on removing his domicile from one country to another, will receive the fraternal support of the Associated Working Men.

10. While united in a perpetual bond of fraternal co-operation, the working men's societies, joining the International Association, will preserve their existent organisations intact.

Written between October 21 and 27,
1864

Reproduced from the pamphlet

First published in *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 161, November 12, 1864 and in the pamphlet *Address and Provisional Rules of the Working Men's International Association...*, London, November 1864

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTIONS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PROVISIONAL CENTRAL COUNCIL¹⁴]

I

That persons residing in any part of England can join the Association, but that no member can be elected upon the General Committee who is unable to attend its meetings, and assist in its deliberations.^a

II

That no one be elected on the Central Council who has not previously paid his annual subscription as a member of this Association.

III

That nominations for the Central Council shall be made at least a week previous to the election, such election to take place in the absence of the candidate, and that the person to be elected shall before his nomination have taken a card of membership.

Adopted by the Central Council on November 8 and 29, 1864 and January 24, 1865

Resolution I was first published in *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 161, November 12, 1864; resolutions II and III were first published, in Russian, in *Generalny Sovet Pervogo Internatsionala. 1864-1866*, Moscow, 1961

Resolution I is reproduced from the newspaper, resolutions II and III from the Minute Book of the General Council

^a As entered in the Minute Book of the General Council, see this volume, p. 353—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTIONS ON THE TERMS OF THE ADMISSION
OF WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS
TO THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION¹⁵]

I

That organised bodies of working men be invited to join this Association in their co-operative capacity, the amount of their contributions to be left to their means and discretion.

II

That societies joining this Association shall have the power to elect a representative to sit on the Central Council, the Council reserving to itself the power to accept or reject such delegates.^a

Adopted by the Central Council on
November 22, 1864

First published in *The Bee-Hive News-
paper*, No. 163, November 26, 1864

Reproduced from the text in the
Minute Book of the General
Council checked with that in *The
Bee-Hive Newspaper*

^a In *The Bee-Hive Newspaper* (No. 163, November 26, 1864) report of this meeting, the Resolution II is formulated as follows: "It was also decided that societies in London who join the Association shall have the power to elect a representative to sit on the Central Council, the Council reserving to itself the power to receive or reject such representative. With regard to societies in the provinces who may join, it was decided that they should have the power to elect a corresponding member of the Association".—*Ed.*

THE BEE-HIVE NEWSPAPER.

A JOURNAL OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, ADVOCATING INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS

Karl Marx

TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA¹⁶

Sir,

We congratulate the American people upon your re-election by a large majority.

If resistance to the Slave Power was the reserved watchword of your first election, the triumphant warcry of your re-election is, Death to Slavery.

From the commencement of the Titanic-American strife the working men of Europe felt instinctively that the star-spangled banner carried the destiny of their class. The contest for the territories which opened the dire epopee, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labour of the emigrant, or prostituted by the tramp of the slave-driver?

When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave-holders dared to inscribe, for the first time in the annals of the world, "slavery" on the banner of Armed Revolt; when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first Declaration of the Rights of Man¹⁷ was issued, and the first impulse given to the European revolution of the 18th century; when on those very spots counter-revolution, with systematic thoroughness, gloried in rescinding "the [...] ideas entertained [...] at the time of the formation of the old Constitution", and maintained "slavery to be a beneficent institution", indeed the only solution of the great problem of "the relation of labour to capital", and cynically proclaimed property in man "the corner-stone of the new edifice",^a then the working

^a From the speech of A. Stephens, a leading Southern slave-holder, made in Savannah on March 21, 1861. See report in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 6215, March 27, 1861.—*Ed.*

classes of Europe understood at once, even before the fanatic partisanship of the upper classes for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slave-holders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy crusade of property against labour, and that for the men of labour, with their hopes for the future, even their past conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict on the other side of the Atlantic. Everywhere they bore therefore patiently the hardships imposed upon them by the cotton crisis,¹⁸ opposed enthusiastically the pro-slavery intervention, importunities of their betters—and, from most parts of Europe, contributed their quota of blood to the good cause.

While the working men, the true political power of the North, allowed slavery to defile their own republic; while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his concurrence, they boasted it the highest prerogative of the white-skinned labourer to sell himself and choose his own master; they were unable to attain the true freedom of labour or to support their European brethren in their struggle for emancipation, but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of civil war.

The working men of Europe feel sure that, as the American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle class, so the American Anti-Slavery War will do for the working classes. They consider it an earnest of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world.

Signed on behalf of the International Working Men's Association

The Central Council

Le Lubez, Corresponding Secretary for France, *F. Rybcziński* (Pole), *Emile Holtorp* (Pole), *J. B. Bocquet*, *H. Jung*, Corresponding Secretary for Switzerland; *Morisot*, *Georgy W. Wheeler*, *J. Denoual*, *P. Bordage*, *Leroux*, *Talandier*, *Jourdain*, *Dupont*, *R. Gray*, *D. Lama*, *Setacci*, *F. Solustri*, *P. Aldovrandi*, *D. G. Bagnagatti*, *G. P. Fontana*, Corresponding Secretary for Italy; *G. Lake*, *J. Buckley*, *G. Howell*, *J. Osborne*, *J. D. Stainsby*, *J. Grossmith*, *G. Eccarius*, *Friedrich Lessner*, *L. Wolff*, *K. Kaub*, *Henry Bolleter*, *Ludwig Otto*, *N. P. Hansen* (Dane), *Karl Pfänder*, *Georg Lochner*, *Peter Petersen*, *Karl Marx*, Corresponding Secretary for Germany, *A. Dick*, *J. Wolff*, *J. Whitlock*, *J. Carter*, *W. Morgan*, *William Dell*, *John Weston*, *Peter Fox*,

Robert Shaw, John H. Longmaid, Robert Henry Side, William C. Worley, Blackmoor W., R. Hartwell, W. Pidgeon, B. Lucraft, J. Nieass,^a

*G. Odger, President of Council,
William R. Cremer, Honorary General Secretary^b*

Written between November 22 and 29,
1864

Reproduced from the manuscript
checked with the newspaper's text

First published in *The Daily News*,
No. 5813, December 23, 1864

^a *The Bee-Hive Newspaper* and *The Miner and Workman's Advocate* have here "Nusperli, Schantzenbach, Smales, Cornelius".—*Ed.*

^b *The Bee-Hive Newspaper* has here: "18, Greek Street, Soho".—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE *BEOBACHTER*¹⁹]

November 28, 1864
1, Modena Villas, Maitland Park,
Haverstock Hill, London

Dear Sir,

I beg you to accept for publication the enclosed letter concerning Herr *Karl Blind*.

I have sent the same statement in the same form—as a letter to the Stuttgart *Beobachter*—to some Prussian newspapers for publication, and will also arrange for it to be reproduced in a *German newspaper here* so that responsibility for it rests solely with me.

Yours faithfully,
K. Marx

First published in *Der Beobachter*,
No. 282, December 3, 1864

Printed according to the news-
paper

Published in English for the first
time

Karl Marx
TO THE EDITOR
OF THE STUTTGART *BEOBACHTER*²⁰

Sir,

Through his man-of-straw in Bradford, Dr. Bronner, *Herr Karl Blind* has sent you a long epistle by, for, and about *Herr Blind*, into which, among other curiosities, the following passage slips:

"I do not wish in this connection to return to that old dispute" in respect of the leaflet "*Zur Warnung*" against Vogt "which was settled by statements from all concerned, and which the editorial office has brought up anew."^a

He "does not wish to return"! What magnanimity!

As evidence that the pompous vanity of Herr Karl Blind occasionally propels Herr Karl Blind beyond the bounds of pure comedy, you make mention of *my work* against Vogt. From Blind's reply you and your readers must draw the conclusion that the accusations made in that work against Herr Karl Blind have been settled by "*statements from all concerned*". In actual fact since the appearance of my work, that is for four years, the otherwise so prolific Herr Karl Blind has *never once* dared to "return to the old dispute" with so much as a word, much less with "*statements from all concerned*".

On the contrary, *Herr Karl Blind* has been content to remain branded an "*infamous liar*" (see pp. 66, 67 of my work^b). Herr Karl Blind has repeatedly declared in public that he did not *know* by *whom* the leaflet against Vogt had been cast into the world, that "*he had absolutely no part in the affair*", etc. In addition, Herr Karl Blind published a statement by the printer *Fidelio Hollinger*, flanked by another statement by the compositor *Wiehe*, to the effect that the leaflet had neither been printed in Hollinger's printing-shop nor had it emanated from Herr Karl Blind. In my

^a "Bradford, 25. Oct.", *Der Beobachter*, No. 268, November 17, 1864. Marx's italics.—Ed.

^b See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 128-29.—Ed.

work against Vogt may be found the *affidavits* (statements made under oath) of the compositor Vögele and of *Wiehe* himself made before the *Bow Street Magistrates Court, London*, proving that the same Herr Karl Blind wrote the manuscript of the leaflet, had it printed by Hollinger, personally corrected the proofs, fabricated a false certificate to refute these facts, and deviously obtained the signature of the compositor *Wiehe* for this false certificate by proffering promises of money from Hollinger, and future gratitude on his own part, and finally sent this false document fabricated by himself, along with the signature he himself had dishonestly obtained, to the *Augsburg Allgemeine*^a and other German newspapers as morally outraged evidence of my "malicious invention".

Thus publicly pilloried, Herr *Karl Blind* kept silent. Why? Because (see p. 69 of my work^b) he could only refute the *affidavits* by me by means of *counter-affidavits*, but he found himself "under the grave jurisdiction of England", where "*felony is no joking matter*".

In the aforementioned letter to your newspaper there are also some strange statements about Herr *Karl Blind's* American industriousness. In order to clear up this point allow me to cite an extract from a letter from *J. Weydemeyer* that arrived here a few days ago. You will recall that *J. Weydemeyer* used to edit the *Neue Deutsche Zeitung* in Frankfurt along with O. Lüning, and was always one of the most stalwart champions of the German workers' party. Shortly after the outbreak of the American Civil War he entered the ranks of the Federals. Summoned by Frémont to St. Louis, he served initially as a captain in the Engineer Corps there, then as lieutenant-colonel in an artillery regiment, and when Missouri was again recently threatened with enemy invasion, he was suddenly given the task of organising the 41st Missouri Volunteer Regiment, which he now commands with the rank of colonel. *Weydemeyer* writes from St. Louis, the capital of Missouri, where his regiment is stationed, as follows^c:

"You will find enclosed a cutting from a newspaper here, the *Westliche Post*, in which the literary pirate *Karl Blind* is again strutting and swaggering with all his might at the expense of the 'German republicans'. Of course here it is rather irrelevant how he distorts *Lassalle's* aspirations and agitations; anyone who has read the works of the latter knows what to think of *Blind's harlequinades*; anyone who has not taken the trouble of becoming somewhat better acquainted with that

^a This refers to Blind's *Allgemeine Zeitung* statements published in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nos. 313 and 345. November 9 and December 11, 1859.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 130-31.—*Ed.*

^c Joseph Weydemeyer to Engels, October 1864.—*Ed.*

agitation, may gullibly admire the wisdom and 'staunchness of spirit' of the great man of Baden, conspirator *par excellence* and member of every secret society and future provisional government; such a judgment is of no consequence. *Also people have other things to do here at present than to concern themselves with Blind's protests.* But it would surely be appropriate to rap this *pompous ass* strongly over the knuckles at home, and so I am sending you the article, which is only a small specimen of similar earlier products."

The cutting from the *Westliche Post* sent by J. Weydemeyer is headed: "A *Republican Protest, London, September 17, 1864*", and is the *American edition* of the "*Republican Protest*" which the same unavoidable *Herr Karl Blind* simultaneously sent under the same title to the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*,^a and then with his customary, assiduous ant-like industriousness forwarded to the London *Hermann*^b as a reproduction from the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*.

A comparison of the two versions of Blind's clumsy handiwork would show how the same *Herr Karl Blind*, while protesting in Frankfurt and London with a respectable, republican, Cato-like woeful countenance, simultaneously gives free rein in far-off St. Louis to the most malicious idiocy and the vilest impudence. A comparison of the two versions of the "Protest", for which there is no space here, would also result in a new amusing contribution to the method of fabricating letters, circulars, leaflets, protests, provisos, defences, proclamations, appeals, and other similar headshakingly solemn Blindian political recipés, from which there is as little chance of escaping as from Mr. Holloway's pills or Mr. Hoff's malt extract.

Nothing could be further from my mind than to seek to explain a man such as *Lassalle* and the real tendency of his agitation to a grotesque *Mazzini-Scapin*^c with nothing behind him but his own shadow. On the contrary, I am convinced that *Herr Karl Blind* is only fulfilling the calling imposed on him by nature and by *Aesop* in stepping behind the *dead lion*.^d

Karl Marx

London, November 28, 1864 1, Modena Villas, Maitland Park

First published in the *Nordstern*, No. 287,
December 10, 1864

Published in English for the first
time

Printed according to the copy in
Mrs. Marx's hand, corrected by
the author and collated with the
newspaper

^a Published in the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 270, September 29, 1864.—*Ed.*

^b Published in the *Hermann*, No. 2407, October 8, 1864.—*Ed.*

^c The *Nordstern* has "a grotesque buffoon".—*Ed.*

^d An allusion to an ass in *Aesop's* fable "Leo senio confectus".—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

ON PROUDHON

[LETTER TO J. B. SCHWEITZER]²¹

[*Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 16, February 1, 1865]

London, January 24, 1865

Dear Sir,

Yesterday I received a letter in which you demand from me a detailed judgment of *Proudhon*. Lack of time prevents me from fulfilling your desire. Added to which I have *none* of his works to hand. However, in order to assure you of my good will I will quickly jot down a brief outline. You can then complete it, add to it or cut it—in short do anything you like with it.^a

Proudhon's earliest efforts I no longer remember. His school work about the *Langue universelle*^b shows how unceremoniously he tackled problems for the solution of which he still lacked the first elements of knowledge.

His first work, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?*, is undoubtedly his best. It is epoch-making, if not because of the novelty of its content, at least because of the new and audacious way of expressing old ideas. In the works of the French socialists and communists he knew "*propriété*" had, of course, been not only criticised in various ways but also "*abolished*" in an utopian manner. In this book Proudhon stands in approximately the same relation to Saint-Simon and Fourier as Feuerbach stands to Hegel. Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor. Nevertheless he was epoch-making *after* Hegel because he laid *stress* on certain points which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, points which Hegel had left in mystic *clair-obscur*.^c

In this book of Proudhon's there still prevails, if I may be

^a The editors of *Der Social-Demokrat* supplied a footnote here: "We found it better to print the letter *without any changes*."—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to Proudhon's *Essai de grammaire générale*.—*Ed.*

^c Semi-obscurity.—*Ed.*

allowed the expression, a strong muscular style. And its style is in my opinion its chief merit. It is evident that even where he is only reproducing old stuff, Proudhon discovers things in an independent way—that what he is saying is new to him and is treated as new. The provocative defiance, which lays hands on the economic “holy of holies”, the ingenious paradox which made a mock of the ordinary bourgeois understanding, the withering criticism, the bitter irony, and, revealed here and there, a deep and genuine feeling of indignation at the infamy of the existing order, a revolutionary earnestness—all these electrified the readers of *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?* and provided a strong stimulus on its first appearance. In a strictly scientific history of political economy the book would hardly be worth mentioning. But sensational works of this kind have their role to play in the sciences just as much as in the history of the novel. Take, for instance, Malthus's book on *Population*.^a Its first edition was nothing but a “SENSATIONAL PAMPHLET” and *plagiarism* from beginning to end into the bargain. And yet what a stimulus was produced by this *lampoon on the human race!*

If I had Proudhon's book before me I could easily give a few examples to illustrate his *early style*. In the passages which he himself regarded as the most important he imitates Kant's treatment of the *antinomies*—Kant was at that time the only German philosopher whose works he had read, in translations—and he leaves one with a strong impression that to him, as to Kant, the resolution of the antinomies is something “*beyond*” human understanding, i.e., something that remains obscure to him himself.

But in spite of all his apparent iconoclasm one already finds in *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?* the contradiction that Proudhon is criticising society, on the one hand, from the standpoint and with the eyes of a French small-holding peasant (later *petit bourgeois*) and, on the other, that he measures it with the standards he inherited from the socialists.

The deficiency of the book is indicated by its very title. The question is so badly formulated that it cannot be answered correctly. *Ancient “property relations”* were superseded by *feudal property relations* and these by “*bourgeois*” property relations. Thus history itself had expressed its criticism upon past *property relations*. What Proudhon was actually dealing with was *modern bourgeois property* as it exists today. The question of what this is

^a T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*.—Ed.

could have only been answered by a critical analysis of “*political economy*”, embracing the totality of these *property relations*, considering not their *legal aspect as relations of volition* but their real form, that is, as *relations of production*. But as Proudhon entangled the whole of these economic relations in the general legal concept of “*property*”, “*la propriété*”, he could not get beyond the answer which, in a similar work published before 1789,^a Brissot had already given in the same words: “*La propriété c’est le vol.*”^b

The upshot is at best that the bourgeois legal conceptions of “*theft*” apply equally well to the “*honest*” gains of the bourgeois himself. On the other hand, since “*theft*” as a forcible violation of property *presupposes the existence of property*, Proudhon entangled himself in all sorts of fantasies, obscure even to himself, about *true bourgeois property*.

During my stay in Paris in 1844 I came into personal contact with Proudhon. I mention this here because to a certain extent I am also to blame for his “*SOPHISTICATION*”, as the English call the adulteration of commercial goods. In the course of lengthy debates often lasting all night, I infected him very much to his detriment with Hegelianism, which, owing to his lack of German, he could not study properly. After my expulsion from Paris Herr *Karl Grün* continued what I had begun. As a teacher of German philosophy he also had the advantage over me that he himself understood nothing about it.

Shortly before the appearance of Proudhon’s second important work, the *Philosophie de la misère, etc.*,^c he himself announced this to me in a very detailed letter in which he said, among other things: “*J’attends votre férule critique.*”^d This criticism, however, soon dropped on him (in my *Misère de la philosophie, etc.*, Paris, 1847), in a way which ended our friendship for ever.

[*Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 17, February 3, 1865]

From what I have said here you can see that Proudhon’s *Philosophie de la misère ou Système des contradictions économiques* first contained the real answer to the question *Qu’est-ce que la propriété?* In fact it was *only* after the publication of this work that he had begun his economic studies; he had discovered that the question

^a J. P. Brissot de Warville, *Recherches philosophiques sur le droit de propriété et sur le vol, considérés dans la nature et dans la société.*—Ed.

^b “Property is theft.”—Ed.

^c P. J. Proudhon, *Système des contradictions économiques, ou philosophie de la misère.*—Ed.

^d “I await your severe criticism.”—Ed.

he had raised could not be answered by *invective*, but only by an *analysis* of modern “*political economy*”. At the same time he attempted to present the *system* of economic categories dialectically. In place of Kant’s insoluble “*antinomies*”, the Hegelian “*contradiction*” was to be introduced as the means of development.

For an estimate of his book, which is in two fat volumes, I must refer you to the refutation I wrote. There I have shown, among other things, how little he had penetrated into the secret of scientific dialectics and how, on the contrary, he shares the illusions of speculative philosophy, for instead of regarding *economic categories as the theoretical expression of historical relations of production, corresponding to a particular stage of development in material production*, he garbles them into pre-existing *eternal ideas*, and how in this roundabout way he arrives once more at the standpoint of bourgeois economy.*

I show furthermore how extremely deficient and at times even schoolboyish is his knowledge of “*political economy*” which he undertook to criticise, and that he and the utopians are hunting for a so-called “*science*” by means of which a formula for the “*solution of the social question*” is to be devised *a priori*, instead of deriving science from a critical knowledge of the historical movement, a movement which itself produces the *material conditions of emancipation*. My refutation shows in particular that Proudhon’s view of *exchange-value*, the basis of the whole theory, remains confused, incorrect and superficial, and that he even mistakes the utopian interpretation of Ricardo’s theory of value for the basis of a new science. With regard to his general point of view I have summarised my conclusions thus:

“Every economic relation has a good and a bad side; it is the one point on which M. Proudhon does not give himself the lie. He sees the good side expounded by the economists; the bad side he sees denounced by the socialists. He borrows from the economists the necessity of eternal relations; he borrows from the socialists the illusion of seeing in poverty nothing but poverty (instead of seeing in it the revolutionary, destructive aspect which will

* “When the economists say that present-day relations—the relations of bourgeois production—are *natural*, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves *natural laws* independent of the influence of time. They are *eternal laws* which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any” (p. 113 of my work).^a

^a See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 174.—Ed.

overthrow the old society).^a He is in agreement with both in wanting to fall back upon the authority of science. Science for him reduces itself to the slender proportions of a scientific formula; he is the man in search of formulas. Thus it is that M. Proudhon flatters himself on having given a criticism of both political economy and of communism: he is beneath them both. Beneath the economists, since as a philosopher who has at his elbow a magic formula, he thought he could dispense with going into purely economic details; beneath the socialists, because he has neither courage enough nor insight enough to rise, be it even speculatively, above the bourgeois horizon....

“He wants to soar as the man of science above the bourgeois and the proletarians; *he is merely the petty bourgeois*, continually tossed back and forth between capital and labour, political economy and communism.”*

Severe though the above judgment may sound I must even now endorse every word of it. At the same time, however, one has to bear in mind that when I declared his book to be the code of socialism of the *petit bourgeois* and proved this theoretically, Proudhon was still being decried as an ultra-arch-revolutionary both by political economists and by socialists. That is why later on I never joined in the outcry about his “*treachery*” to the revolution. It was not his fault that, originally misunderstood by others as well as by himself, he failed to fulfil unjustified hopes.

[*Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 18, February 5, 1865]

In the *Philosophie de la misère* all the defects of Proudhon’s method of presentation stand out very unfavourably in comparison with *Qu’est-ce que la propriété?* The style is often what the French call *ampoulé*.^c High-sounding speculative jargon, purporting to be German-philosophical, appears regularly on the scene when his Gallic astuteness fails him. A noisy, self-glorifying, boastful tone and especially the twaddle about “*science*” and sham display of it, which are always so unedifying, are continually jarring on one’s ears. Instead of the genuine warmth which permeates his first work, he here systematically works himself up into a sudden flush of rhetoric in certain passages. There is in addition the clumsy repugnant show of erudition of the self-taught, whose natural pride in his original reasoning has already

* 1. c., pp. 119, 120.^b

^a The phrase in brackets was added by Marx in this article.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 178.—*Ed.*

^c Bombastic.—*Ed.*

been broken and who now, as a *parvenu* of science, feels it necessary to give himself airs with what he neither is nor has. Then the mentality of the petty bourgeois who for instance makes an indecently brutal attack, which is neither shrewd nor profound nor even correct, on a man like *Cabet*—worthy of respect for his practical attitude towards the French proletariat,²² and on the other hand pays compliments to a man like *Dunoyer* (a “State Councillor”, it is true) although the whole significance of this *Dunoyer* lay in the comic zeal with which, throughout three fat, unbearably boring volumes,^a he preached a rigorism characterised by *Helvétius* as follows: “*On veut que les malheureux soient parfaits*” (It is demanded that the unfortunate should be perfect).

The February Revolution certainly came at a very inconvenient moment for Proudhon, who had irrefutably proved only a few weeks before that “*the era of revolutions*” was past for ever. His speech in the National Assembly, however little insight it showed into existing conditions, was worthy of every praise. After the June insurrection it was an act of great courage.²³ In addition it had the fortunate consequence that *M. Thiers*, by his reply opposing Proudhon’s proposals, which was then issued as a special booklet,^b proved to the whole of Europe what infantile catechism served this intellectual pillar of the French bourgeoisie as a pedestal.²⁴ Compared with *M. Thiers*, *Proudhon* indeed swelled to the size of an antediluvian colossus.

Proudhon’s discovery of “*crédit gratuit*”^c and the “*people’s bank*” (*banque du peuple*), based upon it, were his last economic “deeds”. My book *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Part I, Berlin, 1859* (pp. 59-64) contains the proof that the theoretical basis of his idea arises from a misunderstanding of the basic elements of bourgeois “political economy”, namely of the relation between *commodities* and *money*, while the practical superstructure was simply a reproduction of much older and far better developed schemes. That under certain economic and political conditions the credit system can be used to accelerate the emancipation of the working class, just as, for instance, at the beginning of the eighteenth, and again later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century in England, it facilitated the transfer of

^a Ch. Dunoyer, *De la liberté du travail ou simple exposé des conditions dans lesquelles les forces humaines s'exercent avec le plus de puissance*, t. I-III, Paris, 1845.—Ed.

^b *Rapport du citoyen Thiers, précédé de la proposition du citoyen Proudhon relative à l'impôt sur le revenu, et suivi de son discours prononcé à l'Assemblée nationale, le 31 juillet 1848.*—Ed.

^c Free credit.—Ed.

wealth from one class to another, is quite unquestionable and self-evident. But to regard *interest-bearing capital* as the *main form of capital* and to try to make a particular form of the credit system, comprising the alleged abolition of interest, the basis for a transformation of society is an out-and-out *petty-bourgeois* fantasy. This fantasy, further diluted, can therefore actually already be found among the *economic spokesmen of the English petty bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century*. Proudhon's polemic with Bastiat (1850) about interest-bearing capital^a is on a far lower level than the *Philosophie de la misère*. He succeeds in getting himself beaten even by Bastiat and breaks into burlesque bluster when his opponent drives his blows home.

A few years ago Proudhon wrote a prize essay on *Taxation*,^b the competition was sponsored, I believe, by the government of Lausanne. Here the last flicker of genius is extinguished. Nothing remains but the *petit bourgeois tout pur*.^c

So far as Proudhon's political and philosophical writings are concerned they all show the same contradictory, dual character as his economic works. Moreover their value is purely local, confined to France. Nevertheless his attacks on religion, the church, etc., were of great merit locally at a time when the French socialists thought it desirable to show by their religiosity how superior they were to the bourgeois Voltairianism of the eighteenth century and the German godlessness of the nineteenth. Just as Peter the Great defeated Russian barbarism by barbarity, Proudhon did his best to defeat French phrase-mongering by phrases.

His work on the *Coup d'état*,^d in which he flirts with Louis Bonaparte and, in fact, strives to make him palatable to the French workers, and his last work, written against *Poland*,^e in which for the greater glory of the tsar he expresses moronic cynicism, must be described as works not merely bad but base, a baseness, however, which corresponds to the petty-bourgeois point of view.²⁵

Proudhon has often been compared to *Rousseau*. Nothing could be more erroneous. He is more like *Nicolas Linguet*, whose *Théorie des loix civiles*, by the way, is a very brilliant book.

^a *Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon*, Paris, 1850.—Ed.

^b P. J. Proudhon, *Théorie de l'impôt...*, Brussels and Paris, 1861.—Ed.

^c *Petty bourgeois pure and simple*.—Ed.

^d P. J. Proudhon, *La Révolution sociale démontrée par le coup d'état du 2 décembre*, Paris, 1852.—Ed.

^e P. J. Proudhon, *Si les traités de 1815 ont cessé d'exister? Actes du futur congrès*, Paris, 1863.—Ed.

Proudhon had a natural inclination for dialectics. But as he never grasped really scientific dialectics he never got further than sophistry. This is in fact connected with his petty-bourgeois point of view. Like the historian *Raumer*, the petty bourgeois is made up of on-the-one-hand and on-the-other-hand. This is so in his economic interests and *therefore* in his politics, religious, scientific and artistic views. And likewise in his morals, IN EVERYTHING. He is a living contradiction. If, like Proudhon, he is in addition an ingenious man, he will soon learn to play with his own contradictions and develop them according to circumstances into striking, ostentatious, now scandalous now brilliant paradoxes. Charlatanism in science and accommodation in politics are inseparable from such a point of view. There remains only one governing motive, the *vanity* of the subject, and the only question for him, as for all vain people, is the success of the moment, the *éclat* of the day. Thus the simple moral sense, which always kept a Rousseau, for instance, from even the semblance of compromise with the powers that be, is bound to disappear.

Posterity will perhaps sum up the latest phase of French development by saying that Louis Bonaparte was its Napoleon and Proudhon its Rousseau-Voltaire.

You yourself have now to accept responsibility for having imposed upon me the role of a judge of the dead so soon after this man's death.

Yours very respectfully,

Karl Marx

Written on January 24, 1865

First published in *Der Social-Demokrat*,
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1865

Printed according to the news-
paper text checked with the rough
manuscript which has survived in
part

Frederick Engels

HERR TIDMANN

OLD DANISH FOLK SONG²⁶

Early one morning, when it was day,
Herr Tidmann dressed beside his bed,
And he put on his shirt so fine.
That all the Süder people praise.

And he put on his shirt so fine,
His green silk coat did bravely shine,
Buckskin boots he laced on his legs.
That all the Süder people praise.

Buckskin boots he laced on his legs,
Buckled on gilded spurs so neat,
And went to the Süder district Thing.
That all the Süder people praise.

He went to the Süder district Thing,
Demanded the tax from each *edeling*,
Seven bushels of rye from each man's plough.
That all the Süder people praise.

Seven bushels of rye from each man's plough,
One pig in four from the fattening woods—
But then up stood an aged man.
That all the Süder people praise.

But then up stood an aged man:
"Pay such taxes none of us can.
Before so heavy a tax we pay—"
That all the Süder people praise.

“Before so heavy a tax we pay,
 None from this Thing shall go away.
 You Süder peasants, stand in a ring.”
 That all the Süder people praise.

“You Süder peasants, stand in a ring,
 Herr Tidmann alive shan't leave the Thing.”
 The old man struck the very first blow.
 That all the Süder people praise.

The old man struck the very first blow,
 Down to the ground did Herr Tidmann go.
 There lies Herr Tidmann, he streams with blood.
 That all the Süder people praise.

There lies Herr Tidmann, he streams with blood,
 But the plough goes free on the black soil.
 The pigs go free in the fattening woods.
 That all the Süder people praise.^a

This piece of medieval peasant war takes place in the Süder Harde (*harde* means judicial district) north of Aarhus in Jutland. The Thing, the assembled court of the district, handled questions of taxation and administration, as well as court matters. The song shows how the rising nobility confronted the *edelings*, i.e. the free peasants, and also how the peasants put an end to the nobility's arrogance. In a country like Germany, where the propertied class includes as much feudal nobility as bourgeoisie, and the proletariat includes as many agricultural labourers as industrial workers, if not more—the zestful old peasant song will be eminently apposite.

Written not later than January 27, 1865

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 paper

Published in English in full for the
 first time

^a Translated by Alex Miller.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
TO THE EDITOR OF THE *SOCIAL-DEMOKRAT*

STATEMENT²⁷

In No. 16 of your newspaper Herr M. Hess from Paris casts suspicion on *the French members*, with whom he is entirely unacquainted, of *the London Central Committee* of the International Working Men's Association with the words:

"There is really no knowing whether it would matter *if some friends of the Palais-Royal*^a also belonged to the London Association, since it is a public one, etc."

In an earlier issue,^b while prattling about the newspaper *L'Association*, the same Herr M. H. made similar insinuations about the *Paris friends* of the London Committee. We declare his insinuations to be preposterous slander.

For the rest, we are glad to find in this incident confirmation of our conviction that the Paris proletariat is as irreconcilably opposed as ever to Bonapartism in both its forms, the Tuileries form^c and the form of the Palais-Royal, and never for a moment considered the plan of selling its historical honour (or should we, instead of "*its historical honour*", say "*its historical birthright as bearer of revolution*"?) for a mess of pottage. We recommend this example to the German workers.

London and Manchester

Written on February 6, 1865

Printed according to the rough
manuscript

First published in *Der Briefwechsel zwischen F. Engels und K. Marx*, Bd. 3, Stuttgart, 1913

^a An allusion to Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon III's cousin nicknamed Plon-Plon. Palais-Royal was his residence.—*Ed.*

^b *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 8, January 13, 1865.—*Ed.*

^c An allusion to Napoleon III whose residence was the Tuileries.—*Ed.*

FREDERICK ENGELS

**THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY QUESTION
AND
THE GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY²⁸**

Written between the end of January and
February 12, 1865

First published as a separate pamphlet

Printed according to the pamphlet

Published in English for the first
time

Die
preussische Militärfrage

und die

deutsche Arbeiterpartei.

von

Friedrich Engels.

Sansburg.

Dr. Reifner.

1863.

Title page of the first edition
of *The Prussian Military Question*
and *the German Workers' Party* by Engels

Until now the debate on the military question has merely been conducted between the government and the feudal party on the one hand, and the liberal and radical bourgeoisie on the other. Now, as the crisis approaches, it is time for the workers' party to make its position known too.

In attempting a critique of the military situation in question, we can only proceed from the actual condition facing us. As long as present conditions persist in Germany and Europe we cannot expect the Prussian government to act with any other interests in mind than those of Prussia herself. No more can we seriously expect the bourgeois opposition to proceed from any other standpoint than that of its own bourgeois interests.

The workers' party, which in all questions at issue between reaction and bourgeoisie stands outside the actual conflict, enjoys the advantage of being able to treat such questions quite cold-bloodedly and impartially. It alone can treat them scientifically, historically, as though they were already in the past, anatomically, as though they were already corpses.

I

After the attempts at mobilisation in 1850 and 1859²⁹ there can be but one verdict on the condition of the Prussian army under the old system. Since 1815 the absolute monarchy had been bound by a public promise: not to raise new taxes, nor to float loans without obtaining prior approval from the future representative assembly of the country. It was impossible to break this promise; no loan had the smallest chance of success without such approval. The general system of taxation was however so organised that the increase in yield quite failed to keep pace with the growth of the country's wealth. Absolutism was poor, poor indeed, and the extraordinary expenditure consequent upon the storms of 1830³⁰ was enough to oblige it to practise the utmost economy. Hence the introduction of two-year military service, and hence a system of economy in all branches of military administration which reduced the equipment to be held in readiness for mobilisation to the very lowest level, with regard both to quantity and quality. Despite this, Prussia's position as a great power was to be maintained; to this end the first field army needed to be as strong as possible at the outbreak of a war and therefore also included the first levy of the *Landwehr*.³¹ The necessity for mobilisation at the very first threat of war was thereby ensured and with it the collapse of the whole edifice. This duly occurred in 1850, resulting in a complete and utter fiasco for Prussia.

In 1850 only the material shortcomings of the system became evident; the whole affair was over before the adverse effects on morale could emerge. The funds the Chambers had approved were used to alleviate the material shortcomings as far as possible. As far as possible; for under no circumstances will it be possible to

hold matériel in such a state of readiness as would within 14 days see the called-up reserves and after 14 days the whole of the first levy of the *Landwehr* fully equipped for battle. It should not be forgotten that while the soldiers of the line represented the recruitment of 3 years at most, the reserve and the first levy together represented 9 years' recruitment, and that for every 3 soldiers of the line in battle order therefore, at least 7 called-up men had to be equipped in 4 weeks. Then came the Italian war of 1859 and with it another general mobilisation. On this occasion too a goodly number of material shortcomings were still evident, but they paled into insignificance beside the adverse effects the system had on morale, which were only uncovered now that the state of mobilisation was prolonged. Undeniably the *Landwehr* had been neglected; its battalion-cadres for the most part simply did not exist and had first to be built up; of the existing officers many were unfit for service in the field. But even if all this had not been so, the fact still remained that the officers could not be other than quite estranged from their men, particularly regarding their military ability, and that this military ability was in most cases insufficient for battalions with such officers to be sent with confidence against seasoned troops. If the *Landwehr* officers gave an excellent account of themselves in the Danish war,³² one should not forget that there is a great difference between a battalion which has $\frac{4}{5}$ officers of the line and $\frac{1}{5}$ *Landwehr* officers, and the reverse. But there was a further point that was decisive. As might have been realised beforehand, it became obvious at once that the *Landwehr* can certainly be used to fight, especially in defence of their own country, but under no circumstances can they be used for a show of force. The *Landwehr* is a defensive institution which only lends itself to offensive warfare after repelling an invasion, as in 1814 and 1815. A levy consisting for the most part of married men aged from 26 to 32 cannot be stationed idly at the frontiers for months whilst letters from home come in daily telling of the hardship suffered by their wives and children; for the support given to the families of the men called out also proved to be woefully inadequate. Then there was the fact that the men did not know whom they had to fight, the French or the Austrians—neither of whom had at that time injured Prussia in any way. How could such troops, demoralised by months of inactivity, be expected to attack highly organised and battle-hardened armies?

That a change was inevitable is obvious. In the prevailing circumstances, Prussia's first field army needed to be more strongly organised. How was this achieved?

The 36 regiments of conscripted infantry of the *Landwehr* were allowed to continue in existence for the time being, but were gradually transformed into new regiments of the line. Little by little the cavalry and artillery were also expanded until they achieved equivalent strength to the reinforced infantry; and finally the siege-artillery was detached from the field artillery, which was an improvement in any event, especially for Prussia. In a nutshell, the infantry was doubled and the cavalry and artillery expanded by about one half. In order to maintain this increased standing army, it was proposed to extend the period of service in the line from 5 years to 7—3 years with the colours (in the case of the infantry), 4 in the reserve; on the other hand, liability for the second levy of the *Landwehr* was to be cut by 4 years; and finally annual recruitment was to be increased from the previous figure of 40,000 to 63,000. In the meantime, the *Landwehr* was completely neglected.

The increased battalions, squadrons and batteries thus decreed corresponded almost exactly to the increase in Prussia's population from 10 million in 1815 to 18 million in 1861; since Prussia's wealth has meanwhile grown faster than her population, and since the other major European states have strengthened their armies to a much greater degree since 1815, such an increase in the number of cadres was undoubtedly not excessive. At the same time, of all the obligations borne by conscripts, the proposal added only to those of the youngest age-groups—the liability to serve in the reserve—but reduced liability for *Landwehr*-service for the oldest age-groups by twice as much and in fact almost totally did away with the second levy, the first levy more or less taking over the function the second formerly had.

On the other hand, the following objections could be made to the plan:

Universal conscription—incidentally the sole democratic institution existing in Prussia, albeit only on paper—marks such an enormous advance on all previous forms of military organisation that, having once existed, even if its implementation left much to be desired, it cannot again be permanently reversed. An army today must be based on one of the two clearly defined systems: either the recruitment of volunteers—which is antiquated and only possible in exceptional cases such as England—or universal conscription. All conscriptive systems and ballots³³ are after all no more than very imperfect forms of the latter. The basic idea behind the Prussian law of 1814 is that every citizen who is physically capable of bearing arms thereby has the obligation to do

so personally in defence of his country, during his years of military fitness; this basic idea is far superior to the principle of purchasing substitutes which we find in every other country having a conscriptive system, and having existed for fifty years it will undoubtedly not succumb to the bourgeoisie's burning desire for the introduction of the "trade in human flesh", as the French call it.

However once we accept that the Prussian military system is founded on universal, compulsory service without substitution, the only way it can be further improved without its own spirit being breached is for its basic principle to be put increasingly into practice. Let us consider how things stand in that respect.

40,000 conscripts for 10 million inhabitants in 1815 makes 4 per thousand. 63,000 conscripts for 18 million inhabitants in 1861 makes $3\frac{1}{2}$ per thousand. This represents a deterioration, although it is an improvement compared with the position prior to 1859 when only $2\frac{2}{9}$ per thousand were conscripted. Merely to restore the 1815 percentage, 72,000 men would have to be conscripted. (We shall see that every year approximately this number of men or more do indeed enter the army.) But is the fighting potential of the Prussian people exhausted if 4 per 1,000 of the population are recruited each year?

The Darmstadt *Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung* has time and again shown from the statistics of the middle states that in Germany a full half of the young men presenting themselves for recruitment are fit for service. Now according to the *Zeitschrift des preussischen statistischen Bureaus* (March 1864) the number of young men registering in 1861 was 227,005.^a This would make 113,500 recruits fit for service each year. Of these we will discount 6,500 as not available or morally incapable, which still leaves us with 107,000. Why do only 63,000 of these, or at most 72,000-75,000 actually serve?

In the 1863 session, the Minister for War, von Roon, presented^b the following analysis of the 1861 levy to the Military Commission of the Assembly:

Total population (1858 census).....	17,758,823
Twenty-year-olds liable for military service class of 1861	217,438

^a The figures are taken from Dr. Engel, "Resultate des Ersatz-Aushebungsgeschäfts im preussischen Staate in den Jahren von 1855 bis mit 1862".—*Ed.*

^b On February 10, 1863.—*Ed.*

Men liable for military service carried over from previous years, pending final decision		<u>348,364</u>	565,802
Of these:			
1. Untraced		55,770	
2. Moved to other districts and required to register for service there		82,216	
3. Failed to register without being excused		10,960	
4. Enlisted as 3-year volunteers		5,025	
5. Entitled to serve as 1-year volunteers		14,811	
6. Theologians, deferred or exempted		1,638	
7. Liable for naval service		299	
8. Struck off as morally unfit		596	
9. Rejected by the Regional Commission as manifestly unfit		2,489	
10. Rejected by the Regional Commission as permanently unfit		15,238	
11. Transferred to the Supplementary Reserve ³⁴ :			
a) Below 5 foot after three musters	8,998		
b) Below 5 foot 1 ¹ / ₄ inches after three musters	9,553		
c) Temporarily unfit after three musters	46,761		
d) By reason of domestic circumstances after three musters	4,213		
e) Available after five musters	<u>291</u>	69,816	
12. Allocated to the Service Corps, not including those recruited for the Service Corps		6,774	
13. Deferred for one year:			
a) Temporarily unfit	219,136		
b) By reason of domestic circumstances	10,013		
c) By reason of loss of civil rights and under investigation	<u>1,087</u>	<u>230,236</u>	<u>495,868</u>
Remainder available for recruitment			69,934
Actually recruited			<u>59,459</u>
Remainder still available			10,475

However imperfect these statistics are, however much they confuse the whole issue under every heading from 1 to 13 by amalgamating the men from the class of 1861 and those from the two previous classes who are still available, they do nevertheless contain some very valuable admissions.

59,459 men were conscripted. 5,025 enlisted as 3-year volunteers. 14,811 were entitled to serve for one year; as it is common knowledge that the authorities are not so punctilious about the fitness of the one-year volunteers because they cost nothing, we may assume that at least half of them, that is, 7,400, did actually enlist. That is a very low estimate; the class of men who qualify for one-year service in any case consists chiefly of people fit for service; those who are unfit at the outset do not even go to the trouble of qualifying. But let us assume 7,400. By this count a total of 71,884 men entered the army in 1861.

Let us take this further. 1,638 men were deferred or exempted as theologians. Why theologians should be too grand to serve is incomprehensible. On the contrary, a year's army service, living in the open air, and contact with the outside world can only benefit them. So without more ado we will recruit them; $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total number for the current year, with $\frac{3}{4}$ unfit, still leaves 139 men to be included.

18,551 men were rejected for not being of sufficient stature. Note: not rejected for service altogether but "passed to the reserve". Therefore, in the event of war they should serve after all. They are only excused parade-service in peace-time, being insufficiently imposing for that. It is thus admitted that these short men are quite good enough for service, and it is intended to use them even in emergencies. *The fact that* these short men can be quite good soldiers is demonstrated by the French army, which includes men down to 4 feet 8 inches. We therefore have no hesitation in counting them in with the military resources of the country. The above figure merely includes those who were finally rejected after three musters as being too short; it is thus a number that recurs each year. We will discount half of them as unfit for other reasons and we are then left with 9,275 little fellows whom a capable officer would no doubt soon knock into splendid soldiers.

Then we find 6,774 allocated to the Service Corps, *not including* the men recruited for the Service Corps. The Service Corps is however also part of the army, and there is no evident reason why these men should not spend the short six-month period of service with the Service Corps, which would be of benefit both to them and to the Service Corps.

We thus have:

Men actually serving	71,884
Theologians	139
Men who are fit but not tall enough	9,275
Men allocated to the Service Corps	6,774
<hr/>	
Total	88,072 men,

who on the *admission* of von Roon's *own* statistics could join the army each year if universal conscription were seriously implemented.

Now let us examine those who are unfit.

Deferred for one year as temporarily unfit	219,136 men
Transferred to the reserve after three musters as ditto	46,761 "
Struck off as permanently unfit <i>only</i>	17,727 "
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Total	283,624 men,

so that the men *permanently* unfit on account of *real* physical defects do not even constitute 7% of all the group rejected as unfit and not even 4% of the total number of men appearing annually before the Recruitment Commissions. Almost 17% of the temporarily unfit are transferred each year to the reserve after three musters. These men are thus 23 years old, men at an age when the body's constitution is already beginning to settle down. We are surely not being too optimistic if we assume that of these a third will be quite fit for service by the time they are 25; that makes 15,587 men. The least that may be demanded of these men is that for two years they should serve in the infantry for three months each year, in order to receive at least basic training. This would be the equivalent of an addition of 3,897 men to the peace-time army.

However the whole way in which recruits are medically examined in Prussia has taken a peculiar turn. There were always more recruits than could be enlisted, and yet no one wanted to abandon the appearance of universal conscription. What could have been more convenient than to select the desired number of the best men and to declare the rest unfit on some pretext or other? In these circumstances, which, it should be noted, have obtained in Prussia since 1815 and still obtain today, the concept of unfitness has been extended there quite beyond normal usage, a fact that can best be demonstrated by comparison with the

middle states. There, where there is the possibility of buying out and selection by ballot, there was no reason to declare more people unfit than really were unfit. Conditions are the same as in Prussia; in some states, e.g., Saxony, even worse because the percentage of the industrial population is higher there. Now as we have said, it has been demonstrated time and time again in the *Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung* that in the middle states *fully one half* of the men registering for service are fit, and that must also be so in Prussia. As soon as a war breaks out in earnest, the notion of fitness will undergo drastic revision in Prussia, and the authorities will then discover, too late, to their cost, how many fit men have been allowed to slip away.

Now comes the most wonderful part of all. Of the 565,802 men liable for service about whom a decision has to be reached, we find:

Untraced	55,770 men
Moved to other districts <i>or</i> required to register for service there.....	82,216 "
Failed to register without being excused	10,960 "
<hr/>	
Total	148,946 men.

So for all Prussia's much vaunted system of controls—and anyone who has ever been liable for the army in Prussia knows what that means—a full 27% of men liable for service disappear each year. How is that possible? And what has become of the 82,216 men who are struck off the list because they have “moved to other districts or required to register for service there”? Does one only need to move from Berlin to Potsdam these days in order to escape liability for service? We will assume that here—after all, even Homer nods off at times—the officials have simply blundered in their statistics, that is, that these 82,216 figure *twice* in the grand total of 565,802: firstly in their native district and secondly in the district to which they have migrated. This point really ought to be clarified—the Military Commission of the Chamber has the best opportunity of doing so—since if the number of men really liable for military service is reduced to 483,586 this would have a significant effect on all the percentages. Let us meanwhile assume that such is the case: there still remain 66,730 men who disappear into thin air every year and neither the Prussian system of controls nor the police manages to get them into uniform. This represents nearly 14% of those liable for service. The implication of this is that all the restrictions on

freedom of movement which are imposed in Prussia on the pretext of controlling those liable for military service, are *totally superfluous*. It is well known that real emigration from Prussia is *very small* and bears no comparison with the number of missing recruits. Nor do these men, numbering almost 67,000, all emigrate. The majority of them either never leave the country or go abroad only for a short time. Indeed all the measures designed to prevent evasion of military duty are quite ineffective and at best an incitement to emigration. The overwhelming majority of young people cannot emigrate in any case. All that is needed is to insist strictly and without mercy that men who have avoided recruitment should make up the time afterwards, and then the whole rigmarole of harassment and paperwork would be unnecessary and there would be more recruits than previously.

In order to be quite certain of our position, we shall by the way only take as proven those facts which emerge from Herr von Roon's own statistics: in other words that not counting the one-year volunteers, 85,000 young men can be recruited each year. Now the strength of the present peace-time army is approximately 210,000 men. If the period of service is two years, 85,000 men per year together will make 170,000 men, to which must be added officers, non-commissioned officers and re-enlisted soldiers, some 25,000-35,000 men, making a total of 195,000 to 205,000 men, or 202,000 to 212,000 men including the one-year volunteers. With two-year service for the infantry and foot-artillery (we shall deal with the cavalry later), even taking the government's own figures, the total strength of the reorganised army could be brought up to its full peace-time level. If universal conscription were *really* implemented, with two-year service there would very probably be 30,000 more men; it would therefore be possible to release some of the men after just 1 or 1½ years, to avoid exceeding the figure of 200,000 to 210,000 men. As a reward for keenness, such early release would be of more use to the army as a whole than an extra six months' service.

War-time strength would then be as follows:

The reorganisation plan envisages 4 years' annual intake of 63,000 men, which makes 252,000 reservists. 3 years' annual intake of 85,000 men produce 255,000 reservists. This is surely just as good as the reorganisation plan. (As it is here only a question of the *relative numbers*, it makes no difference that we are here completely ignoring the reduction in the year-groups serving in the reserve.)

It is in this that the weakness of the reorganisation plan resides.

Whilst in appearance reverting to the original concept of universal conscription, which cannot of course function without a large army-reserve in the form of a *Landwehr*, it in fact executes an about-turn in the direction of the Franco-Austrian cadre-system,³⁵ and thereby introduces an element of uncertainty into the Prussian military system which cannot fail to have the direct consequences. The two systems cannot be mixed, one cannot have the advantages of both systems at the same time. It is undeniable and has never been disputed that a cadre-system with a long period of service and liability for immediate mobilisation confers great advantages at the outbreak of war. The men know each other better; even those on leave, and leave is mostly only granted for short periods at a time, regard themselves as soldiers throughout their leave and are constantly ready to be called to the colours at a moment's notice, which the Prussian reservists are certainly not; consequently battalions are necessarily a great deal steadier when they come under fire for the first time. Against this it may be argued that, if one considers this system best, one might just as well adopt the English system of ten years' service with the colours; that the French undoubtedly gained far more from their Algerian campaigns and the wars in the Crimea and Italy³⁶ than from long service; and finally that by this system only some of the men fit to bear arms can be trained, in other words by no means all of the nation's potential is exploited. Furthermore, experience shows that the German soldier readily accustoms himself to being under fire, and three hard-fought and at least partially successful engagements do as much for an otherwise good battalion as a whole year of extra service. For a state such as Prussia the cadre-system is an impossibility. With the cadre-system, Prussia could attain an army of 300,000 to 400,000 men *at the very most* with a peace-time strength of 200,000 men. But if she is to maintain herself as a Great Power, she requires as many as this simply to move the first field army out, in other words, for any serious war, she needs 500,000 to 600,000 men, including fortress garrisons, reinforcements, etc. If the 18 million Prussians are to put forward in time of war an army approaching the numbers of the 35 million French, 34 million Austrians and 60 million Russians, this can only be done by universal conscription, a short but intensive period of service and a comparatively long period of liability for the *Landwehr*. With this system inevitably some of the immediate striking-power and even battle-worthiness of the troops at the outbreak of war will have to be sacrificed; the state and its policies will become neutral and defensive in character; but we

ought also to remember that the attacking élan of the cadre-system led from Jena to Tilsit and the defensive modesty of the *Landwehr* system with universal conscription led from the Katzbach to Paris.³⁷ This therefore means: Either a conscriptive system involving substitution with 7-8 year service, of which about half would be with the colours, and then no subsequent liability for *Landwehr* service; or alternatively universal conscription with 5 or at the most 6 year service, of which two would be with the colours, and then liability for *Landwehr* service, as in Prussia or Switzerland.³⁸ But for the mass of the people first to have the burden of a conscriptive system and then additionally that of the *Landwehr* system is more than any European nation can take, not even the Turks, who in their military barbarism are still prepared to endure the most. A large number of trained men with short service and long-term liability for recall, or a small number with long service and a short period of liability for recall—that is the question; but the choice has to be either one or the other.

William Napier, who naturally declares the British soldier to be the best in the world, says in his *History of the Peninsular War* that after three years' service the British infantryman is fully trained in every respect.^a Now it should be realised that the elements constituting the British army at the beginning of this century were the lowest from which an army can possibly be formed. The British army today comprises vastly superior elements, but even these are still infinitely worse, both morally and intellectually, than the elements that make up the Prussian army. And is it suggested that what those British officers achieved in three years with such riff-raff should not be attainable in two years in Prussia, where the raw material for recruitment is so exceptionally receptive to education and in some cases already so highly educated, and is at the outset morally sound?

It is true that soldiers today have more to learn. But that has never been seriously used as an argument against two-year service. The argument always used has been the cultivation of *true military spirit*, which is said only to emerge in the third year. If these gentlemen were to be perfectly honest and if we discount the increased battalion effectiveness which was conceded above, this is far more of a political issue than a military one. True military spirit is intended to prove itself in face of the enemy within³⁹ rather than abroad. It has never been our experience that the

^a W. F. P. Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814*, Vol. III, London, 1833, p. 271.—Ed.

individual Prussian soldier learnt anything in his third year except boredom and how to extort schnaps from the recruits and tell bad jokes about his superiors. If the majority of our officers had served as privates or non-commissioned officers even for a year, this could not possibly have escaped their notice.—Experience shows that “true military spirit”, insofar as it is a political quality, very rapidly goes to the dogs, never to be revived. Military virtues remain, even after two years' service.

Two years' service is thus perfectly adequate to train our soldiers for infantry duty. Since the field-artillery was detached from the siege-artillery, the same is true of the foot-artillery; any individual difficulties that may emerge here can be overcome either by further division of labour, or else by simplification of the field-artillery's equipment, which is desirable in any case. The enrolment of a larger number of re-enlisted soldiers would similarly raise no problems, but it is particularly in the Prussian army that this category of men is most unwelcome if they are not fitted to be non-commissioned officers—what a *condemnation* of long service! Only in the siege-artillery, with their great variety of equipment, and in the engineers, with their multiplicity of trades, which of course can never be kept entirely apart, will intelligent re-enlisted soldiers be valuable and yet a rarity. The mounted artillery will require the same length of service as the cavalry.

With regard to the cavalry, men born into the saddle need only a short period of service, whilst for those trained to it long service is indispensable. As we have few men born into the saddle, we undoubtedly need the four-year period of service envisaged by the reorganisation plan. The only form of warfare proper to mounted troops is the massed attack with drawn swords, for the execution of which extreme courage and complete confidence of the men in each other are necessary. The men must therefore know that they can rely on each other and on their commanders. This requires long service. But cavalry is useless if the rider has no confidence in his horse; the man must of course be able to ride, and long service is also necessary for him to be able to ensure control over his horse—i.e., more or less any horse which is assigned to him. In this branch of the service, re-enlisted soldiers are highly desirable, and the more like real mercenaries they are, the better, provided they enjoy the trade. We shall be criticised by members of the opposition on the grounds that this would mean a cavalry made up exclusively of mercenaries who would lend themselves to any coup d'état. We would reply: that may well be. But in present conditions the cavalry will always be reactionary (think of the

Baden dragoons in 1849⁴⁰), just as the artillery will always be liberal. That is in the nature of things. A few re-enlisted soldiers more or less will make no difference. And cavalry is useless on the barricades anyway; and it is the barricades in the big cities, and especially the attitude of the infantry and artillery towards them, which nowadays decide the outcome of any coup d'état.

However, besides increasing the number of re-enlisted soldiers, there are also other means of strengthening the striking power and inner cohesion of a short-service army, such as for instance training camps, which the Minister for War, von Roon, himself described as a way of compensating for the reduction in the length of service. Then there is also the rational organisation of training, with regard to which a great deal remains to be done in Prussia. The whole superstitious notion that if you have short service it has to be compensated for by exaggerated precision on the parade-ground, "clockwork" drilling and ridiculously high leg-lift—"swinging from the hip" to kick nature in the teeth—this whole superstitious notion is based on nothing but exaggeration. The Prussian army has repeated this to itself so often that it has finally become an article of faith. What is gained by men thumping their rifles so violently against their shoulders when doing rifle drill that they almost fall over and a most unmilitary shudder, such as is seen in no other army, passes along the whole rank? Finally, improved physical education of youth must be regarded as counter-balancing the reduction in service—and in the most fundamental way. But it will then also be necessary to make quite certain that something really is done. It is true that in every village school parallel and horizontal bars have been set up, but our poor schoolmasters have little idea of what to do with them. At least one retired non-commissioned officer qualified as a gymnastics teacher should be placed in every district and given charge of physical education; care should be taken to see that young people at school are taught over a period of time to march in formation, to move as a platoon and as a company, and to understand the appropriate commands. In 6-8 years this will pay abundant dividends—there will be more recruits and they will be stronger.

In this critique of the reorganisation plan we have, as we said, confined ourselves solely to the military and political facts of the situation as it is. Among them is the assumption that in present circumstances the legal stipulation of two years' service for infantry and foot-artillery was the maximum reduction in the term of service feasible. We are even of the opinion that a state such as Prussia would commit a blunder of the greatest magnitude—

regardless of which party was in power—if it further reduced the normal term of service at the present moment. As long as we have the French army on the one side, the Russian on the other and the possibility of a combined attack by both at the same time, we need troops who will not have to learn the fundamentals of the art of war when they first face the enemy. We therefore totally discount the fantastic notion of a militia army with as it were no term of service at all; for a country of 18 million inhabitants and very exposed frontiers, such an idea is impossible today, and even if circumstances were different, it would not be possible in this form.

Taking all this into account: could an Assembly having Prussia's interests at heart accept the basic features of the reorganisation plan? Our opinion, which is based on military and political factors, is that to strengthen the cadres in the manner in which this was done, to increase the peace-time army to 180,000-200,000 men, to relegate the first levy of the *Landwehr* to the main army reserve or the second field army-cum-fortress garrisons, was acceptable on condition *that universal conscription was strictly implemented, that a two-year term of service with the colours, three with the reserve and up to the 36th birthday with the Landwehr, was fixed by law and, finally, that the cadres of the first levy of the Landwehr were re-established.* Were these conditions obtainable? Only few people who have followed the debates will deny that this was possible in the "New Era"⁴¹ and perhaps even after that.

So what attitude did the bourgeois opposition adopt?

II

The Prussian bourgeoisie, which, as the most advanced section of the whole German bourgeoisie, has a right here to be taken as representative of that whole class, is setting a term to its political existence, thanks to a lack of courage which is without parallel in the history even of that pusillanimous class and which is only excused to some extent by contemporary international events. In March and April 1848 it had the whip-hand; but hardly did the first independent stirrings of the working class begin when the bourgeoisie at once took fright and hastily retreated to shelter behind the self-same bureaucracy and the self-same feudal aristocracy which it had but a moment before conquered with the aid of the workers. The Manteuffel era⁴² was the inevitable consequence. At last came the "New Era" — which the bourgeois opposition had done nothing to bring about. This unexpected piece of good fortune turned the heads of the bourgeoisie. It quite forgot the position it had created for itself by its repeated revisions of the constitution, its subordination to the bureaucracy and the feudal aristocracy (even to the extent of restoring the feudal Provincial and District Estates⁴³) and its constant retreats from one position to the next. It now believed it had the whip-hand again, and quite forgot that it had itself restored all the powers hostile to it, which, subsequently reinvigorated, held the real power in the state in their possession, just as before 1848. Then the reorganisation of the army went off in its midst like a bombshell.

There are only two ways in which the bourgeoisie can gain political power for itself. Since it is an army of officers without any soldiers and can only acquire these soldiers from the ranks of the workers, it must either ensure that the workers are its allies, or it

must buy political power piecemeal from the powers opposing it from above, in particular from the monarchy. The history of the English and French bourgeoisie shows that there is no other way.

But the Prussian bourgeoisie had lost all its enthusiasm—and what is more quite without reason—for forming a sincere alliance with the workers. In 1848 the German workers' party, then still at a rudimentary stage of development and organisation, was prepared to do the bourgeoisie's work for it at a very modest price, but the latter was more afraid of the slightest independent stirring of the proletariat than it was of the feudal aristocracy and the bureaucracy. Peace bought at the price of servitude appeared more desirable to it than even the mere *prospect* of a freedom-struggle.⁴⁴ From that time on, this holy fear of the workers had become a habit with the bourgeoisie, until finally Herr Schulze-Delitzsch began his savings-box campaign.⁴⁵ The purpose of this was to show the workers that there could be no greater happiness for them than to be exploited industrially by the bourgeoisie for the rest of their lives, and even for generations to come; and indeed, that they should themselves contribute to this exploitation by themselves supplementing their income through all manner of industrial associations, thereby enabling the capitalists to reduce their wages. But although no doubt the industrial bourgeoisie is the most uneducated of the classes that constitute the German nation, apart from the junior cavalry officers, such a campaign had from the outset no prospect of lasting success with such an intellectually advanced people as the Germans. The more intelligent of the bourgeoisie themselves could not fail to perceive that nothing could come of this, and the alliance with the workers collapsed once more.

Which left bargaining with the government for political power, to be paid for in cash—from the pockets of the people, naturally. The bourgeoisie's *real* power in the state consisted only in the right to approve taxation, and even that was much hedged about with ifs and buts. This, then, is where the lever needed to be applied, and a class so skilled in bargaining could surely not fail to be at an advantage here.

But no. The bourgeois opposition in Prussia—in complete contrast especially to the classical bourgeoisie of England in the 17th and 18th centuries—saw the situation like this: they would bargain for power *without* paying any money for it.

Simply from the bourgeois point of view and taking full account of the circumstances in which the reorganisation of the army was put forward, what policy ought the bourgeois opposition to have

adopted now? If it appraised its own strength correctly, it could not have been unaware that having only just risen again from its humiliation at the hands of Manteuffel—and indeed without exerting itself to that end in the slightest—it was certainly powerless to prevent the plan being put into *actual practice*, a process which was in fact initiated. It could not be unaware that with every session that passed fruitlessly, the new, actually existing arrangement would be harder to abolish; that with each passing year the government would therefore offer less in exchange for the Chamber's approval. It could not be unaware that it was very far from being able to appoint and dismiss ministers, and that the longer the conflict lasted, therefore, the fewer would be the ministers it faced who would be inclined to compromise. Finally, it could not be unaware that it was above all in its own interest not to push the matter to the extreme. For at that stage in the development of the German workers, a serious conflict with the government could not fail to give rise to an independent workers' movement and thereby in the extreme case present it once again with the dilemma: either an alliance with the workers, but this time under far less favourable conditions than in 1848, or alternatively to go on bended knees before the government and confess: *pater, peccavi!*^a

The liberal and progressist bourgeoisie⁴⁶ ought consequently to have subjected the reorganisation of the army and the necessarily concomitant increase in peace-time strength to a cool and objective examination, in which case they would probably have come to approximately the same conclusions as we ourselves. In so doing they should not have forgotten that after all they could not prevent the provisional introduction of the new system and could only delay its eventual consolidation, as long as the plan contained so many correct and useful elements. Above all therefore they ought to have taken good care not to adopt from the outset a directly hostile attitude to reorganisation; they ought on the contrary to have used this reorganisation and the finance that needed to be approved for it to obtain for themselves as much reimbursement from the "New Era" as possible, to convert the 9 or 10 million in new taxation into as much political power for themselves as possible.

And there were certainly enough things to be done in that regard! There was all Manteuffel's legislation concerning the press and the right of association; there were all the powers accorded to

^a Father, I have sinned! (Luke 15:21).—*Ed.*

the police and bureaucracy which had been taken over unchanged from the absolute monarchy; the emasculation of the courts by disputing their competence; the Provincial and District Estates; above all, the way in which the constitution was interpreted under Manteuffel, which needed to be countered by a new constitutional practice; the attrition of local self-government in the towns by the bureaucracy; and a hundred and one other things for which any other bourgeoisie in the same situation would gladly have paid a tax-increase of $\frac{1}{2}$ Taler per head of population and all of which they could have obtained if they had proceeded with a modicum of skill. But the bourgeois opposition thought otherwise. As far as freedom of the press, association and assembly were concerned, Manteuffel's laws had hit upon precisely that degree of freedom under which the bourgeoisie felt comfortable. It could demonstrate gently against the government without let or hindrance; any increase in freedom would have brought less advantage to it than to the workers, and rather than give the workers freedom for an independent movement, the bourgeoisie preferred to submit to a little more coercion on the part of the government. Precisely the same thing applied to the limitation of the powers enjoyed by the police and bureaucracy. The bourgeoisie believed that with the "New Era" ministry it had already got the better of the bureaucracy, and it approved of this bureaucracy keeping a free hand to deal with the workers. It quite forgot that the bureaucracy was far stronger and more vigorous than any ministry that might be well disposed towards the bourgeoisie. And then it imagined that with the fall of Manteuffel the millennium had arrived for the bourgeoisie and that all that was left to do was to reap the ripe harvest of bourgeois hegemony, without paying a penny for it.

But what about all the finance that would have to be approved, when those few years after 1848 had cost so much money, so increased the national debt and raised taxation to such heights?—Gentlemen, you are the representatives of the youngest constitutional state in the world, and you do not know that constitutional government is the most expensive form of government in the world? Almost more expensive than Bonapartism even, which—*après moi le déluge*^a—pays off old debts by constantly incurring new ones and thus mortgages a century's resources in ten years? The golden days of limited absolutism, whose memory still haunts you, are gone forever.

But what about the clauses in the constitution relating to the

^a After me the deluge (attributed to Louis XV and Mme. Pompadour).—Ed.

continued levying of taxes once they have been approved?—Everyone knows how coy the “New Era” was about asking for money. It would not have been a great loss to have included the costs of reorganisation in the budget, in exchange for a cast-iron guarantee of concessions. It was a question of approving new taxation to cover these costs. Here was an opportunity for being miserly, and for that no better ministry could have been hoped for than that of the “New Era”. You would have retained the whip-hand insofar as you had previously held it, and you would have won new instruments of power in other areas.

But would one not have strengthened reaction if one had doubled the army which is its chief weapon?—This is an issue where the progressist bourgeoisie runs into indissoluble conflict with itself. It asks of Prussia that it should play the part of the Piedmont of Germany. This requires a strong army with striking-power. It has a “New Era” ministry which secretly shares the same ideas, the best ministry which in the circumstances it can have. It *denies* this ministry army reinforcements.—Day after day, from morn till night, it talks about nothing but the glory of Prussia, the greatness of Prussia, the growth of Prussia’s power; but it *denies* the Prussian army reinforcements which would only be of the same order as those which the other great powers have themselves introduced since 1814.—What is the reason for all this? The reason is that it is afraid these reinforcements might benefit only reaction, might revive the decayed officer-aristocracy and in general give the feudal and bureaucratic-absolutist party the power to inter all constitutional government with a coup d’état.

Admittedly, the progressist bourgeoisie was right not to strengthen reaction, and the army was the surest bastion of reaction. But was there ever a better opportunity to bring the army under the control of the Chamber than this very reorganisation, proposed by the ministry most well-disposed towards the bourgeoisie that Prussia had ever experienced in peaceful times? As soon as the reinforcement of the army had been declared approved on certain conditions, was not this the precise moment in which to try to settle the matter of the cadet-schools, the preferential treatment of the aristocracy and all the other grievances, and to obtain guarantees which would give the officer-corps a more bourgeois character? The “New Era” was clear about one thing only: that the reinforcement of the army had to be pushed through. The devious paths and subterfuges by which it carried reorganisation through proved more than anything its bad conscience and its fear of the deputies. This

opportunity needed to be seized with both hands; such a chance for the bourgeoisie could not be expected again in a hundred years. What might not be extracted from this ministry, in point of detail, if the progressist bourgeoisie viewed the situation not as misers but as great speculators!

And then what about the practical consequences of reorganisation on the officer-corps itself! Officers had to be found for twice the number of battalions. The cadet-schools became totally inadequate. There had never been such liberality before in peace-time; lieutenant's commissions were positively offered as bounty to students, probationary lawyers and all educated young men. Anyone seeing the Prussian army again after reorganisation found the officer-corps unrecognisable. We say this not from hearsay but from our own observation. That dialect peculiar to lieutenants had been pushed into the background, the younger officers spoke their natural mother-tongue, they were by no means members of an exclusive caste but more than at any time since 1815 represented all educated classes and all provinces in the state. Here, then, the force of events had enabled this position to be won; it was now just a matter of maintaining and making full use of it. Instead, all this was ignored and talked away by the progressist bourgeoisie, as though all these officers were aristocratic cadets. And yet since 1815 there had never been more bourgeois officers in Prussia than at that very moment.

And incidentally we would attribute the gallant conduct of the Prussian officers before the enemy in the Schleswig-Holstein war⁴⁷ chiefly to this infusion of new blood. The old class of junior officers by themselves would not have dared to act so often on their own responsibility. In this connection the government is right in saying that reorganisation had an important influence on the "panache" of these successes; in what other respect reorganisation struck terror into the hearts of the Danes is not apparent to us.

Finally, the main point: would reinforcement of the peace-time army facilitate a coup d'état?—It is perfectly true that armies are the instrument by which coups d'état are effected, and that any reinforcement of an army therefore also increases the feasibility of a coup d'état. But the strength of army required by a great power is not determined by the greater or lesser likelihood of a coup d'état but by the size of the armies of the other great powers. In for a penny, in for a pound. If one accepts a mandate as a Prussian deputy, if one emblazons the Greatness of Prussia and Her Power in Europe on one's escutcheon, then one must also

agree to the means being procured without which there can be no question of Prussia's greatness and power. If these means cannot be procured without facilitating a coup d'état, so much the worse for these gentlemen of Progress. Had they not conducted themselves in such an absurdly cowardly and clumsy fashion in 1848, the era of coups d'état would probably have been long past. In the circumstances obtaining, however, they have no choice but finally to accept the reinforcement of the army in one form or another after all and to keep their anxieties about coups d'état to themselves.

However, there are yet other aspects to the matter. Firstly, it would always have been more advisable to negotiate approval of the means for a coup d'état with a "New Era" ministry than with a ministry headed by Bismarck. Secondly, it is self-evident that every further step towards the real implementation of universal conscription makes the Prussian army a less fitting instrument for a coup d'état. As soon as the demand for self-government and the necessity of the struggle against all recalcitrant elements had once penetrated the whole mass of the people, even 20-21-year-old young men would inevitably have been caught up in the movement, and even under feudal and absolutist officers, they would necessarily have lent themselves less and less readily to the making of a coup d'état. The further the political education of the country progresses, the more intractable will become the mood of the called-up conscripts. Even the present struggle between the government and bourgeoisie must already have provided testimony of this.

Thirdly, the two-year term of service sufficiently outweighs the increase in the army. To the extent that reinforcement of the army increases the government's material capacity for coups d'état, to that extent will the two-year term of service lessen its moral capacity to do so. In the third year of service the continual inculcation of absolutist doctrines and the habit of obedience may bear some immediate fruit among the soldiers, and for the duration of their service. In the third year of service, when the individual soldier has scarcely anything more of a military nature to learn, our compulsory conscript already begins somewhat to resemble the long-serving soldier of the Franco-Austrian system. He acquires some of the characteristics of the professional soldier and as such is always far more compliant than the younger soldier. The retirement of the men in their third year of service would undoubtedly compensate for the recruitment of 60,000 to 80,000 extra men, from the point of view of a coup d'état.

But there is yet another point, which is crucial. We would not deny that circumstances might arise—we know our bourgeoisie too well for that—in which a coup d'état might nevertheless be possible, even without mobilisation and simply using the standing peace-time army. However that is unlikely. In order to carry out a large-scale coup, it will almost always be necessary to mobilise. And this is what will tip the balance. The Prussian peace-time army may in certain circumstances become a mere tool in the government's hands, for domestic use; the Prussian war-time army would certainly never do so. Anyone who has ever had the opportunity of seeing a battalion first on its peace-time footing and then on a war footing will be familiar with the enormous difference in the whole attitude of the men, in their collective character. The men who had joined the army as little more than boys now return to it as men; they bring with them a fund of self-respect, self-confidence, solidity and character which benefits the whole battalion. The relationship of men to officers and officers to men is at once different. Militarily the battalion is substantially stronger for this, but politically it becomes—for absolutist purposes—totally untrustworthy. This could be seen even during the entry to Schleswig, where to the great astonishment of English newspaper-correspondents Prussian soldiers everywhere openly took part in political demonstrations and fearlessly expressed their by no means orthodox views. And this result—the political decomposition of the mobilised army for absolutist purposes—we chiefly owe to the Manteuffel period and to the “Newest” Era. In 1848 the situation was still quite different.

And that is in fact one of the most positive aspects of the Prussian military system, both before and after reorganisation: that with *this* military system Prussia can neither wage an unpopular war nor carry out a coup d'état which has any prospect of permanence. For even if the peace-time army did allow itself to be used for a small coup d'état, then the first mobilisation and the first threat of war would suffice to call all these “achievements” in question once more. Without the ratification of the war-time army, the heroic deeds of the peace-time army against the “enemy within” would be merely of temporary significance; and the longer this ratification takes, the harder it will be to obtain. Reactionary papers have stated that the “army”, as opposed to parliament, truly represents the people. By this they meant of course only the officers. If it should ever happen that the gentlemen of the *Kreuz-Zeitung* were to carry out a coup d'état, for which they would need the *mobilised* army, these people's representatives

would give them the shock of their lives, they may be sure of that.

Ultimately however that is not the main safeguard against a coup d'état either. That is to be found in the fact that no coup d'état can enable a government to convene a Chamber which will approve new taxation and loans for it; and that, even if it did manage to find a Chamber willing to do so, no banker in Europe would give it credit on the basis of resolutions passed by such a Chamber. In most European states the position would be different. But it so happens that, since the promises made in 1815⁴⁸ and the many futile manoeuvres aimed at raising money from then up until 1848, it is generally accepted that no one may lend Prussia a penny without the legal and unimpeachable approval of the Chamber. Even Herr Raphael von Erlanger, who after all did lend money to the American Confederates,⁴⁹ would scarcely entrust cash to a government that had come to power in Prussia through a coup d'état. Prussia owes this simply and solely to the narrow-mindedness of absolutism.

And this is where the strength of the bourgeoisie lies: that if the government gets into financial difficulties—which sooner or later it is bound to do—it is *itself* obliged to turn to the bourgeoisie for money, and this time not to the political representatives of the bourgeoisie who are ultimately aware that they exist to provide money, but to the great financiers, who would like a profitable transaction with the government, who measure the credit-worthiness of a government by the same token as they would any private individual and are quite indifferent to the question of whether the Prussian state needs more soldiers or less. These gentlemen only discount bills of exchange which bear three signatures, and if one has only been signed by the Upper House, in addition to the government, and not by the House of Deputies, or by a House of Deputies consisting of puppets, they regard this as unsound practice and decline the deal.

It is at this point that the military question ends and the constitutional question begins. It is immaterial by what errors and complications the bourgeois opposition is now forced into the following position: it must fight the military question through to the end, or it will lose the remnants of political power it still possesses. The government has already called in question its whole right to approve budgets. But if the government sooner or later nevertheless *has to* make its peace with the Chamber, is not the best policy in this situation simply to remain adamant until that moment arrives?

Now that the conflict has in fact been taken to these lengths—the answer can only be yes. The possibility of coming to an agreement on an acceptable basis with this government is more than doubtful. By overestimating its own strength, the bourgeoisie has got itself into the situation of having to use this military question as a test-case to see whether it is the decisive force in the state or nothing at all. If it wins, it will simultaneously acquire the power of appointing and dismissing ministers, such as the English Lower House possesses. If it is vanquished, it will never again achieve any kind of significance by constitutional means.

But no one familiar with our German bourgeoisie will expect such perseverance from it. The courage of the bourgeoisie in political matters is always exactly proportional to the importance that it enjoys in the civil society of the country in question. In Germany the social power of the bourgeoisie is far less than in England and even in France; it has neither allied itself with the old aristocracy as in England, nor destroyed it with the help of the peasants and workers as in France. The feudal aristocracy in Germany is still a power, a power hostile to the bourgeoisie and, what is more, allied to government. Factory industry, the basis of all social power of the modern bourgeoisie, is far less developed in Germany than in France and England, enormous though its progress has been since 1848. The colossal accumulations of capital that frequently occur in individual classes in England and even France are rarer in Germany. This is the reason for the petty-bourgeois character of our bourgeoisie as a whole. The circumstances in which it lives and the range of thought of which it is capable are of a petty kind; is it surprising that its whole mentality is equally petty! How could it be expected to find the courage to fight an issue through to the bitter end? The Prussian bourgeoisie knows very well how dependent it is on the government for its own industrial activity. Concessions⁵⁰ and administrative checks weigh down on it like a bad dream. The government can make difficulties for it in any new enterprise, and nowhere more so than in the political sphere! In the course of the dispute over the military question, the bourgeois Chamber can only adopt a negative stance, it is driven purely on to the defensive; meanwhile the government moves over to the attack, interprets the constitution in its own way, disciplines liberal officials, annuls liberal municipal elections, sets all the wheels of bureaucratic power in motion to impress on the bourgeoisie its status as subjects; in fact overruns one line of defence after another and thus conquers for itself a position such as even Manteuffel did not have. Meanwhile the unbudgeted spending of money and levying of taxes quietly

continues, and the reorganisation of the army gains new strength with every year of its existence. In short, the prospect of an eventual victory for the bourgeoisie takes on a more revolutionary character with each passing year, and the government's tactical victories in every field, as they multiply day by day, increasingly assume the form of *faits accomplis*. On top of this there is a workers' movement completely independent of bourgeoisie and government alike, which compels the bourgeoisie either to make the most ominous concessions to the workers, or to face up to having to act without the workers at the decisive moment. Can the Prussian bourgeoisie be expected in these circumstances to have the courage to remain adamant, come what may? It would have to have changed remarkably for the better since 1848—by its own lights—and the yearning for compromise which has found expression daily in the sighs of the Party of Progress since the opening of this session, is not an auspicious sign. We fear that on this occasion too the bourgeoisie will have no scruples in betraying its own cause.

III

“What attitude then does the workers’ party adopt towards this reorganisation of the army and the ensuing conflict between government and bourgeois opposition?”

For its political activity to develop fully, the working class needs a far wider arena than is offered by the separate states of today’s fragmented Germany. Particularism will hamper the free movement of the proletariat, but its existence will never be justified and will never merit serious consideration. The German proletariat will never have any truck with Imperial Constitutions, Prussian hegemonies, tripartite systems⁵¹ and the like, unless it be to sweep them away; it is indifferent to the question of how many soldiers the Prussian state needs in order to prolong its vegetable existence as a great power. Whether reorganisation means some slight increase to the military burden or not, will make little difference to the working class as a *class*. On the other hand it certainly cannot remain indifferent to the question of whether or not universal conscription is fully implemented. The more workers who are trained in the use of weapons the better. Universal conscription is the necessary and natural corollary of universal suffrage; it puts the voters in the position of being able to enforce their decisions gun in hand against any attempt at a coup d’état.

The only aspect of army reorganisation in Prussia which is of interest to the German working class is the increasingly thorough implementation of universal conscription.

More important is the question: what attitude should the

workers' party adopt to the ensuing conflict between government and Chamber.

The modern worker, the proletarian, is a product of the great industrial revolution which has totally revolutionised the whole mode of production in all civilised countries, first in industry and subsequently in agriculture too, especially in the last hundred years, and as a result of it only two classes are still involved in production: the class of capitalists, who are in possession of the tools of labour, raw materials and means of subsistence, and the class of workers who possess neither the tools of labour, nor raw materials, nor food, but must first buy the latter from the capitalists with their labour. The modern proletarian therefore only has direct dealings with *one* class of society, which is hostile to him and exploits him: the class of capitalists, the bourgeoisie. In countries where this industrial revolution is complete, as in England, the worker really does have dealings only with capitalists, for even on the land the large tenant-farmer is nothing other than a capitalist; the aristocrat, who merely lives off the rent from his estates, has no points of social contact with the workers at all.

It is different in countries where this industrial revolution is only now taking place, such as in Germany. Here there are still numerous social elements which have survived from former feudal and post-feudal conditions, and which, if we may so express ourselves, cloud the solution (medium) that is society and deny the social condition of Germany that simple, clear, classical character which distinguishes England's stage of development. Here, in an atmosphere of daily modernisation, and amongst thoroughly modern capitalists and workers, we find the most wonderful antediluvian fossils alive and active: feudal lords, seignorial courts, country squires, birching, central government officials, local government officials, craft corporations, conflicts of authority, bureaucracy with penal powers, etc. And we find that in the struggle for political power all these living fossils are banding themselves together against the bourgeoisie, whose property makes it the most powerful class of the new epoch and who is demanding that the former should surrender political power to it in the name of the new epoch.

Apart from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the large industry of today also gives rise to a kind of intermediate class between the two, the petty bourgeoisie. This consists partly of the relics of the former semi-medieval burghers and partly of workers who have risen somewhat in the world. Its function consists less in the production than in the distribution of goods; the retail trade is its

main activity. Whilst the old burghers were the most stable class in society, the modern petty bourgeoisie is the most changeable; bankruptcy has become one of its institutions. With its slender capital it shares the status of the bourgeoisie, but by the insecurity of its livelihood it shares that of the proletariat. Its political position is as contradictory as its social being; in general however "pure democracy" is its most proper expression. Its political vocation is to encourage the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the relics of the old society and especially against its own weakness and cowardice, and to help win those freedoms—freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, universal suffrage, local self-government—without which, despite its bourgeois character, a timid bourgeoisie can manage passably well but without which the workers can never win their emancipation.

In the course of the struggle between the relics of the old, antediluvian society and the bourgeoisie, sooner or later the time always comes when both combatants turn to the proletariat and seek its support. This moment usually coincides with the first stirrings of the working class itself. The feudal and bureaucratic representatives of the declining society appeal to the workers to join them in attacking the blood-suckers, the capitalists, the sole foes of the worker; the bourgeoisie make it clear to the workers that they jointly represent the new social era and therefore have a common interest at least with regard to the declining, *old* form of society. At about this time the working class then gradually becomes aware that it is a class in its own right with its own interests and its own independent future; and that gives rise to the question, which has forced itself upon their attention in England, in France and in Germany successively: what attitude should the workers' party adopt towards the combatants?

Above all this will depend on what kind of aims the workers' party, i.e., that part of the working class which has become aware of its common class interests, is striving for in the interests of that class.

It seems that the most advanced workers in Germany are demanding the emancipation of the workers from the capitalists by the transfer of state capital to associations of workers, so that production can be organised, without capitalists, for general account; and as a means to the achievement of this end: the conquest of political power by universal direct suffrage.⁵²

This much is now clear: neither the feudal-bureaucratic party, which for the sake of brevity is customarily referred to as *reaction*,

nor the liberal-radical bourgeois party, will be inclined to concede these demands of their own volition. But the proletariat will become a power from the moment when an independent workers' party is formed, and a power has to be reckoned with. Both warring parties know this and will at the appropriate moment therefore tend to make apparent or real concessions to the workers. From which side can the workers wring the greatest concessions?

The mere existence of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is a thorn in the flesh of the reactionary party. Its power is based on suppressing or at least obstructing present-day social development. Otherwise all the possessing classes will gradually be transformed into capitalists and all the oppressed classes into proletarians, and in the process the reactionary party will disappear of its own accord. To be consistent, reaction will indeed attempt to dispose of the proletariat, however not by proceeding to association but by turning the present-day proletarians back into guild-journeymen or restoring them to a state of complete or semi-peasant serfdom. Is such a restoration in the interest of our proletarians? Do they wish to return to the paternal discipline of the guild-master and "his lordship", if such were possible? Surely not. For it is only when the working class became divorced from all these sham possessions and sham privileges of former times and the naked conflict between capital and labour became apparent that the very existence of a single great working class with common interests, a workers' movement and a workers' party became possible at all. And what is more, it is simply impossible to turn back the clock of history in this way. The steam-engines, the mechanical spinning and weaving looms, the steam-ploughs and threshing machines, the railways and electric telegraphs and the steam-presses of the present day do not permit such an absurd backward step, on the contrary, they are gradually and remorselessly destroying all the relics of feudal and guild conditions and are reducing all the petty social contradictions surviving from former times to the one contradiction of world-historical significance: that between capital and labour.

The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, has no other historical function than to proliferate in every field the aforesaid gigantic forces of production and means of communication in present-day society and intensify them to the utmost; to use their credit institutions to take over the means of production handed down from former times as well, landed property in particular; to operate every branch of production by modern means; to destroy

all relics of feudal forms of production and feudal conditions and thus reduce the whole of society to the simple contradiction that exists between a class of capitalists and a class of unpropertied workers. As these contradictions between classes in society are simplified, so the power of the bourgeoisie grows, but at the same time the proletariat's power, class-consciousness and potential for victory grow even more; it is only this increase in the power of the bourgeoisie that gradually enables the proletariat to become the majority, the dominant majority in the state, as it already is in England, but by no means yet in Germany, where in the country peasants of every kind and in the towns small craftsmen and shopkeepers, etc., are still outnumbering it.

Hence: every victory by reaction impedes social development and inevitably delays the time when the workers will be victorious. Every victory by the bourgeoisie over reaction on the other hand is at the same time in one sense a victory for the workers, contributes to the final downfall of capitalist rule and brings the moment closer when the workers will defeat the bourgeoisie.

Let us compare the position of the German workers' party in 1848 and now. There are in Germany still plenty of veterans who were involved in the initial stages of founding a German workers' party before 1848, and who after the revolution helped develop it for as long as the conditions of the time permitted. They all know the trouble it took, even in those agitated times, to set up a workers' movement, to keep it going and to get rid of reactionary guild-minded elements, and how a few years later the whole movement went back to sleep. If a workers' movement has now sprung up as it were of its own accord, what is the explanation? It is that since 1848 large-scale bourgeois industry has made unprecedented advances in Germany, because it has eliminated a great number of small craftsmen and other intermediaries between worker and capitalist, has brought a great number of workers into direct conflict with the capitalists, and in short has created a significant proletariat where previously one did not exist or did so only on a small scale. This development of industry has made a workers' party and workers' movement a necessity.

That is not to say that there may not be times when it appears advisable to reaction to make concessions to the workers. But these concessions are always of a very particular kind. They are never of a political nature. Feudal-bureaucratic reaction will neither extend the franchise nor grant freedom of the press, association and assembly, nor restrict the power of the bureaucracy. The concessions which it does make are always aimed directly against

the bourgeoisie, and are such as do not increase the political power of the workers at all. Thus in England the ten-hour law for factory-workers was passed against the wishes of the manufacturers.⁵³ Thus in Prussia the strict observance of the regulations concerning working hours in the factories—which exist at present only on paper—and in addition the right of association for workers,⁵⁴ etc., could be demanded from the government and possibly obtained. But it is clear that all these concessions on the part of reaction are obtained without anything being offered in return by the workers, and rightly so, for simply by aggravating the bourgeoisie reaction has gained its ends, and the workers owe it no debt of gratitude, nor do they ever express any.

But there is another form of reaction which has enjoyed much success in recent times and is becoming highly fashionable in certain circles; this is the form nowadays called Bonapartism. Bonapartism is the necessary form of state in a country where the working class, at a high level of its development in the towns but numerically inferior to the small peasants in rural areas, has been defeated in a great revolutionary struggle by the capitalist class, the petty bourgeoisie and the army. When the Parisian workers were defeated in the titanic struggle of June 1848 in France, the bourgeoisie had at the same time totally exhausted itself in this victory. It was aware it could not afford a second such victory. It continued to rule in name, but it was too weak to govern. Control was assumed by the army, the real victor, basing itself on the class from which it preferred to draw its recruits, the small peasants, who wanted peace from the rioters in the towns. The form this rule took was of course military despotism, its natural leader the hereditary heir to the latter, Louis Bonaparte.

As far as both workers and capitalists are concerned, Bonapartism is characterised by the fact that it prevents them coming to blows with each other. In other words, it protects the bourgeoisie from any violent attacks by the workers, encourages a little gentle skirmishing between the two classes and furthermore deprives both alike of the faintest trace of political power. No freedom of association, no freedom of assembly, no freedom of the press; universal suffrage under such bureaucratic pressure that election of the opposition is almost impossible; police-control of a kind that had previously been unknown even in police-ridden France. Besides which, sections of the bourgeoisie and of the workers are simply *bought*; the former by colossal credit-swindles, by which the money of the small capitalists is attracted into the pockets of the

big ones; the latter by colossal state construction-schemes which concentrate an artificial, imperial proletariat dependent on the government in the big towns alongside the natural, independent proletariat. Finally, national pride is flattered by apparently heroic wars, which are however always conducted with the approval of the high authorities of Europe against the general scapegoat of the day and only on such conditions as ensure victory from the outset.

The most that such a government can do either for the workers or for the bourgeoisie is to allow them to recuperate from the struggle, to allow industry to develop strongly—other circumstances being favourable—to allow the elements of a new and more violent struggle to evolve therefore, and to allow this struggle to erupt as soon as the need for such recuperation has passed. It would be the absolute height of folly to expect any more for the workers from a government which exists simply and solely for the purpose of holding the workers in check as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned.

Let us now turn to the specific issue we have before us. What can reaction in Prussia offer the workers' party?

Can this reaction offer the working class a real share of political power?—Definitely not. Firstly no reactionary government has ever done so in recent history, either in England or in France. Secondly, the present struggle in Prussia is concerned precisely with whether the government is to unite all real power in itself or to share it with parliament. And the government will certainly not use every means available to it to wrest power from the bourgeoisie, merely to make a present of that power to the proletariat!

The feudal aristocracy and the bureaucracy can retain their real power in Prussia even without parliamentary representation. Their traditional position at the court, in the army and in the civil service guarantees them this power. They may even not want any special representation, since after all there can be no question in Prussia nowadays of permanent chambers of the nobility and bureaucracy such as existed under Manteuffel. They would therefore dearly like to consign parliament and all its trappings to oblivion.

On the other hand the bourgeoisie and workers can only exercise real, organised, political power through parliamentary representation; and such parliamentary representation is valueless unless it has a voice and a share in making decisions, in other words, unless it holds the "purse-strings". That however is

precisely what Bismarck on his own admission is trying to prevent. We ask: is it in the interests of the workers that this parliament should be robbed of all power, this parliament which they themselves hope to enter by winning universal direct suffrage and in which they hope one day to form the majority? Is it in their interests to set all the wheels of agitation in motion in order to enter an assembly whose words ultimately carry no weight? Surely not.

But what if the government were to overturn the present electoral law and decree universal direct suffrage? Yes, *if!* *If* the government were to carry out such a Bonapartist trick and the workers swallowed it, they would thereby from the start have acknowledged the government's right to suspend universal direct suffrage again by a new edict whenever it thought fit, and what would all this universal direct suffrage be worth then?

If the government decreed universal direct suffrage, it would from the outset hedge it about with so many ifs and buts that it would in fact not be universal direct suffrage at all any more.

And regarding universal direct suffrage itself, one has only to go to France to realise what tame elections it can give rise to, if one has only a large and ignorant rural population, a well-organised bureaucracy, a well-regimented press, associations sufficiently kept down by the police and no political meetings at all. How many workers' representatives does universal direct suffrage send to the French chamber, then? And yet the French proletariat has the advantage over the German of far greater concentration and longer experience of struggle and organisation.

Which brings us to yet another point. In Germany the rural population is twice the size of the urban population, i.e., $\frac{2}{3}$ earn their living from agriculture and $\frac{1}{3}$ from industry. And since in Germany the big landowner is the rule and the small peasant with his strips the exception, put another way that means: if $\frac{1}{3}$ of the workers are at the beck and call of the capitalists, $\frac{2}{3}$ are *at the beck and call of the feudal lords*. Let those who never stop railing at the capitalists but never utter a word in anger against the feudalists take that to heart!⁵⁵ The feudalists exploit twice as many workers in Germany as the bourgeoisie; in Germany they are just as directly opposed to the workers as the capitalists. But that is by no means all. The patriarchal economic system on the old feudal estates generates a hereditary dependence of the rural day labourer or cottager on "his lordship" which makes it far more difficult for the agricultural proletariat to enter the urban

workers' movement. The clergy, the systematic obscurantism in the country, the bad schooling and the remoteness of the people from the world at large do the rest. The agricultural proletariat is the section of the working class which has most difficulty in understanding its own interests and its own social situation and is the last to do so, in other words, it is the section which remains the longest as an unconscious tool in the hands of the privileged class which is exploiting it. And which class is that? Not the bourgeoisie, in Germany, but the *feudal aristocracy*. Now even in France, where after all virtually all the peasants are free and own their land, and where the feudal aristocracy has long been deprived of all political power, universal suffrage has not put workers into the Chamber but has almost totally excluded them from it. What would be the consequence of universal suffrage in Germany, where the feudal aristocracy is still a real social and political power and where there are two agricultural day labourers for every industrial worker? The battle against feudal and bureaucratic reaction—for the two are inseparable in our country—is in Germany identical with the struggle for the intellectual and political emancipation of the rural proletariat—and until such time as the rural proletariat is also swept along into the movement, the urban proletariat cannot and will not achieve anything at all in Germany and universal direct suffrage will not be a weapon for the proletariat but a *snare*.

Perhaps this exceptionally candid but necessary analysis will encourage the feudalists to espouse the cause of universal direct suffrage. So much the better.

Or do we imagine that the government is only stultifying the press, the right of association and the right of assembly, as far as the bourgeois opposition is concerned (if indeed there is much left to be stultified in present conditions) in order to make a present of a free press and free rights of association and assembly to the workers? Is not the workers' movement in fact calmly continuing on its own untroubled way?

But that is precisely the crux of the matter. The government *knows*, and the bourgeoisie knows too, that the whole German workers' movement today is only *tolerated*, only survives, for as long as the government *chooses*. For as long as it serves the government's purpose for this movement to exist and for the bourgeois opposition to be faced with new, independent opponents, thus long will it tolerate this movement. From the moment that this movement turns the workers into an independent force, and thereby becomes a danger to the government, there will be an

abrupt end to it all. The whole manner in which the men-of-Progress agitation in the press, associations and assemblies has been put down, should serve as a warning to the workers. The same laws, edicts and measures which were applied in that case, can be applied against them at any time and deal a lethal blow to their agitation; and they will be so applied as soon as this agitation becomes dangerous. It is of the greatest importance that the workers should be clear about this point, and do not fall prey to the same illusion as the bourgeoisie in the "New Era", when they were similarly only *tolerated* but imagined they were already in the saddle. And if anyone should imagine the present government would free the press, the right of association and the right of assembly from their present fetters, he is clearly among those to whom there is no point in talking. And unless there is freedom of the press, the right of association and the right of assembly, no workers' movement is possible.

The present government in Prussia is not so naive as to be likely to cut its own throat. And if it should ever happen that reaction were to throw a few sham political concessions to the German proletariat as a bait—then let us hope the German proletariat will answer with the proud words of the old *Lay of Hildebrand*⁵⁶:

"Mit gêrû scal man geba infâhan, ort widar orte."

With the spear one should accept gifts, point against point.

Concerning the *social* concessions which reaction could offer to the workers—reduction of working hours in the factories, improved operation of the factory acts, the right of association, etc.—experience in every country has shown that reaction makes such propositions without the workers having to offer the slightest thing in return. Reaction needs the workers, but the workers do not need reaction. Therefore as long as the workers insist on these points in their own independent agitation, they can rest assured that the moment will come when reactionary elements will make the same demands merely in order to provoke the bourgeoisie; and in this way the workers will make gains over the bourgeoisie, without owing reaction any debt of gratitude.

But if the workers' party can expect nothing from reaction except small concessions which will come to it anyway without it needing to go begging for them—what then can it expect from the bourgeois opposition?

We have seen that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are both progeny of a new era and that in their social function both are

striving to eliminate the remnants of the bric-à-brac left over from earlier times. It is true that there is a most serious conflict to be settled between them, but this conflict can only be fought out when they are facing each other alone. Only by jettisoning the old lumber can the "decks be cleared for battle"—except that this time the battle will be fought not between two ships but on board the one ship, between officers and crew.

The bourgeoisie cannot win political power for itself nor give this political power constitutional and legal forms without at the same time putting weapons into the hands of the proletariat. As distinct from the old Estates, distinguished by birth, it must proclaim human rights, as distinct from the guilds, it must proclaim freedom of trade and industry, as distinct from the tutelage of the bureaucracy, it must proclaim freedom and self-government. To be consistent, it must therefore demand universal, direct suffrage, freedom of the press, association and assembly and the suspension of all special laws directed against individual classes of the population. And there is nothing else that the proletariat needs to demand from it. It cannot require that the bourgeoisie should cease to be a bourgeoisie, but it certainly can require that it practises its own principles consistently. But the proletariat will thereby also acquire all the weapons it needs for its ultimate victory. With freedom of the press and the right of assembly and association it will win universal suffrage, and with universal, direct suffrage, in conjunction with the above tools of agitation, it will win everything else.

It is therefore in the interests of the workers to support the bourgeoisie in its struggle against all reactionary elements, *as long as it remains true to itself*. Every gain which the bourgeoisie extracts from reaction, eventually benefits the working class, if that condition is fulfilled. And the German workers were quite correct in their instinctive appreciation of this. Everywhere, in every German state, they have quite rightly voted for the most radical candidates who had any prospect of getting in.

But what if the bourgeoisie is untrue to itself and betrays its own class interests, together with the principles these imply?

Then there are two paths left to the workers!

Either to drive the bourgeoisie on against its will and compel it as far as possible to extend the suffrage, to grant freedom of the press, association and assembly and thereby to create an arena for the proletariat in which it can move freely and organise. This is what the English workers have done since the Reform Bill of 1832

and the French workers since the July Revolution of 1830, furthering their own development and organisation precisely through and with this movement, whose immediate aims were purely bourgeois in nature, more than by any other method. There will always be cases like this, for with its lack of political courage the bourgeoisie everywhere will occasionally be untrue to itself.

Or alternatively, the workers might withdraw entirely from the bourgeois movement and leave the bourgeoisie to its fate. This was what happened in England, France and Germany after the failure of the European workers' movement from 1848 to 1850. It can only happen after violent and temporarily fruitless exertions, after which the class needs to rest. It cannot happen when the working class is in a healthy condition, for it would be the equivalent of total political abdication, and a class which is courageous by nature, a class which has nothing to lose and everything to gain, is incapable of that in the long term.

Even if the worst came to the worst and the bourgeoisie was to scurry under the skirts of reaction for fear of the workers, and appeal to the power of those elements hostile to itself for protection against them—even then the workers' party would have no choice but, notwithstanding the bourgeoisie, to continue its campaign for bourgeois freedom, freedom of the press and rights of assembly and association which the bourgeoisie had betrayed. Without these freedoms it will be unable to move freely itself; in this struggle it is fighting to establish the environment necessary for its existence, for the air it needs to breathe.

We are taking it for granted that in all these eventualities the workers' party will not play the part of a mere appendage to the bourgeoisie but of an independent party quite distinct from it. It will remind the bourgeoisie at every opportunity that the class interests of the workers are directly opposed to those of the capitalists and that the workers are aware of this. It will retain control of and further develop its own organisation as distinct from the party organisation of the bourgeoisie, and will only negotiate with the latter as one power with another. In this way it will secure for itself a position commanding respect, educate the individual workers about their class interests and when the next revolutionary storm comes—and these storms now recur as regularly as trade crises and equinoctial storms—it will be ready to act.

The policy of the workers' party in the Prussian constitutional conflict emerges therefore self-evidently:

above all to preserve the organisation of the workers' party as far as present conditions permit;

to drive the Party of Progress on to make *real* progress, as far as possible; to compel it to make its own programme more radical and to keep to it; to chide it and ridicule it mercilessly for all its inconsistencies and weaknesses;

to let the military question itself go the way that it will, in the knowledge that the workers' party will one day also carry out its own, *German* "army-reorganisation";

but to reply to the hypocritical enticements of reaction with the words:

"With the spear one should accept gifts, point against point."

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *SOCIAL-DEMOKRAT*⁵⁷

The undersigned promised to contribute to the *Social-Demokrat* and permitted their being named as contributors on the express condition that the paper would be edited in the spirit of the brief programme submitted to them. They did not for a moment fail to appreciate the difficult position of the *Social-Demokrat* and therefore made no demands that were inappropriate to the meridian of Berlin. But they repeatedly demanded that the language directed at the ministry and the feudal-absolutist party should be at least as bold as that aimed at the men of Progress.⁵⁸ The tactics pursued by the *Social-Demokrat* preclude their further participation in it. The opinion of the undersigned as to the royal Prussian governmental socialism and the correct attitude of the workers' party to such deception has already been set out in detail in No. 73 of the *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* of September 12, 1847, in reply to No. 206 of the *Rheinischer Beobachter*^a (then appearing in Cologne), in which the alliance of the "proletariat" with the "government" against the "liberal bourgeoisie" was proposed. We still subscribe today to every word of the statement we made then.

London and Manchester,
February 23, 1865

First published in the *Barmer Zeitung*,
No. 60 and the *Elberfelder Zeitung*, No. 60,
February 26, 1865

Printed according to the news-
paper text checked against the
original

^a A reference to Marx's article "The Communism of the *Rheinischer Beobachter*" (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 220-34).—Ed.

Frederick Engels

[NOTICE CONCERNING
THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY QUESTION
 AND *THE GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY*]⁵⁹

A pamphlet by *Frederick Engels* entitled *The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party* will shortly be published by Otto Meissner in Hamburg (price 6 Sgr.); unlike the most recent "social-democratic" party tactics,^a this pamphlet bases itself once more on the standpoint adopted by the literary representatives of the proletariat of 1846-1851 and develops this standpoint as against both reaction and the progressist bourgeoisie with regard to the currently topical question of the army and the budget.

Written on February 27, 1865

First published in the *Berliner Reform*, No. 53, the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung*, No. 62 and the *Rheinische Zeitung*, No. 62, March 3, 1865

Printed according to the text in the *Berliner Reform* checked with the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung*

Published in English for the first time

^a In the text which Engels sent to Siebel on February 27, 1865, these tactics are described as follows: "the pro-Bismarck direction adopted by the latest 'Social-Democracy' furthermore made it impossible for the people at the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* to collaborate with the organs of this particular 'Social-Democracy'." The wording of the notice in the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung* also contains this variant.—Ed.

Karl Marx

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL
ON THE CONFLICT IN THE PARIS SECTION⁶⁰

I) *Resolution*. Whereas citizen Tolain has several times tendered his resignation, and the Central Council has as often refused to accept it, the said Council now leaves it to Citizen Tolain and the Paris Administration to reconsider, whether or not under present circumstances, this resignation be opportune. The Central Council confirms beforehand whatever resolution the administration may come to on this point.⁶¹

II) *Resolution*. In deference to the wishes of a meeting of 32 members of the Working Men's International Association held at Paris February 24,⁶² and in obedience to the principles of popular sovereignty and self-government, the Central Council cancels its resolution relating to the appointment of an official vindicator for the French press. At the same time the Council seizes this opportunity of expressing its high esteem for Citizen Lefort, in particular as one of the initiators of the Working Men's International Society and in general for his approved public character,⁶³ and further it protests that it does not sanction the principle that none but an *ouvrier* is admissible as an official in our society.⁶⁴

III) *Resolution*. The Council resolves that the present Administration with the addition of citizen Vinçard be confirmed.^{a 65}

IV. *Resolution*: The Central Council earnestly requests the Administration at Paris to come to an understanding with citizens Lefort and Beluze, so as to admit them, and the group of *ouvriers*

^a In the Minute Book (March 7, 1865) this resolution reads: "The Council resolves that citizens Fribourg, Limousin and Tolain be confirmed in their anterior positions and that the addition to the Administration of Citizen Vinçard is acknowledged".—Ed.

they represent, to be represented in the Administration by three members, but the Council while emitting such a wish, has no power nor design to dictate.

V. The Administration at Paris having expressed its readiness to acknowledge a direct delegation from the Central Council, the Council accordingly appoints Citizen Schily to be its delegate to the said Administration.⁶⁶

Private instruction to Schily

“In case no compromise be arrived at, the Council declare that the group Lefort, *after having taken out their cards of membership*, will have the Power under our Statutes (see § 7^a) to form a Local branch Society.”

This to be held out in terrorem^b but confidentially, to Fribourg et Co., in order to induce them to make the necessary concessions, supposed Lefort and Beluze (the director of the Banque du Peuple⁶⁷) are earnest in inducing their group to become members.

Adopted by the Central Council on
March 7, 1865

First published in: Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. 3, Bd. 3, Berlin, 1930

Reproduced from the manuscript
checked with the Minute Book of
the General Council

^a See this volume, p. 16.— *Ed.*

^b As a warning.— *Ed.*

Karl Marx

[SYNOPSIS OF ENGELS' PAMPHLET
THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY QUESTION
*AND THE GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY*⁶⁸]

The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party.
 By Frederick Engels. (Hamburg, Otto Meissner)

We can warmly commend this pamphlet to our readers as it treats the most urgent issues of the day in Germany with great incisiveness, impartiality and expert knowledge. The old organisation of the Prussian army, the aims behind its reorganisation, the origins of the constitutional conflict in Prussia,⁶⁹ the conduct of the opposition by the Party of Progress and the simultaneous feuding between the Party of Progress and the Workers' Party—all this is presented here in a brief, but original and exhaustive account.

Written in the middle of March 1865

First published in the *Londoner Anzeiger*,
 March 17, 1865

Printed according to the news-
 paper

Published in English for the first
 time

Karl Marx

[REVIEW OF ENGELS' PAMPHLET
*THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY QUESTION
 AND THE GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY*⁷⁰]

The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party.
 By Frederick Engels. (Hamburg, Otto Meissner)

This most important pamphlet falls into three sections.

In the first the author subjects the reorganisation of the Prussian army to the critique of military science. Its main fault he finds in the fact that the reorganisation plan "whilst in appearance reverting to the original concept of *universal conscription*, which cannot ... function without a large army-reserve in the form of a *Landwehr*, ... in fact executes an about-turn in the direction of the *Franco-Austrian cadre-system*".^a

The second section sharply criticises the *bourgeois opposition's* handling of the military question. The author comes to the conclusion:

"It is immaterial by what errors and complications the bourgeois opposition is now forced into the following position: it must fight the military question through to the end, or it will lose the remnants of political power it still possesses... Can the Prussian bourgeoisie be expected ... to have the courage to remain adamant, come what may? It would have to have changed remarkably for the better since 1848, ... and the yearning for compromise which has found expression daily in the sighs of the Party of Progress since the opening of this session, is not an auspicious sign."^b

In the third section the author examines the attitude adopted by "the workers' party towards this reorganisation of the army" and

^a See this volume, p. 51.— *Ed.*

^b *ibid.*, pp. 64-66.— *Ed.*

the “ensuing constitutional conflict”. His answer is summarised in the following sentences:

“The only aspect of army reorganisation in Prussia which is of interest to the German working class is the increasingly thorough implementation of universal conscription.”^a

The policy which the working class must pursue in the constitutional conflict is: “above all to preserve the organisation of the workers’ party as far as present conditions permit; to drive the Party of Progress on to make *real* progress, as far as possible; ...but to reply to the hypocritical enticements of reaction with the words:

‘With the spear one should accept gifts, point against point.’”^b

Written earlier than March 13, 1865

First published in *Hermann*, March 18, 1865

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

^a *ibid.*, p. 67.— *Ed.*

^b *ibid.*, p. 79.— *Ed.*

Karl Marx

STATEMENT
[REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE BREACH
WITH THE SOCIAL-DEMOKRAT⁷¹]

Into his postscript to the statement of resignation of Herren Rüstow and Herwegh (No. 31 of the *Social-Demokrat*) Herr von Schweitzer incorporates an article dispatched from London to the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*^a as proof of "how inconsistent and utterly unprincipled the conduct of Herren Marx and Engels is". He attempts to falsify the facts. Hence the following factual information.

On November 11, 1864 Herr v. Schweitzer informed me by letter of the foundation of the *Social-Demokrat*, organ of the General Association of German Workers and stated at the time, among other things:

"We have approached 6-8 proven members of the Party, or at least men standing close to it, in order to gain their collaboration and there seems to be virtually no doubt that these gentlemen will give their consent. Only we consider it incomparably more important that you, the founder of the German Workers' Party" (these words are underlined by Herr v. Schweitzer himself) "and its first champion, honour us with your participation. We cherish the hope that after the great loss that has befallen it, you will stand by the side of an association that may, if only indirectly, be traced back to your own activity, in its hour of dire struggle."

Along with this letter of invitation was enclosed a prospectus, "printed as a manuscript". Far from "Lassalle's words dominating", or "Lassalle's name being inscribed on the banner", as Herr v. Schweitzer now lyingly informs the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*, Lassalle is neither quoted nor even mentioned in it. The prospectus contained only three points: "Solidarity of the peoples' interests", "the whole of mighty Germany—a free people's state",

^a A reference to Karl Blind's article published in the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 64, March 5, 1865.—Ed.

“abolition of the rule of capital”. With express reference to *this* prospectus Engels and I agreed to contribute.

On *November 19, 1864* Herr v. Schweitzer wrote to me:

“If you should have any remarks to make regarding the issuing of the prospectus, this should be done *by return*.”

I made no remarks.

Herr v. Schweitzer went on to ask whether,

“we” (the editorial board) “may expect an article from you now and then and whether we might also be *permitted to announce this to our readers*”.

Engels and I demanded to know first in what company we were to figure publicly. Herr v. Schweitzer then enumerated them, adding:

“If you should take exception to one or the other of these gentlemen we hope that this will be outweighed by the consideration that no very strict solidarity exists between the contributors to a newspaper.”

On *November 28* Herr v. Schweitzer wrote:

“The consent of yourself and Engels has *produced the happiest sentiments in the Party* insofar as it *knows about it*.”

The two first sample issues already contained a good deal of dubious material. I remonstrated. And, *among other things*, I expressed my indignation that from a private letter which I had written to Countess Hatzfeldt^a on receiving the news of Lassalle’s death, a few words of condolence had been torn out, published without my consent with my signature and disgracefully *abused* in order to “*ring in and out*” a servile panegyric of Lassalle.^b He replied on December 30:

“Dear Sir, Have *patience* with us—matters will *gradually improve*, our position is very difficult. All good things take their time, and *so I hope that you will be reassured and wait a while*.”

This *already on December 30, 1864*, when I still only had the first sample issues in my hand!

At the beginning of *January 1865*, after the confiscation of one of the first issues of the *Social-Demokrat*, I congratulated Herr v. Schweitzer on this event, adding that he must publicly break with the Ministry.

^a Marx to Sophie von Hatzfeldt, September 12, 1864. See present edition, Vol. 41.—*Ed.*

^b This refers to the article “Ferdinand Lassalle” printed in *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 1, sample issue, December 15, 1864. The epigraph to this article contained the words from Marx’s letter to Countess Hatzfeldt: “‘He died young in triumph—*as Achilles*’. K. Marx.”—*Ed.*

On the news of *Proudhon's* death he requested an article on Proudhon. I met his wish by return of post, but took this opportunity of characterising now in his own newspaper "even the semblance of compromise with the powers that be" as a contravention of "simple moral sense", and Proudhon's flirtation with Louis Bonaparte after the coup d'état as "baseness".^a At the same time *Engels* sent him a translation of an Old Danish peasant ballad,^b in order, in a marginal note, to impress on the readers of the *Social-Demokrat* the necessity of struggle against the rural squirearchy.

But during the same month of *January* I again had to protest against Herr v. Schweitzer's "tactics".⁷² He replied on *February 4*:

"As regards *our tactics*, I beg you to consider how difficult our position is. We must definitely seek to *gain strength* first, etc."

At the end of *January* an insinuation by the Paris correspondent of the *Social-Demokrat*^c prompted *Engels* and myself to make a statement^d saying, among other things, that we were glad to find our view confirmed that "the Paris proletariat is as irreconcilably opposed as ever to Bonapartism in both its forms, the Tuileries form and the form of the Palais-Royal, and never for a moment considered the plan of selling its historical honour as the vanguard of the revolution for a mess of pottage". The statement concluded with the words: "We recommend this example to the German workers."

In the meantime, in No. 21 of the *Social-Demokrat*, the Paris correspondent had corrected his earlier allegation^e and deprived our statement of its immediate pretext. We therefore accepted Herr v. Schweitzer's refusal to print it. But at the same time I wrote to him^f that "we would express our opinion in detail elsewhere about the relationship of the workers to the Prussian Government". Finally I made one last attempt to demonstrate to him the wretchedness of his "tactics", however honestly they might be meant, with a *practical example, the coalition question*.⁷³ He replied on *February 15*:

^a See this volume, p. 32.—*Ed.*

^b *ibid.*, pp. 34-35.—*Ed.*

^c M. Hess, "Paris, 28. Januar", *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 16, February 1, 1865.—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, p. 36.—*Ed.*

^e M. Hess, "Paris, 7. Febr.", *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 21, February 12, 1865.—*Ed.*

^f On February 13, 1865.—*Ed.*

“If you wish to enlighten me, as in your last letter, on *theoretical (!) questions*, I would *gratefully* accept such *instruction* on your part. But as regards the *practical questions of immediate tactics* I beg you to consider that in order to assess these things one must be in the centre of the movement. You are therefore doing us an injustice if you *express your dissatisfaction with our tactics anywhere and anyhow*. You should only do this if you were absolutely familiar with conditions. Do not forget either that the General Association of [German] Workers is a consolidated body and remains to a certain extent bound to *its traditions*. Things *in concreto* always drag around some kind of *weight about their feet*.”

To this ultimatum from Schweitzer Engels and I replied with our public statement of resignation.^a

Karl Marx

London, March 15, 1865

First published in the *Berliner Reform*,
No. 67, March 19, 1865

Printed according to the news-
paper

Published in English for the first
time

^a See this volume. p. 80.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx
TO THE EDITOR
OF THE *BERLINER REFORM*⁷¹

From No. 68 of the *Reform* and No. 37 of the *Social-Demokrat*^a forwarded to me here, I see that Herr v. Schweitzer is making embarrassed and mendacious attempts to extricate himself from the "fair impediments"^b he has prepared for himself. *Habeat sibi!*^c However, I will not permit him to distort my statement of March 15,^d in which I simply let him describe himself, into a *statement on Lassalle*. The correspondence between myself and Lassalle in my possession, spanning about fifteen years, totally deprives the Schweitzers and company of the power to misrepresent our personal relationship or to cast suspicion on the motives for my neutral attitude to Lassalle's agitation. The relationship of Lassalle's theoretical works to mine, on the other hand, is a matter for scientific criticism. An occasion may perhaps arise later for discussing individual points. But under any circumstances, reverence prohibits me from making such matters the object of a polemic in the press with sycophants.

Zalt-Bommel, March 28, 1865

First published in the *Berliner Reform*,
No. 78, April 1, 1865

Printed according to the news-
paper text checked against the
original

Published in English for the first
time

^a J. B. Schweitzer, "Der Redacteur des *Social-Demokraten* übersendet uns nachfolgende", *Berliner Reform*, No. 68, March 21, 1865 and "In Betreff der oekannten...", *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 37, March 22, 1865.—*Ed.*

^b H. Heine, *Neuer Frühling*, Prolog.—*Ed.*

^c I don't care!—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, pp. 87-90.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

THE "PRESIDENT OF MANKIND"⁷⁵

On my return from Holland to London No. 39 of the *Social-Demokrat* presents me with an asafetida cake baked by the hand of Herr Bernhard Becker,^a mainly consisting of Vogtian crumbs of slander. The legally documented refutation of Vogt's lying fairy-tales may be found in my work *Herr Vogt*, London, 1860.^b But this time, quite contrary to his custom, Herr Bernhard Becker, the "President of Mankind", does not merely content himself with plagiarism. For the first time in his life he attempts to come up with something of his own as well.

"In fact," says the "President of Mankind", "through Dronke Marx pawned for 1,000 Tlr. a manuscript which was redeemed by the Prussian police inspector, Stieber, who was in London spying among the refugees."

And three times during the course of his personal presidential address our Bernhard Becker returns to this "fact" with ever increasing merriment.

On page 124 of my *Herr Vogt* I state in a footnote^c:

"I myself had made the acquaintance of Bangya in London in 1850, together with his friend at the time, the present General Türr. His underhand dealings with parties of every complexion, Orleanists, Bonapartists, etc., and his association with policemen of every 'nationality' made me suspect him, but he dispelled my suspicions quite simply by showing me a document in *Kossuth's*

^a "Rede des Vereins-Präsidenten Bernhard Becker, gehalten in der Versammlung der Hamburger Mitglieder des Allgemeinen deutschen Arbeiter-Vereins am 22. März 1865", *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 39, supplement, March 26, 1865.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 17.—*Ed.*

^c *ibid.*, p. 219.—*Ed.*

own hand in which he (who had formerly been provisional chief commissioner of the police in Komorn under Klapka) was appointed chief commissioner of the police *in partibus*.^a As a secret chief of police in the service of the revolution he naturally had to keep in 'touch' with police in the service of the governments. In the course of the summer of 1852 I discovered that he had appropriated a manuscript^b I had asked him to convey to a bookseller in Berlin and steered it into the hands of a German government. After I had written to a Hungarian" (Szemere) "in Paris"⁷⁶ describing this incident and a number of other striking peculiarities of the man's, and after the Bangya mystery had been completely cleared up thanks to the intervention of a third person well-informed in the matter, I sent an open denunciation, signed by myself, to the *New-Yorker Criminal-Zeitung* early in 1853."^c

The "President of Mankind" has obviously not read the detailed denunciation of Bangya (at that time still resident in London) published by me 13 years ago in the *New-Yorker Criminal-Zeitung*. Otherwise he would probably have made his fiction fit the facts somewhat better. So he surrenders himself entirely to the play of his fair fantasy, and what was closer to it than the pleasant association of ideas between London and pawning? But I vouch for the fact that Bernhard Becker has never pawned his manuscripts.

The "President of Mankind" deigns to add:

"that on the foundation of the Vienna *Botschafter*, the semi-official organ of the Austrian government, Marx sought to win me" (just the same Bernhard Becker) "over as a correspondent for the same by concealing the semi-official character of the nascent journal, which, he said, had been sent to him, emphasising on the contrary that I should deliver out and out red articles."

Herr Bernhard Becker, who at that time was not yet "President of Mankind", was also possessed by the unfailing habit of scribbling "quite colourless articles" in the London *Hermann*, surprised me one fine evening (I had previously chanced to see him once or twice only) with a visit in person to my house, shortly before quietly sneaking away—for good reasons—from London. He pitifully bemoaned his ill-fortune to me and asked if I could

^a The phrase *in partibus infidelium* (literally: in the land of infidels) was added to the title of Catholic bishops appointed to purely nominal dioceses in non-Christian countries. Here it means "in exile".—*Ed.*

^b K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Great Men of the Exile* (see present edition, Vol. 11).—*Ed.*

^c The reference is to K. Marx's article "Hirsch's Confessions" (see present edition, Vol. 12).—*Ed.*

obtain correspondences for him to help him out of his bitter distress. I replied that a few days before Herr Kolatschek had announced the foundation of a new, allegedly "very liberal" Vienna newspaper to Herr S. Borkheim, a political refugee and merchant in the City, sending him some sample issues and requesting him to recruit a London correspondent. At the earnest entreaty of Bernhard Becker I promised to take up the matter on his behalf with Herr Borkheim, who is always willing to oblige refugees. Bernhard Becker also wrote, as far as I remember, one or more sample articles for Vienna. And his unsuccessful attempt to become the correspondent of the *Botschafter* proves my alliance with the Austrian government! Herr Bernhard Becker obviously believes that because Countess Hatzfeldt has given him a post, the Lord God has also given him the intelligence necessary for it!

"Liebknecht," continues Bernhard Becker, "is now systematically working on Countess Hatzfeldt, to whom Marx, too, sends telegrams and letters in order to turn her against the Association."

Herr Bernhard Becker imagines that I take the importance he acquired by bequest⁷⁷ quite as "systematically" seriously as he does himself! My letters to Countess Hatzfeldt after the death of Lassalle^a consisted of a message of condolence, of answers to various questions put to me on account of the planned Lassalle brochure and of discussions on a refutation against a libeller of Lassalle that I had been requested to, and subsequently did, undertake.^b So as to avoid misunderstandings, however, I thought it very much to the point to remind the Countess in a letter of December 22, 1864 that I did not agree with Lassalle's politics. That concluded our correspondence, in which not a syllable was uttered about the Association. The Countess had requested me among other things to let her know by return whether the release of certain portraits for the planned brochure seemed appropriate to me. I replied by telegraph: No! This single telegram is put into the plural by Herr Bernhard Becker, who is no less eminent a grammarian than he is poet and thinker.

He relates that I also took part in a campaign directed against him at a later date. The sole step on my part in this all-important affair was this: I had heard from Berlin that Bernhard Becker was being persecuted from a certain quarter because he was not willing to allow the *Social-Demokrat* and the Association to be misused in

^a Marx's letters to Sophie Hatzfeldt of September 12, October 16, November 26 and 28 and December 22, 1864.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 23-25.—*Ed.*

order to agitate for the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia.⁷⁸ At the same time I had been asked to bring this "intrigue" to the notice of Herr Klings in Solingen, over whom a certain degree of influence was attributed to me on account of some earlier contacts, and Herr Philipp Becker in Geneva, in order to give them due warning. I did both things, the former through a Barmen friend,^a the latter through my friend Schily in Paris, who was labouring, as I was, under the delusion that something human had happened to the "President of Mankind" and that he had actually behaved decently for once. He now naturally distorts the facts of the matter into the exact opposite—being a dialectician.

The "President of Mankind" is, however, not only an eminent writer, thinker, grammarian and dialectician. He is a pathologist of the first water, to boot. My eighteen-month-old carbuncle complaint, which happened to last six months after Lassalle's death, this blood-red disease he explains as due to "pale envy at Lassalle's greatness".

"But," he emphatically adds, "he did not dare to oppose Lassalle in public because he knew full well that Lassalle would have struck him stone dead, like he did Bastiat-Schulze, with his giant's club."

Now precisely in this his last work on "Bastiat-Schulze"^b Lassalle praises my *Critique of Political Economy*, Berlin, 1859, to the skies, calling it "epoch-making", a "masterpiece", and placing it in line with the works of A. Smith and Ricardo. From this, Herr Bernhard Becker, with that capacity for thought, peculiar to himself, concludes that Lassalle might strike me dead, as he did Bastiat-Schulze. Incidentally Lassalle had quite different ideas of what I "dare". When I wrote to him on an occasion which this is not the place to discuss, saying that Engels and I would, for reasons which I enumerated, be forced to make a public attack on him,⁷⁹ he replied at length in a letter lying here before me at this moment, first setting out his objections and then concluding in these terms:

"Consider all this before you speak out loud and publicly. Dissension and breach between us would be a deplorable event for our particular party, which is not a big one as it is!"^c

^a Karl Siebel.—*Ed.*

^b F. Lassalle, *Herr Bastiat-Schulze von Delitzsch, der ökonomische Julian, oder: Capital und Arbeit*, Berlin, 1864.—*Ed.*

^c Lassalle's letter to Marx written in mid-June 1859.—*Ed.*

Herr Bernhard Becker sees a complete contradiction in the fact that I wished to have nothing to do with an obscure international association in which he, Bernhard Becker, is supposed to have figured,⁸⁰ while on the contrary participating with great keenness in the International Association formed last September by the leaders of the London trade unions.

Herr Bernhard Becker's gift for discrimination obviously provides support for his power of reasoning. His association, he boasts, comprised all of "400 men" in its heyday, while our Association shows so little modesty that it already numbers 10,000 members in England alone. It is, in fact, impermissible that anything of this sort should take place behind the back as it were of the "President of Mankind".

All in all, and with particular respect to Herr Bernhard Becker's abundance of abilities only briefly suggested by me, one finds that he is hardly justified in his complaints that people have sought to impose too much at once on a man like him; that people have not only forced on him the job of exercising autocratic power as his main field, but also the lesser office of "buying eggs and butter for the house",⁸¹ "on the side". It would seem, however, that a better domestic order could be achieved by re-arranging his dual functions. May his main task in future be the "buying of eggs and butter for the house", and, conversely, let him preside over mankind solely "on the side".

London, April 8, 1865

First published in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, No. 102, second supplement, April 12, 1865 and the *Berliner Reform*, No. 88, supplement, April 13, 1865

Printed according to the newspapers

Published in English for the first time

Karl Marx

A CORRECTION ⁸²

After the two motions of Messrs. Beales and Levenson, mentioned in No. 30 of your newspaper, had been carried by the Polish meeting in London on March 1, *Mr. Peter Fox* (an Englishman), on behalf of the *International Working Men's Association*, proposed

"that an integral and independent Poland is an indispensable condition of democratic Europe, and that so long as this condition is unfulfilled, revolutionary triumphs on the Continent are short-lived [...] preludes to prolonged periods of counter-revolutionary rule."

After briefly outlining the history of the evils which had befallen Europe as a result of the loss of liberty by Poland, and of Russia's policy of conquest, Mr. P. Fox said that the stand of the *Liberal* party on this question did not coincide with that of the *democratic* society for which he was speaking. The motto of conservative Europe was: an enslaved Europe with an enslaved Poland as a basis. The motto of the International Working Men's Association was, on the contrary: a free Europe based upon a free and independent Poland.

Mr. Eccarius (a German worker, Vice-President of the International Working Men's Association) seconded the motion, referring in detail to the share Prussia had taken in the various partitions of Poland. In conclusion he said:

"*The downfall of the Prussian monarchy* is the *conditio sine qua non* for the establishment of Germany and the re-establishment of Poland."

Mr. Le Lubez, a French member of the *International Working Men's Association*, likewise spoke in support of the motion, which was *carried unanimously, amid the continuous cheering of the meeting.*

The Daily News and a few other “liberal” London dailies omitted this part of the report,^a being vexed by the triumph of the *International Working Men’s Association*, without whose collaboration, incidentally, the Polish meeting at St. Martin’s Hall could not have taken place at all. On behalf of the International Working Men’s Association, I request you to print this correction.^b

London, etc.

H. Jung,

Corresponding Secretary
of the International Working Men’s Association
for Switzerland

Written on April 13, 1865

First published in *Der weiße Adler*, No. 48,
April 22, 1865

Printed according to the manu-
script checked against the news-
paper

^a “The Late Polish Insurrection”, *The Daily News*, March 2, 1865.—*Ed.*

^b The newspaper editors placed this request at the beginning of the article.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx
[ADDRESS
FROM THE WORKING MEN'S INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON⁸³]

TO ANDREW JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Sir,

The demon of the “peculiar institution”,^a for the supremacy of which the South rose in arms, would not allow his worshippers to honourably succumb in the open field. What he had begun in treason, he must needs end in infamy. As Philip II's war for the Inquisition bred a Gérard, thus Jefferson Davis's pro-slavery war a Booth.

It is not our part to call words of sorrow and horror, while the heart of two worlds heaves with emotion. Even the sycophants who, year after year, and day by day, stick to their Sisyphus work of morally assassinating Abraham Lincoln, and the great Republic he headed, stand now aghast at this universal outburst of popular feeling, and rival with each other to strew rhetorical flowers on his open grave. They have now at last found out that he was a man, neither to be browbeaten by adversity, nor intoxicated by success, inflexibly pressing on to his great goal, never compromising it by blind haste, slowly maturing his steps, never retracing them, carried away by no surge of popular favour, disheartened by no slackening of the popular pulse, tempering stern acts by the gleams of a kind heart, illuminating scenes dark with passion by the smile of humour, doing his titanic work as humbly and homely as Heaven-born rulers do little things with the grandiloquence of pomp and state; in one word, one of the rare men who succeed in becoming great, without ceasing to be good. Such, indeed, was the

^a This is how A. Stephens, a Southern leader, referred to the slave-owning system defending it in his speech at Savannah on March 21, 1861 (see *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 6215, March 27, 1861).—*Ed.*

modesty of this great and good man, that the world only discovered him a hero after he had fallen a martyr.

To be singled out by the side of such a chief, the second victim to the infernal gods of slavery, was an honour due to Mr. Seward. Had he not, at a time of general hesitation, the sagacity to foresee and the manliness to foretell "the irrepressible conflict"?⁸⁴ Did he not, in the darkest hours of that conflict, prove true to the Roman duty to never despair of the Republic and its stars? We earnestly hope that he and his son^a will be restored to health, public activity, and well-deserved honours within much less than "90 days".⁸⁵

After a tremendous civil war, but which, if we consider its vast dimensions, and its broad scope, and compare it to the Old World's 100 years' wars, and 30 years' wars, and 23 years' wars,⁸⁶ can hardly be said to have lasted 90 days. Yours, Sir, has become the task to uproot by the law what has been felled by the sword, to preside over the arduous work of political reconstruction and social regeneration. A profound sense of your great mission will save you from any compromise with stern duties. You will never forget that, to initiate the new era of the emancipation of labour, the American people devolved the responsibilities of leadership upon two men of labour—the one Abraham Lincoln, the other Andrew Johnson.

Signed, on behalf of the International Working Men's Association, London, May 13th, 1865, by the Central Council—

Charles Kaub, Edward Coulson, F. Lessner, Carl Pfänder, N. P. Hansen, Karl Schapper, William Dell, George Lochner, George Eccarius, John Osborne, P. Petersen, A. Janks, H. Klimosch, John Weston, H. Bolleter, B. Lucraft, J. Buckley, Peter Fox, N. Salvatella, George Howell, Bordage, A. Valltier, Robert Shaw, J. H. Longmaid, W. Morgan, G. W. Wheeler, J. D. Niess, W. C. Worley, D. Stainsby, F. de Lassassie, J. Carter, Emile Holtorp, Secretary for Poland; Carl Marx, Secretary for Germany; H. Jung, Secretary for Switzerland; E. Dupont, Secretary for France; J. Whitlock, Financial Secretary; G. Odger, President; W. R. Cremer, Hon. Gen. Secretary.

Written between May 2 and 9, 1865

Reproduced from *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*

First published in *The Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 188, May 20, 1865

^a Frederick William Seward.—*Ed.*

KARL MARX

[VALUE, PRICE AND PROFIT⁸⁷]

Written between the end of May and
June 27, 1865

First published as a separate pamphlet in
London in 1898

Reproduced from the manuscript

[PRELIMINARY]

Citizens,

Before entering into the subject-matter, allow me to make a few preliminary remarks.

There reigns now on the Continent a real epidemic of strikes, and a general clamour for a rise of wages. The question will turn up at our Congress.⁸⁸ You, as the head of the International Association, ought to have settled convictions upon this paramount question. For my own part, I considered it, therefore, my duty to enter fully into the matter, even at the peril of putting your patience to a severe test.

Another preliminary remark I have to make in regard to Citizen Weston. He has not only proposed to you, but has publicly defended, in the interest of the working class, as he thinks, opinions he knows to be most unpopular with the working class. Such an exhibition of moral courage all of us must highly honour. I hope that, despite the unvarnished style of my paper, at its conclusion he will find me agreeing with what appears to me the just idea lying at the bottom of his theses, which, however, in their present form, I cannot but consider theoretically false and practically dangerous.

I shall now at once proceed to the business before us.

1) [PRODUCTION AND WAGES]

Citizen Weston's argument rested, in fact, upon two premises: firstly, that the *amount of national production* is a *fixed thing*, a *constant* quantity or magnitude, as the mathematicians would say;

secondly, that the *amount of real wages*, that is to say, of wages as measured by the quantity of the commodities they can buy, is a *fixed* amount, a *constant* magnitude.

Now, his first assertion is evidently erroneous. Year after year you will find that the value and mass of production increase, that the productive powers of the national labour increase, and that the amount of money necessary to circulate this increasing production continuously changes. What is true at the end of the year, and for different years compared with each other, is true for every average day of the year. The amount or magnitude of national production changes continuously. It is not a *constant* but a *variable* magnitude, and apart from changes in population it must be so, because of the continuous change in the *accumulation of capital* and the *productive powers of labour*. It is perfectly true that if a *rise in the general rate of wages* should take place today, that rise, whatever its ulterior effects might be, would, *by itself*, not *immediately* change the amount of production. It would, in the first instance, proceed from the existing state of things. But if *before* the rise of wages the national production was *variable*, and not *fixed*, it will continue to be variable and not fixed *after* the rise of wages.

But suppose the amount of national production to be *constant* instead of *variable*. Even then, what our friend Weston considers a logical conclusion would still remain a gratuitous assertion. If I have a given number, say eight, the *absolute* limits of this number do not prevent its parts from changing their *relative* limits. If profits were six and wages two, wages might increase to six and profits decrease to two, and still the total amount remains eight. Thus the fixed amount of production would by no means prove the fixed amount of wages. How then does our friend Weston prove this fixity? By asserting it.

But even conceding him his assertion, it would cut both ways, while he presses it only in one direction. If the amount of wages is a constant magnitude, then it can be neither increased nor diminished. If then, in enforcing a temporary rise of wages, the working men act foolishly, the capitalists, in enforcing a temporary fall of wages, would act not less foolishly. Our friend Weston does not deny that, under certain circumstances, the working men *can* enforce a rise of wages, but their amount being naturally fixed, there must follow a reaction. On the other hand, he knows also that the capitalists *can* enforce a fall of wages, and, indeed, continuously try to enforce it. According to the principle of the constancy of wages, a reaction ought to follow in this case not less than in the former. The working men, therefore, reacting against

the attempt at, or the act of, lowering wages, would act rightly. They would, therefore, act rightly in enforcing *a rise in wages*, because every *reaction* against the lowering of wages is an *action* for raising wages. According to Citizen Weston's own principle of the *constancy of wages*, the working men ought, therefore, under certain circumstances, to combine and struggle for a rise of wages.

If he denies this conclusion, he must give up the premise from which it flows. He must not say that the amount of wages is a *constant quantity*, but that, although it cannot and must not *rise*, it can and must *fall*, whenever capital pleases to lower it. If the capitalist pleases to feed you upon potatoes instead of upon meat, and upon oats instead of upon wheat, you must accept his will as a law of political economy, and submit to it. If in one country the rate of wages is higher than in another, in the United States, for example, than in England, you must explain this difference in the rate of wages by difference between the will of the American capitalist and the will of the English capitalist, a method which would certainly very much simplify, not only the study of economic phenomena, but of all other phenomena.

But even then, we might ask, *why* the will of the American capitalist differs from the will of the English capitalist? And to answer the question you must go beyond the domain of *will*. A parson may tell me that God wills one thing in France, and another thing in England. If I summon him to explain this duality of will, he might have the brass to answer me that God wills to have one will in France and another will in England. But our friend Weston is certainly the last man to make an argument of such a complete negation of all reasoning.

The *will* of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible. What we have to do is not to talk about his *will*, but to inquire into his *power*, the *limits of that power*, and the *character of those limits*.

2) [PRODUCTION, WAGES, PROFITS]

The address Citizen Weston read to us might have been compressed into a nutshell.

All his reasoning amounted to this: If the working class forces the capitalist class to pay five shillings instead of four shillings in the shape of money wages, the capitalist will return in the shape of commodities four shillings' worth instead of five shillings' worth. The working class would have to pay five shillings for what, before the rise of wages, they bought with four shillings. But why is this

the case? Why does the capitalist only return four shillings' worth for five shillings? Because the amount of wages is fixed. But why is it fixed at four shillings' worth of commodities? Why not at three, or two, or any other sum? If the limit of the amount of wages is settled by an economic law, independent alike of the will of the capitalist and the will of the working man, the first thing Citizen Weston had to do was to state that law and prove it. He ought then, moreover, to have proved that the amount of wages actually paid at every given moment always corresponds exactly to the necessary amount of wages, and never deviates from it. If, on the other hand, the given limit of the amount of wages is founded on the *mere will* of the capitalist, or the limits of his avarice, it is an arbitrary limit. There is nothing necessary in it. It may be changed by the will of the capitalist, and may, therefore, be changed *against* his will.

Citizen Weston illustrated his theory by telling you that when a bowl contains a certain quantity of soup, to be eaten by a certain number of persons, an increase in the broadness of the spoons would not produce an increase in the amount of soup. He must allow me to find this illustration rather spoony. It reminded me somewhat of the simile employed by Menenius Agrippa. When the Roman plebeians struck against the Roman patricians, the patrician Agrippa told them that the patrician belly fed the plebeian members of the body politic.⁸⁹ Agrippa failed to show that you feed the members of one man by filling the belly of another. Citizen Weston, on his part, has forgotten that the bowl from which the workmen eat is filled with the whole produce of the national labour, and that what prevents them fetching more out of it is neither the narrowness of the bowl nor the scantiness of its contents, but only the smallness of their spoons.

By what contrivance is the capitalist enabled to return four shillings' worth for five shillings? By raising the price of the commodity he sells. Now, does a rise and more generally a change in the prices of commodities, do the prices of commodities themselves, depend on the mere will of the capitalist? Or are, on the contrary, certain circumstances wanted to give effect to that will? If not, the ups and downs, the incessant fluctuations of market prices, become an insoluble riddle.

As we suppose that no change whatever has taken place either in the productive powers of labour, or in the amount of capital and labour employed, or in the value of the money wherein the values of products are estimated, but *only a change in the rate of wages*, how could that *rise of wages* affect the *prices of commodities*?

Only by affecting the actual proportion between the demand for, and the supply of, these commodities.

It is perfectly true that, considered as a whole, the working class spends, and must spend, its income upon *necessaries*. A general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, produce a rise in the demand for, and consequently in the *market prices of, necessaries*. The capitalists who produce these necessaries would be compensated for the risen wages by the rising market prices of their commodities. But how with the other capitalists, who do *not* produce necessaries? And you must not fancy them a small body. If you consider that two-thirds of the national produce are consumed by one-fifth of the population—a member of the House of Commons stated it recently to be but one-seventh of the population—you will understand what an immense proportion of the national produce must be produced in the shape of luxuries, or be *exchanged* for luxuries, and what an immense amount of the necessaries themselves must be wasted upon flunkeys, horses, cats, and so forth, a waste we know from experience to become always much limited with the rising prices of necessaries.

Well, what would be the position of those capitalists who do *not* produce necessaries? For the *fall in the rate of profit*, consequent upon the general rise of wages, they could not compensate themselves by a *rise in the price of their commodities*, because the demand for those commodities would not have increased. Their income would have decreased, and from this decreased income they would have to pay more for the same amount of higher-priced necessaries. But this would not be all. As their income had diminished they would have less to spend upon luxuries, and therefore their mutual demand for their respective commodities would diminish. Consequent upon this diminished demand the prices of their commodities would fall. In these branches of industry, therefore, *the rate of profit would fall*, not only in simple proportion to the general rise in the rate of wages, but in the compound ratio of the general rise of wages, the rise in the prices of necessaries, and the fall in the prices of luxuries.

What would be the consequence of *this difference in the rates of profit* for capitals employed in the different branches of industry? Why, the consequence that generally obtains whenever, from whatever reason, *the average rate of profit* comes to differ in the different spheres of production. Capital and labour would be transferred from the less remunerative to the more remunerative branches; and this process of transfer would go on until the supply in the one department of industry would have risen

proportionately to the increased demand, and would have sunk in the other departments according to the decreased demand. *This change effected*, the *general rate of profit* would again be *equalised* in the different branches. As the whole derangement originally arose from a mere change in the proportion of the demand for, and the supply of, different commodities, the cause ceasing, the effect would cease, and *prices* would return to their former level and equilibrium. Instead of being limited to some branches of industry, the *fall in the rate of profit* consequent upon the rise of wages would have become *general*. According to our supposition, there would have taken place no change in the productive powers of labour, nor in the aggregate amount of production, but *that given amount of production would have changed its form*. A greater part of the produce would exist in the shape of necessaries, a lesser part in the shape of luxuries, or what comes to the same, a lesser part would be exchanged for foreign luxuries, and be consumed in its original form, or, what again comes to the same, a greater part of the native produce would be exchanged for foreign necessaries instead of for luxuries. The general rise in the rate of wages would, therefore, after a temporary disturbance of market prices, only result in a general fall of the rate of profit without any permanent change in the prices of commodities.

If I am told that in the previous argument I assume the whole surplus wages to be spent upon necessaries, I answer that I have made the supposition most advantageous to the opinion of Citizen Weston. If the surplus wages were spent upon articles formerly not entering into the consumption of the working men, the real increase of their purchasing power would need no proof. Being, however, only derived from an advance of wages, that increase of their purchasing power must exactly correspond to the decrease of the purchasing power of the capitalists. The *aggregate demand* for commodities would, therefore, not *increase*, but the constituent parts of that demand would *change*. The increasing demand on the one side would be counterbalanced by the decreasing demand on the other side. Thus the aggregate demand remaining stationary, no change whatever could take place in the market prices of commodities.

You arrive, therefore, at this dilemma: Either the surplus wages are equally spent upon all articles of consumption—then the expansion of demand on the part of the working class must be compensated by the contraction of demand on the part of the capitalist class—or the surplus wages are only spent upon some articles whose market prices will temporarily rise. Then the

consequent rise in the rate of profit in some, and the consequent fall in the rate of profit in other branches of industry will produce a change in the distribution of capital and labour, going on until the supply is brought up to the increased demand in the one department of industry, and brought down to the diminished demand in the other departments of industry. On the one supposition there will occur no change in the prices of commodities. On the other supposition, after some fluctuations of market prices, the exchangeable values of commodities will subside to the former level. On both suppositions the general rise in the rate of wages will ultimately result in nothing else but a general fall in the rate of profit.

To stir up your powers of imagination Citizen Weston requested you to think of the difficulties which a general rise of English agricultural wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would produce. Think, he exclaimed, of the immense rise in the demand for necessaries, and the consequent fearful rise in their prices! Now, all of you know that the average wages of the American agricultural labourer amount to more than double that of the English agricultural labourer, although the prices of agricultural produce are lower in the United States than in the United Kingdom, although the general relations of capital and labour obtain in the United States the same as in England, and although the annual amount of production is much smaller in the United States than in England. Why, then, does our friend ring this alarm bell? Simply to shift the real question before us. A sudden rise of wages from nine shillings to eighteen shillings would be a sudden rise to the amount of 100 per cent. Now, we are not at all discussing the question whether the general rate of wages in England could be suddenly increased by 100 per cent. We have nothing at all to do with the *magnitude* of the rise, which in every practical instance must depend on, and be suited to, given circumstances. We have only to inquire how a general rise in the rate of wages, even if restricted to one per cent., will act.

Dismissing friend Weston's fancy rise of 100 per cent., I propose calling your attention to the real rise of wages that took place in Great Britain from 1849 to 1859.

You are all aware of the Ten Hours' Bill, or rather Ten-and-a-Half Hours' Bill, introduced since 1848.⁹⁰ This was one of the greatest economic changes we have witnessed. It was a sudden and compulsory rise of wages, not in some local trades, but in the leading industrial branches by which England sways the markets of the world. It was a rise of wages under circumstances singularly

unpropitious. Dr. Ure, Professor Senior, and all the other official economical mouthpieces of the middle class, *proved*, and I must say upon much stronger grounds than those of our friend Weston, that it would sound the death-knell of English industry. They proved that it not only amounted to a simple rise of wages, but to a rise of wages initiated by, and based upon, a diminution of the quantity of labour employed. They asserted that the twelfth hour you wanted to take from the capitalist was exactly the only hour from which he derived his profit. They threatened a decrease of accumulation, rise of prices, loss of markets, stinting of production, consequent reaction upon wages, ultimate ruin. In fact, they declared Maximilien Robespierre's Maximum Laws⁹¹ to be a small affair compared to it; and they were right in a certain sense. Well, what was the result? A rise in the money wages of the factory operatives, despite the curtailing of the working day, a great increase in the number of factory hands employed, a continuous fall in the prices of their products, a marvellous development in the productive powers of their labour, an unheard-of progressive expansion of the markets for their commodities. In Manchester, at the meeting, in 1861, of the Society for the Advancement of Science, I myself heard Mr. *Newman*^a confess that he, Dr. Ure, Senior, and all other official propounders of economic science had been wrong, while the instinct of the people had been right.⁹² I mention Mr. W. Newman, not Professor Francis Newman, because he occupies an eminent position in economic science, as the contributor to, and editor of, Mr. Thomas Tooke's *History of Prices*, that magnificent work which traces the history of prices from 1793 to 1856. If our friend Weston's fixed idea of a fixed amount of wages, a fixed amount of production, a fixed degree of the productive power of labour, a fixed and permanent will of the capitalists, and all his other fixedness and finality were correct, Professor Senior's woeful forebodings would have been right, and Robert Owen, who already in 1815 proclaimed a general limitation of the working day the first preparatory step to the emancipation of the working class^b and actually in the teeth of the general prejudice inaugurated it on his own hook in his cotton factory at New Lanark, would have been wrong.

In the very same period during which the introduction of the Ten Hours' Bill, and the rise of wages consequent upon it,

^a Here and below inaccuracy in the manuscript. Should be W. Newmarch.—*Ed.*

^b R. Owen, *Observations on the Effect of the Manufacturing System*, London, 1815.—*Ed.*

occurred, there took place in Great Britain, for reasons which it would be out of place to enumerate here, a *general rise in agricultural wages*.

Although it is not required for my immediate purpose, in order not to mislead you, I shall make some preliminary remarks.

If a man got two shillings weekly wages, and if his wages rose to four shillings, the *rate of wages* would have risen by 100 per cent. This would seem a very magnificent thing if expressed as a rise in the *rate of wages*, although the *actual amount of wages*, four shillings weekly, would still remain a wretchedly small, a starvation pittance. You must not, therefore, allow yourselves to be carried away by the high-sounding per cents in the *rate* of wages. You must always ask, What was the *original* amount?

Moreover, you will understand, that if there were ten men receiving each 2s. per week, five men receiving each 5s. and five men receiving 11s. weekly, the twenty men together would receive 100s., or £5, weekly. If then a rise, say by 20 per cent., upon the *aggregate* sum of their weekly wages took place, there would be an advance from £5 to £6. Taking the average, we might say that the *general rate of wages* had risen by 20 per cent., although, in fact, the wages of the ten men had remained stationary, the wages of the one lot of five men had risen from 5s. to 6s. only, and the wages of the other lot of five men from 55s. to 70s. One-half of the men would not have improved at all their position, one-quarter would have improved it in an imperceptible degree, and only one-quarter would have bettered it really. Still, reckoning by the *average*, the total amount of the wages of those twenty men would have increased by 20 per cent., and as far as the aggregate capital that employs them, and the prices of the commodities they produce, are concerned, it would be exactly the same as if all of them had equally shared in the average rise of wages. In the case of agricultural labour, the standard wages being very different in the different counties of England and Scotland, the rise affected them very unequally.

Lastly, during the period when that rise of wages took place counteracting influences were at work, such as the new taxes consequent upon the Russian war,^a the extensive demolition of the dwelling-houses of the agricultural labourers,⁹³ and so forth.

Having premised so much, I proceed to state that from 1849 to 1859 there took place a *rise of about 40 per cent.* in the average rate of the agricultural wages of Great Britain. I could give you ample

^a The Crimean War of 1853-56.—Ed.

details in proof of my assertion, but for the present purpose think it sufficient to refer you to the conscientious and critical paper read in 1859 by the late Mr. *John C. Morton* at the London Society of Arts,⁹⁴ on *The Forces Used in Agriculture*. Mr. Morton gives the returns, from bills and other authentic documents, which he had collected from about one hundred farmers, residing in twelve Scotch and thirty-five English counties.

According to our friend Weston's opinion, and taken together with the simultaneous rise in the wages of the factory operatives, there ought to have occurred a tremendous rise in the prices of agricultural produce during the period 1849 to 1859. But what is the fact? Despite the Russian war, and the consecutive unfavourable harvests from 1854 to 1856, the average price of wheat, which is the leading agricultural produce of England, fell from about £3 per quarter for the years 1838 to 1848 to about £2 10s. per quarter for the years 1849 to 1859. This constitutes a fall in the price of wheat of more than 16 per cent. simultaneously with an average rise of agricultural wages of 40 per cent. During the same period, if we compare its end with its beginning, 1859 with 1849, there was a decrease of official pauperism from 934,419 to 860,470, the difference being 73,949; a very small decrease, I grant, and which in the following years was again lost, but still a decrease.

It might be said that, consequent upon the abolition of the Corn Laws,⁹⁵ the import of foreign corn was more than doubled during the period from 1849 to 1859, as compared with the period from 1838 to 1848. And what of that? From Citizen Weston's standpoint one would have expected that this sudden, immense, and continuously increasing demand upon foreign markets must have sent up the prices of agricultural produce there to a frightful height, the effect of increased demand remaining the same, whether it comes from without or from within. What was the fact? Apart from some years of failing harvests, during all the period the ruinous fall in the price of corn formed a standing theme of declamation in France; the Americans were again and again compelled to burn their surplus of produce; and Russia, if we are to believe Mr. Urquhart, prompted the Civil War in the United States⁹⁶ because her agricultural exports were crippled by the Yankee competition in the markets of Europe.^a

Reduced to its abstract form, Citizen Weston's argument would come to this: Every rise in demand occurs always on the basis of a

^a D. Urquhart, "The Right of Search: Two Speeches (January 20 and 27, 1862)", London, March 1862.—*Ed.*

given amount of production. It can, therefore, *never increase the supply of the articles demanded*, but can *only enhance their money prices*. Now the most common observation shows that an increased demand will, in some instances, leave the market prices of commodities altogether unchanged, and will, in other instances, cause a temporary rise of market prices followed by an increased supply, followed by a reduction of the prices *to* their original level, and in many cases *below* their original level. Whether the rise of demand springs from surplus wages, or from any other cause, does not at all change the conditions of the problem. From Citizen Weston's standpoint the general phenomenon was as difficult to explain as the phenomenon occurring under the exceptional circumstances of a rise of wages. His argument had, therefore, no peculiar bearing whatever upon the subject we treat. It only expressed his perplexity at accounting for the laws by which an increase of demand produces an increase of supply, instead of an ultimate rise of market prices.

3) [WAGES AND CURRENCY]

On the second day of the debate^a our friend Weston clothed his old assertions in new forms. He said: Consequent upon a general rise in money wages, more currency will be wanted to pay the same wages. The currency being *fixed*, how can you pay with this fixed currency increased money wages? First the difficulty arose from the fixed amount of commodities accruing to the working man, despite his increase of money wages; now it arises from the increased money wages, despite the fixed amount of commodities. Of course, if you reject his original dogma, his secondary grievance will disappear.

However, I shall show that this currency question has nothing at all to do with the subject before us.

In your country the mechanism of payments is much more perfected than in any other country of Europe. Thanks to the extent and concentration of the banking system, much less currency is wanted to circulate the same amount of values, and to transact the same or a greater amount of business. For example, as far as wages are concerned, the English factory operative pays his wages weekly to the shopkeeper, who sends them weekly to the banker, who returns them weekly to the manufacturer, who again

^a Presumably the meeting of the Central Council on May 23, 1865.—*Ed.*

pays them away to his working men, and so forth. By this contrivance the yearly wages of an operative, say of £52, may be paid by one single sovereign turning round every week in the same circle. Even in England the mechanism is less perfect than in Scotland, and is not everywhere equally perfect; and therefore we find, for example, that in some agricultural districts, as compared with the mere factory districts, much more currency is wanted to circulate a much smaller amount of values.

If you cross the Channel, you will find that the *money wages* are much lower than in England, but that they are circulated in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France by a *much larger amount of currency*. The same sovereign will not be so quickly intercepted by the banker or returned to the industrial capitalist; and, therefore, instead of one sovereign circulating £52 yearly, you want, perhaps, three sovereigns to circulate yearly wages to the amount of £25. Thus, by comparing continental countries with England, you will see at once that low money wages may require a much larger currency for their circulation than high money wages, and that this is, in fact, a merely technical point, quite foreign to our subject.

According to the best calculations I know, the yearly income of the working class of this country may be estimated at £250,000,000. This immense sum is circulated by about £3,000,000. Suppose a rise of wages of 50 per cent. to take place. Then, instead of £3,000,000 of currency, £4,500,000 would be wanted. As a very considerable part of the working man's daily expenses is laid out in silver and copper, that is to say, in mere tokens, whose relative value to gold is arbitrarily fixed by law, like that of inconvertible money paper, a rise of money wages by 50 per cent. would, in the extreme case, require an additional circulation of sovereigns, say to the amount of one million. One million, now dormant, in the shape of bullion or coin, in the cellars of the Bank of England, or of private bankers, would circulate. But even the trifling expense resulting from the additional minting or the additional wear and tear of that million might be spared, and would actually be spared, if any friction should arise from the want of the additional currency. All of you know that the currency of this country is divided into two great departments. One sort, supplied by bank-notes of different descriptions, is used in the transactions between dealers and dealers, and the larger payments from consumers to dealers, while another sort of currency, metallic coin, circulates in the retail trade. Although distinct, these two sorts of currency intermix

with each other. Thus gold coin, to a very great extent, circulates even in larger payments for all the odd sums under £5. If tomorrow £4 notes, or £3 notes, or £2 notes were issued, the gold filling these channels of circulation would at once be driven out of them, and flow into those channels where it would be needed from the increase of money wages. Thus the additional million required by an advance of wages by 50 per cent. would be supplied without the addition of one single sovereign. The same effect might be produced, without one additional bank-note, by an additional bill circulation, as was the case in Lancashire for a very considerable time.

If a general rise in the rate of wages, for example, of 100 per cent., as Citizen Weston supposed it to take place in agricultural wages, would produce a great rise in the prices of necessaries, and, according to his views, require an additional amount of currency not to be procured, *a general fall in wages* must produce the same effect, on the same scale, in an opposite direction. Well! All of you know that the years 1858 to 1860 were the most prosperous years for the cotton industry, and that peculiarly the year 1860 stands in that respect unrivalled in the annals of commerce, while at the same time all other branches of industry were most flourishing. The wages of the cotton operatives and of all the other working men connected with their trade stood, in 1860, higher than ever before. The American crisis⁹⁷ came, and those aggregate wages were suddenly reduced to about one-fourth of their former amount. This would have been in the opposite direction a rise of 300 per cent. If wages rise from five to twenty, we say that they rise by 300 per cent.; if they fall from twenty to five, we say that they fall by 75 per cent., but the amount of rise in the one and the amount of fall in the other case would be the same, namely, fifteen shillings. This, then, was a sudden change in the rate of wages unprecedented, and at the same time extending over a number of operatives which, if we count all the operatives not only directly engaged in but indirectly dependent upon the cotton trade, was larger by one-half than the number of agricultural labourers. Did the price of wheat fall? It *rose* from the annual average of 47s. 8d. per quarter during the three years of 1858 to 1860 to the annual average of 55s. 10d. per quarter during the three years 1861-63. As to the currency, there were coined in the mint in 1861 £8,673,232, against £3,378,102 in 1860. That is to say, there were coined £5,295,130 more in 1861 than in 1860. It is true the bank-note circulation was in 1861 less by £1,319,000 than in 1860. Take this off. There remains still an overplus of currency

for the year 1861, as compared with the prosperity year, 1860, to the amount of £3,976,130, or about £4,000,000; but the bullion reserve in the Bank of England had simultaneously decreased, not quite to the same, but in an approximating proportion.

Compare the year 1862 with 1842. Apart from the immense increase in the value and amount of commodities circulated, in 1862 the capital paid in regular transactions for shares, loans, etc., for the railways in England and Wales amounted alone to £320,000,000, a sum that would have appeared fabulous in 1842. Still, the aggregate amounts in currency in 1862 and 1842 were pretty nearly equal, and generally you will find a tendency to a progressive diminution of currency in the face of an enormously increasing value, not only of commodities, but of monetary transactions generally. From our friend Weston's standpoint this is an unsolvable riddle.

Looking somewhat deeper into this matter, he would have found that, quite apart from wages, and supposing them to be fixed, the value and mass of the commodities to be circulated, and generally the amount of monetary transactions to be settled, vary daily; that the amount of bank-notes issued varies daily; that the amount of payments realised without the intervention of any money, by the instrumentality of bills, checks, bookcredits, clearing houses, varies daily; that, as far as actual metallic currency is required, the proportion between the coin in circulation and the coin and bullion in reserve or sleeping in the cellars of banks varies daily; that the amount of bullion absorbed by the national circulation and the amount being sent abroad for international circulation vary daily. He would have found that his dogma of a fixed currency is a monstrous error, incompatible with the everyday movement. He would have inquired into the laws which enable a currency to adapt itself to circumstances so continually changing, instead of turning his misconception of the laws of currency into an argument against a rise of wages.

4) [SUPPLY AND DEMAND]

Our friend Weston accepts the Latin proverb that *repetitio est mater studiorum*, that is to say, that repetition is the mother of study, and consequently he repeated his original dogma again under the new form that the contraction of currency, resulting from an enhancement of wages, would produce a diminution of capital, and so forth. Having already dealt with his currency

crotchet, I consider it quite useless to enter upon the imaginary consequences he fancies to flow from his imaginary currency mishap. I shall proceed to at once reduce his *one and the same dogma*, repeated in so many different shapes, to its simplest theoretical form.

The uncritical way in which he has treated his subject will become evident from one single remark. He pleads against a rise of wages or against high wages as the result of such a rise. Now, I ask him, What are high wages and what are low wages? Why constitute, for example, five shillings weekly low, and twenty shillings weekly high, wages? If five is low as compared with twenty, twenty is still lower as compared with two hundred. If a man was to lecture on the thermometer, and commenced by declaiming on high and low degrees, he would impart no knowledge whatever. He must first tell me how the freezing-point is found out, and how the boiling-point, and how these standard points are settled by natural laws, not by the fancy of the sellers or makers of thermometers. Now, in regard to wages and profits, Citizen Weston has not only failed to deduce such standard points from economical laws, but he has not even felt the necessity to look after them. He satisfied himself with the acceptance of the popular slang terms of low and high as something having a fixed meaning, although it is self-evident that wages can only be said to be high or low as compared with a standard by which to measure their magnitudes.

He will be unable to tell me why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour. If he should answer me, "This was settled by the law of supply and demand," I should ask him, in the first instance, by what law supply and demand are themselves regulated. And such an answer would at once put him out of court. The relations between the supply and demand of labour undergo perpetual change, and with them the market prices of labour. If the demand overshoots the supply wages rise; if the supply overshoots the demand wages sink, although it might in such circumstances be necessary to *test* the real state of demand and supply by a strike, for example, or any other method. But if you accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, it would be as childish as useless to declaim against a rise of wages, because, according to the supreme law you appeal to, a periodical rise of wages is quite as necessary and legitimate as a periodical fall of wages. If you do *not* accept supply and demand as the law regulating wages, I again repeat the question, why a certain amount of money is given for a certain amount of labour?

But to consider matters more broadly: You would be altogether mistaken in fancying that the value of labour or any other commodity whatever is ultimately fixed by supply and demand. Supply and demand regulate nothing but the temporary *fluctuations* of market prices. They will explain to you why the market price of a commodity rises above or sinks below its *value*, but they can never account for that *value* itself. Suppose supply and demand to equilibrate, or, as the economists call it, to cover each other. Why, the very moment these opposite forces become equal they paralyse each other, and cease to work in the one or the other direction. At the moment when supply and demand equilibrate each other, and therefore cease to act, the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *real value*, with the standard price round which its market prices oscillate. In inquiring into the nature of that *value*, we have, therefore, nothing at all to do with the temporary effects on market prices of supply and demand. The same holds true of wages and of the prices of all other commodities.

5) [WAGES AND PRICES]

Reduced to their simplest theoretical expression, all our friend's arguments resolve themselves into this one single dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*"

I might appeal to practical observation to bear witness against this antiquated and exploded fallacy. I might tell you that the English factory operatives, miners, shipbuilders, and so forth, whose labour is relatively high-priced, undersell, by the cheapness of their produce, all other nations; while the English agricultural labourer, for example, whose labour is relatively low-priced, is undersold by almost every other nation, because of the dearness of his produce. By comparing article with article in the same country, and the commodities of different countries, I might show, apart from some exceptions more apparent than real, that on an average the high-priced labour produces the low-priced, and the low-priced labour produces the high-priced commodities. This, of course, would not prove that the high price of labour in the one, and its low price in the other instance, are the respective causes of those diametrically opposed effects, but at all events it would prove that the prices of commodities are not ruled by the prices of labour. However, it is quite superfluous for us to employ this empirical method.

It might, perhaps, be denied that Citizen Weston has put forward the dogma: "*The prices of commodities are determined or regulated by wages.*" In point of fact, he has never formulated it. He said, on the contrary, that profit and rent form also constituent parts of the prices of commodities, because it is out of prices of commodities that not only the working man's wages, but also the capitalist's profits and the landlord's rents must be paid. But how, in his idea, are prices formed? First by wages. Then an additional percentage is joined to the price on behalf of the capitalist, and another additional percentage on behalf of the landlord. Suppose the wages of the labour employed in the production of a commodity to be ten. If the rate of profit was 100 per cent. to the wages advanced, the capitalist would add ten, and if the rate of rent was also 100 per cent. upon the wages, there would be added ten more, and the aggregate price of the commodity would amount to thirty. But such a determination of prices would be simply their determination by wages. If wages in the above case rose to twenty, the price of the commodity would rise to sixty, and so forth. Consequently all the superannuated writers on political economy, who propounded the dogma that wages regulate prices, have tried to prove it by treating profit and rent as mere *additional percentages upon wages*. None of them were, of course, able to reduce the limits of those percentages to any economic law. They seem, on the contrary, to think profits settled by tradition, custom, the will of the capitalist, or by some other equally arbitrary and inexplicable method. If they assert that they are settled by the competition between the capitalists, they say nothing. That competition is sure to equalise the different rates of profit in different trades, or reduce them to one average level, but it can never determine the level itself, or the general rate of profit.

What do we mean by saying that the prices of the commodities are determined by wages? Wages being but a name for the price of labour, we mean that the prices of commodities are regulated by the price of labour. As "*price*" is exchangeable value—and in speaking of value I speak always of exchangeable value—is exchangeable *value expressed in money*, the proposition comes to this, that "*the value of commodities is determined by the value of labour*", or that "*the value of labour is the general measure of value*".

But how, then, is the "*value of labour*" itself determined? Here we come to a standstill. Of course, to a standstill if we try reasoning logically. Yet the propounders of that doctrine make short work of logical scruples. Take our friend Weston, for example. First he told us that wages regulate the price of

commodities and that consequently when wages rise prices must rise. Then he turned round to show us that a rise of wages will be no good because the prices of commodities had risen, and because wages were indeed measured by the prices of the commodities upon which they are spent. Thus we begin by saying that the value of labour determines the value of commodities, and we wind up by saying that the value of commodities determines the value of labour. Thus we move to and fro in the most vicious circle, and arrive at no conclusion at all.

On the whole it is evident that by making the value of one commodity, say labour, corn, or any other commodity, the general measure and regulator of value, we only shift the difficulty, since we determine one value by another, which on its side wants to be determined.

The dogma that “wages determine the prices of commodities”, expressed in its most abstract terms, comes to this, that “value is determined by value”, and this tautology means that, in fact, we know nothing at all about value. Accepting this premise, all reasoning about the general laws of political economy turns into mere twaddle. It was, therefore, the great merit of Ricardo that in his work *On the Principles of Political Economy*, published in 1817, he fundamentally destroyed the old, popular, and worn-out fallacy that “wages determine prices”, a fallacy which Adam Smith and his French predecessors had spurned in the really scientific parts of their researches, but which they reproduced in their more exoterical and vulgarising chapters.

6) [VALUE AND LABOUR]

Citizens, I have now arrived at a point where I must enter upon the real development of the question. I cannot promise to do this in a very satisfactory way, because to do so I should be obliged to go over the whole field of political economy. I can, as the French would say, but *effleurer la question*, touch upon the main points.

The first question we have to put is: What is the *value* of a commodity? How is it determined?

At first sight it would seem that the value of a commodity is a thing quite *relative*, and not to be settled without considering one commodity in its relations to all other commodities. In fact, in speaking of the value, the value in exchange of a commodity, we mean the proportional quantities in which it exchanges with all other commodities. But then arises the question: How are the

proportions in which commodities exchange with each other regulated?

We know from experience that these proportions vary infinitely. Taking one single commodity, wheat, for instance, we shall find that a quarter of wheat exchanges in almost countless variations of proportion with different commodities. Yet, *its value remaining always the same*, whether expressed in silk, gold, or any other commodity, it must be something distinct from, and independent of, these *different rates of exchange* with different articles. It must be possible to express, in a very different form, these various equations with various commodities.

Besides, if I say a quarter of wheat exchanges with iron in a certain proportion, or the value of a quarter of wheat is expressed in a certain amount of iron, I say that the value of wheat and its equivalent in iron are equal *to some third thing*, which is neither wheat nor iron, because I suppose them to express the same magnitude in two different shapes. Either of them, the wheat or the iron, must, therefore, independently of the other, be reducible to this third thing which is their common measure.

To elucidate this point I shall recur to a very simple geometrical illustration. In comparing the areas of triangles of all possible forms and magnitudes, or comparing triangles with rectangles, or any other rectilinear figure, how do we proceed? We reduce the area of any triangle whatever to an expression quite different from its visible form. Having found from the nature of the triangle that its area is equal to half the product of its base by its height, we can then compare the different values of all sorts of triangles, and of all rectilinear figures whatever, because all of them may be dissolved into a certain number of triangles.

The same mode of procedure must obtain with the values of commodities. We must be able to reduce all of them to an expression common to all, distinguishing them only by the proportions in which they contain that identical measure.

As the *exchangeable values* of commodities are only *social functions* of those things, and have nothing at all to do with their *natural* qualities, we must first ask, What is the common *social substance* of all commodities? It is *Labour*. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, or worked up in it. And I say not only *Labour*, but *social Labour*. A man who produces an article for his own immediate use, to consume it himself, creates a *product*, but not a *commodity*. As a self-sustaining producer he has nothing to do with society. But to produce a *commodity*, a man must not only produce an article satisfying some

social want, but his labour itself must form part and parcel of the total sum of labour expended by society. It must be subordinate to the *Division of Labour within Society*. It is nothing without the other divisions of labour, and on its part is required to *integrate* them.

If we consider *commodities as values*, we consider them exclusively under the single aspect of *realised, fixed*, or, if you like, *crystallised social labour*. In this respect they can *differ* only by representing greater or smaller quantities of labour, as, for example, a greater amount of labour may be worked up in a silken handkerchief than in a brick. But how does one measure *quantities of labour*? By the *time the labour lasts*, in measuring the labour by the hour, the day, etc. Of course, to apply this measure, all sorts of labour are reduced to average or simple labour as their unit.

We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion. A commodity has a *value*, because it is a *crystallisation of social labour*. The *greatness* of its value, or its *relative value*, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labour necessary for its production. The *relative values of commodities* are, therefore, determined by the *respective quantities or amounts of labour, worked up, realised, fixed in them*. The *correlative quantities* of commodities which can be produced in the *same time of labour* are *equal*. Or the value of one commodity is to the value of another commodity as the quantity of labour fixed in the one is to the quantity of labour fixed in the other.

I suspect that many of you will ask, Does then, indeed, there exist such a vast, or any difference whatever, between determining the values of commodities by *wages*, and determining them by the *relative quantities of labour* necessary for their production? You must, however, be aware that the *reward* for labour, and *quantity* of labour, are quite disparate things. Suppose, for example, *equal quantities of labour* to be fixed in one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold. I resort to the example because it was used by *Benjamin Franklin* in his first Essay published in 1729, and entitled, *A Modest Inquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency*, where he, one of the first, hit upon the true nature of value. Well. We suppose, then, that one quarter of wheat and one ounce of gold are *equal values* or *equivalents*, because they are *crystallisations of equal amounts of average labour*, of so many days' or so many weeks' labour respectively fixed in them. In thus determining the relative values of gold and corn, do we refer in any way whatever to the *wages* of the agricultural labourer and the miner? Not a bit. We leave it quite *indeterminate how* their day's or

week's labour was paid, or even whether wages labour was employed at all. If it was, wages may have been very unequal. The labourer whose labour is realised in the quarter of wheat may receive two bushels only, and the labourer employed in mining may receive one-half of the ounce of gold. Or, supposing their wages to be equal, they may deviate in all possible proportions from the values of the commodities produced by them. They may amount to one-half, one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, or any other proportional part of the one quarter of corn or the one ounce of gold. Their *wages* can, of course, not *exceed*, not be *more* than the values of the commodities they produced, but they can be *less* in every possible degree. Their *wages* will be *limited* by the *values* of the products, but the *values of their products* will not be limited by the wages. And above all, the values, the relative values of corn and gold, for example, will have been settled without any regard whatever to the value of the labour employed, that is to say, to *wages*. To determine the values of commodities by the *relative quantities of labour fixed in them*, is, therefore, a thing quite different from the tautological method of determining the values of commodities by the value of labour, or by *wages*. This point, however, will be further elucidated in the progress of our inquiry.

In calculating the exchangeable value of a commodity we must add to the quantity of labour *last* employed the quantity of labour *previously* worked up in the raw material of the commodity, and the labour bestowed on the implements, tools, machinery, and buildings, with which such labour is assisted. For example, the value of a certain amount of cotton-yarn is the crystallisation of the quantity of labour added to the cotton during the spinning process, the quantity of labour previously realised in the cotton itself, the quantity of labour realised in the coal, oil and other auxiliary substances used, the quantity of labour fixed in the steam engine, the spindles, the factory building, and so forth. Instruments of production properly so-called, such as tools, machinery, buildings, serve again and again for a longer or shorter period during repeated processes of production. If they were used up at once, like the raw material, their whole value would at once be transferred to the commodities they assist in producing. But as a spindle, for example, is but gradually used up, an average calculation is made, based upon the average time it lasts, and its average waste or wear and tear during a certain period, say a day. In this way we calculate how much of the value of the spindle is transferred to the yarn daily spun, and how much, therefore, of the total amount of labour realised in a pound of yarn, for

example, is due to the quantity of labour previously realised in the spindle. For our present purpose it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon this point.

It might seem that if the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour bestowed upon its production*, the lazier a man, or the clumsier a man, the more valuable his commodity, because the greater the time of labour required for finishing the commodity. This, however, would be a sad mistake. You will recollect that I used the word "*Social labour*", and many points are involved in this qualification of "*Social*". In saying that the value of a commodity is determined by the *quantity of labour* worked up or crystallised in it, we mean *the quantity of labour necessary* for its production in a given state of society, under certain social average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labour employed. When, in England, the power-loom came to compete with the hand-loom, only one half of the former time of labour was wanted to convert a given amount of yarn into a yard of cotton or cloth. The poor hand-loom weaver now worked seventeen or eighteen hours daily, instead of the nine or ten hours he had worked before. Still the product of twenty hours of his labour represented now only ten social hours of labour, or ten hours of labour socially necessary for the conversion of a certain amount of yarn into textile stuffs. His product of twenty hours had, therefore, no more value than his former product of ten hours.

If then the quantity of socially necessary labour realised in commodities regulates their exchangeable values, every increase in the quantity of labour wanted for the production of a commodity must augment its value, as every diminution must lower it.

If the respective quantities of labour necessary for the production of the respective commodities remained constant, their relative values also would be constant. But such is not the case. The quantity of labour necessary for the production of a commodity changes continuously with the changes in the productive powers of the labour employed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the more produce is finished in a given time of labour, and the smaller the productive powers of labour, the less produce is finished in the same time. If, for example, in the progress of population it should become necessary to cultivate less fertile soils, the same amount of produce would be only attainable by a greater amount of labour spent, and the value of agricultural produce would consequently rise. On the other hand, if with the modern means of production, a single spinner converts into yarn,

during one working day, many thousand times the amount of cotton which he could have spun during the same time with the spinning wheel, it is evident that every single pound of cotton will absorb many thousand times less of spinning labour than it did before, and, consequently, the value added by spinning to every single pound of cotton will be a thousand times less than before. The value of yarn will sink accordingly.

Apart from the different natural energies and acquired working abilities of different peoples, the productive powers of labour must principally depend:

Firstly. Upon the *natural* conditions of labour, such as fertility of soil, mines, and so forth;

Secondly. Upon the progressive improvement of the *Social Powers of Labour*, such as are derived from production on a grand scale, concentration of capital and combination of labour, subdivision of labour, machinery, improved methods, appliance of chemical and other natural agencies, shortening of time and space by means of communication and transport, and every other contrivance by which science presses natural agencies into the service of labour, and by which the social or co-operative character of labour is developed. The greater the productive powers of labour, the less labour is bestowed upon a given amount of produce; hence the smaller the value of this produce. The smaller the productive powers of labour, the more labour is bestowed upon the same amount of produce; hence the greater its value. As a general law we may, therefore, set it down that:—

The values of commodities are directly as the times of labour employed in their production, and are inversely as the productive powers of the labour employed.

Having till now only spoken of *Value*, I shall add a few words about *Price*, which is a peculiar form assumed by value.

Price, taken by itself, is nothing but the *monetary expression of value*. The values of all commodities of this country, for example, are expressed in gold prices, while on the Continent they are mainly expressed in silver prices. The value of gold or silver, like that of all other commodities, is regulated by the quantity of labour necessary for getting them. You exchange a certain amount of your national products, in which a certain amount of your national labour is crystallised, for the produce of the gold and silver producing countries, in which a certain quantity of *their* labour is crystallised. It is in this way, in fact by barter, that you learn to express in gold and silver the values of all commodities, that is, the respective quantities of labour bestowed upon them.

Looking somewhat closer into the *monetary expression of value*, or what comes to the same, the *conversion of value into price*, you will find that it is a process by which you give to the *values* of all commodities an *independent and homogeneous form*, or by which you express them as quantities of *equal social labour*. So far as it is but the monetary expression of value, price has been called *natural price* by Adam Smith, "*prix nécessaire*" by the French physiocrats.

What then is the relation between *value* and *market prices*, or between *natural prices* and *market prices*? You all know that the *market price* is the *same* for all commodities of the same kind, however the conditions of production may differ for the individual producers. The market price expresses only the *average amount of social labour* necessary, under the average conditions of production, to supply the market with a certain mass of a certain article. It is calculated upon the whole lot of a commodity of a certain description.

So far the *market price* of a commodity coincides with its *value*. On the other hand, the oscillations of market prices, rising now over, sinking now under the value or natural price, depend upon the fluctuations of supply and demand. The deviations of market prices from values are continual, but as *Adam Smith* says:

"The natural price ... is [...] the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it."^a

I cannot now sift this matter. It suffices to say that *if* supply and demand equilibrate each other, the market prices of commodities will correspond to their natural prices, that is to say, to their values, as determined by the respective quantities of labour required for their production. But supply and demand *must* constantly tend to equilibrate each other, although they do so only by compensating one fluctuation by another, a rise by a fall, and vice versa. If instead of considering only the daily fluctuations you analyse the movement of market prices for longer periods, as Mr. Tooke, for example, has done in his *History of Prices*, you will find that the fluctuations of market prices, their deviations from values, their ups and downs, paralyse and compensate each other; so that,

^a A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Vol. I, Edinburgh, 1814, p. 93.—Ed.

apart from the effect of monopolies and some other modifications I must now pass by, all descriptions of commodities are, on the average, sold at their respective *values* or natural prices. The average periods during which the fluctuations of market prices compensate each other are different for different kinds of commodities, because with one kind it is easier to adapt supply to demand than with the other.

If then, speaking broadly, and embracing somewhat longer periods, all descriptions of commodities sell at their respective values, it is nonsense to suppose that profit, not in individual cases, but that the constant and usual profits of different trades, spring from *surcharging* the prices of commodities, or selling them at a price over and above their *value*. The absurdity of this notion becomes evident if it is generalised. What a man would constantly win as a seller he would as constantly lose as a purchaser. It would not do to say that there are men who are buyers without being sellers, or consumers without being producers. What these people pay to the producers, they must first get from them for nothing. If a man first takes your money and afterwards returns that money in buying your commodities, you will never enrich yourselves by selling your commodities too dear to that same man. This sort of transaction might diminish a loss, but would never help in realising a profit.

To explain, therefore, the *general nature of profits*, you must start from the theorem that, on an average, commodities are *sold at their real value*, and that *profits are derived from selling them at their values*, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labour realised in them. If you cannot explain profit upon this supposition, you cannot explain it at all. This seems paradox and contrary to everyday observation. It is also paradox that the earth moves round the sun, and that water consists of two highly inflammable gases. Scientific truth is always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which catches only the delusive appearance of things.

7) LABOURING POWER

Having now, as far as it could be done in such a cursory manner, analysed the nature of *Value*, of the *Value of any commodity whatever*, we must turn our attention to the specific *Value of Labour*. And here, again, I must startle you by a seeming paradox. All of you feel sure that what they daily sell is their Labour; that, therefore, Labour has a Price, and that, the price of

a commodity being only the monetary expression of its value, there must certainly exist such a thing as the *Value of Labour*. However, there exists no such thing as the *Value of Labour* in the common acceptance of the word. We have seen that the amount of necessary labour crystallised in a commodity constitutes its value. Now, applying this notion of value, how could we define, say, the value of a ten hours' working day? How much labour is contained in that day? Ten hours' labour. To say that the value of a ten hours' working day is equal to ten hours' labour, or the quantity of labour contained in it, would be a tautological and, moreover, a nonsensical expression. Of course, having once found out the true but hidden sense of the expression "*Value of Labour*", we shall be able to interpret this irrational, and seemingly impossible application of value, in the same way that, having once made sure of the real movement of the celestial bodies, we shall be able to explain their apparent or merely phenomenal movements.

What the working man sells is not directly his *Labour*, but his *Labouring Power*, the temporary disposal of which he makes over to the capitalist. This is so much the case that I do not know whether by the English Laws, but certainly by some Continental Laws, the *maximum time* is fixed for which a man is allowed to sell his labouring power. If allowed to do so for any indefinite period whatever, slavery would be immediately restored. Such a sale, if it comprised his lifetime, for example, would make him at once the lifelong slave of his employer.

One of the oldest economists and most original philosophers of England—Thomas Hobbes—has already, in his *Leviathan*, instinctively hit upon this point overlooked by all his successors. He says:

"The value or worth of a man is, as in all other things, his *price*: that is, so much as would be given for the *Use of his Power*."^a

Proceeding from this basis, we shall be able to determine the *Value of Labour* as that of all other commodities.

But before doing so, we might ask, how does this strange phenomenon arise, that we find on the market a set of buyers, possessed of land, machinery, raw material, and the means of subsistence, all of them, save land in its crude state, the *products of labour*, and on the other hand, a set of sellers who have nothing to sell except their labouring power, their working arms and brains? That the one set buys continually in order to make a profit and enrich themselves, while the other set continually sells in order to earn their livelihood? The inquiry into this question would be an

^a *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, Vol. III, London, 1839, p. 76.—Ed.

inquiry into what the economists call "*Previous, or Original Accumulation*", but which ought to be called *Original Expropriation*. We should find that this so-called *Original Accumulation* means nothing but a series of historical processes, resulting in a *Decomposition of the Original Union* existing between the Labouring Man and his Instruments of Labour. Such an inquiry, however, lies beyond the pale of my present subject. The *Separation* between the Man of Labour and the Instruments of Labour once established, such a state of things will maintain itself and reproduce itself upon a constantly increasing scale, until a new and fundamental revolution in the mode of production should again overturn it, and restore the original union in a new historical form.

What, then, is the *Value of Labouring Power*?

Like that of every other commodity, its value is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to produce it. The labouring power of a man exists only in his living individuality. A certain mass of necessaries must be consumed by a man to grow up and maintain his life. But the man, like the machine, will wear out, and must be replaced by another man. Beside the mass of necessaries required for *his own* maintenance, he wants another amount of necessaries to bring up a certain quota of children that are to replace him on the labour market and to perpetuate the race of labourers. Moreover, to develop his labouring power, and acquire a given skill, another amount of values must be spent. For our purpose it suffices to consider only *average* labour, the costs of whose education and development are vanishing magnitudes. Still I must seize upon this occasion to state that, as the costs of producing labouring powers of different quality differ, so must differ the values of the labouring powers employed in different trades. The cry for an *equality of wages* rests, therefore, upon a mistake, is an *insane* wish never to be fulfilled. It is an offspring of that false and superficial radicalism that accepts premises and tries to evade conclusions. Upon the basis of the wages system the value of labouring power is settled like that of every other commodity; and as different kinds of labouring power have different values, or require different quantities of labour for their production, they *must* fetch different prices in the labour market. To clamour for *equal or even equitable retribution* on the basis of the wages system is the same as to clamour for *freedom* on the basis of the slavery system. What you think just or equitable is out of the question. The question is: What is necessary and unavoidable with a given system of production?

After what has been said, it will be seen that the *value of labouring power* is determined by the *value of the necessaries* required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the labouring power.

8) PRODUCTION OF SURPLUS-VALUE

Now suppose that the average amount of the daily necessaries of a labouring man require *six hours of average labour* for their production. Suppose, moreover, six hours of average labour to be also realised in a quantity of gold equal to 3s. Then 3s. would be the *Price*, or the monetary expression of the *Daily Value* of that man's *Labouring Power*. If he worked daily six hours he would daily produce a value sufficient to buy the average amount of his daily necessaries, or to maintain himself as a labouring man.

But our man is a wages labourer. He must, therefore, sell his labouring power to a capitalist. If he sells it at 3s. daily, or 18s. weekly, he sells it at its value. Suppose him to be a spinner. If he works six hours daily he will add to the cotton a value of 3s. daily. This value, daily added by him, would be an exact equivalent for the wages, or the price of his labouring power, received daily. But in that case *no surplus-value* or *surplus-produce* whatever would go to the capitalist. Here, then, we come to the rub.

In buying the labouring power of the workman, and paying its value, the capitalist, like every other purchaser, has acquired the right to consume or use the commodity bought. You consume or use the labouring power of a man by making him work as you consume or use a machine by making it run. By paying the daily or weekly value of the labouring power of the workman, the capitalist has, therefore, acquired the right to use or make that labouring power work during the *whole day or week*. The working day or the working week has, of course, certain limits, but those we shall afterwards look more closely at.

For the present I want to turn your attention to one decisive point.

The *value* of the labouring power is determined by the quantity of labour necessary to maintain or reproduce it, but the *use* of that labouring power is only limited by the active energies and physical strength of the labourer. The daily or weekly *value* of the labouring power is quite distinct from the daily or weekly *exercise* of that power, the same as the food a horse wants and the time it can carry the horseman are quite distinct. The quantity of labour

by which the *value* of the workman's labouring power is limited forms by no means a limit to the quantity of labour which his labouring power is apt to perform. Take the example of our spinner. We have seen that, to daily reproduce his labouring power, he must daily reproduce a value of three shillings, which he will do by working six hours daily. But this does not disable him from working ten or twelve or more hours a day. But by paying the daily or weekly *value* of the spinner's labouring power, the capitalist has acquired the right of using that labouring power during the *whole day or week*. He will, therefore, make him work daily, say, *twelve* hours. *Over and above* the six hours required to replace his wages, or the value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work *six other hours*, which I shall call hours of *surplus-labour*, which surplus labour will realise itself in a *surplus-value* and a *surplus-produce*. If our spinner, for example, by his daily labour of six hours, added three shillings' value to the cotton, a value forming an exact equivalent to his wages, he will, in twelve hours, add six shillings' worth to the cotton, and produce a *proportional surplus of yarn*. As he has sold his labouring power to the capitalist, the whole value or produce created by him belongs to the capitalist, the owner *pro tempore* of his labouring power. By advancing three shillings, the capitalist will, therefore, realise a value of six shillings, because, advancing a value in which six hours of labour are crystallised, he will receive in return a value in which twelve hours of labour are crystallised. By repeating this same process daily, the capitalist will daily advance three shillings and daily pocket six shillings, one-half of which will go to pay wages anew, and the other half of which will form *surplus-value*, for which the capitalist pays no equivalent. It is *this sort of exchange between capital and labour* upon which capitalistic production, or the wages system, is founded, and which must constantly result in reproducing the working man as a working man, and the capitalist as a capitalist.

The rate of surplus-value, all other circumstances remaining the same, will depend on the proportion between that part of the working day necessary to reproduce the value of the labouring power and the *surplus-time* or *surplus-labour* performed for the capitalist. It will, therefore, depend on the *ratio in which the working day is prolonged over and above that extent*, by working which the working man would only reproduce the value of his labouring power, or replace his wages.

9) VALUE OF LABOUR

We must now return to the expression, "*Value, or Price of Labour*".

We have seen that, in fact, it is only the value of the labouring power, measured by the values of commodities necessary for its maintenance. But since the workman receives his wages *after* his labour is performed, and knows, moreover, that what he actually gives to the capitalist is his labour, the value or price of his labouring power necessarily appears to him as the *price or value of his labour itself*. If the price of his labouring power is three shillings, in which six hours of labour are realised, and if he works twelve hours, he necessarily considers these three shillings as the value or price of twelve hours of labour, although these twelve hours of labour realise themselves in a value of six shillings. A double consequence flows from this.

Firstly. The value or price of the labouring power takes the semblance of the *price or value of labour itself*, although, strictly speaking, value and price of labour are senseless terms.

Secondly. Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is *paid*, while the other part is *unpaid*, and while that unpaid or surplus-labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which *surplus-value* or *profit* is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour.

This false appearance distinguishes *wages labour* from other *historical* forms of labour. On the basis of the wages system even the *unpaid* labour seems to be *paid* labour. With the *slave*, on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is paid appears to be unpaid. Of course, in order to work the slave must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the value of his own maintenance. But since no bargain is struck between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to be given away for nothing.

Take, on the other hand, the peasant serf, such as he, I might say, until yesterday existed in the whole East of Europe. This peasant worked, for example, three days for himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratuitous labour on the estate of his lord. Here, then, the paid and unpaid parts of labour were visibly separated, separated in time and space; and our Liberals overflowed with moral indignation at the preposterous notion of making a man work for nothing.

In point of fact, however, whether a man works three days of

the week for himself on his own field and three days for nothing on the estate of his lord, or whether he works in the factory or the workshop six hours daily for himself and six for his employer, comes to the same, although in the latter case the paid and unpaid portions of labour are inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by the *intervention of a contract* and the *pay* received at the end of the week. The gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one instance, and to be compulsory in the other. That makes all the difference.

In using the expression "*value of labour*", I shall only use it as a popular slang term for "*value of labouring power*".

10) PROFIT IS MADE BY SELLING A COMMODITY AT ITS VALUE

Suppose an average hour of labour to be realised in a value equal to sixpence, or twelve average hours of labour to be realised in six shillings. Suppose, further, the value of labour to be three shillings or the produce of six hours' labour. If, then, in the raw material, machinery, and so forth, used up in a commodity, twenty-four hours of average labour were realised, its value would amount to twelve shillings. If, moreover, the workman employed by the capitalist added twelve hours of labour to those means of production, these twelve hours would be realised in an additional value of six shillings. The *total value of the product* would, therefore, amount to thirty-six hours of realised labour, and be equal to eighteen shillings. But as the value of labour, or the wages paid to the workman, would be three shillings only, no equivalent would have been paid by the capitalist for the six hours of surplus-labour worked by the workman, and realised in the value of the commodity. By selling this commodity at its value for eighteen shillings, the capitalist would, therefore, realise a value of three shillings, for which he had paid no equivalent. These three shillings would constitute the surplus-value or profit pocketed by him. The capitalist would consequently realise the profit of three shillings, not by selling his commodity at a price *over and above* its value, but by selling it *at its real value*.

The value of a commodity is determined by the *total quantity of labour* contained in it. But part of that quantity of labour is realised in a value for which an equivalent has been paid in the form of wages; part of it is realised in a value for which *no*

equivalent has been paid. Part of the labour contained in the commodity is *paid* labour; part is *unpaid* labour. By selling, therefore, the commodity *at its value*, that is, as the crystallisation of the *total quantity of labour* bestowed upon it, the capitalist must necessarily sell it at a profit. He sells not only what has cost him an equivalent, but he sells also what has cost him nothing, although it has cost his workman labour. The cost of the commodity to the capitalist and its real cost are different things. I repeat, therefore, that normal and average profits are made by selling commodities not *above* but *at their real values*.

11) THE DIFFERENT PARTS INTO WHICH SURPLUS-VALUE IS DECOMPOSED

The *surplus-value*, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the *surplus-labour* or *unpaid labour* of the working man is realised, I call *Profit*. The whole of that profit is not pocketed by the employing capitalist. The monopoly of land enables the landlord to take one part of that *surplus-value*, under the name of *rent*, whether the land is used for agriculture, buildings or railways, or for any other productive purpose. On the other hand, the very fact that the possession of the *means of labour* enables the employing capitalist to produce a *surplus-value*, or, what comes to the same, to *appropriate to himself a certain amount of unpaid labour*, enables the owner of the means of labour, which he lends wholly or partly to the employing capitalist—enables, in one word, the *money-lending capitalist* to claim for himself under the name of *interest* another part of that surplus-value, so that there remains to the employing capitalist *as such* only what is called *industrial* or *commercial* profit.

By what laws this division of the total amount of surplus-value amongst the three categories of people is regulated is a question quite foreign to our subject. This much, however, results from what has been stated.

Rent, Interest, and Industrial Profit are only *different names for different parts* of the *surplus-value* of the commodity, or the *unpaid labour enclosed in it*, and they are *equally derived from this source, and from this source alone*. They are not derived from *land* as such or from *capital* as such, but land and capital enable their owners to get their respective shares out of the surplus-value extracted by the employing capitalist from the labourer. For the labourer himself it is a matter of subordinate importance whether that

surplus-value, the result of his surplus-labour, or unpaid labour, is altogether pocketed by the employing capitalist, or whether the latter is obliged to pay portions of it, under the name of rent and interest, away to third parties. Suppose the employing capitalist to use only his own capital and to be his own landlord, then the whole surplus-value would go into his pocket.

It is the employing capitalist who immediately extracts from the labourer this surplus-value, whatever part of it he may ultimately be able to keep for himself. Upon this relation, therefore, between the employing capitalist and the wages labourer the whole wages system and the whole present system of production hinge. Some of the citizens who took part in our debate were, therefore, wrong in trying to mince matters, and to treat this fundamental relation between the employing capitalist and the working man as a secondary question, although they were right in stating that, under given circumstances, a rise of prices might affect in very unequal degrees the employing capitalist, the landlord, the moneyed capitalist, and, if you please, the tax-gatherer.

Another consequence follows from what has been stated.

That part of the value of the commodity which represents only the value of the raw materials, the machinery, in one word, the value of the means of production used up, forms *no revenue* at all, but replaces *only capital*. But, apart from this, it is false that the other part of the value of the commodity *which forms revenue*, or may be spent in the form of wages, profits, rent, interest, is *constituted* by the value of wages, the value of rent, the value of profits, and so forth. We shall, in the first instance, discard wages, and only treat industrial profits, interest, and rent. We have just seen that the *surplus-value* contained in the commodity or that part of its value in which *unpaid labour* is realised, *dissolves* itself into different fractions, bearing three different names. But it would be quite the reverse of the truth to say that its value is *composed of*, or *formed by*, the *addition of the independent values of these three constituents*.

If one hour of labour realises itself in a value of sixpence, if the working day of the labourer comprises twelve hours, if half of this time is unpaid labour, that surplus-labour will add to the commodity a *surplus-value* of three shillings, that is, a value for which no equivalent has been paid. This surplus-value of three shillings constitutes the *whole fund* which the employing capitalist may divide, in whatever proportions, with the landlord and the money-lender. The value of these three shillings constitutes the limit of the value they have to divide amongst them. But it is not

the employing capitalist who adds to the value of the commodity an arbitrary value for his profit, to which another value is added for the landlord and so forth, so that the addition of these arbitrarily fixed values would constitute the total value. You see, therefore, the fallacy of the popular notion, which confounds the *decomposition of a given value* into three parts, with the *formation of that value* by the addition of three *independent* values, thus converting the aggregate value, from which rent, profit, and interest are derived, into an arbitrary magnitude.

If the total profit realised by a capitalist be equal to £100, we call this sum, considered as *absolute* magnitude, the *amount of profit*. But if we calculate the ratio which those £100 bear to the capital advanced, we call this *relative* magnitude, the *rate of profit*. It is evident that this rate of profit may be expressed in a double way.

Suppose £100 to be the capital *advanced in wages*. If the surplus value created is also £100—and this would show us that half the working day of the labourer consists of *unpaid* labour—and if we measured this profit by the value of the capital advanced in wages, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted to one hundred per cent., because the value advanced would be one hundred and the value realised would be two hundred.

If, on the other hand, we should not only consider the *capital advanced in wages*, but the *total capital* advanced, say for example £500, of which £400 represented the value of raw materials, machinery, and so forth, we should say that the *rate of profit* amounted only to twenty per cent., because the profit of one hundred would be but the fifth part of the *total capital* advanced.

The first mode of expressing the rate of profit is the only one which shows you the real ratio between paid and unpaid labour, the real degree of the *exploitation* (you must allow me this French word) *of labour*. The other mode of expression is that in common use, and is, indeed, appropriate for certain purposes. At all events, it is very useful for concealing the degree in which the capitalist extracts gratuitous labour from the workman.

In the remarks I have still to make I shall use the word *Profit* for the whole amount of the surplus-value extracted by the capitalist without any regard to the division of the surplus-value between different parties, and in using the words *Rate of Profit*, I shall always measure profits by the value of the capital advanced in wages.

12) GENERAL RELATION OF PROFITS,
WAGES AND PRICES

Deduct from the value of a commodity the value replacing the value of the raw materials and other means of production used upon it, that is to say, deduct the value representing the *past* labour contained in it, and the remainder of its value will dissolve into the quantity of labour added by the working man *last* employed. If that working man works twelve hours daily, if twelve hours of average labour crystallise themselves in an amount of gold equal to six shillings, this additional value of six shillings is the *only* value his labour will have created. This given value, determined by the time of his labour, is the only fund from which both he and the capitalist have to draw their respective shares or dividends, the only value to be divided into wages and profits. It is evident that this value itself will not be altered by the variable proportions in which it may be divided amongst the two parties. There will also be nothing changed if in the place of one working man you put the whole working population, twelve million working days, for example, instead of one.

Since the capitalist and workman have only to divide this limited value, that is, the value measured by the total labour of the working man, the more the one gets the less will the other get, and vice versa. Whenever a quantity is given, one part of it will increase inversely as the other decreases. If the wages change, profits will change in an opposite direction. If wages fall, profits will rise; and if wages rise, profits will fall. If the working man, on our former supposition, gets three shillings, equal to one half of the value he has created, or if his whole working day consists half of paid, half of unpaid labour, the *rate of profit* will be 100 per cent., because the capitalist would also get three shillings. If the working man receives only two shillings, or works only one-third of the whole day for himself, the capitalist will get four shillings, and the rate of profit will be 200 per cent. If the working man receives four shillings, the capitalist will only receive two, and the rate of profit would sink to 50 per cent., but all these variations will not affect the value of the commodity. A general rise of wages would, therefore, result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but not affect values.

But although the values of commodities, which must ultimately regulate their market prices, are exclusively determined by the total quantities of labour fixed in them, and not by the division of that quantity into paid and unpaid labour, it by no means follows

that the values of the single commodities, or lots of commodities, produced during twelve hours, for example, will remain constant. The *number* or mass of commodities produced in a given time of labour, or by a given quantity of labour, depends upon the *productive power* of the labour employed, and not upon its *extent* or length. With one degree of the productive power of spinning labour, for example, a working day of twelve hours may produce twelve pounds of yarn, with a lesser degree of productive power only two pounds. If then twelve hours' average labour were realised in the value of six shillings, in the one case the twelve pounds of yarn would cost six shillings, in the other case the two pounds of yarn would also cost six shillings. One pound of yarn would, therefore, cost sixpence in the one case, and three shillings in the other. This difference of price would result from the difference in the productive powers of the labour employed. One hour of labour would be realised in one pound of yarn with the greater productive power, while with the smaller productive power, six hours of labour would be realised in one pound of yarn. The price of a pound of yarn would, in the one instance, be only sixpence, although wages were relatively high and the rate of profit low; it would be three shillings in the other instance, although wages were low and the rate of profit high. This would be so because the price of the pound of yarn is regulated by the *total amount of labour worked up* in it, and not by the *proportional division of that total amount into paid and unpaid labour*. The fact I have before mentioned that high-priced labour may produce cheap, and low-priced labour may produce dear commodities, loses, therefore, its paradoxical appearance. It is only the expression of the general law that the value of a commodity is regulated by the quantity of labour worked up in it, and that the quantity of labour worked up in it depends altogether upon the productive powers of the labour employed, and will, therefore, vary with every variation in the productivity of labour.

13) MAIN CASES OF ATTEMPTS AT RAISING WAGES OR RESISTING THEIR FALL

Let us now seriously consider the main cases in which a rise of wages is attempted or a reduction of wages resisted.

1. We have seen that the *value of the labouring power*, or in more popular parlance, the *value of labour*, is determined by the value of

necessaries, or the quantity of labour required to produce them. If, then, in a given country the value of the daily average necessaries of the labourer represented six hours of labour expressed in three shillings, the labourer would have to work six hours daily to produce an equivalent for his daily maintenance. If the whole working day was twelve hours, the capitalist would pay him the value of his labour by paying him three shillings. Half the working day would be unpaid labour, and the rate of profit would amount to 100 per cent. But now suppose that, consequent upon a decrease of productivity, more labour should be wanted to produce, say, the same amount of agricultural produce, so that the price of the average daily necessaries should rise from three to four shillings. In that case the *value* of labour would rise by one-third, or $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. Eight hours of the working day would be required to produce an equivalent for the daily maintenance of the labourer, according to his old standard of living. The surplus-labour would therefore sink from six hours to four, and the rate of profit from 100 to 50 per cent. But in insisting upon a rise of wages, the labourer would only insist upon getting the *increased value of his labour*, like every other seller of a commodity, who, the costs of his commodities having increased, tries to get its increased value paid. If wages did not rise, or not sufficiently rise, to compensate for the increased values of necessaries, the *price* of labour would sink *below the value of labour*, and the labourer's standard of life would deteriorate.

But a change might also take place in an opposite direction. By virtue of the increased productivity of labour, the same amount of the average daily necessaries might sink from three to two shillings, or only four hours out of the working day, instead of six, be wanted to reproduce an equivalent for the value of the daily necessaries. The working man would now be able to buy with two shillings as many necessaries as he did before with three shillings. Indeed, the *value of labour* would have sunk, but that diminished value would command the same amount of commodities as before. Then profits would rise from three to four shillings, and, the rate of profit from 100 to 200 per cent. Although the labourer's absolute standard of life would have remained the same, his *relative wages*, and therewith his *relative social position*, as compared with that of the capitalist, would have been lowered. If the working man should resist that reduction of relative wages, he would only try to get some share in the increased productive powers of his own labour, and to maintain his former relative position in the social scale. Thus, after the abolition of the Corn

Laws, and in flagrant violation of the most solemn pledges given during the anti-corn law agitation, the English factory lords generally reduced wages ten per cent. The resistance of the workmen was at first baffled, but, consequent upon circumstances I cannot now enter upon, the ten per cent. lost were afterwards regained.

2. The *values* of necessaries, and consequently the *value of labour*, might remain the same, but a change might occur in their *money prices*, consequent upon a previous *change* in the *value of money*.

By the discovery of more fertile mines and so forth, two ounces of gold might, for example, cost no more labour to produce than one ounce did before. The *value* of gold would then be depreciated by one half, or fifty per cent. As the *values* of all other commodities would then be expressed in twice their former *money prices*, so also the same with the *value of labour*. Twelve hours of labour, formerly expressed in six shillings, would now be expressed in twelve shillings. If the working man's wages should remain three shillings, instead of rising to six shillings, the *money price of his labour* would only be equal to *half the value of his labour*, and his standard of life would fearfully deteriorate. This would also happen in a greater or lesser degree if his wages should rise, but not proportionately to the fall in the value of gold. In such a case nothing would have been changed, either in the productive powers of labour, or in supply and demand, or in values. Nothing could have changed except the *money names* of those values. To say that in such a case the workman ought not to insist upon a proportionate rise of wages, is to say that he must be content to be paid with names, instead of with things. All past history proves that whenever such a depreciation of money occurs the capitalists are on the alert to seize this opportunity for defrauding the workman. A very large school of political economists assert that, consequent upon the new discoveries of gold lands, the better working of silver mines, and the cheaper supply of quicksilver, the value of precious metals has been again depreciated. This would explain the general and simultaneous attempts on the Continent at a rise of wages.

3. We have till now supposed that the *working day* has given limits. The working day, however, has, by itself, no constant limits. It is the constant tendency of capital to stretch it to its utmost physically possible length, because in the same degree surplus-labour, and consequently the profit resulting therefrom, will be increased. The more capital succeeds in prolonging the working

day, the greater the amount of other people's labour it will appropriate. During the seventeenth and even the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century a ten hours' working day was the normal working day all over England. During the anti-Jacobin war, which was in fact a war waged by the British barons against the British working masses⁹⁸ capital celebrated its bacchanalia, and prolonged the working day from ten to twelve, fourteen, eighteen hours. Malthus, by no means a man whom you would suspect of a maudlin sentimentalism, declared in a pamphlet, published about 1815, that if this sort of things was to go on the life of the nation would be attacked at its very source.^a A few years before the general introduction of the newly-invented machinery, about 1765, a pamphlet appeared in England under the title, *An Essay on Trade*.^b The anonymous author, an avowed enemy of the working classes, declaims on the necessity of expanding the limits of the working day. Amongst other means to this end, he proposes *working houses*, which, he says, ought to be "*Houses of Terror*". And what is the length of the working day he prescribes for these "*Houses of Terror*"? *Twelve hours*, the very same time which in 1832 was declared by capitalists, political economists, and ministers to be not only the existing but the necessary time of labour for a child under twelve years.⁹⁹

By selling his labouring power, and he must do so under the present system, the working man makes over to the capitalist the consumption of that power, but within certain rational limits. He sells his labouring power in order to maintain it, apart from its natural wear and tear, but not to destroy it. In selling his labouring power at its daily or weekly value, it is understood that in one day or one week that labouring power shall not be submitted to two days' or two weeks' waste or wear and tear. Take a machine worth £1,000. If it is used up in ten years it will add to the value of the commodities in whose production it assists £100 yearly. If it be used up in five years it would add £200 yearly, or the value of its annual wear and tear is in inverse ratio to the quickness with which it is consumed. But this distinguishes the working man from the machine. Machinery does not wear out exactly in the same ratio in which it is used. Man, on the contrary, decays in a greater ratio than would be visible from the mere numerical addition of work.

^a Th. R. Malthus, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent, and the Principles by which it is regulated*, London, 1815.—Ed.

^b *An Essay on Trade and Commerce: Containing Observations on Taxes*, London, 1770.—Ed.

In their attempts at reducing the working day to its former rational dimensions, or, where they cannot enforce a legal fixation of a normal working day, at checking overwork by a rise of wages, a rise not only in proportion to the surplus-time exacted, but in a greater proportion, working men fulfil only a duty to themselves and their race. They only set limits to the tyrannical usurpations of capital. Time is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime, apart from the mere physical interruptions by sleep, meals, and so forth, is absorbed by his labour for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a mere machine for producing Foreign Wealth, broken in body and brutalised in mind. Yet the whole history of modern industry shows that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class to the utmost state of degradation.

In prolonging the working day the capitalist may pay *higher wages* and still lower the *value of labour*, if the rise of wages does not correspond to the greater amount of labour extracted, and the quicker decay of the labouring power thus caused. This may be done in another way. Your middle-class statisticians will tell you, for instance, that the average wages of factory families in Lancashire have risen. They forget that instead of the labour of the man, the head of the family, his wife and perhaps three or four children are now thrown under the Juggernaut wheels¹⁰⁰ of capital, and that the rise of the aggregate wages does not correspond to the aggregate surplus-labour extracted from the family.

Even with given limits of the working day, such as now exist in all branches of industry subjected to the factory laws, a rise of wages may become necessary, if only to keep up the old standard *value of labour*. By increasing the *intensity* of labour, a man may be made to expend as much vital force in one hour as he formerly did in two. This has, to a certain degree, been effected in the trades, placed under the Factory Acts, by the acceleration of machinery, and the greater number of working machines which a single individual has now to superintend. If the increase in the intensity of labour or the mass of labour spent in an hour keeps some fair proportion to the decrease in the extent of the working day, the working man will still be the winner. If this limit is overshot, he loses in one form what he has gained in another, and ten hours of labour may then become as ruinous as twelve hours were before. In checking this tendency of capital, by struggling for a rise of wages corresponding to the rising intensity of labour, the

working man only resists the depreciation of his labour and the deterioration of his race.

4. All of you know that, from reasons I have not now to explain, capitalistic production moves through certain periodical cycles. It moves through a state of quiescence, growing animation, prosperity, overtrade, crisis, and stagnation. The market prices of commodities, and the market rates of profit, follow these phases, now sinking below their averages, now rising above them. Considering the whole cycle, you will find that one deviation of the market price is being compensated by the other, and that, taking the average of the cycle, the market prices of commodities are regulated by their values. Well! During the phase of sinking market prices and the phases of crisis and stagnation, the working man, if not thrown out of employment altogether, is sure to have his wages lowered. Not to be defrauded, he must, even with such a fall of market prices, debate with the capitalist in what proportional degree a fall of wages has become necessary. If, during the phases of prosperity, when extra profits are made, he did not battle for a rise of wages, he would, taking the average of one industrial cycle, not even receive his *average wages*, or the *value* of his labour. It is the utmost height of folly to demand that while his wages are necessarily affected by the adverse phases of the cycle, he should exclude himself from compensation during the prosperous phases of the cycle. Generally, the *values* of all commodities are only realised by the compensation of the continuously changing market prices, springing from the continuous fluctuations of demand and supply. On the basis of the present system labour is only a commodity like others. It must, therefore, pass through the same fluctuations to fetch an average price corresponding to its value. It would be absurd to treat it on the one hand as a commodity, and to want on the other hand to exempt it from the laws which regulate the prices of commodities. The slave receives a permanent and fixed amount of maintenance; the wages labourer does not. He must try to get a rise of wages in the one instance, if only to compensate for a fall of wages in the other. If he resigned himself to accept the will, the dictates of the capitalist as a permanent economical law, he would share in all the miseries of the slave, without the security of the slave.

5. In all the cases I have considered, and they form ninety-nine out of a hundred, you have seen that a struggle for a rise of wages follows only in the track of *previous* changes, and is the necessary offspring of previous changes in the amount of production, the productive powers of labour, the value of labour, the value of

money, the extent or the intensity of labour extracted, the fluctuations of market prices, dependent upon the fluctuations of demand and supply, and consistent with the different phases of the industrial cycle; in one word, as reactions of labour against the previous action of capital. By treating the struggle for a rise of wages independently of all these circumstances, by looking only upon the change of wages, and overlooking all the other changes from which they emanate, you proceed from a false premise in order to arrive at false conclusions.

14) THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOUR AND ITS RESULTS

1. Having shown that the periodical resistance on the part of the working men against a reduction of wages, and their periodical attempts at getting a rise of wages, are inseparable from the wages system, and dictated by the very fact of labour being assimilated to commodities, and therefore subject to the laws regulating the general movement of prices; having, furthermore, shown that a general rise of wages would result in a fall in the general rate of profit, but not affect the average prices of commodities, or their values, the question now ultimately arises, how far, in this incessant struggle between capital and labour, the latter is likely to prove successful.

I might answer by a generalisation, and say that, as with all other commodities, so with labour, its *market price* will, in the long run, adapt itself to its *value*; that, therefore, despite all the ups and downs, and do what he may, the working man will, on an average, only receive the value of his labour, which resolves into the value of his labouring power, which is determined by the value of the necessaries required for its maintenance and reproduction, which value of necessaries finally is regulated by the quantity of labour wanted to produce them.

But there are some peculiar features which distinguish the *value of the labouring power*, or the *value of labour*, from the values of all other commodities. The value of the labouring power is formed by two elements—the one merely physical, the other historical or social. Its *ultimate limit* is determined by the *physical* element, that is to say, to maintain and reproduce itself, to perpetuate its physical existence, the working class must receive the necessaries absolutely indispensable for living and multiplying. The *value* of

those indispensable necessities forms, therefore, the ultimate limit of the *value of labour*. On the other hand, the length of the working day is also limited by ultimate, although very elastic boundaries. Its ultimate limit is given by the physical force of the labouring man. If the daily exhaustion of his vital forces exceeds a certain degree, it cannot be exerted anew, day by day. However, as I said, this limit is very elastic. A quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations will keep the labour market as well supplied as a series of vigorous and long-lived generations.

Besides this mere physical element, the value of labour is in every country determined by a *traditional standard of life*. It is not mere physical life, but it is the satisfaction of certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and reared up. The English standard of life may be reduced to the Irish standard; the standard of life of a German peasant to that of a Livonian peasant. The important part which historical tradition and social habitude play in this respect, you may learn from Mr. Thornton's work on *Over-population*, where he shows that the average wages in different agricultural districts of England still nowadays differ more or less according to the more or less favourable circumstances under which the districts have emerged from the state of serfdom.

This historical or social element, entering into the value of labour, may be expanded, or contracted; or altogether extinguished, so that nothing remains but the *physical limit*. During the time of the *anti-Jacobin war*, undertaken, as the incorrigible tax-eater and sinecurist, old George Rose, used to say, to save the comforts of our holy religion from the inroads of the French infidels, the honest English farmers, so tenderly handled in a former chapter of ours, depressed the wages of the agricultural labourers even beneath that *mere physical minimum*, but made up by *Poor Laws*¹⁰¹ the remainder necessary for the physical perpetuation of the race. This was a glorious way to convert the wages labourer into a slave, and Shakespeare's proud yeoman into a pauper.

By comparing the standard wages or values of labour in different countries, and by comparing them in different historical epochs of the same country, you will find that the *value of labour* itself is not a fixed but a variable magnitude, even supposing the values of all other commodities to remain constant.

A similar comparison would prove that not only the *market rates of profit* change but its *average rates*.

But as to *profits*, there exists no law which determines their

minimum. We cannot say what is the ultimate limit of their decrease. And why cannot we fix that limit? Because, although we can fix the *minimum* of wages, we cannot fix their *maximum*. We can only say that, the limits of the working day being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to the *physical minimum of wages*; and that wages being given, the *maximum of profit* corresponds to such a prolongation of the working day as is compatible with the physical forces of the labourer. The maximum of profit is, therefore, limited by the physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum of the working day. It is evident that between the two limits of this *maximum rate of profit* an immense scale of variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction.

The matter resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants.

2. As to the *limitation of the working day* in England, as in all other countries, it has never been settled except by *legislative interference*. Without the working men's continuous pressure from without that interference would never have taken place. But at all events, the result was not to be attained by private settlement between the working men and the capitalists. This very necessity of *general political action* affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side.

As to the *limits of the value of labour*, its actual settlement always depends upon supply and demand. I mean the demand for labour on the part of capital, and the supply of labour by the working men. In colonial countries the law of supply and demand favours the working man. Hence the relatively high standard of wages in the United States. Capital may there try its utmost. It cannot prevent the labour market from being continuously emptied by the continuous conversion of wages labourers into independent, self-sustaining peasants. The position of a wages labourer is for a very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to leave within a longer or shorter term. To mend this colonial state of things, the paternal British Government accepted for some time what is called the modern colonisation theory, which consists in putting an artificial high price upon colonial land, in order to prevent the too quick conversion of the wages labourer into the independent peasant.¹⁰²

But let us now come to old civilised countries, in which capital domineers over the whole process of production. Take, for example, the rise in England of agricultural wages from 1849 to 1859. What was its consequence? The farmers could not, as our friend Weston would have advised them, raise the value of wheat, nor even its market prices. They had, on the contrary, to submit to their fall. But during these eleven years they introduced machinery of all sorts, adopted more scientific methods, converted part of arable land into pasture, increased the size of farms, and with this the scale of production, and by these and other processes, diminishing the demand for labour by increasing its productive power, made the agricultural population again relatively redundant. This is the general method in which a reaction, quicker or slower, of capital against a rise of wages takes place in old, settled countries. Ricardo has justly remarked that machinery is in constant competition with labour, and can often be only introduced when the price of labour has reached a certain height, but the appliance of machinery is but one of the many methods for increasing the productive powers of labour.^a This very same development which makes common labour relatively redundant simplifies on the other hand skilled labour, and thus depreciates it.

The same law obtains in another form. With the development of the productive powers of labour the accumulation of capital will be accelerated, even despite a relatively high rate of wages. Hence, one might infer, as *Adam Smith*, in whose days modern industry was still in its infancy, did infer, that the accelerated accumulation of capital must turn the balance in favour of the working man, by securing a growing demand for his labour. From this same standpoint many contemporary writers have wondered that English capital having grown in the last twenty years so much quicker than English population, wages should not have been more enhanced. But simultaneously with the progress of accumulation there takes place a *progressive change* in the *composition of capital*. That part of the aggregate capital which consists of fixed capital, machinery, raw materials, means of production in all possible forms, progressively increases as compared with the other part of capital, which is laid out in wages or in the purchase of labour. This law has been stated in a more or less accurate manner by Mr. Barton, Ricardo, Sismondi, Professor Richard Jones, Professor Ramsay, Cherbuliez, and others.

^a D. Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation*, London, 1821, p. 479.—*Ed.*

If the proportion of these two elements of capital was originally one to one, it will, in the progress of industry, become five to one, and so forth. If of a total capital of 600, 300 is laid out in instruments, raw materials, and so forth, and 300 in wages, the total capital wants only to be doubled to create a demand for 600 working men instead of for 300. But if of a capital of 600, 500 is laid out in machinery, materials, and so forth, and 100 only in wages, the same capital must increase from 600 to 3,600 in order to create a demand for 600 workmen instead of 300. In the progress of industry the demand for labour keeps, therefore, no pace with accumulation of capital. It will still increase, but increase in a constantly diminishing ratio as compared with the increase of capital.

These few hints will suffice to show that the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favour of the capitalist against the working man, and that consequently the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the *value of labour* more or less to its *minimum limit*. Such being the tendency of *things* in this system, is this saying that the working class ought to renounce their resistance against the encroachments of capital, and abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken wretches past salvation. I think I have shown that their struggles for the standard of wages are incidents inseparable from the whole wages system, that in 99 cases out of 100 their efforts at raising wages are only efforts at maintaining the given value of labour, and that the necessity of debating their price with the capitalist is inherent in their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities. By cowardly giving way in their everyday conflict with capital, they would certainly disqualify themselves for the initiating of any larger movement.

At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude involved in the wages system, the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these everyday struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerilla fights incessantly springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market. They ought to

understand that, with all the miseries it imposes upon them, the present system simultaneously engenders the *material conditions* and the *social forms* necessary for an economical reconstruction of society. Instead of the *conservative* motto, "A fair day's wage for a fair day's work!" they ought to inscribe on their banner the *revolutionary* watchword, "*Abolition of the wages system!*"

After this very long and, I fear, tedious exposition which I was obliged to enter into to do some justice to the subject-matter, I shall conclude by proposing the following resolutions:

Firstly. A general rise in the rate of wages would result in a fall of the general rate of profit, but, broadly speaking, not affect the prices of commodities.

Secondly. The general tendency of capitalist production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages.

Thirdly. Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organised forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class, that is to say, the ultimate abolition of the wages system.

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTION
ON THE CONVOCAION OF A GENERAL CONGRESS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL IN 1866]

The Standing Committee recommended to the Central Council to agree to the following as a recommendation to the conference ¹⁰³:

The Central Council shall in 1866 convoke a general congress unless unforeseen circumstances shall necessitate its further postponement.

Adopted by the Central Council on
September 19, 1865

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council

First published, in Russian, in *Generalny
Sovet Pervogo Internatsionala. 1864-1866*,
Moscow, 1961

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTION
ON THE PROCEDURE OF DISCUSSING
THE PROGRAMME OF THE CONGRESS¹⁰⁴]

That the general purposes and ruling principles of the Association as laid down in the Address and Statutes be first defined before entering upon the discussion of the questions proposed by the conference.

Adopted by the Central Council on
January 23, 1866

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council

First published, in Russian, in *Generalny
Sovet Pervogo Internatsionala. 1864-1866*,
Moscow, 1961

THE COMMONWEALTH.

REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION ABROAD

No. 159.

SATURDAY, MARCH 24, 1866.

Price One Penny.

Frederick Engels

WHAT HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES TO DO WITH POLAND?¹⁰⁵

I.

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE COMMONWEALTH*.

[*The Commonwealth*, No. 159, March 24, 1866]

Sir,—Wherever the working classes have taken a part of their own in political movements, there, from the very beginning, their foreign policy was expressed in the few words—*Restoration of Poland*. This was the case with the Chartist movement so long as it existed; this was the case with the French working men long before 1848, as well as during that memorable year, when on the 15th of May they marched on to the National Assembly to the cry of “*Vive la Pologne!*”—Poland for ever!¹⁰⁶ This was the case in Germany, when, in 1848 and '49, the organs of the working class^a demanded war with Russia for the restoration of Poland.¹⁰⁷ It is the case even now;—with one exception—of which more anon—the working men of Europe unanimously proclaim the restoration of Poland as a part and parcel of their political programme, as the most comprehensive expression of their foreign policy. The middle-class, too, have had, and have still, “sympathies” with the Poles; which sympathies have not prevented them from leaving the Poles in the lurch in 1831, in 1846, in 1863,¹⁰⁸ nay, have not even prevented them from leaving the worst enemies of Poland, such as Lord Palmerston, to manage matters so as to actually assist Russia while they talked in favour of Poland. But with the working classes it is different. They mean intervention, not non-intervention; they mean war with Russia while Russia meddles with Poland; and they have proved it every time the Poles rose against their oppressors. And recently, the International Working Men’s Association has given a fuller expression to this universal

^a A reference to the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* and other democratic and workers’ newspapers.—*Ed.*

instinctive feeling of the body it claims to represent, by inscribing on its banner, "Resistance to Russian encroachments upon Europe—Restoration of Poland."¹⁰⁹

This programme of the foreign policy of the working men of Western and Central Europe has found a unanimous consent among the class to whom it was addressed, with one exception, as we said before. There are among the working men of France a small minority who belong to the school of the late P. J. Proudhon. This school differs *in toto* from the generality of the advanced and thinking working men; it declares them to be ignorant fools, and maintains, on most points, opinions quite contrary to theirs. This holds good in their foreign policy also. The Proudhonists, sitting in judgment on oppressed Poland, find the verdict of the Staleybridge jury, "Serves her right." They admire Russia as the great land of the future, as the most progressive nation upon the face of the earth, at the side of which such a paltry country as the United States is not worthy of being named. They have charged the Council of the International Association with setting up the Bonapartist principle of nationalities, and with declaring that magnanimous Russian people without the pale of civilised Europe; such being a grievous sin against the principles of universal democracy and the fraternity of all nations. These are the charges.¹¹⁰ Barring the democratic phraseology at the wind-up, they coincide, it will be seen at once, verbally and literally with what the extreme Tories of all countries have to say about Poland and Russia. Such charges are not worth refuting; but, as they come from a fraction of the working classes, be it ever so small a one, they may render it desirable to state again the case of Poland and Russia, and to vindicate what we may henceforth call the foreign policy of the united working men of Europe.

But why do we always name Russia alone in connection with Poland? Have not two German Powers, Austria and Prussia, shared in the plunder? Do not they, too, hold parts of Poland in bondage, and, in connection with Russia, do they not work to keep down every national Polish movement?

It is well known how hard Austria has struggled to keep out of the Polish business; how long she resisted the plans of Russia and Prussia for the partition. Poland was a natural ally of Austria against Russia. When Russia once became formidable, nothing could be more in the interest of Austria than to keep Poland alive between herself and the newly-rising Empire. It was only when Austria saw that Poland's fate was settled, that with or without her,

the other two Powers were determined to annihilate her, it was only then that in self-protection she went in for a share of the territory. But as early as 1815 she held out for the restoration of an independent Poland; in 1831 and in 1863 she was ready to go to war for that object, and give up her own share of Poland, provided England and France were prepared to join her. The same during the Crimean war. This is not said in justification of the general policy of the Austrian Government. Austria has shown often enough that to oppress a weaker nation is congenial work to her rulers. But in the case of Poland the instinct of self-preservation was stronger than the desire for new territory or the habits of Government. And this puts Austria out of court for the present.

As to Prussia, her share of Poland is too trifling to weigh much in the scale. Her friend and ally, Russia, has managed to ease her of nine-tenths of what she got during the three partitions.¹¹¹ But what little is left to her weighs as an incubus upon her. It has chained her to the triumphal car of Russia, it has been the means of enabling her Government, even in 1863 and '64, to practise unchallenged, in Prussian-Poland, those breaches of the law, those infractions of individual liberty, of the right of meeting, of the liberty of the press, which were so soon afterwards to be applied to the rest of the country; it has falsified the whole middle-class Liberal movement which, from fear of risking the loss of a few square miles of land on the eastern frontier, allowed the Government to set all law aside with regard to the Poles. The working men, not only of Prussia, but of all Germany, have a greater interest than those of any other country in the restoration of Poland, and they have shown in every revolutionary movement that they know it. Restoration of Poland, to them, is emancipation of their own country from Russian vassalage. And this, we think, puts Prussia out of court, too. Whenever the working classes of Russia (if there is such a thing in that country, in the sense it is understood in Western Europe) form a political programme, and that programme contains the liberation of Poland—then, but not till then, Russia as a nation will be out of court too, and the Government of the Czar will remain alone under indictment.

II.

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE COMMONWEALTH*.

[*The Commonwealth*, No. 160, March 31, 1866]

Sir,—It is said that to claim independence for Poland is to acknowledge the “principle of nationalities”, and that the principle of nationalities is a Bonapartist invention concocted to prop up the Napoleonic despotism in France. Now what is this “principle of nationalities”?

By the treaties of 1815 the boundaries of the various States of Europe were drawn merely to suit diplomatic convenience, and especially to suit the convenience of the then strongest continental Power—Russia. No account was taken either of the wishes, the interests, or the national diversities of the populations. Thus, Poland was divided, Germany was divided, Italy was divided, not to speak of the many smaller nationalities inhabiting south-eastern Europe, and of which few people at that time knew anything. The consequence was that for Poland, Germany, and Italy, the very first step in every political movement was to attempt the restoration of that national unity without which national life was but a shadow. And when, after the suppression of the revolutionary attempts in Italy and Spain, 1821-23, and again, after the revolution of July, 1830, in France, the extreme politicians of the greater part of civilised Europe came into contact with each other, and attempted to work out a kind of common programme, the liberation and unification of the oppressed and subdivided nations became a watchword common to all of them.¹¹² So it was again in 1848, when the number of oppressed nations was increased by a fresh one, viz., Hungary. There could, indeed, be no two opinions as to the right of every one of the great national subdivisions of Europe to dispose of itself, independently of its neighbours, in all internal matters, so long as it did not encroach upon the liberty of the others. This right was, in fact, one of the fundamental conditions of the internal liberty of all. How could, for instance, Germany aspire to liberty and unity, if at the same time she assisted Austria to keep Italy in bondage, either directly or by her vassals? Why, the total breaking-up of the Austrian monarchy is the very first condition of the unification of Germany!

This right of the great national subdivisions of Europe to political independence, acknowledged as it was by the European democracy, could not but find the same acknowledgment with the working classes especially. It was, in fact, nothing more than to

recognise in other large national bodies of undoubted vitality the same right of individual national existence which the working men of each separate country claimed for themselves. But this recognition, and the sympathy with these national aspirations, were restricted to the large and well-defined historical nations of Europe; there was Italy, Poland, Germany, Hungary. France, Spain, England, Scandinavia, were neither subdivided nor under foreign control, and therefore but indirectly interested in the matter; and as to Russia, she could only be mentioned as the detainer of an immense amount of stolen property, which would have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning.

After the *coup d'état* of 1851, Louis Napoleon, the Emperor "by the grace of God and the national will", had to find a democraticised and popular-sounding name for his foreign policy. What could be better than to inscribe upon his banners the "principle of nationalities"? Every nationality to be the arbiter of its own fate—every detached fraction of any nationality to be allowed to annex itself to its great mother-country—what could be more liberal? Only, mark, there was not, now, any more question of *nations*, but of *nationalities*.

There is no country in Europe where there are not different nationalities under the same government. The Highland Gaels and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the English are, although nobody will give to these remnants of peoples long gone by the title of nations, any more than to the Celtic inhabitants of Brittany in France. Moreover, no state boundary coincides with the natural boundary of nationality, that of language. There are plenty of people out of France whose mother tongue is French, same as there are plenty of people of German language out of Germany; and in all probability it will ever remain so. It is a natural consequence of the confused and slow-working historical development through which Europe has passed during the last thousand years, that almost every great nation has parted with some outlying portions of its own body, which have become separated from the national life, and in most cases participated in the national life of some other people; so much so, that they do not wish to rejoin their own main stock. The Germans in Switzerland and Alsace do not desire to be reunited to Germany, any more than the French in Belgium and Switzerland wish to become attached politically to France. And after all, it is no slight advantage that the various nations, as politically constituted, have most of them some foreign elements within themselves, which form connecting links with their neigh-

bours, and vary the otherwise too monotonous uniformity of the national character.

Here, then, we perceive the difference between the "principle of *nationalities*" and the old democratic and working-class tenet as to the right of the great European *nations* to separate and independent existence. The "principle of nationalities" leaves entirely untouched the great question of the right of national existence for the historic peoples of Europe; nay, if it touches it, it is merely to disturb it. The principle of nationalities raises two sorts of questions; first of all, questions of boundary between these great historic peoples; and secondly, questions as to the right to independent national existence of those numerous small relics of peoples which, after having figured for a longer or shorter period on the stage of history, were finally absorbed as integral portions into one or the other of those more powerful nations whose greater vitality enabled them to overcome greater obstacles. The European importance, the vitality of a people is as nothing in the eyes of the principle of nationalities; before it, the Roumans of Wallachia, who never had a history, nor the energy required to have one, are of equal importance to the Italians who have a history of 2,000 years, and an unimpaired national vitality; the Welsh and Manxmen, if they desired it, would have an equal right to independent political existence, absurd though it would be, with the English.¹¹³ The whole thing is an absurdity, got up in a popular dress in order to throw dust in shallow people's eyes, and to be used as a convenient phrase, or to be laid aside if the occasion requires it.

Shallow as the thing is, it required cleverer brains than Louis Napoleon's to invent it. The principle of nationalities, so far from being a Bonapartist invention to favour a resurrection of Poland, is nothing but a *Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland*. Russia has absorbed the greater part of ancient Poland on the plea of the principle of nationalities, as we shall see hereafter. The idea is more than a hundred years old, and Russia uses it now every day. What is Panslavism but the application, by Russia, and in Russian interest, of the principle of nationalities to the Serbians, Croats, Ruthenes,¹¹⁴ Slovaks, Czechs, and other remnants of bygone Slavonian peoples in Turkey, Hungary, and Germany? Even at this present moment, the Russian Government have agents travelling among the Lapponians in Northern Norway and Sweden, trying to agitate among these nomadic savages the idea of a "great Finnic nationality", which is to be restored in the extreme North of Europe, under Russian protection, of course. The "cry

of anguish" of the oppressed Laplanders is raised very loud in the Russian papers—not by those same oppressed nomads, but by the Russian agents—and indeed it is a frightful oppression, to induce these poor Laplanders to learn the civilised Norwegian or Swedish language, instead of confining themselves to their own barbaric, half Esquimaux idiom! The principle of nationalities, indeed, could be invented in Eastern Europe alone, where the tide of Asiatic invasion, for a thousand years, recurred again and again, and left on the shore those heaps of intermingled ruins of nations which even now the ethnologist can scarcely disentangle, and where the Turk, the Finnic Magyar, the Rouman, the Jew, and about a dozen Slavonic tribes, live intermixed in interminable confusion. That was the ground to work the principle of nationalities, and how Russia has worked it there, we shall see by-and-by in the example of Poland.^a

III.

THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONALITY APPLIED TO POLAND.

[*The Commonwealth*, No. 165, May 5, 1866]

Poland, like almost all other European countries, is inhabited by people of different nationalities. The mass of the population, the nucleus of its strength, is no doubt formed by the Poles proper, who speak the Polish language. But ever since 1390 Poland proper has been united to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,¹¹⁵ which has formed, up to the last partition in 1794, an integral portion of the Polish Republic. This Grand Duchy of Lithuania was inhabited by a great variety of races. The northern provinces, on the Baltic, were in possession of *Lithuanians* proper, people speaking a language distinct from that of their Slavonic neighbours; these Lithuanians had been, to a great extent, conquered by German immigrants, who, again, found it hard to hold their own against the Lithuanian Grand Dukes. Further south, and east of the present kingdom of Poland, were the *White Russians*, speaking a language betwixt Polish and Russian, but nearer the latter; and finally the southern provinces were inhabited by the so-called *Little Russians*,^b whose language is now by most authorities considered as perfectly distinct from the Great Russian (the language we

^a Here follows an editor's note: (To be continued).—*Ed.*

^b Ukrainians.—*Ed.*

commonly call Russian). Therefore, if people say that, to demand the restoration of Poland is to appeal to the principle of nationalities, they merely prove that they do not know what they are talking about, for the restoration of Poland means the re-establishment of a State composed of at least four different nationalities.

When the old Polish State was thus being formed by the union with Lithuania, where was then Russia? Under the heel of the Mongolian conqueror, whom the Poles and Germans combined, 150 years before, had driven back east of the Dnieper. It took a long struggle until the Grand Dukes of Moscow finally shook off the Mongol yoke, and set about combining the many different principalities of Great Russia into one State.¹¹⁶ But this success seems only to have increased their ambition. No sooner had Constantinople fallen to the Turk,^a than the Moscovite Grand Duke^b placed in his coat-of-arms the double-headed eagle of the Byzantine Emperors, thereby setting up his claim as their successor and future avenger; and ever since, it is well known, have the Russians worked to conquer Czaregrad, the town of the Czar, as they call Constantinople in their language. Then, the rich plains of Little Russia excited their lust of annexation; but the Poles were then a strong, and always a brave people, and not only knew how to fight for their own, but also how to retaliate; in the beginning of the seventeenth century they even held Moscow for a few years.¹¹⁷

The gradual demoralisation of the ruling aristocracy, the want of power to develop a middle class, and the constant wars devastating the country, at last broke the strength of Poland. A country which persisted in maintaining unimpaired the feudal state of society, while all its neighbours progressed, formed a middle class, developed commerce and industry, and created large towns—such a country was doomed to ruin. No doubt the aristocracy *did* ruin Poland, and ruin her thoroughly; and after ruining her, they upbraided each other for having done so, and sold themselves and their country to the foreigner. Polish history, from 1700 to 1772, is nothing but a record of Russian usurpation of dominion in Poland, rendered possible by the corruptibility of the nobles. Russian soldiers were almost constantly occupying the country, and the Kings of Poland, if not willing traitors themselves, were placed more and more under the thumb of the

^a in 1453.—*Ed.*

^b Ivan III.—*Ed.*

Russian Ambassador. So well had this game succeeded, and so long had it been played, that, when Poland at last was annihilated, there was no outcry at all in Europe, and, indeed, people were astonished at this only, that Russia should have the generosity of giving such a large slice of the territory to Austria and Prussia.

The way in which this partition was brought about, is particularly interesting. There was, at that time, already an enlightened "public opinion" in Europe. Although the *Times* newspaper had not yet begun to manufacture that article, there was that kind of public opinion which had been created by the immense influence of Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the other French writers of the eighteenth century. Russia always knew that it is important to have public opinion on one's side, if possible; and Russia took care to have it, too. The Court of Catherine II was made the head-quarters of the enlightened men of the day, especially Frenchmen; the most enlightened principle was professed by the Empress and her Court, and so well did she succeed in deceiving them that Voltaire and many others sang the praise of the "Semiramis of the North", and proclaimed Russia the most progressive country in the world, the home of liberal principles, the champion of religious toleration.

Religious toleration—that was the word wanted to put down Poland. Poland had always been extremely liberal in religious matters; witness the asylum the Jews found there while they were persecuted in all other parts of Europe. The greater portion of the people in the Eastern provinces belonged to the Greek faith, while the Poles proper were Roman Catholics. A considerable portion of these Greek Catholics had been induced, during the sixteenth century, to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, and were called United Greeks¹¹⁸; but a great many continued true to their old Greek religion in all respects. They were principally the serfs, their noble masters being almost all Roman Catholics, they were Little Russians by nationality. Now, this Russian Government, which did not tolerate at home any other religion but the Greek, and punished apostasy as a crime; which was conquering foreign nations and annexing foreign provinces right and left; and which was at that time engaged in riveting still firmer the fetters of the Russian serf—this same Russian Government came soon upon Poland in the name of religious toleration, because Poland was said to oppress the Greek Catholics; in the name of the principle of nationalities, because the inhabitants of these Eastern provinces were *Little* Russians, and ought, therefore, to be annexed to *Great* Russia; and in the name of the right of revolution arming the

serfs against their masters. Russia is not at all scrupulous in the selection of her means. Talk about a war of class against class as something extremely revolutionary;—why, Russia set such a war on foot in Poland nearly 100 years ago, and a fine specimen of a class-war it was, when Russian soldiers and Little Russian serfs went in company to burn down the castles of the Polish lords, merely to prepare Russian annexation, which being once accomplished, the same Russian soldiers put the serfs back again under the yoke of their lords.

All this was done in the cause of religious toleration, because the principle of nationalities was not then fashionable in Western Europe. But it was held up before the eyes of the Little Russian peasants at the time, and has played an important part since in Polish affairs. The first and foremost ambition of Russia is the union of all Russian tribes under the Czar, who calls himself the Autocrat of all the Russias (*Samodergetz vseckh Rossyiskikh*), and among these she includes White and Little Russia. And in order to prove that her ambition went no further, she took very good care, during the three partitions, to annex none but White and Little Russian provinces; leaving the country inhabited by Poles, and even a portion of Little Russia (Eastern Galicia) to her accomplices. But how do matters stand now? The greater portion of the provinces annexed in 1793 and 1794 by Austria and Prussia are now under Russian dominion, under the name of the Kingdom of Poland, and from time to time hopes are raised among the Poles, that if they will only submit to Russian supremacy, and renounce all claims to the ancient Lithuanian provinces, they may expect a reunion of all other Polish provinces and a restoration of Poland, with the Russian Emperor for a King. And if at the present juncture Prussia and Austria came to blows, it is more than probable that the war will not be, ultimately, for the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, or of Venice to Italy, but rather of Austrian, and at least a portion of Prussian, Poland to Russia.

So much for the principle of nationalities in Polish affairs.

Written at the end of January and before
April 6, 1866

Reproduced from the newspaper

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May 5, 1866

Signed: *Frederic Engels*

Karl Marx

A WARNING¹¹⁹

Some time ago the London journeymen tailors formed a general association¹²⁰ to uphold their demands against the London master tailors, who are mostly big capitalists. It was a question not only of bringing wages into line with the increased prices of means of subsistence, but also of putting an end to the exceedingly harsh treatment of the workers in this branch of industry. The masters sought to frustrate this plan by recruiting journeymen tailors, chiefly in Belgium, France and Switzerland. Thereupon the secretaries of the Central Council of the International Working Men's Association published in Belgian, French and Swiss newspapers a warning which was a complete success.¹²¹ The London masters' manoeuvre was foiled; they had to surrender and meet their workers' just demands.

Defeated in England, the masters are now trying to take counter-measures, starting in *Scotland*. The fact is that, as a result of the London events, they had to agree, initially, to a 15 per cent. wage rise in Edinburgh as well. But secretly they sent agents to Germany to recruit journeymen tailors, particularly in the Hanover and Mecklenburg areas, for importation to Edinburgh. The first group has already been shipped off. The purpose of this importation is the same as that of the importation of Indian^a COOLIES to Jamaica, namely, *perpetuation of slavery*. If the Edinburgh masters succeeded, through the import of German labour, in nullifying the concessions they had already made, it would inevitably lead to repercussions in England. *No one would suffer more than the German workers themselves*, who constitute in Great

^a "Asiatic" in the original.—*Ed.*

Britain a larger number than the workers of all the other Continental nations. And the newly-imported workers, being completely helpless in a strange land, would soon sink to the level of pariahs.

Furthermore, it is a point of honour with the German workers to prove to other countries that they, like their brothers in France, Belgium and Switzerland, know how to defend the common interests of their class and will not become *obedient mercenaries of capital* in its struggle against labour.

On behalf of the Central Council^a
of the International Working Men's Association,

Karl Marx

London, May 4, 1866

German journeymen tailors who wish to know more about conditions in Britain are requested to address their letters to the German branch committee of the London Tailors' Association, %
Albert F. Haufe, Crown Public House, Hedden Court, Regent Street, *London*.

First published in *Der Bote vom Niederrhein*, No. 57, May 13, 1866, reprinted in *Oberrheinischer Courier*, No. 113, May 15, 1866 and *Mitteldeutsche Volks-Zeitung*, No. 184, August 10, 1866

Printed according to the newspaper text checked against the manuscript

^a "General Council" in the original.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

NOTES ON THE WAR IN GERMANY¹²²

No. I

[*The Manchester Guardian*, No. 6190, June 20, 1866]

The following notes are intended to comment impartially, and from a strictly military point of view, upon the current events of the war, and, as far as possible, to point out their probable influence upon impending operations.

The locality where the first decisive blows must be struck is the frontier of Saxony and Bohemia. The war in Italy can scarcely lead to any decisive results so long as the Quadrilateral¹²³ remains untaken, and to take that will be rather a lengthy operation. There may be a good deal of warlike action in Western Germany, but from the strength of the forces engaged, it will be altogether subordinate in its results to the events on the Bohemian frontier. To this neighbourhood, therefore, we shall, for the present, exclusively direct our attention.

In order to judge of the strength of the contending armies it will suffice, for all practical purposes, if we take into account the infantry only, keeping in mind, however, that the strength of the Austrian cavalry will be to the Prussian as three to two. The artillery will be, in both armies, in about the same proportion as the infantry, say three guns per 1,000 men.

The Prussian infantry consists of 253 battalions of the line, 83 1/2 depot battalions, and 116 battalions of the Landwehr (first levy, containing the men from 27 to 32 years of age).¹²⁴ Of these, the depot battalions and Landwehr form the garrisons of the fortresses, and are intended, besides, to act against the smaller German states, while the line is massed in and around Saxony to oppose the Austrian army of the north. Deducting about 15 battalions occupying Schleswig-Holstein, and another 15 battalions—the late garrisons of Rastatt, Mainz, and Frankfurt, now

concentrated at Wetzlar—there remain about 220 battalions for the main army. With cavalry and artillery, and such Landwehr as may be drawn from the neighbouring fortresses, this army will contain about 300,000 men, in nine army corps.

The Austrian army of the north counts seven army corps, each of which is considerably stronger than a Prussian one. We know very little at present of their composition and organisation, but there is every reason to believe that they form an army of from 320,000 to 350,000 men. Numerical superiority, therefore, seems assured to the Austrians.

The Prussian army will be under the command-in-chief of the King^a—that is to say, of a parade soldier of at best very mediocre capacities, and of weak, but often obstinate, character. He will be surrounded, firstly, by the general staff of the army, under General Moltke, an excellent officer; secondly, by his “private military cabinet”, composed of personal favourites; and, thirdly, by such other unattached general officers as he may call to his suite. It is impossible to invent a more efficient system for ensuring defeat at the very headquarters of an army. Here is, at the very beginning, the natural jealousy between the staff of the army and the Cabinet of the King, each of which sections will struggle for supreme influence and will concoct and advocate its own pet plan of operations. This alone would render almost impossible all singleness of purpose, all consistent action. But then come the interminable councils of war, which are unavoidable under such circumstances, and which, in nine cases out of ten, end in the adoption of some half measure—the very worst course in war. The orders of to-day, in such cases, generally contradict those of yesterday, and when matters become complicated or threaten to go wrong, no orders at all are given out, and things take their own course. “*Ordre, contre-ordre, désordre*,” as Napoleon used to say. Nobody is responsible, because the irresponsible King takes all responsibility upon himself, and, therefore, nobody does anything until distinctly ordered to do so. The campaign of 1806 was commanded in a similar way by the father of the present King^b; the defeat of Jena and Auerstädt, and the destruction of the whole Prussian army within three weeks,¹²⁵ was the consequence. There is no reason to suppose that the present King is superior in mettle to his father; and if he has found in Count Bismarck a man whose political direction he can implicitly follow, there is no man of

^a William I.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick William III.—*Ed.*

sufficient standing in the army to take exclusive charge, in a similar way, of military matters.

The Austrian army is under the unconditional command of General Benedek, who is an experienced officer and who, at least, knows his mind. The superiority of supreme command is decidedly on the side of the Austrians.

The Prussian troops are subdivided into two "armies"; the first, under Prince Frederick Charles, composed of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, and 8th corps; the second, under the Crown Prince,^a of the 5th and 6th corps. The Guards, forming the general reserve, will probably join the first army. Now this subdivision not only breaks the unity of command, but it also induces, very often, the two armies to move on two different lines of operation, to make combined movements, to lay their mutual point of junction within the reach of the enemy; in other words, it tends to keep them separated whereas they ought, as much as possible, to keep together. The Prussians in 1806, and the Austrians in 1859, under very similar circumstances, followed the same course, and were beaten.¹²⁶ As to the two commanders, the Crown Prince is an unknown magnitude as a soldier; and Prince Frederick Charles certainly did not show himself to be a great commander in the Danish war.¹²⁷

The Austrian army has no such subdivision; the commanders of the army corps are placed directly under General Benedek. They are, therefore, again superior to their opponents as far as the organisation of the army goes.

The Prussian soldiers, especially the men of the reserve and such Landwehr men as had to be taken to fill up vacancies in the line (and there are many) go to war against their will; the Austrians, on the contrary, have long wished for a war with Prussia, and await with impatience the order to move. They have, therefore, also the advantage in the *morale* of the troops.

Prussia has had no great war for fifty years; her army is, on the whole, a peace army, with the pedantry and martinetism inherent to all peace armies. No doubt a great deal has been done latterly, especially since 1859, to get rid of this; but the habits of forty years are not so easily eradicated, and a great number of incapable and pedantic men must still be found, particularly in the most important places—those of the field officers. Now the Austrians have been fundamentally cured of this complaint by the war of 1859, and have turned their dearly-bought experience to the very

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

best use. No doubt, in organisation of detail, in adaptation for, and experience in, warfare, the Austrians again are superior to the Prussians.

With the exception of the Russians the Prussians are the only troops whose normal formation for fighting is the deep close column. Imagine the eight companies of an English battalion in a quarter-distance column, but two companies instead of one forming the front, so that four rows of two companies each form the column, and you have the "Prussian column of attack". A better target for rifled fire-arms than this could not be imagined, and, since rifled cannon can throw a shell into it at 2,000 yards range, such a formation must render it almost impossible to reach the enemy at all. Let one single shell explode in the midst of this mass, and see whether that battalion is fit for anything afterwards on that day.

The Austrians have adopted the loose open column of the French, which is scarcely to be called a column; it is more like two or three lines following each other at 20 or 30 yards distance, and is scarcely, if anything more exposed to losses by artillery than a deployed line. The advantage of tactical formation is, again, on the side of the Austrians.

Against all these advantages the Prussians have but two points to set off. Their commissariat is decidedly better, and the troops will therefore be better fed. The Austrian commissariat, like all Austrian Administration, is one den of bribery and speculation scarcely better than in Russia. Even now we hear of the troops being badly and irregularly fed; in the field and in the fortresses it will be worse still, and the Austrian Administration may happen to be a more dangerous enemy to the fortresses in the Quadrilateral than the Italian artillery.

The second set-off the Prussians have is their superior armament. Although their rifled artillery is decidedly better than that of the Austrians, this will make very little difference in the open field. The range, trajectory, and accuracy of the Prussian and Austrian rifles will be about on a par; but the Prussians have breech-loaders, and can deliver a steady well-aimed fire in the ranks at least four times in a minute. The immense superiority of this arm has been proved in the Danish war, and there is no doubt the Austrians will experience it in a far higher degree. If they, as it is said Benedek has instructed them to do, will not lose much time with firing, but go at the enemy at once with the bayonet, they will have enormous losses. In the Danish war, the loss of the Prussians was never more than one fourth, sometimes only one

tenth, of that of the Danes; and, as a military correspondent of *The Times* a short time ago very correctly pointed out, the Danes were almost everywhere beaten by a minority of troops actually engaged.^a

Still, in spite of the needle gun, the odds are against the Prussians; and if they refuse to be beaten in the first great battle by the superior leadership, organisation, tactical formation, and *morale* of the Austrians, and last, not least, by their own commanders, then they must certainly be of a different mettle from that of which a peace army of 50 years' standing may be expected to be.

No. II

[*The Manchester Guardian*, No. 6194, June 25, 1866]

People begin to grow impatient at the apparent inactivity of the two great armies on the Bohemian frontier. But there are plenty of reasons for this delay. Both the Austrians and the Prussians are perfectly aware of the importance of the impending collision, which may decide the result of the whole campaign. Both are hurrying up to the front whatever men they can lay their hands on; the Austrians from their new formations (the fourth and fifth battalions of the infantry regiments), the Prussians from the Landwehr, which at first was intended for garrison duty only.

At the same time, there appears to be on either side an attempt to out-manoeuve the opposing army, and to enter upon the campaign under the most favourable strategical conditions. To understand this, we shall have to look at the map and examine the country in which these armies are placed.

Taking it for granted that Berlin and Vienna are the normal points of retreat of the two armies, and that therefore the Austrians will aim at the conquest of Berlin and the Prussians at that of Vienna, there are three routes by which they might operate. A large army requires a certain extent of country from the resources of which it has to live on the march, and is compelled, in order to move quick, to march in several columns on as many parallel roads; its front will, therefore, be extended on a line which may vary between, say, sixty and sixteen miles, according to the proximity of the enemy and the distance of the roads from each other. This will have to be kept in mind.

^a "Austrian and Prussian Armaments", *The Times*, No. 25507, May 25, 1866, p. 5, c. 4.—*Ed.*

The first route would be on the left bank of the Elbe and Moldau, by Leipzig and Prague. It is evident that on this route each of the belligerents would have to cross the river twice, the second time in the face of the enemy. Supposing either army to attempt to turn, by this route, the flank of its opponent, the latter, having the shorter, because straighter road, could still anticipate the turning force on the line of the river, and if successful in repelling it, could march straight upon the enemy's capital. This route, equally disadvantageous to both parties, may therefore be dismissed from consideration.

The second route is on the right bank of the Elbe, between it and the Sudetic mountain chain which divides Silesia from Bohemia and Moravia. This is almost on the straight line from Berlin to Vienna; the portion now lying between the two armies is marked out by the railway from Löbau to Pardubitz. This railway passes through that portion of Bohemia which is bounded by the Elbe to the south and west, and the mountains to the north-east. It has plenty of good roads, and if the two armies were to march straight at each other, here would be the point of collision.

The third route is that by Breslau, and thence across the Sudetic chain. This chain, of no considerable elevation, on the Moravian frontier, where it is crossed by several good roads, rises to greater elevation and abruptness in the Riesengebirge, which forms the boundary of Bohemia. Here there are but few roads across; in fact, between Trautenau and Reichenberg, a distance of forty miles, the whole north-eastern portion of the range is not traversed by a single military road. The only road in existence there, that from Hirschberg to the valley of the Iser, stops short at the Austrian frontier. It follows, then, that this whole barrier of forty miles in length, is impassable, at least for a large army, with its innumerable impediments, and that an advance upon or by Breslau must pass the mountains to the south-west of the Riesengebirge.

Now, what are the relative positions of the two armies, with regard to their communications, if engaged on this route?

The Prussians, by advancing due south from Breslau, lay open their communications with Berlin. The Austrians might, if strong enough to command the almost absolute certainty of victory, leave them to advance as far as the intrenched camp of Olmütz, which would stop them, while they themselves could march upon Berlin, trusting to re-open any temporarily-interrupted communications by a decisive victory; or they might meet the Prussian columns singly as they debouch from the mountains, and, if successful,

drive them back upon Glogau and Posen, whereby Berlin and the greater portion of the Prussian states would be at their mercy. Thus an advance by Breslau would be advisable for the Prussians in case of a great numerical superiority only.

The Austrians are in a far different position. They have the advantage that the bulk of the monarchy lies south-east of Breslau; that is, in the *direct prolongation* of a line drawn from Berlin to Breslau. Having fortified the northern bank of the Danube near Vienna, so as to shelter the capital from a surprise, they may, temporarily and even for a length of time, sacrifice their direct communication with Vienna, and draw their supplies of men and stores from Hungary. They can, therefore, with equal safety operate by way of Löbau and by way of Breslau, to the north or to the south of the hills; they have far greater freedom in manoeuvring than their opponents.

The Prussians, moreover, have further reasons to be cautious. From the northern frontier of Bohemia, the distance to Berlin is not much more than half of that to Vienna; Berlin is so much more exposed. Vienna is sheltered by the Danube, behind which a beaten army can find protection; by the fortifications erected to the north of that river; and by the intrenched camp of Olmütz, which the Prussians could not pass unnoticed with impunity, if the mass of the Austrian army, after a defeat, were to take up a position there. Berlin has no protection of any kind, except the army in the field. Under these circumstances, and those detailed in our first number, the part destined for the Prussians appears to be clearly marked out as a defensive one.

The same series of circumstances, and strong political necessity besides, almost compels Austria to act on the offensive. A single victory may ensure to her great results, while her defeat would not break her power of resistance.

The strategical plan of the campaign in its fundamental features is necessarily very simple. Whichever of the two attacks first, he has only this alternative: either a false attack *north-west* of the Riesengebirge, and the true attack south-east of it, or *vice versa*. The forty-mile barrier is the decisive feature of the seat of war, and round it the armies must gravitate. We shall hear of fighting at both its extremities, and a very few days afterwards will clear up the direction of the true attack, and probably the fate of the first campaign. Yet, with two such unwieldy armies opposed to each other, we feel inclined to think that the most direct route is the safest, and that the difficulty and danger of moving such large bodies of troops in separate columns on different roads through a

difficult mountain country, will almost naturally draw both opposing armies on the route Löbau-Pardubitz.

The actual movements which have taken place are as follows:— The Prussians, in the first week of June, massed their army of Saxony along the Saxon frontier, from Zeitz to Görlitz, and their Silesian army from Hirschberg to Neisse. By the 10th June they drew nearer together, having their right wing on the Elbe near Torgau, and their extreme left near Waldenburg. From the 12th to the 16th, the army of Silesia, now consisting of the 1st, 5th, and 6th corps and the Guards, were again extended to the east, this time as far as Ratibor, that is to say, into the extreme south-eastern corner of Silesia. This looks like a feint, especially the parading of the Guards, which are supposed to be always with the main army. If it be more than a feint, or if measures have not been taken to move these four corps back towards Görlitz at the shortest notice and in the shortest time, then this massing of more than 120,000 men in a remote corner is a palpable mistake; they may be cut off from all possibility of retreat and certainly from all connection with the remainder of the army.

Of the Austrians we know little more than that they were concentrated around Olmütz. The *Times* correspondent in their camp states that their sixth corps, 40,000 strong, arrived on the 19th from Weisskirchen at Olmütz indicating a movement to the westward. He adds that on the 21st headquarters were to be shifted to Trübau, on the frontier between Moravia and Bohemia.^a This move would point in the same direction, if it did not look exceedingly like a *canard* sent on to London with the intention of being thence telegraphed to the Prussian headquarters in order to mislead them. A general who acts with such secrecy as Benedek, and who has such objections to newspaper correspondents, is not likely to inform them on the 19th where his headquarters will be on the 21st, unless he has his reasons for it.

Before concluding, we may be allowed to cast a glance at the operations in North-western Germany. The Prussians had more troops here than was at first known. They had 15 battalions disposable in Holstein, 12 in Minden, and 18 in Wetzlar. By rapid concentric moves, during which the troops showed a quite unexpected capability of supporting forced marches, they took possession in two days of all the country north of a line from

^a "The Austrian Army (from our military correspondent). Headquarters of the Army of the North, Olmütz, June 19", *The Times*, No. 25532, June 23, 1866, p. 9, c. 4.—*Ed.*

Coblenz to Eisenach, and of every line of communication between the eastern and western provinces of the kingdom. The Hessian troops, about 7,000 strong, managed to escape, but the Hanoverians, 10,000 or 12,000, had their direct line of retreat towards Frankfurt cut off, and already on the 17th the rest of the 7th Prussian army corps, 12 battalions, together with the two Coburg battalions, arrived in Eisenach from the Elbe. Thus the Hanoverians appear to be hemmed in on all sides, and could escape only by a miracle of stupidity on the part of the Prussians. As soon as their fate will be settled, a force of 50 Prussian battalions will be available against the Federal army which Prince Alexander of Darmstadt is forming at Frankfurt, and which will consist of about 23,000 Württembergers, 10,000 Darmstadters, 6,000 Nassauers, 13,000 Badenens (only mobilising now), 7,000 Hessians, and 12,000 Austrians, now on the road from Salzburg; in all about 65,000 men, who may be possibly reinforced by from 10,000 to 20,000 Bavarians. About 60,000 men of these are now reported as already concentrated at Frankfurt, and Prince Alexander has ventured upon a forward move by re-occupying Giessen on the 22d. This, however, is of no consequence. The Prussians will not advance against him until they are well concentrated, and then, with 70,000 men of all arms, and their superior armament, they ought to make short work of this motley army.

No. III

[*The Manchester Guardian*, No. 6197, June 28, 1866]

The first great battle has been fought, not in Bohemia, but in Italy, and the Quadrilateral has again given the Italians a lesson in strategy. The strength of this famous position, as indeed of all fortified positions of any value, consists, not so much in the high defensive capabilities of its four fortresses, but in their being so grouped in a country with strongly-marked military features that the attacking force is almost always induced, and often compelled, to divide itself and attack on two different points, while the defending force can send its whole combined strength against one of these attacks, crush it by superior numbers, and then turn against the other. The Italian army has been induced to commit this fault. The King stood with eleven divisions on the Mincio, while Cialdini with five divisions faced the Lower Po, near Ponte

Lagoscuro and Polesella. An Italian division counts 17 battalions of 700 men each; consequently, Victor Emmanuel would have, with cavalry and artillery, at least 120,000 or 125,000 men, and Cialdini about half that number. While the King crossed the Mincio on the 23d, Cialdini was to cross the Lower Po and act upon the rear of the Austrians; but up to the moment we write, no certain news has arrived of this latter movement having been effected. At all events, the 60,000 men whose presence might, and probably would, have turned the scale on Sunday last at Custozza,¹²⁸ cannot, so far, have obtained any advantage at all commensurate to the loss of a great battle.

The Lake of Garda lies encased between two spurs of the Alps, forming, to the south of it, two clusters of hills, between which the Mincio forces its way towards the lagoons of Mantua. Both of these groups form strong military positions; their slopes towards the south overlook the Lombard plain, and command it within gun-range. They are well known in military history. The western group, between Peschiera and Lonato, was the scene of the battles of Castiglione and Lonato in 1796, and of Solferino in 1859¹²⁹; the eastern group, between Peschiera and Verona, was contested during three days in 1848,¹³⁰ and again in the battle of last Sunday.

This eastern group of hills slopes down on one side towards the Mincio, where it ends in the plain at Valeggio; on the other side, in a long arc, facing south-east, towards the Adige, which it reaches at Bussolengo. It is divided, from north to south, in two about equal portions by a deep ravine, through which flows the rivulet Tione; so that a force advancing from the Mincio will have first to force the passage of the river, and immediately afterwards find itself again arrested by this ravine. On the edge of the slope, facing the plain, and east of the ravine, are the following villages: Custozza, on the southern extremity; further north, in succession, Somma Campagna, Sona, and Santa Giustina. The railway from Peschiera to Verona crosses the hills at Somma Campagna, the high road at Sona.

In 1848, after the Piedmontese had taken Peschiera, they blockaded Mantua and extended their army from beyond that place to Rivoli, on the Lake of Garda, their centre occupying the hills in question. On the 23d July Radetzky advanced with seven brigades from Verona, broke through the centre of this over-extended line, and occupied the hills himself. On the 24th and 25th the Piedmontese tried to re-take the position, but were decisively beaten on the 25th, and retreated at once through Milan

beyond the Ticino. This first battle of Custoza decided the campaign of 1848.

The telegrams from the Italian headquarters about last Sunday's battle are rather contradictory; but, with the assistance of those from the other side, we get a pretty clear insight into the circumstances under which it was fought. Victor Emmanuel intended his 1st corps (General Durando, four divisions or 68 battalions), to take up a position between Peschiera and Verona, so as to be able to cover a siege of the former place. This position must, of course, be Sona and Somma Campagna. The 2d corps (General Cucchiari, three divisions or 51 battalions) and 3d corps (General Della Rocca, of the same strength as the second) were to cross the Mincio at the same time, to cover the operations of the 1st. The 1st corps must have crossed near or south of Saliongo, and taken the road of the hills at once; the 2d seems to have crossed at Valeggio, and the 3d at Goito, and advanced in the plain. This took place on Saturday the 23d. The Austrian brigade Pulz, which held the outposts on the Mincio, fell slowly back on Verona; and on Sunday,^a the anniversary of Solferino, the whole of the Austrian army debouched from Verona to meet the enemy. They appear to have arrived in time to occupy the heights of Sona and Somma Campagna, and the eastern edge of the ravine of the Tione before the Italians. The struggle then would principally be fought for the passage of the ravine. At the southern extremity the two corps in the plain could co-operate with the 1st Italian corps in the hills, and thus Custoza fell into their hands. Gradually the Italians in the plain would advance more and more in the direction of Verona, in order to act upon the Austrian flank and rear, and the Austrians would send troops to meet them. Thus the front lines of the two armies, which were originally facing east and west respectively, would wheel round a quarter circle, the Austrians facing south and the Italians north. But, as the hills retreat from Custoza to the north-east, this flank movement of the Italian 2d and 3d corps could not immediately affect the position of their 1st corps in the hills, because it could not be extended far enough without danger to the flanking troops themselves. Thus the Austrians appear merely to have occupied the 2d and 3d corps by troops sufficient to break their first impetus, while they launched every available man upon the 1st corps, and crushed it by superior numbers. They were perfectly successful; the first corps was repulsed, after a gallant struggle,

^a June 24, 1866.—*Ed.*

and at last Custozza was stormed by the Austrians. By this, the Italian right wing advanced east and north-east beyond Custozza, appears to have been seriously endangered; consequently a new struggle for the village took place, during which the lost connection must have been restored, and the Austrian advance from Custozza checked, but the place remained in their hands, and the Italians had to re-cross the Mincio the same night.

We give this sketch of the battle, not as a historical account—for which every detail is as yet wanting—but merely as an attempt, map in hand, to reconcile the various telegrams relating to it amongst each other, and with military common sense; and if the telegrams were anything like correct and complete, we feel confident that the general outline of the battle would appear to be not very different from what we have stated.

The Austrians lost about 600 prisoners, the Italians 2,000, and a few guns. This shows the battle to have been a defeat, but no disaster. The forces must have been pretty equally matched, although it is very probable that the Austrians had less troops under fire than their opponents. The Italians have every reason to congratulate themselves that they were not driven back into the Mincio; the position of the 1st corps between that river and the ravine, on a strip of land between two and four miles wide, and a superior enemy in front, must have been one of considerable danger. It was undoubtedly a mistake to send the main body of the troops into the plain; while the commanding heights, the decisive points, were neglected; but the greatest mistake was, as we pointed out before, to divide the army, to leave Cialdini with 60,000 men on the Lower Po, and to attack with the remainder alone. Cialdini could have contributed to a victory before Verona, and then, marching back to the Lower Po, have effected his passage much more easily, if this combined manoeuvre was to be insisted upon at all hazards. As it is, he seems no further advanced than on the first day, and may now have to meet stronger forces than hitherto. The Italians ought, by this time, to know that they have a very tough opponent to deal with. At Solferino, Benedek, with 26,000 Austrians, held the whole Piedmontese army of fully double that number at bay for the whole day, until he was ordered to retreat in consequence of the defeat of the other corps by the French. That Piedmontese army was much superior to the present Italian army; it was better schooled, more homogeneous, and better officered. The present army is but of very recent formation and must suffer from all the disadvantages inherent to such; while the Austrian army of to-day is much superior to that of 1859.

National enthusiasm is a capital thing to work upon, but until disciplined and organised, nobody can win battles with it. Even Garibaldi's "thousand"¹³¹ were not a crowd of mere enthusiasts, they were drilled men who had learnt to obey orders and to face powder and shot in 1859. It is to be hoped that the staff of the Italian army, for their own good, will refrain from taking liberties with an army which, if numerically inferior, is intrinsically superior to theirs, and, moreover, holds one of the strongest positions in Europe.

No. IV

[*The Manchester Guardian*, No. 6201, July 3, 1866]

Suppose a young Prussian ensign or cornet, under examination for a lieutenancy, to be asked what would be the safest plan for a Prussian army to invade Bohemia? Suppose our young officer were to answer,—“Your best way will be to divide your troops into two about equal bodies, to send one round by the east of the Riesengebirge, the other to the west, and effect their junction in Gitschin.” What would the examining officer say to this? He would inform the young gentleman that this plan sinned against the two very first laws of strategy:—Firstly, never to divide your troops so that they cannot support each other, but to keep them well together; and, secondly, in case of an advance on different roads, to effect the junction of the different columns at a point which is not within reach of the enemy; that, therefore, the plan proposed was the very worst of all; that it could only be taken into consideration at all in case Bohemia was quite unoccupied by hostile troops; and that, consequently, an officer proposing such a plan of campaign was not fit to hold even a lieutenant's commission.

Yet, this is the very plan which the wise and learned staff of the Prussian army have adopted. It is almost incredible; but it is so. The mistake for which the Italians had to suffer at Custoza, has been again committed by the Prussians, and under circumstances which made it ten-fold worse. The Italians knew at least that, with ten divisions, they would be numerically superior to the enemy. The Prussians must have known that if they kept their nine corps together they would be at best barely on a par, as far as numbers went, with Benedek's eight corps; and that by dividing their troops they exposed the two armies to the almost certain fate of being crushed in succession by superior numbers. It would be completely

inexplicable how such a plan could ever be discussed, much less adopted, by a body of such unquestionably capable officers as form the Prussian staff—if it was not for the fact of King William being in chief command. But nobody could possibly expect that the fatal consequences of kings and princes taking high command would come out so soon and so strong. The Prussians are now fighting, in Bohemia, a life-and-death struggle. If the junction of the two armies at or about Gitschin is prevented, if each of the two, being beaten, has to retire out of Bohemia, and, by retiring, to get further away again from the other then the campaign may be said to be virtually over. Then Benedek may leave the army of the Crown Prince^a unnoticed while it retires towards Breslau, and follow up, with all his forces, the army of Prince Frederick Charles, which can hardly escape utter destruction.

The question is, Will this junction have been prevented? Up to the moment we write we have no news of events later than Friday evening, the 29th. The Prussians, beaten out of Gitschin (the name of the place, in Bohemian, is spelt Jičín) on the 28th by General Edelsheim, claim to have stormed the town again on the 29th, and this is the last information we possess. The junction was not then effected; at least four Austrian and parts of the Saxon army corps had then been engaged against about five or six Prussian corps.

The various columns of the army of the Crown Prince, as they descended into the valley on the Bohemian side of the hills, were met by the Austrians at favourable points where the valley, widening out, allowed them to offer a larger front to the Prussian columns, and to attempt to prevent them from deploying; while the Prussians would send troops, wherever practicable, through the lateral valleys, to take their opponents in flank and rear. This is always the case in mountain warfare, and accounts for the great number of prisoners that are always made under such circumstances. On the other side, the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth von Bittenfeld appear to have got through the passes almost unopposed; the first engagements took place on the line of the Iser river, that is almost midway between the starting points of the two armies. It would be idle to try to disentangle and bring into harmony the fearfully contradictory, and often totally unauthenticated, telegrams which have come to hand these last three or four days.

The fighting has been necessarily very much chequered in its results: as new forces came up, victory favoured first one and then

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

the other side. Up to Friday, however, the general result appears to have been, so far, in favour of the Prussians. If they maintained themselves in Gitschin, no doubt the junction was effected on Saturday or Sunday, and then their greatest danger would be passed. The final fight for the junction would probably be fought with concentrated masses on both sides, and decide the campaign for some time, at least. If the Prussians were victorious, they would be at once out of all their self-begotten difficulties, but they might have obtained the same, and even greater, advantages without exposing themselves to such unnecessary dangers.

The fighting appears to have been very severe. The very first Austrian brigade which met the Prussians in battle, was the "black and yellow" brigade, which, in Schleswig, stormed the Königsberg, near Oberselk, the day before the evacuation of the Dannevirke. It is called black and yellow after the facings of the two regiments composing it, and was always considered one of the best brigades in the service. They were, however, beaten by the needle-gun, and above 500 men of one of its regiments (Martini) were taken prisoners after they had charged the Prussian lines five times in vain. In a later engagement, the colours of the 3d battalion, of the Deutschmeister regiment were taken. This regiment, recruited in Vienna exclusively, is considered the best in the whole army. Thus the very best troops have been already in action. The Prussians must have behaved splendidly for an old peace army. When war was actually declared, a totally different spirit came over the army, brought on, chiefly, by the clearing-out of the small fry of potentates in the north-west.¹³² It gave the troops—rightly or wrongly, we merely register the fact—the idea that they were asked to fight, this time, for the unification of Germany, and the hitherto sullen and sulky men of the reserve and Landwehr then crossed the frontier of Austria with loud cheers. It is owing to this chiefly that they fought so well; but at the same time we must ascribe the greater portion of whatever success they have had to their breech-loaders; and if they ever get out of the difficulties into which their generals so wantonly placed them, they will have to thank the needle-gun for it. The reports as to its immense superiority over the muzzle-loaders are again unanimous. A sergeant from the Martini regiment, taken prisoner, said to the correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*^a:

"We have surely done whatever may be expected from brave soldiers, but no man can stand against that rapid fire."

^a "Reichenberg, 27. Juni, Mittags", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 179, June 29, 1866.—*Ed.*

If the Austrians are beaten, it will be not so much General Benedek or General Ramming as General Ramrod who is to blame for the result.

In the north-west, the Hanoverians, brought to a sense of their position by a sharp attack from General Manteuffel's advanced guard under General Flies, have surrendered, and thereby 59 Prussian battalions will be at liberty to act against the Federal troops. It was high time, too, that this should be done before Bavaria had completed all her armaments, for otherwise much stronger forces would be required to subdue South-western Germany. Bavaria is notoriously always slow and behindhand with her military arrangements, but when they are complete, she can bring into the field from 60,000 to 80,000 good troops. We may now soon hear of a rapid concentration of Prussians on the Main and of active operations against Prince Alexander of Hesse Darmstadt and his army.

No. V

[*The Manchester Guardian*, No. 6204, July 6, 1866]

The campaign which the Prussians opened with a signal strategic blunder has been since carried on by them with such a terrible tactical energy that it was brought to a victorious close in exactly eight days.

We said in our last note that the only case in which the Prussian plan of invading Bohemia by two armies separated by the Riesengebirge could be justified was that in which Bohemia was unoccupied by hostile troops. The mysterious plan of General Benedek appears to have mainly consisted in creating a situation of that sort. There appear to have been but two Austrian army corps—the 1st (Clam-Gallas) and the 6th (Ramming)—in the north-western corner of Bohemia, where, from the beginning, we expected the decisive actions would be fought. If this was intended to draw the Prussians into a trap, Benedek has succeeded so well that he got caught in it himself. At all events, the Prussian advance on two lines, with from forty to fifty miles of impassable ground between them, towards a point of junction two full marches from the starting points, and within the enemy's lines,—this advance remains a highly dangerous manoeuvre under all circumstances, and one which would have been followed by signal defeat but for Benedek's strange slowness, for the unexpected dash of the Prussian troops, and for their breech-loading rifles.

The advance of Prince Frederick Charles took place with three corps (the 3d, 4th, and 2d, the latter in reserve) by Reichenberg, north of a difficult range of hills, on the southern side of which General Herwarth advanced with a corps and a half (the 8th and one division of the 7th). At the same time, the Crown Prince stood, with the 1st, 5th, and 6th corps, and the Guards, in the mountains about Glatz. Thus the army was divided into three columns—one on the right, of 45,000, one in the centre, of 90,000, and one on the left, of 120,000 men—none of which could support either of the others for at least several days. Here, if ever, there was a chance for a general commanding at least an equal number of men to crush his opponents in detail. But nothing appears to have been done. On the 26th Prince Frederick Charles had the first serious engagement, at Turnau, with a brigade of the 1st corps, by which he established his communication with Herwarth; on the 27th, the latter took Münchengrätz, while, of the army of the Crown Prince, a first column, the 5th corps, advanced beyond Nachod, and beat the 6th Austrian corps (Ramming) severely; on the 28th, the only slightly unlucky day for the Prussians, Prince Frederick Charles's advance guard took Gitschin, but was again dislodged by General Edelsheim's cavalry, while the 1st corps of the army of the Crown Prince was checked with some loss at Trautenau by the 10th Austrian corps of Gablenz, and only disengaged by the advance of the Guards towards Eipel, on an intermediate road between the 1st and 5th Prussian corps. On the 29th, Prince Frederick Charles stormed Gitschin, and the army of the Crown Prince totally defeated the 6th, 8th, and 10th Austrian corps. On the 30th, a fresh attempt of Benedek's to re-take Gitschin by the 1st corps and the Saxon army was signally foiled, and the two Prussian armies effected a junction. The Austrian loss represents men to the number of at least a corps and a half, while that of the Prussians is less than one fourth that number.

Thus we find that on the 27th there were only two Austrian army corps, of about 33,000 men each, at hand; on the 28th, three; on the 29th, four, and if one Prussian telegram be correct, part of a fifth (the 4th corps); while on the 30th the Saxon army corps only had been able to come up in support. There were, then, two, if not three, corps absent from the contested ground during all that time, while the Prussians brought every man down into Bohemia. In fact, up to the evening of the 29th, the whole of the Austrian troops on the spot were barely superior in numbers to either of the two Prussian armies, and being brought into line

successively, the supports arriving after the defeat only of the troops first engaged, the result was disastrous.

The 3d army corps (Archduke Ernst), which fought at Custoza, is reported to have been sent to the north by rail immediately after that battle, and is, in some accounts, set down among Benedek's available forces. This corps, which would make the whole force, including the Saxons, nine corps, could not have been up in time for the battles in the latter days of June.

The Prussians, whatever the faults of their plan of operations were, made up for them by their rapidity and energy of action. No fault can be found with the operations of either of their two armies. Short, sharp, and decisive were all their blows, and completely successful. Nor did this energy forsake them after the two armies were joined; on they marched, and already on the 3d they met Benedek's combined forces with the whole of theirs, and gave them a last crushing blow.¹³³

It is hardly possible to suppose that Benedek accepted this battle of his own free will. No doubt the rapid pursuit of the Prussians compelled him to take a strong position with all his army, in order to re-form his troops, and to give a day's start to his retiring army train, expecting not to be attacked in force during the day, and to be able to draw off during the night. A man in his position, with four of his corps completely shattered, and after such tremendous losses, cannot have desired, there and then, to deliver a decisive battle, if he could draw off in safety. But the Prussians appear to have compelled him to fight, and the result was the complete rout of the Austrians, who, if the armistice be not granted, will now be trying to make towards Olmütz or Vienna, under the most disadvantageous circumstances, for the slightest out-flanking movement of the Prussians on their right must cut off numerous detachments from the direct road, and drive them into the hills of Glatz, to be made prisoners. The "army of the north", as splendid a host as there was in Europe ten days ago, has ceased to exist.

No doubt the needle-gun, with its rapid fire, has done a great part of this. It may be doubted whether without it the junction of the two Prussian armies could have been effected; and it is quite certain that this immense and rapid success could not have been obtained without such superior fire, for the Austrian army is habitually less subject to panic than most European armies. But there were other circumstances co-operating. We have already mentioned the excellent dispositions and unhesitating action of the two Prussian armies, from the moment they entered Bohemia. We may add that they also deviated, in this campaign, from the

column system, and brought their masses forward principally in deployed lines, so as to bring every rifle into activity, and to save their men from the fire of artillery. We must acknowledge that the movements both on the march and before the enemy were carried out with an order and punctuality which no man could have expected from an army and administration covered with the rust of fifty years' peace. And, finally, all the world must have been surprised at the dash displayed by these young troops in each and every engagement without exception. It is all very well to say the breech-loaders did it, but they are not self-acting, they want stout hearts and strong arms to carry them. The Prussians fought very often against superior numbers, and were almost everywhere the attacking party; the Austrians, therefore, had the choice of ground. And in attacking strong positions and barricaded towns, the advantages of the breech-loader almost disappear; the bayonet has to do the work, and there has been a good deal of it. The cavalry, moreover, acted with the same dash, and with them cold steel and speed of horse are the only weapons in a charge. The French *canards* of Prussian cavalry lines first peppering their opponents with carbine fire (breech-loading or otherwise) and then rushing at them sword in hand, could only originate among a people whose cavalry has very often been guilty of that trick, and always been punished for it by being borne down by the superior impetus of the charging enemy. There is no mistaking it, the Prussian army has, within a single week, conquered a position as high as ever it held, and may well feel confident now to be able to cope with any opponent. There is no campaign on record where an equally signal success, in an equally short time, and without any noteworthy check, has been obtained, except that campaign of Jena which annihilated the Prussians of that day, and, if we except the defeat of Ligny,¹³⁴ the campaign of Waterloo.

Written between June 19 and July 5,
1866

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in *The Manchester Guardian*, Nos. 6190, 6194, 6197, 6201 and 6204, June 20, 25 and 28, July 3 and 6, 1866

Karl Marx

[PROPOSALS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON THE PROGRAMME
OF THE GENEVA CONGRESS ¹³⁵]

1. They recommend the order as published in the French programme with the single amendment that the last question be amalgamated with the first.¹³⁶

2. That the Secretary be instructed to make out a report of the number of members and a general statement of income and expenditure.

3. They recommend the Congress to make an enquiry into the condition of the working classes according to the following schedule of enquiries¹³⁷:

- 1) Occupation,^a name of.
- 2) Age and sex of the employed.
- 3) Number of the employed.
- 4) Hiring and wages. A. Apprentices. B. Wages, day or piece work. Whether paid by middlemen, etc. Weekly, yearly average earnings.
- 5) Hours of labour. In factories. Hours of small employers and home work if the business carried on in those modes. Nightwork, daywork.
- 6) Meal times and treatment.
- 7) State of place and work, overcrowding, defective ventilation, want of sunlight, use of gaslight, etc., cleanliness, etc.
- 8) Nature of the occupation.
- 9) Effect of employment upon the physical condition.

^a In the Minute Book this word is written instead of "Industry" which is crossed out.— *Ed.*

10) Moral condition. Education.

11) State of trade, whether season trade or more or less uniformly distributed over year, whether greatly fluctuating, whether exposed to foreign competition, whether destined principally for home or foreign consumption, etc.

[4] That a yearly contribution of $\frac{1}{2}$ [d.] per member be paid by societies joining, cost price of cards or *livrets* to be charged extra. The Secretary to have power to negotiate with poor societies on easier terms.^a

[5] The Committee recommends that the Council advise members to found benefit societies and to organise an international exchange between benefit societies.^b

[6] That the local committees keep reports of the state of trade in their districts and act as intelligence officers for working men.

Adopted by the Central Council on
July 31, 1866 with certain alterations

First published in *The Commonwealth*,
No. 180, August 18, 1866

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council
checked with the newspaper

^a In *The Commonwealth* this para reads: "They also recommend to the Congress the election of a General Secretary who shall be permanently engaged on the business of the Association, which has now assumed such proportions as to make the above a necessity. They also recommend that the rate of contributions for organised bodies be at the rate of one half-penny per member per year, the cost price of cards (*livrets*) to be charged extra."—*Ed.*

^b After this the Minute Book has: "A debate arose on this point. The recommendation was amended so as to require that the Swiss members take the initiative at the Congress on this question.

"The resolution in its amended form was carried unanimously."—*Ed.*

THE INTERNATIONAL COURIER

ENGLISH PART

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LONDON, FEBRUARY 20, 1867.

ONE PENNY.

Karl Marx

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DELEGATES OF THE PROVISIONAL GENERAL COUNCIL. THE DIFFERENT QUESTIONS¹³⁸

1.—ORGANISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

Upon the whole, the Provisional Central Council recommend the *plan of Organisation* as traced in the Provisional Statutes. Its soundness and facilities of adaptation to different countries without prejudice to unity of action have been proved by two years' experience. For the next year we recommend London as the seat of the Central Council, the Continental situation looking unfavourable for change.

The members of the Central Council will of course be elected by Congress (5 of the Provisional Statutes) with power to add to their number.

The *General Secretary* to be chosen by Congress for one year and to be the only paid officer of the Association. We propose £2 for his weekly salary.^a

The uniform *annual contribution of each individual member of the Association* to be *one half penny* (perhaps one penny). The cost price of cards of membership (carnets) to be charged extra.

While calling upon the members of the Association to form benefit societies and connect them by an international link, we leave the initiation of this question (*établissement des sociétés de secours mutuels. Appui moral et matériel accordé aux orphelins de l'association*^b) to the Swiss who originally proposed it at the conference of September last.

^a In the French text the following paragraph has been added: "The *Standing Committee*, which is in fact an executive of the Central Council, to be chosen by Congress, the function of any of its member to be defined by the Central Council." The same paragraph is given in the German text.—*Ed.*

^b foundation of benefit societies; moral and material assistance to the Association's orphans.—*Ed.*

2.—INTERNATIONAL COMBINATION OF EFFORTS,
BY THE AGENCY OF THE ASSOCIATION,
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN LABOUR AND CAPITAL

(a) From a general point of view, this question embraces the whole activity of the International Association which aims at combining and generalising the till now disconnected efforts for emancipation by the working classes in different countries.

(b) To counteract the intrigues of capitalists always ready, in cases of strikes and lockouts, to misuse the foreign workman as a tool against the native workman, is one of the particular functions which our Society has hitherto performed with success. It is one of the great purposes of the Association to make the workmen of different countries not only *feel* but *act* as brethren and comrades in the army of emancipation.

(c) One great "International combination of efforts" which we suggest is a *statistical inquiry into the situation of the working classes of all countries to be instituted by the working classes themselves*. To act with any success, the materials to be acted upon must be known. By initiating so great a work, the workmen will prove their ability to take their own fate into their own hands. We propose therefore:

That in each locality, where branches of our Association exist, the work be immediately commenced, and evidence collected on the different points specified in the subjoined scheme of inquiry.

That the Congress invite all workmen of Europe and the United States of America to collaborate in gathering the elements of the statistics of the working class; that reports and evidence be forwarded to the Central Council. That the Central Council elaborate them into a general report, adding the evidence as an appendix.

That this report together with its appendix be laid before the next annual Congress, and after having received its sanction, be printed at the expense of the Association.

GENERAL SCHEME OF INQUIRY,
WHICH MAY OF COURSE BE MODIFIED BY EACH LOCALITY

1. Industry, name of.
2. Age and sex of the employed.
3. Number of the employed.
4. Salaries and wages: (a) apprentices; (b) wages by the day or piece work; scale paid by middlemen. Weekly, yearly average.
5. (a) Hours of work in factories. (b) The hours of work with

small employers and in home work, if the business be carried on in those different modes. (c) Nightwork and daywork.

6. Meal times and treatment.

7. Sort of workshop and work: overcrowding, defective ventilation, want of sunlight, use of gaslight. Cleanliness, etc.

8. Nature of occupation.

9. Effect of employment upon the physical condition.

10. Moral condition. Education.

11. State of trade: whether season trade, or more or less uniformly distributed over year, whether greatly fluctuating, whether exposed to foreign competition, whether destined principally for home or foreign competition,^a etc.¹³⁹

3.—LIMITATION OF THE WORKING DAY

A preliminary condition, without which all further attempts at improvement and emancipation must prove abortive, is the *limitation of the working day*.

It is needed to restore the health and physical energies of the working class, that is, the great body of every nation, as well as to secure them the possibility of intellectual development, sociable intercourse, social and political action.

We propose *8 hours work* as the *legal limit* of the working day. This limitation being generally claimed by the workmen of the United States of America,¹⁴⁰ the vote of the Congress will raise it to the common platform of the working classes all over the world.

For the information of continental members, whose experience of factory law is comparatively short-dated, we add that all legal restrictions will fail and be broken through by Capital if the *period of the day* during which the 8 working hours must be taken, be not fixed. The length of that period ought to be determined by the 8 working hours and the additional pauses for meals. For instance, if the different interruptions for meals amount to *one hour*, the legal period of the day ought to embrace 9 hours, say from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., or from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., etc. Nightwork to be but exceptionally permitted, in trades or branches of trades specified by law. The tendency must be to suppress all nightwork.

This paragraph refers only to adult persons, male or female, the latter, however, to be rigorously excluded from all *nightwork whatever*, and all sort of work hurtful to the delicacy of the sex, or

^a The Minute Book of the General Council has "consumption".—*Ed.*

exposing their bodies to poisonous and otherwise deleterious agencies. By adult persons we understand all persons having reached or passed the age of 18 years.

4.—JUVENILE AND CHILDREN'S LABOUR (BOTH SEXES)

We consider the tendency of modern industry to make children and juvenile persons of both sexes co-operate in the great work of social production, as a progressive, sound and legitimate tendency, although under capital it was distorted into an abomination. In a rational state of society *every child whatever*, from the age of 9 years, ought to become a productive labourer in the same way that no able-bodied adult person ought to be exempted from the general law of nature, viz.: to work in order to be able to eat, and work not only with the brain but with the hands too.

However, for the present, we have only to deal with the children and young persons of both sexes divided into *three classes*, to be treated differently^a; the first class to range from 9 to 12; the second, from 13 to 15 years; and the third, to comprise the ages of 16 and 17 years. We propose that the employment of the first class in any workshop or housework be legally restricted to *two*; that of the second, to *four*; and that of the third, to *six* hours. For the third class, there must be a break of at least one hour for meals or relaxation.

It may be desirable to begin elementary school instruction before the age of 9 years; but we deal here only with the most indispensable antidotes against the tendencies of a social system which degrades the working man into a mere instrument for the accumulation of capital, and transforms parents by their necessities into slave-holders, sellers of their own children. The *right* of children and juvenile persons must be vindicated. They are unable to act for themselves. It is, therefore, the duty of society to act on their behalf.

If the middle and higher classes neglect their duties toward their offspring, it is their own fault. Sharing the privileges of

^a Instead of this sentence the French and German texts have two sentences ending the preceding paragraph and beginning a new one: "However, for the present, we have only to deal with the children and young persons belonging to the working class."

"We deem it necessary, basing on physiology, to divide children and young persons of both sexes" and then as in the English text.—*Ed.*

these classes, the child is condemned to suffer from their prejudices.

The case of the working class stands quite different. The working man is no free agent. In too many cases, he is even too ignorant to understand the true interest of his child, or the normal conditions of human development. However, the more enlightened part of the working class fully understands that the future of its class, and, therefore, of mankind, altogether depends upon the formation of the rising working generation. They know that, before everything else, the children and juvenile workers must be saved from the crushing effects of the present system. This can only be effected by converting *social reason* into *social force*, and, under given circumstances, there exists no other method of doing so, than through *general laws*, enforced by the power of the state. In enforcing such laws, the working class do not fortify governmental power. On the contrary, they transform that power, now used against them, into their own agency. They effect by a general act what they would vainly attempt by a multitude of isolated individual efforts.

Proceeding from this standpoint, we say that no parent and no employer ought to be allowed to use juvenile labour, except when combined with education.

By education we understand three things.

Firstly: *Mental education*.

Secondly: *Bodily education*, such as is given in schools of gymnastics, and by military exercise.

Thirdly: *Technological^a training*, which imparts the general principles of all processes of production, and, simultaneously initiates the child and young person in the practical use and handling of the elementary instruments of all trades.

A gradual and progressive course of mental, gymnastic, and technological training ought to correspond to the classification of the juvenile labourers. The costs of the technological^a schools ought to be partly met by the sale of their products.

The combination of paid productive labour, mental education, bodily exercise and polytechnic training, will raise the working class far above the level of the higher and middle classes.

It is self-understood that the employment of all persons from 9 and to 17 years (inclusively) in nightwork and all health-injuring trades must be strictly prohibited by law.

^a The German text has "polytechnical".—*Ed.*

5. CO-OPERATIVE LABOUR

It is the business of the International Working Men's Association to combine and generalise the *spontaneous movements* of the working classes, but not to dictate or impose any doctrinary system whatever. The Congress should, therefore, proclaim no *special system* of co-operation, but limit itself to the enunciation of a few general principles.

(a) We acknowledge the co-operative movement as one of the transforming forces of the present society based upon class antagonism. Its great merit is to practically show, that the present pauperising, and despotic system of the *subordination of labour* to capital can be superseded by the republican and beneficent system of *the association of free and equal producers*.

(b) Restricted, however, to the dwarfish forms into which individual wages slaves can elaborate it by their private efforts, the co-operative system will never transform capitalist society. To convert social production into one large and harmonious system of free and co-operative labour, *general social changes* are wanted, *changes of the general conditions of society*, never to be realised save by the transfer of the organised forces of society, viz., the state power, from capitalists and landlords to the producers themselves.

(c) We recommend to the working men to embark in *co-operative production* rather than in *co-operative stores*. The latter touch but the surface of the present economical system, the former attacks its groundwork.

(d) We recommend to all co-operative societies to convert one part of their joint income into a fund for propagating their principles by example as well as by precept, in other words, by promoting the establishment of new co-operative fabrics, as well as by teaching and preaching.

(e) In order to prevent co-operative societies from degenerating into ordinary middle-class joint stock companies (*sociétés par actions*), all workmen employed, whether shareholders or not, ought to share alike. As a mere temporary expedient, we are willing to allow shareholders a low rate of interest.

6. TRADES' UNIONS. THEIR PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

(a) Their past.

Capital is concentrated social force, while the workman has only to dispose of his working force. The *contract* between capital and labour can therefore never be struck on equitable terms, equitable even in the sense of a society which places the ownership of the material means of life and labour on one side and the vital productive energies on the opposite side. The only social power of the workmen is their number. The force of numbers, however, is broken by disunion. The disunion of the workmen is created and perpetuated by their *unavoidable competition among themselves*.

Trades' Unions originally sprang up from the *spontaneous* attempts of workmen at removing or at least checking that competition, in order to conquer such terms of contract as might raise them at least above the condition of mere slaves. The immediate object of Trades' Unions was therefore confined to everyday necessities, to expediences for the obstruction of the incessant encroachments of capital, in one word, to questions of wages and time of labour. This activity of the Trades' Unions is not only legitimate, it is necessary. It cannot be dispensed with so long as the present system of production lasts. On the contrary, it must be generalised by the formation and the combination of Trades' Unions throughout all countries. On the other hand, unconsciously to themselves, the Trades' Unions were forming *centres of organisation* of the working class, as the mediaeval municipalities and communes did for the middle class. If the Trades' Unions are required for the guerilla fights between capital and labour, they are still more important as *organised agencies for superseding the very system of wages labour and capital rule*.

(b) Their present.

Too exclusively bent upon the local and immediate struggles with capital, the Trades' Unions have not yet fully understood their power of acting against the system of wages slavery itself. They therefore kept too much aloof from general social and political movements. Of late, however, they seem to awaken to some sense of their great historical mission, as appears, for instance, from their participation, in England, in the recent political movement,¹⁴¹ from the enlarged views taken of their function in the United States,¹⁴² and from the following resolution passed at the recent great conference of Trades' delegates at Sheffield:

"That this Conference, fully appreciating the efforts made by the International Association to unite in one common bond of brotherhood the working men of all countries, most earnestly recommend to the various societies here represented, the advisability of becoming affiliated to that body, believing that it is essential to the progress and prosperity of the entire working community."¹⁴³

(c) Their future.

Apart from their original purposes, they must now learn to act deliberately as organising centres of the working class in the broad interest of its *complete emancipation*. They must aid every social and political movement tending in that direction. Considering themselves and acting as the champions and representatives of the whole working class, they cannot fail to enlist the non-society men into their ranks. They must look carefully after the interests of the worst paid trades, such as the agricultural labourers, rendered powerless^a by exceptional circumstances. They must convince the world at large^b that their efforts, far from being narrow and selfish, aim at the emancipation of the downtrodden millions.

7. DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXATION

(a) No modification of the form of taxation can produce any important change in the relations of labour and capital.

(b) Nevertheless, having to choose between two systems of taxation, we recommend the *total abolition of indirect taxes*, and the *general substitution of direct taxes*.^c

Because indirect taxes enhance the prices of commodities, the tradesmen adding to those prices not only the amount of the indirect taxes, but the interest and profit upon the capital advanced in their payment;

Because indirect taxes conceal from an individual what he is paying to the state, whereas a direct tax is undisguised, unsophisticated, and not to be misunderstood by the meanest capacity. Direct taxation prompts therefore every individual to control the governing powers while indirect taxation destroys all tendency to self-government.

^a The French text here reads: "incapable of organised resistance".—*Ed.*

^b The French and German texts read: "convince the broad masses of workers".—*Ed.*

^c In Marx's rough manuscript, the French and German texts here follows: "because direct taxes are cheaper to collect and do not interfere with production".—*Ed.*

8. INTERNATIONAL CREDIT

Initiative to be left to the French.

9. POLISH QUESTION^a

(a) Why do the workmen of Europe take up this question? In the first instance, because the middle-class writers and agitators conspire to suppress it, although they patronise all sorts of nationalities, on the Continent, even Ireland. Whence this reticence? Because both, aristocrats and bourgeois, look upon the dark Asiatic power in the background as a last resource against the advancing tide of working class ascendancy. That power can only be effectually put down by the restoration of Poland upon a democratic basis.

(b) In the present changed state of central Europe, and especially Germany, it is more than ever necessary to have a democratic Poland. Without it, Germany will become the outwork of the Holy Alliance,¹⁴⁴ with it, the co-operator with republican France. The working-class movement will continuously be interrupted, checked, and retarded, until this great European question be set at rest.

(c) It is especially the duty of the German working class to take the initiative in this matter, because Germany is one of the partitioners of Poland.

10. ARMIES^b

(a) The deleterious influence of large standing armies upon *production*, has been sufficiently exposed at middle-class congresses of all denominations, at peace congresses, economical congresses, statistical congresses, philanthropical congresses, sociological congresses. We think it, therefore, quite superfluous to expatiate upon this point.

(b) We propose the general armament of the people and their general instruction in the use of arms.

^a The French reads: "Necessity of annihilating Russian influence in Europe by implementing the right of nations to self-determination and restoring Poland on a democratic and social basis." The German has a similar subtitle in a somewhat altered wording.—*Ed.*

^b The French and the German read: "Standing armies; their relation to production".—*Ed.*

(c) We accept as a transitory necessity small standing armies to form schools for the officers of the militia; every male citizen to serve for a very limited time in those armies.

11. RELIGIOUS QUESTION^a

To be left to the initiative of the French.

Written at the end of August 1866

First published in *Der Vorbote*, Nos. 10 and 11, October and November 1866 and *The International Courier*, Nos. 6/7, February 20, and Nos. 8/10, March 13, 1867

Reproduced from *The International Courier* checked with Marx's partly extant rough manuscript, *Le Courier international* and *Der Vorbote*

^a The French and the German read: "Religious ideas; their influence on the social, political and intellectual movement".—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTION OF GRATITUDE TO THE DELEGATES
OF THE CENTRAL (GENERAL) COUNCIL
TO THE GENEVA CONGRESS ¹⁴⁵]

Citizen *Marx* moved, and *Dell* seconded, a vote of thanks to the delegates for the able manner in which they had represented the Central Council at Geneva.

Adopted by the General Council on
September 18, 1866

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council

First published in *The Commonwealth*,
No. 185, September 22, 1866

Karl Marx

SPEECH AT THE POLISH MEETING
IN LONDON

JANUARY 22, 1867¹⁴⁶

Ladies and Gentlemen,^a

Some 30 years ago, a Revolution broke out in France.^b It was an event not foreseen by the St. Petersburg providence which had just concluded a secret treaty with Charles X for the better administration and geographical arrangement of Europe. On the arrival of the awkward news, the Czar Nicholas summoned the officers of his horseguard and addressed them a short, warlike speech, culminating in the words: *à cheval, Messieurs!*¹⁴⁷ This was no empty threat. Paskiewitch was despatched to Berlin there to settle the invasion of France. A few months later, all was ready. The Prussians were to concentrate on the Rhine, the Polish army to march into Prussia, and the Muscovites^c to follow in the rear. But then, as Lafayette said in the French Chamber of Deputies—“*l'avant garde tournait contre le gros de l'armée*” (the advanced guard turned round upon the main body).^d The insurrection of Warsaw saved Europe from a second Anti-Jacobin war.

Eighteen years later, there was another eruption of the revolutionary volcano, or rather an earthquake shaking the whole

^a The *Głos Wolny* prefaces Marx's speech with the words: “At the beginning Dr. Marx, a German, presented a short, but extremely significant resolution: ‘That liberty cannot be established in Europe without the independence of Poland.’”—*Ed.*

^b Revolution of July 1830.—*Ed.*

^c Here and below this word is used in the sense of “champions of the reactionary policy of Czarist autocracy”.—*Ed.*

^d From Lafayette's speech made in the French Chamber of Deputies on January 16, 1831 on the occasion of the Polish insurrection of November 1830 (*Le Moniteur universel*, January 17, 1831).—*Ed.*

continent. Even the Germans began to fidget, despite the maternal leading-strings in which Russia had kept them ever since their so-called war of independence.^a Still more strange. Of all German cities, Vienna was the first to try its hands at barricade building, and successfully too. This time, and, perhaps, for the first time in his history, the Russ lost his temper. The Czar Nicholas did no longer address his horseguard. He issued a manifesto to his people, telling them that the French plague had infected even the Germans, that it approached the frontiers of the Empire and that Revolution, in its madness, casts its delirious eyes upon Holy Russia. No wonder! he exclaimed. This same Germany has been the hotbed of infidelity for many years past. The cancer of a sacrilegious philosophy has eaten into the vitals of that apparently solid people. And then, he winds up with the following apostrophe to the Germans:

“With us is God! Know that, ye heathens, and submit to us, for God is with us!”^b

Very soon after, through the hands of his trusted servant Nesselrode, he sent another bull to the Germans, but quite overflowing with tenderness for that heathenish people.^c Whence this change?

Why, the Berliners had not only made a Revolution, they had proclaimed the restoration of Poland, and the Prussian Poles deceived by the popular enthusiasm were forming military camps in Posnania. Hence the courtesies of the Czar. It was again Poland, the immortal Knight of Europe, that had warned off the Mongol! Only after the betrayal of the Poles by the Germans, especially the German National Assembly at Frankfurt,¹⁴⁸ Russia recovered her forces and waxed strong enough to stab the Revolution of 1848 in its last asylum, Hungary. And even here, the last man who bestrode the battlefield against her, was a Pole, General Bem.

Now there are many people silly enough to believe that all this has changed, that Poland has ceased to be “une nation nécessaire”, as a French writer calls it, and dwindled to a sentimental souvenir, and you know that sentiments and souvenirs are not quoted at the Stock Exchanges. When the last Russian ukases for

^a A reference to the war of 1813-14 against Napoleonic rule.—*Ed.*

^b *Severnaya Pchela*, No. 59, March 15, 1848.—*Ed.*

^c Nesselrode's circular to all Russian Embassies in “St. Petersburg, 6. Juli. Die russische Note”, *Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung*, No. 210 (second supplement), July 28, 1848. See also “The Russian Note”, present edition, Vol. 7 pp. 307-13.—*Ed.*

the abolition of Poland became known in this country,¹⁴⁹ the organ of the leading purses exhorted the Poles to turn into Muscovites.^a Why should they not, if it were only to give further security for the six mill. 1. st. just lent to the Czar by the English capitalists?¹⁵⁰ A mere *Times*-reading Englishman may tell me that, let the worst arrive to the worst, and Russia seize Constantinople, England will then appropriate Egypt and thus secure the road to her great Indian market.^b Lastly, as to *The Times* saying that Russia may seize Constantinople, if she does not prevent England from seizing upon Egypt, what does it all mean? That England will surrender Constantinople to Russia, if Russia allows England to have a fight with France over Egypt. This is the comfortable vista opened to you by *The Times*. As to Russian love for England, fond as she is of British £.s.d., it suffices to quote the words of the *Gazette de Moscou*, d.d. Dec. 1831:

“Non, il faut que le tour de perfide Albion vienne, et dans quelque temps nous ne devons plus faire de traite avec ce peuple qu'à Calcutta.” (No, it is necessary that the turn of perfidious Albion come, and soon we shall conclude no more treaty with that people, save at Calcutta.)^c

But I ask you, what has changed? Has the danger grown less? No. Only the judicial blindness of the governing classes of Europe has reached its climax.

In the first instance, the policy of Russia is unchangeable, as averred by her official historian, the Muscovite Karamzin.^d Her methods, her tactics, her *manoeuvring* may change, but the leading star of her policy is a fixed star—the empire of the world. Only a civilised government^e swaying barbarian masses can nowadays

^a Here and below the reference is to the leading article in *The Times*, No. 25701, January 7, 1867. In Marx's rough manuscript this and the next phrase are at the beginning of the speech and crossed with a vertical line.—*Ed.*

^b In the rough manuscript this phrase is at the end of the paragraph beginning “A continental European” and crossed with a vertical line. In the *Glos Wolny* the beginning of the phrase reads: “If the worst comes to the worst, *The Times* wrote, let Russia take Constantinople after all, England...” — *Ed.*

^c Marx quotes from *Polonia*, No. IV, November 1832. In the rough manuscript the text from the words “Lastly, as to *The Times* saying ...” makes up the last paragraph but one and is crossed with a vertical line. The *Glos Wolny* reads: “In other words, let England hand Constantinople over to Russia, if Russia kindly allows England to dispute France's right to Egypt. The Muscovite, *The Times* writes, likes to raise loan in England, and is a good payer. He loves English money. He really does love it. But the extent to which he loves the English themselves you may best gauge from the *Gazette de Moscou* of December 1831:”—*Ed.*

^d Н. М. Карамзинъ, *Исторія Государства Россійскаго*, т. XI, Спб., 1835, стр. 23.—*Ed.*

^e The *Glos Wolny* has “cunning government”.—*Ed.*

hatch such a plan, and execute it. As the greatest Russian diplomatist of modern times, Pozzo di Borgo, wrote to Alexander I, at the epoch of the Vienna Congress,¹⁵¹ Poland is the great tool for the execution of the world-embracing schemes of Russia, but also her invincible obstacle, until the Pole, fatigued by the accumulated treacheries of Europe, becomes her scourge in the hand of the Muscovite.

Now, apart from the dispositions of the Polish people, has anything happened to thwart the plans of Russia or paralyse her action?

I need not tell you that in Asia, her progress of conquest is continuous. I need not tell you that the so-called Anglo-French war against Russia^a handed over to her the mountain fortresses of Caucasus, the domination of the Black Sea, and the maritime rights which Catherine II, Paul and Alexander I had vainly tried to wrest from England. Railways are connecting and concentrating her vastly disseminated bonds. Her material resources in Congress Poland,¹⁵² which forms her entrenched camp in Europe, have enormously increased. The fortifications of Warsaw, Modlin, Ivangorod—points singled out by the first Napoleon—domineer the whole course of the Vistula and constitute a formidable basis of attack to the North, West and South. The Panslavonian propaganda has kept pace with the enfeeblement of Austria and Turkey, and what that Panslavonian propaganda means, you had some foretaste in 1848-49, when Hungary was overrun, Vienna laid waste, Italy countered by the Slavs, fighting under the banners of Jellachich, Windischgrätz and Radetzky! And besides all this, England's wrongs against Ireland have raised a new powerful ally of Russia on the other side of the Atlantic.

The plan of Russian policy remains unchangeable, her means of action have wonderfully increased even since 1848, but as yet there is one thing out of reach, and Peter the First hit the weak point when he exclaimed that to conquer the world, the Muscovites wanted nothing but souls. Well, this living spirit, which Russia lacks, will be infused into her carcass the moment the Poles turn into Russian subjects. What then will you have to throw into the opposite balance?^b

A continental European will, perhaps, answer that Russia, by the emancipation of the serfs, has entered the family of civilised

^a The Crimean war of 1853-56.—*Ed.*

^b In the rough manuscript this paragraph is crossed with a vertical line. In the *Głos Wolny* the first sentence reads: "Peter I once said that in order to conquer the world the Muscovites lacked nothing but souls."—*Ed.*

nations, that the German power recently concentrated in Prussian hands can stand any Asiatic shock, and, lastly, that Social Revolution in Western Europe will do away with all "international" conflicts.^a

In the first instance, the emancipation of the serfs has emancipated the supreme government from the impediments the nobles were able to oppose to its centralised action. It has created a vast recruiting place for its army, broken up the common property of the Russian peasants, insulated them, and, above all, strengthened their faith in their pope-autocrat. It has not *deodorised* their Asiatic barbarism, the slow growth of centuries.^b Any attempt at raising their moral standard is punished as a crime. I remind you only of the official provocations against the temperance societies which had undertaken to wean the Muscovite from what Feuerbach calls the practical substance of his religion, namely brandy. However it may work in the future, for the present the serf emancipation has increased the disposable forces of the Czar.

Now, as to Prussia. Once a vassal of Poland, she has but grown into a first rate power under the auspices of Russia, and by the partition of Poland. If she lose to-morrow her Polish booty, she would merge into Germany instead of absorbing it. To maintain herself as a power distinct from Germany, she must fall back upon the Muscovite. Her recent access of domain, instead of loosening these ties, has rendered them indissoluble, because it has heightened her antagonism to France and Austria. At the same time Russia is the prop upon which the arbitrary rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty and its feudal retainers rest. This is their safeguard against popular disaffection. Prussia is, therefore, not a bulwark against the Muscovite but his predestined tool for the invasion of France and the enslavement of Germany.

As to social revolution, what does it mean if not a struggle of classes? It is possible that the struggle between the workmen and the capitalist will be less fierce and bloody than the struggles between the feudal lord and the capitalist proved in England and in France.

^a In the rough manuscript this paragraph is crossed with a vertical line. The *Gtos Wolny* here reads: "People reply to this question from different points of view. Some say that after the emancipation of the serfs, Russia has entered the family of civilised nations. German power, recently concentrated in the hands of the Prussians, could, claim others, defy all Asiatic attacks. Still others, more radical, place their hope in the internal social transformation in Western Europe".—*Ed.*

^b The *Gtos Wolny* has "for civilisation is created over centuries".—*Ed.*

We will hope so. But at all events, although such a social crisis may rouse the energies of the Western peoples, it will, like all internal feuds, also invite aggression from abroad. It will clothe anew Russia with the character she bore during the Anti-Jacobin war and since the Holy Alliance, that of the predestined saviour of order. It will enlist in her ranks all the privileged classes of Europe. Already during the revolution of February it was not only the Count of Montalembert, who laid his ear to the ground to listen whether there was a distant troop of Cossack horses.^a It was not only Prussian squires who proclaimed in the midst of German representative bodies the Czar their "Oberlandesvater".^b It was all the Stock Exchanges of Europe that rose with every Russian victory over the Magyars^c and fell at every Russian defeat.

There is only one alternative left for Europe. Asiatic barbarism under Muscovite leadership will burst over her head like a lawine,^d or she must restore Poland, thus placing between herself and Asia 20 millions of heroes, and gaining breathing time for the accomplishment of her social regeneration.

First published in Polish in the *Głos Wolny*, No. 130, February 10, 1867

Reproduced from the rough manuscript; arranged according to the text in the *Głos Wolny*

^a An allusion to Victor Hugo's speech made in the French Legislative Assembly on July 17, 1851 and published in *Le Moniteur officiel*, July 18, 1851.—*Ed.*

^b Supreme sovereign.—*Ed.*

^c In the *Głos Wolny* the words "over the Magyars" are omitted.—*Ed.*

^d An avalanche.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx
[A CORRECTION¹⁵³]

I request the esteemed Editorial Board of the *Zeitung für Norddeutschland* to print the following correction:

Your obedient servant,
Karl Marx

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD
OF THE *ZEITUNG FÜR NORDDEUTSCHLAND*

It seems to me that the notice

“Dr. Marx, who is living in London ... seems to have been chosen to tour the continent to make propaganda for this affair” (“the next” Polish “insurrection”), which probably found its way into your paper No. 5522^a by an oversight, must be a fabrication hatched by the police, I don’t know for what “affair”.

London, February 18, 1867

Karl Marx

First published in *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2,
No. 3, 1901

Printed according to Marx’s man-
uscript as copied by Kugelmann

Published in English for the first
time

^a February 15, 1867.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE AGENDA
OF THE LAUSANNE CONGRESS¹⁵⁴]

I

On the practical means by which to enable the International Working Men's Association to fulfil its function of a common centre of action for the working classes, female and male, in their struggle tending to their complete emancipation from the domination of capital.

II

That our Congress programme be published in the *Courrier Français*, that no branch has a right to put forth a programme of its own, that the Council alone is empowered to draw up the Congress programme, and that the General Secretary be instructed to send the Council programme to the *Courrier* and communicate the foregoing resolution to the Paris Committee.

Adopted by the General Council on
July 9 and 23, 1867

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council

Resolution I first published as a leaflet
and in *The Working Man*, No. 16, *The
Bee-Hive Newspaper*, No. 300, and *The
Commonwealth*, No. 75, July 13, 1867

Karl Marx

[RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE LEAGUE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM^a]

That the delegates of the Council be instructed not to take any official part in the Peace Congress, and to resist any motion that might be brought forward at the Working Men's Congress tending to take an official part.¹⁵⁵

Adopted by the General Council on
August 13, 1867

Reproduced from the Minute
Book of the General Council

First published in *The Bee-Hive News-
paper*, No. 305, and *The Working Man*,
No. 21, August 17, 1867

^a The record of Marx's speech before proposing the resolution see on pp. 426-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

ARTICLES AND REVIEWS
WRITTEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE
PUBLICATION
OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*

(October 1867-July 1868)

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL* FOR THE *ZUKUNFT*¹⁵⁶]

K. Marx. *Capital*. Volume One.
Hamburg, Meissner, 1867. 784 pp., octavo

For every German it is a saddening fact that we, the nation of thinkers, have so far achieved so little in the field of political economy. Our famous men in this line are at best compilers like Rau and Roscher and, where anything original is produced, we have protectionists like List (who, however, is said to have copied a Frenchman^a) or socialists like Rodbertus and Marx. Our standard political economy actually seems to have set itself the aim of driving into the arms of socialism all who treat the science of political economy seriously. Have we not seen the whole of official economics daring to oppose a Lassalle on the well-known and recognised^b law on the determination of wages, and leaving it to Lassalle to defend people like Ricardo against Schulze-Delitzsch and others^c? Alas, it is true that scientifically they could not even cope with Lassalle and, whatever recognition their practical endeavours may have won, had to endure the charge that their entire science consists in watering down a Bastiat's harmonies^d which gloss over all contradictions and difficulties. Bastiat as an authority and Ricardo disowned—that is our official political economy in Germany today! But indeed, how could it be otherwise? Alas, with us political economy is a field in which nobody takes a scientific interest; it is

^a A reference to F. L. Ferrier, a French economist, and his book *Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce*, propositions of which were widely used by F. List in his book *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (cf. present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 290-93).—*Ed.*

^b *Die Zukunft* has omitted the word "recognised".—*Ed.*

^c An allusion to F. Lassalle's *Herr Bastiat-Schulze von Delitzsch, der ökonomische Julian, oder: Capital und Arbeit*, Berlin, 1864.—*Ed.*

^d F. Bastiat, *Harmonies économiques*, Paris, 1850.—*Ed.*

either a breadwinning study for the examinations in cameralistics or an aid to political agitation for which the merest smattering is thought sufficient. Is that the fault of our political dismemberment, our unfortunately still so little developed industry, or our traditional dependence for this branch of science on foreign countries?

In these circumstances it is always a pleasure when a book like the above comes to hand, in which the author, indignantly referring the current watered down or, as he aptly terms it, "*vulgar political economy*" back to its classical models concluding with Ricardo and Sismondi, also takes a critical attitude to the classics, but always endeavours to retain the path of strictly scientific analysis. Marx's earlier writings, in particular the treatise on money published in 1859 by Duncker in Berlin,^a were already distinguished by a strictly scientific spirit as much as by ruthless criticism, and to our knowledge our entire official political economy has not produced anything to refute them. But if it could not cope with the treatise of those days, how will it fare with the 49 sheets about capital now? Understand us rightly: we do not say that no objections can be made to the conclusions of this book, that Marx has brought forward proofs that are complete; we merely say: We do not believe that among all our political economists one can be found capable of refuting them. The studies made in this book are of the greatest scientific subtlety. We refer in particular to the masterly, dialectical arrangement of the whole, to the manner in which the concept of the commodity is already presented as implying money existing in itself and how capital is developed out of money. We acknowledge that we regard the newly introduced category of *surplus-value* as an advance; that we do not see what can be objected to the statement that not *labour* but *labour-power* appears on the market as a commodity; that we regard as quite in order the correction to Ricardo's law of the rate of profit, that surplus-value must be substituted for profit. We must confess that we are much impressed by the sense of history which pervades the whole book and forbids the author to take the laws of economics for eternal truths, for anything but the formulations of the conditions of existence of certain transitory states of society; we would, alas, look in vain among our official economists for that scholarship and acumen with which the various historical states of society and their conditions of existence are here presented.

^a K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, see present edition, Vol. 30.—Ed.

Studies like that on the economic conditions and laws of slavery, the various forms of serfdom and bondage and the origin of free labour have hitherto remained quite alien to our economic specialists. We would also like to hear the opinion of these gentlemen on the expositions given here of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and large-scale industry in their historical and economic connections and effects; at any rate, they could here learn much that is new. And what in particular will they say of the fact which runs counter to all traditional theories of free competition and which is here nevertheless substantiated from official material, namely that in England, the fatherland of free competition, there is almost no industry left in which the daily working hours are not strictly prescribed by government intervention and which is not supervised by factory inspectors? And that nevertheless, not only do the individual industries prosper, in line with the reduction in working hours, but the individual worker also produces more in the shorter hours than he did previously in the longer hours?

Alas, we cannot deny that the particularly bitter tone which the author uses against the *official German* economists is not without justification. They more or less all belong to the "vulgar economists"; they have prostituted their science for the sake of momentary popularity and denied its great classical exponents. They speak of "harmonies" and wallow in the most banal contradictions. May the severe lesson given them in this book serve to awaken them from their lethargy, to recall to them that political economy is not merely a milchcow providing us with butter but a science demanding serious and zealous application.

Written on October 12, 1867

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Printed according to the manuscript checked with the newspaper text

Published in English for the first time

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG*¹⁵⁷]

Karl Marx. *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy.
Volume I. The Process of Production of Capital.
Hamburg, O. Meissner, 1867

Universal suffrage has added to our present parliamentary parties a new one, the *Social-Democratic Party*. At the last elections to the North German Imperial Diet it put up its own candidates in most big cities and in all factory districts, and succeeded in getting six or eight representatives elected.¹⁵⁸ Compared with the last but one election it deployed much greater strength and we can therefore assume that, at least for the time being, it is still growing. It would be foolish to continue to treat the existence, activity and doctrines of such a party with genteel silence in a country where universal suffrage has placed the final decision into the hands of the most numerous and poorest classes.

However much the few social-democratic parliamentarians may be at loggerheads with each other, we can be sure that all factions of this party will welcome the present book as their *theoretical bible*, as the armoury from which they will take their most telling arguments. For this reason alone it deserves special attention. But it is also bound to cause a stir by its own content. If *Lassalle's* main argumentation—and in political economy Lassalle was only a pupil of Marx—was confined to repeating again and again the Ricardo so-called law of wages, we here have before us a work which with undeniably rare scholarship presents the whole relationship of capital and labour in its connection with economic science as a whole, and which makes it its final goal “to reveal *the economic law of motion* of modern society”, and comes, after obviously sincere studies unmistakably conducted with expert knowledge, to the conclusion that the whole “capitalist mode of production” must be abolished. Moreover, we would like to draw particular attention to the fact that, in addition to the conclusions of the work, the author

in its course represents a whole series of major points of political economy in quite a new light, and comes in purely scientific questions to results which markedly depart from hitherto current political economy, and which orthodox economists will have to criticise seriously and refute scientifically if they do not wish to see their hitherto current doctrines founder. In the interest of science it is desirable that the polemic on these particular points should develop very soon in the specialist literature.

Marx begins with the presentation of the relationship between commodity and money, the essence of which was already published some time ago in a special work.^a He then passes on to capital, and here we soon come to the crucial point of the whole work. What is capital? Money which changes into a commodity in order to change from a commodity into more money than the original amount. When I buy cotton for 100 talers and sell this for 110 talers, I establish my 100 talers as capital, self-expanding value. Now the question arises: whence do the ten talers come which I earn in this process, how does it happen that by two simple exchanges 100 talers become 110 talers? For political economy presupposes that in all exchanges equal value is exchanged for equal value. Marx now runs through all possible cases (variations in the price of commodities, etc.) to prove that under the presuppositions assumed by political economy the formation of 10 talers *surplus-value* from an original sum of 100 talers is *impossible*. Nevertheless, this process takes place daily, and the economists still owe us an explanation for this. Marx provides the explanation as follows: The riddle can only be solved if we find on the market a commodity of a very peculiar kind, a commodity the use-value of which consists in creating exchange-value. This commodity exists: it is *labour-power*. The capitalist buys labour-power on the market and makes it work for him so as to sell its product again. We must therefore in the first instance examine labour-power.

What is the value of labour-power? According to a well-known law it is the value of the means of subsistence necessary to maintain and reproduce the worker in the manner historically established in the given country and epoch. We assume that the worker's labour-power is paid for at its full value. We assume further that this value is represented in *six hours' work* a day, or *half a working day*. But the capitalist claims that he has bought the labour-power for a *whole* day and makes the worker work 12

^a K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.—Ed.

hours or more. Hence with 12 hours of work he has acquired the product of six hours working-time without payment. Marx concludes: *All surplus-value*, whichever way it may be distributed, as capitalist gain, rent, tax, etc., is *unpaid labour*.

The struggle for the length of the working day arises from the interest of the factory owner to gain every day as much unpaid labour as possible and the opposite interest of the worker. Marx describes the course of this struggle in an illustration well worth reading, which fills about a hundred pages, taken from English large-scale industry; in spite of the protest of the factory owner, who was a champion of free trade, this struggle ended last spring in not only all factory industry, but all the small-scale and even domestic industry being brought under the restraints of the factory act which limits the daily work of women and children under 18 years of age—and therewith indirectly also that of men—in the most important industries to at most 10½ hours.¹⁵⁹ He also explains why English industry has not suffered, but on the contrary, gained thereby: since the work of every individual worker became more intense as its duration was shortened.

Surplus-value can, however, also be raised by another method than that of extending working-time beyond that needed to produce the necessary means of subsistence or their value. According to our previous assumption, a given working day of, say, 12 hours, contains six hours of necessary work and six hours of work used to produce surplus-value. If by some means we succeed in reducing the necessary working-time to five hours, there remain seven hours during which surplus-value is produced. This can be achieved by shortening the working-time needed to produce the necessary means of subsistence, in other words, by reducing their cost, and this again only by improvements in production. On this point Marx gives again a detailed illustration, examining and describing the three main levers by which these improvements are brought about: 1. *co-operation*, or the multiplication of the forces which results from the simultaneous and planned working together of many individuals; 2. the *division of labour* as it was developed in the period of manufacture properly so-called, i.e. up to about 1770; and, lastly, 3. *machinery* with the aid of which large-scale industry has developed since then. These descriptions are also of great interest, and reveal amazing expert knowledge, up to technical details...^a

We cannot go more deeply into the details of the studies on

^a The following page, where evidently surplus-value and wages were analysed, is missing.— *Ed.*

surplus-value and wages; to avoid misunderstandings we merely remark that wages are less than the total product of labour, as Marx proved by a number of quotations, and which is a fact not unknown to orthodox economics either. We must hope that this book will provide the opportunity for the gentlemen of the orthodox tradition to give us more enlightenment on this really strange point. It is most commendable that all factual examples given by Marx are taken from the best sources, mostly official parliamentary reports. We take this opportunity to support the author's plea made indirectly in the preface: that in Germany, too, working conditions in the various industries should be thoroughly investigated by government commissioners—who, however, should not be biassed bureaucrats—and their reports submitted to the Imperial Diet and the public.

The first volume concludes with a discourse on the accumulation of capital. Much has already been written on this point, but we must confess that here too there is much given that is new, while the old is presented from new angles. Most original is the attempt to prove that the accumulation of a redundant population of workers goes hand in hand with the concentration and accumulation of capital, and that eventually both make a social revolution on the one hand necessary, on the other possible.

Whatever the reader may think of the author's socialist views, we believe to have shown above that he has here before him a work which stands way above the current social-democratic literature of the day. We add that except for the somewhat stark dialectical style on the first 40 pages and in spite of its scientific strictness, the work is very easy to follow and is made most interesting by the author's sarcastic manner of writing which spares no one.

Written on October 12, 1867

Printed according to the manuscript

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Russian edition, Book II, Moscow, 1927

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *ELBERFELDER ZEITUNG*¹⁶⁰]

Karl Marx on Capital

(Hamburg, Otto Meissner, Volume I, 1867)

Fifty sheets of learned treatise to prove to us that the entire capital of our bankers, merchants, manufacturers and large landowners is nothing but the accumulated and unpaid labour of the working class! We recall that in 1849 the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* raised the demand for a “Silesian milliard” in the name of the Silesian peasants.^a A thousand million talers, it was claimed, were illegally withdrawn from the Silesian peasants alone, to flow into the pockets of the large landowners when serfdom and feudal services were abolished, and this amount was demanded back. But the gentlemen of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of old are like the late Sibyl with her books: the less they are offered, the more they ask. What are a thousand million talers compared with the colossal amount now demanded back in the name of the working class as a whole—for that is, surely, how we must understand it! If the entire accumulated capital of the propertied classes is nothing but “unpaid labour”, it would appear to follow directly that this labour is to be paid later, that is, the entire capital in question is to be transferred to labour. That would indeed raise the question *who* in particular would be entitled to receive it. But joking apart! However radically socialist the present book is in its approach, however blunt and unsparing on all hands its treatment of people who as a rule are regarded as authorities, we must confess that it is a most scholarly work which has a claim to be regarded as most

^a A reference to the series of articles *Die schlesische Milliarde* written by Wilhelm Wolff, an associate of Marx and Engels, and published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, Nos. 252, 255, 256, 258, 264, 270-72 and 281, from March 22 to April 25, 1849.—*Ed.*

strictly scientific. The press has already frequently mentioned Marx's intention to sum up the results of his many years' studies in a critique of the whole of political economy to date and thereby to provide the scientific basis for socialist aspirations which neither Fourier nor Proudhon nor even Lassalle had been able to do. This work has already long since and frequently been announced in the press. In 1859 a "first part"^a appeared at Duncker's in Berlin, which, however, dealt only with matters without immediate practical interest and which therefore caused hardly a stir. The following parts did not appear and the new socialist science seemed destined not to survive its birthpangs. How many jokes were not made about this new revelation which was announced so often and yet never once seemed actually about to appear in public! Well and good, here is at last the "first volume"—fifty sheets as we have said—and nobody can maintain that it does not contain enough and more than enough that is new, bold and audacious and that this is not presented in thoroughly scientific form. This time Marx appeals with his unusual propositions not to the masses but to the men of science. It is up to them to defend their economic theories which are here attacked at their foundations, and give proof that capital is indeed accumulated labour but not accumulated *unpaid* labour. Lassalle was a practical agitator, and it could suffice to oppose him in practical agitation, in the daily press and at meetings. But here we have a systematic scientific theory, and here the daily press cannot help to decide, here only science can speak the last word. It is to be hoped that people like Roscher, Rau, Max Wirth, etc., will seize the opportunity to defend the up till now generally recognised political economy against this new and certainly not contemptible attack. The social-democratic seed has sprouted among the younger generation and the working population of many a place—through this book it will in any case find plenty of new nourishment.

Written on October 22, 1867

First published in the *Elberfelder Zeitung*,
No. 302, November 2, 1867

Printed according to the news-
paper

Published in English for the first
time

^a A reference to Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *DÜSSELDORFER ZEITUNG*¹⁶¹]

Karl Marx. *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy.
Volume One. Hamburg, Meissner, 1867

This book will disappoint many a reader. In certain circles its appearance had been anticipated for years. Here the true secret socialist teaching and panacea was at last to be revealed, and many may have imagined, when at last they saw it announced, that they would now learn what the communist Millennium would actually be like. Anyone who had keenly awaited this pleasure made a great mistake. Indeed, he learns here how things should not be, and this he is told in detail with very outspoken bluntness on 784 pages, and he who has eyes to see will find here the demand for a social revolution clearly enough presented. Here it is not a question of workers' associations with state capital, as with Lassalle of old; here it is a question of *abolishing capital* altogether.

Marx is and remains the same revolutionary he has always been, and in a scientific work he would assuredly be the last to hide his views in this respect. But as for what is going to happen after the social revolution—on that he gives us only *very* dark hints. We learn that large-scale industry “matures the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form of the production process and thereby at the same time the elements for the formation of a new society and the elements for exploding the old one”,^a and further that the abolition of the capitalist form of production “restores individual property but on the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., of co-operation of free workers and the

^a Quoted from the first German edition of Volume One of *Capital*, pp. 492-93. Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, translated by S. Moore and E. Aveling and edited by F. Engels, London, 1887, Chapter XV, “Machinery and Modern Industry”. Section 9, p. 512.—Ed.

common ownership of the land and the means of production produced by labour itself".^a

With this we must rest content, and to judge by the present volume the promised second and third will also tell us little on this interesting point. For the present we must be contented with the "Critique of Political Economy", and there we get into a very wide field indeed. Here, of course, we cannot enter into the scientific consideration of the detailed conclusions presented in this voluminous book, we cannot even briefly repeat the main propositions put forward there. The more or less well-known principles of the socialist theory can all be reduced to the fact that in modern society the worker does not obtain the full value of the product of his labour. This proposition is also the red thread which runs through the present work, but it is made more acutely precise followed more consistently in all its implications, and knitted more closely into the main propositions of political economy or more directly placed in opposition to them than hitherto. This part of the work is distinguished to great advantage from all similar earlier writings we know by its attempt to be strictly scientific, and we see that the author takes seriously not only his own theory but science as a whole.

We found particularly striking in this book the author's conception of the propositions of political economy not, as is usual, as eternally valid truths but as the results of certain historical developments. While even the natural sciences are being transformed more and more into historical sciences—compare Laplace's astronomical theory, the whole of geology and the works of Darwin—political economy has hitherto been just as abstract and universally valid a science as mathematics. Whatever may be the fate of the remaining propositions of this book, we regard it as a lasting merit of Marx to have put an end to this narrow-minded concept. After this work it will no longer be possible to treat slave labour, serf labour and free wage labour, for example, as economically alike, or to apply laws which are valid for modern large-scale industry, conditioned by free competition, without further ado to the conditions of antiquity or the guilds of the Middle Ages, or, when these modern laws do not fit ancient conditions, simply to declare the ancient conditions as heretical. The Germans of all nations have the

^a Quoted from the first German edition of Volume One of *Capital*, p. 745. Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, London, 1887, Chapter XXXII, "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", p. 789.—*Ed.*

greatest, nay, even a unique historical sense, and thus it is quite natural that it is again a German who traces the historical connections also in the sphere of political economy.

Written between November 3 and 8,
1867

First published in the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung*,
No. 316, November 17, 1867

Printed according to the news-
paper

Published in English for the first
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Karl Marx

PLAGIARISM ¹⁶²

Social-Demokrat of November 29. General Meeting of the General Association of German Workers

Karl Marx: *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy, 1867. Section: "The Working Day"

Debate on the Working Day

Speaker: v. Hofstetten
(Owner of the *Social-Demokrat*):

1) "*Labour-power* is today a commodity. [...] The purchase price" (read: *the value*) "of a thing" (read: *commodity*) "is determined by the working-time necessary to its production. The worker must work a certain number of hours to reproduce the value he has received for his labour-power: that is the *necessary part of the working day*, but by no means the *working day itself*. To reproduce this, an indetermined part must" (why?) "be added; although it is *indetermined*, it has its *necessary limits*."

1) "We started with the supposition that *labour-power* is bought and sold at its *value*. Its value, like that of all other commodities, is determined by the working-time necessary to its production. If the production of the average daily means of subsistence of the labourer takes up six hours, he must work, on the average, six hours every day, to produce his daily labour-power, or to reproduce the *value* received as the result of its sale. The *necessary part of his working day* amounts to six hours, and is, therefore, *caeteris paribus*, a *given quantity*. But with this, *the extent of the work-*

ing day itself is not yet given... One of its parts, certainly, is determined by the working-time required for the continual reproduction of the labourer himself. But its total amount varies with the length or the duration of the *surplus-labour*... Although the working day is not a fixed, but a fluent quantity, it can, on the other hand, only vary *within certain limits*" (pp. 198, 199 [214-15]).

2) "One of these" (limits), "the *maximum limit*, rests in the physical possibility" (how can a limit rest in a possibility!) "of how long a man is able at all to work, as in order to keep alive he must also sleep, rest, dress and wash himself. The *minimum limit* is given by the demands of the prevailing *level of culture* of an epoch. The duration of the working day and of the surplus-labour also differ in accordance with this level and with the existing legislation. Accordingly, there are eight, twelve, sixteen, yes even 18-hour working days."

2) "The *minimum limit*" (of the working day) "is, however, not determinable; of course, if we make the surplus-labour=0, we have a minimum limit, i. e., the part of the day which the labourer must necessarily work for his own maintenance. On the basis of the capitalist mode of production, however, this necessary labour can form a part only of his working day; the working day itself can never be reduced to this minimum. On the other hand, the working day has a *maximum limit*. It cannot be prolonged beyond a certain point. This maximum limit is determined by two things. First, by the *physical bounds of labour-power*. Within the 24 hours of the natural day a man can expend only a definite quantity of his vital force and the extent of this expenditure of force is a measure for his physically possible working-time. A horse, in

like manner, can only work from day to day for 8 hours. During part of the day this force must rest, sleep; during another part the man has to satisfy other physical needs, to feed, wash and clothe himself, etc. Besides these *purely physical limitations*, the extension of the working day encounters *moral ones*. The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants, the extent and number of which are determined by the general *level of culture*... But both these limits" (the physical and moral maximum limits) "are of a very elastic nature, and allow the greatest latitude. So we find working days of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 hours" (p. 199 [215]).

Herr v. Hofstetten makes nonsense of the passage he plagiarises. Thus, for example, he lets the *maximum limit* of the working day be determined by purely *physical*, and the *minimum limit* by *moral* limitations, although he himself has earlier mechanically repeated that the *necessary part of the working day*, i.e., its absolute minimum limit, is determined by the *working-time necessary* to maintain the labour-power!

3) "Experience in England has shown that with a shorter working day the same surplus-labour is achieved, as in that case labour is greatly intensified."

4) "The *endeavour* of the capitalists therefore is to *aim* at the longest possible working day." (What nonsense! The endeavour to aim!) "But the worker possesses as sole commodity only his labour-power, and if in that a

3) On the intensification of labour and the achievement of equal or greater "surplus-labour" by the enforced legal restriction of the working day in England see pp. 401-09 [407-17].

4) "The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible, and to make, whenever possible, two

certain point is overstepped" (what does that mean: *a point is overstepped in the labour-power?*) "he must say *I am used up* (!), *I have been killed.*" (Well done! He is still supposed to say that after he has already been killed!) "Hence," (because he must say that!) "the extent of his labour must be fixed in the interest of the labourer, so that his commodity, labour-power, is maintained and can be *exploited* as long as possible. Therewith he demands only his due." (He has just complained that he has been *used up*; now he demands as his due to be exploited!)

working days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a definite normal duration... *I will*" (he says) "husband my sole wealth, labour-power... The *use* of my labour-power and the *spoliation* of it are quite different things... You pay me for one day's labour-power, whilst you use that of three days. That is against our contract and the law of commodity exchange. I demand, therefore, a working day of *normal* length, etc." (pp. 202, 201 [218, 217]).

5) "In England this measure" (for the working day) "is fixed by law at 10 hours(!) and there are factory inspectors who report on the observance of this law to the Home Secretary. In many countries there are also laws limiting the labour of children: in Austria, in Switzerland, in America and in *Belgium* (!) similar laws are in *preparation* (!). In *Prussia* there are also the same laws, but there they exist *only* on paper and have never been put into practice. In America, since the end of the Civil War which led to the emancipation of the slaves, an eight-hour day has even been demanded. The 'International Working Men's Congress' also proposed an eight-hour day, in 1866."

5) "The Factory Act of 1850 now in force" (not *in England*, but in *specific* industries of the United Kingdom named by Marx) "allows for the average working day of 10 hours... Certain guardians of the law are appointed, *Factory Inspectors*, directly under the Home Secretary, whose reports are published half-yearly by order of Parliament" (p. 207 [223]).

...Limitations of the working day for minors exist in certain States of North America in reality, not just in preparation (p. 244 [256]), limitation of the working day in general in France (p. 251 [262]), for children in some cantons of Switzerland (p. 251 [262-63]), in

Austria (p. 252 [263]), in Belgium *nothing* of the kind (ibid.). The ordinances of Messrs. v. d. Heydt and Manteuffel, etc., would be praiseworthy if they were put into practice (ibid.). "In the United States of North America, every independent movement of the workers was paralysed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic... But out of the death of slavery a new young life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the *eight hours agitation*. At the same time the "*The International Working Men's Congress*", made the following resolution: "...We propose eight hours work as the legal limit of the working day"¹⁶³ (pp. 279, 280 [287]).

In the same manner as Herr v. Hofstetten, the speaker who followed him, Herr *Geib* of Hamburg, bowdlerised the history of the English factory legislation given by Marx. Both gentlemen take the same care not to divulge the source of their wisdom.

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Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL* FOR THE *BEOBACHTER*¹⁶⁴]

Karl Marx. *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy.
Volume One. Hamburg, Meissner, 1867

Whatever one may think of the tendency of the book before us, we believe we may say that it is one of those achievements which do honour to the German spirit. It is indicative that while the author is a Prussian, he is one of the Rhenish Prussians, who until recently liked to describe themselves as "compulsory Prussians", and, moreover, a Prussian who has spent the last few decades far from Prussia, in exile. Prussia itself has long ceased to be a country of any scientific initiative whatsoever, and especially in historical, political or social subjects such an initiative would be impossible there. One could say of it that it represents the Russian rather than the German spirit.

As for the book itself, one must distinguish clearly between two very disparate aspects of it: between, firstly, its solid, positive expositions and, secondly, the tendential conclusions the author draws from them. The first are to a great extent a direct enrichment of science. The author there treats economic relations with a quite new, materialistic, natural-historic method. In this way he represents money and very expertly traces in detail the various successive forms of industrial production: co-operation, the division of labour and with it manufacture in the narrower sense, and lastly machinery, large-scale industry and the corresponding social combinations and relations which naturally grow one from the other.

As for the author's tendencies, we can here, too, discern again a two-fold trend. In so far as he endeavours to show that present-day society, economically considered, is pregnant with

another, higher form of society, he merely strives to present as law in the social sphere the same process which Darwin traced in natural history, a process of gradual evolution. Up to now such a gradual transformation has indeed taken place in social relations from antiquity through the Middle Ages to the present; and as far as we know it has never been seriously claimed from any scientific quarters that Adam Smith and Ricardo have said the last word on the future development of present-day society. On the contrary, liberal teaching on progress also includes progress in the social sphere, and it is one of the arrogant paradoxes of so-called socialists to pretend that they alone have a lien on social progress. By contrast to the run-of-the-mill socialists we must recognise it as a merit of Marx that he also traces progress where the extremely one-sided development of present-day conditions is accompanied by directly abhorrent consequences, as everywhere in the presentation of the great extremes of wealth and poverty resulting from the factory system as a whole, etc. Just by this critical conception of the subject the author has brought forward—certainly against his will—the strongest arguments against all socialism by the book.

It is quite a different matter with the other tendency, the author's subjective conclusions, with the manner in which he represents to himself and others the ultimate result of the present course of social developments. These have nothing to do with what we have called the positive part of the book; nay, if space permitted we could perhaps show that his *subjective* whims are refuted by his own *objective* exposition.

If Lassalle's entire socialism consisted in abusing the capitalists and flattering the Prussian rural squires, here we find the diametrical opposite. Herr Marx explicitly proves the historical necessity of the capitalist mode of production, as he calls the present social phase, and equally the superfluous nature of the merely consuming land-holding squirearchy. If Lassalle had big ideas about Bismarck's fitness to introduce the socialist Millennium, Herr Marx refutes his wayward pupil loudly enough. He not only explicitly declares that he will have nothing to do with any "Royal Prussian government socialism",^a he says straight out on p. 762 ff. that the system now prevailing in France and Prussia would shortly bring about the rule of the Russian knout over Europe if it were not stopped in time.¹⁶⁵

Finally, we remark that above we have only been able to con-

^a See this volume, p. 80.—*Ed.*

sider the main features of this big volume; in detail there is still much that could be said about it, but here we must pass it by. For this purpose there exist enough specialist journals, which will doubtless enter into this most remarkable phenomenon.

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Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *STAATS-ANZEIGER FÜR WÜRTTEMBERG*¹⁶⁶]

Karl Marx. *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy.
Volume One. Hamburg, Meissner, 1867

When we take the above work into consideration we certainly do not do so on account of the specifically socialist tendency which the author openly displays already in the preface.

We do so because, apart from this tendency, the work contains scientific expositions and factual material which deserve every consideration. We shall not enter into the scientific part either, since this is far from our purpose, and confine ourselves to the factual matters alone.

We do not believe that any work exists—either in German or a foreign language—in which the analytical fundamentals of more recent industrial history from the Middle Ages to the modern day are so clearly and completely summed up as on pages 302-495 of the present book in the three chapters: Co-operation, Manufacture and Large-scale Industry. Every single aspect of industrial progress is here emphasised in its proper place, according to merit, and even if the specific tendency comes through here and there, one must do the author justice for never moulding the facts to suit his theory but, on the contrary, seeking to present his theory as the result of the facts. He takes these facts always from the best sources, and where the latest state of affairs is concerned, from sources which are as authentic as they are at present unknown in Germany: the English Parliamentary Reports. German businessmen who consider their industry not merely from the standpoint of day-to-day business but regard it as an essential link in the whole development of large-scale modern industry in all countries and hence also take an interest in matters not directly concerning their own industry, will here find a copious source of instruction and will thank us for having directed their attention to it. For the time when every trade existed singly and quietly for itself alone has indeed long passed, now they all depend on one another and on the progress being made in distant lands as well as in the closest neighbourhood and on the changing economic

situation of the world market. And if, as may well be, the new Customs Union agreements¹⁶⁷ lead to a reduction in the present protective tariffs, all our manufacturers are likely to ask to be made better acquainted with the history of modern industry in general, so as to learn in advance how best to conduct themselves when such changes occur. Higher education, which up to now has saved us Germans again and again, in spite of the political dismemberment, would also in this case be the best weapon we could use against the crude materialism of the English.

This leads us to another point. With the new Customs Union legislation the moment may soon arrive when a uniform regulation of the working hours in the factories of the Union states will be demanded by the manufacturers themselves. It would be obviously unfair if in one state the working hours, especially of women and children, were entirely at the discretion of the manufacturer, while in another they were subject to considerable limitations. It will be difficult to avoid coming to an understanding on common regulations in this respect, and the more so if the protective tariffs were actually lowered. In this respect, however, we Germans have greatly insufficient, one could even say, no experience at all, and are entirely dependent on the lessons to be drawn from the legislation of other countries, particularly England, and from its fruits. And here the author has done a great service to German industry by giving the history of English factory legislation and its results in the greatest detail from official documents. (Cf. pp. 207-81 and 399-496,^a and passim.) This whole aspect of English industrial history is as good as unknown in Germany, and one will be surprised to learn that since a Parliamentary Act of the current year placed no fewer than a million and a half workers under government control, not only almost all industrial but even most of domestic and part of agricultural labour in England are now subjected to the supervision of officials and direct or indirect time limits. We ask our manufacturers not to be deterred by the tendency of this book from seriously studying particularly this part of it; sooner or later the same question will surely be put before them!

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^a See 1887 English edition, pp. 223-88 and 407-515.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *NEUE BADISCHE LANDESZEITUNG*¹⁶⁸]

Karl Marx. *Capital*. Critique of Political Economy.
Volume One. Hamburg, Meissner, 1867

We must leave it to others to deal with the theoretical and strictly scientific part of this work and criticise the new view the author gives of the origin of capital. But we cannot fail to draw attention to the great mass of most valuable historical and statistical material with which the author at the same time presents us and which almost without exception is taken from the official Commission Reports which have been put before the English Parliament. He is quite right to emphasise the importance of such commissions of inquiry for the study of the internal social conditions of a country. Provided the right people are found for them, they are the best means for a nation to learn to know itself; and Herr Marx is surely not wrong in saying that similar investigations conducted in Germany would lead to results which would definitely horrify us. Before they were introduced, there was not an Englishman either who knew how the poorer classes of his country lived!

It stands to reason, moreover, that without such investigations all social legislation will be made with only half the knowledge of facts available and often quite in the dark, as they now say in Bavaria. The so-called "inquiries" and "investigations" of German authorities have not remotely the same value. We know the bureaucratic routine only too well: forms are sent round, one is glad if they are returned filled in some way or another; the information thus supplied is all too often sought precisely among those who are interested in hushing up the truth. Compare with that the investigations of English commissions on working conditions in individual industries, for example. Not only the manufacturers and masters, but also the workers down to the little girls are interviewed, and not only these, but doctors, Justices of the Peace, clergymen, teachers, and moreover anyone

who can give any kind of information on the matter. Every question and every answer is taken down in shorthand and printed word for word, and is attached to the whole material on which the commission report with its conclusions and proposals is based. The report and its material at the same time proves in detail whether and how the commissioners have fulfilled their duty and makes things very difficult for individual bias. The details as well as innumerable examples can be read in the above book itself. Here we want only to emphasise the one point, that in England the expansion of the freedom of trade and business has gone hand in hand with the expansion of the legal limitation of the working hours for women and children, and therewith the placing of almost all industries under the supervision of the government. Herr Marx gives us a detailed historical presentation of this development, showing how first, since 1833, spinning and weaving mills were in this way limited to a 12-hour working day; how after a long struggle between manufacturers and workers the working hours were at long last fixed at $10\frac{1}{2}$ — $6\frac{1}{2}$ for children—and then, beginning in 1850, one industry after another became subject to this factory law. First the cotton printers (already in 1845), then in 1860 the dyeing and bleaching works, in 1861 the lace and hosiery manufactures, in 1863 the potteries, wallpaper factories, etc., and eventually in 1867 almost all the remaining industries of any importance. One can form a picture of the significance of this last Act of 1867 when one learns that it places no fewer than *a million and a half* women and children under the protection and the control of the law. We emphasise this point particularly because in this respect things are, alas, bad indeed with us in Germany, and we must thank the author for having dealt with it in such detail and made the facts accessible to the German public for the first time. This will be the view of every friend of humanity, whatever he may think of the theoretical propositions of Herr Marx.

Space does not permit us to enter into other valuable materials from the history of industry and agriculture, but we are of the opinion that no one interested in political economy, industry, workers' condition, the history of culture and social legislation, whatever standpoint he may hold, should leave this book unread.

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Organ der deutschen Volkspartei.

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1868.

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF *CAPITAL*
FOR THE *DEMOKRATISCHES WOCHENBLATT*¹⁶⁹]

Marx's *Capital* *

I

[*Demokratisches Wochenblatt*, No. 12, March 21, 1868]

As long as there have been capitalists and workers on earth no book has appeared which is of as much importance for the workers as the one before us. The relation between capital and labour, the axis on which our entire present system of society turns, is here treated scientifically for the first time, and at that with a thoroughness and acuity such as was possible only for a German. Valuable as the writings of an Owen, Saint-Simon or Fourier are and will remain—it was reserved for a German first to reach the height from which the whole field of modern social relations can be seen clearly and in full view just as the lower mountain scenery is seen by an observer standing on the top-most peak.

Political economy up to now has taught us that labour is the source of all wealth and the measure of all values, so that two objects whose production has cost the same labour time possess the same value and must also be exchanged for each other, since on the average only equal values are exchangeable for one another. At the same time, however, it teaches that there exists a kind of stored-up labour, which it calls capital; that this capital, owing to the auxiliary sources contained in it, raises the productivity of living labour a hundred and a thousandfold, and in return claims a certain compensation which is termed profit or gain. As we all know, this occurs in reality in such a way that the profits of stored-up, dead labour become ever more massive, the capitals of the capitalists become ever more colossal, while the

* *Das Kapital*. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, von Karl Marx. Erster Band. Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals. Hamburg, O. Meissner, 1867.

wages of living labour become ever smaller and the mass of the workers living solely on wages becomes ever more numerous and poverty-stricken. How is this contradiction to be solved? How can there remain a profit for the capitalist if the worker receives in compensation the full value of the labour he adds to his product? Yet this ought to be the case, since only equal values are exchanged. On the other hand, how can equal values be exchanged, how can the worker receive the full value of his product, if, as is admitted by many economists, this product is divided between him and the capitalist? Political economy up to now has been helpless in the face of this contradiction, and writes or stutters embarrassed meaningless phrases. Even the previous socialist critics of political economy have not been able to do more than to emphasise the contradiction; no one resolved it, until now at last Marx has traced the process by which this profit arises right to its birthplace and has thereby made everything clear.

In tracing the development of capital, Marx starts out from the simple, notoriously obvious fact that the capitalists increase the value of their capital through exchange: they buy commodities for their money and afterwards sell them for more money than they cost them. For example, a capitalist buys cotton for 1,000 talers and resells it for 1,100, thus "earning" 100 talers. This excess of 100 talers over the original capital Marx calls *surplus-value*. Where does this surplus-value come from? According to the economists' assumption, only equal values are exchanged and in the sphere of abstract theory this, of course, is correct. Hence the purchase of cotton and its resale can just as little yield surplus-value as the exchange of a silver taler for thirty silver groschen and the re-exchange of the small coins for a silver taler,^a a process by which one becomes neither richer nor poorer. But surplus-value can just as little arise from sellers selling commodities above their value, or purchasers buying them below their value, because each one is in turn buyer and seller and things would therefore again balance. Just as little can it arise from buyers and sellers reciprocally overreaching each other, for this would create no new or surplus-value, but only divide the existing capital differently among the capitalists. In spite of the fact that the capitalist buys the commodities at their value and sells them at their value, he gets more value out than he puts in. How does this happen?

The capitalist finds on the commodity market under present social conditions *a commodity* which has the peculiar property that

^a One silver taler equals 30 silver groschen.—*Ed.*

its use is a source of new value, is a creation of new value, and this commodity is labour-power.

What is the value of labour-power? The value of every commodity is measured by the labour required for its production. Labour-power exists in the form of the living worker who requires a definite amount of means of subsistence for his existence as well as for the maintenance of his family, which ensures the continuance of labour-power also after his death. The labour-time necessary for producing these means of subsistence represents, therefore, the value of the labour-power. The capitalist pays for it weekly and purchases thereby the use of one week's labour of the worker. So far messieurs the economists will be pretty well in agreement with us as to the value of labour-power.

The capitalist now sets his worker to work. In a certain period of time the worker will have performed as much labour as was represented by his weekly wages. Supposing that the weekly wages of a worker represent three workdays, then, if the worker begins on Monday, he has by Wednesday evening *replaced* to the capitalist the *full value of the wages paid*. But does he then stop working? Not at all. The capitalist has bought his *week's* labour and the worker must go on working during the last three days of the week too. This *surplus-labour* of the worker, over and above the time necessary to replace his wages, is the *source of surplus-value*, of profit, of the steadily growing increase of capital.

Do not say it is an arbitrary assumption that the worker works off in three days the wages he has received, and works the remaining three days for the capitalist. Whether he takes exactly three days to replace his wages, or two or four, is to be sure quite immaterial here and hence varies according to circumstances; the main point is that the capitalist, besides the labour he pays for, also extracts labour that he *does not pay for*, and this is no arbitrary assumption, for the day the capitalist were to extract from the worker in the long run only as much labour as he paid him in wages, on that day he would shut down his workshop, since indeed his whole profit would come to nought.

Here we have the solution of all those contradictions. The origin of surplus-value (of which the capitalists' profit forms an important part) is now quite clear and natural. The value of the labour-power is paid for, but this value is far smaller than that which the capitalist manages to extract from the labour-power, and it is precisely the difference, the *unpaid labour*, that constitutes the share of the capitalist, or, more accurately, of the capitalist class. For even the profit that the cotton dealer made on his cotton

in the above example must consist of unpaid labour, if cotton prices did not rise. The trader must have sold [it] to a cotton manufacturer, who is able to extract a profit for himself from his product besides the 100 talers, and therefore shares with him the unpaid labour he has pocketed. In general it is this unpaid labour which maintains all the non-working members of society. The state and municipal taxes, as far as they affect the capitalist class, as also the rent of the landowners, etc., are paid from it. On it rests the whole existing social system.

It would, however, be absurd to assume that unpaid labour arose only under present conditions where production is carried on by capitalists on the one hand and wage-workers on the other. On the contrary, the oppressed class at all times has had to perform unpaid labour. During the whole long period when slavery was the prevailing form of the organisation of labour, the slaves had to perform much more labour than was returned to them in the form of means of subsistence. The same was the case under the rule of serfdom and right up to the abolition of peasant *corvée* labour; here in fact the difference stands out palpably between the time during which the peasant works for his own maintenance and the surplus-labour for the feudal lord, precisely because the latter is carried out separately from the former. The form has now been changed, but the substance remains and as long as "a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production" (Marx, p. 202 [218]).

II

[*Demokratisches Wochenblatt*, No. 13, March 28, 1868]

In the previous article we saw that every worker employed by a capitalist performs two kinds of labour: during one part of his working-time he replaces the wages advanced to him by the capitalist, and this part of his labour Marx terms the *necessary labour*. But afterwards he has to go on working and during that time he produces *surplus-value* for the capitalist, an important part of which constitutes profit. That part of the labour is called surplus-labour.

Let us assume that the worker works three days of the week to replace his wages and three days to produce surplus-value for the

capitalist. In other words, it means that, with a twelve-hour working day, he works six hours daily for his wages and six hours for the production of surplus-value. One can get only six days out of the week, and even by including Sunday only seven at the most, but one can extract six, eight, ten, twelve, fifteen or even more hours of work out of every single day. The worker sells the capitalist a working day for his day's wages. But, *what is a working day?* Eight hours or eighteen?

It is in the capitalist's interest to make the working day as long as possible. The longer it is, the more surplus-value it produces. The worker correctly feels that every hour of labour which he performs over and above the replacement of his wages is unjustly taken from him; he learns from bitter personal experience what it means to work excessive hours. The capitalist fights for his profit, the worker for his health, for a few hours of daily rest, to be able to engage in other human activities as well, besides working, sleeping and eating. It may be remarked in passing that it does not depend at all upon the good will of the individual capitalists whether they desire to embark on this struggle or not, since competition compels even the most philanthropic among them to join his colleagues and to fix working hours to be as long as theirs.

The struggle for the fixing of the working day has lasted from the first appearance of free workers in the arena of history down to the present day. In various trades various traditional working days prevail; but in reality they are seldom observed. Only where the law fixes the working day and supervises its observance can one really say that there exists a normal working day. And up to now this is the case virtually solely in the factory districts of England. Here the ten-hour working day (ten and a half hours on five days, seven and a half hours on Saturday) has been fixed for all women and for youths of thirteen to eighteen, and since the men cannot work without them, they also come under the ten-hour working day.¹⁷⁰ This law has been won by English factory workers by years of endurance, by the most persistent, stubborn struggle with the factory owners, by freedom of the press, the right of association and assembly, as well as by adroit utilisation of the divisions in the ruling class itself. It has become the palladium of the English workers, it has gradually been extended to all important branches of industry and last year to almost *all trades*, at least to all those employing women and children. The present work contains most exhaustive material on the history of this legislative regulation of the working day in England. The next "North German Imperial Diet" will also have

factory regulations to discuss and in connection therewith the regulation of factory labour. We expect that none of the deputies that have been elected by German workers will proceed to discuss this bill without previously making themselves thoroughly conversant with Marx's book. *There is much to be achieved here.* The divisions within the ruling classes are more favourable to the workers than they ever were in England, because *universal suffrage compels the ruling classes to court the favour of the workers.* Under these circumstances, four or five representatives of the proletariat¹⁷¹ are a power, if they know how to use their position, if above all they know what is at issue, which the bourgeois do not know. And for this purpose, Marx's book gives them all the material in ready form.

We will pass over a number of further excellent investigations of more theoretical interest and will pause only at the final chapter which deals with the accumulation or amassing of capital. Here it is first shown that the capitalist mode of production, i.e. that inaugurated by capitalists on the one hand and wage-workers on the other, not only continually regenerates capital for the capitalist, but at the same time also continually produces the poverty of the workers; thereby it is provided for a constant regeneration of, on the one hand, capitalists who are the owners of all means of subsistence, all raw materials and all instruments of labour, and, on the other hand, the great mass of the workers, who are compelled to sell their labour-power to these capitalists for a quantum of the means of subsistence which at best just suffices to keep them able-bodied and to bring up a new generation of able-bodied proletarians. But capital does not merely reproduce itself: it is continually increased and multiplied—and thereby its power over the propertyless class of workers. And just as it itself is reproduced on an ever greater scale, so the modern capitalist mode of production reproduces the class of propertyless workers also on an ever greater scale, in ever greater numbers. "...Accumulation of capital reproduces the capital-relation on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage-workers at that.... *Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat*" (p. 600 [627]). Since, however, owing to the progress of machinery, owing to improved agriculture, etc., fewer and fewer workers are necessary in order to produce the same quantity of products, since this perfecting, that is, this making the workers superfluous, is more rapid than even the growth of capital, what becomes of this ever-increasing number of workers? They form an industrial reserve army, which, when

business is bad or middling, is paid *below* the value of its labour and is irregularly employed or is left to be cared for by public charity, but which is indispensable to the capitalist class at times when business is especially lively, as is palpably evident in England—but which *under all circumstances* serves to break the power of resistance of the regularly employed workers and to keep their wages down. “The greater the social wealth ... the greater is the relative surplus-population, or industrial reserve-army. But the greater this reserve-army in proportion to the active (regularly employed) labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated (permanent) surplus-population, or strata of workers, whose misery is in inverse ratio^a to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus-layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve-army, the greater is official pauperism. *This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation*” (p. 631 [659-60]).

These, strictly scientifically-proved—and the official economists are taking great care not to make even an attempt at a refutation—are some of the chief laws of the modern, capitalist, social system. But does this tell the whole story? By no means. Marx sharply stresses the bad sides of capitalist production but with equal emphasis clearly proves that this social form was necessary to develop the productive forces of society to a level which will make possible an equal development worthy of human beings for *all* members of society. All earlier forms of society were too poor for this. Capitalist production is the first to create the wealth and the productive forces necessary for this, but at the same time it also creates, in the numerous and oppressed workers, the social class which is compelled more and more to claim the utilisation of this wealth and these productive forces for the whole of society—instead of their being utilised, as they are today, for a monopolist class.

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^a Should be “in direct proportion”. Marx made this change in the French edition of Volume One of *Capital*.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

[REVIEW OF VOLUME ONE OF CAPITAL FOR THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW¹⁷²]

*Karl Marx on Capital.**

I.

Mr. Thomas Tooke, in his inquiries on currency, points out the fact that money, in its function as capital, undergoes a reflux to its point of issue, while this is not the case with money performing the function of mere currency.^a This distinction (which, however, had been established long before by Sir James Steuart)^b is used by Mr. Tooke merely as a link in his argumentation against the "Currency men" and their assertions as to the influence of the issue of paper-money on the prices of commodities.¹⁷³ Our author, on the contrary, makes this distinction the starting point of his inquiry into the nature of capital itself, and especially as regards the question: How is money, this independent form of existence of value, converted into capital?

All sorts of businessmen—says Turgot—have this in common, that they *buy in order to sell*; their purchases are an advance which afterwards is returned to them.^c

To buy in order to sell, such is indeed the transaction in which money functions as capital, and which necessitates its return to its point of issue, in contradistinction to *selling in order to buy*, in which process money may function as currency only. Thus it is seen that the different order in which the acts of selling and buying follow upon each other, impress upon money two different motions of

* *Das Kapital*. Von Karl Marx. Erster Band, Hamburg, Meissner, 1867.

^a Th. Tooke, *An Inquiry into the Currency Principle*, London, 1844, pp. 69-70.—*Ed.*

^b J. Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy*.—*Ed.*

^c Turgot, "Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses" in *Oeuvres*, Tome premier, Paris, 1844, p. 43.—*Ed.*

circulation. In order to illustrate these two processes, our author gives the following formulae:

To sell in order to buy: a commodity C is exchanged for money M , which is again exchanged for another commodity C ; or: $C—M—C$.

To buy in order to sell: money is exchanged for a commodity and this is again exchanged for money: $M—C—M$.

The formula $C—M—C$ represents the simple circulation of commodities, in which money functions as means of circulation, as currency. This formula is analysed in the first chapter of our book¹⁷⁴ which contains a new and very simple theory of value and of money, extremely interesting scientifically, but which we here leave out of consideration as, on the whole, immaterial to what we consider the vital points of Mr. Marx's views on capital.

The formula $M—C—M$, on the other hand, represents that form of circulation in which money resolves itself into capital.

The process of buying in order to sell: $M—C—M$, may evidently be resolved into $M—M$; it is an indirect exchange of money against money. Suppose I buy cotton for £1,000.—and sell it for £1,100.—; then, *in fine*, I have exchanged £1,000 for £1,100, money for money.

Now, if this process were always to result in returning to me the same sum of money which I had advanced, it would be absurd. But, whether the merchant, who [had] advanced £1,000, realises £1,100, or £1,000, or even £900 only, his money has gone through a phase essentially different from that of the formula $C—M—C$; which formula means, to sell in order to buy, to sell what you do not want in order to be able to buy that what you do want. Let me compare the two formulae.

Each process is composed of two phases or acts, and these two acts are identical in both formulae; but there is a great difference between the two processes themselves. In $C—M—C$, money is merely the mediator; the Commodity, useful value, forms the starting and the concluding point. In $M—C—M$, the commodity is the intermediate link, while money is the beginning and the end. In $C—M—C$ the money is spent once for all; in $M—C—M$ it is merely advanced, with the intention to recover it; it returns to its point of issue, and in this we have a first palpable difference between the circulation of money as *currency* and of money as *capital*.

In the process of selling in order to buy, $C—M—C$, the money can return to its point of issue on the condition only that the whole process be repeated, that a fresh quantity of commodity be

sold. The reflux, therefore, is independent of the process itself. But in $M-C-M$, this reflux is a necessity and intended from the beginning; if it does not take place, there is a hitch somewhere and the process remains incomplete.

To sell in order to buy, has for its object the acquisition of *useful* value; to buy in order to sell, that of *exchangeable* value.

In the formula $C-M-C$, the two extremes are, economically speaking, identical. They are both commodities; they are, moreover, of the same quantitative value, for the whole theory of value implies the supposition that, normally, equivalents only are exchanged. At the same time, these two extremes $C-C$ are two useful values different in quality, and they are exchanged on that very account.—In the process of $M-C-M$, the whole operation, at the first glance, appears meaningless. To exchange £100 for £100, and that by a roundabout process, appears absurd. A sum of money can differ from another sum of money by its quantity only. $M-C-M$, therefore, can only have any meaning by the quantitative difference of its extremes. There must be more money drawn out from circulation than had been thrown into it. The cotton bought for £1,000 is sold for £1,100 = £1,000 + £100; the formula representing the process, thus, changes to $M-C-M'$, in which $M' = M + \Delta M$, M plus an increment. This ΔM , this increment, Mr. Marx calls *surplus-value*.* The value originally advanced not only maintains itself, it also adds to itself an increment, it *begets value*, and *it is this process which changes money into capital*.

In the form of circulation $C-M-C$, the extremes *may*, certainly, also differ in value, but such a circumstance would here be perfectly indifferent; the formula does not become absurd if both extremes are equivalents. On the contrary, it is a condition of its normal character that they should be so.

The repetition of $C-M-C$ is limited by circumstances entirely extraneous to the process of exchange itself: by the requirements of consumption. But in $M-C-M$, beginning and end are identical as to quality, and by that very fact the motion is, or may be, perpetual. No doubt, $M + \Delta M$ is different in quantity from M ; but still it is a mere limited sum of money. If you spend it, it will cease to be capital; if you withdraw it from circulation, it will be a stationary hoard. The inducement once admitted for the process of making value beget value, this inducement exists as much for M' as it existed for M ; the motion of capital becomes

* Wherever "value" is here used without qualification, it always means *value in exchange*.

perpetual and endless, because at the close of each separate transaction its end is no more attained than before. The performance of this endless process transforms the owner of money into a *capitalist*.

Apparently, the formula $M—C—M$ is applicable to merchants' capital alone. But the manufacturer's capital, too, is money which is exchanged for commodities and re-exchanged for more money. No doubt, in this case, a number of operations intervene between purchase and sale, operations which are performed outside of the sphere of mere circulation; but they do not change anything in the nature of the process. On the other hand, we see the same process in its most abbreviated form in capital lent on interest. Here the formula dwindles down to $M—M'$, value which is, so to say, greater than itself.

But whence does this increment of M , this surplus-value arise? Our previous inquiries into the nature of commodities, of value, of money, and of circulation itself, not only leave it unexplained, but appear even to exclude any form of circulation which results in such a thing as a surplus-value. The whole difference between the circulation of commodities ($C—M—C$) and the circulation of money as capital ($M—C—M$) appears to consist in a simple reversion of the process; how should this reversion be capable of producing such a strange result?

Moreover: this reversion exists for *one* only of the three parties to the process. I, as a capitalist, buy a commodity from A, and sell it again to B. A and B appear as mere sellers and buyers of commodities. I myself appear, in buying from A, merely as an owner of money, and in selling to B, as owner of a commodity; but in neither transaction do I appear as a capitalist, as the representative of something which is *more* than either money or commodity. For A the transaction began with a sale, for B it began with a purchase. If from my point of view there is a reversion of the formula $C—M—C$, there is none from theirs. Besides, there is nothing to prevent A from selling his commodity to B without my intervention, and then there would be no occasion for any surplus-value.

Suppose A and B buy their respective requirements from each other directly. As far as useful value is concerned they may both be gainers. A may even be able to produce more of his particular commodity than B could produce in the same time, and *vice versa*, in which case they both would gain. But it is different with regard to value in exchange. In this latter case equal quantities of value are exchanged, whether money serves as the medium or not.

Considered in the abstract, that is to say excluding all circumstances which are not deducible from the inherent laws of the simple circulation of commodities, there is in this simple circulation, besides the fact of one useful value being replaced by another, a mere change of form of the commodity. The *same* value in exchange, the same quantity of social labour fixed in an object, remains in the hands of the owner of the commodity, be it in the shape of this commodity itself, or in that of the money it is sold for, or in that of the second commodity bought for the money. This change of form does not in any way involve any change in the quantity of the value, as little as the exchange of a five pound note for five sovereigns. Inasmuch as there is merely a change in the *form* of the value in exchange, there must be exchange of equivalents, at least whenever the process takes place in its purity and under normal conditions. Commodities *may* be sold at prices above or below their values, but if they are, the law of the exchange of commodities is always violated. In its pure and normal form, therefore, the exchange of commodities is not a means of creating surplus-value. Hence arises the error of all economists who attempt to derive surplus-value from the exchange of commodities, such as Condillac.^a

We will, however, suppose that the process does not take place under normal conditions, and that non-equivalents are exchanged. Let every seller, for instance, sell his commodity 10 per cent above its value. *Caeteris paribus*,^b everybody loses again as a buyer what he had gained as a seller. It would be exactly the same as if the value of money had fallen 10 per cent. The reverse, with the same effect, would take place if all buyers bought their goods 10 per cent below their value. We do not get an inch nearer to a solution by supposing that every owner of commodities sells them above their value in his quality as a producer, and buys them above their value in his quality as a consumer.

The consistent representatives of the delusion that surplus-value arises from a nominal addition to the price of commodities presuppose always the existence of a class which buys without ever selling, which consumes without producing. At this stage of our inquiry, the existence of such a class is as yet inexplicable. But admit it. Whence does that class receive the money with which it keeps buying? Evidently from the producers of commodities—on the strength of no matter what legal or compulsory titles, without

^a E. B. Condillac, "Le commerce et le gouvernement" in *Mélanges d'économie politique*, Paris, 1847, pp. 267 and 290-91.—*Ed.*

^b Other things being equal.—*Ed.*

exchange. To sell, to such a class, commodities above their value, means nothing but to recover a portion of the money which had been given away gratuitously. Thus the cities of Asia Minor, while paying a tribute to the Romans, recovered part of this money by cheating the Romans in trade; but after all, these cities were the greatest losers of the two. This, then, is no method of creating surplus-value.

Let us suppose the case of cheating. A sells to B wine of the value of £40 for corn of the value of £50. A has gained £10 and B has lost £10, but betwixt them, they have only £90 just as before. Value has been transferred but not created. The whole capitalist class of a country cannot, by cheating one another, increase their collective wealth.

Therefore: If equivalents are exchanged, there arises no surplus-value, and if non-equivalents are exchanged, there arises no surplus-value either. The circulation of commodities creates no new value. This is the reason why the two oldest and most popular forms of capital, commercial capital and interest-bearing capital, are here left entirely out of consideration. To explain the surplus-value appropriated by these two forms of capital otherwise than as the result of mere cheating, a number of intermediate links are required which are still wanting at this stage of the inquiry. Later on we shall see that they both are secondary forms only and shall also trace the cause why both appear in history long before modern capital.

Surplus-value, then, cannot originate from the circulation of commodities. But can it originate outside of it? Outside of it, the owner of a commodity is simply the producer of that commodity, the value of which is established by the amount of his labour contained in it and measured by a fixed social law. This value is expressed in money of account, say, in a price of £10. But this price of £10 is not at the same time a price of £11; this labour contained in the commodity creates value, but no value which begets new value; it can add new value to existing value, but merely by adding new labour. How, then, should the owner of a commodity, outside the sphere of circulation, without coming into contact with other owners of commodities—how should he be able to produce surplus-value, or in other words, to change commodities or money into capital?

“Capital, then, cannot originate from the circulation of commodities, and no more can it *not* originate from it. It has to find its source in it, and yet *not* in it. The change of money into capital has to be explained on the basis of the laws inherent to the

exchange of commodities, *the exchange of equivalents forming the starting-point*. Our owner of money, as yet the mere chrysalis of a capitalist, has to buy his commodities at their value, to sell them at their value, and yet to extract more money from this process than he had invested in it. His development into the capitalist butterfly has to take place within the sphere of the circulation of commodities, and yet *not* within it. These are the terms of the problem. *Hic Rhodus, hic salta*"^a [144-45].

And now for the solution:

"The change in the value of the money, which is to be transformed into capital, cannot take place in that money itself; for, as means of purchase and means of payment, it merely *realises* the price of the commodity which it buys or pays for, while if it remained in its money-form, without being exchanged, it could never change its value at all. No more can the change arise from the second act of the process, the re-sale of the commodity; because this merely changes the commodity from its natural form into the form of money. *The change must take place with the commodity* which is bought in the first act *M—C*; but it cannot take place in its value in exchange, because we exchange equivalents; the commodity is bought at its value. *The change can only arise from its value in use*, that is *from the use which is made of it*. In order to extract value in exchange from the use of a commodity, our owner of money must have the good luck to discover, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, *the useful value of which is endowed with the peculiar quality of being a source of exchangeable value, the using-up of which is the realisation of labour and therefore the creation of value*. And the owner of money finds, in the market, such a specific commodity: the power to work, *the labour-power*.

"By power to work, or labour-power, we understand the sum total of the physical and mental faculties which exist in the living person of a human being and which he puts into motion when he produces useful values.

"But in order to enable the owner of money to meet the labour-power as a commodity in the market, several conditions have to be fulfilled. In itself, the exchange of commodities does not include any other relations of dependence except such as arise from its own nature. On this supposition, labour-power can

^a "Here is Rhodes, leap here!"—words addressed to a Swaggerer (in a fable by Aesop, "The Boasting Traveller") who claimed that he had made tremendous leaps in Rhodes. Figuratively means: "Here is the main point, now show us what you can do."—*Ed.*

appear as a commodity, in the market, so far only as it is offered for sale, or sold, by its own owner, the person whose labour-power it is. In order to enable its owner to sell it as a commodity, he must be able to dispose of it, he must be the free proprietor of his labour-power, of his person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and transact business, as each other's peers, as free and independent owners of commodities, so far different only, that the one is the buyer and the other the seller. This relation of equality before the law must continue; the owner of the labour-power can, therefore, sell it for a limited time only. If he were to sell it in a lump, once for all, he would sell himself, he would from a free man change into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity... The second essential condition to enable the money-owner to meet labour-power as a commodity in the market, is this: that the owner of the labour-power, instead of selling commodities in which his labour has been embodied, be compelled to sell this, his labour-power itself, such as it exists in his own personality.

"No producer can sell commodities different from his own labour-power, unless possessed of means of production, raw materials, instruments of labour, etc. He can make no boots without leather. Moreover, he requires the means of subsistence. Nobody can feed upon future products, upon useful values the production of which he has not yet completed; as on the first day of his appearance on the stage of the world, man is compelled to consume before and while he produces. If his products are produced as *commodities*, they must be sold *after* production, and can satisfy his wants after the sale only. The time of production is lengthened by the time required for sale.

"The change of money into capital, thus, requires that the money-owner meet in the market the *free labourer*, free in that double sense, that he, as a free person, can dispose of his labour-power; and that, on the other hand, he have no other commodities to sell; that he be entirely unencumbered with, perfectly free from, all the things necessary for putting his labour-power into action.

"The question why this free labourer meets him in the market, has no interest for the money-owner. For him, the labour-market is only one of the various departments of the general market for commodities. And, for the moment, it has no interest for us either. We stick to the fact theoretically, as he sticks to it practically. One thing, however, is clear. It is not nature which produces, on the one hand, owners of money and of commodities,

and on the other, owners of nothing but their own labour-power. This relation does not belong to natural history; nor is it a social relation common to all historical periods. It is evidently the result of a long historical process, the product of a number of economical revolutions, of the destruction of a whole series of older [...^a] strata of social production.

“The economical categories which we have previously analysed bear in the same manner the impress of their historical origin. The existence of a product in the form of a commodity involves certain historical conditions. In order to become a commodity, the product must not be produced as the immediate means of subsistence of the producer. Now, if we had inquired: How and under what circumstances do all, or at least the great majority of products adopt the form of commodities?—we should have found that this occurs exclusively on the basis of a specific system of production, the *capitalistic* mode of production. But this inquiry was entirely foreign to the analysis of commodity. The production and circulation of commodities may take place, while the overwhelming mass of products—produced for immediate domestic self-use—is never changed into commodities; while, thus, the process of social production, in all its breadth and depth, is, as yet, far from being ruled by value in exchange... or, in analysing money, we find that the existence of money presupposes a certain development of the circulation of commodities. The peculiar forms of existence of money, such as the form of simple equivalent, or of means of circulation, means of payment, hoard, or universal money, as either one or the other may prevail, point to very different stages of the process of social production. Still, experience shows that a relatively crude state of the circulation of commodities suffices to produce all these forms. But with capital it is quite different. The historical conditions necessary for its existence are far from being created simultaneously with the mere circulation of commodities and money. Capital can originate when the owner of the means of production and subsistence meets, in the market, the free labourer offering for sale his labour-power, and this one condition implies ages of historical development. Thus capital at once heralds itself as a specific epoch of the process of social production.” [145-149]

We have now to examine this peculiar commodity, the labour-power. It has a value in exchange, as all other commodities; this value is determined in the same way as that of all other

^a Here the word “formations” is deleted in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

commodities: by the time of labour required for its production, which includes reproduction. The value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner in a normal state of fitness for work. These means of subsistence are regulated by climate and other natural conditions, and by a standard historically established in every country. They vary, but for a given country and a given epoch they are also given. Moreover, they include the means of subsistence for the substitutes of worn-out labourers, for their children, so as to enable this peculiar species of owners of a commodity to perpetuate itself. They include, finally, for skilled labour, the expense of education.

The minimal limit of the value of labour-power is the value of the physically absolute necessities of life. If its price falls to this limit, it falls below its value, as the latter involves labour-power of normal, not of inferior quality.

The nature of labour makes it evident that labour-power is used *after* the conclusion of the sale only;—and in all countries with capitalist mode of production, labour is paid after having been performed. Thus everywhere the labourer gives credit to the capitalist. Of the practical consequences of this credit given by the labourer, Mr. Marx gives some interesting examples from Parliamentary papers, for which we refer to the book itself.—

In consuming labour-power, its purchaser produces at once commodities and surplus-value; and in order to examine this, we have to leave the sphere of circulation for that of production.

Here we find at once that the process of labour is of a double nature. On the one hand it is the simple process of production of useful value; as such, it can and must exist under all historical forms of social existence; on the other hand, it is this process carried on under the specific conditions of capitalistic production, as before stated. These we have now to inquire into.

The process of labour, on a capitalistic basis, has two peculiarities. Firstly, the labourer works under the control of the capitalist who takes care that no waste is made and that no more than the socially indispensable amount of labour is spent upon each individual piece of work. Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist, the process itself being carried on between two things belonging to him: the labour-power and the means of work.

The capitalist does not care for the useful value, except so far as it is the incorporation of exchangeable value, and above all, of

surplus-value. His object is to produce a commodity of a value higher than the sum of value invested in its production. How can this be done?

Let us take a given commodity, say cotton yarn, and analyse the quantity of labour embodied in it. Suppose that for the production of 10 lbs of yarn we require 10 lbs of cotton, value 10/- (leaving waste out of consideration). There are further required certain means of work, a steam-engine, carding-engines and other machinery, coal, lubricants, etc. To simplify matters, we call all these "spindle" and suppose that the share of wear and tear, coal, etc., required for spinning 10 lbs of yarn, is represented by 2/-. Thus we have 10/- cotton+2/- spindle=12/-. If 12/- represent the product of 24 working hours or two working days, then the cotton and spindle in the yarn incorporate two days' labour. Now, how much is added in the spinning?

We will suppose the value, *per diem*,^a of labour-power to be 3/-, and these 3/- to represent the labour of six hours. Further, that six hours are required to spin 10 lbs of yarn by one labourer. In this case 3/- have been added to the product by labour, the value of the 10 lbs yarn is 15/- or 1/6d. per lb.

This process is very simple, but it does not result in any surplus-value. Nor can it, as in capitalistic production things are not carried on in this simple way.

"We supposed the value of labour-power was 3/- *per diem* and that 6 hours' labour was represented by that sum. But if *half-a-day's* labour is required to maintain a labourer for 24 hours, there is nothing in that to prevent the same labourer from working a *whole* day. The exchangeable value of labour-power, and the value which it may produce, are two entirely different quantities, and it was this difference which the capitalist had in his eye when he invested his money in that commodity. That it has the quality of producing useful value, was a mere *conditio sine qua non* inasmuch as labour must be invested in a useful form in order to produce value. But our capitalist looked beyond that; what attracted him was the specific circumstance that this labour-power is the source of exchangeable value, and of more exchangeable value than is contained in itself. This is the peculiar 'service' which he expects from it. And in doing so, he acts in accordance with the eternal laws of the exchange of commodities. The seller of the labour-power realises its exchangeable, and parts with its useful value. He cannot obtain the one without giving away the other.

^a Daily.—Ed.

The useful value of the labour-power, labour itself, no more belongs to its seller, than the useful value of sold oil to an oil-merchant. The capitalist has paid the value *per diem* of the labour-power; to him, therefore, belongs its use during the day, a day's labour. The circumstance that the maintenance of the labour-power for one day costs half a day's labour only, although this labour-power can be made to work a whole day; that, therefore, the value created by its use during a day, is twice as great as its own daily value—this circumstance is a peculiar piece of good luck for the buyer, but not at all a wrong inflicted upon the seller.

“The labourer, then, works 12 hours, spins 20 lbs of yarn representing 20/- in cotton, 4/- in spindle, etc., and his labour costs 3/-,—total, 27/-. But if 10 lbs of cotton absorbed 6 hours of labour, 20 lbs of cotton have absorbed 12 hours of labour, equal to 6/-. The 20lbs of yarn now represent 5 days of labour; 4 in the shape of cotton and spindle, etc., 1 in the shape of spinning labour; the expression, in money, for 5 days' labour, is 30/-; consequently the price of the 20 lbs yarn is 30/-, or 1/6d. per lb. as before. But the sum total of the value of the commodities invested in this process was 27/-. The value of the product has increased beyond the value of the commodities invested in its production by one-ninth. Thus 27/- have been transformed into 30/-. They have produced a surplus-value of 3/-. The trick has, at last, succeeded. Money has been converted into capital.

“All the conditions of the problem have been solved, and the laws of the exchange of commodities have in no way been violated. Equivalent has been exchanged against equivalent. The capitalist, as purchaser, has paid every commodity at its value: cotton, spindles, etc., labour-power. After which, he did what every buyer of commodities does. He consumed their useful value. The process of consumption of the labour-power, at the same time process of production of the commodity, resulted in a product of 20 lbs of yarn, value 30/-. Our capitalist returns to the market and sells the yarn at 1/6 d. per lb., not a fraction above or below its value, and yet he extracts 3/- more from circulation than he originally invested in it. The whole of this process, the transformation of his money into capital, passes within the sphere of circulation, and at the same time *not* within it. By the intervention of circulation, because the purchase, in the market, of the labour-power was its indispensable condition. Not within the sphere of circulation, because this merely initiates the process of value begetting value, which is performed in the sphere of

production. And thus *tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles.*"^a [174-176]

From the demonstration of the mode in which surplus-value is produced, Mr. Marx passes to its analysis. It is evident, from what precedes, that only one portion of the capital invested in any productive undertaking directly contributes to the production of surplus-value, and that is the capital laid out in the purchase of labour-power. This portion only produces *new* value; the capital invested in machinery, raw material, coal, etc., does indeed re-appear in the value of the product *pro tanto*,^b it is maintained and reproduced, but no surplus-value can proceed from it. This induces Mr. Marx to propose a new subdivision of capital into *constant* capital, that which is merely reproduced—the portion invested in machinery, raw materials and all other accessories to labour;—and *variable* capital, that which is not only reproduced, but is, at the same time, the direct source of surplus-value—that portion which is invested in the purchase of labour-power, in wages. From this it is clear, that however necessary constant capital may be to the production of surplus-value, yet it does not directly contribute to it; and, moreover, the amount of constant capital invested in any trade has not the slightest influence upon the amount of surplus-value produced in that trade.* Consequently, it ought not to be taken into consideration in fixing the *rate* of surplus-value. That can be determined only by comparing the amount of surplus-value to the amount of capital directly engaged in creating it, that is to say, the amount of *variable* capital. Mr. Marx, therefore, determines the rate of surplus-value by its proportion to variable capital only: if the daily price of labour be 3/-, and the surplus-value created daily be also 3/-, then he calls the rate of surplus-value 100 per cent. What curious blunders may result from reckoning, according to usual practice, constant capital as an active factor in the production of surplus-value, is shown in an example from Mr. N. W. Senior,^c “when that Oxford professor, noted for his scientific attainments and his beautiful diction, was invited, in 1836, to Manchester, in order to learn political economy there (from the cotton spinners) instead of teaching it in Oxford.”—[207]¹⁷⁵

The working-time in which the labourer reproduces the value of

* We must observe here, that *surplus-value* is not at all identical with *profit*.

^a “All is for the best in the best of possible worlds” (Voltaire, *Candide*).—Ed.

^b For so much.—Ed.

^c N. W. Senior, *Letters on the Factory Act*, London, 1837.—Ed.

his labour-power, Mr. Marx calls "*necessary labour*"; the time worked beyond that, and during which surplus-value is produced, he calls "*surplus-labour*". Necessary labour and surplus-labour combined form the "*working day*".—

In a working day, the time required for necessary labour is given; but the time employed in surplus-labour is not fixed by any economical law,^a it may be longer or shorter, within certain limits. It can never be zero, as then the inducement for the capitalist to employ labour would have ceased; nor can the total length of the working day ever attain 24 hours, for physiological reasons. Between a working day of, say, six hours, and one of 24, there are, however, many intermediate stages. The laws of the exchange of commodities demand that the working day have a length not exceeding that which is compatible with the normal wear and tear of the labourer. But what is this normal wear and tear? How many hours of daily labour are compatible with it? Here the opinions of the capitalist and those of the labourer differ widely, and, as there is no higher authority, the question is solved by *force*. The history of the determination of the length of the working day is the history of a struggle about its limits, between the collective capitalist and the collective labourer, between the two classes of capitalists and working men.

"Capital, as has been stated before, has not invented surplus-labour. Wherever a portion of society holds the exclusive monopoly of the means of production, there the labourer, slave, serf, or free, has to add, to the labour necessary for his own subsistence, an increment of labour in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owner of the means of production, be that owner an Athenian *καλὸς καγαθός*,^a an Etruscan theocrat, a *civis Romanus*,^b a Norman baron, an American slave-owner, a Wallachian boyar, a modern landlord or capitalist." [218].

It is, however, evident that in any form of society where the value in use of the product is more important than its value in exchange, surplus-labour is restrained by the narrower or wider range of social wants; and that under these circumstances there does not exist necessarily a desire for surplus-labour for its own sake. Thus we find that in the classical period surplus-labour in its extremist form, the working to death of people, existed almost exclusively in gold and silver mines, where value in exchange was produced in its independent form of existence: money.

^a Aristocrat.—*Ed.*

^b Roman citizen.—*Ed.*

“But wherever a nation whose production is carried on in the more rudimentary forms of slavery or serfage, lives in the midst of a universal market dominated by capitalist production, and where therefore the sale of its products for exports forms its chief purpose—there to the barbarous infamies of slavery or serfdom are superadded the civilised infamies of over-working. Thus in the Southern States of America slave-labour preserved a moderate and patriarchal character while production was directed to immediate domestic consumption chiefly. But in the same measure as the export of cotton became a vital interest to those states, the over-working of the negro, in some instances even the wearing-out of his life in seven working years, became an element in a calculated and calculating system... Similar with the *corvées* of the serfs in the Danubian principalities.” [219]

Here the comparison with capitalist production becomes particularly interesting, because, in the *corvée*, surplus-labour has an independent, palpable form.

“Suppose the working day counts six hours of necessary and six hours of surplus-labour; then the labourer furnishes the capitalist with 36 hours of surplus-labour a week. He might as well have worked three days for himself and three days for the capitalist. But this is not at once visible. Surplus-labour and necessary labour are more or less mixed together. I might express the same relation thus, that, in every minute, the labourer works 30 seconds for himself and 30 more for the capitalist. But with the serfs’ *corvée* it is different. The two kinds of labour are separated in space. The labour, which, for instance, a Wallachian peasant performs for himself, he performs on his own field, his surplus-labour for the boyar he performs on the boyar’s estate. The two portions of his labour exist independent of each other, surplus-labour, in the shape of *corvée*, is completely separated from necessary labour.” [219-220]

We must refrain from quoting the further interesting illustrations from the modern social history of the Danubian principalities, by which Mr. Marx proves the boyars there, aided by Russian intervention, to be quite as clever extractors of surplus-labour as any capitalist employers. But what the *Règlement organique*,¹⁷⁶ by which the Russian General Kisseleff presented the boyars with almost unlimited command over the peasants’ labour, expresses positively, the English Factory Acts express negatively.

“These acts oppose the inherent tendency of capital to an unlimited exploitation—we ask pardon for introducing this

French term, but there does not exist any English equivalent^a—of the labour-power, by forcibly putting a limit to the length of the working day by the power of the State, and that a State ruled by landlords and capitalists. Not to speak of the working class movement which was daily gaining greater dimensions, this limitation of factory labour was dictated by the same necessity which brought Peruvian guano on the fields of England. That same blind rapacity which in the one case had exhausted the soil, in the other case had attacked the vitality of the nation at its root. Periodical epidemics here spoke as plainly, as in France and Germany, the necessity for constantly reducing the standard of height for soldiers.” [229]

To prove the tendency of capital to extend the working day beyond all reasonable limits Mr. Marx quotes amply from the Reports of the Factory Inspectors, of the Children’s Employment Commission, the Reports on Public Health^b and other Parliamentary Papers, and sums up in the following conclusions:

“What is a working day? How long is the time during which capital may be allowed to consume the working power on paying for its value *per diem*? How far may the working day be extended beyond the time necessary for reproducing the working power itself? Capital, as we have seen, replies: the working day counts full 24 hours, excepting those few hours of rest without which the labour-power absolutely refuses to renew its services. It is a matter of course that the labourer during the whole of the live-long day is nothing but labour-power; that all his disposable time is working-time and belongs to value-begetting capital... But in this madly blind race after surplus-labour, capital outruns not only the moral, but also the purely physical maximum limits of the working day... Capital does not care for the duration of life of the working power... it produces its premature exhaustion and death, it effects the prolongation of the working-time during a given period by shortening the labourer’s life.” [249-251]

But is not this against the interest of capital itself? Has capital, in the long run, not to replace the cost of this excessive wear and tear? That may be the case theoretically. Practically, the organised slave trade in the interior of the Southern States had raised the practice of using up the working power of the slave in seven years

^a This is Engels’ addition to the quotation.—Ed.

^b *Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department* (for the 1840s-60s); *Children’s Employment Commission* (1862). *Reports* (I-VI); *Public Health. Reports of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council* (for the 1860s).—Ed.

to an acknowledged economical principle; practically, the English capitalist relies upon the supply of labourers from the agricultural districts.

“He sees a constant over-population, that is, an over-population as compared with the capacity of capital to absorb living labour, though this over-population be formed by a constant current of crippled, quickly fading generations of men, pressing upon their successors and plucked before maturity. Certainly, to an uninterested observer, experience would show on the other hand how soon capitalist production, though dating, historically speaking, from yesterday only, has attacked the vital root of national strength, how the degeneration of the industrial population is retarded only by the constant absorption of agricultural elements, and how even these agricultural labourers, in spite of fresh air and that principle of natural selection which is so specially powerful amongst them, have already begun to decline. Capital, which has such capital motives to deny the sufferings of the working classes in the midst of which it exists, capital will be disturbed in its practical activity as little and as much by the prospect of future degeneracy of the human race and of inevitable ultimate depopulation, as by the possible fall of the earth into the sun. In every joint-stock ‘limited’ swindle, every participator knows that the thunderstorm will come sooner or later, but every one expects that the lightning will fall on the head of his neighbour, after he himself shall have had time to collect the golden rain and store it up safely. *Après moi le déluge!*^a is the battle-cry of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Capital, therefore, is reckless of the health and life of the labourer, unless society compels it to act otherwise [...] And, upon the whole, this disregard of the labourer does not depend upon the good or bad will of the individual capitalist. Free competition imposes the immanent laws of capitalist production upon every individual capitalist in the shape of extraneous compulsory laws.” [254-255]

The determination of the normal working day is the result of many centuries of struggle between employer and labourer. And it is curious to observe the two opposing currents in this struggle. At first, the laws have for their end to compel the labourers to work longer hours; from the first statute of labourers 23rd Edward III (1349) up to the eighteenth century, the ruling classes never succeeded in extorting from the labourer the full amount of

^a After me the deluge—the words attributed to Louis XV and Mme. de Pompadour.—Ed.

possible labour. But with the introduction of steam and modern machinery, the tables were turned. So rapidly did the introduction of the labour of women and children break down all traditional bounds to working hours, that the nineteenth century began with a system of overworking which is unparalleled in the history of the world, and which, as early as 1803, compelled the legislation to enact limitations of working hours. Mr. Marx gives a full account of the history of English factory legislation up to the Workshops Act of 1867, and draws from it these conclusions:

1) Machinery and steam cause overwork, at first, in those branches of industry where they are applied, and legislative restrictions are, therefore, first applied to these branches; but in the sequel we find that this system of overwork has spread also to almost all trades even where no machinery is used, or where the most primitive modes of production continue in existence. (*Vide* Children's Employment Commission's Reports.)

2) With the introduction of the labour of women and children in the factories, the individual "free" labourer loses his power of resistance to the encroachments of capital and has to submit unconditionally. Thus he is reduced to collective resistance; the struggle of class against class, of the collective workmen against the collective capitalists begins.

If we now look back to the moment when we supposed our "free" and "equal" labourer to enter into a contract with the capitalist, we find that, under the process of production, a good many things have changed considerably. That contract, on the part of the labourer, is not a free contract. The daily time during which he is at liberty to sell his working power is the time during which he is compelled to sell it; and it is merely the opposition of the labourers, as a mass, which forcibly obtains the enactment of a public law to prevent them from selling themselves and their children, by a "free" contract, into death and slavery. "In the place of the grandiloquent catalogue of the inalienable rights of man, he has now nothing but the modest *Magna Charta* of the Factory Act."—[288]

We have next to analyse the *rate* of surplus-value and its relation to the *total quantity* of surplus-value produced. In this inquiry, as we have done hitherto, we suppose the value of labour-power to be a determinate constant quantity.

Under this supposition, the rate of surplus-value determines at the same time the quantity furnished to the capitalist by a single labourer in a given time. If the value of our labour-power be 3/- a day representing six hours' labour, and the rate of surplus-value

be 100 per cent, then the variable capital of 3/- produces every day a surplus-value of 3/-, or the workman furnishes six hours of surplus-labour every day.

Variable capital being the expression in money of all the labour-power employed simultaneously by a capitalist, the sum total of the surplus-value produced by the labour-power is found by multiplying that variable capital by the rate of surplus-value; in other words it is determined by the proportion between the number of working powers simultaneously employed, and the degree of exploitation. Either of these factors may vary, so that the decrease in the one may be compensated by the increase of the other. A variable capital required to employ 100 labourers with a rate of surplus-value of 50 per cent (say 3 hours of daily surplus-labour) will produce no more surplus-value than half that variable capital, employing 50 labourers at a rate of surplus-value of 100 per cent (say six hours of daily surplus-labour). Thus, under certain circumstances and within certain limits, the supply of labour at the command of capital may become independent of the actual supply of labourers.

There is, however, an absolute limit to this increase of surplus-value by increasing its rate. Whatever may be the value of labour, whether it be represented by two or by ten hours of necessary labour, the total value of the work performed, day after day, by any labourer, can never attain the value representing 24 hours' labour. In order to obtain equal quantities of surplus-value, variable capital may be replaced by prolongation of the working day within this limit only. This will be an important element in explaining, hereafter, various phenomena arising from the two contradictory tendencies of capital: 1) to reduce the number of labourers employed, i.e. the amount of variable capital, and 2) yet to produce the greatest possible quantity of surplus-labour.

It follows further: "The value of labour being given, and the rate of surplus-value being equal, the quantities of surplus-value produced by two different capitals are in direct proportion to the quantities of variable capital contained in them. [...] This law flatly contradicts all experience founded upon the *appearance* of facts. Everybody knows that a cotton spinner who [...] works with a relatively large constant, and a relatively small variable capital, does not, on that account, obtain a lesser ratio of profit than a baker who puts in motion relatively little constant and relatively much variable capital. To solve this apparent contradiction, a good many intermediate links are required, just as, starting from elementary algebra, a great number of intermediate links are

required in order to understand that $\frac{v}{c}$ may represent a real quantity." [293]

For a given country and a given length of working day, surplus-value can be increased only by increasing the number of labourers, i.e. by an increase of population; this increase forms the mathematical limit for the production of surplus-value by the collective capital of that country. On the other hand, if the number of labourers be determined, this limit is fixed by the possible prolongation of the working day. It will be seen hereafter that this law is valid for that form only of surplus-value which has been hitherto analysed.

We find, at this stage of our inquiry, that not every amount of money is capable of being converted into capital; that there is an extreme minimum for it: the cost of a unit of labouring power and of the means of labour necessary to keep it going. Suppose the rate of surplus-value to be 50 per cent, our infant-capitalist would be required to be able to employ two workmen in order to live, himself, as a workman lives. But this would prevent him from saving anything; and the end of capitalist production is not merely preservation, but also and chiefly increase of wealth.

"To live twice as well as a common labourer, and to re-transform one half of the surplus-value produced into capital, he would have to be able to employ eight workmen. He might certainly take his share of the work, along with his workmen, but he would still remain a small master, a hybrid between capitalist and labourer. Now, a certain development of capitalist production renders it necessary that the capitalist should devote the whole of the time during which he acts as a capitalist, as capital personified, to the appropriation and control of other people's labour, and to the sale of its products. The restrictive guilds of the Middle Ages attempted to check the transformation of the small master into a capitalist by fixing a very low maximum to the number of workmen which each was allowed to employ. The owner of money or commodities changes into a real capitalist only then, when he is able to advance, for the purpose of production, a minimum sum far higher than this medieval maximum. Here, just as in the natural sciences, the correctness is proved of the law discovered by Hegel that mere quantitative changes, at a certain point, imply a qualitative difference."^a [295-296]

The minimum amount of value required to change an owner of money or commodities into a capitalist varies for different stages

^a G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*.—Ed.

of the development of capitalist production, and for a given stage of development, it varies for different branches of industry.

“During the process of production detailed above, the relation of capitalist and labourer has changed considerably. First of all, capital has been developed into command of labour, i.e. into command over the labourer himself. Personified capital, the capitalist, takes care that the labourer performs his work regularly, carefully and with the required degree of intensity.

“Further, capital has been developed into a compulsory relation which obliges the working class to perform more labour than is prescribed by the narrow circle of their own requirements. And as a producer of other people’s industry, as an extortioner of surplus-labour and exploiter of labour-power, capital far exceeds in energy, recklessness, and efficiency all former systems of production, though they were based upon direct forced labour.

“Capital, at first, takes the command of labour under such technological conditions as it finds historically established. It does not, therefore, necessarily at once change the mode of production. The production of surplus-value, in the form hitherto analysed, that is to say by mere prolongation of the working day, appeared independent of every change in the mode of production itself. It was quite as efficient in the primitive baking trade as in modern cotton-spinning.

“In the process of production considered as a mere process of labour, the relation between the labourer and his means of production is not that of labour and capital, but that of labour and the mere instrument and raw material of productive action. In a tannery, for instance, he treats the skins as a mere object for labour. It is not the capitalists whose skin he tans. But things change as soon as we look upon the process of production as a process of creating surplus-value. The means of production at once change into means of absorbing other people’s labour. It is no longer the workman who employs the means of production, it is the means of production which employ the workman. It is not he who consumes *them* as material elements of his productive action; it is they which consume *him* as the ferment of their own vital process; and the vital process of capital consists in nothing but its progressive motion as value begetting value. Furnaces and workshops which have to stand idle at night, without absorbing labour, are a pure loss to the capitalist. Therefore furnaces and workshops constitute a ‘title upon the night-work of the hands’. (See Reports of Children’s Employment Commission, 4th Report,

1865, pages 79 to 85.)^a The mere change of money into means of production changes the latter into legal and compulsory titles upon other people's labour and surplus-labour." [296-297]

There is, however, another form of surplus-value. Arrived at the utmost limit of the working day, another means remains to the capitalist for increasing surplus-labour: by increasing the productivity of labour, by thereby reducing the value of labour, and thus shortening the period of necessary labour. This form of surplus-value will be examined in a second article.

Written on about May 22-June 28,
1868

Reproduced from the manuscript

Signed: *Samuel Moore*

First published, in Russian, in *Letopisi marksizma*, No. 1, 1926

^a The reference is given by Engels.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

MY PLAGIARISM OF F. BASTIAT¹⁷⁷

In^a a Bastiatite discovers that I have pinched the definition of the *magnitude of value* of commodities as being the “*socially necessary labour-time*” required for their production from F. Bastiat, and in bowdlerised form to boot. I could easily put up with this quid pro quo. For if that Bastiatite No. I finds Bastiat’s definition of value and my own to be basically identical, Bastiatite No. II declares almost simultaneously in the *Leipzig Literarisches Centralblatt* of : “ ”^b

The sum total of Bastiatite No. I added to Bastiatite No. II would be that the whole army of Bastiatites would have forthwith to transfer to my camp and accept wholesale my exposition on capital. One will understand that it is only after much mental strife that I deny myself the pleasure of such an annexation.

The definition of value contained in my work *Capital*, published in 1867, is to be found two decades earlier in my work attacking Proudhon: *Misère de la Philosophie*, Paris 1847 (p. 49

^a This space is left in the manuscript for the title *Vierteljahrsschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Kulturgeschichte*.—*Ed.*

^b This space is left in the manuscript for the date—July 4, 1868—and the following quotation: “Rejecting the theory of value is the only task facing anyone who opposes Marx; for if one concedes this axiom, then one must grant Marx nearly all the conclusions based on it, which he reaches by applying the strictest logic.”—*Ed.*

seqq.^a). Bastiat's words of wisdom on value did not see the light of day until some years later.^b I could not therefore have copied from Bastiat, though Bastiat could well have copied from me.

However, in fact Bastiat gives absolutely no analysis of value. He only dilates upon empty notions as consoling proof that "the world abounds in great and excellent daily services".^c It is well known that the German Bastiatites are all national liberals.¹⁷⁸ I shall therefore do them also a "great and excellent service" by pointing out the *specifically Prussian origin* of Bastiat's store of wisdom. Old Schmalz was in fact a councillor to the Prussian government, if I am not mistaken, even a Prussian privy councillor. In addition he was a Demagogue hunter.¹⁷⁹ In 1818 in Berlin this old Schmalz published a *Handbuch der Staatswirtschaftslehre*. The French edition of his handbook appeared in 1826 in Paris under the title of *Économie politique*. The translator, Henri Jouffroy, appeared on the title as "*conseiller au service de Prusse*".^d In the following quotation one will find Bastiat's notion of value in its essentials, not only as far as its content is concerned but even as regards its wording:

"Le travail d'autrui en général ne produit jamais pour nous qu'une *économie de temps*, et [que] cette économie de temps est tout ce qui constitue sa valeur et son prix. Le menuisier, par exemple, qui me fait une table, et le domestique qui me porte mes lettres à la poste, qui me bat mes habits, ou qui cherche pour moi les choses qui me sont nécessaires, me rendent l'un et l'autre un service absolument de même nature; l'un et l'autre m'*épargne* et le temps que je serais obligé d'employer moi-même à ces occupations, et celui qu'il m'aurait fallu consacrer à acquérir l'aptitude et les talents qu'elles exigent"^e (*Schmalz, l.c., t. I, p. 304*).

^a See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 138 et seqq.—*Ed.*

^b A reference to Bastiat's *Harmonies économiques* (1850).—*Ed.*

^c From Martin Luther's *An die Pharrherrn Wider den Wucher zu predigen*. Vermanung, Wittemberg, 1540, p. 9.—*Ed.*

^d Adviser to the Prussian Government.—*Ed.*

^e "The work of others only serves to *save us time*, and this time-saving is all that constitutes *its value*, and *its price*. The carpenter, for example, who makes me a table, and the servant who posts my letters, cleans my clothes or brings me the things I need, both render me the same *service*; they *save* me both the time which I would otherwise have to use to do those things myself, and the time I would otherwise have had to devote to acquiring the necessary skills."—*Ed.*

Now we know where Bastiat learnt his lesson,^a I nearly said his “Schmalz”.

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script

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^a The German phrase used by Marx here contains the word *Fett* (English, fat), making a word play with the name Schmalz (fat or grease).— *Ed.*

FREDERICK ENGELS

[SYNOPSIS OF VOLUME ONE
OF *CAPITAL* BY KARL MARX¹⁸⁰]

Written in spring-summer 1868

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script

CAPITAL BY KARL MARX, VOL. I.
BOOK ONE—THE PROCESS
OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION¹⁸¹

Chapter I

COMMODITIES AND MONEY^a

I. COMMODITIES AS SUCH

The wealth of societies in which capitalist production prevails consists of *commodities*. A commodity is a thing that has *use-value*; the latter exists in all forms of society, but in capitalist society, use-value is, in addition, the material depository of *exchange-value*.

Exchange-value presupposes a *tertium comparationis*^b by which it is measured: labour, the common social substance of exchange-values, to be precise, the *socially necessary labour-time* embodied in it.

Just as a commodity is something twofold: use-value and exchange-value, so the labour contained in it is twofold determined: on the one hand, as *definite productive activity*, weaving labour, tailoring labour, etc.—*useful labour*; on the other, as the *simple expenditure of human labour-power, precipitated abstract labour*. The former produces use-value, the latter exchange-value; only the latter is quantitatively comparable (the differences between SKILLED and UNSKILLED, complex and simple labour *confirm* this).

Hence the substance of exchange-value is abstract labour and its magnitude is the measure of time of abstract labour. Now to consider the form of exchange-value.

(1) x commodity $a = y$ commodity b ; value of a commodity expressed in the use-value of another is its *relative value*. The expression of the equivalence of two commodities is the simple form of relative value. In the above equation y commodity b is the

^a This chapter corresponds to Part I of the 1887 English edition (Chapter I.—Commodities, Chapter II.—Exchange, Chapter III.—Money, or the Circulation of Commodities).—*Ed.*

^b Literally: a third something for comparison; here a standard.—*Ed.*

equivalent. In it *x commodity a* acquires its value-form in contrast to its [the commodity's] natural form, while *y commodity b* acquires at the same time the property of direct exchangeability, even in its natural form. Exchange-value is impressed upon the use-value of a commodity by definite historical relations. Hence the commodity cannot express its exchange-value in its own use-value, but only in the use-value of another commodity. Only in the equation of two concrete products of labour does the property of the concrete labour contained in both come to light as abstract human labour, i.e., a commodity cannot be related to the concrete labour contained in itself, as the mere form of realisation of abstract labour, but it can be so related to the concrete labour contained in other kinds of commodities.

The equation *x commodity a = y commodity b* necessarily implies that *x commodity a* can also be expressed in other commodities, thus:

(2) *x commodity a = y commodity b = z commodity c = v commodity d = u commodity e =, etc., etc.* This is the *expanded* relative form of value. Here *x commodity a* no longer refers to one, but to *all* commodities as the mere forms of manifestation of the labour represented in it. But through simple reversal it leads to

(3) the converse second form of relative value:

y commodity b = x commodity a
v commodity c = x commodity a
u commodity d = x commodity a
t commodity e = x commodity a

etc., etc.

Here the commodities are given the *general relative form of value*, in which all of them are abstracted from their use-values and equated to *x commodity a* as the materialisation of abstract labour; *x commodity a* is the generic form of the equivalent for all other commodities; it is their *universal equivalent*; the labour materialised in it at once represents in itself the realisation of abstract labour, general labour. Now, however,

(4) *every* commodity of the series can take over the role of universal equivalent, but only one of them can do so *at a time*, since if *all* commodities were universal equivalents, each of them would in turn exclude the others from that role. Form 3 is not obtained by *x commodity a*, but by the other commodities, objectively. Hence a definite commodity must take over the role—for a time, it can change—and only in this way does a commodity become a commodity completely. This special com-

modity, with whose natural form the universal equivalent form becomes identified, is *money*.

The *difficulty* with a *commodity* is that, like all categories of the capitalist mode of production, it represents a personal relationship under a material wrapping. The producers relate their different kinds of labour to one another as general human labour by relating their products to one another as *commodities*—they cannot accomplish it without this mediation of things. The relation of *persons* thus *appears* as the relation of *things*.

For a society in which commodity production prevails, Christianity, particularly Protestantism, is the fitting religion.

2. THE PROCESS OF COMMODITY EXCHANGE

A commodity proves that it is a commodity in exchange. The owners of two commodities must be willing to exchange their respective commodities and therefore to recognise each other as *private owners*. This legal relation, the *form* of which is the contract, is only a relation of wills, reflecting the economic relation. Its *content* is given by the economic relation itself. (P. 45.)

A commodity is a use-value for its non-owner, a non-use-value for its owner. Hence the need for exchange. But every commodity owner wants to get in exchange specific use-values that he needs—to that extent the exchange is an individual process. On the other hand, he wants to realise his commodity as value, that is, in any suitable commodity, whether or not *his* commodity is use-value to the owner of the other commodity. To that extent the exchange is for him a generally social process. But one and the same process cannot be simultaneously both individual and generally social for all commodity owners. Every commodity owner regards *his own* commodity as the universal equivalent, while all other commodities are so many particular equivalents of his own. Since *all* commodity owners do the same, *no* commodity is the universal equivalent, and hence *no* commodity possesses a general relative form of value, in which they are equated as values and compared as magnitudes of value. Therefore they do not confront each other at all as commodities, but only as products. (P. 47.)

Commodities can be related as values and hence as commodities only by comparison with some other commodity as the universal equivalent. But only the *social act can make a particular commodity the universal equivalent—money*.

The immanent contradiction in a commodity as the direct unity of use-value and exchange-value, as the product of useful private

labour ... and as the direct social materialisation of abstract human labour—this contradiction finds no rest until it results in duplicating the commodity into commodity and money. (P. 48.)

Since all other commodities are merely particular equivalents of money, and money is their universal equivalent, they are related to money as *particular* commodities to the universal commodity. (P. 51.) The process of exchange gives the commodity which it converts into money, not its *value*, but its *value-form*. (P. 51.) Fetishism: a commodity does not seem to become money only because the other commodities all express their values in it, but conversely, they seem to express their values in it because it *is money*.

3. MONEY, OR THE CIRCULATION OF COMMODITIES

A. *The Measure of Values (Assuming Gold=Money)*

Money, as the measure of value, is the necessary *form of manifestation* of the measure of value *immanent* in commodities, i.e., *labour-time*. The simple, relative expression of the value of commodities in money, x commodity $a=y$ money, is their price. (P. 55.)

The price of a commodity, its money-form, is expressed in *imaginary money*; hence money is the *measure of values* only ideally. (P. 57.)

Once the change from value to price is effected, it becomes technically necessary to develop the measure of values further, into the *standard of prices*; i.e., a quantity of gold is fixed, *by which different quantities of gold are measured*. This is quite different from the measure of values, which itself depends upon the value of gold, while the latter is immaterial for the standard of prices. (P. 59.)

Once prices are expressed in accounting names of gold, money serves as *money of account*.

If price, as the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity's value, is the exponent of its exchange ratio with money it does *not* follow conversely that the exponent of its exchange ratio with money is *necessarily* the exponent of the magnitude of its value. Assuming that circumstances permit or compel the sale of a commodity above or below its value, these selling prices do not correspond to its value, but they are none the less *prices* of the commodity, for they are (1) its value-form, money, and (2) exponents of its exchange ratio with money.

The possibility, therefore, of quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value is *given in the price-form itself*. That is no defect of this form, but on the contrary makes it the adequate form of a mode of production in which the rule can impose itself only as a blindly-acting law of averages of irregularity. The price-form, however, can also ... harbour a qualitative contradiction, so that price ceases altogether to be an expression of value... Conscience, honour, etc., can ... acquire the form of commodities through their price. (P. 61.)

Measurement of values in money, the price-form, implies the necessity of alienation, the ideal pricing implies the actual. Hence circulation.

B. *The Medium of Circulation*

a. *The Metamorphosis of Commodities*

Simple form: $C—M—C$. Its material content= $C—C$. Exchange-value is alienated and use-value appropriated.

α) First phase: $C—M$ = sale, for which two persons are required, hence the possibility of failure, i.e., of sale below value, or even below the cost of production, if the social value of the commodity changes. "The division of labour converts the product of labour into a commodity, and thereby makes *necessary* its further conversion into money."^a At the same time it also makes the accomplishment of this transubstantiation quite *accidental*. (P. 67.) But, considering the phenomenon in its *pure* form, $C—M$ presupposes that the possessor of the money (unless he is a producer of gold) previously got his money through exchange for another commodity; hence it is not only conversely $M—C$ for the *buyer*, but it presupposes that he made a previous sale, etc., so that we have an endless series of purchases and sales.

β) The same takes place in the second phase, $M—C$, i.e., *purchase*, which is, at the same time, a sale for the other party.

γ) The total process hence is a circuit of purchases and sales. *The circulation of commodities*. This is quite different from the direct exchange of products; first, the individual and local bounds of the direct exchange of products are broken through, and the interchange of matter of human labour is effected; on the other hand, here it already appears that the whole process depends upon

^a See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, London, 1887, p. 81.—Ed.

social relations spontaneous in their growth and independent of the actors. (P. 72.) Simple exchange was extinguished in the one act of exchange, where each exchanges non-use-value for use-value; circulation proceeds indefinitely.

(P. 73.) Here the false economic dogma: *the circulation of commodities involves a necessary equilibrium of purchases and sales, because every purchase is also a sale and vice versa—which is to say that every seller also brings his buyer to market with him.* (1) Purchase and sale are, on the one hand, an identical act of two polarly opposite persons; on the other hand, they are two polarly opposite acts of one and the same person. Hence the identity of purchase and sale implies that the commodity is useless unless it is sold, and likewise that this case *can* occur. (2) $C—M$, as a partial process, is similarly an independent process and implies that the acquirer of money can choose the time when he again converts this money into a commodity. He can *wait*. The inner unity of the independent processes $C—M$ and $M—C$ moves in external antitheses precisely because of the independence of these processes; and when these dependent processes reach a certain limit of independence, *their unity asserts itself in a crisis*. Hence the *possibility* of the latter is already given here.

Being the intermediary in commodity circulation, money is the *medium of circulation*.

b. The Currency of Money

Money is the medium by which each individual commodity goes into, and out of, circulation; it always remains therein itself. Hence, although the circulation of money is merely the *expression* of commodity circulation, the circulation of commodities *appears* to be the result of money circulation. Since money always remains within the sphere of circulation, the question is: *how much* money is present in it?

The quantity of money in circulation is determined by the *sum of the prices of commodities* (money-value remaining the same), and the latter by the *quantity of commodities* in circulation. Assuming that this quantity of commodities is given, the circulating quantity of money fluctuates with the *fluctuations* in the prices of commodities. Now, since one and the same piece of money always mediates a number of transactions in succession in a given time, for a given interval of time we have:

$$\frac{\text{Sum of the prices of commodities}}{\text{Number of moves made by a piece of money}} = \text{Quantity of money functioning as the circulation medium. (P. 80.)}$$

Hence paper money can displace gold money if it is thrown into a saturated circulation.

Since the currency of money only *reflects* the process of commodity circulation, its rapidity reflects that of the change in the form of the commodities, its stagnation, the separation of purchase from sale, the stagnation of social interchange of matter. The origin of this stagnation cannot, of course, be seen from circulation itself, which merely puts in evidence the phenomenon itself. The philistines attribute it to a deficient quantity of the circulation medium. (P. 81.)

Ergo: (1) If the prices of commodities remain constant, the quantity of money circulating rises when the quantity of circulating commodities increases or the circulation of money is retarded; and drops *vice versa*.

(2) With a general rise in the prices of commodities, the quantity of money circulating remains constant if the quantity of commodities decreases or the velocity of circulation increases in the same proportion.

(3) With a general drop in the prices of commodities, the converse of (2).

In general, there is a fairly constant average from which significant deviations occur almost exclusively as a result of *crises*.

c. Coin: Symbol of Value

The standard of prices is fixed by the state, as are also the denomination of the particular piece of gold—the coin, and its coining. In the world market the respective national uniforms are doffed again (seigniorage is disregarded here), so that coin and bullion differ only in form. But *a coin wears away* during circulation; gold as a circulation medium differs from gold as a standard of prices. The coin becomes more and more a *symbol* of its official content.

Herewith the latent possibility is given of replacing metallic money by tokens or symbols. Hence: (1) small coinage of copper and silver tokens, the permanent establishment of which in place of real gold money is prevented by limiting the quantity in which they are LEGAL TENDER. Their metallic content is determined purely

arbitrarily by law, and thus their function as coinage becomes independent of their *value*. Hence the further step to *quite worthless* symbols is possible. (2) *Paper money*, i.e., *paper money issued by the state, having compulsory rate* (credit money not to be discussed here as yet). So far as this paper money actually circulates in place of gold money, it is subject to the laws of gold circulation. Only the proportion in which paper replaces gold can be the object of a special law, which is that the issue of paper money is to be limited to the quantity in which the gold represented by it would actually have to circulate. The degree of saturation of the circulation fluctuates, to be sure, but everywhere experience determines a minimum below which it never falls. This minimum can be issued. If more than the minimum is issued, a portion becomes superfluous as soon as the degree of saturation drops to the minimum. In that case the total amount of paper money within the commodity world still represents only the quantity of gold fixed by that world's immanent laws, and hence alone representable.

Thus, if the amount of paper money represents twice the absorbable amount of gold, each piece of paper money is depreciated to half its nominal value. Just as if gold were changed in its function as the measure of prices, in its value. (P. 89.)

C. Money

a. Hoarding

With the earliest development of commodity circulation there develops the need, and the passionate desire, to hold fast the product of $C-M$, money. From a mere agency of interchange of matter, this change of form becomes an *end in itself*. Money petrifies into a *hoard*; the commodity seller becomes a *money hoarder*. (P. 91.)

This form was dominant precisely in the beginnings of commodity circulation. *Asia*. With further development of commodity circulation every producer of commodities must secure for himself the *nexus rerum*,^a the social pledge—money. Thus HOARDS accumulate everywhere. The development of commodity circulation increases the power of money, the absolutely social form of wealth always ready for use. (P. 92.) The urge for hoarding is by

^a The bond between things.—*Ed.*

nature boundless. *Qualitatively*, or with respect to its form, money is unrestricted, i.e., the universal representative of material wealth, because it is directly convertible into any other commodity. But *quantitatively*, every actual sum of money is limited, and therefore of only limited efficacy as a means of purchasing. This contradiction always drives the hoarder back, again and again, to the Sisyphus-like labour of accumulation.

Besides, the accumulation of gold and silver IN PLATE creates both a new market for these metals and a latent source of money.

Hoarding serves as a *conduit for supplying or withdrawing circulating money* with the continuous fluctuations in the degree of saturation of the circulation. (P. 95.)

b. Means of Payment

With the development of commodity circulation new relations appear: the alienation of a commodity can be separated in time from the realisation of its price. Commodities require different periods of time for their production; they are produced in different seasons; some must be sent to distant markets, etc. Hence *A* can be a seller before *B*, the buyer, is able to pay. Practice regulates the conditions of payment in this way: *A* becomes a *creditor*, *B* a *debtor*; money becomes a *means of payment*. Thus the relation of *creditor and debtor* already becomes *more antagonistic*. (This can also occur independently of commodity circulation, e.g., in antiquity and the Middle Ages.) (P. 97.)

In this relation, money functions: (1) as the measure of value in the determination of the price of the commodity sold; (2) as an ideal means of purchase. In the hoard, money was *withdrawn* from circulation; here, being a means of payment, money enters circulation, but only after the commodity has left it. The indebted buyer sells in order to be able to *pay*, or he will be put up for auction. Therefore, money now becomes *the sale's end in itself* through a social necessity arising out of the relations of the very circulation process. (Pp. 97-98.)

The lack of simultaneity of purchases and sales, which gives rise to the function of money as a means of payment, at the same time effects an economy of the circulation media, payments being concentrated at a definite place. The *virements*^a in Lyons in the Middle Ages—a sort of CLEARING-HOUSE, where only the net balance of the mutual claims is paid. (P. 98.)

In so far as the payments balance one another, money functions

^a Remittance by draft from own account to another.—*Ed.*

only ideally, as *money of account* or measure of values. In so far as actual payments have to be made, it does not appear as a circulation medium, as only the vanishing and mediating form of interchange of matter, but as the individual embodiment of social labour, as the independent existence of exchange-value, as the *absolute commodity*. This *direct contradiction* breaks out in that moment of production and commercial crises *that is called a monetary crisis*. It occurs only where the progressing chain of payments, and an artificial system of settling them, are fully developed. With more general disturbances of this mechanism, no matter what their origin, money changes suddenly and immediately from its merely ideal shape of *money of account into hard cash*; profane commodities can no longer replace it. (P. 99.)

Credit money originates in the function of money as a means of payment; certificates of debt themselves circulate in turn to transfer these debts to others. With the system of credit the function of money as a means of payment again expands; in that capacity money acquires its own forms of existence, in which it occupies the sphere of large-scale commercial transactions, while coin is largely relegated to the sphere of retail trade. (P. 101.)

At a certain stage and volume of commodity production the function of money as a means of payment spreads beyond the sphere of circulation of commodities; it becomes the *universal commodity of contracts*. *Rents, taxes, and the like are transformed from payments in kind into money payments*. Cf. France under Louis XIV. (Boisguillebert^a and Vauban)¹⁸²; on the other hand, Asia, Turkey, Japan, etc. (P. 102.)

The development of money into a means of payment necessitates the accumulation of money against the date when payment is due. Hoarding which, as a distinct form of acquiring riches, vanished as society further developed, again appears as a reserve fund of the means of payment. (P. 103.)

c. World Money

In world trade the local forms of coin, small coinage, and tokens of value are discarded and only the bullion form of money is valid as *world money*. *Only in the world market does money function to the full extent as the commodity whose natural form is at the same time the immediate social materialisation of human labour in the abstract*. Its mode of existence becomes adequate to its concept. (P. 104; details p. 105.)

^a A reference to P. Boisguillebert, "Dissertation sur la nature..." in *Économistes financiers du XVIII-e siècle*, Paris, 1843, pp. 413, 419 and 417.—Ed.

Chapter II

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MONEY INTO CAPITAL^a

1. THE GENERAL FORMULA FOR CAPITAL

Commodity circulation is the starting point of capital. Hence commodity production, commodity circulation and the latter's developed form, commerce, are always the historical groundwork from which capital arises. The modern history of capital dates from the creation of modern world trade and the world market in the sixteenth century. (P. 106.)

If we consider only the economic forms produced by commodity circulation, we find that its final product is money, and the latter is the *first form in which capital appears*. Historically, capital invariably confronts landed property at first as *moneyed wealth*, merchant capital or usurer's capital, and even today all new capital first comes on the stage in the shape of *money* that by definite processes has to be transformed into capital.

Money as money and money as capital differ, to begin with, only in their **form of circulation**. Alongside $C—M—C$, the form $M—C—M$, buying in order to sell, also occurs. Money that describes this form of circulation in its movement *becomes* capital, is already capital in itself (i.e., by its destination).

The result of $M—C—M$ is $M—M$, the indirect exchange of money for money. I buy cotton for £100 and sell it for £110; ultimately I have exchanged £100 for £110, money for money.

If this process yielded at its outcome the same money-value that was originally put into it, £100 out of £100, it would be absurd. Yet whether the merchant realises £100, £110, or merely £50 for

^a This chapter corresponds to Part II of the 1887 English edition (Chapter IV.—The General Formula for Capital, Chapter V.—Contradictions in the General Formula of Capital, Chapter VI.—The Buying and Selling of Labour-Power).—*Ed.*