



Antonio Gramsci

PRISON NOTEBOOKS

VOLUME III

Edited and translated by Joseph A. Buttigieg

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*Edited and translated by
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PREFACE

On November 17, 1930, Antonio Gramsci wrote to his sister-in-law Tatiana Schucht: "For the time being, you mustn't send me any books. Put the ones you have aside, and wait for me to tell you to ship them." Why would Gramsci, a voracious reader, want to suspend temporarily the flow of books to his prison cell at Turi di Bari? He was studying and writing as assiduously as ever, filling the pages of one notebook after another with critical commentaries, bibliographical information, textual analyses, and theoretical reflections. He was certainly not slowing down; indeed, at the time he wrote this letter, Gramsci was about to begin or had just begun making entries in three fresh notebooks—namely, Notebooks 6, 7, and 8, which are included in this volume—while continuing to fill whatever blank spaces were still available in the ones he had started using earlier.

The reason for this atypical request, Gramsci explained, was that he needed time "to get rid of all the old periodicals that have accumulated over four years." Getting rid of the back issues of the journals and reviews he had received since the beginning of 1927 meant, of course, not just leafing through them but taking notes "on the subjects that interest me most, and naturally this takes up a good part of my day, because the scholarly notes are accompanied by references, comments, etc." The contents of the notebooks in this volume, as in the earlier volumes, are fully indicative of the thoroughness with which Gramsci scrutinized the periodical literature in his possession and the ways in which this material often

provided him with the starting point or the cue for a line of thinking, an argument, or an insight that had an important bearing on his continuously expanding and increasingly intricate intellectual project. Furthermore, by surveying the miscellaneous articles and book reviews in the rather broad range of journals and reviews he received and also by reading the newspapers and magazines available to the inmates of the Turi prison, Gramsci was able to keep himself rather well informed about the political and cultural scene in the outside world. Much of what Gramsci read and commented on belonged decidedly to his time and was of little lasting value. Yet, short of reading for themselves the same range of publications that Gramsci painstakingly examined, there are few better ways for today's readers to enrich their understanding of the cultural politics and political culture of fascist Italy than by accompanying Gramsci as he systematically casts his critical eye on the journalistic and scholarly writings of his contemporaries.

Important though it was for Gramsci to catch up with his scrutiny of periodical literature, however, he had an additional reason for wanting a pause in the shipment of books. He did not convey it directly to Tatiana Schucht, but it is rather easy to detect if one juxtaposes some additional remarks he made in the letter of November 17, 1930, with what he wrote at about the same time on the first page of Notebook 8. By the end of 1930, Gramsci had written such a large quantity of notes and his initial plan of study had branched out so extensively that he believed it was necessary to organize at least some of the widely scattered entries on what he considered the salient motifs or main threads of his work. "I've focused on three or four principal subjects," he informed Tatiana Schucht, while also revealing that foremost among them was the "cosmopolitan role played by Italian intellectuals until the end of the eighteenth century." What he went on to describe to her in the next couple of sentences, however, was not so much a plan for containing his notes within a general frame or shaping them into a study held together by a governing thesis but rather the necessity of subdividing this main topic into a series of separate studies. The topic had so many facets that all he could attempt under the circumstances was an "introduction to a number of monographs."

Intending to implement his rather vague organizational plan, Gramsci turned to a fresh notebook (Notebook 8 in this volume), and on the first line of its first page he inscribed and underlined a title: "Loose notes and jottings for a history of Italian intellec-

tuals." Immediately underneath the title, Gramsci made it clear what he meant by "loose notes": the notes that would be gathered under this heading would still be provisional, and they would not constitute the draft or outline of "a comprehensive organic work," though they could possibly result in "independent essays." Further down the page, he started compiling a list of the topics of these independent essays, or monographs, as he called them in the letter to Tatiana Schucht. Included are all but a few of the major topics he had already addressed in many different notes scattered throughout the notebooks he had already filled. In one respect, then, this list looks back at ground already covered, a succinct reminder of not only many prominent, recurring themes but also the fact that, despite their seemingly disparate foci, Gramsci regarded them as interrelated. The list, however, also adumbrates the future course of Gramsci's work. For although he continued till the very end to use some notebooks as repositories for his miscellaneous and nonconsecutive reflections, analyses, critiques, and theoretical explorations, he would also gradually devote more of his time to assembling special—that is, thematically organized—notebooks by selecting and often elaborating notes he had already composed. Thus, for example, Notebook 13, on Machiavelli's politics, incorporates a large block of notes originally drafted in Notebook 8.

Gramsci abandoned the idea of reserving the pages of Notebook 8 for his notes on Italian intellectuals. Whereas its first page was written around the same time as his letter of November 17, 1930, the rest of the notebook was not used until late the following year. (This edition gives 1930 as the beginning date of the notebook, based on the sketchy annotations Gramsci made on its opening page. In Valentino Gerratana's critical edition of the *Quaderni*, the notebook is dated as having been started in 1931, which is in fact the year when Gramsci began using its pages regularly for his various notes.) In any case, within a couple of weeks of his letter to Tatiana Schucht, Gramsci was asking for new books and persisted in the practice of writing more or less unsystematically on a broad array of topics, as can be seen from the contents of this volume. There is, however, a specific project within his larger program of study and research that he did complete by the time he used up the last page of Notebook 8, in the spring of 1932. It is a project that he had launched in Notebook 4 by devoting half its pages to "Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism. First series." The second and third (and final) series of this sequence of notes occupy most

of the pages of Notebook 7 that were not set aside for translations and fully half the pages of Notebook 8. Gramsci wrote this three-part series of notes consecutively, in the sense that as soon as he ran out of pages in one notebook he started another series in the pages of the next available notebook. He would later reassemble most of their components in separate notebooks: Notebook 11 (on philosophy and Marxist theory) is almost entirely made up of notes from this series, and so is a substantial part of Notebook 10 (on Croce). These two notebooks occupy an especially important place in Gramsci's opus; in them, the lineaments of his philosophy of praxis and conception of historical materialism are brought into relief by a detailed critique of positivism and idealism, as exemplified by Nikolai Bukharin and Benedetto Croce, respectively.

Despite Gramsci's own efforts to bring some order to the proliferation of notes by organizing them thematically, readers of the *Prison Notebooks* would run the risk of overlooking the author's most provocative and valuable contributions to political thought and cultural analysis if they used his own lists of topics and thematic assemblages as a guide to what is especially significant and what is peripheral in the massive and unwieldy text. To give an obvious example, nowhere does Gramsci specify hegemony, civil society, or the concept of the state as a rubric around which to cluster a block of his notes. The titles of the individual notes in which Gramsci makes some of the most penetrating observations about these three inseparable core elements of his political theory often provide little indication of the import of their content. One of the clearest expressions of Gramsci's concept of the state—"state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion"—occurs in a note (Notebook 6, §88) with a title, "Gendarme or night-watchman state," that is used only once in the entire text of the notebooks. There are numerous such instances scattered throughout the three notebooks that constitute this volume.

In these three notebooks, one finds Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, civil society, and the state developing and acquiring greater subtlety even as they become ever more tightly interwoven with the other major strands of his program of study. The impulse to direct his attention to "the history of Italian intellectuals," Gramsci tells Tatiana Schucht in his letter of August 3, 1931, "arose from the desire, on the one hand, to probe the concept of the state and,

on the other, to understand certain aspects of the historical development of the Italian people." The notes on Machiavelli are part of the same inquiry, as are those on the Reformation and the Renaissance, and the same can be said of many of the notes on literature and popular culture. It is not surprising, then, that Gramsci postponed his plan to organize his notes along thematic lines. While Gramsci did set aside some fresh notebooks for specific topics not very long after completing these three notebooks, many of his notes on the state and civil society never found their way into these special thematic notebooks. His method of inquiry, his way of thinking, resists systematization, which is why there is no better way of studying his work than by following the multiple strands of thought as they develop, overlap, and intertwine over the course of the composition of the notebooks.

Nobody has understood Gramsci's thought and the complex processes of composition that produced the *Prison Notebooks* better than Valentino Gerratana and Antonio Santucci. I relied very heavily on their expertise and advice in preparing the first two volumes of this edition. Sadly, they have since both passed away, but in constructing the critical apparatus of this volume, I was still aided by the information and insights they had provided over the years during the countless hours we spent together discussing Gramsci's ideas and poring over his text. Many other friends and colleagues have supported this project over the years, none more steadfastly and generously than Paul Bové, Frank Rosengarten, and David Ruccio. Walter Adamson, Derek Boothman, Carlos Nelson Coutinho, and Guido Liguori have been especially kind and helpful, providing me with many valuable suggestions. I have also benefited hugely from the scholarship and friendship of Giorgio Baratta, David Betson, Carmel Borg, Gerald Bruns, Alberto Burgio, John Cammett, Benedetto Fontana, Christopher Fox, Marcus Green, Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Ronald Judy, John Matthias, Peter Mayo, Carlo Ricchini, Anne Showstack Sassoon, William Spanos, and Jennifer Warlick. The help of Jennifer Crewe, Anne McCoy, and their colleagues at Columbia University Press has been indispensable since the very beginning of this project. In preparing this volume for publication, I was assisted by Corey Zwikstra and relied heavily on the expertise of Sarah St. Onge. Above all, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to J. Anne Montgomery and Peter Paul Buttigieg, who have enabled every aspect of my work.

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Antonio Gramsci
PRISON NOTEBOOKS

VOLUME III

NOTEBOOK 6
1930-1932

§<1>. *Risorgimento. The events of February 1853 and the moderates of Milan.* Luca Beltrami, in his article "Francesco Brioschi" (a chapter from *Rievocazioni dell'Ottocento*), *Il Marzocco*, 6 April 1930,¹ recalls that Brioschi was accused of having signed the declaration of loyalty to Franz Josef in February 1853 (following the attempt on the emperor's life by a Viennese shoemaker).² Brioschi did not sign (if the name Brioschi appeared among the signatures, it did not belong to the renowned professor of the University of Pavia, who later coordinated the founding of the Politecnico). Beltrami observes: "Moreover, 'obsequious' is hardly the word to describe the behavior of those government employees who were 'invited' to sign the protest against the insane and reckless act of a Viennese shoemaker." Beltrami, however, forgets that the declaration of loyalty was signed after the repressive measures that had been taken in Milan and on the eve of Belfiore.³

Cf. Notebook 19, §55.

§<2>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Giulio Bechi.* He died in combat on 28 August 1917¹ (cf. the publications of the time: Guido Biagi wrote about him in *Il Marzocco*; cf. *Profili e caratteri*, by Ermenegildo Pistelli, and Mario Puccioni's "Militarismo ed italianità negli scritti di Giulio Bechi," in *Il Marzocco*, 13 July 1930).² According to Puccioni: "The Sardinian members of parliament, with their mentality, refused to regard *Caccia grossa* as anything other than an unrestrained attack on certain customs and people, and they put him in a bad fix—as Giulio used to describe it with his Neapolitan turn of phrase—holding him under arrest for two months in the fortress of Belvedere." Bechi went to Sardinia with the 67th Infantry. The questions concerning his behavior in the suppression of brigandage (which

was carried out like a colonial expedition) and his book (with its symptomatic general tone, evident even in its title) are much more complicated than Puccioni seems to think. Puccioni tries to highlight Bechi's protests against the way that Sardinia had been forsaken and his exaltation of Sardinian native virtues.

Cf. Notebook 23, §54.

§<3>. *Encyclopedic notions. Cleopatra's nose.* Find out the exact meaning that Pascal attached to this phrase of his that became so famous (Pascal talks about it in the *Pensées*) and see what connection it has with the general views of the French writer.¹ (The transitoriness and frivolousness of human history, Jansenist pessimism, etc.)

Cf. Notebook 26, §3.

§<4>. *Popular literature.* The literary efforts of the new social classes. A book by Oskar Maria Graf has been translated into French: *Nous sommes prisonniers . . .*, Gallimard, 1930. It appears to be an interesting and significant work for understanding the German popular classes.¹

Cf. Notebook 23, §55.

§<5>. *Popular literature. Serial novels.* See Henry Jagot, *Vidocq*, Paris, Berger-Levrault Ed., 1930.¹ Vidocq inspired Alexandre Dumas and Balzac's Vautrin. (Traces of him can also be found in V. Hugo's Jean Valjean and especially in Rocambole.)² Vidocq received an eight-year prison sentence for forgery, a consequence of his recklessness. Twenty instances of attempted escape, etc. In 1812 he joined Napoleon's police force and for fifteen years headed a special police unit created specifically for him; his sensational arrests made him famous. Louis-Philippe dismissed him; he established a private detective agency, but it failed. He could only operate within the regular police force. Died in 1857. He left his *Memoirs*, but they were not written entirely by him, and they are full of exaggeration and bragging.³

Cf. Notebook 21, §13.

§<6>. *Risorgimento. Italy in the eighteenth century.* French influence on Italian politics, literature, philosophy, art, customs. The Bourbons ruled in Naples and in the duchy of Parma. On French influence in Parma, one must look at the thoroughly researched publications of Henri Bédarida:

Parme dans la politique française au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Alcan, and two earlier works—([see also Giuseppe^a Ortolani,] "Italie [et France] au XVIIIe siècle," in *Mélanges de littérature et d'histoire publiés par l'Union intellectuelle franco-italienne*, Paris, Leroux).¹ In French policy, Italy, by virtue of its geographical position, was destined to assume the function of an element of equilibrium vis-à-vis the growing power of Austria. Hence, from the time of Louis XIV to that of Louis XVI, France tried to affirm its supremacy, thus anticipating the policy of Napoleon III, as one can see from its plans and efforts to federate the Italian states in the service of France. (These elements of French policy should be analyzed carefully in order to identify the kind of relationship that existed between international and national factors in the development of the Risorgimento.)

Cf. Notebook 19, §56.

§<7>. *The cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals. The bourgeoisie in the Middle Ages and the fact that it never moved beyond the economic-corporative phase.* It is necessary to determine the following: What does the independence and autonomy of a state consist in, concretely? And what does the period after the year 1000 consist in? Even today, alliances, with the hegemony of a great power, render the freedom of action of a large number of states problematic—especially their freedom to establish their own policy lines. The same phenomenon must have manifested itself much more markedly after the year 1000 because of the international role of the empire and the papacy and because of the military monopoly of the empire.

§<8>. *The Italian Risorgimento. The Parthenopean Republic.* Cf. Antonio Manes, *Un cardinale condottiere. Fabrizio Ruffo e la repubblica partenopea*, Aquila, Vecchioni, 1930.¹ Manes tries to rehabilitate Cardinal Ruffo² (this could be cited in the "Past and present" paragraph that alludes to these rehabilitations—Solaro della Margarita, etc.—and it also mentions the "polemics" of some teachers against Settembrini, in whom they find a great deal of "demagogy" against the Bourbon monarchy)³ by laying the responsibility for the repressions and the betrayed agreements on the Bourbon king [and Nelson]. Manes, it appears, is somewhat confused when it comes to establishing the political and social divisions in the Neapolitan kingdom. At times, he talks about the clear division between the

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "Tullio."

nobility and the clergy on one side and the people on the other. At other times, this clear division becomes confused, and he finds members of the nobility and the clergy on both sides of the divide. He even goes so far as to say that Ruffo "becomes an altogether national character, if one can use such a word with its exceedingly modern and present-day coloration" (so does this mean that the "patriots" exterminated by the bands of Sanfedisti were not "national"?).⁴

On the separation of the nobility and the clergy from the people, cf. Rodolico's book on southern Italy and his article in *Il Marzocco* (no. 11) of 1926.⁵

Cf. Notebook 19, §57.

§<9>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Lina Pietravalle.* From Giulio Marzot's review of the novel *Le catene* (Milan, Mondadori, 1930, 320 pp., L. 12) by Pietravalle: "To those who ask her about her feelings when she participates in the life of the peasants, Felicia responds: 'I love them as I love the soil, but I would not mix the soil with my bread.' There is, then, the awareness of a separation: she admits that the peasant, too, may have his own human dignity, but she keeps the peasant within the boundaries of his social position."¹ Marzot has written an essay on Giovanni Verga,² and he is an occasionally intelligent critic.

The following question should be examined: whether French naturalism already contained the germs of the ideological position that would later have a substantial development in Italian naturalism or local realism, and especially in Verga, wherein rural people are observed with "detachment," as "nature" extrinsic to the writer, as a natural spectacle, etc. It is the point of view in Hagenbeck's *Io e le belve*.³ In Italy, the "naturalist" element was grafted onto a preexisting ideological position, as one can see in Manzoni's *The Betrothed*, where there is the same "detachment" from the people—a detachment barely concealed by a benevolent smile that is ironic and has the quality of caricature.

Cf. Notebook 23, §56.

§<10>. *Past and present.* In his review of Otto Westphal's *Feinde Bismarcks* in *La Critica* of 20 November 1930, Croce writes that the success of Ludwig's books "and many other similar works stems from . . . a certain enfeeblement and trivialization of the mind that the war has produced all across the world."¹ What could be the meaning of this affirmation? If analyzed, it means nothing, absolutely nothing. In my view, the phenomenon has a more realistic

explanation: in the postwar period, a very important social stratum has emerged in the world of culture that is also interested in history; writers of Ludwig's type are the literary expression of this phenomenon. Does the Ludwig phenomenon signify an intellectual advance or a regression? I believe that in a certain specific sense it indicates an advance: the current readers of "belletristic history" (to use Croce's expression) are the equivalent of those social elements who in the past used to read historical novels and learned history from the novels of Dumas, Hugo, etc. Hence it seems to me that there has been an "advance." One could only talk of an enfeeblement of the mind and of trivialization if the history of historians had disappeared. But this is not the case, and, perhaps, the opposite is taking place; in other words, more people may be reading serious history today, as one can see, at least in Italy, from the increasing number of historical book series (see, for example, the series published by Vallecchi and by *Nuova Italia*). Even Croce's own books on history are more widely read today than they were before the war; at present, there is a greater intellectual interest in politics and hence in history among the petty bourgeois strata, and they satisfy their needs immediately with "belletristic history." One thing, however, is certain: namely, that in the cultural field, the relative stature of the "serious historians" has been diminished by Ludwig and Co.'s entry into the field. Croce expresses regret over this fact, which reflects a "crisis of authority" in the sphere of knowledge and high culture. The role of the great intellectuals, even if it has remained intact, is much more difficult to affirm and develop in the present milieu: the great intellectual, too, must take the plunge into practical life and become an organizer of the practical aspects of culture, if he wants to remain a leader; he must democratize himself, be more in touch with the times. Renaissance man is no longer possible in the modern world, at a time when increasingly large masses of humans are participating actively and directly in history.

In reality, the Ludwig phenomenon and "belletristic history" are not postwar novelties; the fundamental features of these phenomena can be found in journalism and in the successful popular newspaper. The precursors of Ludwig and Co. are the authors of articles in the opinion pages of newspapers, the writers of historical sketches, etc. The phenomenon is thus essentially political and practical; it belongs to the series of practical movements that Croce lumps together under the general heading of "antihistoricism," which

when analyzed from this point of view may be described as follows: the critique of the practical movements that aim to become history; that have not yet been consecrated by success; that are still disjointed and hence "abstract," irrational episodes of the movement of history, of the general unfolding of world history. It is often forgotten (and when the critic of unfolding history forgets this, it means that he is not a historian but a political man in action) that in every moment of unfolding history there is a struggle between the rational and the irrational—irrational here means that which in the final analysis will not triumph, will never become actual history, but which in reality is also rational because it is necessarily linked to the rational and is an indispensable moment of the rational. It is often forgotten that in history, even though the general always triumphs, the "particular" also struggles to impose itself, and, in the final analysis, it, too, imposes itself insofar as it determines a certain development of the general instead of another. In modern history, however, the "particular" no longer has the same meaning it did for Machiavelli and Guicciardini; it no longer refers to mere individual interest, for in modern history, the historico-political individual is not the "biological" individual but the social group. Only the struggle and its outcome—which is not to say its immediate outcome but the outcome that manifests itself in a permanent victory—will reveal that which is rational or irrational, that which is "worthy" of victory because it continues the past in its own way and moves beyond it.

Croce's attitude in practice is an element to consider in the analysis and critique of his philosophical position; indeed, it is the fundamental element. In Croce, philosophy and "ideology" finally become one, and philosophy reveals itself to be nothing other than a "practical instrument" for organization and action: for the organization of a party or, rather, an international of parties and a practical course of action. Croce's address to the Philosophy Congress at Oxford is in fact a political manifesto for an international union of the great intellectuals of all countries, especially the Europeans; and one cannot deny that this might become an important party and play a significant role.² One can say that, generally speaking, the modern world is currently experiencing a phenomenon similar to the split between the "spiritual" and the "temporal" in the Middle Ages, a phenomenon that is more complex now than it was then, to the extent that modern life has become more complex. Regressive

and conservative social groupings are shrinking back more and more to their initial economic-corporative phase, while progressive and innovative groupings are still in their initial phase—which is, precisely, the economic-corporative phase. The traditional intellectuals are detaching themselves from the social grouping to which they have hitherto given the highest, most comprehensive form and hence the most extensive and complete consciousness of the modern state. Their detachment is in fact an act of incalculable historical significance; they are signaling and sanctioning the crisis of the state in its decisive form. These intellectuals, however, have neither the kind of organization possessed by the church nor anything comparable to it; that is what makes the modern crisis more severe than the medieval crisis. The medieval crisis lasted for several centuries, until the French Revolution, when the social grouping that had become the economic driving force in Europe after the year 1000 was able to present itself as an integral “state” with all the intellectual and moral forces that were necessary and adequate to the task of organizing a complete and perfect society. Today, the “spiritual” that is detaching itself from the “temporal” and setting itself apart is something disorganic, decentered, an unstable scattering of great cultural personalities, “without a Pope” and without a territory. Consequently, this [process of] disintegration of the modern state is far more catastrophic than the medieval [historical process], which was simultaneously disintegrative and integrative, given the particular grouping that was the motor of the historical process itself and given the type of state that had existed after the year 1000 in Europe, a state that knew nothing of modern centralization and could be described as “federative of the dominant classes” rather than the state of a single dominant class.

One should examine the extent to which Gentile’s “actualism” corresponds to the positive phase of the state,³ whereas Croce provides the opposition to it. Gentile’s “unity in the act” allows him to recognize as “history” that which for Croce is antihistory. For Gentile, history is entirely history of the state, while, for Croce, it is “ethico-political.” In other words, Croce wants to maintain a distinction between civil society and political society, between hegemony and dictatorship; the great intellectuals exercise hegemony, which presupposes a certain collaboration, that is, an active and voluntary (free) consent; in other words, a liberal-democratic regime. Gentile posits the [economic-]corporative phase as

an ethical phase within the historical act: hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force is no different from consent; it is impossible to distinguish political society from civil society; only the state exists and, of course, the state-as-government, etc.

The conflict between Croce and Gentile in the philosophical sphere has its equivalent in the field of political economy, in the conflicting positions of Einaudi and the followers of Gentile (cf. the Einaudi-Benini-Spirito polemic in *Nuovi Studi* of 1930).⁴ Spirito's concept of the citizen as functionary of the state is the direct product of the failure to distinguish between political society and civil society, between hegemony and state-political government. In reality, then, it is the product of the antihistoricity or ahistoricity of the concept of the state that is implicit in Spirito's view, his peremptory affirmations and polemical bellowings notwithstanding. Spirito refuses to acknowledge that, by virtue of the fact that every form of property is linked to the state, even from the point of view of the classical economists, the state intervenes at every moment of economic life, which is a continuous web of transfers of property. Spirito's view, in concrete terms, represents a return to the pure economicity of which he accuses his opponents.

It is interesting to note that this view contains within it "Americanism," since America has yet to surpass the economic-corporative phase, which the Europeans traversed during the Middle Ages; in other words, it has not yet produced a conception of the world and a group of great intellectuals to lead the people within the ambit of civil society. In this sense, it is true that America is under the influence of Europe, of European history. (This question of the form[-phase] of the state in the United States is very complex, but the kernel of the question seems to me to be precisely this.)

§<11>. *Encyclopedic notions*. Freedom-discipline. The concept of freedom should not be linked directly with discipline, which in such an instance is taken to mean something imposed from the outside, as the forced curtailment of freedom. The concept of freedom should be linked with that of responsibility: the responsibility that generates discipline. Responsibility as opposed to individual free will. The only freedom is "responsible"—that is, "universal"—freedom insofar as it posits itself as the individual aspect of a collective or group "freedom," as the individual expression of a law.

§<12>. *The state and regulated society.* For a critical starting point, one should take note of the confusion between the concept of class-state and the concept of regulated society, a confusion that is reflected in the new "juridical" trends, especially in the *Nuovi Studi* of Volpicelli and Spirito. This confusion is quite conspicuous in the paper "La libertà economica" presented by Spirito at the XIXth Meeting of the Society for Scientific Progress held at Bolzano in September 1930 and published in the *Nuovi Studi* of September–October 1930.¹ As long as the class-state exists, the regulated society cannot exist, other than metaphorically—that is, only in the sense that the class-state, too, is a regulated society. The utopians, insofar as they expressed a critique of existing society at their time, understood very well that the class-state could not be the regulated society. So much so that in the types of society depicted in the various utopias, economic equality is put forward as the necessary basis for the projected reform; in this respect, the utopians were not utopians but concrete political scientists and consistent critics. The utopian character of some of them was due to the fact that they believed it possible to introduce economic equality with arbitrary laws, an act of will, etc. Their concept, however, remains correct, namely, that complete and perfect political equality cannot exist without economic equality. The same concept can be found in other political writers (including the right-wing critics of democracy—insofar as the Swiss or Danish model is used to argue that the system is a reasonable one for all countries). This concept is found in seventeenth-century writers, for example, in Ludovico Zuccolo and his book *Il Belluzzi*,² as well as in Machiavelli, I believe. Maurras believes that in Switzerland that particular form of democracy is possible precisely because there is a certain average level of economic well-being, etc.³

The confusing of class-state with regulated society is typical of the middle classes and petty intellectuals, who would be delighted with any form of regularization that prevented intense struggles and violent change; it is a typically reactionary and regressive conception.

§<13>. *The medieval communes as an economic-corporative phase of modern development.* The book by Bernardino Barbadoro, *Le Finanze della repubblica fiorentina*, Florence, Olschki, 1929,

L. 100. In his review of Barbadoro's book, published in the July 1930 issue of *Pègaso*, Antonio Panella recalls the (unfinished and flawed) effort undertaken by Giuseppe Canestrini to publish a series of volumes on statecraft based on the official documents of the Republic of Florence and the Medicis.¹ (The first and only volume of the projected series was published in 1862.)² The finances of the Commune of Genoa have been studied by Sieveking,³ and those of Venice by Besta, Cessi, and Luzzatto.⁴

Barbadoro now writes about the Florentine fiscal system. In chronological terms, he goes as far as the establishment of the Monte after the "signoria" of the duke of Athens.⁵ The contents include a treatment of direct taxation and of the public debt—in other words, the fundamental elements of the economic structure of the commune (it appears that Barbadoro is to complete the treatment of the subject by examining indirect taxation).

The first form of taxation: the "hearth tax"—it still shows traces of the feudal tributary systems, and it represents the tangible sign of the assertion of the autonomy of the commune, which takes over the rights that belonged to the empire. A more refined form of taxation: the "assessment"—based on the general appraisal of the citizen's ability to contribute.

The system of direct taxation as the main source of receipts conflicted with the interest of the dominant class that possessed the wealth and therefore was inclined to place the fiscal burden on the mass of the population by taxing consumption. That period saw the first form of public debt; the well-to-do made loans or advances to meet the needs of the treasury while assuring themselves of reimbursement from sales tax revenues. The political struggle was characterized by an oscillation between "assessment" taxes and sales taxes. When the commune fell under the seigniorship of outsiders (the duke of Calabria and the duke of Athens) the "assessment" tax appeared, whereas at other times (as in 1315) the "assessment" was repudiated in the city. The seigniorial regime, standing above the interests of the social classes (but in fact, according to Panella, "representing a certain equilibrium of the social classes, which enabled the people to limit the excessive power of the wealthy classes"), could adhere to the principle of distributive justice and even improve the system of direct taxation, until 1427 when, at the dawn of the Medicean principality and the waning of oligarchy, the system for the taxation of landed property was established.

Barbadoro's book is indispensable, precisely, for showing how the bourgeoisie of the commune was unable to move beyond the economic-corporative phase—unable, in other words, to create a state based on "the consent of the governed," a state capable of further development. The state could only be developed as a principality and not as a communal republic.

This book is also interesting for studying the importance of public debt, which grew as a result of the expansionist wars—in other words, to secure for the bourgeoisie freedom of movement and a larger market. (This should be compared with what Marx has to say in *Capital* apropos of the function and importance of public debt.)⁶ The consequences of public debt are also interesting: the wealthy class believed that in providing loans it had found a method for passing most of the fiscal burdens on to the mass of citizens, but instead it found itself penalized by the insolvency of the commune, which coincided with the economic crisis and thus contributed to worsening a bad situation and fueling the financial troubles of the country. This situation led to the consolidation of the debt, which was made irredeemable (perpetual yield [and reduction of the interest rate]), and also to the establishment of the Monte, after the expulsion of the duke of Athens and the advent to power of the "common" people.

§<14>. *The international function of Italian intellectuals. Monsignor Della Casa.* In the installment of his study "La lirica del Cinquecento," published in *La Critica* of November 1930, Croce writes on *Galateo*: "Nothing in it is dull and academic, and it consists of a series of agreeable instructions on how to be well mannered in social intercourse; it is one of those originative books that sixteenth-century Italy gave to the modern world" (p. 410).¹ Is it correct to say that it is an "originative" book given to the "modern world"? Who was more of an "originator" of the "modern world," Della Casa and Castiglione or Leon Battista Alberti?² Those who concerned themselves with relations among courtiers or those who imparted advice aimed at the improvement of the bourgeois type in civil society? Nevertheless, in this inquiry, one should take Della Casa into consideration; it is certainly correct not to regard him as merely "dull and academic." (But does this view of the "modern world" not imply a "separation"—rather than an originative relation—between Della Casa and the modern world?)

Della Casa wrote other minor political works, the orations, and a small treatise in Latin, *De officiis inter potentiores et tenuiores amicos*. The latter "is about the relations between powerful men and their friends of lower station; between those whose need for a livelihood and advancement leads them to serve as courtiers and those who employ them; a relationship that Della Casa deems, correctly, as utilitarian and that he does not attempt to convert into a bond governed by a law of justice; rather, he argues that both sides should accept such a relationship and introduce into it some bright element of kindness—he does so by explaining to both sides the realities of their respective positions and the tact that these positions demand."³

§<15>. *Encyclopedic notions*. "What people call intelligence is often nothing more than the ability to comprehend secondary truths to the detriment of fundamental truths." "Nothing can make us despair of men more than frivolity." (Two aphorisms by Ugo Bernasconi in *Pègaso*, August 1930: "Parole alla buona gente.")¹

This kind of intelligence is also generically called "talent," and it is [evident in] the kind of superficial polemic that is governed by the vanity of wanting to appear independent and of not accepting anyone's authority, hence the effort to oppose fundamental truths with objections that consist of a whole series of partial and secondary truths.

"Frivolity" is often manifest in the clumsiness of ostentatious seriousness; indeed, that which is imputed to certain intellectuals and to women as "frivolity" is—in politics, for example—nothing other than clumsiness and narrow-minded provincialism.

§<16>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Italian national culture*. In Ugo Ojetti's "Lettera a Umberto Fracchia sulla critica" (*Pègaso*, August 1939),¹ there are two observations worth noting. (1) Ojetti recalls that Thibaudet divides criticism into three categories: that of the professional critics, that of the authors themselves, and that of the "honnêtes gens"²—i.e. the general public, which, ultimately, is the stock exchange of literary values, since in France there is a large, attentive public that follows all the vicissitudes of literature. In Italy, it is precisely criticism by the public that is missing: "There is no conviction or, if you prefer, no illusion that he [the writer] performs a task of national importance and, in the case of the best

writers, a task of historical importance; for, as you [Fracchia] say, 'every year and every day that passes has its literature all the same; that's the way it has always been, and that's the way it will always be, and it is absurd to wait or to prognosticate or to invoke for tomorrow what already exists today. Each century, each part of a century, has always extolled its own works; indeed, if anything, each has been led to exaggerate their importance, greatness, value, and enduring qualities.' True, but not in Italy," etc. (Fracchia wrote an article following a speech given by Gioachino Volpe at a meeting of the Academy at which prizes were distributed. Volpe said: "No great paintings, historical works, or novels are emerging. Those who look closely, however, will notice latent forces in current literature, a desire to climb higher, and some good and promising achievements."³ I will provide the precise reference to Volpe's speech in another note, later.)⁴

(2) Ojetti's other noteworthy observation is the following: "The lack of popularity of our past literature, in other words, of our classics. It is true: in English and French criticism, one often reads comparisons between living authors and the classics, etc., etc." This observation is fundamental for a historical assessment of Italian culture at the present time. The past does not live in the present, it is not an essential part of the present; in other words, the history of our national culture lacks continuity and unity. The affirmation of this continuity and unity is rhetorical or propagandistic; it is a practical act insofar as it seeks to create something artificially, but it is not an actualized reality. The past, literature included, is seen as an element of scholastic culture, not as an element of life; this means, then, that the national sentiment is of recent vintage; indeed, it can be said to be in a formative phase, for literature has never been a national phenomenon but a "cosmopolitan" one.

Cf. Notebook 23, §57.

§<17>. *Popular literature. The detective novel.* Cf. Aldo Sorani, "Conan Doyle e la fortuna del romanzo poliziesco" in *Pègaso* of August 1930.¹ Very interesting with regard to this kind of literature and the different forms it has assumed. However, Sorani's discussion of Chesterton and his detective, Father Brown, fails to take into account the touch of caricature that is part of the general atmosphere of Chesterton's stories—and that, it seems to me, is an essential element; indeed, it is the artistic element that ennobles Chesterton's detective stories when they are perfectly executed (which is not always the case). In his article, Sorani dwells on the various attempts that have been made—especially by Anglo-Saxon writers and those of major importance—to improve the technical aspects of the detective novel. The archetype is Sherlock Holmes, with his two [basic] characteristics: the scientist-detective and the psychologist. Writers attempt

to perfect either one of these two characteristics or both of them simultaneously. Chesterton has focused on psychology with the game of inductions and deductions by Father Brown (who becomes the hero of a Roman Catholic "apologetic" literature as opposed to the Protestant "scientism" of Conan Doyle—another cultural element that Sorani fails to mention).² It appears, however, that Chesterton may have gone too far in this direction with the poet-detective type Gabriel Gale.³

Sorani sketches a picture of the unprecedented success of the detective novel at all levels of society, and he tries to identify the reason behind it. In his view, it is an expression of rebellion against mechanical nature and the standardization of modern life, a way of escaping the triviality of quotidian existence. Of course, this explanation is applicable to all forms of popular literature, from chivalric poetry (doesn't Don Quixote, in effect, also try to escape the triviality of everyday existence?) to the various kinds of serial novels. In any case, Sorani's article [will be] indispensable when the time comes for a more organic study on this branch of popular literature.

The question: why is detective literature so widely read? This is a particular aspect of the larger issue: why is nonartistic literature widely read? For practical (moral and political) reasons, undoubtedly, and this generic response is also the most precise. But doesn't artistic literature also circulate for practical-political and moral reasons, and only indirectly for artistic reasons? In reality, one reads a book because of practical impulses, and one rereads certain books for artistic reasons: the aesthetic emotion never arises on a first reading. The same thing happens in the theater, where the aesthetic emotion constitutes a minuscule "percentage" of the spectator's interest, because, in the theater, other elements are at work, many of which are not of an intellectual but of a physiological order, such as "sex appeal," etc. In other cases, the aesthetic emotion in the theater comes not from the literary work but from the actors' interpretation; in these cases, however, the literary work must not be "difficult" but "elementary" and "popular," in the sense that the passions represented are deeply human and immediately familiar (revenge, maternal love, etc.)—and so here, too, the analysis becomes complicated. The great actors received greater applause in *Morte Civile*, *Les Crochets du père Martin*, etc., than they did in complicated psychological plots; in the former case, the applause was unqualified, but in the latter it was cold and meant to distinguish the actor whom the public loved from the work that would have been booed, etc.⁴

Cf. Notebook 21, §13.

§<18>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. The national sentiment of writers.* From Ugo Ojetti's "Lettera a Piero Parini sugli scrittori sedentari" in the *Pègaso* of September 1930:

How is it that we Italians who have spread our work (and not just our manual labor) all across the face of the earth, and who have our own crowded settlements from Melbourne to Rio, from San Francisco to Marseilles, from Lima to Tunis—how is it that we are the only ones who do not have novels in which our customs and our consciousness are brought into relief in contrast with the consciousness and customs of those foreigners among whom we have happened to live, to struggle, to suffer, and sometimes even to prevail? There are Italians in every corner of the world, whether it be at the bottom or at the top: unskilled workers or bankers, miners or doctors, waiters or engineers, bricklayers or merchants. Our most refined literature ignores them. If there is no novel or play without a heightened contrast of persons, what contrast is deeper and more concrete than this one between two races—and with the older of the two, the richer one (in immemorial customs and rituals) expatriated and reduced to living without the support of anything other than its own vigor and resistance?¹

There are no books on Italians abroad, but there are no books on foreigners, either (except for journalistic literature).

Cf. Notebook 23, §58.

§<19>. *Encyclopedic notions. On truth or on telling the truth in politics.* There is a very widely held view in certain circles (and the dissemination of this view is indicative of the political and cultural stature of these circles) that lying, knowing how to conceal astutely one's true opinions and objectives, knowing how to make people believe the opposite of what one really wants, etc., is of the essence in the art of politics. This view is so deeply rooted and widespread that people do not believe in telling the truth. Abroad, Italians are generally regarded as masters of the art of simulation and dissimulation, etc. Recall the Jewish anecdote: "Where are you going?" Isaac asks Benjamin. "To Cracow," Benjamin replies. "What a liar you are. You say that you're going to Cracow in order to lead me to believe that you are really going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you're going to Cracow. What need is there to lie, then?"¹ In politics, one may talk of circumspection, not of lying in the mean sense held by many; in mass politics, telling the truth is, precisely, a political necessity.

§<20>. *Problems in linguistics*. Giulio Bertoni. Natalino Sapegno's favorable review of *Linguaggio e poesia* (Rieti: Bibliotheca, 1930, L. 5) in the *Pègaso* of September 1930 is astounding.¹ Sapegno does not realize that Bertoni's theory—i.e., that the new linguistics "is a subtle analysis that distinguishes poetic words from instrumental words"—is anything but original. In fact, it goes back to a very old rhetorical and pedantic concept that divides words into "ugly" and "beautiful," poetic and nonpoetic or antipoetic, etc., in the same way that languages used to be divided into beautiful and ugly, civilized or barbaric, poetic or prosaic. Bertoni adds nothing to linguistics other than old prejudices, and it is astonishing that these stupidities gained the approval of Croce and his students.² What are words when they are uprooted and abstracted from the literary work? No longer an aesthetic element but an element of the history of culture, and the linguist studies them as such. And how does Bertoni justify "the naturalistic analysis of languages as a physical fact and as a social fact"? As a physical fact? What does that mean? That man, too, must be studied not only as an element of political history but also as a biological fact? That one must make a chemical analysis of a painting? Etc.? That it would be worth analyzing how much mechanical effort Michelangelo expended sculpting Moses?

It is astounding that these Croceans are oblivious to all this, and it shows what great confusion Bertoni has helped spread in this field. Sapegno actually writes that Bertoni's inquiry (on the beauty of isolated individual words—as if the most "overused and automated" word did not regain its freshness and pristine simplicity in the concrete work of art) "is difficult and delicate yet not any the less necessary: because of it, linguistics will be on its way toward becoming something better than a science of language aimed at discovering laws that are more or less fixed and unfailing; it will become the history of language, attentive to particular facts and their spiritual significance." And again: "The nucleus of this argument [of Bertoni's] is, as anyone can see, a living and fertile concept of Crocean aesthetics. Bertoni's originality, however, consists in having developed and enriched the concept in a concrete direction that Croce himself had only pointed to or just initiated but never pursued thoroughly and purposefully," etc. If Bertoni "revives Crocean thought" and even enriches it, and if Croce recognizes himself in Bertoni, then one would have to say that Croce himself must be reexamined and corrected. It seems to me, however, that Croce has

been very indulgent with Bertoni only because he has not pursued the issue in depth and for "didactic" reasons.

In certain respects, Bertoni's research is partly a return to certain etymological systems: "sol quia solus est" implicitly contains in itself the image of "solitude" in the immense sky and so on; "how beautiful it is that in Apulia the dragonfly with its wings in the form of a cross is called *la morte*" and so on. Recall, in one of Carlo Dossi's works, the story of the teacher who explains the formation of words: "In the beginning, a fruit fell, making the sound "pum!" hence the word "pomo," etc. "And what if a pear had fallen?" asks the young Dossi.³

§<21>. *The cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals.* On the political writers and moralists of the seventeenth century to whom Croce draws attention in his volume *Storia dell'età barocca*, cf. Domenico Pettrini's review "Politici e moralisti del Seicento" (in the *Pègaso* of August 1930), of a book by the same title, *Politici e moralisti del Seicento (Strada, Zuccolo, Settala, Accetto, Brignole Sale, Malvezzi)*, edited by Benedetto Croce and Santino Caramella, Bari: Laterza, 1930, L. 25 (in the series "Scrittori d'Italia").¹

§<22>. *The English and religion.* From an article in *Civiltà Cattolica* [of 4 January 1930], "L'opera della grazia in una recente conversione dall'anglicanismo,"¹ I extract the following quotation from Vernon Johnson's book *One Lord, One Faith* (London, Sheed and Ward, 1929; Johnson is the convert): "To the average Englishman the question of any authority in his religion hardly ever occurs. He accepts that aspect of the Church of England's teaching in which he was brought up, either Anglo-Catholic, Broad, or Evangelical, and follows it until it either fails to satisfy his needs or else comes into conflict with his own personal views. He then being essentially honest and sincere and not desiring to profess more than he really believes, discards all that he cannot accept and evolves a personal religion of his own."² The writer in *Civiltà Cattolica* continues, perhaps paraphrasing: "He [the average Englishman] regards religion as an exclusively private affair between God and the soul; and with this attitude he is extremely cautious, diffident, and reluctant to allow the intervention of any authority. As a result, there is a growing number of people who increasingly entertain

doubts in their mind: whether the Gospels are really to be believed, whether the Christian religion is obligatory for the whole world, and whether one can know with certainty what Christ's doctrine really was. Therefore, they are hesitant to admit that Jesus Christ is truly God."³ And again: "The greatest of all [the difficulties for the return of the English to the Roman Church]: every Englishman's love of independence. He does not accept any interference, least of all in religion or by a foreigner. Inbred in him, deep-set in his subconscious mind, is the instinct that national independence and religious independence go hand in hand. England, he maintains, will never accept an Italian-governed church."⁴

§<23>. *Past and present. The Catholics after the concordat.* The pope's response to the Christmas greetings of the College of Cardinals is very important; it is published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 4 January 1930.¹ The *Civiltà Cattolica* of 18 January published the papal encyclical *Quinquagesimo ante anno* (marking Pius XI's fiftieth year as a priest), which reiterates that the treaty and the concordat are indivisible and inseparable; "either both hold good or both perish."² This assertion, repeated by the pope, is of great significance: perhaps it is stated and stressed not only with respect to the Italian government with which the two pacts were concluded but especially as a safeguard in case there is a change of government. The difficulty resides in the fact that if the treaty collapsed, the pope would have to reimburse the sums of money received in the interim from the Italian state under the treaty agreement; nor would the possible cavil based on the Law of Guarantees have any merit.³ One needs to examine how on earth the sum of money that the state had allotted to the Vatican after the Guarantee Act was accounted for in the budget, for there was a provision that the state would be freed from its obligation if within five years of the enactment of the law the Vatican were to refuse receipt of the money.

§<24>. *Encyclopedic notions. Civil society.* One must distinguish civil society as Hegel understands it and in the sense it is often used in these notes (that is, in the sense of the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole of society; as the ethical content of the state) from the sense given to it by Catholics, for whom civil society is, instead, political society or the state,

as opposed to the society of the family and of the church. In his encyclical on education (*Civiltà Cattolica*, 1 February 1930),¹ Pius XI states:

Now there are three *necessary* societies, distinct from one another and yet harmoniously combined by God, into which man is born: two, namely the family and civil society, belong to the natural order; the third, the Church, to the supernatural order. In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society. The third society, into which man is born when through Baptism he reaches the divine life of grace, is the Church; a society of the supernatural order and of universal extent; a perfect society, because it has in itself all the means required for its own end, which is the eternal salvation of mankind; hence it is supreme in its domain.²

For Catholicism, what is called "civil society" in Hegelian language is not "necessary"; that is, it is purely historical or contingent. In the Catholic conception, the state is just the church, and it is a universal and supernatural state: the medieval conception is fully preserved in theory.

§<25>. *Past and present*. The pope's encyclical on education (published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 1 February 1930):¹ discussions it has stirred up, problems it has posed in theory and in practice. (This is a part of the larger issue concerning schooling, or the educational aspect of the national problem of culture or the struggle for culture.)

§<26>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. *Pirandello*. Pirandello does not, by any means, belong in this category of writers. I put him here in order to group together the notes on literary culture. A special essay will have to be written on Pirandello, using all the notes

I wrote during the war,¹ when Pirandello was opposed by critics who were not able even to summarize his plays and who provoked some of the public to furious anger. (Recall the reviews in the Turin newspapers following the première of *L'innesto* and Nino Berrini's offers to join forces with me.)² Remember that *Liola* was removed from the repertory because of hostile demonstrations by young Turin Catholics at its second performance.³ Cf. the article in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 5 April 1930, "Lazzaro ossia un mito di Luigi Pirandello."⁴

The importance of Pirandello, I believe, is not so much artistic as it is intellectual and moral—that is, cultural. He has tried to introduce into popular culture the "dialectic" of modern philosophy, in opposition to the Aristotelian-Catholic way of conceiving the "objectivity of the real." He has done it in the way it can be done in the theater and in the way Pirandello himself is able to do it: this dialectical conception of objectivity seems acceptable to the public because it is enacted by exceptional characters; hence it has the romantic quality of a paradoxical struggle against common sense and good sense. But could it be otherwise? This is the only thing that makes Pirandello's plays look less like "philosophical dialogues." Even so, they still have, to a considerable degree, the character of "philosophical dialogues," since all too often the main characters have to "explain and justify" the new way of conceiving reality. Besides, Pirandello himself sometimes slips into a real solipsism, since the "dialectic" in his work is more sophisticated than dialectical.

§<27>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Supercity and supercountry.* In *L'Italia Letteraria* of 16 November 1930, see Massimo Bontempelli's open letter to G.B. Angioletti ("Il Novecentismo è vivo o è morto?") with a gloss by the latter.¹ Bontempelli wrote this letter immediately after he was nominated to the Royal Academy of Italy, and every word exudes the author's satisfaction at being able to say that he had made his enemies—Malaparte and the *Italiano* group—"bite the dust."² According to Bontempelli, this polemic of supercountry against supercity was stirred by dark and ignoble sentiments, and this view is acceptable to those who bear in mind Malaparte's display of social climbing throughout the postwar period. It was the battle of a small group of "orthodox" litterateurs who saw themselves smitten by the "disloyal competition" of the former writers for *Il Mondo*, such as Bontempelli, Alvaro, etc.,³ and

wanted to give substance of an ideological-artistic-cultural kind to their resistance, etc. Meanness from both sides. Angioletti's gloss is even meaner than Bontempelli's letter.

§<28>. *Popular literature*. *L'Italia Letteraria* of 9 November 1930 reprinted some passages from an article by Filippo Burzio (in *La Stampa* of 22 October) on Dumas's *Three Musketeers*.¹ Burzio regards the three musketeers as very successful personifications, similar to Don Quixote and Orlando Furioso, of the myth of adventure,

that is, of something essential to human nature, that seems to be seriously and progressively disappearing from modern life. As existence becomes more rational and organized, social discipline more rigid, and the task assigned to the individual more precise and predictable, so also, to the same degree, the margin of adventure is reduced, like the common open woods in the midst of the suffocating walls demarcating private property. . . . Taylorism is a fine thing, and man is an adaptable animal, but perhaps there are limits to his mechanization. If I were asked for the deep reasons of the anxiety of the West, I would respond without hesitation: the decay of faith and the deadening of adventure. . . . Will Taylorism win or the Musketeers? This is another issue, and the answer, which seemed certain thirty years ago, is best left up in the air. If the present civilization does not collapse, we might witness interesting mixtures of the two.

The issue is this: there has always been a part of humanity whose life is Taylorized, and these people have attempted to escape—by means of fantasies and dreams—from the constrictions of the existing order that crushes them. The greatest adventure, the greatest "utopia" collectively created by humanity: religion. Is it not a way of escaping the terrestrial world? Is this not what Marx means when he talks of "opium of the people"? Now, the problem is aggravated by the fact that the rationalization of life threatens to hit the middle and intellectual classes harder than ever before—hence preoccupations, entreaties, and exorcisms. But this is an old phenomenon, at least as old as religions. Popular literature as "opium of the people": the point has already been jotted down in another notebook in connection with *The Count of Monte Cristo*.²

Cf. Notebook 21, §13

§<29>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. It is noteworthy that the concept of culture in Italy is purely bookish: the literary journals

deal with books or the authors of books. One never gets a chance to read articles on impressions of collective life, on ways of thinking, on the "signs of the times," on the changes in customs that are taking place, etc. The difference between Italian literature and other literatures. Writers of memoirs are missing in Italy; biographers and autobiographers are rare. There is a lack of interest in the living person, in personal experience. (Is Ugo Ojetti's *Cose viste*, after all, the great masterpiece everyone started talking about after Ojetti became editor of the *Corriere della Sera*—that is, the literary organ that remunerates writers better and enhances their reputation? At least, judging by the "Cose viste" I read years ago, the author deals mostly with writers. This could be checked.)¹ It is another sign of the separation of Italian intellectuals from the national-popular reality.

Prezzolini's observation on intellectuals, written in 1920 (*Mi pare . . .*, p.16): "Among us, the intellectual claims the right to act as a parasite. He considers himself like the bird made for the golden cage, which must be supplied with mash and millet seed. The disdain that still exists for anything resembling work, the enduring fond attachment to the romantic notion that one has to wait for an afflatus from heaven, as the Pythia waited to be possessed—these are rather putrid symptoms of inner corruption. The intellectuals should understand that the good old days for these interesting masquerades are over. Before long, one will not be allowed to be smitten by literature or to remain useless."² Intellectuals conceive of literature as a sui generis "profession" that should "pay" even when nothing is immediately produced and that it should entitle them to a pension. But who determines whether so-and-so is really a "man of letters" and that society can support him in the expectation that he'll produce a "masterpiece"? The litterateur claims the right to be idle ("otium et non negotium"), to travel, to fantasize, without worrying about money. This way of thinking is linked to court patronage, which, however, is misunderstood, because the great literary figures of the Renaissance worked in some other capacity in addition to writing (even Ariosto, the litterateur par excellence, had administrative and political responsibilities): a false and mistaken image of the Renaissance litterateur. Nowadays, the litterateur <is> a professor and journalist or a simple literate person (in the sense that he tends to become one, if he is a government official, etc.).

One can say that "literature" is a social function but that men of letters, taken individually, are not necessary for this function—

even though this may seem paradoxical. Yet it is true, in the sense that, whereas other professions are collective and their social function is distributed among individuals, this does not occur in literature. This is a question of "apprenticeship," but can one speak of an artistic "apprenticeship" in literature? The intellectual function cannot be cut off from productive work in general, and the same is true for artists—unless they have effectively shown themselves to be "artistically" productive. Nor will this be harmful to "art"; indeed, it might even be helpful. It will only be detrimental to the artistic "bohème," and there is absolutely nothing wrong with that.

§<30>. *Encyclopedic notions*. The assertion that "there is no destruction without creation" is very widespread. I read it even before 1914 in *L'Idée nationale*, which was really a bric-à-brac of banalities and clichés.¹ Every group or coterie that regards itself as the bearer of historical innovations (the matters in question are in fact old and timeworn) solemnly declares itself destroyer-creator. Destruction is difficult; indeed, it is as difficult as creation. For it is not a question of destroying material things; what is at stake is the destruction of "relations" that are invisible, impalpable, even though they are hidden in material things. The destroyer-creator is the one who destroys the old in order to bring to light, to enable the flowering of the new that has become "necessary" and presses implacably on the threshold of history. Hence it can be said that one destroys to the extent that one creates. Many self-proclaimed destroyers are nothing other than "procurers of unsuccessful abortions," liable to the penal code of history.

§<31>. *Past and present*. From Prezzolini's book, *Mi pare . . .*: "Modern impiety is a new freshness of mind, a moral act, a liberation. Impiety is a hurdle, a burden, an obligation, a superior duty. In this sense, it makes us noble. It is the emulation of the past virtue. We, the impious, can and must be as religious as the men of the past. Even more so; or better: differently."¹

§<32>. *Brief notes on Indian culture*. From F. Lefèvre's interview with Aldous Huxley (in *Nouvelles Littéraires* of 1 November 1930):

"Qu'est-ce que vous pensez des révoltes et de tout ce qui se passe aux Indes?"

—Je pense qu'on y a commencé la civilisation du mauvais côté. On a créé des hautes universités, on n'a plus fondé d'écoles primaires. On a cru qu'il suffisait de donner des lumières à une caste et qu'elle pourrait ensuite élever les masses, mais je ne vois pas que les résultats obtenus aient été très heureux. Ces gens qui ont bénéficié de la civilisation occidentale sont tous chattryas ou brahmanes. Une fois instruits, ils demeurent sans travaux et deviennent dangereux. Ce sont eux qui veulent prendre le gouvernement. C'est en visitant les Indes que j'ai le mieux compris la différence qu'il pouvait y avoir au moyen âge entre un *vilain* et un *cardinal*. L'Inde est un pays où la supériorité de droit divin est encore acceptée par les *intouchables* qui reconnaissent eux-mêmes leur indignité.¹

There is some element of truth here, but not much. How could they create elementary schools for the masses in India without producing the adequate personnel? And in order to produce the personnel, is it not necessary at the outset to turn to the already existing intellectual classes? Furthermore, is it possible that a situation like that in India is simply the result of the fact that intellectual groups are unemployed? (Recall Loria's notorious theory about unemployed intellectuals.)² Are these intellectuals "isolated," or have they not become, rather, the expression of the middle and industrial classes that economic development has produced in India?

§<33>. *The intellectuals*. Valuable material on concepts that are widespread among intellectuals can be gleaned from the series of interviews by Frédéric Lefèvre published in *Nouvelles Littéraires* under the title "Une heure avec . . ." Several volumes have been published. These interviews are not exclusively on literary and artistic issues; they also deal with political, economic, etc., and ideological questions in general. The authors' way of thinking is expressed with greater spontaneity and clarity than in their books.¹

§<34>. *Georges Renard*. Died in October 1930. He was professor of the history of labor at the Collège de France. He participated in the Commune. He was the general editor of the following book se-

ries: "Le Socialisme à l'œuvre"; "Histoire Universelle du Travail"; "Bibliothèque Sociale des Métiers." A theoretical book: *Le Régime Socialiste* in which he defends the tradition of French socialism against Marx. He must have written a book on utopian literature, *Les Cités Imaginaires* (but, perhaps, it was just the theme of his university course for 1930-31, which was never taught because of his death), but his books must contain many references to this topic. It would be worth compiling a complete bibliography of Renard, identifying those works that are of scholarly and historical value.¹

§<35>. *Italian culture*. Does "racism" exist in Italy? Many efforts have been made, but all of them are literary and abstract in nature. In this respect, Italy differs from Germany, even though there are some interesting extrinsic similarities between the two countries: (1) The tradition of localism and hence the belated achievement of national and state unity. (An extrinsic similarity, because the causes of Italian and German regionalism are not the same. In Italy, there were two main contributing elements: [a] the revival of local races after the fall of the Roman Empire; [b] the barbarian invasions and, later, rule by foreigners. International relations have had an influence in Germany, but not in the sense of direct occupation by foreigners.) (2) Medieval universalism had a greater effect on Italy than on Germany; in Germany, the empire and secularism triumphed during the Reformation, much earlier than in Italy. (3) In modern times, the domination of the rural landowning classes, but their relations are very different. The German has a stronger sense of race than the Italian. Racism: the historical return to Romanism has little influence outside of literature. The general exaltation of race, etc. Strangely, racism today is upheld by Kurt Erich Suckert (with *Italia Barbara* [*Arcitaliano*], and the supercountry movement),¹ whose name is obviously racial and strongly suggestive of country of origin. Recall, during the war, Arturo Foà and his exaltations of the Italic race, as congruous as Suckert's.²

§<36>. *Lorianism. Trombetti and Etruscan*. Cf. Luigi Pareti, "Alla vigilia del 1° Congresso Internazionale etrusco," *Il Marzocco* of 29 April 1928; and Pareti, "Dopo il Congresso etrusco," *Il Marzocco*,

13 May 1928; and "Consensi e dissensi storici archeologici al Congresso Etrusco," *Il Marzocco*, 20 May 1928.¹

Apropos of research in linguistics, Pareti writes, in the first article:

Assured of the accuracy of the transcribed texts and the thoroughness of our collection, it is possible to rework them in a manner that differs from the usual practice in linguistics. For it is now absolutely necessary not only to drive the efforts of interpretation forward but also to proceed historically; that is, to look at the lexical terms and the phonetic phenomena in a spatial and temporal framework, distinguishing what is ancient from what is recent and singling out the dialectal variations of every region. Once this historical-linguistic foundation is established, it will be possible to trace back, more easily and reliably, the oldest words and phenomena, comparing them with other languages that are pertinent to the question of original language family ties, and also to move in the opposite direction, starting with certain characteristics of the Etruscan dialects in their final stage and moving closer to current dialectal terms and phenomena. Naturally, the research has to be just as meticulous to discern the various levels of *toponymy* that can be used in historical studies. Since, in theory, one has to trace back the age and the original ethnic stratum of every name, it is indispensable to gather the most ancient occurrences of each name and to record its precise original form alongside subsequent deformations. This is necessary in order to avoid the risky comparison of words that can be shown to be incomparable, either because of a real phonetic deformity or because of a chronological impossibility. From all the material that has been thoroughly examined, it will then be appropriate to compile lexicons and topographic maps that are handy and clear reference works.

These articles by Pareti are very well done, and they provide a clear idea of the current state of Etruscan studies.

§<37>. *Past and present*. On the recent state of the schools and of education in Italy, one must look at Mario Missiroli's articles in *L'Italia Letteraria* of 1929.¹

§<38>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Umberto Fracchia's open letter to H. E. Gioacchino Volpe is in *L'Italia Letteraria* of 22 June 1930 (cf. previous note);¹ Volpe's speech at the Academy took place fifteen days earlier. A typical passage by Fracchia: "Just a little more courage, spontaneity, faith

would be enough to transform Your Excellency's begrudging eulogy of contemporary literature into an open and explicit eulogy; to say that the Italian literature of today has strengths that are not only latent but also overt and visible [!], that are only waiting [!] to be seen and recognized by those who ignore them," etc., etc. Volpe had paraphrased somewhat "earnestly" the joyous verses of Giusti: "Heroes, heroes, what are you doing?—We're straining after the future."² And Fracchia moans pitifully that the strainings that have already taken place are not acknowledged.

Fracchia has often threatened publishers who print too many translations with legislative-corporative measures to protect Italian authors. (Recall the decree by the undersecretary of the interior, Bianchi, which was then explained away and de facto withdrawn and which was connected with a campaign conducted by Fracchia.)³ Fracchia's argument in his letter to Volpe is priceless: every century, every part of a century not only has its own literature, it also exalts it, so much so that literary histories have had to reevaluate many works that were once highly acclaimed but are now recognized as worthless. (This is correct, but all it means is that the present period is incapable of interpreting its own time, it is cut off from life, so much so that works are not even praised for "practical reasons"—works that later, perhaps, will be deemed artistically worthless and their "practical" function outdated. But is it true that there are no widely read books? There are, but they are foreign, or there would be if they were translated, like Remarque's book, etc.)⁴ In reality, the present has no literature because, rare exceptions aside, current literature is not tied to national-popular life but to castelike groups uprooted from life, etc. Fracchia moans about criticism that has no standpoint other than that of the great masterpieces and has rarefied itself in the perfection of aesthetic [theories], etc. But if books were criticized in terms of their content, he would still complain, because Fracchia's content, like that of the majority of books by current writers, represents absolutely nothing in the cultural world.

It is not true that in Italy criticism by the public does not exist (as Ojetti writes in his letter in *Pègaso*, mentioned in another note);⁵ it exists, but it comes from a public that still likes the novels of Dumas *père* and *fils*, or foreign crime fiction, or Carolina Invernizio's works.⁶ This criticism is represented by the editors of the daily newspapers and the popular periodicals with a large circulation, and it manifests itself in the serials they choose to publish; it is represented by the publishers, and it manifests itself in the translation of foreign books—not only current books but old, very old, ones; it is manifested in the repertoires of the theatrical companies, etc., etc. Yet this is not a phenomenon of total "exoticism" because when it comes to music, the public wants to hear Verdi, Puccini, and Mascagni, who obviously have no analogues in literature. And in other countries, foreign audiences prefer Verdi, Puccini, and Mascagni to their own national and current composers. There is, then, a disjunction between writers and

the public, and the public seeks its literature abroad and feels that foreign literature is more "ours" than the national literature. This is the problem. For if it is true that every century and every part of a century has its own literature, it is not always the case that this literature is discovered within the same national community: every people has its own literature, but this literature can come to it from another people; in other words, the people in question can be subordinated to the intellectual hegemony of other peoples. This is often the most shocking paradox for many monopolistic movements of a nationalistic and repressive character: while they make grand plans for their own hegemony, they fail to notice that they are subjected to foreign hegemonies, just as while they make imperialistic plans, they are in fact the object of other imperialisms, etc. On the other hand, one cannot be sure: it could be the case that the central political leadership is fully cognizant of the real situation, and it exalts its imperialism in order to keep the empty brains happy and thus prevent the people from having any sense of what in fact they have become subjected to.

Cf. Notebook 23, §57

§<39>. *Encyclopedic notions*. Paul Bourget's assertion at the outbreak of the war (I think, but it might even have been earlier) that the four pillars of Europe were the Vatican, the Prussian General Staff, the English House of Lords, the Académie Française.¹ Bourget forgot Russian czarism, which was the greatest pillar, the only one that withstood the French Revolution, Napoleon, and 1848.

One would have to find out exactly where and when Bourget made this assertion and what his precise words were. Perhaps Bourget was ashamed of including Russian czarism in the list. Bourget's proposition may serve as a starting point for a discussion of the role played by Russia in the history of Europe: it defended Western Europe from the Tartar invasions, it was a rampart between European civilization and Asiatic nomadism, but this role quickly became conservative and reactionary. With its massive population, comprising many different nationalities, Russia could always raise imposing armies—made up of troops who were absolutely immune to liberal propaganda—that could be launched against the peoples of Europe: such was the case in 1848, leaving an ideological deposit that was still having an effect in 1914 (the steamroller, namely, the Cossacks who would destroy the University of Berlin, etc.). Many people still fail to appreciate what a historic change took place in Europe in 1917 and what freedom the peoples of the West acquired.

§<40>. *Past and present. The English government.*¹ An interesting article by Ramsay Muir on the English system of government was published in the November 1930 issue of *Nineteenth Century* (quoted in the *Rassegna settimanale della Stampa Estera* of 9 December 1930).² Muir maintains that one cannot speak of a parliamentary regime in England, since parliament has no control over government or the bureaucracy; one can speak only of a party dictatorship or, rather, of an inorganic dictatorship, since power oscillates between extreme parties. The debate that takes place in parliament is not the debate of a council of state, which is what it ought to be; it is, rather, a debate between parties competing for the electorate at the next election, with the government making promises and the opposition discrediting the government. The deficiencies of the English system of government were harshly revealed after the war by the huge problems of reconstruction and adaptation to the new situation. (But this was also true on the eve of the war: cf. the case of Carson in Northern Ireland. Carson derived his audacity and sense of impunity precisely from this system of government, through which his subversive actions would be forgiven once the Conservatives returned to power.)³ Muir locates the origin of party dictatorship in an electoral system that does not allow for run-off elections or for proportional representation, which is even worse. This makes it difficult to arrive at compromises and middle-of-the-road positions (or, at least, it forces the parties into an internal opportunism that is worse than parliamentary compromise.) Muir overlooks other phenomena: within the government, there is a restricted group that dominates the whole cabinet, and, furthermore, there is a bigwig who exercises a Bonapartist role.

§<41>. *Religion.* "In your travels, you may come upon cities without walls, writing, king, houses [!] or property, doing without currency, having no notion of a theatre or a gymnasium (athletic facilities); but a city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveler has ever seen or will ever see." Plutarch, *adv. Col.*, 31.¹

Turchi's definition of religion (*Storia delle religioni*, Bocca 1922): "The word 'religion' in its broadest sense denotes a bond of dependence that ties man to one or more higher powers on whom he feels dependent and to whom he pays tribute with individual and

collective acts of worship."² In other words, the concept of religion presupposes the following constitutive elements: (1) belief in the existence of one or more personal divinities that transcend earthly and temporal conditions; (2) man's sense of dependence on these superior beings, who totally govern the life of the cosmos; (3) the existence of relations (a cult) between men and gods. In *Orpheus*, Salomon Reinach defines religion without presupposing belief in higher powers: "An ensemble of scruples (taboos) that hinder the free exercise of our faculties."³ This definition is too broad and can embrace not just religions but any social ideology that aspires to make it possible for people to live together and thus obstructs (with scruples) the free (or arbitrary) exercise of our faculties.

It remains to be seen whether one can use the term "religion" when referring to a faith that does not have a personal god for an object but only impersonal and indeterminate forces. The modern world abuses the words "religion" and "religious" by attributing them to sentiments that have nothing to do with positive religions. Pure "theism" should not be considered a religion, either—it has no system of worship, no particular relation between man and the divinity.

§<42>. *Tendencies in Italian literature*. Giovanni Cena. Arrigo Cajumi's article on Cena, "Lo strano caso di Giovanni Cena" (*L'Italia letteraria*, 24 November 1929), is very interesting.¹

Cajumi's articles are worth looking for; he is very adept at discovering certain connections in the Italian cultural world. Regarding Cajumi, one must recall the question of Arrigo and Enrico. Enrico was secretary of the editorial board of *Italia Nostra* (the weekly of the neutralist intellectuals in 1914-15) and editor of the *Ambrosiano* when Gualino controlled it; I think that as editor-in-chief of the paper he signed as "cav." or "comm."² Enrico Cajumi. Arrigo wrote articles on literature and culture for *La Stampa*, was the Geneva correspondent of *La Stampa* during the sessions of the League of Nations, and an enthusiastic supporter of Briand's politics and rhetoric.³ Why this transformation of Arrigo into Enrico and of Enrico into Arrigo?⁴ Cajumi was a third-year student at the University of Turin during my first year; he was a brilliant young man as both a student and a conversationalist. Recall the episode involving Berra in 1918 or 1919, that is, just when Arrigo Cajumi's signature was starting to appear in *La Stampa*.⁵ Berra told me that he had

met Enrico Cajumi and talked to him about these articles; Cajumi appeared to be offended by the fact that someone would mistake him for Enrico-Arrigo. In 1912-13, Cajumi transferred from the University of Turin to the University of Rome and became the friend as well as the student of Cesare De Lollis, specializing in French literature.⁶ That this is the same person is demonstrated by Arrigo's current veneration for De Lollis and by the fact that he is a member of the group that has restarted *La Cultura*. Furthermore: Cajumi, with the name of Enrico, continued to lend his name to *L'Ambrosiano* even after he had left it, because of a mutiny by the editorial staff, I think. In an article on Marco Ramperti in *La Stampa* that he wrote at the time, he recalled that he had come to know Ramperti personally during one of his journalistic adventures and had seen him work at close quarters; now, Ramperti was in fact the theater critic of *L'Ambrosiano*. Cajumi currently works for the Bemporad company of Florence, and he writes only journal articles and articles on literature for *La Stampa* and *L'Italia Letteraria*.

I extract some passages from the article on Cena:⁷

Born in 1870, died in 1917, Giovanni Cena appears to us as a representative figure of the intellectual movement formed by the best elements of our bourgeoisie driven by the new ideas coming from France and Russia; but his contribution was personally more bitter and energetic due to his proletarian [! or peasant?] origins and years of poverty. A self-educated man who miraculously escaped from the brutalizing experience of his father's work and from his small native town, Cena unconsciously became part of the movement which in France—continuing a tradition [!] deriving from Proudhon on [!] through Vallès and the Communards up to Zola's *Quatre évangiles*, the Dreyfus affair, and the Popular Universities of Daniel Halévy, and which continues today in Guéhenno [!] [rather than in Pierre Dominique and others]—was defined as going to the people.

[Cajumi takes a catchphrase of today, used by the populists, and transports it into the past. In the past, from the French Revolution up to Zola, there was never a split between the people and the writers in France. The symbolist reaction created a wide gap between people and writers, between writers and life; Anatole France is the perfect example of a bookish and caste writer.]

Our author [Cena] came from the people, hence the originality [!] of his position, but the social milieu of the struggle was still the same, the milieu in which the socialism of a Prampolini was tempered.⁸ It was

the second petty bourgeois generation after the unification of Italy (the history of the first generation was chronicled by Augusto Monti in his magisterial work *Sansoussi*),⁹ a stranger to the politics of the dominant conservative classes and, in literature, more connected to De Amicis and Stecchetti than to Carducci and far removed from d'Annunzio.¹⁰ It preferred to form itself on Tolstoy—the thinker more than the artist; it discovered Wagner; it believed vaguely in the symbolists, in social poetry [symbolists and social poetry?], and in permanent peace; it insulted statesmen because of their lack of idealism; and it did not even allow the gunfire of 1914 to dispel its dreams.

(This is all rather mannered and strained.) "Since he grew up in the midst of incredible privations, he knew that he was amphibious, neither bourgeois nor a man of the people: 'When I think of how I made it through an academic education and obtained diplomas, I often lose my temper. And when, upon reflection, I think that I can *forgive*, then I truly feel victorious.' 'Deep down I feel that only the outlet of literature and faith with its liberating and uplifting power saved me from becoming another Ravachol.'" ¹¹

In the first draft of *Gli ammonitori*, Cena portrayed the suicidal protagonist hurling himself under a real car, but he did not retain the scene in the final version: "A student of social issues, a stranger to Croce, Missiroli, Jaurès, and Oriani, as well as to the real, pressing needs of the northern proletariat which he, a peasant, could not feel. A denizen of Turin, he was hostile toward the newspaper, which represented the liberal or, rather, the social-democratic bourgeoisie. There is no trace of syndicalism and no mention of Sorel. Modernism did not concern him." This passage reveals the superficiality of Cajumi's political culture. Cena is alternately a man of the people, a proletarian, a peasant. *La Stampa* is social-democratic; a social-democratic bourgeoisie does indeed exist in Turin: in this respect, Cajumi imitates certain Sicilian politicians who founded social-democratic or even labor parties and falls into the trap of many ridiculous journalists who have cooked the term "social democracy" in every sauce. Cajumi forgets that in Turin, before the war, *La Stampa* was to the right of *La Gazzetta del Popolo*, a moderate democratic newspaper. And the bundling together of Croce-Missiroli-Jaurès-Oriani for social studies is quite something.¹²

In his article "Che fare?" Cena wanted to fuse the nationalists with philo-socialists like himself.¹³ But, in the end, wasn't this petty bourgeois socialism à la De Amicis an embryonic form of national-

socialism that attempted to advance itself in so many ways in Italy and found fertile ground in the postwar period?

§<43>. *The commune as an economic-corporative phase of the state.* By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the spirit of initiative of Italian merchants had declined; people preferred to invest the wealth they had acquired in landed property and to have a secure income from agriculture rather than risk their money again in foreign expeditions and investments. But how did this happen? There were several contributing factors: the extremely fierce class struggles in the communal cities; the bankruptcies caused by the insolvency of the royal debtors (the bankruptcies of the Bardi and the Peruzzis);¹ the absence of a great state that could protect its citizens abroad—in other words, the fundamental cause resided in the very structure of the commune, which was incapable of developing into a great territorial state. Since that time, a reactionary mentality has taken root in Italy, namely, the belief that the only secure wealth is landed property. This phase, in which the merchants became landowners, must be studied carefully, and one needs to examine what were the inherent risks of exchange and of banking business.

§<44>. *On Italian literature.* Cf. G. A. Borgese's essay "Il senso della letteratura italiana" in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 January 1930. "An epithet, a motto, cannot epitomize the spirit of an epoch or a people, but sometimes it is useful as a reference or a mnemonic aid. French literature is said to have grace or logical clarity. One could say: chivalric loyalty of analysis. For English literature, we might say: lyricism of intimacy; for the German: audacity of liberty; for the Russian: courage of truth. The words we can use for Italian literature are precisely those we have used for these visual memories: majesty, magnificence, grandeur."¹ In short, Borgese finds that the character of Italian literature is "theological-absolute-metaphysical-antiromantic," etc., and perhaps his hierophantic language could be translated into simple words: Italian literature is cut off from the real development of the Italian people, it is the literature of a caste, it does not feel [reflect]^a the drama of history; in other words, it is not national-popular.

^a Variant inserted between the lines by Gramsci.

He discusses Bonghi's book: "The author and his friends soon realized—but not in time to correct a title that quickly became too famous—that the little book should have been called instead: Why Italian prose is not popular in Italy. What is relatively weak in Italian literature is, specifically, prose or, more precisely, prose understood as a literary genre and verbal rhythm, what one might call the *sense of the prosaic*—the interest in, the curiosity to observe, the patient love for historical and contingent life as it unfolds before our eyes, for the world in its becoming, for the dramatic and progressive realization of the divine."²

A little earlier, there is a passage on De Sanctis that is interesting and contains this laughable reproach: "He saw Italian literature living for over six centuries and asked it to be born." In reality, De Sanctis wanted literature to renew itself because the Italian people had been renewed; because, once the separation between literature and the people had been removed, etc. It is noteworthy that, in comparison with the many Borgeses of current criticism, De Sanctis is a progressive even today.

Its limited popularity [Italian literature], the singular, quasi-aristocratic, and separate kind of fortune that befell it for such a long time is not explained only [!] by its inferiority; it is more fully [!] explained by its heights [! heights mixed with inferiority!], by the rarefied atmosphere in which it developed. Nonpopularity is like saying nondissemination; it follows from the premise: *odi profanum vulgus et arceo*. Anything but common and profane, this literature was born sacred, with a poem that its poet himself called sacred [sacred because it speaks about God, but what subject is more popular than God? And the *Divine Comedy* speaks not only of God but also of the devils and their "strange wind instrument"], etc., etc. . . . The political fate that deprived Italy of liberty and material power made it into what one could call, in the biblical language of Leviticus, a nation of priests.³

The essay concludes, thank goodness, that the character of Italian literature can, indeed must, change, etc.; but this is out of tune with the essay as a whole.

§<45>. *Past and present*. A thought of Guicciardini's: "How wrong it is to cite the Romans at every turn. For any comparison to be valid, it would be necessary to have a city with conditions like theirs and then to govern it according to their example. In the case

of a city with different qualities, the comparison is as much out of order as it would be to expect a jackass to race like a horse." (Is it in the *Ricordi*? Search and check.)¹

In 1929 (maybe in *Augustea*) Franco Ciarlantini asked Italian writers what they thought would better enhance the stature of Italian culture in the world: unqualified apologies or honest criticism?² A typical problem.

§<46>. *The function of czarism in Europe*. Cf. Cavour's letter (of 4 January 1861) to Count Vimercati, published by A. Luzio in the *Nuova Antologia* of 16 January 1930 ("I carteggi cavouriani"). Cavour first explains the arrangements he made with the Hungarian émigrés for the preparation of an insurrection in Hungary and in the Slavic countries of the Austrian Empire, which was to be followed by an Italian attack to liberate Venice; then he goes on to write: "Depuis lors deux événements ont profondément modifié la situation. Les conférences de Varsovie et les concessions successives de l'Empereur d'Autriche. Si, comme il est à craindre, l'Empereur de Russie s'est montré disposé à Varsovie à intervenir en Hongrie dans le cas où une insurrection éclaterait dans ce pays, il est évident qu'un mouvement ne pourrait avoir lieu avec chance de succès qu'autant que la France serait disposée à s'opposer par la force à l'intervention Russe."¹ Luzio's article is also interesting because it alludes to the way in which documents of the Risorgimento have been mutilated in historical publications and in collections of documents. Luzio, surely, was already working at the State Archive of Turin (or the Royal Archive) when Prof. Bollea's house was searched because he had published some of D'Azeglio's letters—which, in any case, had no bearing on diplomatic issues (and Italy was at war against none other than Austria and Germany at the time). It would be interesting to know whether Luzio protested against the search and the seizures when they occurred or whether he was not the one who actually suggested them to the Turin police.²

§<47>. *Past and present*. Recall the little book by a certain Ghezzi or Gherzi [Raoul, perhaps?] that I received toward the end of 1923 or early in 1924 (it was printed in Turin). It defended the attitude in particular of Agnelli but also of the other industrialists in 1921–22;

it also explained the financial organization of *La Stampa* and the *Gazzetta del Popolo*, etc.¹ It was very poorly written from a literary point of view, but it contained interesting data on the organization of industrial life in Turin.

§<48>. *Portrait of the Italian peasant*. Cf. in Pitré's *Fiabe e leggende popolari* (p. 207)^a a popular Sicilian tale that (according to D. Bulferetti in the *Fiera Letteraria* of 29 January 1928)^b is analogous to a woodcut of old Venetian prints in which one sees God imparting the following orders from heaven: to the pope: "pray"; to the emperor: "protect"; to the peasant: "and you toil."¹

The spirit of popular tales conveys the peasant's conception of himself and of his position in the world, a conception that he has resigned himself to absorbing from religion.

§<49>. *Americanism. Babbitt again*. The European petty bourgeois laughs at Babbitt and thus laughs at America, which is supposedly populated by 120 million Babbitts. The petty bourgeois cannot get outside of himself, he cannot understand himself, just as the imbecile cannot understand that he is an imbecile (if he did, he would prove that he is an intelligent man). So the imbeciles are those who do not know they are imbeciles, and the petty bourgeois are the philistines who do not know they are philistines. The European petty bourgeois laughs at the particular philistinism of the American, but he is not aware of his own; he does not know that he is the European Babbitt, inferior to the Babbitt of Lewis's novel—for Lewis's Babbitt tries to escape, he tries not to be Babbitt any longer. The European Babbitt does not struggle with his own philistinism but basks in it, and he believes that his sound, his croaking in the style of a frog stuck in a swamp, is a nightingale's song. In spite of everything, Babbitt is the philistine of a country on the move; the European petty bourgeois is the philistine of conservative countries that are rotting in the stagnant swamp of clichés about the great tradition and the great culture. The European philistine believes that he discovered America with Christopher Columbus and that Babbitt is a puppet by which he, as a man weighed down by millennia

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "p. 247."

^b In the manuscript, Gramsci recorded the date inaccurately as "28 January 1928."

of history, can be entertained. Meanwhile, no European author has been able to provide us with a portrayal of the European Babbitt and thus show himself capable of self-criticism: the only imbecile and philistine is precisely the one who knows that he is not an imbecile and a philistine.¹

§<50>. *Machiavelli*. The "practical" fortune of Machiavelli: Charles V studied him. Henry IV. Pope Sixtus V made a summary of his work. Catherine de' Medici carried the book with her to France, and, maybe, she was guided by it in the struggle against the Huguenots and the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Richelieu, etc.¹ In other words, Machiavelli was really of use to the absolute states in their formative stage because he was the expression of the European, more than the Italian, "philosophy of the age."²

§<51>. *The siege of Florence in 1529-1530*. It represents the end of the struggle between the economic-corporative phase of the history of Florence and the (relatively) modern state.¹ The arguments among scholars on the significance of the siege (cf. the polemic between Antonio Panella and Aldo Valori that ended with the scholarly capitulation by Valori in *Il Marzocco* and his mean journalistic "vendetta" in *Critica Fascista*—I will refer to this polemic later)² stem from the failure to recognize the importance of these two phases, and this is caused by the rhetoric on the medieval commune: that Maramaldo could have been a symbol of historical progress and that Ferrucci was historically retrograde may be morally distasteful, but historically this view can and must be supported.³

§<52>. *Machiavelli*. Machiavelli as a transitional figure between the republican corporative state and the monarchic absolute state. He was unable to detach himself from the republic, but he understood that only an absolute monarchy could resolve the problems of the time. This tragic split in Machiavelli's human personality (Machiavelli the human individual) will have to be examined.

§<53>. *Encyclopedic notions*. The old English maxim "no representation without labor" evoked by Augur ("Britannia, quo vadis?")

in *Nuova Antologia*, 16 January 1930)¹ to argue that the unemployed must be stripped of their right to vote in order to solve the problem of unemployment (that is, in order to form a government that would reduce the funds for the unemployed to a minimum): When was this put into practice? By whom and how? And how was it understood?

§<54>. *On the English empire*. The role of the king of England as the political nexus of the empire: that is, of the Privy Council of the Crown and especially of the judicial committee of the Privy Council, which not only receives appeals against the decisions of the high courts of the dominions but also rules on disputes among the members of the empire.¹ The Irish Free State and South Africa aspire to remove themselves from the judicial committee. The statesmen in charge do not know how to replace it. Augur favors maximum freedom within the empire: anyone can leave it; but this, according to him, should also mean that anyone can apply to join it. He anticipates that the Commonwealth might develop into a world body, but only after England's relations with other countries, especially the United States, have been clarified. (Augur supports English—by which he means specifically England's—hegemony in the empire, which it enjoys by virtue of its economic and cultural weight, despite a system of equality.)²

§<55>. *Past and present*. Arturo Calza, the "Farmacista" of the *Giornale d'Italia*,¹ with Bergamini and Vettori.² At first he wrote his dull and confused notes for *Nuova Antologia* under the pseudonym Diogene Laerzio; later, his real name, Arturo Calza, appeared. In the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 February 1930, he wrote one of his usual dismally stupid notes: "La 'questione dei giovani' e il manifesto dell'Universalismo.'"³ He was attacked by *Critica Fascista*, which recalled his Bergaminian past,⁴ and Sen. Tittoni thought it would be a good idea to cut him off.⁵ His regular column, at least, was abolished; it was replaced by brief summaries of articles from periodicals that were so full of nonsense that they could have been written by Calza—they are signed XXX, but they may be attributable to Marchetti-Ferranti. (Calza wrote his last note in the *Nuova Antologia* of 16 February 1930;⁶ check the date when the attack appeared in *Critica Fascista*.)

§<56>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Filippo Crispolti.¹ I have already pointed out in another section how Crispolti does not hesitate to posit himself as a paradigm for judging the suffering of Leopardi.² In Crispolti's article "Ombre di romanzi manzoniani,"³ Manzoni becomes a paradigm that Crispolti uses to judge the novel *Il duello* (and another novel, *Pio X*, which was never completed), which was actually written by Crispolti.⁴ Crispolti's arrogance is even ridiculous: *I promessi sposi* is about a "brutal impediment to a marriage," Crispolti's *Il duello* is about the duel; both novels refer to the conflict that exists in society between adherence to the Gospel that condemns violence and the brutal use of violence. There is a difference between Manzoni and Crispolti: Manzoni had a Jansenist background, Crispolti is a lay Jesuit; Manzoni belonged to the liberal and democratic wing (although of an aristocratic type) of Catholicism, and he supported the elimination of the temporal power of the church; Crispolti was, and still is, a diehard reactionary—if he detached himself from the intransigent papists and agreed to become a senator, it was only because he wanted the Catholics to become the country's ultraright party.⁵

The plot of the unwritten novel, *Pio X*, is interesting only because it touches on certain objective problems that arise out of the coexistence of two powers in Rome, namely, the monarchy and the pope, who is really recognized as a sovereign by the Guarantee Act.⁶ Every time the pope leaves the Vatican to go across Rome: (1) the state is saddled with a huge expense to provide the trappings of honor that befit the pope; (2) there is a threat of civil war because the progressive parties have to be compelled to refrain from organizing demonstrations—and this implicitly poses the question of whether these parties could ever accede to power with their platform. In other words, the pope's presence interferes ominously with the sovereignty of the state.

§<57>. *So-called social poetry in Italy*. Rapisardi.¹ Cf. Nunzio Vaccalluzzo's very interesting article, "La poesia di Mario Rapisardi," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 16 February 1930.² Rapisardi was passed off as a materialist and even as a historical materialist. Is this true? Or was he not, rather, a "mystic" of naturalism and of pantheism? But tied to the people, especially to the Sicilian people, to the hardships of the Sicilian peasant, etc.

Vaccaluzzo's article could be useful for starting a study on Rapisardi and also for the references it provides. Acquire an overview of Rapisardi's works, etc. *Giustizia* is an especially important collection of poems;³ Vaccaluzzo says that Rapisardi had composed it as a proletarian poet (!) "with greater vehemence of words than of sentiment"⁴—but in fact, as I recall, *Giustizia* is democratic-peasant poetry.

§<58>. *History of Italian journalism*. Which Italian newspapers have published supplements like those of English and German newspapers? The classic example is the *Fanfulla della Domenica* of *Il Fanfulla*; I say classic because it had a personality and an authority of its own. Supplements like *La Domenica del Corriere* or *La Tribuna Illustrata* are a different thing and can hardly be called supplements. The *Gazzetta del Popolo* made attempts with "pages" devoted to a single topic; it also had the *Gazzetta letteraria*, and now it has the *Illustrazione del Popolo*. The Rome paper *Il Tempo* made the most coherent effort in 1919-20, with real supplements such as the "economic" supplement or the "trade union" supplement, which, for Italy, was very successful. This is how the *Giornale d'Italia agricolo* succeeded. A well-produced daily that also aims to introduce itself through supplements, even in places it would have difficulty penetrating as a daily, needs to have a series of monthly supplements in a format different from the daily's but with the same name as the daily followed by a subtitle referring to the specific subject matter it is devoted to. The main supplements should be, at least: (1) literary; (2) economic, industrial, trade union; (3) agricultural. The literary supplement should also deal with philosophy, art, and the theater. The agricultural supplement is the most difficult to produce: technical-agricultural or political-agricultural for the more intelligent farmer? The latter type should be similar to a political weekly; in other words, it should summarize the entire week's politics and, in addition, have a section devoted specifically to agriculture (not of the kind found in the *Domenica dell'Agricoltore*): it would be agricultural only in the sense that it is designed for farmers who do not read the dailies; therefore, like *L'Amico delle famiglie*—the bigger the agronomy section, the more popular. Sports supplement, etc.

The literary supplement should also have a section on education, etc. All monthlies, and in a different format in keeping with the con-

tents. (The literary supplement like the weekly *Ordine Nuovo*, etc.; the agriculture supplement like *L'Amico delle famiglie*; the economics supplement like the literary supplement of the *Times*, etc.)

§<59>. *Southern Italy*. On the abundance of pettifogging lawyers in southern Italy, recall the anecdote about Innocent XI, who asked the marquis of Carpio to furnish him with thirty thousand head of swine. The marquis answered that he was unable to meet his request, but that if His Holiness ever happened to need thirty thousand lawyers, he had them at his service.¹

§<60>. *Naval issues*. The difference between land and sea armaments: naval armaments are hard to conceal; it is possible to have secret arms and munitions factories, but it is impossible to have secret shipyards or cruisers built in secret. The "visibility," the possibility of estimating the power of a navy, gives rise to questions of prestige; in other words, prestige reaches its maximum expression in the war fleet and hence in the struggle for parity between two powers. Classic example: England and the United States. In the final analysis, the basis for the fleet, as for the entire military apparatus, resides in the productive and financial potential of each country, but the pertinent questions are raised on "rationalist" assumptions. England keeps in mind its position as an island and the vital necessity for it to maintain uninterrupted connections with the colonies in order to provision its population, whereas America is a self-sufficient continent, has two oceans that are connected by the Panama Canal, etc. But why should a state relinquish its geographic and strategic advantages if these put it in a position conducive to world hegemony? Why should England have a certain hegemony over a set of countries based on certain traditional conditions that favored its superiority, if the United States can be superior to England and absorb it, together with its empire, if possible?¹ There is no "rationality" in these matters, but only questions of power—and the figure of Mr. Panera, who wants to transfix the acquiescent enemy, is always ridiculous.²

§<61>. *Frederick II*. Cf. Raffaello Morghen, "Il tramonto della potenza sveva e la più recente storiografia," *Nuova Antologia*, 16

March 1930.¹ It carries some [recent] bibliographic information on Frederick II.² Michelangelo Schipa's little book, *Sicilia e l'Italia sotto Federico II* (Naples, Società Napoletana di storia patria, 1929), is interesting from the viewpoint of the "meaning" of Italian history expounded in the sections on the medieval communes and on the cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals. (If it is true that Schipa "seems offended" by the communes and the pope, who held out against Frederick, then that is antihistorical, of course; but it shows how the pope stood in the way of Italy's unification and how the communes never came out of the Middle Ages.)³

Morghen commits a different error when he writes that at the time of the struggles between Frederick and the pope, <the communes> "looked forward to the future eagerly and impatiently, etc."; "Italy was the one getting ready to give the world a new civilization that was as *secular* and *national* as the previous one was universalistic and ecclesiastical."⁴

Morghen would find it hard to justify this statement, other than by citing books like *The Prince*. But it would take a great deal of rhetoric to sustain the argument that books are a nation and not just one component of culture.

Was Frederick II still bound to the Middle Ages? Certainly. But it is also true that he detached himself from it: his struggle against the church, his religious tolerance, his use of three civilizations—Hebraic, Latin, and Arabic—and his effort to amalgamate them place him outside the Middle Ages. He was a man of his times, but he really was capable of establishing a secular and national society, and he was more Italian than German, etc. The question has to be examined in its entirety, and this article by Morghen could be useful, too.

§<62>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. De Sanctis writes somewhere that before writing an essay or giving a lecture on a canto by Dante, for example, he would read the canto aloud many times over, memorize it, etc., etc.¹ This is being recalled by way of supporting the observation that the artistic element of a work cannot be appreciated upon a first reading, except on rare occasions (about which more later) and often not even by major specialists of De Sanctis's caliber. The first reading only permits one to enter into the cultural and sentimental world of the author, and even this is not always the case, especially for writers from another era whose cultural and sentimental world is different from today's. A poem by a cannibal

on the joys of a sumptuous banquet of human flesh may be considered beautiful, and it may demand a certain psychological detachment from the present culture in order to be artistically appreciated without "extra-aesthetic" prejudices. But a work of art also contains other "historicist" elements apart from the determinate cultural and sentimental world; and this is language, understood not just as purely verbal expression—which can be photographed in a given place and time by grammar—but as an ensemble of images and modes of expression that do not form part of grammar. These elements appear more distinctly in the other arts. The difference between Japanese and Italian is immediately obvious, but the same is not true of the language of painting, music, and the figurative arts in general; yet these differences in language exist in the other arts as well, and they become more conspicuous as one moves down the scale from the artistic expressions of artists to the artistic expressions of folklore, where the language of these arts is reduced to the most autochthonous and primordial element. (Recall the anecdote of the sketch artist who drew the profile of a Negro, and the other Negroes mocked the portrait because the artist had reproduced "only half a face.") From a cultural and historical point of view, however, there is a great difference between the linguistic expression of the written and spoken word and the linguistic expressions of the other arts. "Literary" language is tightly linked to the life of the national multitudes, and it develops slowly and only molecularly. One might say that every social group has a "language" of its own; nevertheless, one must point out that (rare exceptions aside) there is a continuous relationship and exchange between popular language and the language of the cultured classes. This does not happen with the languages of the other arts, apropos of which one can notice that two orders of phenomena actually occur: (1) the expressive elements of the past, one might say of the entire past, are always alive in them, at least to a much greater degree than in literary language; (2) they sustain the rapid development of a cosmopolitan language that absorbs the technical-expressive elements of all nations that from time to time produce great painters, writers, composers, etc. Wagner has contributed more^a linguistic elements to music than all of German literature in its entire history, etc. This occurs because the people hardly participate in the production of these languages that belong to an international élite, etc., but the

^a Above this word, between the lines, Gramsci inserted the variant "as many."

people can come to understand them rather quickly (as a collectivity, not as individuals). All this is to point out that, in reality, even if purely aesthetic "taste" can be considered primary as a form and activity of the spirit, it is not primary in practice—that is, in the chronological sense.

Some (for example, Prezzolini in his little book *Mi pare . . .*)² have maintained that the theater cannot be called art, for it is a mechanistic type of relaxation. They say this because the audience is incapable of appreciating the performed play aesthetically and is only interested in the plot, etc. (or something of the sort). The observation is wrong: in the theatrical performance, the artistic element does not reside solely in the play qua literature; the writer is not the only creator. The author intervenes in the theatrical performance with the words and stage directions that limit the freedom of the actor and the director; what really happens, though, is that in the performance the literary component becomes the occasion for new artistic creations that at first were complementary and critical-interpretative but are actually becoming increasingly important: the interpretation of the individual actor^b and the scenic ensemble created by the director. Nevertheless, it is true that the play as created by the author can be relished only through repeated readings. To conclude: a work of art is more "artistically" popular when its moral, cultural, and sentimental content is in greater accord with national morality, culture, and sentiments—and these should not be understood as something static but as a continually developing activity. The immediate contact between the reader and the writer occurs when the unity of form and content in the reader is premised upon a unity of the poetic and sentimental world; otherwise, the reader has to start translating the "language" of the content into his own language. It would be something like the situation of a person who has learned English in an accelerated course at the Berlitz School and then reads Shakespeare; the laborious effort required to arrive at a literal understanding through constant reliance on some mediocre dictionary reduces the reading to nothing more than a pedantic scholastic exercise.

§<63>. *Roman law or Byzantine law?* Roman "law" consisted essentially of a method for the creation of law through the continual

^b In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "*autore*" (author), but from the context it is clear that this is a slip of the pen and that he meant "*attore*" (actor).

resolution of specific legal cases. The mass of legal cases resolved by the concrete, legal actions of the Romans was gathered together by the Byzantines (Justinian) not as historical documentation but as an ossified and permanent code. This transition from a "method" to a permanent "code" can also be taken to signal the end of an era—the transition from a history in constant and rapid development to a relatively stagnant historical phase. The resurgence of "Roman law"—that is, of the Byzantine codification of the Roman method for resolving legal questions—coincides with the emergence of a social group that wants a permanent "legislation" that stands above the individual judgments of magistrates (a movement that culminates in "constitutionalism"). The powers implicit in the historical role of this social group could only be developed within a permanent framework of *discordia concors*, of a struggle that fixes the limits of individual arbitrariness within legal boundaries.

§<64>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. "Art educates insofar as it is art but not insofar as it is 'educative art,' because in that case it is nothing, and nothing cannot educate. Of course, it seems that we all desire an art that resembles Risorgimento art and not, for example, the art of the D'Annunzio period; but in fact, on reflection, this is not a desire for one kind of art over another but rather a preference for one kind of moral reality over another. In the same way, someone who stands in front of a mirror wishing to see the reflection of a beautiful rather than an ugly person is hoping not for a different mirror but for a different person." (Croce, *Cultura e Vita morale*, pp. 169–70; chapt. "Fede e programmi" of 1911.)¹

"When a poetic work or a cycle of poetic works is formed, it is impossible to continue that cycle by studying, imitating, and producing variations of those works; that would only yield a so-called school of poetry, the *servum pecus* of epigones. Poetry does not generate poetry; there is no parthenogenesis. There must be the intervention of the male element, of that which is real, passionate, practical, moral. On this issue, the most renowned critics of poetry warn against the reliance on literary recipes; instead, as they say, one should 'remake man.' A new poetry will arise, if at all, from the remaking of man, the renewal of the spirit, the emergence of a new affective life." (Croce, *Cultura e Vita morale*, pp. 241–42; chapter "Troppa filosofia" of 1922.)²

This observation could befit historical mat<erialism>. Literature does not generate literature, etc.; in other words, ideologies do not create ideologies, superstructures do not generate superstructures other than as a legacy of inertia and passivity. They are not generated through "parthenogenesis" but through the intervention of the "masculine" element—history—which is the revolutionary activity that creates the "new man" (that is, new social relations).

From this, one also deduces the following: through this change, the old "man" also becomes "new" since he enters into new relationships, the primitive ones having been overturned. This is why before the positively created "new man" has created poetry, one can witness the "swan song" of the negatively renewed old man, and, often, this swan song is wonderfully brilliant: in it, the new melds with the old, the passions become red-hot in an incomparable manner, etc. (Isn't the *Divine Comedy*, to some extent, the swan song of the Middle Ages but also a harbinger of the new age and the new history?)

§<65>. *Journalism*. What Napoleon III said about journalism when, during his imprisonment in Germany, he talked with the English journalist Mels-Cohn (cf. Paul Guériot, *La captivité de Napoleon III en Allemagne*, 250 pp., Paris, Perrin). Napoleon wanted to transform the official newspaper into a model paper that would be sent free of charge to every voter and would publish articles by the most illustrious writers of the time, as well as the most reliable and thoroughly checked news from every part of the world. It would exclude polemics, restricting them to private newspapers, etc.¹

The concept of a state newspaper is logically tied to illiberal structures of government (that is, those in which civil society merges with political society), whether they be despotic (wherein the oligarchic minority pretends to be the whole of society) or democratic (wherein the indistinct people claims and believes itself to be truly the state). If schooling is in the hands of the state, why shouldn't journalism, which is the school of adults, also be in the hands of the state?

Napoleon's argument is based on the following notion: if one accepts the legal axiom that ignorance of the law does not exonerate those charged with a crime, then the state is obliged to keep its citizens informed gratis of all its actions; in other words, it must educate them. This is a democratic argument transformed into a

justification of oligarchic action. The argument, however, is not without merit: it can be "democratic" only in those societies wherein the historical unity of civil society and political society is understood dialectically (in a real and not just conceptual dialectic) and the state is conceived as surmountable by "regulated society." In the latter kind of society, the dominant party is not organically confused with the government; it is, rather, an instrument for the transition from civil-political society to "regulated society," in that it absorbs both of them in order to surpass them (not to perpetuate their contradiction), etc.

Apropos of the condition of journalism under Napoleon III, recall the episode of the prefect of police who admonished a newspaper because of an article on manure that did not clearly determine which manure is the best: this, according to the prefect, contributed to the public's being left in a state of uncertainty, and it was therefore reprehensible and deserved to be rebuked by the police.

§<66>. *Machiavelli*. Gino Arias, "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli" (in the Bocconi University's *Annali di Economia* of 1928 [or 1927?]).¹

§<67>. *Italian culture*. Valentino Piccoli. It will be useful to recall Piccoli's note, "Un libro per gli immemori" (in *I Libri del giorno* of October 1928), in which he reviews Mario Giampaoli's book, *1919* (Rome-Milan, Libreria del Littorio, in 16°, 335 pp. with 40 plate illustrations, L. 15).¹ Piccoli uses the same adjectives for Giampaoli that he uses for Dante, Leopardi, and every other great writer that he whiles away the time covering in his sycophantish pieces. Frequent recurrence of the adjective "austere," etc.; "choicest pages," etc.

§<68>. *Alfredo Oriani*. Floriano Del Secolo, "Contributo alla biografia di Oriani. Con lettere inedite," in the *Pègaso* of October 1930.¹

In the so-called tragedy of his intellectual life, Oriani appears as a "genius" undiscovered by the people, an apostle without followers, etc. But was Oriani really "undiscovered," or was he a sphinx without enigmas, a volcano that belched only some tiny mice? And

has Oriani now become "popular," a "master of life," etc.? Much is being published about him, but is the national edition of his works being bought and read? There is reason to doubt it. Oriani and Sorel (in France). But Sorel has been much more relevant to our time than Oriani. Why did Oriani fail to form a school, a group of followers? Why did he not establish a journal? He wanted to be "recognized" without any effort on his part (except for his laments to his closest friends). He lacked willpower and a practical disposition, but he wanted to influence the political and moral life of the nation. Many people must have found him disagreeable precisely because of this instinctive judgment that he was a person with foolish aspirations who wanted to be paid before completing the work and who wanted to be recognized as "genius," "chief," "master" by [a] divine right peremptorily asserted by himself. Psychologically, Oriani is comparable to Crispi and to a whole stratum of Italian intellectuals that is dragged down to the level of the ridiculous and intellectual farce by some of its inferior representatives.

§<69>. *Caporetto*. On Volpe's book, *Ottobre 1917: Dall'Isonzio al Piave*, cf. the review by Antonio Panella in the *Pègaso* of October 1930.¹ The review is favorable but superficial. Caporetto was basically a "military accident"; the fact that Volpe, with all his authority as a historian and statesman, has endowed this formula with the value of a commonplace pleases many people who were fully aware of the historical and moral inadequacy (moral abjection) of the controversy about Caporetto as a "crime" of the defeatists or a "military job action." But the satisfaction at the validity of this new commonplace has been excessive since there should not be a reaction—which, in any case, is more difficult than the reaction to the previous commonplace, as can be seen from Omodeo's criticism of Volpe's book.² The soldiers, the officers, and the rank-and-file military mass ("l'outil tactique élémentaire," as Anatole France had a general say of the soldiers) having been "absolved,"³ one still gets the sense that the debate is not over. The polemic between Volpe and Omodeo about the "reserve officers" is an interesting indicator. It seems, from Omodeo's article, that Volpe underestimates the military contribution of the reserve officers—that is, of the intellectual petty bourgeoisie—and that therefore he indirectly points to them as responsible for the "accident," if only to exonerate the upper class, which is already reassured by the word "acci-

dent." In order to determine the historical responsibility, one must look at the general class relationships within which the soldiers, the reserve officers, and the general staff occupy a specific position; hence one must look at the structure of the nation for which the ruling class is solely responsible, precisely because it rules (and here, too, it is the case that "ubi maior, minor cessat"). But this critique, which could be really fruitful even from the national point of view, is too hot to handle.⁴

§<70>. *Risorgimento*. Niccolò Rodolico, "La prima giovinezza di Carlo Alberto," in the *Pègaso* of November 1930.¹ (The publication by Le Monnier of Rodolico's book *Carlo Alberto Principe di Carignano* has been announced; the article in *Pègaso* may be an extract from the book.)² One should examine the formation—this occurred within the political class in Piedmont during the Napoleonic empire but especially during its collapse—of the group that detached itself from the parochial conservatives in order to draw the attention of the dynasty to the task of national unification. This group would attain the height of its visibility in the neo-Guelph movement of 1848.³ The dynastic, non-national character of this new group (of which De Maistre was a most noteworthy member):⁴ its politics, more cunning than Machiavellian, became the accepted politics of the governing class up to 1870 and even later; its organic weakness manifested itself, above all, in the crux of 1848–49 and was related to this politics of mean and niggardly cunning.

§<71>. *Linguistics*. Antonio Pagliaro, *Sommario di linguistica arioeuropea*, fasc. 1: *Cenni storici e quistioni teoriche*, Libreria di Scienza e Lettere del dott. G. Bardi, Rome, 1930 (in "Pubblicazioni della Scuola di Filologia Classica dell'Università di Roma; Second series: *Sussidi materiali*, II, 1"). On Pagliaro's book, cf. the review by Goffredo Coppola in the *Pègaso* of November 1930.¹

The book is indispensable for examining the advances made in linguistics in recent years. It seems to me that much has changed (judging from the review), and yet a basis on which to situate linguistic studies has not been found. Croce's identification of art and language has opened the way for some progress, and it has made it possible to solve some problems and declare other problems nonexistent [or arbitrary]. But linguists, who are essentially historians,

face another problem: is the history of language possible outside the history of art and, furthermore, is the history of art possible?

Linguists, however, study languages precisely insofar as they are not art but the "material" of art, a social product, a cultural expression of a given people, etc. These questions have not been resolved, or else they have been resolved by recourse to an embellished version of the old rhetoric (cf. Bertoni).²

According to Perrotto³ (and Pagliaro as well?), the identification of art and language has led to the realization that the problem of the origin of language is insoluble (or arbitrary?); it would mean asking why man is man (language = imagination, thought). He does not seem to be very precise: the problem cannot be resolved because no documents exist, and thus it is arbitrary. Beyond a certain historical limit, one can construct a hypothetical, conjectural, and sociological history but not a "historical" history. This identification supposedly also makes it possible to determine what constitutes error in language—in other words, what is nonlanguage. "Error is artificial, rationalistic, willed creation that cannot take hold because it reveals nothing, it is peculiar to the individual outside his society."⁴ I think that one should therefore say that language = history, and nonlanguage = the arbitrary. Artificial languages are like jargons: it is not true that they are absolutely nonlanguages because they are somehow useful; they have a very limited sociohistorical content. But this is also true of the relation between a dialect and the national-literary language. Yet dialect too is language-art. But between the dialect and the national-literary language, something changes: specifically, the cultural, political-moral-sentimental environment. The history of languages is the history of linguistic innovations, but these innovations are not individual (as in art); they are the innovations of an entire social community that has renewed its culture and "progressed" historically. To be sure, they, too, become individual, not as in the individual-artist but in the *complete*, determinate individual qua [cultural]-historical element.

There is no parthenogenesis in language, either; a language does not produce another language. Rather, innovation occurs through the interference of different cultures, etc., and this takes place in very different ways, it still occurs for whole masses of linguistic elements, and it takes place molecularly. (For example: Latin, as a "mass," transformed the Celtic of the Gauls, but it influenced the Germanic language "molecularly," that is, by lending it individual words or forms.) "Molecular" influence and interference can take

place among different strata within a nation, etc.; a new class that acquires a leading role innovates as a "mass"; professional jargons, etc.—that is, the jargons of specific groups—innovate molecularly. In these innovations, artistic judgment has the quality of "cultural taste" and not aesthetic taste, for the same reason that one prefers brunettes or blondes and that aesthetic "ideals," related to specific cultures, change.

§<72>. *Risorgimento*. On Melchiorre Gioia, cf. the bibliography (of Gioia's writings) published by Angelo Ortolini in the *Libri del Giorno* of January 1929 ("Il centenario di Melchiorre Gioia").¹ Gioia's first book was a 1796 disquisition he submitted to a competition sponsored by the Istituto della Repubblica Cisalpina on the question "Which of the free forms of government is most suitable for Italy?" Gioia argued in favor of "a unified and indivisible republic." His dissertation received an award, but one must find out whether it was just a purely ideological elaboration of the Jacobin formula. In 1815 he published *Della costituzione di una monarchia nazionale rappresentativa*.

§<73>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Cf. Carlo Linati's article "Dell'interesse," in the *Libri del giorno* of February 1929.¹ Linati wants to know what "quiddity" makes a book interesting and ends up without an answer. To be sure, it is impossible to come up with a precise answer, at least not in the sense intended by Linati, who would like to find the "quidditas" in order to be able, or enable others, to write interesting books. Linati states that in recent times this has become a "burning" issue—which is true, and it is only natural that it should be so. There has been a certain resurgence of nationalistic sentiments: it is understandable that one should ask why Italian books are not read, why they are considered "boring" whereas foreign books are found to be "interesting." With the nationalist revival comes the feeling that Italian literature is not "national," in the sense that it is not popular, and that as a people we are subject to foreign hegemony. The result: programs, polemics, and efforts that achieve nothing. What is needed is a merciless critique of tradition and a cultural-moral renewal that would give rise to a new literature. But that is precisely what cannot take place because of the contradiction, etc.: the nationalist revival has come

to mean the exaltation of the past. Marinetti is now a member of the Academy, and he is fighting against the tradition of spaghetti.²

§<74>. *Caporetto*. Cf. Gen. Alberto Baldini's book on General Diaz (*Diaz*, in 8°, 263 pp., Barbèra ed., L. 15, 1929).¹ General Baldini, it seems, implicitly criticizes Cadorna and tries to show that Diaz played a much more important role than has been attributed to him.²

In this controversy on the significance of Caporetto,³ some clear and precise points need to be established:

1. Was Caporetto a purely military event? War historians now take this explanation to be an established fact, but it is based on a misunderstanding.⁴ Every military event is also a political and social event. Immediately after the defeat, there was an effort to spread the view that the political responsibility for Caporetto lay with the military mass, that is, with the people and the parties that are the political expression of the people. This thesis is now universally, even officially, rejected. But this does not mean, as one is led to believe, that Caporetto thus becomes nothing more than a purely military phenomenon, as if the political element consisted solely of the people—that is, those responsible for politico-military administration. Even if one were to prove that (contrary to the unanimous view) Caporetto was a "military job action," it would not mean that the people should be saddled with the political responsibility, etc. (From a judicial perspective, this is understandable, but the judicial point of view is a unilateral act of will that tends to identify government ineptitude with a regime of terror.) Historically—that is, from the most elevated political point of view—the blame would always be placed on those in government and their failure to foresee that certain factors could have led to a military job action and hence their failure to implement timely and effective measures (class sacrifices) to prevent such a potential emergency. It is understandable that in the case of force majeure and for the immediate purposes of the psychology of resistance one would say "we must cut through the barbed wire with our teeth," but to believe that soldiers should always cut through barbed wire with their teeth because that's what military duty in the abstract calls for, while neglecting to provide them with pliers—that is criminal. To believe that one cannot wage war without human victims is understandable, but to forget that human lives must not be sacrificed

in vain is criminal, etc. This principle of military relations extends to social relations. To believe, and to uphold without reservations, that the military mass must wage war and endure all its sacrifices is understandable, but to maintain that this should always be the case without considering the social character of the military mass and without addressing its needs—that is typical of simpletons, in other words, of inept politicians.

2. Thus, if the military mass is exempted from responsibility, so, too, is the supreme commander, Cadorna, beyond certain limits—that is, beyond the limits demarcated by the powers available to a supreme commander, by military technique, and by the political attributes that a supreme commander has in any case. Cardona surely had very serious responsibilities, both technical and political, but his political responsibilities could not have been decisive. If Cadorna failed to understand and explain to the government the need for a “determinate political government” of the masses under command, then he must certainly be held responsible, but not to the same degree as the government and the ruling class as a whole—for, in the final analysis, it was their mentality and their political understanding that he expressed. This widespread responsibility is “historically” demonstrated by the fact that there has been no objective analysis of the factors that brought about Caporetto and no concrete action has been taken to eliminate them.

3. The importance of Caporetto in the course of the entire war. The current inclination is to diminish the importance of Caporetto, treating it as merely one episode in the larger frame of things. This tendency is politically significant, and it will have political repercussions both nationally and internationally: it shows that there is no willingness to eliminate the general factors that caused the defeat, and this has a bearing on the system of alliances and on the conditions that will be imposed on the country in the event of a new war situation. The self-criticism that is being shunned on the national level in order to avoid certain inevitable consequences for the politico-social direction of the country—this criticism will undoubtedly be carried out by the appropriate bodies in the other countries, insofar as Italy is assumed capable of participating in military alliances. In their calculations about alliances, the other countries will have to take into account the possibility of new Caporetto, and they will ask for insurance premiums, in other words, they will want hegemony and even a hegemony that goes beyond certain limits.

4. The importance of Caporetto in the overall picture of the World War. For this, one should also look at the resources (all the stockpiles of food supplies, munitions, etc.) that were forfeited to the enemy, enabling it to prolong its resistance, and at the burden imposed on the allies to replenish these stockpiles, disrupting all their services and general plans.

It is true that in every war, including the World War, there have been other events similar to Caporetto. However, one must examine (setting Russia aside) whether they had the same absolute and relative importance, whether their causes were similar or comparable, and whether they had similar or comparable consequences for the political standing of the country whose army suffered defeat. After Caporetto, Italy was materially at the mercy of the allies (for armaments, provisions, etc.), and their inexpensive equipment was not as effective. The absence of self-criticism signifies an unwillingness to eliminate the causes of disease, and thus it is a symptom of serious political debility.

§<75>. *Past and present*. It ought to be a matter of principle that government must try to raise the material standard of living of the people above a certain level. There is no need here to come up with some special "humanitarian" motive or even some "democratic" goal: even the most oligarchic and reactionary government should acknowledge the "objective" validity of this principle, its essentially political value (which is universal in the political sphere, in the art of preserving and enhancing the power of the state). No government can fail to take into consideration the possibility of an economic crisis, and furthermore no government can overlook the hypothesis that it may be compelled to go to war, which would mean having to overcome the greatest crisis that a state and a society can be subjected to. And since every crisis entails a decline in the people's standard of living, it is obvious that there needs to be an adequate preexisting fallback zone so that the "biological" and hence the psychological resistance of the people does not crumble the moment it collides with the new reality. The degree of real power of a state therefore must also be measured by this standard that, in turn, is related to the other factors that are used to assess the structural solidity of a country. If in fact the dominant classes of a nation have failed to move beyond the economic-corporative stage and as a result exploit the popular masses to the extreme limit

of their strength (that is, reduce them to a mere vegetative biological state), then it is clear that one cannot speak of the power of the state but only of the camouflaging of power. I think that in analyzing this crucial aspect of the art of politics, it is important to steer clear systematically of any extrapolitical reference (in the technical sense, that is, outside the technical political sphere), any reference to humanitarianism or to any particular political ideology (which is not say that "humanitarianism" is not itself also a politics, etc.). For the purposes of this paragraph, it is necessary to go back to the article by Prof. Mario Camis, published in the *Riforma Sociale* issue of January–February 1926.¹

§<76>. *The function of czarism in Europe in the nineteenth century.* In his memoirs, Prince von Bülow recounts his encounter with Bethmann-Hollweg^a immediately after Germany's declaration of war on Russia in August 1914. Asked why he had first declared war on Russia, Bethmann answered: "In order to have the social democrats on my side right away."¹ In relation to this, Bülow makes some observations on Bethmann-Hollweg's psychology, but what matters from the perspective of this topic is the chancellor's conviction that he could have social democracy side with him against Russian czarism; the chancellor ably exploited the 1848 tradition, etc., of the "gendarme d'Europe."

§<77>. *Individuals and nations.* Some additional observations on the question of national pride associated with the inventions of individual men of genius whose discoveries and inventions, however, did not receive attention or recognition in their countries of origin: inventions and discoveries can be and in fact often are fortuitous; moreover, the individual inventors may belong to cultural and scientific currents that originated and were developed in other countries, within other nations. An invention or a discovery thus ceases to be individual and fortuitous and may be deemed national only when the individual is very closely [and necessarily] connected to a cultural organization with national characteristics or the invention is thoroughly studied, applied, and developed in every way possible by the cultural complex of the inventor's country

^a In the manuscript, the name is incorrectly spelt "Bethmann-Holwegg."

of origin. Absent these conditions, the only remaining factor is "race"—that is, an imponderable element that all countries can lay claim to and that, in the end, gets mixed up with so-called human nature. The term "national," then, applies only to an individual who is the product of the concrete national reality and who initiates a distinctive phase in the practical or theoretical activity of the nation. One must also point out that a new discovery that remains inert is worthless: what constitutes "originality" is not only "discovering" but just as importantly "deepening," "developing," and "making available to society" (that is, transforming something into an element of universal civilization), and it is specifically in these areas that a nation's vigor—which is collective, the ensemble of the internal relations of a nation—manifests itself.

§<78>. *The Italian Risorgimento*. How should one date the beginning of the historical movement that came to be known as the Italian Risorgimento? The answers are diverse and contradictory, but generally they fall into two groups: (1) those who want to uphold the autonomous origin of the Italian national movement and who go so far as to maintain that the French Revolution adulterated and sidetracked the Italian tradition; (2) those who assert that the Italian national movement is heavily indebted to the French Revolution and its wars.

The historical question is muddled by the intrusion of emotions and politics and by prejudices of every sort. It is really difficult to make common sense understand that an Italy of the kind that was formed in 1870 had never existed before and could never have existed: common sense is led to believe that what exists today has always existed and that Italy has always existed as a unified nation but was suffocated by foreign powers, etc. Numerous ideologies have helped reinforce this belief, which is nourished by the desire to be seen as the heir of the ancient world, etc. Furthermore, these ideologies have had a remarkable function as a basis for political, cultural, etc., organization.

It is necessary, I think, to analyze the entire historical movement starting from different points of view, up to the moment when the essential elements of national unity converge and become a force capable of reaching the goal, which in my view happened only after 1848. These elements are negative [[passive]] and positive [[active]], national and international. A rather old ele-

ment is the consciousness of "cultural unity," which has existed among Italian intellectuals since at least 1200, that is, since the beginning of the development of a standardized literary language (Dante's illustrious vulgar tongue). This element, however, does not have a direct effect on historical events, even though it is the most thoroughly exploited element in patriotic rhetoric; besides, it does not coincide with and neither does it express a concrete and effective national sentiment. Another element is the awareness of the necessity of the independence of the Italian peninsula from foreign influence—an element that is much less widespread than the first, but politically it is definitely more important, and historically it yielded more practical results. Nevertheless, the importance, significance, and especially the breadth and depth of this element must not be exaggerated, either. The two elements pertain to small minorities of great intellectuals, and they have never manifested themselves as an expression of a widespread and solid unitary national consciousness.

Conditions for national unity: (1) the existence of an international balance of powers that would constitute the premise of Italian unification. This occurred after 1748, following the collapse of French hegemony and the total exclusion of the Spanish-Austrian hegemony, but it disappeared once more after 1815. Still, the period between 1748 and 1815 was extremely important for preparing the ground for unification or, rather, for the development of those elements that would lead to unification. Among the international elements, one has to consider the position of the papacy, whose power within Italy was linked to international power. Regalism and Josephinism,¹ namely, the first liberal and secular assertions of the state, were essential preparatory elements of unification. The international situation, which was a negative and passive element, became a positive element after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, which spread political and national interest among the petty bourgeoisie and the minor intellectuals who provided some military experience and produced a number of Italian officers. The slogan "a republic, one and indivisible" acquired a certain degree of popularity and, aside from everything else, the Action Party had its origins in the French Revolution and its repercussions in Italy; this slogan was adjusted to "a state, united and indivisible" and to a single monarchy, indivisible, centralized, etc.

National unity developed in one specific direction and the driving powers behind this development were the state of Piedmont

and the Savoy dynasty. It is therefore necessary to examine the course of history in Piedmont from the national perspective. Piedmont had had an interest in a certain internal equilibrium among Italian states from as far back as 1492 (that is, from the period of foreign dominations); it regarded such an equilibrium as a premise of independence (that is, of freedom from the influence of powerful foreign states). Of course, the state of Piedmont would have liked to be the hegemon in Italy, or at least in northern and central Italy, but it did not succeed; Venice, etc., was too powerful.

The state of Piedmont became the real driving force of unification after 1848, that is, after the defeat of the Piedmontese political Right and Center and the accession to power of the liberals with Cavour. The Right: Solaro della Margarita,² that is, the "exclusivist nationalists of Piedmont" (the term "municipalism" derives from a conception of Italian unity that is latent or real, according to patriotic rhetoric). The Center: Gioberti and the neo-Guelphs.³ But Cavour's liberals are not national Jacobins; in reality, they go beyond Solaro's Right (though not qualitatively) because they conceive of unification as an extension of the state of Piedmont and of the patrimony of the dynasty—not as national movement from below but as a royal conquest. A more truly national element is the Action Party, etc. (See other notes.)⁴

It would be interesting and necessary to gather all the statements on the question of the origin of the Risorgimento in the literal sense of the term, that is, the uprising that brought about the territorial and political unification of Italy—bearing in mind that many also use the term Risorgimento when referring to the revival of "indigenous" Italian forces after the year 1000, that is, the movement that led to the communes and the Renaissance. All these questions about origins stem from the fact that the Italian economy was very weak and capitalism was just emerging; a strong and extensive bourgeois economic class did not exist, but instead one had numerous intellectuals and petty bourgeois, etc. It was not so much a question of freeing the advanced economic forces from antiquated legal and political fetters but rather of creating the general conditions that would enable these economic forces to come into existence and to grow on the model of other countries. Contemporary history provides a model for understanding Italy's past. There is today a European cultural consciousness, and there exists a long list of public statements by intellectuals and politicians who maintain that a European union is necessary. It is fair to say that

the course of history is heading toward this union and that there are many material forces that will only be able to develop within this union. If this union were to come into existence in x years, the word "nationalism" will have the same archaeological value as "municipalism" has today.

Another contemporary fact that explains the past is Gandhi's principle of "nonresistance and noncooperation." This can help one understand the origins of Christianity and the reasons for its growth in the Roman Empire. Tolstoyism had the same origins in czarist Russia, but unlike Gandhism it never became a "popular belief." Through Tolstoy, Gandhi, too, is connected to primitive Christianity; throughout India, a form of primitive Christianity is being revived that the Catholic and Protestant world cannot even comprehend. The relationship between Gandhism and the English Empire resembles the relationship between Christianity-Hellenism and the Roman Empire. They both have an ancient civilization, they are disarmed, technically (militarily) inferior, and dominated by countries that are technically advanced (the Romans had developed governmental and military techniques) but whose populations are of negligible size. A large population that considers itself civilized is dominated by a small nation that is regarded as less civilized but materially invincible—this is what defines the connection between primitive Christianity and Gandhism. The consciousness of the material impotence of a great mass against a few oppressors leads to an exaltation of purely spiritual values, etc., to passivity, to nonresistance, and to <non>cooperation—but, in reality, it is a debilitating and diluted form of resistance, the mattress against the bullet.

The popular religious movements of the Middle Ages, like Franciscanism, etc., fit within the same general framework of the relationship of political impotence of the great masses vis-à-vis oppressors that are smaller in number but battle-trained and centralized: the "humiliated and offended" entrench themselves in primitive evangelical pacifism, in the naked "exposure" of their "human nature," misunderstood and downtrodden despite their affirmations of brotherhood in god the father, equality, etc. In the history of medieval heresies, Francis occupies a very distinct and unique position: he refuses to struggle, he does not even think of struggling in any way, unlike the other innovators (Waldo, etc. [and the Franciscans themselves]).⁵ His position is portrayed in an anecdote recounted in ancient Franciscan texts. "A Dominican theologian asked him

how one should interpret the words of Ezekiel:^a 'If you do not warn the wicked man to renounce his evil ways, I will hold you responsible for his soul.'⁶ Francis replied: 'The servant of God must conduct himself in his life and in his love of virtue in such a way that *through the radiance of good example and the healing power of the word he would succeed in being a reproof to all the wicked*; and thus it will come to pass, I believe, that the splendor of his life and the odor of his good repute will make the wicked aware of their iniquity.'" (Cf. Antonio Viscardi, "Francesco d'Assisi e la legge della povertà evangelica," in the *Nuova Italia* of January 1931.)⁷

§<79>. *Types of periodicals*. Dilettantism and discipline. The need for a severe and rigorous internal critique devoid of conventionalism and half measures. There is a tendency within historical materialism^a that brings out [and encourages] all the bad traditions of Italian middlebrow culture, and it seems to correspond to certain traits of the Italian character: improvisation, reliance on "natural talent," fatalistic indolence, harebrained dilettantism, lack of intellectual discipline, moral and intellectual disloyalty, and irresponsibility. Historical materialism^b destroys a whole set of prejudices and conventionalities, fake duties, hypocritical obligations, but this does not mean that it justifies skepticism and snobbish cynicism. Machiavellism had the same result because of an arbitrary extension or because of a confusion between political "morality" and private "morality," that is to say, between politics and ethics. This confusion is certainly not found in Machiavelli; quite the opposite, for the greatness of Machiavelli consists precisely in the distinction he drew between politics and ethics. A permanent association capable of growth cannot exist unless it is buttressed by definite ethical principles that the association itself sets down for its individual constituents in order to maintain the internal unity and homogeneity needed to reach its goal. This is not to say that these principles lack a universal character. That would be the case if the association existed only for its own sake, if it were a sect or a criminal gang ([only] in this case, in my view,

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "Ezechia" [Hezekiah]. The erroneous attribution is made by Antonio Viscardi, the author of the article in *Nuova Italia* from which Gramsci transcribed this passage.

^a In the manuscript: "mat. storico" [historical mat.].

^b In the manuscript: "mat. storico" [historical mat.].

is it possible to say that politics is confused with ethics, precisely because the "particular" is elevated to a "universal"). But a normal association conceives of itself as an aristocracy, an elite, a vanguard; in other words, it sees itself linked by a million threads to a given social grouping and through that to the whole of humanity. Consequently, this association does not set itself up as a definitive and rigid entity but as something that aims to extend itself to a whole social grouping that is itself conceived as aiming to unify all humanity. All these relationships give a [tendentially] universal character to the group ethic that must be considered capable of becoming a norm of conduct for humanity as a whole. Politics is conceived as a process that will culminate in a morality; in other words, politics is seen as leading toward a form of society in which politics and hence morality as well are both superseded. (Only from this historicist perspective can one explain the anguish that many people feel about the conflict between private morality and public-political morality: it is an unconscious and sentimentally acritical reaction to the contradictions of contemporary society, that is, the inequality of moral subjects.)

But one cannot talk of elite-aristocracy-vanguard as if it were some amorphous and chaotic collectivity that, by the grace of a mysterious holy spirit or some other mysterious and metaphysical unknown deity, is infused with the grace of intelligence, skill, technical competence, etc. Yet this way of thinking is common. It is a microcosm of what happened on a national scale when the state was conceived as something abstracted from the collectivity of citizens, as an eternal father who took care of everything, arranged everything, etc.—hence the absence of a real democracy, of a real national collective will, and hence, because of this passivity of individuals, the need for a more or less disguised despotism of the bureaucracy. The collectivity must be understood as the product of painstaking will and collective thought attained through concrete individual effort and not through a reliance on a process of destiny that is extraneous to the individual; hence the need for inner discipline, not just external and mechanical discipline. If there must be polemics and schisms, one must not be afraid of confronting them and moving beyond them. Such things are inevitable in the processes of development; avoiding them simply means putting them off until they become really dangerous or even catastrophic, etc.

§<80>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Répaci.¹ Take note of his linguistic pedantry, a characteristic that seems to have become even more pronounced lately, as one can see from his most recent short stories, for ex., *Guerra di fanciulli*. The artificial insertion of certain words, the use of Tuscan quips in stories set in Calabria produce an extremely comical effect; also notice how mechanical his effort becomes when, as an outsider, he tries to construct "psychoanalytic" stories—stories that in fact are prompted by a superficial folkloric and picturesque impulse.

§<81>. *Hegemony (civil society) and separation of powers*. The separation of powers, all the discussion that its implementation stirred up, and the legal theorizing it generated were the outcome of a struggle between [the] civil society and the political society of a specific historical period—there was a certain unstable equilibrium among the classes due to the fact that certain categories of intellectuals (in the direct service of the state, especially the civil and military bureaucracy) were still too closely tied to the old ruling classes. Within society, there was what Croce has described as the "perpetual conflict between church and state,"¹ a situation in which the church was taken to represent the whole ensemble of civil society (when in fact its importance in civil society was on the wane) while the state was taken to represent every effort to crystallize permanently a particular stage of development, a particular situation. In this sense, the church itself could become state, in which case the conflict would manifest itself as secular and secularizing civil society versus state-church (when the church has become an integral part of the state, of political society monopolized by a specific privileged group that embraces the church in order to reinforce its monopoly with the support of that segment of "civil society" represented by the church). Essential importance of the separation of powers for political and economic liberalism: the entire liberal ideology, with all its strengths and weaknesses, can be epitomized by the principle of the separation of powers. Therein one can see the source of liberalism's weakness: it is the bureaucracy that is the crystallization of the management personnel that exercises coercive power and at a certain point becomes a caste. Hence the people's demand to make all public offices elective; a demand that is extreme liberalism and, at the same time, its dissolution (principle of the permanent Constituent Assembly, etc.; in

republics, the regular elections of the head of state create the illusion that these elementary popular demands are met).

The unity of the state in the separation of powers: parliament has closer ties to civil society; judiciary power, positioned between government and parliament, represents the continuity of the written law (even against the government). Naturally, all three powers are also organs of political hegemony, but with a difference of degree: (1) parliament; (2) judiciary; (3) government.² It is noteworthy that breaches in the administration of justice make an especially disastrous impression on the public: the hegemonic apparatus is more sensitive in this sector (and arbitrary actions by the police or the political administration may redound upon it as well).

§<82>. *Past and present*. Political and civil society. Polemics over Ugo Spirito's criticisms of traditional economics.¹ The polemic is rife with ideological undertones and presuppositions, but it seems that the "economists" as well as Spirito have refrained from discussing them. It is obvious that the economists do not want to discuss Spirito's concept of the state, even though the dispute hinges on it. Spirito, on the other hand, is unwilling or hesitant to prod and push them on this ground for fear of provoking a general political discussion that would reveal the existence of several parties within the same party, one of which has close links with those who claim to belong to no party; it would make it appear that there exists a party of scientists and of high culture. On the other hand, the scientists would have an easy time revealing the total arbitrariness of Spirito's propositions and his conception of the state, but they do not want to go beyond certain limits that rarely cross the line of indulgence and personal courtesy. The comic side of this is Spirito's pretension that the economists should construct for him an economic science that matches his point of view. But Spirito's polemic must not be rejected wholesale; there are some real exigencies buried under the hodgepodge of "speculative" words. The whole polemic is therefore noteworthy as an episode of the political-cultural struggle. The starting point of the exposition must be precisely the concept of the state set forth by Spirito and by Gentilian idealism,² which is very far removed from the conception adopted by the "state" itself—that is, by the dominant classes and the more active political personnel. In other words, Spirito's concept of the state has not become, by any means (far from it!), an element

of the government's political culture. The concordat is opposed to it (implicitly, of course),³ and Gentile's antipathy towards the concordat is well known—he voiced it in 1928 (cf. his articles in the *Corriere della Sera* and speeches of the time).⁴ One must also bear in mind Paolo Orano's speech in parliament in 1930 (check), which is particularly significant considering that Orano has often addressed the Chamber of Deputies in a quasi-official capacity.⁵ Another thing to take into account is the succinct but violent attack on Spirito's book (*Critica dell'Economia liberale*) by A. De Pietri Tonelli, published in the *Rivista di Politica Economica* [(December 1930)],⁶ given that this review is a mouthpiece of the Italian industrialists (cf. the editorship; in the past, it was the organ of the Association of Joint-Stock Companies).⁷ And more: the well-known orthodox economist P. Jannaccone, who demolished Spirito in *La Riforma Sociale* [(December 1930)], has been elected to the academy.⁸ Cf. also Croce's note in *La Critica* of January 1931.⁹ Judging by Spirito's publications in *Nuovi Studi*, it seems that so far his theses have been wholly accepted only by . . . Massimo Fovel, a notorious political and economic adventurer.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Spirito is allowed to go around talking like a bully, and he is entrusted with positions of responsibility (by the minister Bottai, I believe, who founded the *Archivio di Studi corporativi* with a great deal of help from Spirito and Co.).¹¹

Spirito's conception of the state is not very clear and rigorous. At times, he seems actually to be saying that before he became "philosophy," no one had understood anything about the state and the state did not exist or was not a "real" state, etc. But since he wants to be a historicist, when he comes to think of it, he concedes that the state existed [even] in the past, but now everything has changed and the state (or the concept of the state) is better understood and put on "quite different" speculative foundations from in the past, and since "a science becomes more practical as it becomes more speculative," it thus seems that these speculative foundations must ipso facto become practical foundations and the whole real construction of the state must change because Spirito (not, of course, the empirical man Spirito but Spirito-Philosophy) has changed its speculative foundations. See *Critica dell'economia liberale*,^a p. 180: "My essay on Pareto was intended as an act of faith and goodwill:

^a In the manuscript, "*Contro l'ec. lib.*" [Against lib<eral>ec<onomics>]. The correct title of Ugo Spirito's book is as Gramsci wrote it out earlier in this note, *Critica dell'economia liberale*.

faith, insofar as with that essay I wanted to begin developing the program of *Nuovi Studi* and thus the rapprochement of philosophy and science and their effective collaboration."¹² The inferences are there: philosophy = reality and therefore science and economics as well; in other words, Ugo Spirito = the radiant sun of the whole of philosophy-reality inviting scientific specialists to collaborate with him, to allow themselves to feel the warmth of his sunbeams-principles, even to be^b the sunbeams themselves so they may become "true" scientists, that is, "true" philosophers.

Since scientists have no such inclination, and only a few can be persuaded to enter into correspondence with him, Spirito challenges them on his own ground, and, if they still refuse, he smiles sardonically and triumphantly: they decline the challenge because they are scared, or something of the sort. Spirito cannot imagine that scientists do not want to be bothered with him because he is not worth the trouble and because they have better things to do. Since he is "philosophy" and philosophy = science, etc., those scientists are not "true" scientists, indeed, true science has never existed, etc.

Volpicelli and Spirito, editors of *Nuovi Studi*, the Bouvard and Pécuchet of philosophy, of politics, of economics, of law, of science, etc., etc.¹³ A basic problem: Spirito and Volpicelli's utopia consists in confusing the state with regulated society, a confusion that arises out of a [purely] "rationalistic" concatenation of concepts: individual = society (the individual is not an "atom" but the historical individuation of the whole of society), society = state [therefore] individual = state. What differentiates this "utopia" from other "utopias"—and from quests for the "perfect state" in general—is that Spirito and Volpicelli assume that this product of their "fantasy" exists [already]—it exists but is not recognized by anyone except the two of them, the repositories of the "true truth," whereas others (economists in particular and social scientists in general) understand nothing, are in "error," etc. Why do Spirito and Volpicelli alone possess the truth, and why "the devil!" don't others want it? The duo has not yet explained this, but here and there one catches a glimpse of the means that the pair of them believe should be employed to ensure that the truth is disseminated and becomes self-awareness: it is the police (recall Gentile's speech in Palermo in 1924).^c For political reasons, the masses have been

^b Above this word, between the lines, Gramsci inserted the variant "to become."

^c In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "1925."

told, "What you expect and what was promised to you by charlatans—behold! It already exists"; in other words, regulated society, economic parity, etc. Spirito and Volpicelli (following Gentile—but he is not as stupid as this pair) have broadened this assertion, they have "speculated" it, "philosophized" it, systematized it, and they are fighting like straw lions against the entire world, which has a good idea of what to make of all this. The critique of this "utopia," however, would require a quite different kind of criticism, and it would have an impact on things altogether different from the more or less brilliant careers of the two Ajaxes of "actualism"—so, in the meantime, we are watching the current jousting match. In any case, the intellectual world fully deserves to be under the ferule of these two clowns, just as the Milanese aristocracy fully deserved to be, for many years, under the heel of the triad. (The subscription for the wedding of Donna Franca bears comparison with the act of homage to Francis Joseph in 1853; the juxtaposition of Donna Franca to Francis Joseph is indicative of the depths plumbed by the Milanese aristocracy.)¹⁵ One must also point out that Spirito and Volpicelli's conception is a logical derivation of the silliest and most "rational" democratic theories. Again, this is linked to the conception of an identical "human nature" that does not undergo development—no different from the way "human nature" was conceived before Marx. According to this conception, all humans are fundamentally equal in the realm of Spirito (in this case = the Holy Spirit<0> and God the father of all men).

This conception is expressed in Benedetto Croce's quotation from "an old German dissertation" in the chapter "A proposito del positivismo italiano" (in *Cultura e Vita morale*, p. 45): "Omnis enim Philosophia, cum ad communem hominum cogitandi facultatem revocet, per se democratica est; ideoque ab optimatibus non iniuria sibi existimatur perniciosa."¹⁶ This "common faculty of thought" become "human nature" has given rise to many utopias, traces of which are found in many sciences that start from the concept of perfect human equality, etc.

§<83>. *Italian intellectuals*. Cf. P.H. Michel, *La Pensée de L. B. Alberti (1404-1472)*, Collection de littérature général, 40 francs, Ed. Les Belles Lettres, Paris.¹

§<84>. *Past and present. Continuity and tradition.* Apropos of "Dilettantism and discipline" already mentioned on p. 33:¹ there is an aspect of the issue that pertains to the organizing center of a grouping, namely, the question of "continuity" that tends to create a "tradition"—not in the passive sense of the term, obviously, but in an active sense, as continuity in constant development, but "organic development." This problem contains in a nutshell the entire "juridical problem," that is to say, the problem of assimilating the whole grouping to its most advanced fraction; it is a problem of education of the masses, of their "adaptation" according to the exigencies of the end pursued. This is precisely the function of law in the state and in society: through "law," the state renders the ruling group "homogeneous" and aims to create a social conformism that serves the purposes of the ruling group's line of development. The general activity of law (which encompasses more than purely state and governmental activity and also includes directive activity in those spheres of civil society—namely, the spheres of morality and custom in general—that legal experts call legally neutral) enables a better understanding, in concrete terms, of the ethical problem. This problem is, in practice, the "spontaneously and freely consented to" correspondence between the actual behavior and the acknowledged principles^a of each individual, between the conduct of each individual and the ends that society posits as necessary. This correspondence is compulsory in the realm of positive law technically understood, and it is free and spontaneous (more ethical, strictly speaking) in those spheres where the source of "constraint" is not the state but public opinion, the moral climate, etc. The "juridical" continuity of the organizing center must not be of the Byzantine-Napoleonic type (that is, a code conceived as permanent) but of the Roman-Anglo-Saxon kind, whose essential characteristic consists in its method, which is realistic, always in touch with concrete life in perpetual development. This organic continuity requires a good archive, well stocked, and easy to consult, in which all past activity can be readily verified and "criticized." The most important instances of these activities are not so much the "organic decisions" as the explicative, reasoned (educative) circulars.

^a In the Gerratana edition, the word here is "*omissioni*" [omissions], but checking the manuscript leaves little doubt that Gramsci wrote "*ammissioni*" [literally, "admissions," which is here taken to indicate principles that an individual "admits," "concedes," "acknowledges," and so on].

There exists, to be sure, the danger of becoming "bureaucratized," but every organic continuity presents this danger, which must be watched. The danger of discontinuity, of improvisation is much greater. Organ: the "bulletin" with three major sections: (1) articles on general policy; (2) decisions and circulars; (3) critique of the past, that is, continual reference to the past from the viewpoint of the present in order to show the differentiations and clarifications and to justify them critically.

§<85>. *The medieval commune as an economic-corporative phase of the modern state. Dante and Machiavelli.* Dante's political theory needs to be freed from all subsequent accretions and reduced to its precise historical significance.¹ Because of the importance Dante has had as an element of Italian culture, his ideas and doctrines have had an effective influence in stimulating and prodding political thinking on the nation—that is one issue—but one must reject the notion that his theories have had a genetic value, in the organic sense. Past solutions to given problems help to find solutions to similar problems today, thanks to the cultural critical practice of scholarly discipline. However, one cannot say that the solution of contemporary problems depends genetically on past solutions; the genesis of the solution resides in the current situation and not in anything else. This criterion is not absolute and must not be stretched to the point of absurdity, otherwise it would lapse into empiricism: extreme actualism, extreme empiricism. One must know how to go about defining the great historical periods that, in general, have brought forth certain issues and from their onset have pointed to the rudiments of the resolution of those same issues. Thus I would say that Dante brings the Middle Ages (a phase of the Middle Ages) to a close, whereas Machiavelli shows that a phase of the Modern World has already managed to elaborate its questions and the pertinent solutions very clearly and thoroughly. The notion that Machiavelli is genetically dependent on or allied with Dante is a gross historical blunder. The current construal (see F. Coppola) of church-state relations along Dantesque lines—"the Cross and the Eagle"—is pure intellectual fiction.² There is no genetic connection between Machiavelli's prince and Dante's emperor, and much less between the modern state and the medieval empire. This effort to discover genetic connections among the intellectual emanations of the Italian cultured classes

of the various epochs is precisely what constitutes the national "rhetoric": real history is exchanged for sham history. (That is not to say that the phenomenon is insignificant: it has no scientific significance, that's all. It is a political element; it is even less than that—it is a secondary and subordinate element of the political and ideological organization of small groups struggling for cultural and political hegemony.)

Dante's political theory, in my view, should be reduced to just one component of Dante's biography (something that cannot possibly be done in the case of Machiavelli). I do not mean this in the generic sense that in every biography the protagonist's intellectual activity is essentially important and that it is not only what he did that matters but also what he thought and imagined. I mean, rather, that Dante's political theory did not have, and could not have, any historical-cultural impact; it is important only as a factor in Dante's personal development following the defeat of his faction and his exile from Florence. Dante underwent a radical process of transformation of his political-civic convictions, his emotions, his passions, his general way of thinking. This process had the effect of isolating him from everyone. It is true that his new orientation could be called, but only in manner of speaking, a "new Ghibellinism," superior to the old Ghibellinism but superior also to Guelphism. In reality, this was not a political theory but a political utopia colored by reflections of the past; it was, more than anything else, an effort to synthesize as a doctrine what was only poetic material taking shape, in a state of effervescence, an incipient poetic phantasm that would reach perfection in the *Divine Comedy*—both in its "structure" as a continuation of the effort (now in verse form) to synthesize the emotions into a doctrine and in its "poetry" as an impassioned invective and a drama in progress. Dante rises above the internecine strife of the communes, with its alternating cycle of destruction and slaughter, and dreams of a society superior to the commune, superior both to the church that was supporting the Blacks and to the old empire that backed the Ghibellines;³ he dreamt of a form that would impose a law above factions, etc. A victim of class war, he dreams of the abolition of this war under the aegis of an arbitrating power. But the defeated Dante, with all the rancor, the passions, the emotions of the vanquished, is also a "learned man" who knows the theories and the history of the past. The past provides him with the model of Augustan Rome and its medieval reflection, the Roman Empire

of the Germanic nation. Machiavelli, too, had his eyes trained on the past, but in a very different way from Dante, etc.

§<86>. *Economic-corporative phase of the state*. Guicciardini, in contrast to Machiavelli, represents a step backward in political science—that is all Guicciardini's greater pessimism signifies. Guicciardini turned back to a purely Italian political thought, whereas Machiavelli had worked his way up to European thought. It is impossible to understand Machiavelli without taking into account the fact that with the European (international, for his times) experience he went beyond the Italian experience; without the European experience, his "will" would have been utopian. That is why the very conception of "human nature" becomes different in the two of them. Machiavelli's "human nature" comprises "European man"; and, with the absolute monarchy in France and in Spain, European man had effectively left behind the [fragmented] phase of feudalism. Thus it was not "human nature" that prevented the rise of a unitary absolute monarchy in Italy but transitory conditions that can be overcome by the will. Machiavelli is "pessimistic" (or, better, "realistic") in his thinking about men and the motives of their actions; Guicciardini is not pessimistic but skeptical and petty.

Paolo Treves (cf. "Il realismo politico di Francesco Guicciardini," in *Nuova Rivista Storica*, November-December 1930) commits many errors in his judgments on Guicciardini and Machiavelli.¹ He fails to distinguish clearly between "politics" and "diplomacy," and it is precisely this nondistinction that lies at the root of his misguided evaluations. In politics in fact, the element of will is of far greater importance than in diplomacy. Diplomacy sanctions and tends to conserve situations created by the clash of policies between states; it is only creative metaphorically or by political convention (all human activity is creative). International relations deal with a balance of forces in which the impact of any single state is bound to be very weak. Florence, for example, might have had an impact if it had reinforced itself, but even if such a reinforcement would have enhanced its position in the Italian and European balance of force, it certainly could not have been regarded as a decisive factor that would upset the entire equilibrium. Just by virtue of his professional habit, the diplomat is inclined to be skeptical and narrow-mindedly conservative.

In the internal relations of a state, the situation is incomparably more favorable to initiative from the center, to a will to command, as Machiavelli understood it. De Sanctis's view of Guicciardini is much more realistic than Treves believes. One should consider why De Sanctis was better prepared than Treves to give this more historically and scientifically accurate assessment. De Sanctis participated in a creative moment of Italian political history, a moment in which the effectiveness of political will—aimed at stirring up new and original forces instead of just counting on traditional forces that were considered incapable of development and reorganization (political skepticism à la Guicciardini)—had revealed all its potentiality in the art of founding a state from within as well as mastering international relations, modernizing the professional and habitual methods of diplomacy (with Cavour). The cultural climate favored a more comprehensively realistic conception of the science and art of politics. But even if one were to ignore this climate, was it impossible for De Sanctis to understand Machiavelli? The atmosphere produced by the historical moment enriched De Sanctis's essays with a sentimental pathos that renders his arguments more sympathetic and intense, his scientific exposition more aesthetically expressive and captivating, but the logical content of his political science could have been thought out even in the worst reactionary periods. Isn't reaction itself, perhaps, a constructive act of will? And is conservatism not a voluntary act? Why, then, is Machiavelli's will considered "utopian"? And why is one's will considered revolutionary and not utopian if one wants to conserve what exists and to impede the emergence and organization of new forces that would disturb and overturn the traditional equilibrium? Political science abstracts the element of "will" and fails to take into account the goal toward which a particular will is applied. The attribute "utopian" is not applicable to political will in general but to particular wills that are incapable of connecting the means to the end and thus should not even be called wills but foolish aspirations, dreams, longings, etc.

Guicciardini's skepticism (not pessimism of the intelligence that in active, realistic politicians can be fused with an optimism of the will) has different sources:² (1) The diplomatic habit, namely, the habits of a subaltern [subordinate, executive-bureaucratic] profession³ that must accept a will (the political will of the diplomat's government or sovereign) that is extraneous to the personal

² Above this word, between the lines, Gramsci inserted the variant "activity."

convictions of the diplomat. (Of course, the diplomat may feel that will to be his own, insofar as it corresponds to his own convictions, but, on the other hand, he might not. Since diplomacy has of necessity become a specialized profession, it has had the effect of allowing the diplomat to become detached from the policies of changing governments, etc.) Consequently, skepticism and extrascientific prejudices in scientific elaborations. (2) The specific convictions of Guicciardini, who, within the general framework of Italian politics, was a conservative and therefore theorized his own opinions, his own political position, etc.

Guicciardini's writings are a sign of the times more than they are political science—this is De Sanctis's judgment. Similarly, Paolo Treves's piece is a sign of the times and not an essay on the history of political science.

§<87>. *Arms and religion*. Guicciardini's assertion that two things are absolutely necessary for the life of a state: arms and religion.¹ Guicciardini's formula can be translated into various other, less drastic formulas: force and consent, coercion and persuasion, state and church, political society and civil society, politics and morals (Croce's ethicopolitical history), law and freedom, order and discipline,² or, with an implicit judgment of libertarian flavor, violence and fraud. In any case, in the political conception of the Renaissance, religion was consent, and the church was civil society, the hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group that did not have an apparatus of its own; that is, it did not have its own cultural and intellectual organization, but it felt as if the universal ecclesiastical organization was its own. If it were not for the fact that religion is openly conceived and analyzed as an "instrumentum regni," we would still be in the Middle Ages.

This is the point of view from which to examine the Jacobin initiative of instituting the cult of the "supreme Being." From this perspective, the initiative appears to have been an attempt to create an identity between state and civil society, to unify in a dictatorial manner the constitutive elements of the state organically and more broadly (the state, in the rigorous sense, and civil society) in a desperate effort to tighten their grip on the life of the people and the nation as a whole. Yet it also appears to have been the first root of the modern secular state, independent of the church, seeking

and finding within itself, within its complex life, all the elements of its historical personality.

§<88>. *Gendarme or night-watchman state, etc.* It is worth reflecting on the following issue: Isn't the conception of the state as gendarme–night watchman, etc. (setting aside the polemical nature of the terms: gendarme, night watchman, etc.), after all, the only conception of the state that goes beyond the ultimate stages of "economic-corporativism"? We are still on the terrain of the identification of state and government, an identification that is precisely a representation of the economic-corporative form—in other words, of the confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be noted that certain elements that fall under the general notion of the state must be restored to the notion of civil society (in the sense, one might say, that state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion). In a theory that conceives of the state as inherently liable to wither away and dissolve into regulated society, this issue is fundamental. It is possible to imagine the state-coercion element withering away gradually, as the increasingly conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical state or civil society) assert themselves. In that case, the expressions "ethical state" or "civil society" mean that this "image" of a state without a state was in the mind of the greatest political scientists and legal thinkers, insofar as they viewed things from within the sphere of pure science (= pure utopia, to the extent that it is based on the premise that all men are really equal and hence equally rational and moral—that is, likely to accept the law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another class, as something external to their consciousness). It must be remembered that the appellation "night watchman" for the liberal state comes from Lassalle, a dogmatic, nondialectical statist. (Cf. closely Lassalle's doctrine on this point and on the state in general,¹ as opposed to Marxism.) In the theory of state → regulated society (from a phase in which state equals government to a phase in which state is identified with civil society), there must be a transition phase of state as night watchman, that is, of a coercive organization that will protect the development of those elements of regulated society that are continually on the rise and, precisely because they are on the rise, will gradually reduce the state's

authoritarian and coercive interventions. This is not to say that one should think of a new "liberalism," even if the beginning of an era of organic freedom were at hand.

§<89>. *Politics and diplomacy*. Cavour. (Cf. the note on p. 39 bis on Machiavelli and Guicciardini.)¹ An anecdote recounted by Ferdinando Martini in *Confessioni e Ricordi, 1859-1892* (ed. Treves, 1928),² pp. 150-51: according to Crispi,³ Cavour should not have been considered a frontline figure in the history of the Risorgimento; Vittorio Emanuele, Garibaldi, and Mazzini were the only ones. "Cavour? What did Cavour do? Nothing more than 'diplomatize' the revolution." Martini comments: "I did not dare tell him, but I thought: 'Beg your pardon if it's not much.'" It seems to me that Crispi and Martini are thinking along different lines. Crispi means to refer to the active elements, the "creators" of the revolutionary national movement, that is, to the politicians in the strict sense. For him, then, diplomacy is a subaltern and subordinate activity: the diplomat does not create new historical relations but works to get those created by the politician ratified—Talleyrand cannot be compared to Napoleon.

Actually, Crispi is wrong, but for reasons different from what Martini believes. Cavour was not just a diplomat; indeed, he was essentially a "creative" politician, only his mode of "creating" was not revolutionary but conservative. In the final analysis, it was Cavour's program that triumphed, not Mazzini's or Garibaldi's. Nor can one understand how Crispi places Vittorio Emanuele alongside Mazzini and Garibaldi: Vittorio Emanuele was on Cavour's side, and it was through Vittorio Emanuele that Cavour controlled Garibaldi and also Mazzini. To be sure, Crispi would not have accepted such an analysis because of "the emotion that constrains the intellect." His sectarian passion was still alive, as it always was, despite the radical shifts in his political positions. On the other hand, Martini would never have admitted (at least not publicly) that Cavour was essentially a "fireman" or, as one might say, "a precautionary Thermidorian" since neither Mazzini, nor Garibaldi, nor Crispi was made of the stuff of the Jacobins of the Committee of Public Safety. As I pointed out elsewhere,⁴ Crispi was a Jacobin by temperament but not a "politico-economic Jacobin," that is, he did not have a program comparable in substance to the Jacobins'; neither did he have their fierce intransigence. On

the other hand: did any of the necessary conditions exist in Italy for a movement similar to the French Jacobin movement? France was a hegemonic nation for many centuries; its international autonomy was substantial. Italy was totally different: it had no international autonomy. Given these particular conditions, one understands why diplomacy was concretely preferable to creative politics, why diplomacy was the "only creative politics." This was not a question of rousing a nation that was preeminent in Europe and in the world or a unitary state that would seize civil initiative away from France; it was rather a question of stitching together a unitary state of whatever kind. Gioberti's and Mazzini's ambitious programs had to make way for Cavour's political realism and pragmatism.⁵ This lack of "international autonomy" explains much of Italian history, and not just the history of the bourgeois classes. It also explains why Italy was able to achieve many diplomatic victories, despite its relative politico-military weakness. It is not Italian diplomacy as such that triumphs; rather, this has to do with the skill of knowing how to take advantage of the international balance of forces; it is a subaltern activity, though useful. Italy, per se, is not strong, but no international system would be the strongest without Italy.

Also interesting, apropos of Crispi's Jacobinism, is the chapter "Guerra di successione," in the same book by Martini (pp. 209–24, especially p. 224). When Depretis died,⁶ the northerners did not want Crispi, a Sicilian, to succeed him. Crispi was already prime minister when he opened his heart to Martini, proclaimed his unitarism, etc., asserted that all forms of provincialism were dead, etc. This appears to be one of Crispi's positive qualities; instead, I believe the opposite is true. Crispi's weakness consisted precisely in the fact that he attached himself closely to the northern group, leaving himself open to blackmail, and that he systematically sacrificed the South, that is to say, the peasant. In other words, Crispi, unlike the Jacobins, did not dare set aside the immediate corporate interests of the small ruling group in order to address first and foremost the historical interests of the future class whose latent energies he could have revived with an agrarian reform. Crispi, too, was a precautionary Thermidorian, that is, he was the kind of Thermidorian who does not seize power when the latent forces have been set in motion but seizes power in order to prevent such forces from being unleashed. During the Revolution, a "*feuillant*" was a Thermidorian before the fact.

One needs to check carefully whether during the Risorgimento period any reference was ever made, even in passing, to a program in which the unity of the socioeconomic structure of Italy was looked at in this concrete manner. I have the impression that, in the end, Cavour was the only one who had a conception of this kind. In other words, within the general context of national politics, Cavour gave top priority to the southern agrarian classes—the agrarian classes and not the peasants, of course; that is, the agrarian bloc led by the great landowners and the great intellectuals. It is therefore important to study the special volume of Cavour's correspondence that is devoted to the "Quistione meridionale."⁷ (Also to be studied on this topic: Giuseppe Ferrari before and after 1860; after 1860 the parliamentary speeches on the events in the South.)⁸

§<90>. *Psychology and politics.* During periods of financial crisis, in particular, one hears a great deal of talk about "psychology" as the efficient cause of certain marginal phenomena. Psychology (lack of confidence), panic, etc. But what does "psychology" mean in this case? It is a fig leaf, a euphemism for "politics," that is, a particular political situation. Since "politics" is normally taken to refer to the actions of parliamentary factions, parties, newspapers and, in general, to any action that is carried out according to a known and predetermined policy, the term "psychology" is applied to those rudimentary mass phenomena that are unorganized, not predetermined, not obviously steered, and that evince a fracture in the social unity between the governed and those who govern. Through these "psychological pressures," the governed express their lack of confidence in their leaders, and they demand changes in personnel as well as in the direction of financial and economic affairs. Savers do not invest their savings, and they withdraw their investments from certain ventures that appear particularly risky, etc. They are content with minimal and even zero interest rates; in some instances, they even prefer to sacrifice part of their capital in order to safeguard the rest.

Can these crises caused by a general loss of confidence be avoided solely by means of "education"? These crises are symptomatic precisely because they are "generic," and it is difficult to educate a new confidence when confronting something that is "generic" in character. The frequent recurrence of such psychological crises indicates that the organism is sick, in other words, that the social en-

semble is no longer able to produce competent leaders. These, then, are political—and even sociopolitical—crises of the ruling group.

§<91>. *Functionaries and functions*. What does the difference between wholesale and retail prices mean from the point of view of “functionaries and functions”? It means that there is an “army” of functionaries that pockets the difference, living off the consumer and the producer. And what is the meaning of the astronomically high number of bankruptcies? It means that the “competitive exams” for this army of functionaries are not going well at all. And these are “competitive exams” of a special sort: those who are “rejected” destroy an enormous amount of wealth, and they are only rejected “pro tempore”: even if “rejected,” they resume functioning and destroying new wealth. How many such functionaries are there? They create their own functions, determine their own salaries, and set aside a pension.

§<92>. *Past and present*. The fascist periodical *19*, edited by Mario Giampaoli in Milan, published a little article by Antonio Aniante in 1927¹ (it could have been before or after: I read the article in the Milan prison) that gave one to understand that Aniante, together with some other Sicilian, had taken seriously the hare-brained idea of some Sardinian intellectuals (C. Bell. and some others—I remember that Em. Lu. tried to consign the notion to oblivion by making light of it)² to create a federal Mediterranean state that would have been made up of Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Corsica and Sardinia, Sicily, and Crete. Aniante wrote about this with the silliness of a braggart, and one must not give too much credence to what he says: for ex., is it believable that he was sent abroad (to Paris, I believe) to meet other “conspirators”? And who sent him? And who gave him the money?

§<93>. *Encyclopedic notions*. Theocracy, Caesaro-papism, hierocracy. They are not exactly the same: (1) theocracy—inseparable from the idea of rule by the grace of God; (2) Caesaro-papism—the emperor is also the religious head, even though his predominant characteristic is military-secular; (3) hierocracy is government by

the clergy—the predominant authority is of a priestly nature; papal rule is a hierocracy.

§<94>. *Italian culture*. The national sentiment is not national-popular (cf. scattered notes); in other words, it is a purely "subjective" sentiment disconnected from objective institutions, factors, realities. It is therefore a sentiment of "intellectuals" who are conscious of their own category and history—the only category that has had an uninterrupted history.

One objective element is language, but, in Italy, its development is not much influenced by popular language, which does not exist (except in Tuscany); what exist instead are dialects. Another element is culture, but it is much too limited, and it has a caste character. The intellectual ranks are extremely small and restricted. The political parties: they were hardly solid, and they lacked consistent vitality; they only sprung into action during electoral campaigns. The newspapers: their connections with the political parties were weak, and few people read them. The church was the most effective and wide-ranging national-popular element, but with the struggle between church and state, the church became a divisive factor more than a unifying force, and now things are not much different because the general formulation of the moral-popular question has changed. The monarchy.—Parliament.—University and the schools.—The city.—Private organizations, such as Masonry.—The popular university.—The military.—Labor unions.—Science (aimed at the people—doctors, veterinarians, itinerant teachers, hospitals).—The theater.—Books.

§<95>. *Italian culture. Regionalism*. Cf. Leonardo Olschki, "Kulturgeografie Italiens," in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, January 1927, pp. 19-36. The *Leonardo* of February 1927 considers it "a lively and very good analysis of Italian regionalism, its present features, and its historical origins."¹

§<96>. *Types of periodicals. Economics. A review of Italian economic studies*. 1. Italy in the world economy. General works in which the Italian economy is compared to and placed in the context of the world economy. Books of this kind: Mortara's *Prospettive*

economiche; the *Annuario economico della Società delle Nazioni*; the Dresdner Bank publications on world economic forces, etc.¹ Books on the balance of trade; on exports and imports; on international loans; on the remittances made by emigrants (and hence on emigration and its characteristics); on international tourism in Italy and its economic impact; on trade agreements; on world economic crises and their reverberations in Italy; on the merchant marine and its revenues from freight; on free ports; on protectionism and free trade; on transshipment and its effect on the Italian economy—and hence on the ports and their non-Italian hinterland (Genoa and Switzerland, Trieste and the Balkans, etc.); on fishing outside Italian territorial waters; on cartels and international trusts and their effects on Italy; on the banks and their foreign expansion (the Banca Commerciale abroad, the Banco di Roma abroad, etc.); on foreign capital in Italy and Italian capital abroad.

2. Economic infrastructure and national production. Comprehensive books on Italian production and on Italy's economic policy; on the taxation system; on the spread of industry by region compared to agriculture and to smaller economic enterprises; on the geographical distribution of the major national economic zones and their distinctive features—northern Italy, central Italy, the South, Sicily, Sardinia.

3. Studies on the economies of the regions (Piedmont, Lombardy, etc.)

4. Studies on the economies of the provinces or provincial areas. Publications of the chambers of commerce, the agrarian consortiums, and the provincial economic councils; publications of the local banks; the municipal gazettes of the major provincial towns; [studies by individual researchers]; publications of the economic observatories such as the one in Palermo for Sicily or the one in Bari for Apulia, etc. The review should be concerned with the current situation, but each section should also have a historical approach—in other words, it would be beneficial to refer to studies that have now been superseded, etc. This review can be preceded or followed by another review on the study of economics and schools of economic thought, on journals dealing with economics and political economy, and on individual economists both living and dead.

§<97>. *Past and present. Lofty ambition and petty ambitions.* Could politics—that is, history in the making—exist without am-

bition? "Ambition" has acquired a pejorative and derogatory connotation for two major reasons: (1) because (lofty) ambition is confused with petty ambitions; (2) because much too often ambition has led to the basest opportunism and to the betrayal of those old principles and old social formations that, in the first place, provide the conditions that enable the ambitious person to turn to more lucrative and immediately profitable activities. Ultimately, the latter reason is reducible to the first: it all has to do with petty ambitions that are in a hurry and want to avoid having to overcome too many (or great) difficulties [or having to run too many risks].

It is in the character of every leader to be ambitious, that is, to aspire with all his energies to wield state power. An unambitious leader is not a leader and is a dangerous person for his followers: he is inept and cowardly. Recall Arturo Vella's statement: "Our party will never be a ruling party"; in other words, it will always be an opposition party.¹ But what does it mean to propose remaining forever in the opposition? It means laying the ground for the worst disasters: being in the opposition might be convenient to the opposers, but it is not "convenient" [(depending, of course, on the nature of the forces in the opposition)] to the government leaders, who at some point must consider the issue of destroying the opposition and sweeping it away. Aside from being necessary for the struggle, lofty ambition is not morally reprehensible, either; quite the reverse: it all depends on whether the "ambitious" person rises after scorching everything around him or whether his rise is [consciously] conditioned by the rise of an entire social stratum—whether the ambitious person actually views his own rise as part of the general rise.

Usually, one witnesses the struggle of petty ambitions (of the specific individual) against lofty ambition (which is inseparable from the collective good). These observations on ambition could and should be combined with the other observations on so-called demagoguery. Demagoguery means various things: in the pejorative sense, it means exploiting the popular masses—their cleverly roused and stoked passions—for one's own ends, for one's own petty ambitions. (The parliamentary and electoral system provides a fertile terrain for this particular form of demagoguery that culminates in Caesarism and Bonapartism with its plebiscitary regime.) But if the leader does not regard the human masses as a servile instrument—useful to attain one's own aims and then to be discarded—but aims, instead, to achieve organic political results (of which these masses are the necessary historical protagonists), if the leader carries out

a constructive "constituent" task, then his is a superior "demagoguery." The masses cannot but be helped to advance through the rise of particular individuals and of entire "cultural" strata. The reprehensible "demagogue" posits himself as irreplaceable, he creates a desert around himself, he systematically crushes and eliminates potential rivals, he wants to establish a direct relationship with the masses (plebiscite, etc., grandiose rhetoric, stage effects, spectacular phantasmagoric displays—what Michels called "charismatic leader").² The political leader with a lofty ambition, on the other hand, is inclined to create an intermediate stratum between himself and the masses, to foster potential "rivals" and peers, to elevate the capabilities of the masses, to produce individuals who can replace him as leader. His thinking is in line with the interests of the masses, who do not wish to see an apparatus of conquest [or domination] dismantled by the death or incapacitation of a single leader, which would plunge the masses back into chaos and primitive impotence. If it is true that every party is the party of a particular class, then the leader must build on this and develop a general staff and an entire hierarchy; if the leader is of "charismatic" origin, he must repudiate his origin and work to make the function of leadership organic—organic and with the characteristics of permanence and continuity.

§<98>. *Custom and laws*. It is widely believed—and this view is, in fact, considered realistic and intelligent—that laws should be preceded by custom, that the law is effective only insofar as it sanctions custom. This view goes against the real history of the evolution of law, which has always required a struggle to assert itself and which is actually a struggle for the creation of new customs. This view contains a very conspicuous residue of moralism that has intruded into politics.

It is falsely assumed that the law is an integral expression of society as a whole. Instead, a truer expression of society is those rules of behavior that jurists call "legally neutral," and the sphere they encompass changes with the times and with the scope of state intervention in the life of citizens. The law does not express the whole of society (if it did, those who break the law would have to be considered antisocial beings by nature or mentally deficient); the law, rather, is an expression of the ruling class, which "imposes" on the whole of society those norms of conduct that are most

tightly connected to its own *raison d'être* and expansion. The greatest function of the law is the following: to presuppose that insofar as all citizens can become members of the ruling class, all of them must freely accept the conformity set down by the law. In other words, the democratic utopia of the eighteenth century is implicit in modern law.

Nevertheless, there is some truth in the view that custom must precede law: in fact, in the revolutions against absolute states, much of what was to become mandatory law had already existed as custom [and as aspiration]. It is with the emergence and the growth of inequalities that the compulsory character of the law became increasingly strong, and the same is true of the enlargement of the sphere of state intervention and of legal imposition. But this latter phase—despite the assertion that compliance must be free and spontaneous—is something quite different: it has nothing to do with compliance but rather with the suppression and smothering of a nascent law.

This argument forms part of the broader issue concerning the different position occupied by the subaltern classes before becoming dominant. Certain subaltern classes, unlike others, must have a long period of juridical intervention that is rigorous and then subdued. There is a difference in approach as well: in the case of certain classes, expansion never ceases, until the whole of society is entirely absorbed; in other cases, the initial period of expansion is followed by a period of repression. This educative, creative, formative character of the law has not been stressed much by certain intellectual currents: there is a residue of spontaneity, of abstract rationalism that is based on an abstractly optimistic and slipshod concept of "human nature." Another issue arises for these currents: what the organ of legislation "in the broad sense" should be; in other words, the need to hold legislative discussions in all the organisms of the masses—an organic transformation of the concept of "referendum," but preserving for the government the legislative function in the last instance.

§<99>. *The concept of great power.* (Cf. other previous notes.)¹ According to the head of the Italian government: "Navies determine the ranking of great powers."² It should be pointed out that the sizes of navies can be measured at any time with a clear mathematical system, but the same is not true of ground forces. Recall

Anatole France's epigram: "All armies are the best in the world, but when it comes to the navy it is the number of ships that counts."³

§<100>. *Past and present*. Industrialists and farmers. All of past history, from the emergence of some form of industry onward, is characterized by a difficult and complicated effort to divide the national income between industrialists and farmers, an effort complicated by the existence of a rather vast category of middling and small landowners who do not cultivate the land but live in cities (in the hundred cities),¹ voracious parasites of agricultural income. A system constructed in this manner (industrial protectionism and agricultural protectionism) is bound to be inadequate, but it remains in place because of the low standard of living of the great masses, the lack of raw materials (which makes big industrial development impossible), and the impossibility of significant savings—the profits are swallowed up by the parasitic strata, and there is no accumulation (despite the low standard of living of the great masses). This also explains the precarious condition of certain export industries, such as silk, that would otherwise benefit enormously from the low price of supplies and could even compete successfully with France, to which Italy hands over the raw material (the cocoons). Estimate how many cocoons are sold abroad and how many are processed in Italy, and calculate the difference between finished silk and unprocessed cocoons. Another estimate for sugar: more protected than wheat, etc. Analysis of the export industries that could emerge [or grow] in the cities as well as in agriculture, if it were not for the existing system of tariffs. When the absence of raw materials is the result of militaristic and nationalist (certainly not imperialist, which is a more advanced level of the same process) policy, it is natural to ask whether existing raw materials are well used—because otherwise we are not dealing with the politics of a nation (that is, of an entire class) but with a parasitic and privileged oligarchy; in other words, this would be a matter not of foreign policy but of corrupt internal politics that deprive the nation of its strength.

§<101>. *Italian culture*. Primitive bourgeoisie. For the study of the formation and propagation of the bourgeois spirit in Italy (a work along the lines of Groethuysen),¹ cf. also Franco Sacchetti's

*Sermoni*² (see what Croce wrote about it in *La Critica* of March 1931—"Il Boccaccio e Franco Sacchetti").³

§<102>. *Past and present*. Peasants and rural life. Guidelines for research: material living conditions: housing, diet, alcoholism, hygiene, clothing, demographics (mortality, birth rates, infant mortality, marriage rate, births out of wedlock, migration to urban centers, [frequency of] homicide and other noneconomic crimes, lawsuits on property disputes [mortgages, auctions for unpaid taxes, transfers of landed property, audits, construction of rural houses], economic crimes, fraud, larceny, forgery, etc., migration by women to the cities to work as domestic servants [emigration, family members who do not work]). The orientation of popular psychology on religious and political issues, school attendance by children, illiteracy among recruits and women.

§<103>. *Risorgimento*. When did the Risorgimento begin?¹ Cf. Arrigo Solmi, *L'unità fondamentale della storia italiana*, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1927, 58 pp., L. 6.² On this publication, cf. Francesco Collotti, "Pretesti oratori," in the *Leonardo* of 20 May 1927,³ Solmi's response in the *Leonardo* of 20 August, and L. Russo's note on the response.⁴ Solmi finds this fundamental unity in the "city," and it is certainly remarkable that the same reforms took place in many autonomous cities simultaneously. (I have not read Solmi's little book, and therefore I do not know exactly how he explains this phenomenon.) On this question, one should look at Carlo Cattaneo's little book *La Città considerata como principio ideale delle istorie italiane*, edited by G. A. Belloni, 140 pp., L. 8, Vallecchi, Florence.⁵ Did Solmi derive his principle from Cattaneo? Besides, what does "city" mean? Does it not mean, perhaps, "bourgeoisie," etc.?

§<104>. *Journalism*. The type of provincial weekly that was traditionally circulated in Italy—and especially favored by Catholics and socialists—represented adequately the cultural conditions of the provinces (villages and small cities). No interest in international life (other than as a curiosity and an oddity), little interest even in national life except when it had some connection with local—especially electoral—concerns; solely interested in local life, includ-

ing gossip and trivialities. Great importance attached to personal polemics (of the knavish and provincial sort, making the adversary appear stupid, ridiculous, dishonest, etc.). Information reduced to nothing more than reports from various villages. Generic political commentaries that presupposed the information provided by the daily newspapers that the readers of the weekly did not read—and, indeed, it was assumed that they did not read the dailies (which is why the weekly was produced for them).

The editor of this kind of weekly was usually a mediocre intellectual, pretentious and ignorant, captious, and full of banal sophisms. He would have regarded summarizing the dailies as beneath his dignity; he thought himself capable of filling the weekly with editorials and "brilliant" articles and of inventing a whole string of theories on economics, politics, and philosophy.

Italy, with its unfortunate geography and its lack of a national political and intellectual center, should have been precisely the place for a successful weekly of the kind published in England ("Observer," "Sunday Times,"^a etc.), which is edited on the model of the daily: in other words, a publication that every week provides information for readers who do not read the daily paper or who would like to have a digest of the week's events. This English model should be examined and, in theory, adapted to suit the Italian situation. It should (weekly, biweekly) replace the daily newspaper in large areas where the daily does not have a sufficiently strong foothold (Naples, Florence, Palermo, etc.; generally, in the principal regional cities and also in the main cities of nonindustrial provinces: remember places such as Biella, Como, Tortona that wanted to have a weekly even though they were industrialized and purchased daily newspapers. Similarly, Alessandria, Cuneo, Fossano, etc. In Italy, a weekly edited on this model would serve the same function as the many small provincial daily newspapers in Germany and Switzerland).

§<105>. *Types of periodicals. Tradition and its psychological sedimentations.* The fact that generic anarchism (cf. the wholly Italian concept of "subversive") is deeply rooted in popular traditions can be studied through an examination of the poetry and the speeches of P. Gori, who, as a poet (!), can be compared (on a lower level) to

^a In the manuscript, "Times Sunday."

Cavallotti.¹ Gori has a whole way of thinking and of expressing himself that smacks of the sacristy and of papier-mâché heroism. Yet those forms and expressions, allowed to spread without challenge and criticism, made very deep inroads among the people and constituted a predilection (and, perhaps, they still do).

§<106>. *Journalism. News editor.* Difficulty of producing good news editors, that is, journalists who have the technical preparation that enables them to understand and analyze the organic life of a big city and place within its context (without pedantry but also not superficially and without "brilliant" improvisations) every single problem as it arises and becomes topical. What one says about the news editor can also be extended to apply to a whole set of public activities: a good news editor should have the same technical preparation that is sufficient and necessary to become a magistrate, or even a prefect, or the (effective) chairman of the economic council of a province of the kind that exists today. From a journalistic point of view, the news editor should be analogous to the local correspondent in a big city (and, in descending order of competence and complexity of issues, to the correspondents of midsize and small cities and of villages).

Generally speaking, the functions of a newspaper should be compared to analogous functions of administrative directors. From this point of view, journalism schools should be set up if one wants this profession to come out of the primitive and amateurish stage in which it is stuck, to become qualified, and to have complete independence—in other words, for the newspaper to be in a position to offer the public information and opinions that are not tied to particular interests. If the news editor informs the public "journalistically," as they say, it means that he accepts without criticism and without independent judgment the information and opinions provided by individuals (through interviews or *tuyaux*)¹ who intend to take advantage of the newspaper to promote particular special interests.

There should be two types of news editing: (1) the organic type; and (2) the type that gives greater prominence to what is topical. Regarding the organic type: in order to provide a comprehensive perspective, it should be possible—after removing from the articles those topical elements that must always be present in every journalistic publication—to compile books on the most overarching and

constant aspects of the life of a city; to be clear, in these "organic" articles, the topical elements must be subordinate, not in the forefront. These organic articles must therefore be more frequent. The news editor studies the urban organism as a whole, in its totality, in order to be professionally qualified (but only in a limited sense, because a news editor may change cities: his major qualification cannot be bound to a specific city). As for the original or generally useful results of these studies: it is legitimate for them not to be entirely disinterested, a mere introduction, and to be brought directly into relief, taking their cue from topical issues. In reality, the work of a news editor is of the same scope as the work of the editor-in-chief or the work of a department head of a journalistic organization with a division of labor for the personnel. A school of journalism must have a series of monographs on the big cities and their complex life. Just the problem of supplying a big city is of such magnitude that it would require a huge amount of work (on different branches of the activity of a news editor, I have written other notes).² Cf. W. P. Hedden's book, *How Great Cities Are Fed*, Boston, Heath, 1929, \$2.80; reviewed in the *Giornale degli Economisti* of January 1931.³ Hedden examines how certain cities in the United States, especially New York, are supplied with provisions.

§<107>. *Past and present*. Giolitti and Croce. It is notable—and this has to be documented chronologically—that Croce and Giolitti committed the same exact errors, the former in the present political sphere and the latter in the sphere of cultural and intellectual politics. Both of them failed to understand the direction of the historical current, and, in practice, they boosted the very things they wanted to avoid and tried to combat. In reality, just as Giolitti failed to comprehend the changes wrought by the incursion of the great popular masses into the processes of Italian politics, so Croce failed to understand, in practice, what powerful cultural influence the unmediated passions of these masses would have (in the sense of modifying the leading cadres of intellectuals). From this point of view, one should take a look at Croce's contributions to F. Coppola's *Politica*¹ (De Ruggiero also wrote for it during the same period).² How does one explain the fact that Croce, who in 1914–15 positioned himself against Coppola and Co., with his articles in *Italia Nostra* and *Critica*³ (and Coppola was the main target of the brief comments by De Lollis, if I remember correctly, in *Italia*

Nostra),⁴ supported this group in 1919-20 by contributing articles that criticized and showed the limitations of the liberal system? Etc., etc.

§<108>. *Popular literature*. Cf. the 1931 issue of *Cultura* devoted to Dostoyevsky. In one of the articles, Pozner correctly maintains that Dostoyevsky's novels are derived (culturally) from the kind of novels written by Sue, etc.¹ It is worth keeping this "derivation" in mind for developing this survey of popular literature; it demonstrates how a certain "cultural" type of literature (motives, moral interests, sensibilities [ideologies], etc.) can have a double expression: a mechanical expression (typified by Sue) and a "lyrical" expression (Dostoyevsky). Contemporaries fail to notice how shoddy certain expressions are—this was the case with Sue, who was read by people of all classes and even "moved" cultured persons but was subsequently dismissed as a "writer read by the people." (A "first reading" produces sensations that are purely, or almost purely, "cultural" or based on content, and the people are first readers; they read for the "ideology.")

On the same topic: Mario Praz, *La carne, la morte e il diavolo nella letteratura romantica*, in 16°, X-505 pp., Milan-Rome, Soc. Ed La Cultura, L. 40, and L. F. Benedetto's review of it in the *Leonardo* of March 1930.² Based on this review, it seems to me (I have not read the book) that Praz did not draw a clear distinction between the various levels of *culture* that account for some of the objections by Benedetto, who in turn fails to understand the precise nexus of the historical question.

Cf. Notebook 21, §14.

§<109>. *Past and present. The individual and the state*. How the economic situation has changed to the "detriment" of the old liberalism: Is it true that every individual citizen knows his own affairs better than anyone else in today's environment? Is it true that meritocracy prevails under the present circumstances? The "individual citizen": insofar as he cannot know [and, most important, cannot control] the general conditions in which business is conducted, given the magnitude of the world market and its complexity, in reality he does not know his own affairs, either—the need for big industrial organizations, etc. Moreover, the state with its increasingly burdensome taxation system strikes at its own citizens but cannot touch the citizens of other nations (who enjoy lower taxes or are taxed on a different scale); the big states that

must incur huge expenditures for massive public services (including the army, navy, etc.) impose a heavier burden on their citizens (to which one must add the cost of unemployment benefits, etc.). But does the intervention of the state through customs duties create a new base? Through its customs duties, the state "selects" which of its citizens to protect, even though they do not "merit" it, etc.—it unleashes a struggle among different groups for their share of the national income, etc.

§<110>. *Machiavelli and Guicciardini*. In the chapter "Les critiques de l'escalier" in Clemenceau's book *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire* (Plon, 1930)¹ there are some of the general observations I made in the note on Paolo Treves's article "Il realismo politico di Guicciardini";² for ex., the distinction between politicians and diplomats. Clemenceau says that diplomats have been trained (*dressés*) to execute policy, not initiate it. The entire chapter is a polemic against Poincaré, who had criticized the fact that diplomats were not given a role in the preparation of the Versailles treaty. Clemenceau, as a pure man of action, as a pure politician, is extremely sarcastic in his criticism of Poincaré, his legalistic attitude, his illusion that one can make history with quibbles, subterfuges, formal skills, etc.³ "La diplomatie est instituée <plutôt> pour le maintien des inconciliables que pour l'innovation des imprévus. Dans le mot 'diplomate' il y a la racine double, au sens de plier."⁴ [It is true, however, that this concept of *double* does not refer to "diplomats" but to the "diplomas" that diplomats keep—it meant, physically, a folded sheet of paper.]

§<111>. *Popular literature. Serial novels*. Cf. Étienne Servais, *Le genre romanesque en France depuis l'apparition de la "Nouvelle Héloïse" jusqu'aux approches de la Révolution* (pub. by Armand Colin); Reginald W. Hartland, *Le Roman terrifiant ou "Roman noir" de Walpole à Anne Radcliffe, et son influence sur la littérature française jusqu'en 1860* (pub. by Champion), and *Walter Scott et le "Roman frénétique"* (pub. by Champion).

Pozner's assertion, recorded in an earlier note,¹ that the Dostoyevskyan novel is an "adventure novel" is probably taken from an essay by Jacques Rivière on the "adventure novel" (that may have appeared in *NRF*), where the term is taken to mean "a wide-ranging representation of actions that

are both dramatic and psychological," as Balzac, Dostoyevsky, Dickens, and George Eliot conceived it.²

André Moufflet has written an essay, "Le style du roman-feuilleton," in the *Mercure de France* of 1 February 1931.³

Cf. Notebook 21, §21.

§<112>. *Past and present. The Crocean utopia.* Cf. the note that refers to Croce's contributions to Coppola's *Politica* in the years 1919-21 (check) that contradicts his 1915 stance in *Italia Nostra* against Coppola, his ideology, and his particular mindset.¹ From this one can see and assess the "utopian" character of Croce's theoretical and practical activity—I say "utopian" in the sense that the consequences of Croce's stance are contrary to his "intentions" as they ensue from his subsequent stance vis-à-vis these consequences. Croce believes that his work is "pure science," pure "history," pure "philosophy," whereas it is really "ideology"; he offers practical instruments of action to specific political groups, and then he is astonished that these are not "understood" as "pure science" but are "separated" from their true purely scientific purpose. Cf., for ex., the two chapters "Fissazione filosofica," on p. 296, and "Fatti politici e interpretazioni storiche," on p. 270 of his book *Cultura e vita morale*.² On p. 296, Croce protests against the famous speech that Gentile gave in Palermo in 1924:³ "But if the citizens of some state on planet Earth, who—thanks to such 'methods of force' as criticism and oratory, free association, voting, and so on—were once able to debate their affairs, adopted the different method of resorting to the cudgel and the dagger, and in their midst there were those who hankered after the old custom and endeavored to suppress the new (which they considered savage)—in that case, what could possibly be the role of the philosopher who, intervening in the contest, declared that every force (hence also the force of the cudgel and the dagger) is a spiritual force?"³ Etc., etc. (the rest is interesting and should be quoted, if it is pertinent). But he himself had written on p. 270: "Writing poetry is one thing and fighting with one's fists is, in my view, something quite different; but those who do not succeed in the former may be very adept at the latter, and it is entirely possible that, in certain cases, resorting to fisticuffs might even be useful and opportune." That is what Croce wrote in

¹ In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "1925."

1924: it is probable that in 1924^b Gentile wanted to philosophize the “useful and opportune” and added the cudgel and even the dagger to the fists. Nor did Croce stop at “fisticuffs” (besides, fists can kill, too, and there is even a law-and-order measure against “forbidden fistfights”). Gentile has put into “actualist” language Croce’s proposition based on the distinction between logic and practice; for Croce, this is uncouth, but this sort of thing happens all the time, and it is awfully pretentious to want to be understood to perfection and to justify oneself by claiming to have been misunderstood. One may compare what Croce wrote in other chapters on intolerance, the Inquisition, etc.,⁴ to see his different states of mind: from the exclamation marks, which he said were among the means used by the Holy Inquisition to exert pressure on the will of others,⁵ he has had to return to the cudgel and the dagger, which we have seen reappear before us as a means of persuasion in the service of truth.

§<113>. *Risorgimento. The country and the city.* From this point of view, the following study might be interesting: Carlo Cattaneo’s *La città considerata come principio ideale delle istorie italiane*, edited by G. A. Belloni for the publisher Vallecchi (1930 or 1931).¹ The study had appeared in installments in the *Crepuscolo* of 1858, and it was never included in the works of Cattaneo edited by Bertani, Gabriele Rosa, and Mario.² According to Belloni, the concept expounded by Cattaneo—that an Italian revival required unity between the cities and the countryside—had already been put forward by Romagnosi.³ One possible source of Cattaneo’s idea could have been the French democratic literature of his time, which adhered to the Jacobin tradition (cf., for ex., Sue’s *Les mystères du peuple*, which was widely disseminated in Italy as well).⁴ In any case, the important thing would have been not so much to articulate the concept but to express it in direct political terms for Italy—which is precisely what was missing and which in fact was purposely and systematically avoided by the democratic parties of the *Risorgimento*.

§<114>. *Risorgimento.* For certain episodes, cf. F. Martini’s book, *Confessioni e Ricordi (1859–1892)*, Treves, Milan, 1928.¹ Some of the book’s chapters are interesting. The interesting element in the

^b In the manuscript, “1925.”

first chapter, "Per cominciare e per finire," concerns the political attitude of the Tuscan moderates in 1859, which cannot be treated good-humoredly as just a psychological phenomenon, as Martini does; it was, rather, a clear-cut political attitude tied to certain convictions and a definite position, as can be seen from recently published documents (cf. Panella's article in *Il Marzocco* and the polemic with Puccioni).² The Tuscan moderates opposed the dissolution of the grand duchy; they were reactionary federalists. The episodes of military abulia in Tuscany in 1859 cannot be attributed solely to the "psychology" of the Tuscan people, as Martini does; what occurred was a sabotage of the national war or at the very least a sabotaging "neutrality." The scarcity of "volunteers" stemmed from the moderates' ill will.

The importance of the French intervention in 1859 is also brought into relief by these events, just as Martini's text brings into relief the complete absence of national consciousness and national pride among the moderates, who were wont to say that "it is up to the emperor to wage war"³—in other words, not that Italy should liberate itself but that France should liberate Italy. One can understand how certain established customs took root in the French bureaucratic tradition of foreign policy, and an opinion was formed about the merits of the leading personnel in Italy.

Another interesting chapter is "*Parlamentum Indoctum*," which contains remarks on the intellectual preparation of many politicians of the time. Martini offers a good-natured justification of the crass ignorance of such individuals as Nicotera; he asserts that their plotting and imprisonment did not leave them with much time for studying.⁴ To be sure, Nicotera's life was not conducive to "regular" study, but Settembrini also was serving a life sentence, and yet he did not waste his time.⁵ Some Southerner, tired of all the rhetorical literature against the Bourbons (from before the war I remember an article by Oreste Mosca in F. Russo's journal *Vela latina*),⁶ wrote that in Piedmont (with a population of five million) there were five penitentiaries, the same as in Naples with its ten million inhabitants—which means that Piedmont was either more reactionary or had a higher crime rate; in any case, Naples did not look so bad, after all. Paradoxically, this is true: the patriots serving life sentences in Naples were better off than the ones in Piedmont, which, for a long time, was dominated by the Jesuits and by a civil and military bureaucracy that was much more inquisitorial and "heavy-handed" than the Neapolitan one. Those serving a life sen-

tence did not have their legs chained, nor were they held in solitary confinement; their sentence was “psychologically and morally”—but not “materially”—more severe than a fixed number of years of hard labor. The severity consisted in the fact that many of those imprisoned for life had been sentenced to die, they “really” believed they were about to be executed, and then, at the last minute, they were spared. At the same time, though, the political prisoners could not have believed that they would really be imprisoned for life because they could not have believed that the Bourbon regime would last that long. This is not meant in any way to minimize the gravity of their suffering. They were in fact “able to study,” and some did (Settembrini, for ex.), while others did not (Nicotera, for ex.); therefore, the reason adduced by Martini does not apply to all cases and hence is invalid. One must look elsewhere to find an explanation: many of those men lacked the consciousness of a revolutionary class and of the duties incumbent on every member of such a class. In other words, they lacked political passion, which must not be confused with fanaticism or sectarianism, which they had in abundance.

On Vittorio Emanuele II, Martini recounts (on pp. 152–153) the following anecdote that was passed on to him by Quintino Sella. In October 1870, Vittorio Emanuele received, at the Pitti palace, the Roman delegation, which was presenting him with the results of the plebiscite held in Rome. Lanza and Sella were present. Sella said, “Your majesty, you must be very happy today.” Vittorio Emanuele replied, “Keep quiet; there’s nothing left for me to do but to take a revolver and shoot myself. For the rest of my days, I’ll have nothing left to plunder.” Therefore, Sella called Vittorio Emanuele the “last of the conquerors.”⁷

§<115>. *Father Bresciani’s progeny*. Angelo Gatti. His novel *Ilia e Alberto*, published in 1931 (check): an autobiographical novel.¹ Gatti converted to Jesuitic Catholicism. The key, the crux, of the novel consists of the following event: Ilia, a healthy woman, ends up with drops of a tubercular’s saliva in her mouth because of a sneeze, a cough (what do I know? I have not read the novel, only some reviews),² or something else; she contracts tuberculosis and dies.

It seems odd and puerile that Gatti placed so much stress on this mechanical and superficial detail and made it such a salient feature of his novel that a reviewer has lingered over it. Recall the silly

things that gossipers commonly say to explain infections. Did Ilia, perhaps, always stand with her mouth open in front of people who coughed and sneezed in her face in trams and in crowded places? And how could she ascertain the precise cause of her infection? Or was there a sick person who went around purposely infecting healthy people? It is truly amazing that Gatti resorted to this kind of trick for his novel.

§<116>. *The Renaissance*. (The economic-corporative phase of Italian history.) *The origins of vernacular literature and poetry*. See Ezio Levi's work *Uguccione da Lodi e i primordi della poesia italiana* and his later (1921) studies on the ancient poets of Lombardy, including his edition of the poetry with commentary and short biographies.¹ Levi maintains that it was a "literary phenomenon," "accompanied by a movement of ideas," and that it represented "the earliest affirmation of the new Italian consciousness in contrast to the lazy and torpid medieval period" (cf. S. Battaglia, "Gli studi sul nostro duecento letterario," in the *Leonardo* of February 1927).² Levi's thesis is interesting and should be explored further—as a thesis on the history of culture, of course, rather than the history of art. Battaglia writes that "Levi mistakes this modest production of verse, which preserves characteristics and expressions of an obviously popular character, for a literary phenomenon." And, as often happens in such cases, it is quite possible that Levi exaggerates the artistic importance of these writers. But what does this mean? And what does it mean to oppose "popular character" to the "literary"? When a new culture emerges, is it not natural that it assumes "popular" and primitive forms and that its bearers are "modest" people? And is this not even more natural during periods when literature and culture were a monopoly of exclusive castes? Furthermore, were there any great artists and writers in Uguccione da Lodi's time, even among the cultured class? The question raised by Levi is interesting because his research suggests that the earliest elements of the Renaissance had a popular rather than a courtly or scholastic source, and they were the expressions of a general cultural and religious (Patarin) movement in rebellion against the medieval institutions of church and empire.³ The poetic stature of these writers from Lombardy may not have been very high, but that does not diminish their historico-cultural importance.

Another prejudice that both Battaglia and Levi evince is that the origin of a "new Italian culture" is to be sought and found in the thirteenth century. Research along such lines is purely rhetorical and is guided by modern practical interests. The new culture was not a "national" but a class culture; both "politically" and "culturally," it would assume a "communal" and local form, not a unitary form. As a result, it was born in "dialect" and would have to wait until the great [Tuscan] florescence of the fourteenth century before it could meld linguistically, and even then only up to a certain point. Before that, cultural unity did not exist—quite the opposite. What existed was a cultural "Euro-Catholic universality," and the new culture reacted against this universality (which was based in Italy) by means of the local dialects and by bringing to the fore the practical interests of municipal bourgeois groups. Hence we are dealing with a period in which the existing cultural world was decaying and falling apart; the new forces did not become part of this world but reacted against it, albeit unconsciously, and they represented embryonic elements of a new culture. The heresies of the Middle Ages will have to be studied (Tocco, Volpe, etc.).⁴ Battaglia's essay "Gli studi sul nostro duecento letterario," *Leonardo*, January-February-March 1927, contains useful bibliographical references, etc.⁵

§<117>. *Past and present*. "Resistance stretched over an unusually long period of time in a besieged location has in itself a demoralising effect. It comprises suffering, exertion, lack of rest, disease and the constant presence, not of acute danger which steels, but of that chronic danger which breaks men down." Karl Marx, "Events in the Crimea," an article of 14 September 1855 (*Œuvres politiques*, tome VIII, p. 22).¹

§<118>. *The Renaissance*. Origins (cf. note on p. 50 bis).¹ Two historical moments are confused: (1) the rupture with medieval culture, the most significant evidence of which is the emergence of the vernaculars; (2) the development of an "illustrious vulgar tongue"—in other words, the fact that intellectual groups or, rather, professional men of letters achieved a certain degree of centralization. In reality, the two moments, though related, were not fully welded together. The vernacular languages started to appear

in a fragmentary and casual manner for religious reasons (military oaths, legal testimony to establish property rights given by peasants who did not know Latin), but what really matters is the fact that literary works written in the vernacular (whatever their merit) were still a new phenomenon. One of the local vernaculars, Tuscan, became hegemonic, but this is a different matter that needs to be qualified: it was not accompanied by a sociopolitical hegemony, and thus it remained a purely literary phenomenon. The fact that the written vernacular made its first significant appearance in Lombardy must be highlighted; the fact that it was related to the Patarin movement is also extremely important.² In reality, the nascent bourgeoisie imposed its own dialects, but it failed to create a national language. If a national language did indeed come into existence, it was limited to the litterati, and they were assimilated by the reactionary classes, by the courts; they were aulic rather than "bourgeois litterati." And this absorption did not occur without conflict. Humanism demonstrated that "Latin" was very resilient, etc. A cultural compromise, not a revolution, etc.

§<119>. *Risorgimento*. The military traditions of Piedmont. There were no arms factories in Piedmont; all arms had to be purchased abroad. As military "tradition" goes, there was nothing wrong with that. It is worth doing some research on this topic. The arms that Carlo Alberto sent to the Swiss Sonderbund: Were they sold, and for how much?¹ Or where they donated? Did Piedmont lose them? When was the first arms factory set up?

In his speech to the senate on 23 May 1851, Cavour said that in fact there were no arms factories and he hoped that such factories could be built once the policy of free trade (treaty with England) had lowered the price of iron.²

§<120>. *Types of periodicals*. *The final evolutionary being*. Anecdote on Prof. D'Ercole's course on [the history of] philosophy and the "final evolutionary being." For forty years he spoke of nothing but Chinese philosophy and Lao-tzu. Every year there were "new students" who had not heard the previous year's lectures, and so he had to start all over again. Thus the "final evolutionary being" became a legend among whole generations of students.¹

Certain cultural movements enlist their adherents from people who have just started taking the first steps in their own cultural development; they expand rapidly, attracting new followers, and the members they have already recruited lack individual cultural initiative. As a result, these cultural movements seem incapable of moving beyond the ABCs. This has serious repercussions on journalistic activity in general, newspapers, weeklies, periodicals, etc.; they seem permanently stuck at a certain level. Moreover, the failure to take these pressing matters into account explains the Sisyphean task of the so-called little periodicals, which are addressed to everyone and no one and at a certain point become utterly useless. *La Voce* was the perfect example: at a certain point, it split into *Lacerba*, *La Voce*, and *L'Unità*, each with its own propensity to split, ad infinitum.² Unless the editorial boards are linked to a disciplined rank-and-file movement, they tend either to become little coteries of "unarmed prophets" or to split along the lines of the disorderly and chaotic movements that arise among various groups and different strata of readers.

One must openly acknowledge, then, that periodicals per se are sterile, unless they become the formative and driving force of cultural institutions with a mass membership rather than restricted cadres. The same applies to periodicals of political parties; one must not believe that the party in itself constitutes the mass cultural "institution" of the periodical. The party is essentially political, and its cultural activity in itself constitutes a cultural policy. The cultural "institutions" must not confine themselves to "cultural policy"; they must also address "cultural technique." Example: some party members are illiterate, and the party's cultural policy is the fight against illiteracy. A group dedicated to the struggle against illiteracy is not quite the same thing as a "school for the illiterate." In a school for the illiterate, people are taught to read and write; a group for the struggle against illiteracy marshals all the most effective means for eradicating illiteracy among the great masses of the population of a country, etc.

§<121>. *Journalism*. Albert Rival, *Le journalisme appris en 18 leçons*, Albin Michel, 1931, L. 3.50.¹ In four parts: (1) *History of journalism: Origins of journalism. The great journalists.* (2) *How a newspaper is produced: Editorial office. Producing an issue: writing,*

corrections, pagination, *clicherie*, print run. (3) *The required qualities of a journalist*. What is a journalist? The aptitude needed. The necessary qualities. Can a woman aspire to be a journalist? (4) *The journalist's style*: Style in general. Different styles. On writing. Description. How not to write. The news article. The higher level of reportage: how it is done. The editorial. The polemical article. The organization of a newspaper. (Rudimentary and flawed outline. Makes no reference to the different types of newspapers, etc.)

§<122>. *Types of periodicals. Reviews*. Law reviews that are of interest to specific movements. For example: the concept of "employee" according to Italian jurisprudence; the concept of "sharecropper," or "technical director," etc. Which means: What positions do the "employee," the "sharecropper," the "technical director," etc., occupy, as economic entities, within the framework of Italian law? And for what theoretical-practical reasons?

Collections of such reviews as *Il Foro italiano*,¹ which publishes court decisions and articles by specialists commenting on the decisions, must be carefully checked to see when certain cases are taken up and for what reasons, how they unfold, and how they are resolved (if they are resolved), etc. After all, this, too, is an aspect (and a very important one) of the history of labor; in other words, it is the legal-legislative reflex of the real historical movement. Examining how this reflex expresses itself is tantamount to studying an aspect of the state's reaction to the movement itself, etc. In addition to the court decisions and the articles in these technical reviews, one must also look at other publications (books, periodical, etc.) on law; in recent years, they have multiplied at an impressive rate, even though their quality is poor.

§<123>. *Past and present*. Observations on the crisis of 1929-30? Cf. the March 1931 issue of *Economia* devoted to "La depressione economica mondiale": the two articles by P. Jannaccone and by Gino Arias.¹ Jannaccone maintains that the "primary cause" (! sic) of the crisis is "an excess of consumption, not a lack of it." In other words, we are faced with a deep and, in all likelihood, a prolonged disruption of the *dynamic* equilibrium between, on the one hand, the proportion of the national income going to consumption and the proportion going into savings and, on the other hand, the rate

of production needed to sustain or improve the standard of living of a population that is rising at a given rate of net growth. A disruption of this equilibrium can occur in a variety of ways: an increase in the proportion of income consumed at the expense of savings and reinvestment for future production; a decline in the rate of productivity of capital; an increase in the rate of net growth of the population. At a certain point, in other words, average individual income stops rising and becomes static and then starts to decline progressively; at this point, crises break out and the decline in average income leads to a drop (even in absolute terms) in consumption that in turn leads to further cuts in production, etc. According to this view, then, the world crisis is a *savings crisis*, and "unless the rate of <net> population growth slows down, the ultimate remedy would be to increase the proportion of income set aside for savings and for new capital formation. This is the warning of high moral value that flows from the reasoning of economic science."²

Jannaccone's observations are certainly acute; Arias, however, draws from them conclusions that are purely tendentious and, in part, stupid. Even if one were to accept Jannaccone's thesis, the question remains: what is the excess of consumption attributed to? Can it be shown that the rise in the standard of living of the working masses has been so great as to represent an excess of consumption? In other words, has the ratio of wages to profit become catastrophic for profits? Statistics belie this, even in the case of America.³ Arias "disregards" a rather important "historical" factor: in the postwar period, largely as a result of trade and the stock exchange, a category of people who "siphon money" has been introduced [(or has become more numerous than before)] into the national income distribution, a category that does not represent any necessary and indispensable productive function but absorbs a massive proportion of income. One must bear in mind that, setting aside the wages or benefits absorbed by the category of workers employed in the service of the unproductive and absolutely parasitic categories of society (and there is also the separate category of disabled or unemployed workers who live on public charity and subsidies), "wages" are always necessarily tied to jobs,⁴ and the income absorbed by wage earners can be accounted for almost to the last cent. By contrast, it is difficult to account for the income absorbed by nonwageworkers who have no necessary and indispensable function in trade and industry. The ratio between "employed" workers and the rest of the population would reveal the weight

of "parasitism" that drags down productivity. Unemployment of nonwageworkers: they do not show up in statistics because they "live," somehow, on their own means, etc. Since the war, the unproductive parasitic category has grown enormously, both relatively and absolutely; it is this category that devours savings. In European countries, this category is still larger than in America, etc. The causes of the crisis, then, are neither "moral" (pleasure, etc.) nor political;⁵ they are, rather, socioeconomic—they are of the same nature as the crisis itself. Society creates its own poison; it has to provide a living for those masses of the population (not only of unemployed wage earners) who impede saving and thus rupture the dynamic equilibrium.

§<124>. *Croce and literary criticism*. Is Croce's aesthetics becoming normative; is it becoming a "rhetoric"? One would have to read his *Aesthetica in nuce* (which is the entry on aesthetics in the latest edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*). It asserts, among other things, that the principal task of modern aesthetics is "the restoration and defence of the classical against the romantic; of the synthetic, formal, and theoretical moment which is of the essence of art, against that affective moment which it is art's business to resolve into itself."¹ In addition to Croce's aesthetic concerns, this passage shows his "moral" preoccupations, that is, his "cultural" and hence "political" preoccupations. One might ask whether aesthetics can have any other task than that of elaborating a theory of art, beauty, and expression. Aesthetics, here, means "criticism in action, concretely." But shouldn't criticism in action simply criticize, that is, produce the history of art concretely, which means the history of "individual artistic expressions"?

§<125>. *Types of periodicals. History and "progress."* History has arrived at a certain stage, hence every movement that appears to be at odds with that given stage seems antihistorical insofar as it "reproduces" an earlier stage. In such cases, there is talk of reaction, etc. The problem arises out of the failure to think of history as the history of classes. A class reaches a certain stage, it sets up a certain form of state life; the dominated class rebels, breaking up the achieved reality—does that make it reactionary?

Unitary states, autonomist movements. The unitary state has been a historical advance, it has been necessary, but that does not mean that every movement that aims to break up a unitary state is antihistorical and reactionary. If the dominated class cannot attain its historicity other than by smashing these facades, then we are not dealing with a modern "unity" but with an administrative-military-fiscal "unity." It may be the case that the creation of a modern unity requires the destruction of the previous "formal" unity, etc. Where does one best find modern unity: in "federal" Germany or in the unitary "Spain" of Alfonso and the landowners-generals-Jesuits?¹ And so on. This observation can be extended to many other historical manifestations; for example, the level of "cosmopolitanism" in the different periods of international cultural development. In the eighteenth century, the cosmopolitanism of the intellectuals was "maximal," but how big of a fraction of society as a whole did it touch? And was it not, to a large extent, a hegemonic manifestation of the culture and of the great French intellectuals?

Still, there is no doubt that every [national] ruling class is closer, culturally and in its mores, to the other ruling classes than the subaltern classes are to other subaltern classes—even though the subaltern classes <are> "cosmopolitan" in terms of their program and historical purpose. A social group may be "cosmopolitan" in its politics and its economics and, at the same time, not be "cosmopolitan" in its mores and even in its (real) culture.

§<126>. *Types of periodicals.* A series of guides or little manuals for newspaper readers (or readers in general). Similar to reading a stock exchange list, the balance sheet of an industrial company, etc. (Succinct; just the basic schematic data.) It should be aimed at the average Italian reader who, generally speaking, is poorly informed on these matters, etc.

The ensemble of these little manuals could constitute a popular series at the basic level that could be developed into a "second-level" series of more complex and comprehensive texts, etc.—both of them would be like school textbooks, compiled as companions to hypothetical lessons, and both series should serve as introductions to a series of scientific texts of general culture and to a series for specialists. In other words, four series: two series of the school

textbook type and two general ones, aimed at different levels from the more to the less rudimentary, each according to its genre.

§<127>. *Industrial issues*. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 15 November 1930 published the retrospective talk "Les relations entre patrons et ouvriers: Les délégués de corporation,"¹ delivered at the Paris Academy of Moral and Political Sciences by Eugène Schneider, the head of the Creusot company. The retrospective is very important, especially for my work. Schneider has organized the delegations according to trade (*corporation*), as in Turin² (though Schneider had a different goal: disunity). But the delegations do not constitute a deliberative body, and they do not have a directorate, etc. Nevertheless, Schneider's effort is of prime importance, etc. Analyze it. Look for other pertinent publications.

§<128>. *Organic centralism*, etc. Schneider quotes the following words by Foch: "Commander n'est rien. Ce qu'il faut, c'est bien comprendre ceux avec qui on a affaire et bien se faire comprendre d'eux. Le bien comprendre, c'est tout le secret de la vie."¹ Tendency to separate "command" from every other element and transform it into a new kind of "panacea." And one must also distinguish among the expressions of "command" by different social groups: the art of command and the way it manifests itself differs greatly from group to group, etc. Organic centralism, crudely imperious and "abstractly" conceived, is linked to a mechanical conception of history and of the movement, etc.²

§<129>. *Past and present*. *D'Annunzio's politics*. There are some interesting pages in the book *Per l'Italia degli Italiani*, Milan, "Bottega di Poesia," 1923.¹ At one point, he recalls his tragedy *La Gloria* in connection with his political view of the peasants, who should "reign" because they are the "best."² Not a single genuine political concept: clichés and emotions, etc.

As for the 2,000 lire he donated for the starving during the famine of 1921: basically, he tries to obscure it by making the donation appear to have been a "Machiavellian" political stroke; he donated to thank them for liberating the world from an illusion, etc.³ D'Annunzio's politics can be studied as one of the many re-

peated efforts by litterateurs (Pascoli,⁴ but maybe one should go all the way back to Garibaldi) to promote a national-socialism in Italy (that is, to lead the great masses to the national or nationalist-imperialist "idea").

§<130>. *Encyclopedic notions. Conjuncture.* The origin of the word: it helps to understand the concept better. In Italian = economic fluctuation. Linked to very rapidly changing postwar phenomena. (In Italian, the term "conjuncture" still means "favorable or unfavorable [economic] opportunity." Difference between "situation" and "conjuncture": conjuncture is the ensemble of the immediate and transitory peculiarities of the economic situation, and one must therefore take this concept to refer to the most fundamental and enduring characteristics of the situation itself. The study of conjuncture, then, is more closely related to immediate politics, to "tactics" [and agitation], whereas "situation" is related to "strategy" and to propaganda, etc.)¹

§<131>. *Past and present. Characters.* Ethics and politics.¹ The virulence of certain polemics among politicians is notable for its personal and moralistic character. If their goal is to diminish or destroy the political influence of a prominent figure or a party, they make no effort to demonstrate that the individual's or the party's politics are inept or harmful; instead, they set out to show that certain persons are scoundrels, etc., lack "good faith," have vested "interests" (in a personal and private sense), etc. It shows the rudimentary level of political sense, the persistently low level of national life. This is due to the fact that there still exists an enormous stratum that, lacking all conviction, "lives" off politics in "bad faith." This phenomenon is of a piece with the general destitution that leads people to believe political behavior is motivated by pecuniary considerations, etc. Expressions such as "he is inept but a man of honor" are curious in politics; it is acknowledged that a person is inept, but because he is believed to be a "man of honor" he is trustworthy. But in politics, isn't "inept" morally equivalent to "rogue"? It is true that usually these moralistic campaigns change nothing, unless they are meant to condition public opinion to accept or even demand a kind of "liquidation" of politics.

§<132>. *History of the subaltern classes*. On some aspects of the 1848 movement in Italy, insofar as they reflect the theories of French utopians, cf. Petruccelli della Gattina, *La rivoluzione di Napoli nel 1848*, 2d ed., 1912, edited by Francesco Torraca;¹ Mondaini, *I moti politici del 48*;² De Ruggiero, *Il pensiero politico meridionale*.³

§<133>. *For a new literature (art) through a new culture*. Cf., in B. Croce's book, *Nuovi saggi sulla letteratura italiana del seicento* (1931), the chapter in which he discusses the Jesuit academies of poetry and compares them to the "schools of poetry" created in Russia¹ (Croce may have taken his cue, as usual, from Fülöp-Miller).² But why didn't he compare them to the painters' and sculptors' workshops of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? Were they also "Jesuit academies"? And why shouldn't one do for poetry what had been done for painting and sculpture? Croce fails to consider the social element that "wants to have" its own poetry, an element that does not belong to any "school"—in other words, it has not mastered a "technique" and a diction. In reality, this is all about a "school" for adults that educates taste and creates a "critical" sense, broadly speaking. A painter "copies" one of Raphael's works: is he in some sort of "Jesuit academy"? He "steeps" himself in Raphael's art in the best possible way, he tries to re-create it for himself, etc. So why can't workers practice versification? Doesn't this help educate the ear to the musicality of verse, etc.?

§<134>. *Popular literature. The serial novel*. Cf. what I wrote apropos of *The Count of Monte Cristo* as a paradigm of the serial novel.¹ The serial novel is a substitute for (and, at the same time, it stimulates) the fantasies of the common man; it really is daydreaming. One can look up what Freud and the psychoanalysts have to say about daydreaming.² In this case, one could say that the fantasies of the people stem from a (social) "inferiority complex" that is the source of fantasies about revenge, punishing those responsible for their adversities, etc. *The Count of Monte Cristo* contains all the ingredients to induce these flights of fancy and hence to administer a narcotic that dulls the sense of pain, etc.

§<135>. *Past and present. Fordism.* In Ford's industrial practice, high wages do not represent the same thing that Ford wants them to signify in theory. (Cf. the notes on the fundamental significance of high wages as a means for selecting skilled workers that would fit into the Fordist methods of production and work, as well as Ford's commercial and financial system: the need to avoid work stoppages, hence the open shop, etc.)¹ In addition, one should also note the following: in certain countries where capitalism is still backward and the economic structure consists of a mixture of modern big industry, artisan production, midsize and small-scale agriculture, and large land holdings, the masses of workers and peasants are not considered to be a "market." Industry looks abroad for a market, it seeks to export its goods to backward countries where it is easier to penetrate politically through the establishment of colonies and spheres of influence. With protectionism and low wages in the home country, industry corners foreign markets through blatant sustained dumping.²

There are countries that have nationalism but not a "national-popular" situation—in other words, countries in which the great popular masses are treated like cattle. The enduring presence of a large industrial artisan stratum in certain countries: is it not actually linked to the fact that the great peasant masses are not regarded as a market for big industry, which, for the most part, sells its products abroad? And the so-called revitalization or protection of small industry: does it not in fact evince the desire to perpetuate this situation at the expense of the poorer peasants, who are excluded from progress of any kind?

§<136>. *Organization of national societies.* I have pointed out elsewhere that in any given society nobody is unorganized and without a party, provided that organization and party are understood broadly, in a nonformal sense.¹ The numerous private associations are of two kinds: natural and contractual or voluntary. In this multiplicity of private associations, one or more prevails, relatively or absolutely, constituting the hegemonic apparatus of one social group over the rest of the population (civil society), which is the basis for the state in the narrow sense of governmental-coercive apparatus.

There are always cases of individuals belonging to more than one private association, and often they belong to associations that are

essentially² in conflict with one another. A totalitarian policy in fact attempts: (1) to ensure that the members of a particular party find in that one party all the satisfactions that they had previously found in a multiplicity of organizations, that is, to sever all ties these members have with extraneous cultural organisms; (2) to destroy all other organizations or to incorporate them into a system regulated solely by the party.² This occurs: (1) when the party in question is the bearer of a new culture—this is a progressive phase; (2) when the party in question wants to prevent another force, bearer of a new culture, from becoming itself “totalitarian”—this is a regressive and objectively reactionary phase, even if the reaction (as always) does not admit it and tries to create the impression that it is itself the bearer of a new culture.

In the *Riforma Sociale* of May–June 1931, Luigi Einaudi reviewed a French book by Étienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *Les sociétés de la nation: Étude sur les éléments constitutifs de la nation française* (415 pp., Ed. Spes, rue Soufflot, Paris 1930, 45 Fr.) that examines some of these organizations, but only those that exist formally.³ (For ex., do the readers of a newspaper constitute an organization or not?, etc.)⁴ In any case, if this topic is discussed, take a look at the book together with Einaudi’s review.

§<137>. *Concept of state*. Through a discussion of Daniel Halévy’s recent book *Décadence de la liberté*—I read a review of it in *Nouvelles Littéraires*—one can show that the mainstream conception of the state is one-sided and leads to gross errors.¹ For Halévy, the “state” is the representative apparatus, and he discovers that the most important events in French history from 1870 to the present were due not to initiatives of political organisms generated by universal suffrage but to initiatives of private organisms (capitalist corporations, general staffs, etc.) or of high-ranking civil servants unknown to the general public, etc. But that means only one thing: state does not mean only the apparatus of government but also the “private” apparatus of hegemony or civil society. It is noteworthy that this critique of the noninterventionist state trailing behind events, etc., gives rise to the dictatorial ideological current of the Right, with its reinforcement of the executive, etc. Still, one must read Halévy book to find out whether he, too, has embarked on this

² Above this word, between the lines, Gramsci inserted the variant “objectively.”

line of thinking—which is not unlikely in principle, given his previous work (his leanings toward Sorel, Maurras, etc.).²

§<138>. *Past and present. Transition from the war of maneuver (and frontal assault) to the war of position—in the political field as well.* In my view, this is the most important postwar problem of political theory; it is also the most difficult problem to solve correctly. This is related to the issues raised by Bronstein,¹ who, in one way or another, can be considered the political theorist of frontal assault, at a time when it could only lead to defeat.² In political science, this transition is only indirectly³ related to what happened in the military field, although there is a definite and essential connection, certainly. The war of position calls on enormous masses of people to make huge sacrifices; that is why an unprecedented concentration of hegemony is required and hence a more “interventionist” kind of government that will engage more openly in the offensive against the opponents and ensure, once and for all, the “impossibility” of internal disintegration by putting in place controls of all kinds—political, administrative, etc., reinforcement of the hegemonic positions of the dominant group, etc. All of this indicates that the culminating phase of the politico-historical situation has begun, for, in politics, once the “war of position” is won, it is definitively decisive. In politics, in other words, the war of maneuver drags on as long as the positions being won are not decisive and the resources of hegemony and the state are not fully mobilized. But when, for some reason or another, these positions have lost their value and only the decisive positions matter, then one shifts to siege warfare—compact, difficult, requiring exceptional abilities of patience and inventiveness. In politics, the siege is reciprocal, whatever the appearances; the mere fact that the ruling power has to parade all its resources reveals its estimate of the adversary.

§<139>. *Conflict between state and church as an eternal historical category.* On this topic, cf. the pertinent chapter in Croce’s book on politics.¹ One could add that, in a certain sense, the conflict between “state and church” symbolizes the conflict between any system of crystallized ideas (that represent a past phase of

³ Above this word, between the lines, Gramsci inserted the variant “mediately.”

history) and current practical needs. A struggle between conservation and revolution, etc.; between what was thought in the past and new thinking; between the old that refuses to die and the new that wants to live, etc.

§<140>. *Past and present*. Italian Catholicism. Concerning the question of a possible Protestant reform in Italy, take note of the "discovery" made in July-August 1931 (after the encyclical on Catholic Action)¹ by some Italian periodicals about the true nature of Catholicism (the *Critica fascista* editorial on the encyclical is especially noteworthy).² These Catholics have discovered, much to their amazement and shock, that Catholicism equals "papism." This discovery must not have pleased the Vatican very much: it is a potential Protestantism, as is the aversion to every papal interference with the domestic affairs of the nation, as well as considering and declaring the papacy a "foreign power." These repercussions of the concordat must have come as a surprise to the "great" statesmen of the Vatican.³

§<141>. *On national sentiment*. The publisher Grasset has brought out a collection of *Lettres de jeunesse* by the erstwhile captain Lyautey.¹ The letters are from 1883, when Lyautey was a monarchist and a devotee of the count of Chambord.² Lyautey belonged to the grand bourgeoisie that was closely allied to the aristocracy. Later, after the count of Chambord had died and following Leo XIII's actions supporting the *ralliement*,³ Lyautey joined the movement of Albert de Mun, who followed the instructions of Leo XIII,⁴ and thus Lyautey became a high official of the republic, conquered Morocco, etc.

Lyautey was and remains an integral nationalist, but here is how he conceived of national solidarity in 1883. In Rome, he had made the acquaintance of the German count von Dillen, captain of the cavalry, about whom he wrote the following to his friend Antoine de Margerie: "Un gentleman, d'une éducation parfaite, de façons charmantes, ayant en toutes choses, religion, politique, toutes nos idées. Nous parlons la même langue et nous nous entendons à merveille. Que veux-tu? J'ai au coeur, une haine féroce, celle du désordre, de la révolution. Je me sens, certes, plus près de tous ceux qui la combattent, de quelque nationalité qu'ils soient, que de tels de

nos compatriotes avec qui je n'ai pas une idée commune et que je regarde comme des ennemis publics."⁵

§<142>. *Past and present. Corsica. L'Italia Letteraria* of 9 August 1931 published an article by Augusto Garsia, "Canti d'amore e di morte nella terra dei Corsi."¹ It appears that Garsia was in Corsica recently with Umberto Biscottini, who notoriously organizes in Livorno all the irredentist activity in Corsica (the Corsican edition of *Il Telegrafo*, the *Giornale di Politica e di Letteratura*, books, literary anthologies, etc.). From Garsia's article, one gathers that of late a periodical has been launched, 31-47, "which reprints many articles from the special edition of the newspaper *Il Telegrafo*,² which is produced for the Corsicans and smuggled into the island." Also, the Livorno publishing house of Raffaello Giusti now publishes the *Archivio storico di Corsica*, which first appeared in Milan in 1925; it was subsequently edited by Gioacchino Volpe.³ The *Giornale di Politica e Letteratura* is banned in France (and therefore in Corsica).

Italian irredentism is quite widespread in Italy; I don't know how widespread it is in Corsica. Corsica has the *Muvra* movement and the Corsican Action Party,⁴ but they have no wish to break with the French and even less to rejoin Italy. At most, they want broad autonomy and are part of the autonomist movement in France (Brittany, Alsace, Lorraine, etc.). Recall the small-time lawyer from Veneto I met on the train in 1914: he subscribed to *A Muvra* and to the *Archivio storico di Corsica*, he read novels by Corsican authors (for ex., Pierre Dominique, whom he considered a turncoat). He supported not only the claims on Corsica but also the claims on Nice and Savoy.

Also, in September 1925, when Comm. Belloni, the deputy commissioner of police in Rome, conducted a four-hour-long search of my house, he spoke to me at length about these claims. Before the war, the veterinarian in Ghilarza, Dr. Nessi,⁵ who was originally from Val de Brianza, went so far as to lay claim to the province of Dauphiné, including Lyon, and he had an approving audience among the Sardinian petty intellectuals, who are anti-French extremists for economic reasons (the tariff war with France after 1889) and for nationalistic reasons (the Sardinians maintain that Napoleon himself failed to conquer Sardinia and that the feast of St. Eufisio in Cagliari is nothing other than a reenactment of the Sardinians'

defeat of the French in 1794 that utterly destroyed the French fleet (40 frigates) and an expeditionary force of 4,000 men.⁶

§<143>. Guido Calogero, "Il neohegelismo nel pensiero italiano contemporaneo" (Croce, but especially Gentile), *Nuova Antologia*, 16 August 1930.¹

§<144>. *G. Pascoli and Davide Lazzaretti*. In his prefatory "Nota per gli alunni" in the anthology *Sul limitare*, Pascoli refers to Giacomo Barzellotti's book on Lazzaretti and writes the following:

Reading the book, I felt my thoughts rise to consider the very *uncertain* future of our civilization. The century has come to a close: what will the twentieth century bring us? Peace among nations, peace between the classes, peace of mind? Or will it bring strife and war? Oh well! That carter, *moved by a new impulse of living faith* who fell in his own blood, and this thinker (Barzellotti), *the conscience and intellect of our times*, who studies him, recounts his life, and mourns him—they seem like a symbol to me. Wise humanity, with proud chest and bowed head, caught between the surety of its thinking and the compassion of its feeling, admonishes and weeps over the other humanity that becomes delirious and dies.¹

This passage is of interest: (1) for Pascoli's political thinking in 1899-1900; (2) to show the ideological impact of Lazzaretti's death; (3) to look at the kind of relations between the intellectuals and the people that Pascoli wanted.

§<145>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. Giovanni B. Botero. Cf. Emilio Zanette's "Il numero come forza nel pensiero di Giovanni Botero" in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 September 1930.¹ It is a superficial article, of the journalistic, throwaway sort. The significance of the importance that Botero attached to the "fact" of population is not as great as it could be today.² Botero is one of the most typical cosmopolitan and a-Italian writers of the Counter-Reformation period. He discusses Italy in the same way he discusses any other country; he is not specifically interested in its problems. He criticizes the "conceitedness" of Italians, who consider themselves su-

perior to other nationalities, and he shows that such pretension is groundless. He should be studied from numerous angles (reason of state, Machiavellism, Jesuitical leanings, etc.). Gioda has written on Botero; more recent essays, etc.³ On the basis of this article, Zanette may qualify for inclusion in the section on "petty Italians."⁴

§<146>. *History of Italian intellectuals. The Jews.* Cf. Yoseph Colombo, "Lettere inedite del p. Hyacinthe Loyson," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 September 1930.¹ It deals with the rabbi Benamozegh from Livorno, his conception of Judaism in relation to Christianity, his writings, his relations with Loyson;² it touches on the importance of the Jewish community in Livorno as a center of rabbinical culture, etc.

§<147>. *Popularity of Italian literature.* Ercole Reggio, "Perchè la letteratura italiana non è popolare in Europa," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 October 1930.

The poor reception that Italian books, even excellent ones, get in our country, as compared to the reception enjoyed by so many foreign books, should convince us that probably our literature is unpopular in Europe for the same reasons that make it unpopular in our country. After all, we can hardly demand of others what we do not expect even within our own country. Even sympathetic foreigners who are partial to Italian culture maintain that, generally speaking, our literature is devoid of those unpretentious and necessary qualities that would attract the *average man*, the *man of the economists* [?!]; and it is because of its prerogatives, those things that account for its originality and its merits, that it does not, and can never, attain the same level of popularity as the other great European literatures.¹

Reggio alludes to the fact that, by contrast, Italian figurative arts (he forgets about music) are popular in Europe. This leads him to wonder whether there is an abyss between literature and the other arts in Italy that would defy explanation or whether the phenomenon can only be explained by looking at secondary and extra-artistic causes. In other words, whereas the language of the figurative arts (and music) is European and universal, literature is confined within the boundaries of the national language. In my view, this ar-

gument cannot be sustained: (1) Because there has been a historical period (the Renaissance) in which Italian literature and figurative arts were simultaneously popular in Europe; that is, the whole of Italian culture was popular. (2) Because in Italy, it is not just literature that is unpopular but the figurative arts as well (whereas Verdi, Puccini, Mascagni, etc., are popular). (3) Because the popularity of Italian figurative arts in Europe is relative: it is limited to intellectuals and a few other sectors of the European population; it is a popularity associated with classical and romantic memories, not art. (4) Italian music, on the other hand, is as popular in Europe as in Italy. Reggio's article continues along the tracks of the usual rhetoric, although it contains the occasional intelligent observation.

§<148>. *The genius in history*. In Niccolò Tommaseo's previously unpublished essay "Pio IX e Pellegrino Rossi" (edited by Teresa Lodi and printed in the *Pègaso* of October 1931), one reads the following, apropos of Pius IX (p. 407): "Even if he were a genius, he could have benefited from having aides and interpreters, for the man who rises on his own remains alone, and oftentimes he ends up being abandoned or trampled. In every education, whether private or public, it is important to know the instrument you have in your hands and to ask it to produce the sound it is capable of producing and none other, and, above all, you need to know how to play it." Tommaseo also writes: "I refrain from delving into the private affairs of the individual unless they help me explain the public affairs"—this is a good proposition, even though Tommaseo hardly ever adheres to it.¹

§<149>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. On L. B. Alberti, cf. the book by Paul-Henry Michel, *Un idéal humain au XV^e siècle: La pensée de L. B. Alberti (1404-72)*, in 8°, 649pp., Paris: Soc. Ed. "Les Belles Lettres", 1930. A minute analysis of L. B. Alberti's thought but, judging by some of the reviews, not always accurate, etc.¹

The UTET edition of *Novellino*, edited by Letterio di Francia, who has established that the original core of the collection was written at the very end of the thirteenth century by a *bourgeois Ghibelline*.²

Both books need to be analyzed for the previously mentioned study on the way that literature reflects the transition from the

medieval economy to the bourgeois economy of the communes and subsequently to the collapse of the spirit of economic enterprise in Italy and on to the Catholic restoration.³

§<150>. *Past and present*. Apropos of the march on Rome, see the issue of *Gioventù Fascista* that was published to mark its ninth anniversary (1931); it contains very interesting articles by De Bono and Balbo.¹ Among other things, Balbo writes:

Mussolini acted. If he had not acted, the fascist movement would have continued waging civil war for decades; nor can it be excluded that other forces that operated, as we did, outside the law of the state—but for anarchic and destructive purposes—would have ended up taking advantage of the neutrality and the impotence of the state so that they could eventually carry out the act of revolt that we attempted in October 1922. In any case, it is certain that if it were not for the March on Rome—that is, if it were not for the revolutionary solution—our movement would have run up against those fatal crises of fatigue, factionalism, and indiscipline that had doomed the old parties.

There are some inaccuracies: the state was not “neutral and impotent,” as people are in the habit of saying, precisely because during that period the state was propped up primarily by the fascist movement; nor could there have been a “civil war” between the state and the fascist movement but only some sporadic violent action to change the direction of the state and to reform the administrative apparatus. In the civil war, the fascist movement was on the side of the state, not against the state, except metaphorically and in terms of the superficial aspect of the law.

§<151>. *Catholic Action*. The canonization of Robert Bellarmine: a sign of the times and of the new impetus of power that the Catholic Church believes it has; strengthening of the Jesuits, etc. Bellarmine conducted the trial against Galileo, and he drafted the list of eight allegations that sent Giordano Bruno to the stake. Canonized on 29 June 1930: this date is not important; instead, one must look at the date when the process of canonization was set in motion.¹ Cf. Banfi's *Vita di Galileo* (published by La Cultura) and G. De Ruggiero's review in *La Critica*, which documents all the

Jesuitical machinations that ensnared Galileo.² Bellarmine is the source of the formula of the *indirect power* of the church over all civil sovereignties. The feast of Christ the King (instituted in 1925 or 1926?) celebrated annually on the last Sunday in October.³

§<152>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. The trials of Galileo, Giordano Bruno, etc., and the effectiveness of the Counter-Reformation in hindering scientific development in Italy. Growth of the sciences in Protestant countries or where the direct power of the church was less strong than in Italy. The church contributed to the denationalization of Italian intellectuals in two ways: positively, as a universal institution that trained personnel for the entire Catholic world, and negatively, by forcing into exile those intellectuals who refused to submit to the discipline of the Counter-Reformation.

§<153>. *The national popular character of Italian literature. Goldoni*. Why is Goldoni popular, even today? Goldoni is almost "unique" in the Italian literary tradition.¹ His ideological positions: a democrat before he had read Rousseau and before the French Revolution. The popular content of his plays: his use of popular language, his biting criticism of the corrupt and putrefied aristocracy.

The Goldoni-Carlo Gozzi conflict.² Gozzi reactionary. He wrote *Fiabe* to demonstrate that the most insipid foolish things attract people in droves and are successful. Still, the contents of *Fiabe*, too, are popular; they embody a facet of popular culture or folklore of which the marvelous and the improbable (presented as such, in a fabulous context) are integral parts. (The popularity of *A Thousand and One Nights*, even today, etc.)

§<154>. *The Saint-Simonians*. The Saint-Simonians' expansive power. Recall Goethe's observation in his *Memoirs* (check) written in 1828: "These gentlemen of the *Globe* . . . are imbued with one spirit. Such a paper would be utterly impossible in Germany. We are merely individuals; mutual understanding is inconceivable; each has the opinions of his province, his city, and his own idiosyncrasy, and it will be a long time before we acquire a common sensibility."¹

§<155>. *Past and present. Politics and the art of war.* Tactic of the great masses and the direct tactic of small groups. This belongs to the discussion about war of position and war of movement, insofar as it is reflected in the psychology of great leaders (strategists) and subalterns. It is also (if one can say so) the point of intersection of strategy and tactics, both in politics and in the art of war. Individuals (even as components of great masses) are inclined to conceive of war instinctively as "partisan warfare" or as "warfare à la Garibaldi" (which is a higher form of "partisan warfare"). In politics, the error stems from an inaccurate understanding of the nature of the state (in the full sense: dictatorship + hegemony). In war, a similar error occurs when the misconception is applied to the enemy camp (a failure to understand not only one's own state but also the nature of the state of one's enemy). In both cases, the error is related to individual, municipal, or regional particularism. This results in underestimating the adversary and his fighting organization.

§<156>. *On ancient capitalism* or, rather, on ancient industrialism, one should read G. C. Speziale's article "Delle navi di Nemi e dell'archeologia navale," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 November 1930 (polemic with Prof. Giuseppe Lugli, who wrote in *Pègaso*; articles in the daily newspapers at the same time).¹ Speziale's article is very interesting, but he seems to attach too much importance to the possibilities for industrialism in antiquity (cf. the question of ancient capitalism in the *Nuova Rivista Storica*).² In my view, Speziale does not have a clear understanding of what the "machine" was in the classical world and what it is today (the same is especially true of Barbagallo and Co.).³ The "innovations" that Speziale dwells on were not yet even implied in Vitruvius's definition of "machine"—that is, a device suitable for facilitating the movement and transportation of heavy objects (check Vitruvius's exact definition)⁴—and thus they are innovations only in a relative sense. The modern machine is an altogether different thing: it does not just "help" the worker; it "replaces" him. It may well be the case, not surprisingly, that Vitruvius's machines continue to exist alongside "modern" ones and that, in this sphere, the Romans might have attained a previously unknown level of perfection. But in all this there is nothing "modern" in the proper sense of the term that has been established by the industrial "revolu-

tion"—that is, by the invention and widespread use of machines that "replace" human labor.

§<157>. *Philosophical novels, utopias, etc.* The Counter-Reformation and utopias: the desire to reconstruct European civilization according to a rational plan. Another, perhaps more common, reason: a way of expounding heterodox, nonconformist ways of thinking, especially before the French Revolution. If so, then one could trace back to utopias the trend of attributing to foreign peoples the institutions that one desires to see in one's own country or of criticizing the supposed institutions of a foreign people in order to criticize those of one's own country. In that case, utopias gave rise to the practice of extolling primitive peoples, savages (the noble savage) presumed to be closer to nature. (This is replicated in the exaltation of the idealized "peasant" by populist movements.) This body of literature has been quite important in the history of the dissemination of sociopolitical views among determinate masses and hence in the history of culture.

One could say that this "novelized" political literature reacts against "chivalric" literature in decline (*Don Quixote*, *Orlando Furioso*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, *Città del sole*).¹ It therefore signals a transition from the exaltation of a feudal social type to the exaltation of the popular masses in general, with all their basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, reproduction), which one tries to satisfy rationally. Studies of these writings ignore the deep scars that must have been left, often for generations, by the great famines and plagues that decimated and exhausted the great popular masses. These elemental disasters along with the phenomena of religious morbidity—that is, of passive resignation—also stirred up "elemental" critical sentiments that found their expression precisely in this utopian literature, even several generations after the disasters occurred, etc.

§<158>. *History of the subaltern classes.* Cf. Armando Cavalli's article "Correnti messianiche dopo il '70" in the *Nuova Antologia* of 16 November 1930.¹ Cavalli has also addressed similar issues before (see his articles in Gobetti's journals *Rivoluzione Liberale* and *Baretti* and elsewhere),² albeit very superficially. He makes reference to Davide Lazzaretti,³ the Bands of Benevento,⁴ and the

republican movements (Barsanti), as well as the internationalist movements in Romagna and in the South.⁵ To call these phenomena "messianic currents" is hyperbolic; they were isolated and separate events that, more than anything else, revealed the "passivity" of the great rural masses rather than any sense of vibrancy they might have felt from the "currents" coursing through them. Thus Cavalli exaggerates the importance of certain statements about religion that are of a "Protestant" or "generally reformist" character; such statements were not made only after 1870 but also before, by R. Bonghi and other liberals.⁶ (It is well known that, before 1870, *La perseveranza* thought it could put pressure on the pope with these threats that Italians would embrace Protestantism.)⁷ Moreover, Cavalli commits a monstrous error when he appears to be putting these reformist statements and Davide Lazzaretti on the same plane. His conclusion is formally correct: dictatorship of the Right, exclusion of the republican and clerical parties from political life, indifference of the government toward the poverty of the peasant masses.

The concept of the "ideal" that has taken shape among the masses of the Left; in its formal vacuity, it characterizes the situation quite accurately: no goals, no concrete and explicit political programs, but a hazy and fluctuating mood that found its contentment in an empty phrase—because it is empty, it is capable of accommodating the most disparate contents. The term "ideal" complements "subversive": a useful formula for the coining of words by the petty intellectuals who formed the organization of the Left. The "ideal" is a residue of popular Mazzinism coupled with Bakuninism; the fact that it persisted until very recently shows that genuine political leadership of the masses had not taken shape.

§<159>. *Risorgimento*. Cf. Emanuele Librino, "Agostino Depretis prodittatore in Sicilia" (previously unpublished documents on the Expedition of the Thousand: letters by Garibaldi, Cavour, Farini, Crispi, Bixio, and Bertani), in the *Nuova Antologia* of 16 December 1930.¹ The question of immediate annexation: struggles between the Action Party and the Moderates. In opposition to the Action Party, which would not appeal to the peasantry, the policies of Cavour prevailed—he found his allies among the rich landowners who favored immediate annexation. The article contains interesting information on this matter: petitions by Sardinian

carabinieri, etc. The big landowners did not want to remain under the threat of a popular movement for land, and they yearned for unification. (This article should be placed alongside Crispi's book on the Thousand.)²

§<160>. *On morals*. In his brief introduction to a set of [previously unpublished] letters from Diderot to Grimm and to Madame d'Épinay (in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 15 February 1931), André Babelon writes: "Diderot, qui éprouvait pour la postérité le même respect que d'autres pour l'immortalité de l'âme . . ." ¹

§<161>. *Risorgimento. Garibaldi*. Cf. Emanuele Librino, "L'attività politica di Garibaldi nel 1861," *Nuova Antologia*, 16 February 1931.¹ It publishes a short note from Garibaldi to General Medici that states the main reason for the conflict with Cavour is the following:² Cavour wants a constitutional government of the French type, with a standing army that could be used against the people; Garibaldi wants an English type of government, without a standing army but with an armed people. Is this what the conflict between Garibaldi and Cavour boils down to? One can see the limitations of Garibaldi's political skills and the unsystematic nature of his views.

§<162>. *Past and present. Italian characters*. Some note with pleasure and others with pessimism and distrust that Italian people are "individualist": some say this is "harmful"; others say it is "fortunate," etc. This "individualism" needs to be analyzed, if it is to be evaluated correctly, for various forms of "individualism" exist, some of which are more progressive and others less so, depending on the different types of civilization and of cultural life. Retrograde individualism that goes hand in hand with a kind of "a-political" attitude, which is today's equivalent of ancient "a-nationalism": once upon a time, they used to say, "Let France come, let Spain come, as long as there's food to eat," just as today people are indifferent about the life of the state, the political life of the parties, etc.

But is this really the kind of individualism we are dealing with? Not to participate actively in collective life, that is, in the life of the

state (meaning, quite simply, not supporting any of the "regular" political parties)—is it perhaps the same thing as being non-"partisan" or not belonging to any constituted group? Is it the same thing as the "splendid isolation" of the separate individual who relies solely on himself to construct his economic and moral life? Not at all. It means that instead of the "modern" political party and economic trade union (as they have developed through the growth of the more progressive productive forces), people "prefer" organizations of a different sort and, specifically, "underworld" types of organization—hence the cabals, the secret organizations, the mafias, whether they be linked to the populace or to the upper classes. Each level or type of civilization has its own "individualism"; in other words, the position and activity of the separate individual have their particular place within its general framework. This Italian "individualism" (which is more or less pronounced and prevalent, depending on the socioeconomic sectors of the country) is characteristic of a period during which the most immediate economic needs cannot be satisfied in a regular and lasting manner (endemic unemployment among rural laborers and among the strata of petty and midlevel intellectuals). The cause of this state of affairs has deep historical roots, and the nation's ruling group is responsible for the perpetuation of this situation.

A historical-political issue arises: can this kind of situation be overcome using the methods of state centralization (schools, legislation, law courts, police), which aims at making life equal for everybody in keeping with a national standard? In other words, can the situation be overcome through resolute and energetic action from the top down? In the meantime, the question arises of how to form the ruling group that would carry out such action: through competition among the parties and their economic and political programs? Or through the action of one group that would exercise power monopolistically? In either case, it is difficult to rise above the general situation that would reflect itself in the personnel of the parties or in the bureaucracy that serves the monopolistic group. For even though it is possible to imagine selecting a small group of leading persons according to a given standard, a similarly selective "screening" of the huge mass of individuals who constitute the entire organizational apparatus (of the state and of hegemony) of a big country is impossible. Method of liberty, but not in the "liberal" sense: the new structure has to emerge from below to the extent that an entire stratum of the nation—that is, the

lowest stratum, economically and culturally—would participate in a radical historical event that impacts every aspect of the life of the people and makes everyone mercilessly face their own ineluctable responsibilities.

The historical fault of the ruling class has been that it systematically prevented such a phenomenon from occurring during the Risorgimento and that, ever since the Risorgimento, it has made the preservation of this crystallized situation the *raison d'être* of its historical continuity.

§<163>. *Past and present. The papal encyclicals.* A literary-critical analysis of the papal encyclicals. Ninety percent of their contents is made up of a potpourri of vague and generic quotations whose purpose, it seems, is to assert on every occasion the continuity of church doctrine from the Gospels to the present. At the Vatican, they must have a formidable card index of quotations on every topic: when the need arises for a new encyclical, they start by selecting the index cards containing the required doses of quotations—so many quotations from the Gospels, so many from the church fathers, so many from previous encyclicals. The impression one gets is of great coldness. Charity is brought up not out of any such feeling for living individuals but because of what Matthew said, or Augustine, or "our predecessor of blessed memory." Only when the pope writes [or speaks] about pressing political issues does one feel a certain warmth.

§<164>. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists.* Examine the effects that the religious crisis in Spain has had on the balance of forces among Catholics. In Spain, the anticlerical battle was primarily aimed at the Jesuits, but it seems to me that in Spain, in particular, the integralists should have been strong, whereas the Jesuits should have functioned as a counterpoise to these forces. The attempted agreement between the Vatican and Alcalà Zamora, broken off by the Constituent Assembly, should have had the effect of improving the position of the Jesuits by eliminating or sacrificing the integralists (Segura, etc.).¹ But the Spanish situation was complicated by the fact that the Jesuits were engaged in significant capitalist activity: they dominated a number of important compa-

nies, including tramlines (check the accuracy of this). In Spain, the Jesuits had a distinctive tradition: their struggle against the Inquisition and against the Dominicans (look at the significance of this struggle; cf. Lea's book on the Inquisition in Spain).²

§<165>. *Encyclopedic notions. Science and scientific.* In his book *Standards*, Dubreuil correctly points out that the adjective "scientific" that is so often attached to words—scientific management, scientific organization, etc.—does not have the pedantic and threatening meaning that is often attributed to it, but he does not go on to explain what exactly it should be taken to mean.¹ In fact, scientific means "rational" and, more precisely, that which "rationally conforms to the end" to be attained—in other words, to achieve maximum production with minimum effort, to arrive at maximum economic efficiency, etc., by rationally [identifying and] defining all the operations and actions that lead to the end.

The adjective "scientific" is used extensively nowadays, but its meaning can always be reduced to that of "conforming to the end" insofar as such "conformity" is rationally (methodically) pursued after the most minute analysis of all the elements (down to the capillary level) that are constitutive and necessarily constitutive (the elimination of the emotive elements being part of the calculation).

§<166>. *Past and present. Apolitical attitude.* Aldo Valori published an article ("L'Esercito di una volta") in the *Corriere della Sera* of 17 November 1931 on what should be an interesting book by Emilio De Bono, *Nell'esercito italiano prima della guerra* (Mondadori, 1931),¹ and he quotes the following passage: "Not much reading went on; the newspapers, novels, the gazette, the service bulletins were little read. . . . Nobody was concerned with politics. I recall, for example, that I never paid any attention to government crises, and if I happened to know the name of the prime minister, it was by pure chance. . . . Election dates interested us because we were entitled to twelve days' leave in order to go vote. Eighty percent of the men, however, enjoyed the leave and never so much as glanced at a ballot box, not even in a photograph." Valori comments: "It may seem to be an exaggeration, but it really isn't. Abstention from politics did not mean estrangement from the life of

the Nation, but only from the basest aspects of the fighting among the parties. By conducting itself in this manner, the Army remained immune from the degeneracy of many other public institutions, and it constituted the great reserve of the forces of order, which was the most reliable way to serve the Nation, even politically."

In order to evaluate this situation, one should compare it to the aspirations of the army during the Risorgimento; an expression of these aspirations can be found in the book by Giuseppe^a Cesare Abba dedicated to the soldiers—a book that gained official recognition, won prizes, etc., etc.² Abba and his companions thought of the army as an institution with the responsibility of integrating the popular forces into the life of the nation and the state. The army represented the nation under arms, the material force that buttressed constitutionalism and parliamentary representation, the force that had to prevent coups d'état and reactionary adventures. The soldier was expected to become soldier-citizen, and compulsory military service was not to be regarded as a duty but rather as the active exercise of a right—the right of the armed freedom of the people. These were utopias, obviously; as De Bono's book shows, the military relapsed into its apolitical ways and thus became a new type of professional army rather than a national army—for this, after all, is what an apolitical attitude means. From the point of view of the "forces of order," this was an ideal state of affairs: the less people participated in the political life of the state, the more powerful these forces became. But how to judge the parties that continued in the footsteps of the Action Party! What is said about the army can be extended to the entire personnel employed by the state apparatus: the bureaucracy, the justice system, the police, etc. A "constitutional" education of the people could not be carried out by the forces of order; the task belonged to the Action Party, but it failed miserably in its duty and thus helped bolster the attitude of the forces of order.

As for De Bono, it should be pointed out that in 1918-19, his views on the relations between politics and the armed forces were not quite the same as they are today: one should take another look at the military notes he contributed to *Il Mondo* and at one of his publications from that period when the memory of the lessons of the Caporetto debacle was still fresh.³

^a In the manuscript, between the lines, Gramsci erroneously wrote "Giulio."

§<167>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bog and bogati.* Someone pointed out somewhere that the connections between "Bog" and "bogati" are a fortuitous coincidence of the linguistic development of a particular national culture.¹ But that is not exactly the case. The appearance of the Germanic word "reich" has muddied the relation that existed in Latin between "deus," "dives" and "divites," "divitia" (*dovizia, dovizioso, etc.*).² In Alessandro Chiappelli's article "Come s'inquadra il pensiero filosofico nell'economia del mondo" (the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 April 1931), one can find scattered here and there some data to show that throughout the Western world, as opposed to the Asiatic world (India), the concept of God is closely linked to the concept of *property* and of *proprietor*:

The concept of property that is the center of gravity and the root of our entire juridical system is likewise the very fiber of our entire civil and moral structure. Even our theological view is shaped in many cases by this model, and God is sometimes represented as the great proprietor of the world. The rebellion against God in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, as in Dante's earlier poem, is depicted as Satan's or Lucifer's reckless attempt to dispossess the Almighty and oust him from his supreme throne. A perspicacious contributor to and erstwhile editor of the *Hibbert Journal* (Jacks, "The Universe as Philosopher," in *The Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1907,³ p. 26) gave an account of a conference he attended at which the proof of the existence of God was based on the necessity of postulating an owner for the world. How could anyone believe that a property so vast, so desirable, so rich in resources belonged to nobody? In essence, that is the same question raised by the shepherd in the sublime monologue in Leopardi's "Pastore errante nell'Asia."³ Whether the world had a first cause or not may remain open to question. But the necessity of a first owner should seem self-evident and beyond any doubt.⁴

Chiappelli forgets that in the Creed, too, God is said to be "creator and lord (*dominus*: master, owner) of heaven and earth."

§<168>. *Popular literature.* Cf. Alberto Consiglio, "Populismo e nuove tendenze della letteratura francese," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 April 1931.¹ Consiglio's point of departure is the investigation of the "worker and peasant novel" in *Les Nouvelles Littéraires* (July-

¹ In the manuscript, "1917."

August 1930).² The article would have to be reread if this topic were to be treated comprehensively. Consiglio's thesis [(rather explicit and self-conscious)] is this: faced with the growth of the political and social power of the proletariat and its ideology, some segments of the French intellectual set are reacting with these movements "toward the people." In that case, the effort to get closer to the people signals a revival of bourgeois thought, which does not want to lose its hegemony over the popular classes, and, in order to exercise this hegemony better, it embraces a part of proletarian ideology. This would constitute a return to "democratic" forms that are more substantial than the formal "democracy" of the present time.

It remains to be seen whether a phenomenon of this kind is also of great historical importance and whether it represents a necessary transitional phase and an episode in the indirect "education of the people." It would be interesting to construct a list of "populist" tendencies and to analyze each one of them: one might "discover" one of Vico's "ruses of nature"—that is, how a social impulse, directed toward one goal, achieves its opposite.³

§<169>. *Journalism*. Cf. Luigi Villari, "Giornalismo britannico di ieri e di oggi," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 May 1931.¹

§<170>. *Past and present. Governments and national cultural standards*. Every government has a cultural policy that it can defend from its own point of view, demonstrating that it has raised the country's cultural standard. It all depends on how this standard is measured. A government might improve the organization of high culture and downgrade popular culture. Furthermore, within the sphere of high culture, a government might choose to improve the organization of the sector concerned with technology and the natural sciences by paternalistically providing that sector with funds that were not previously made available to it, etc. There is only one criterion of judgment: is the system of government repressive or expansive? And this criterion can be articulated even more precisely: is a government repressive in certain respects while it is expansive in other respects? A system of government is expansive when it facilitates and promotes growth from the bottom upward, when it raises the level of national-popular culture and thus enables the emergence of a variety of "intellectual heights" across

a more extensive area. A desert with a cluster of tall palms is still a desert; indeed, it is characteristic of a desert to have small oases with clusters of tall palms.

§<171>. *Risorgimento*. A center of intellectual propaganda for the organization and "concentration" of the leading intellectual group of the Italian bourgeoisie of the Risorgimento was established by Vieusseux in Florence; it had a literary bureau and published periodicals, including *Antologia*, *Archivio Storico Italiano*, *Il Giornale Agrario*, and *Guida dell'Educatore*.¹ Missing was a technical-industrial publication like Carlo Cattaneo's *Politecnico* (which, not accidentally, originated in Milan).² Vieusseux's initiatives reflect the most important issues that concerned the most progressive individuals of the time: schooling and public education, agricultural production, literary and historical culture. It is true that *Antologia* covered all these areas, but one would have to check whether it attached much importance (or what kind of importance) to industrial technology. Also missing was specialized work in "political economy." (One must find out whether, at that time, other countries, particularly France and England, had journals specializing in political economy and in technology or whether these things were treated and brought to a wider audience only in books. It may be that the *essay* in political economy and in technology appeared belatedly in those other countries as well.) On Vieusseux's movement, cf. Francesco Baldasseroni, *Il Rinascimento civile in Toscana*, Florence: Olschki, 1931.³

§<172>. *Popular literature*. Cf. Antonio Baldini, "Stonature di cinquant'anni fa: La Farfalla petroliera," *Nuova Antologia*, 16 June 1931.¹ *La Farfalla* was founded in Cagliari by Angelo Sommaruga and after two years (around 1880) moved to Milan.² The periodical ended up as the journal of a group of "proletarian artists." Paolo Valera and Filippo Turati wrote for it.³ At the time, Valera was running *La Plebe* (which one? check) and writing the novel *Milano sconosciuta* and its sequel *Gli scamiciati*.⁴ Other contributors included Cesario Testa, editor of *Anticristo*, and Ulisse Barbieri.⁵ The *Farfalla* had its own publishing house that also published a "naturalist book series" as well as a "socialist book series." *Almanacco degli Atei per il 1881*.⁶ Zola, Vallès, De Goncourt;⁷ novels

on the underworld, prisons, brothels, hospitals, the streets (lumpen proletariat), anticlericalism, atheism, naturalism (the "civilized poet" Stecchetti).⁸ G. Aurelio Costanzo, *Gli eroi della soffitta* (as children, at home, we had seen the book and thought it was about battles waged by mice).⁹ The Carducci of the hymn "A Satana."¹⁰ Baroque style, like Turati's (recall his verses reprinted by Schiavi in the anthology *Fiorita di canti sociali*): "Buddha, Socrates, Jesus have said the truth: / By Satan, an infidel I swear to you. / The dead live, to strangle them is futile."¹¹ (This "episode" of "artistic" life in Milan could be studied and reconstructed for curiosity's sake, yet it is not devoid of interest from a critical and educational viewpoint.) On *La Farfalla* during its Cagliari years, there is an article by Raffa Garzia, "Per la storia del nostro giornalismo letterario," in *Glossa Perenne*, February 1929.¹²

§<173>. *Catholic Action*. Cf. the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 19 April 1930: "Azione Cattolica e Associazioni religiose."¹ It carries a letter by Cardinal Pacelli and a summary of a speech by the pope.² The month before, in March, the secretary of the PNF had issued a circular on the nonincompatibility of simultaneous membership in Catholic Action and the PNF.³

§<174>. *The Catholic Church. Atlas Hierarchicus. Descriptio geographica et statistica Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae tum Orientis, tum Occidentis juxta statum praesentem. Consilio et hortatu Sanctae Sedis Apostolicae, elaboravit, P. Carulus Streit, Paderbornae, 1929* (Casa Ed. Di S. Bonifacio, Paderborn). On the second edition, cf. *Civiltà Cattolica*, 7 June 1930; on the first edition, cf. *Civiltà Cattolica*, 1914, Vol. III, p. 69.¹ It contains all the data on the structure of the church worldwide. It might be interesting to compare the first and second edition and look at the fluctuations in the number of ecclesiastical personnel caused by the war. (In Spain, for example, the number of priests rose during this period, whereas in Italy the number went down—but it probably rose again after the concordat and the augmentation of the clergy's income, etc.)²

§<175>. *Catholic Action*. On its activity in France, cf. "Les nouvelles conditions de la vie industrielle," *Semaines Sociales de*

France, XXI Session, 1929, Paris 1930, in 8^o, 574 pp.¹ It would be interesting to find out what topics were addressed at the Semaines Sociales in different countries and why some issues are never discussed in certain countries, etc.²

§<176>. *Past and present*. Clemente Solaro della Margarita's *Memorandum storico-politico* was reprinted in 1930 (Turin: Bocca, xx-488 pp., L. 20), edited under the auspices of "Centro di Studi Monarchici" in Turin.¹ Who could have established this center? Is it perhaps an extension of Giuseppe Brunati and Co.'s Monarchical Association? The mouthpiece of that association, one recalls, was the weekly *Il Sovrano* that used to be published in Milan. Around 1925 there was a schism, and Brunati started a weekly in Turin, *Il Sabauda*, that used to publish very strange articles aimed at workers (it went to far as to state that only the king could make communism a reality, or something like that).²

§<177>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. Cf. Angelo Scarpellini, "La Battaglia intorno al latino nel settecento," in *Glossa Perenne*, 1929.¹ (Provides an account of the terms of the eighteenth-century battle for and against the study of Latin and, in particular, for and against the use of Latin in writing—the latter was the fundamental issue with respect to the upheaval [in the attitudes and relations] of the intellectual strata vis-à-vis the people.)

§<178>. *Encyclopedic notions*. *Theopanism*. Term used by the Jesuits [for example] to denote a characteristic of the Hindu religion. (But doesn't theopanism mean pantheism? Or is it used to denote a particular religious-mythological concept, in order to distinguish it from "pantheism" of a philosophically superior kind?) Cf. *Civiltà Cattolica*, 5 July 1930 (the article "L'Induismo," pp. 17-18):

For Hinduism, there is no substantial difference between God, man, animal, and plant: everything is God, not only in the belief of the lower classes, among whom such a pantheism is conceived animistically, but also in the belief of the upper classes and educated persons, in whose way of thinking the divine essence is revealed, in the theopanistic sense, as the world of souls and of visible objects. Nevertheless, though the

error is basically the same, *pantheism* is different in its manner of conception and expression; it imagines the world as an absolute being, an object of religious worship: "everything is God." *Theopanism*, on the other hand, conceives of God as the true-spiritual reality from which all things emanate: "God becomes everything," necessarily, incessantly, without beginning and without end. Theopanism is (alongside a few dualistic systems) the most common way in which Hindu philosophy conceives of God and the world.¹

§<179>. *Past and present. The vocational school.* In November 1931 there was an extensive parliamentary debate on vocational education; it brought into relief, in a quite lucid and organic manner, all the theoretical and practical elements needed for a study of the problem.¹ Three types of school: (1) vocational, (2) middle technical, (3) classical. The first for workers and peasants, the second for the petty bourgeoisie, the third for the ruling class.

The dispute revolved around the issue of whether the vocational schools should be strictly practical and an end in themselves—so that they would not provide for the possibility of moving on either to the classical school or even to technical school. The broad-based position was that allowance had to be made for the possibility of moving on to technical school (moving on to the classical school was excluded a priori by everyone). (The problem is linked to the structure of the military: can a private become a noncommissioned officer? And, if a private can become a noncommissioned officer, can he become a subaltern officer, etc.? The same is true, generally, of any personnel structure, as in the civil service, etc.)

It would be interesting to reconstruct the history of vocational and technical schools in parliamentary debates and the discussions of the principal municipal councils, given that some of the major vocational schools were established by local governments or by private bequests that are administered, controlled, or budgeted by local councils. The study of vocational schools goes hand in hand with an awareness of the needs of production and its growth. Vocational schools for agriculture: a very important matter; many private initiatives (recall the Faina schools in the Abruzzo region and in Central Italy).² Specialized agricultural schools (for viticulture, etc.). Schools of agriculture for landholders of small and medium-sized properties; in other words, schools that produce people who

are capable of heading and managing farming businesses. Has there been a professional type of agricultural school aimed at creating specialized agricultural workers?

§<180>. *Encyclopedic notions. "Scientific." What is "scientific"?* The ambiguity surrounding the terms "science" and "scientific" stems from the fact that they have acquired their meaning from one particular segment of the whole range of fields of human knowledge, specifically, from the natural and physical sciences. The description "scientific" was applied to any method that resembled the method of inquiry and research of the natural sciences, which had become the sciences par excellence, the fetish sciences. There are no such things as sciences par excellence, nor is there any such thing as a method par excellence, a "method in itself." Each type of scientific research creates a method that is suitable to it, creates its own logic, which is general and universal only in its "conformity with the end." The most generic and universal methodology is nothing other than formal or mathematical logic, that is, the ensemble of those abstract mechanisms of thought that have been discovered over time, clarified, and refined in the course of the history of philosophy and culture. This abstract methodology—namely, formal logic—is scorned for misguided reasons by idealist philosophers. The study of this abstract methodology is analogous to the study of grammar; in other words, not only does it go hand in hand with probing deeper into the past experiences of the methodology of thought (the technique of thought) and the absorption of past knowledge, but it is a condition for the further development of knowledge itself.

Examine the reasons why formal "logic" has become increasingly a discipline linked to the mathematical sciences—Russell in England, Peano in Italy¹—right up to the point of being elevated, as in Russell's case, to the pretension of being the "only true philosophy." One could start with Engels's assertion that "scientific" is the opposite of "utopian."² Does the subtitle of Turati's *Critica Sociale* have the same meaning as in Engels? Certainly not. By "scientific," Turati means something close to "the method of the physical sciences" (the subtitle disappeared at a certain point; check when—certainly before 1917), and, even so, it is meant in a very generic and tendentious sense.³

§<181>. *The Catholic Church. The canonized and the beatified.* The Congregation of Rites has published (cf. the *Corriere della Sera* of 2 December 1931) the official list of the causes of the beatifications and canonizations that are currently under way. The previous list, issued ten years ago, enumerated 328 processes; the current list has a total of 551. In the list, Italy shows up with 271 causes, France with 116, etc.¹ It would be interesting to examine, for socio-political statistical purposes, the lists covering a somewhat longer stretch of time and to look at the distribution of the processes by nationality, by social rank, etc. One would have to take the various circumstances into account: who proposes the causes, how, etc. From such information, it should be possible to deduce the criteria of the policy that the Vatican follows in these matters and the modifications of such a policy over time.

§<182>. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, and modernists. Giovanni Papini.* From the review of Giovanni Papini's book *Sant'Agostino* in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 19 July 1930 (p. 155),¹ it appears that the Catholic integralists have aligned themselves against Papini:

Tilgher's invectives were outdone by an anonymous writer and a notorious secret "bureau" that, as we know, transmitted them to newspapers of various stripes, and even though it wrapped itself in the mantle of "integralist" Catholicism, the faith and well-being of souls were certainly not among its primary concerns—much less could it possibly represent, with its methods of criticism, any segment of *true* and *genuine Catholics*.² Wise persons had no reason, therefore, to pay any attention to the ebullience of that critical zeal and the sincerity of those invectives, and they had much less reason to be edified by them. Papini did very well to ignore them; so did his friends who attached no importance to them.

The book review must have been written by Father Rosa,³ as one can see from the somewhat contorted syntax and the affectations, such as the one about the "bureau" that is notorious but also secret. Papini, defended in this manner by the Jesuits and attacked by the integralists even though he is not a modernist, must be listed among the Jesuits, without any doubt.

§<183>. *Catholic Action*. For the prehistory of Catholic Action, cf. the article "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia," in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 2 August 1930.¹ By "Catholic press," the author means the "press of militant Catholics" among the laity; this is something other than the Catholic "press" in the narrow sense of "mouthpiece of the ecclesiastical institution."

The *Corriere d'Italia* of 8 July 1926 published a letter from Filippo Crispolti that should be very interesting,² specifically because Crispolti "pointed out that if one were searching for the *earliest* stirrings of the movement that gave rise to the array of 'militant Catholics' in Italy—that is to say, the *innovation* that produced all others in our camp—one would have to start with those remarkable associations in Piedmont, called 'Amicizie,' that were founded or inspired by the abbé Pio Brunone Lanteri."³ In other words, Crispolti acknowledges the fact that Catholic Action is an innovation and not, as the papal encyclicals always say, an activity that goes all the way back to the apostles. It is an activity closely linked—as a reaction—to the French Enlightenment, to liberalism, etc., and to the efforts of modern states to separate themselves from the church. In other words, it was a reaction against the secularizing intellectual and moral reform that was far more radical (for the ruling classes) than the Protestant Reformation; it was a Catholic activity that took shape mainly after 1848, as the Restoration and the Holy Alliance came to an end.

The movement to establish a Catholic press that is associated with the name of Cesare D'Azeglio^a (discussed in the *Civiltà Cattolica* article) is also interesting, because of Manzoni's attitude toward it. One can say that Manzoni understood the reactionary character of D'Azeglio's initiative and, with exquisite tact, declined to participate in it. He eluded D'Azeglio's expectations by sending his famous letter *Sul Romanticismo*,⁴ which, according to *Civiltà Cattolica*, "in light of what motivated it, may be regarded as a declaration of principles. Obviously, the literary catchword was merely a screen for other ideas, other sentiments that divided them"⁵—in other words, their different positions on the question of the defense of religion.

The *Civiltà Cattolica* article is essential for the study of how the ground was prepared by Catholic Action.

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "Balbo," but it is obvious from the context that this was a slip of the pen.

§<184>. *Encyclopedic notions*. Vestiges of medieval organization along corporate lines: (1) the Caravan association among the longshoremen in Genoa; there must be some literature about it; (2) in Ravenna, there still is the so-called Casa Matha, the vestige of a "fishermen's school" that goes further back than the year 1000. *Matha* presumably derives from the Greek *matheis*, "mat," and brings to mind the huts made of matted marsh reeds that the earliest fishermen of Byzantine Ravenna used for shelter. A historian named Bard is said to have written about the "Society of the Men of Casa Matha":¹ the author of the annals of Ravenna, Agnello,² is said to have recorded that the fishermen's school existed in 733 (but is it the same?); L. A. Muratori supposedly found a reference to it dating back to 943 (but is it the same thing?).³ The Society of the Men of Casa Matha has statutes that go back to 1304: the president is called "First Bailiff." The statutes were revised in 1887, abolishing the religious ceremonies with which meetings used to open. The statute has a rule that the moment a meeting starts the doors must be locked in order to prevent tardy members (who will be fined) from entering and those present from leaving before the end of the proceedings. The society now has a total of 150 members, who are divided into two categories, the "ordinary" ones and those of the "apron" (fishmongers and fishermen).

Investigate the language of workers' organizations before the formation of the CGL;⁴ for instance, the term "consul," which was preserved by the first workers' "fasci" of the Workers Party, etc.⁵

§<185>. *Encyclopedic notions*. *Council of state*. Double meaning of the term. In Italy, "council of state" has come to mean a judicial body that deals with administrative affairs. This is not, however, what English journalists are referring to in their polemics over the question of whether Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) could and should be transformed into a council of state. They are referring, rather, to parliamentarism as a party system or to a parliamentarism that should be reduced to a legislative body in a purely constitutional regime, with the balance of power broken up to the advantage of the Crown or of the executive branch in general—in other words, a parliament reduced to the function of a council of state in a regime of absolute monarchy or a dictatorship of the Right. In Italy, a trace of the old institution of the council of state can still be found in the senate, which is not a chamber of the

aristocracy [(as it is in England)], is not elected, not even indirectly, as in France and elsewhere, but is selected by the executive branch from among people who are loyal to the authority of a particular power, in order to stem the spread of democracy and interference by the people.

§<186>. *Catholic Action. In Spain.* Cf. M. De Burgos y Mazo, *El problema social y la democracia cristiana*. Part one, tome V (?), 790 pp., Barcelona: L. Gili, was published in 1929.¹ It must be a work of gigantic proportions. This tome 5 of part one costs 18.70 pesetas.

§<187>. *Catholic Action. The United States.* A report from a United States correspondent published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 20 September 1930 is interesting. Catholics often resort to the example of the United States in order to draw attention to their solidarity and religious fervor. They contrast themselves to the Protestants, divided into numerous sects and continuously weakened by the tendency to lapse into indifferentism or an areligious attitude—and hence the striking number of people who declare no religious affiliation in the censuses. From this report, however, it appears that indifferentism is not rare among Catholics. The report reproduces data from a series of articles published over the last few months in the “famous” *Ecclesiastical Review* of Philadelphia. One parish priest states that for many years he knew nothing about 44 percent of his parishioners, notwithstanding his and his assistants’ repeated efforts to produce an accurate census. In all sincerity, he admits that about half his flock remained entirely unacquainted with his ministry and that his only contact with parishioners came from their irregular attendance at Mass and the sacraments. The same is true of almost all the parishes in the United States, according to the parish priests themselves.

The Catholics run and provide the funding for 7,664 parochial schools^a with a student population of 2,201,942, under the direction of male and female members of religious orders. That leaves another 2,750,000 schoolchildren (that is, over 50 percent) who, “either because of their parents’ laziness or because they live too far

^a In the manuscript, “churches”—an obvious slip of the pen.

away, are compelled to attend the nonreligious government schools where no word is ever uttered about God, one's duties toward the Creator, or even the existence of the immortal soul."

An instance of indifferentism is provided by mixed marriages: "20 percent of the families legally joined in mixed marriages fail to attend Mass if the father is not a Catholic, but when the mother is the non-Catholic, the statistic is 40 percent. Furthermore, these parents totally neglect the Christian education of their children." There was an effort to restrict and even prohibit these mixed marriages, but the outcome was "worse" because the "recalcitrants" in these cases left the church (together with their children), contracting "invalid" unions—60 percent of these cases occur when the father is a "heretic," and 94 percent when the "heretic" is the mother. As a result, the policy was liberalized; when the dispensation for a mixed marriage was turned down [for Catholic women], the loss amounted to 58 percent, but when the dispensation was granted, "only" 16 percent were lost.¹

It appears, then, that the number of Catholics [in the United States] is merely a statistic derived from censuses; in other words, individuals of Catholic origin find it more difficult than Protestants to declare that they have no religious affiliation. In short, greater hypocrisy. From all this, one can judge the accuracy and authenticity of the statistics of countries with a Catholic majority.

§<188>. *Catholic Action*. On the origins of Catholic Action, cf. the article "La fortuna del La Mennais e le prime manifestazioni d'Azione Cattolica in Italia" (the first part of the article is in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 4 October 1930; its continuation will be published much later, and it will be noted).¹ This article is related to the previous one on Cesare D'Azeglio, etc.² *Civiltà Cattolica* speaks of "that broad movement of ideas and action witnessed in Italy as in the other Catholic countries of Europe in the period between the first and second revolutions (1821-31), during which some of the seeds (whether good or evil we shall not say) were sown that were subsequently to bear fruit in more mature times." This means that the first Catholic Action movement arose out of the fact that the true goal of the Restoration—namely, to put the ancien régime back in place—proved impossible to achieve. Catholicism and legitimism followed the same trajectory: starting from positions that were integralist and totalitarian in the field of cul-

ture and politics,³ they became parties opposed to other parties, and, furthermore, they became parties whose defensive posture and attitude of conservation compelled them to make numerous concessions to their adversaries in order to gain more staying power. This, moreover, is the significance of the Restoration as a general European phenomenon, and this is what gives it its fundamentally "liberal" character. The *Civiltà Cattolica* article poses one essential question: if Lamennais is at the origins of Catholic Action, then does this origin not contain the germ of subsequent liberal Catholicism, a germ that with further development would produce Lamennais version two? It is noteworthy that all the innovations within the church, unless they stem from a centrist initiative, contain within them something heretical, and they end up explicitly assuming this heretical character until the center reacts forcefully, throws the forces of innovation into disarray, reabsorbs the waverers, and casts out the recalcitrants. The church, it should be noted, has never had a well-developed sense of self-criticism as a central function, despite its much-vaunted attachment to the great masses of the faithful. As a result, innovations have always been imposed rather than proposed, and they have been accepted only by compulsion. The historical development of the church has been produced by factiousness (the various religious congregations are really factions that have been absorbed and brought under control in the form of "religious orders"). Another fact about the Restoration: governments made concessions to the liberal currents at the expense of the church and its privileges, and this is one factor that created the need for a church party, that is to say Catholic Action.

Studying the origins of Catholic Action thus leads to a study of Lamennais's movement, its varying success, and its spread.

§<189>. *Lorianism*. On 12 December 1931, at the height of the world crisis, Achille Loria was at the senate discussing a question he had raised: whether the minister of the interior "did not deem it opportune to prevent acrobatic spectacles that do not serve any educational purpose but are much too often occasions of fatal accidents." From the Hon. Arpinati's response it appears that "acrobatic spectacles are unproductive activities of the kind Senator Loria has analyzed in his *Trattato di Economia*."¹ Consequently, according to Loria, the question could be seen as a contribution to the solution of the economic crisis. One can come up with many

cheap jokes about Loria's own acrobatic spectacles, which have not yet caused him a fatal accident.

§<190>. *South American culture*. Cf. the article "Il protestantismo degli Stati Uniti e l'Evangelizzazione protestante nell'America latina" in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 18 October 1930.¹ The article is interesting and instructive for understanding how Catholics and Protestants are battling one another. Catholics, of course, portray Protestant missions as the vanguard of economic and political penetration by the United States, and they fight it by arousing national sentiment. Protestants reproach Catholics for the same thing: they portray the pope and the church as worldly powers hiding under the mantle of religion, etc.

§<191>. *America and Freemasonry*. Cf. the study "La Massoneria americana e la riorganizzazione della Massoneria," published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 1 November 1930 and 3 January 1931.¹ The study is very interesting and seems rather objective. The current international situation of Freemasonry, with its internal strife caused by the war (France against Germany), stands out in clear relief. Impelled by Franco-Belgian Freemasonry, the Association Maçonnique Internationale was founded after the war, with headquarters in Geneva, for the purpose of reorganizing the ranks.² The primary problem was bringing German and Anglo-Saxon Freemasonry back under the leadership of Franco-Belgian Freemasonry, with the backing of American Freemasonry. Father Pirri (who writes for *Civiltà Cattolica* on questions related to Freemasonry) has published a small book on the AMI that consists of extracts from the periodical.³ It appears that the AMI was a complete failure, and the Americans withdrew their sponsorship of France. The Germans responded to the initiative by expanding the base of an "Esperanto Framasona" that had existed even before the war and was reorganized as the "Universala Framasona Ligo" (Allgemeine Freimaurerliga)—it wanted to use the spread of Esperanto as a foundation for the creation of a new kind of Freemasonry that would be agnostic in matters of religion and politics (French Freemasonry is illuminist and democratic). American Freemasonry, it seems, now supports the German Freemasons (Germans and Austrians) against the French Grand Orient. Ossian Lang,⁴ an American Freemason,

travels constantly around Europe carrying out this organizational work. Keep in mind that American Freemasonry has great resources and can finance these initiatives. The Ligo is spreading all across Europe; it appears to be more conciliatory and tolerant toward Catholicism than the old French type of Freemasonry. This attitude has led to a meeting of three representative of the Ligo with Father Gruber, a Jesuit who studies Freemasonry.⁵ *La Civiltà Cattolica* has treated the matter in depth, and this should be kept in mind because it has a certain importance for the history of culture. Symbolic Rite and Scottish Rite: it seems that the Symbolic Rite is more prevalent in Latin countries, whereas the Scottish Rite is dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries—hence, all this American activity will lead to a strengthening of the Scottish Rite.

§<192>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. Cf. G. Masi, *La struttura sociale delle fazioni politiche fiorentine ai tempi di Dante*, Florence: Olschki, 1930, in 8^o, 32 pp.¹

§<193>. *Catholic Action. Spain*. Cf. N. Noguera, S.J., *La acción católica en la teoría y en la práctica en España y en el extranjero*, Madrid: Razon y Fe, in 16^o, 240–272 pp., 8 pesetas.¹

§<194>. *Past and present. The Gentile reform and religion in the schools*. Cf. the article "L'ignoto e la religione naturale secondo il senator Gentile," in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 6 December 1930.¹ It examines Gentile's conception of religion, but, of course, it is grateful to him for having introduced the teaching of religion in schools.²

§<195>. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists. The Turmel case*. Cf. the article "La catastrofe del caso Turmel e i metodi del modernismo critico," in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 6 December 1930.¹ This is a very important text, and the Turmel case is most interesting. For over twenty years, using the most varied pseudonyms,

¹ In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "storia" (history), but from the context one can deduce that this was just a slip of the pen and that he meant to write "scuola" (school or the schools).

Turmel wrote articles and books so heterodox that in the end they were openly atheistic—and throughout he remained a priest. In 1930 the Jesuits managed to unmask him and had him excommunicated; the decree of the Holy Office lists his publications and his pseudonyms. Turmel's story resembles a novel. It turns out that after the modernist crisis, secret groups were formed within the organization of the church: in addition to the Jesuits (who moreover are not homogeneous; nor are they always in agreement but have a modernist wing—Tyrrell was a Jesuit—and an integralist wing—Cardinal Billot was an integralist),² there was, and probably there still is, an integralist as well as a modernist secret formation. The identification of Turmel with his pseudonyms is itself also like something out of a novel. Undoubtedly, the Jesuit center had cast a wide net around him that was gradually tightened until they finally trapped him. It appears that Turmel had protectors within the Roman congregations, which goes to show that despite the oath everyone was made to take, not all the modernists have been identified and they are still operating secretly. Turmel had written articles and books under fifteen pseudonyms: Louis Coulange, Henri Delafosse, Armand Dulac, Antoine Dupin, Hippolyte Gallerand, Guillaume Herzog, André Lagard, Robert Lawson, Denys Lenain, Paul Letourneur, Goulven Lézurec, Alphonse Michel, Edmond Perrin, Alexis Vanbeck, Siouville. It turned out that Turmel would use a pseudonym to refute or praise an article or a book he had written under another pseudonym, etc. He was a contributor to the journal *Revue d'histoire des religions* and to the book series "Christianisme" edited by Couchoud and published by Rieder.

Another article also needs to be taken into account: "Lo spirito dell'Action Française a proposito di 'intelligenza' e di 'mistica,'" in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 20 December 1930.³ This article discusses Jean Héritier's volume *Intelligence et Mystique* (Paris: Librairie de France, 1930, in 8°, 230 pp.), published as part of the series "Les Cahiers d'Occident" which is meant to propagate the principles of the *defense of the West* in the spirit of Henri Massis's well-known book.⁴ The Jesuits regard Massis and his theories as suspect; moreover, the ties between Massis and Maurras are widely known.⁵ The movement led by Massis has to be counted among the movements of "Catholic integralism" or Catholic reaction. (Similarly, the Action Française movement is to be counted among those supported by the integralists.) The emergence of integralism in France has to be viewed in relation to the *Ralliement* movement championed by

Leo XIII:⁶ the integralists are the ones who disobeyed Leo XIII and sabotaged his initiative. Pius X's struggle against *Combism* seemed to vindicate them,⁷ and Pius X is their pope, just as he is Maurras's pope. The appendix to Héritier's volume includes articles by other authors who discuss the *Ralliement* and whose treatments of questions of religious history support Maurras's theses on the corrosive anarchism of Judaic Christianity and on the Romanization of Catholicism.

§<196>. *Vatican politics. Malta.* Cf. in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 20 December 1930: "Nel decimo anno della diarchia maltese." Diarchy, or dual government, is the term used by *Civiltà Cattolica* to characterize the political situation created in Malta in 1921 with the concession of a constitution that, while keeping the island under British rule, entrusted the government to the citizens.¹ This is obviously a tendentious interpretation, but it is useful to Catholics: it provides them with a rationale for their agitation against Protestant England and for making sure that Catholics do not lose their supremacy in Malta.

§<197>. *The intellectuals.* At the University of Madrid, Eugenio D'Ors is currently (1931) giving an extensive series of lectures entitled "The Science and the History of Culture" that, judging by some references to it that appeared in the *Nouvelles Littéraires* of 3 October 1931, appears to be a [massive] sociology of the phenomenon of culture or civilization. Surely, the course will be published in books.¹

§<198>. *Past and present. "Importuning the texts."* In other words, when out of zealous attachment to a thesis, one makes texts say more than they really do.¹ This error of philological method occurs also outside of philology, in studies and analyses of all aspects of life. In terms of criminal law, it is analogous to selling goods at lesser weight and of different quality than had been agreed upon, but it is not considered a crime unless the will to deceive is glaringly obvious. But don't negligence and incompetence deserve to be sanctioned—if not a judicial sanction, at least an intellectual and moral sanction?

§<199>. *Risorgimento. The Spanish Constitution of 1812.* Why did the earliest Italian liberals (in 1821 and afterward) choose the Spanish Constitution as the object of their demands?¹ Was it merely a case of mimicry and hence of political primitiveness? Or was it an instance of mental laziness? Without totally ignoring the influence of these factors, which are a manifestation of the political and intellectual immaturity and thus of the abstractedness of the leading strata of the Italian bourgeoisie, one must not succumb to the superficial view that all Italian institutions are imported mechanically from abroad and superimposed on the refractory makeup of the nation. Meanwhile, one must distinguish between southern Italy and the rest of Italy: the demand for the Spanish Constitution emerged in southern Italy, and it was taken up by the rest of Italy because of the role played by the Neapolitan exiles after the collapse of the Parthenopean Republic.² Now, were the needs of southern Italy much different, really, from those of Spain? Marx's acute analysis of the Spanish Constitution (cf. his piece on General Espartero in the political writings)³ and the clear demonstration that the Spanish Constitution was a true expression of historical necessity by Spanish society and not a mechanical application of the principles of the French Revolution lead one to believe that the Neapolitan demand was more "historicist" than meets the eye. One must therefore return to Marx's analysis and make a comparison with the Sicilian Constitution of 1812 and with the needs of the South;⁴ the comparison could also be extended to include the Albertine Statute.⁵

§<200>. *Italian intellectuals.* Why is it that at a certain point the majority of cardinals was Italian and the popes were always chosen from among the Italians? This fact has a certain significance in the national development of intellectuals in Italy, and someone might even detect in it the starting point of the *Risorgimento*. This situation was certainly the result of the church's own internal needs to protect itself, grow, and preserve its independence vis-à-vis the great foreign monarchies of Europe; none of this, however, diminishes the importance of its repercussions in Italy. From a positive standpoint, the origins of the *Risorgimento* can be said to coincide with the beginning of the struggle between church and state, in other words, with the demands for purely secular governmental

power and hence with regalism and "jurisdictionalism" (wherein resides the importance of Giannone).¹ From a negative standpoint, it is equally certain that the need of the church to protect its independence impelled it with ever-increasing urgency to base its supremacy in Italy and to staff its organizational apparatus with Italians. These are the origins out of which the neo-Guelph currents developed,² going through various phases (such as Italian Sanfedism)³ that were more or less retrograde and primitive.

The interest of this note, then, extends beyond the rubric of intellectuals to the rubric of the Risorgimento and the rubric of the origins of the "Italian" Catholic Action.

When studying the development of a national class, one must take into account not only the process of its formation within the economic sphere but also its parallel growth in the ideological, juridical, religious, intellectual, philosophical spheres, etc. Indeed, one ought to say that growth in the economic sphere cannot take place without these other parallel developments. Still, every movement that is the bearer of a "thesis" leads to movements of "antithesis" and [then] to partial and provisional "syntheses." The movement to nationalize the church [in Italy] is imposed, not proposed: in Italy, the church is nationalized in forms that are quite different from what took place in France with Gallicism, etc. In Italy, the church is nationalized in an "Italian" way because it must, at the same time, remain universal; in the meantime, the church nationalizes its governing personnel who, increasingly, look at the national aspect of the historical function of Italy as the seat of the papacy.

§<201>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Bruno Cicognani. The novel *Villa Beatrice: Storia di una donna*, published in *Pègaso* in 1931.¹ Cicognani belongs to the group of Florentine Catholic writers: Papini, Enrico Pea, Domenico Giuliotti.²

Would it be correct to describe *Villa Beatrice* as a novel of the neoscholastic philosophy of Father Gemelli,³ a novel of Catholic "materialism," a novel of the "experimental psychology" so dear to the neoscholastics and the Jesuits? Compare psychoanalytic novels with Cicognani's novel. It is difficult to say in what way Catholic doctrine and religiosity contribute to the design of the novel (its characters and plot). The intervention of the priest, at the end, comes out of nowhere, Beatrice's religious reawakening

is merely asserted, and the changes in the protagonist are also entirely attributable to physiological reasons. Beatrice's whole personality, if one can call it a personality, is described in minute detail like some phenomenon of natural history; it is not represented artistically. Cicognani "writes well," in the vulgar sense of the term, so that if he were to produce a treatise on chess it would be "well written." Beatrice is "described" as the personification and typification of emotional coldness. Why is she "incapable" of loving and of entering into an emotional relationship with anyone (including her mother and father)—an incapacity that is described in an extreme and hackneyed fashion? Is it because of her physiologically imperfect genital organs, because she suffers physiologically in intercourse and would not be able to give birth? But this intimate imperfection (and why did nature not make her physically ugly, undesirable, etc? Contradiction of nature!) is due to the fact that she has a heart ailment. Cicognani believes that from the moment the egg is fertilized, the new being that inherits an organic malady starts setting up its defenses against the future attack of the disease. Thus, the ovum-Beatrice, born with a weak heart, develops an imperfect sexual organ that will make her abhor love and all stirrings of emotion, etc., etc. This whole theory is Cicognani's; it constitutes the general framework of his novel. Naturally, Beatrice is not conscious of the fact that her psychic existence is determined by all this. Her actions are not guided by any knowledge of her real situation; her actions are what they are because of the reality that lies outside her consciousness. In fact, her consciousness is not represented; it is not a motive power that helps explain the action. Beatrice is an "anatomical specimen," not a woman.

Cicognani does not avoid contradictions: it seems that, at times, Beatrice suffers from having to be cold, as if this suffering were not itself a "passion" that could bring on her heart disease. It appears, then, that only sexual intercourse and conception leading to childbirth are dangerous "by nature"; in that case, nature should have provided a different "safeguard" for Beatrice's ovaries—nature should have made her "sterile" or, better, "physiologically incapable" of sexual intercourse. Ugo Ojetti has extolled this whole mess as Cicognani's attainment of "artistic classicism."⁴

Cicognani's way of thinking could be incoherent, and he could still have written a good novel, but this is definitely not the case.

§<202>. *The concordat*. When did the concordat negotiations start?¹ Did the speech of 1 January 1926 refer to the concordat?² The negotiations must have gone through a number of stages: semiofficial meetings of varying degrees of importance before the official, diplomatic stage. As a result, the date of the beginning of the negotiations can be shifted, and the natural tendency would be to shift it in such a way as to make the whole process seem shorter. On p. 548 of the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 19 December 1931 (a bibliographical note on the book by Wilfred Parsons, *The Pope and Italy*, Washington: The America Press, 1929, in 16°, 134pp.—Parsons is the editor of the periodical *America*), one reads: "in the end, he *faithfully* retraces the history of the negotiations that dragged on from 1926 till 1929."³

§<203>. *Past and present. The state and the civil servants*. The following is a widespread view: citizens are legally bound to observe the law, but when it comes to the "state," observing the law is only a moral obligation—that is, an obligation without punitive sanctions for evasion. The question arises: what is meant by "state"? In other words, who exactly has no more than a "moral" obligation to observe the law? There is no end to the number of people who believe that they have no "legal" obligations and that they enjoy immunity and impunity. Is this "mentality" related to a custom, or has it established a custom? Both. In other words, the state, as permanent written law, has never been conceived (or presented) as an objective and universal obligation.

This way of thinking is linked to the odd conception of "civic duty" as independent from "rights," as if there were such things as duties without rights and vice versa. This conception is in fact linked to the other view that the legal obligation to observe the law does not apply to the state—in other words, that it does not apply to civil servants and representatives of the state, who, it seems, are much too busy making others comply to have any time for themselves to comply.

§<204>. *Past and present*. A popular saying: The love of the woodworm. Recall also the English proverb: a hundred hares do not add up to a horse, a hundred suspicions do not add up to a proof.

§<205>. *Encyclopedic notions. Direct action.* Various meanings, depending on the political and ideological tendencies. The meaning attached to the term by the "individualists" and the "economists,"¹ with other meanings in between. The meaning attached to the term by the "economists" or syndicalists of diverse tendencies (reformists, etc.) is what unleashed a whole range of meanings, including that of pure "criminals."²

§<206>. *Educational issues.* Cf. Metron's article "Il facile e il difficile," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 7 January 1932.¹ Metron makes two interesting observations (pertaining to engineering courses and the state examinations for engineers): (1) that of a hundred things the instructor says in a course, the student absorbs one or two; (2) that in the state exams students are able to answer the "difficult" questions but are stymied by the "easy" questions. Metron, however, does not thoroughly analyze the reasons for these two problems, and he does not suggest any "purposeful" remedy. It seems to me that the two shortcomings are linked to the scholastic system of lecture lessons with no "seminars" and to the traditional nature of examinations. Notes and handouts. The notes and handouts deal primarily with "difficult" questions; the teaching itself dwells on what is difficult on the assumption that the student will handle the "easy things" on his own. As the exams approach, more time is spent recapitulating the material covered in the course, until the eve of the exam, when only the most difficult questions are reviewed. The student is, as it were, mesmerized by what is difficult; all his mnemonic prowess and intellectual acuity are focused on the difficult problems, etc. As for the low level of absorption: the system of lecture lessons discourages the teacher from repeating himself or from repeating himself any more than is absolutely necessary. As a result, the problems are presented only within a specific framework that makes them one dimensional for the student. The student absorbs only one or two things out of the hundred things the teachers says, but if what the teacher passes on consists of a hundred one-dimensional items, then it is inevitable that the student absorbs very little. A university course is conceived like a book on a topic: but can one become cultured through the reading of just one book? What we are dealing with, then, is the question of the method of teaching at the university: does one attend university *to study* or *to study in order to know how to study*? Should one study "facts" or

the method for studying the "facts"? The "seminar" format in fact is meant to complement oral teaching and invigorate it.

§<207>. *Popular literature. Guerin Meschino.* The *Corriere della Sera* of 7 January 1932 published an article signed Radius under the headline "I classici del popolo" and the subtitle "Guerino detto il Meschino."¹ The headline is vague and ambiguous. *Guerino*, together with a whole list of similar books (*I Reali di Francia*, *Bertoldo*,² tales of bandits, knights, etc.), typifies a particular kind of popular literature: the most rudimentary and primitive type of literature that circulates among the most backward and "isolated" strata of the population, especially those in the south, in the mountains, etc. Those who read *Guerino* do not read Dumas or *Les Misérables*, much less Sherlock Holmes. There is a specific kind of folklore, a particular type of "common sense" that corresponds to these strata.

Radius has only thumbed through the book, and he's not exactly a philologist. His interpretation of *Meschino* is bizarre: "the hero was tacked with the nickname because of his very humble pedigree." This is a colossal error that alters entirely the popular psychology of the book and distorts the psychological-emotional affinity of the popular readers with the book. It is immediately obvious that Guerin is of royal blood, but his misfortune compelled him to become a "servant," that is to say, "meschino" in the sense of the word as it was used in the Middle Ages and also in Dante (in the *Vita Nuova*, I remember perfectly well).³ So, Guerin is the son of a king, reduced to bondage, and he regains his natural rank through his own abilities and determination. Among the most primitive "people," there is this traditional high regard for those of noble lineage; the high regard changes to "affection" when misfortune strikes the hero, and that, in turn, gives way to enthusiasm when the hero defies misfortune and regains his social position.

Guerino as an "Italian" popular poem: from this perspective, one should note how coarse and dull the book is; in other words, it has not been elaborated or polished in any way, due to the cultural isolation of the people, left to themselves. This may help explain why there are no love affairs in *Guerino* and why it is utterly devoid of eroticism.

Guerino as "popular encyclopedia": consider how low the level of culture of those strata who read *Guerino* must be; how little

interested in "geography" they must be, for example, for them to be content with *Guerino* and take it seriously. One could analyze *Guerino* as an "encyclopedia" to gather information on the mental coarseness and the cultural indifference of the vast stratum of people who still feed on it.

§<208>. *Popular literature*. R. Giovagnoli's *Spartaco*. The *Corriere della Sera* of 8 January 1932 published a letter that Garibaldi sent from Caprera to Raffaele Giovagnoli on 25 June 1874, immediately after reading his novel *Spartaco*.¹ The letter is very interesting for this survey of "popular literature" since Garibaldi, too, wrote "popular novels,"² and this letter contains the principal elements of his "poetics" in this genre. Giovagnoli's *Spartaco*, furthermore, is one of the very few Italian popular novels to have also circulated abroad at a time when the popular "novel" in Italy was "anticlerical" and "national," that is, when it had the characteristics and limitations of a strictly indigenous literature. From what I can remember, it seems that *Spartaco* would lend itself [especially] well to an attempt that, within certain limits, could become a method. That is to say, one could "translate it" into modern language: purge its narrative language of baroque and rhetorical forms, expunge its occasional stylistic and technical idiosyncrasies, and thus make it "contemporary." The task would entail a conscious adaptation of the book to present times, to new sentiments, and new styles—which is in fact the same process that popular literature traditionally underwent when it was transmitted orally and had not yet been fixed and fossilized in writing and in print. If this is done in translations from one language to another for the masterpieces of the classical world, which each age has translated and imitated in terms of its new culture, why could it and why should it not be done for works like *Spartaco* and others whose value is more "popular[-cultural]" than aesthetic? (A theme to be developed.) This activity of adaptation is still going on in popular music with widely popular tunes: there are so many love songs that have been made over two or three times and became political. This happens in every country, and one can come up with some rather strange cases (for ex., the Tyrolean hymn to Andreas Hofer that provided the musical form for "Molodaia Gvardia").³

For novels there would be the obstacle of copyright, which, I believe, now lasts eighty years from the date of first publication (there

are, however, certain works that would be impossible to modernize, for ex., *Les Misérables*, *The Wandering Jew*, *The Count of Monte Cristo*, etc., which are too firmly fixed in their original form).

§<209>. *Intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals.* One category of traditional intellectuals whose importance—stemming from its prestige and the social role it played in primitive societies—is second only to the “ecclesiastical” is the category of *medical men* in the broad sense that includes all those who “struggle” or seem to struggle against death and disease. On this issue, one must check Arturo Castiglioni’s *Storia della medicina*.¹ Bear in mind that there used to be a connection between religion and medicine, and in certain respects there still is: hospitals in which certain organizational functions are in the hands of religious orders, in addition to the fact that wherever the doctor appears, so does the priest (exorcism, various forms of assistance, etc.). Many famous religious either were or were thought to be great “healers”—the idea of miracles that even includes resurrecting the dead. Even kings, according to a long-lived belief, could heal with the laying on of hands, etc.

§<210>. *Intellectuals.* Cf. Louis Halphen, *Les Universités au XIII^e siècle*, Ed. Alcan, 1931, 10 Fr.¹

§<211>. *Intellectuals. The academies.* The role they have played in the development of culture in Italy, in ossifying it and making it into a museum piece, removed from national-popular life. (But have the academies been the cause or the effect? Did they proliferate, perhaps, in order to meet some of the needs of those activities that found no outlet in public life, etc.?) The *Enciclopedia* (1778 edition) asserts that there were 550 academies in Italy at the time.¹

NOTEBOOK 7
1930-1931

NOTES ON PHILOSOPHY.
MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM.

Second Series

§<1>. *Benedetto Croce and historical materialism* [cf. p. 55 bis].¹ Apropos of Croce's address to the Aesthetics section of the Philosophical Congress in Oxford (cf. *La Nuova Italia* of 20 October 1930).² The translation of the terms of one philosophical system into the terms of another philosophical system, just like the translation of the language of one economist into the language of another economist, has limits, and these limits are determined by the fundamental nature of philosophical systems or of economic systems. In other words, such translation is possible within traditional philosophy, whereas it is not possible to translate traditional philosophy into the terms of historical materialism or vice versa. The principle of mutual translatability is an inherent "critical" element of historical materialism, inasmuch as it presupposes or postulates that a given stage of civilization has a "basically identical" cultural and philosophical expression, even though the language of the expression varies depending on the particular tradition of each "nation" or each philosophical system. In that case, Croce is guilty of a peculiar abuse: he resorted to a polemical "trick"; he made use of a critical element of historical materialism in order to attack historical materialism as a whole, making it look like a conception of the world that is belated even with respect to Kant. (Croce has thus "radically" transmuted his entire critique of historical materialism; this new point of view can be looked at in relation to the eulogies he lavished on De Man's book.)³ But is Croce completely wrong? I said that he resorted to a

polemical "trick," that is, he did not act as a philosopher or as a historian; rather, he engaged in a "political act," a "practical" act. It is true that a current of inferior quality has emerged within historical materialism; this may be regarded as analogous to popular Catholicism in relation to the Catholicism of theologians or intellectuals. Just as popular Catholicism can be translated into the terms of "paganism" or other religions of that sort, so, too, this inferior kind of historical materialism can be translated into "theological" terms—that is, into the terms of pre-Kantian and pre-Cartesian philosophy. Croce's trick resembles the tactic of the Masonic anti-clericals and vulgar rationalists who fought Catholicism using precisely these comparisons and these "translations" of popular Catholicism into "fetishistic" language. (Croce has fallen into the same position that Clemenceau supposedly fell into when Sorel upbraided him for judging a philosophy by its literature of intellectual popularization.⁴ It is the position of the Renaissance man vis-à-vis the man of the Protestant Reformation: the failure to understand that the intellectual coarseness of the men of the Reformation foreshadowed classical German philosophy and the vast movement of modern German culture.) Erasmus and Luther: "Wherever Luther goes, culture dies," Erasmus wrote (or something similar).⁵ Croce reproaches historical materialism for its "scientism," its materialistic "superstition," its return to the intellectual "Middle Ages." They are the reproaches that Erasmus, in the language of his time, directed at Luther. The man of the Renaissance and the man of the Reformation have been fused in the modern intellectual of the Crocean type. Yet, even though this Crocean type comprises the man of the Reformation, he no longer understands how the historical process that started with the "medieval" Luther could extend all the way to Hegel. Therefore, when faced with the new intellectual and moral Reformation represented by historical materialism, the Crocean type finds himself in the same position as Erasmus vis-à-vis Luther. This position of Croce's can be examined in his practical stance toward religion. Croce is antireligious, and, for Italian intellectuals, his philosophy—especially in its less systematic forms (such as the book reviews, notes, etc., that are collected in such volumes as *Cultura e vita morale*, *Conversazioni critiche*, *Frammenti di etica*, etc.)—has constituted a genuine intellectual and moral reform of the "Renaissance" type. Croce, however, has not gone "to the people," he has not become a "national" element (just like the men of the Renaissance, as opposed to the Lutherans and Calvinists), because he has not been able to create a group of disciples who could have made his philosophy "popular," so that it could become an educational factor even in the elementary schools (and thus educational for the ordinary worker and peasant, in other words, for the common man). This was not possible, as events have shown. Croce once wrote something along the following lines: "One cannot take religion away from the common man without immediately putting in its place something

that satisfies the same needs that gave rise to religion and keeps it alive."⁶ There is some truth in this assertion, but isn't it also an admission of the impotence of idealist philosophy, of its incapacity to become an integral conception of the world? So Gentile, who is more consistent in practice than Croce, put religion back into the schools,⁷ and he justified his action by invoking the Hegelian conception of religion as a primitive phase of philosophy. (Besides, Croce would have done the same thing if his plan for education had successfully overcome the stumbling blocks of parliamentary politics.)⁸ But isn't Gentile's justification pure sleight of hand? Why should one feed the people one thing and the intellectuals another? Recall the "fragment" on religion in Croce's *Etica*:⁹ it is excellent. Why was it not developed? In reality, it was not possible. The conception of the "objectivity of the real," as it has been ingrained in the people by religions, can only be dislodged by a principle that appears to be "dogmatic" but has the inherent capacity to become historical; this principle can emerge only from science. This might even become a superstition, similar to or even worse than religious superstition, but it could find within itself the elements necessary for overcoming this primitive phase. It puts man in contact with nature, maintaining the superiority of man and hence of history and of the spirit, as Croce says. (See Missiroli's chapter on "science" published by the *Ordine Nuovo* with a note by P.T.)¹⁰

The following passage by Missiroli ("Calendario: Religione e filosofia," *L'Italia Letteraria*, 23 March 1930) is interesting in this regard:

It is likely that, sometimes, when confronted by the logic of the philosophy teacher (especially when the philosophy teacher is a follower of absolute idealism), the *common sense* of the students and the good sense of the other teachers will coalesce in support of the theologian rather than the philosopher. I would not like to find myself in some debate in front of an *uninitiated public* having to hold forth on the claims of modern philosophy. Humanity is still wholly Aristotelian, and the common view remains attached to the dualism that is characteristic of Greco-Christian realism. That knowing is a "seeing" rather than a "doing"; that truth lies outside us, existing in itself and for itself, and is not created by us; that "nature" and the "world" are intangible realities—nobody doubts any of this, and anybody holding the opposite view runs the risk of being taken for a lunatic. The defenders of the objectivity of knowledge, the most unyielding defenders of positive knowledge, those who defend the science and the method of Galileo against the epistemology of absolute idealism are to be found among Catholics nowadays. What Croce calls pseudo-concepts and what Gentile defines as abstract thought constitute the last bastions of objectivism. Hence the increasingly apparent tendency of Catholic culture to favor positive science and experiential knowledge over the new metaphysics of the absolute. It is not to be excluded that

Catholic thought might be rejuvenated by taking refuge inside the citadel of experimental science. For thirty years, the Jesuits have been working to eliminate the conflicts—which, in reality, stemmed from misunderstandings—between religion and science. Not accidentally, Georges Sorel observed (in a text that is now extremely hard to find) that among all the scientists, the mathematicians are the only ones for whom miracles have nothing miraculous about them.¹¹

Missiroli has expounded these views more extensively and presented them somewhat differently in the volume *Date a Cesare*.¹² Catholics strive very hard not to lose touch with modern society and specifically with high culture. With the spread of public education constantly transforming the cultural level and configuration of the popular masses, the influence of religion was disappearing, except among women and the elderly. Religion changes molecularly. Catholics have tried to absorb positivism, but they have also flirted with actualist idealism and, especially, with Crocean thought. At the same time, Croce is continuously flirting with the “common sense” and the “good sense” of the people (all Croce’s pieces on the relation between philosophy and “common sense” need to be collected).

Croce’s attack on materialism has to be examined from different angles: (1) Croce’s attitude toward historical materialism systematically articulated in a particular book and in scattered articles connected with the book;¹³ (2) how much of historical materialism found its way into Croce’s own philosophy; that is, the role that historical materialism has had in Croce’s philosophical development: in other words, to what extent is Croce a historical materialist “unconsciously” or consciously in the sense of what he calls “surpassing”? (3) Croce’s recent attitude, in the postwar period, represents a renunciation not only of his first critique but also of an important part of his philosophy (the first sign of this most recent attitude is to be found, in my view, in his small book on politics¹⁴ [and even earlier in his *Storia della storiografia italiana nel sec. XIX*]):¹⁵ in other words, this new attitude of Croce’s is not directed solely at historical materialism but also at himself, at all his earlier philosophy.

Croce plays with words: When he states that for historical materialism superstructures are appearances¹⁶ (which is true in polemics about politics but not true “epistemologically”), doesn’t he realize that this might mean something similar to his assertion of the non-“definitive” character of all philosophy? When he states that historical materialism separates structure from superstructures, thus reinstating theological dualism,¹⁷ does he not think that this separation is to be understood in a dialectical sense, as in thesis and antithesis, and that therefore all accusations of theological dualism are vacuous and superficial? Perhaps structure is conceived as

something static rather than as reality in motion. But what did M. mean when, in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, he talked about "the education of the educator"—did he not mean to say that the superstructure reacts dialectically to the structure and modifies it?¹⁸ In other words, does he not affirm, in "realistic" terms, a negation of the negation? Does he not affirm the unity of the process of the real?

Croce accuses historical materialism of breaking up the process of the real, which is what the followers of Gentile accused Croce of doing, insofar as he makes a "distinction" among the activities of the spirit and introduces a "dialectic of distincts"¹⁹ (an unfortunate and incongruous phrase, even though Croce's affirmation is correct). This is why one can say that Croce's attitude toward historical materialism reveals a process of revision of the core elements of his own philosophy. (Concept of historical bloc: in historical materialism, it is the philosophical equivalent of "spirit" in Croce's philosophy; the introduction of dialectical activity and a process of distinction into the "historical bloc" does not mean negating its real unity.)

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.i.

§<2>. *Translatability of scientific and philosophical languages*. In 1921: organizational issues.¹ Vilici said and wrote:² "We have not been able to 'translate' our language into the 'European' languages."³

Cf. Notebook 11, §46.

§<3>. *Philosophical and scientific "Esperanto."* The failure to comprehend the historicity of languages and hence of ideologies and scientific opinions has resulted in a tendency to construct an Esperanto or a Volapük of philosophy and science.¹ The representatives of this tendency oddly evince the same mentality as primitive people do vis-à-vis other peoples they have encountered. Every primitive people called itself "man" or "men"—that is, they referred to themselves with their word for "man"—and they called the other peoples "mutes" or "stammerers" (barbarians), in the sense of not knowing the "language of men." Similarly, the inventors of the Volapük of philosophy and science regard whatever is not expressed in this Volapük as delirium, prejudice, superstition, etc. They transform what should be a historical judgment into a moral judgment or into a psychiatric diagnosis (the process is analogous to that of sectarian mind-sets).

It seems that, in Italy, the most perfect example of this tendency today is Mr. Mario Govi with his book *Fondazione della Metodologia—Logica ed Epistemologia*, Turin, Bocca, 1929, 579pp.,² but many traces of this tendency can be found in the *Popular Manual*.³ It seems that, for Govi, logic

and epistemology (that is, special methodology; logic is regarded as general methodology) exist in and for themselves, abstracted from concrete thought and from particular concrete sciences (in the way language exists in dictionaries and grammar books, technique detached from work, etc., etc.). Given this way of thinking, it is only natural that one finds nothing wrong with a Volapük of philosophy.

Cf. Notebook 11, §45.

§<4>. *Moral science and historical materialism.* In my view, the scientific foundations for a morality of historical materialism should be sought in the assertion that "society does not set itself tasks unless the conditions for their successful completion already exist."¹ If the conditions do exist, the completion of the tasks *becomes* "duty," "will" *becomes* free. Morality thus becomes, in a certain sense, a search for the necessary conditions for the freedom of the will, a will aimed at a certain end and at proving that the necessary conditions exist. The issue should not be about a hierarchy of ends but about the gradation of the ends to be attained, since the purpose is to "moralize" not just each person individually but also an entire society of individuals.

§<5>. *The Popular Manual, science, and the instruments of science.* Geology does not have any instruments other than the *hammer*. The progress and history of geology, then, cannot be accounted for in terms of the improvement of its instruments and their history.¹ In general, the advance of science cannot be *materially* documented; the most one can do, and not even in all cases, is to revive its memory, to recall the successive improvements of instruments (its means) and of machines (its applications). The most important "instruments" of scientific progress are intellectual and methodological, and Engels has correctly stated that "intellectual instruments" are not born out of nothing, they are not innate; rather, they are acquired, they have developed and are developing historically.² Furthermore, along with the "material" instruments of science, there has been the growth of a "science of instruments" that is closely linked to the general development of production. (On this topic, see G. Boffito, *Gli strumenti della scienza e la scienza degli strumenti*, Libreria Internazionale Seeber, 1929.)³

Cf. Notebook 11, §21.

§<6>. *The Popular Manual and sociology*. The reduction of historical materialism to a Marxist "sociology" encourages the facile journalistic improvisations of phony "geniuses." The "experience" of historical materialism is history itself, the study of particular facts, "philology." This is, perhaps, what was meant by those writers who, as is briefly mentioned in the *Popular Manual*, deny the possibility of constructing a Marxist sociology and assert that historical materialism lives only in particular historical essays.¹

"Philology" is the methodological expression of the importance of particular facts understood as definite and specific "individualities." This method is challenged by another one, namely, the method of large numbers, or "statistics," that is borrowed from the natural sciences, or at least from some of them. But not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the law of "large numbers" can be applied to history and politics only as long as the great masses of the population remain passive or are assumed to remain passive with regard to the issues that interest the historian and the politician. This extension of the law of large numbers from the natural sciences to the fields of history and political science has different consequences for history and politics. In historical studies, it might lead to errors that could easily be corrected with the discovery of new documents that enhance the accuracy of what was previously considered a mere "hypothesis." In the science and art of politics, however, it can lead to catastrophes so devastating as to be irreparable. In the science and art of politics, the elevation of the law of large numbers to the status of an essential law is not just a scientific error; it is a political error in action: it induces mental laziness and superficial political programs, it is an aprioristic affirmation of the "unknowability" of the real—which is much more serious than in the natural sciences, in which "not knowing" is a principle of methodological prudence rather than a philosophical declaration. The aim of political action is, precisely, to bestir the great multitudes out of passivity, that is, to destroy the "law" of large numbers. How, then, could this be taken to be a "law"? Within this context, one can also see the turmoil that in the art of politics leads to the collective organism assuming the leadership role in place of the single individual, the individual chief. The "individual" knows the standardized sentiments of the great masses as the expression of the law of large numbers (that is, rationally, intellectually), and, if he is a great leader, he translates them into ideas-as-force, into words-as-force. By contrast, the collective organism knows the sentiments of the great masses through "coparticipation," through "compassionality," and, if the collective organism is vitally embedded among the masses, it knows their sentiments through experience of immediate particulars—a system of living "philology," so to speak.

If De Man's book has any value, it is, in my view, precisely this: it stimulates us to "be inspired" in particular by the "sentiments" of groups and

individuals² and not to be satisfied with the laws of large numbers.² De Man has not discovered anything new, nor has he come up with some original principle that can supersede historical materialism or scientifically prove it to be sterile or erroneous. He has simply elevated to the level of scientific "principle" a criterion that was already known, though it was not sufficiently well defined and developed—or, at least, its theory and its scientific significance had not yet been systematically defined and developed. De Man has even failed to understand the significance of his criterion: he has unwittingly produced a new law of "large numbers," a new statistical and classificatory method, a new abstract sociology.

Cf. Notebook 11, §25.

§<7>. *The metaphor of the midwife and Michelangelo's metaphor.* The metaphor of the midwife, who, with her forceps, helps the newborn to emerge from the mother's womb, and the principle expressed by Michelangelo in his lines: "The great artist has no conception / that a block of marble does not contain / within its largeness; and it is only reached / by the hand that obeys the intellect."¹ The act of removing with big hammer blows the excess of marble that conceals the figure conceived by the artist resembles the operation of the midwife who opens the mother's womb to bring forth the newborn into the light.

§<8>. *Benedetto Croce and historical materialism.* Cf. Croce's judgment on Giovanni Botero in the volume *Storia dell'età barocca in Italia*. Croce recognized that the moralists of the seventeenth century, though of lesser stature than Machiavelli, "represented a further and higher stage of political philosophy."¹ This judgment should be juxtaposed to Sorel's view that Clemenceau could not see through a mediocre "literature" and recognize that such literature represented exigencies that were not themselves "mediocre."² It is a prejudice typical of an "intellectual" to measure historical and political movements with the yardstick of "intellectualism"—that is, to look at the perfection of the literary expression rather than the yardstick of "political science," which is the concrete and practical ability to make the means conform to the end. This is also a "popular" prejudice at certain stages of political organization, and it is often confused with prejudices about the "orator": the politician must be a great orator or a great intellectual, he must be an anointed "genius," etc.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.ii.

§<9>. *B. Croce and ethico-political history.* The juxtaposition of the two terms "ethical" and "political" is in fact the exact expression of the exigencies that frame Croce's historiography. *Ethical history* is the aspect of history that is related to "civil society," to hegemony. *Political history* is the aspect of history related to state-governmental activity. When there is a conflict between hegemony and the state-government, there is a crisis in society, and Croce goes as far as to assert that sometimes the "state"—that is, the directive force of historical impetus—is not to be found, as one would think, in the state as juridically understood; rather, it is often to be found among "private" forces and at times even among so-called revolutionaries.¹ (This statement of Croce's is, on the theoretical level, very important for understanding fully his conception of politics and historiography.) It would be useful to conduct a concrete analysis of Crocean theory, using two books in particular as models: *La storia del regno^a di Napoli* and *La Storia d'Italia dal 1870 al 1915*.²

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.iii.

§<10>. *Structure and superstructure.* (See the notes in the "First Series.")¹ On this subject, I believe, one could draw a comparison with the technique of warfare as it was transformed during the last war with the shift from war of maneuver to war of position. Take note of Rosa's little book that was translated by Alessandri in 1919–20;² its theory is based on the historical experiences of 1905. (Besides, it appears that the events were not analyzed accurately. The "voluntary" and organizational elements are ignored, even though they were much more widespread than Rosa was inclined to believe; because of her "economistic" prejudice, she unconsciously ignored them.) This little book, in my view, constitutes the most significant theory of the war of maneuver applied to the study of history and to the art of politics. The immediate economic factor (crises, etc.) is seen as the field artillery employed in war to open a breach in the enemy's defenses big enough to permit one's troops to break through and gain a definitive strategic victory—or, at least, to achieve what is needed for a definitive victory. Naturally, in historical studies, the impact of the immediate economic factor is seen as much more complex than the impact of field artillery in a war of maneuver. The immediate economic factor was expected to have a double effect: (1) to open a breach in the enemy's defenses, after throwing him into disarray and making him lose faith in himself, his forces, and his future; (2) to organize in a flash one's own

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "reame" instead of "regno." Both words mean the same thing, that is, "kingdom."

troops, to create cadres, or at least to place the existing cadres (formed, up to that point, by the general historical process) at lightning speed in positions from which they could direct the dispersed troops; to produce, in a flash, a concentration of ideology and of the ends to be achieved. It was a rigid form of economic determinism, made worse by the notion that effects of the immediate economic factor would unfold at lightning speed in time and space. It was thus historical mysticism through and through, the anticipation of some sort of dazzling miracle.

General Krasnov stated (in his novel) that, during the war, the Entente (specifically, England, which did not want to see imperial Russia victorious, lest the Eastern Question be definitively resolved in favor of czarism) ordered the Russian general staff to adopt trench warfare (an absurdity, given the enormous extension of the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with vast areas of marshes and forests) when the only viable option was a war of maneuver.³ This has only the semblance of truth. In reality, the Russian Army did attempt a war of maneuver and breakthroughs, especially in the Austrian sector (but also in Prussia, near the lakes of Mazovia) and had some partial successes that were extremely brilliant but ephemeral. A war of position in fact does not consist solely of a set of actual trenches; it comprises the entire organizational and industrial structure of the territory that lies behind the arrayed forces, and it is especially dependent on the rapid-fire capacity and concentration of cannons, machine guns, and rifles (and on an abundance of matériel that makes it possible to replace quickly any equipment lost after an enemy breakthrough). On the eastern front one could see immediately that the Russian tactic of incursion had quite different results in the German sector than it did in the Austrian sector, and, even in the Austrian sector, once the Germans assumed command, the incursion tactics proved disastrous. Likewise, in the Polish war of 1920: the irresistible invasion was halted at Warsaw by Weygand and the line defended by French officers.⁴

This does not mean that the tactics of assault and incursion and the war of maneuver should now be considered to be utterly erased from the study of military science; that would be a serious error. But in wars among the most industrially and socially advanced states, these methods of war must be seen to have a reduced tactical function rather than a strategic function; their place in military history is analogous to that of siege warfare in the previous period.

The same reduction must take place in the art and science of politics, at least in those cases pertaining to the most advanced states, where "civil society" has become a very complex structure that is very resistant to the catastrophic "irruptions" of the immediate economic factor (crises, depressions, etc.): the superstructures of civil society resemble the trench system of modern warfare. Sometimes, it would appear that a ferocious artillery attack against enemy trenches had leveled everything, whereas in fact it

had caused only superficial damage to the defenses of the adversary, so that when the assailants advanced they encountered a defensive front that was still effective. The same thing occurs in politics during great economic crises. A crisis does not enable the attacking troops to organize themselves at lightning speed in time and in space; much less does it infuse them with a fighting spirit. On the other side of the coin, the defenders are not demoralized; nor do they abandon their defensive positions, even in the midst of rubble; nor do they lose faith in their own strength or their own future. This is not to say that everything remains intact, but events do not unfold at lightning speed and with the definitive forward march expected by the strategists of political Cadornism.⁵ The events of 1917 were the last instance of this kind. They marked a decisive shift in the art and science of politics.

This means that one must conduct an in-depth study of those components of civil society that correspond to the defensive systems in a war of position. I say "in-depth" for a reason: the events of 1917 have been examined, but from a superficial and banal point of view (as historians of mores study the oddities of women's fashions, or whatever) or from a "rationalistic" viewpoint—in other words, with the conviction that certain phenomena are destroyed from the moment they are clarified or "realistically" explained away as superstitions.

Cf. Notebook 13, §24.

§<11>. *A judgment on Gentile's "actual idealism."* From the *Italia Letteraria* of 23 November 1930, an article by Bruno Revel, "Il VII Congresso di Filosofia":

Once again, *actual idealism* offers us history as the supreme instance of justification. Beware: this *history* is pregnant with all the intrinsically universal and positive values that customarily used to be isolated in a transcendental realm of essences and norms. By appropriating those values that over time have been knowingly isolated and absolutized (and they are valid absolutely only because they have been declared to be transcendent and pure), this immanentist idealism can now allow itself to preach and teach morals, almost unaware of its incurable relativism and skepticism. Social evolution, marked by a growing organization centered on the factories, is moving toward <ironbound>^a and well-organized centralized formations, so all actual idealism does is provide this evolution with the luster^b of the absolute and with metaphysical dignity, in accor-

^a The adjective "*ferrée*" (ironbound) is missing in the manuscript, but it appears in the printed article from which Gramsci transcribed this extract.

^b Gramsci made an error in his transcription here: instead of "*lustro*" (luster) he wrote "*fede*" (faith).

dance with its theory of the state. And it believes that it is thus conferring an absolute ethical character on the contingent industrial exigencies of the modern state.¹

Tortuous and bungled, but the influence of historical materialism is noticeable.

§<12>. *Man as individual and man as mass*. The Latin proverb "Senatores boni viri, senatus mala bestia" has become a platitude.¹ What is the meaning of this proverb, and what meaning has it acquired? That a crowd of people governed by immediate interests or gripped by a passion stirred by the impressions of the moment, acritically transmitted from one person to the next, unites around the worst collective decision, reflecting the lowest animal instincts. The observation is valid and realistic insofar as it refers to the kind of crowd that forms by chance, such as when a crowd gathers under a roof during a downpour; these are crowds composed of people who are not bound together by a burden of responsibility toward other people or groups of people or toward a concrete economic reality whose collapse would result in disaster for individuals. One can say, then, that in such crowds individualism is not transcended and, worse, it is exacerbated by the certainty of impunity and the absence of responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is also commonly observed that an "orderly" assembly of quarrelsome and unruly individuals unites around collective decisions that are superior to those of the average individual: quantity becomes quality. If it were not so, it would be impossible to have an army, and the same can be said, for example, of the incredible sacrifices that well-disciplined groups of people are able to make on certain occasions when their sense of social responsibility is strongly aroused by the immediate sense of common danger and the future seems more important than the present. One may look, by way of illustration, at an open-air rally, which is different from a meeting behind closed doors, or a trade union meeting, and so on. A meeting of the officers of the general staff would be quite different from an assembly of the soldiers of a platoon, etc.

The tendency toward conformity in the contemporary world is more widespread and deeper than in the past; the standardization of ways of thinking and of behavior extends across nations and even

continents. The economic base of collective man: big factories, Taylorization, rationalization, etc. But did collective man exist in the past? He existed, as Michels would say,² under the form of charismatic leadership. In other words, a collective will was attained under the impetus and direct influence of a "hero," of a paradigmatic individual, but this collective will was produced by extraneous factors and once formed would disintegrate, repeatedly. Today, by contrast, collective man is formed essentially from the bottom up, on the basis of the position that the collectivity occupies in the world of production. The paradigmatic individual still has a role in the formation of collective man, but it is a greatly diminished role, so much so that he could disappear without the collective cement disintegrating or the structure collapsing.

It is said that "Western scientists maintain that the psyche of the masses is nothing other than the resurgence of the old instincts of the primordial horde and is therefore a regression to stages of culture that have long been surpassed."³ This must be taken to refer to so-called crowd psychology, that is, <the psychology> of crowds that are formed by chance; it is a pseudoscientific assertion rooted in positivist sociology.

Apropos of social "conformism," it should be noted that the question is not new and that the alarm sounded by certain intellectuals is simply comical. Conformism has always existed; today, there is a struggle between "two conformisms," that is, a struggle for hegemony, and a crisis of civil society. The old intellectual and moral leaders of society feel the ground giving way under their feet. They are aware that their sermons have become, precisely, "sermons," namely, things that are removed from the real world, pure form devoid of content, hollow shells; hence their despair, their reactionary and conservative tendencies. Since the particular form of civilization, culture, morality that they have represented is decomposing, they shriek at the death of all civilization, of all culture, of all morality, and they demand that the state take repressive measures, or, secluded from the real process of history, they constitute themselves into groups of resistance and by so doing prolong the crisis, since the demise of a way of living and thinking cannot take place without a crisis. On the other hand, the representatives of the new order now in gestation, full of "rationalistic" hatred for the old, are disseminating utopias and crackpot schemes. What is the reference point of the new world in gestation? The world of production, labor. The maximum degree of utilitarianism must inform every

analysis of the moral and intellectual institutions to be created and of the principles to be disseminated; collective and individual life must be organized to maximize the yield of the productive apparatus. The development of economic forces on new foundations and the progressive establishment of the new structure will heal the inevitable contradictions and, having created a new "conformism" from below, will allow new possibilities for self-discipline—that is, new possibilities for freedom, including individual freedom.

§<13>. *Einaudi and historical materialism*. Einaudi does not seem to have devoted much study to the theories of historical materialism; indeed, one could say that he talks about historical materialism like a dabbler, relying on hearsay, often third or fourth hand.¹ His main concepts are derived from Croce (*Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*),² but superficially and haphazardly. (In one note, I compared a passage by Croce on the originality of science with Einaudi's coarse rendition of it.)³ Even more interesting is the fact that Achille Loria has always been a highly esteemed writer for *La Riforma Sociale* (and for a time also a member of its editorial board), the same Achille Loria who popularized (in the pejorative sense of the word) historical materialism.⁴ Indeed, one can say that, in Italy, much of what passes for historical materialism is nothing other than Lorianism. Recently, Loria published in—what else?—*La Riforma Sociale* a miscellany of chaotic notes under the title "Nuove conferme dell'economismo storico."⁵ In the *Riforma Sociale* of November–December 1930, Einaudi published a note, "Il mito dello strumento tecnico . . .," on Rinaldo Rigola's autobiography that reinforces the opinion mentioned above.⁶ In his book on materialism, Croce showed specifically that the myth of the instrument was one of Loria's inventions;⁷ Einaudi makes no mention of this. Furthermore, Einaudi commits a whole series of errors out of ignorance of the topic: (1) he confuses the technical instrument with the "development of economic forces" in general; he deals with the development of economic forces as if they were the same thing as the technical instrument; (2) he believes that in Marxism the term "technical instrument" or "economic forces" refers to material objects rather than to social relations—that is, human relations that are incorporated into material things and whose juridical expression is the principle of property; (3) in this text, too, one can see the usual "economic cretinism" that is typical of Einaudi and many of his associates who, as propagandists, are pure "illuminists." It would be interesting to see Einaudi's collected works of economic propaganda;⁸ they would reveal that capitalists have never understood their real interests and their behavior has always been antieconomic, etc.

Given Einaudi's undeniable influence on a broad stratum of intellectuals, it would be worth searching through all the notes in which he refers to historical materialism—remember the article on Gobetti published in the special issue of *Il Baretto* and the passage on Gobetti in Giuseppe Prato's *Piemonte*.⁹

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §39.

§<14>. *Testimonies*. From Luigi Volpicelli's "Per la nuova storiografia italiana" (*La Fiera Letteraria*, 29 January 1928): "The first quarter of the century has not been an unproductive period for research and publications in historical studies; indeed, all in all, there have been many advances over the historiography of the last century. Totally regenerated by *historical materialism*, contemporary research has been able to pursue new and more appropriate paths of inquiry and to make itself increasingly rigorous and complex." Volpicelli, however, does not fully understand what he is writing about. In fact, after mentioning the role of historical materialism during the first quarter-century, he goes on to criticize (in a very vague and superficial way) nineteenth-century historiography:

I have dwelt at length on this topic [nineteenth-century historiography] in order to give the reader an accurate [!] idea of the gigantic step accomplished by contemporary historiography. The consequences, in fact, have been enormous [—consequences of what?]; nothing less than total renewal. The boundaries established by the various methodologies that reduced historical inquiry to philological or diplomatic formal research have been destroyed. The economic-juridical approaches of the turn of the century have been left far behind, together with the delusions of historical materialism, the abstractions and the a priori of certain ideologues, who were novelists more than historians.¹

So, historical materialism, which at first is said to have renewed historiography, all of a sudden becomes, in the form of a "delusion," one of the victims of renewal; the gravedigger of nineteenth-century historiography becomes part of the nineteenth century that is buried in its entirety. Volpicelli needs to study a little bit of formal logic.

§<15>. *The question of capitalism in antiquity and Barbagallo*. Barbagallo's history of capitalism in antiquity is hypothetical, con-

jectural, possible, a historical sketch, a sociological outline; it is not an indubitable and definite history.¹ Historians like Barbagallo, in my view, fall into a peculiar critical-philological error: they proceed as if ancient history must be constructed out of documents of the time, on which they formulate hypotheses, etc., without taking into account that the unfolding of all subsequent history is a "document" for the earlier history, etc. The English emigrants to North America carried with them the technical-economic experience gained in England; how, then, did the experience of capitalism in antiquity get lost if capitalism had indeed existed to the degree that Barbagallo supposes or would have us suppose?

§<16>. *War of position and war of maneuver, or frontal war.* One should determine whether Bronstein's famous theory about the *permanence* of movement is not a political reflection of the theory of the war of maneuver (remember the observation by the Cossack general Krasnov);¹ whether it is not, in the final analysis, a reflection of the general-economic-cultural-social conditions of a country in which the structures of national life are embryonic and unsettled and cannot become "trench or fortress." In that case, one might say that Bronstein, while appearing to be "Western," was in fact a cosmopolitan, that is, superficially national and superficially Western or European. Ilyich,² on the other hand, was profoundly national and profoundly European. In his memoirs, Bronstein recalls somebody saying that his theory had proved true . . . fifteen years later; he responded to the epigram with another epigram.³ In reality, his theory, as such, was good neither fifteen years earlier nor fifteen years later. Like the obstinate man described by Guicciardini,⁴ he guessed more or less correctly; in other words, his more sweeping general prediction proved true. It's like predicting that a four-year-old girl would become a mother and then saying, "I had guessed it," when at the age of twenty she does indeed become a mother—forgetting about wanting to rape the girl when she was four, out of the conviction that she would become a mother. In my view, Ilyich understood the need for a shift from the war of maneuver that had been applied victoriously in the East in 1917, to a war of position, which was the only viable possibility in the West, where, as Krasnov observes, the armies could quickly amass huge quantities of munitions and where the structures of society were still capable of themselves becoming heavily fortified trenches. This, I believe, is

the meaning of the term "united front,"⁵ which corresponds to the conception of a single front for the Entente under the sole command of Foch.⁶ Ilyich, however, never had time to develop his formula. One should also bear in mind that Ilyich could only have developed his formula on a theoretical level, whereas the fundamental task was a national one; in other words, it required a reconnaissance of the terrain and an identification of the elements of trench and fortress represented by the components of civil society, etc. In the East, the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was immediately revealed. The state was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements. Needless to say, the configuration varied from state to state, which is precisely why an accurate reconnaissance on a national scale was needed.

Bronstein's theory can be compared to that of certain French syndicalists on the general strike and to Rosa's theory in the little book translated by Alessandri.⁷ Rosa's book and theory, moreover, influenced the French syndicalists, as is clear from some of Rosmer's articles on Germany in *La Vie Ouvrière* (the first series in little pamphlets);⁸ this also derives, in part, from the theory of spontaneity.

§<17>. *Croce*. One could say that Croce is the last Renaissance man and that he is an expression of international or cosmopolitan relationships more than of purely national relationships. (This does not mean that Croce is not a national element, even in the modern sense of nation; it means, rather, that even in modern times and within the context of modern life, Croce embodies the role of the cosmopolitan intellectual that used to be fulfilled by Italian intellectuals from the Middle Ages until the end of the eighteenth century.) Croce's role, in short, is comparable to the pope's, and one must say that, in his sphere of influence, Croce conducts himself (or is capable of conducting himself) better than the pope; the war was a typical example. One must not look primarily at Croce the philosopher but at Croce the moralist who teaches about life and formulates principles of conduct. The two Croces are theoretically inseparable, but, in practice, the spread of Croce's influence owes more to his thoroughgoing polemical activity than to his theoretical works.

The question arises: who, from a theoretical and moral standpoint, best (or more thoroughly) represents contemporary Italian society—the pope, Croce, or Gentile?¹ In other words: who, from the point of view of

hegemony, is most important within the structure of civil society, which is the content of political society? In my view, the most important is the pope, then Croce, and third Gentile. It seems to me that Gentile's philosophy, actualism,² is intimately linked to the economic-corporative moment; it is still at the stage of a direct technical expression of this moment. For this same reason, many people may believe the opposite (and appear to be right), just as many people believe that in parliament an industrialist represents the interests of industry more fully than a lawyer, a professor, or even a trade union organizer, overlooking the fact that if the entire parliamentary majority consisted of industrialists, parliament would immediately lose its political function and its prestige. (Remember the speech Gentile gave in Rome, published in *Cultura e Fascismo*.)³ The pope and Croce are on the same theoretical level (in other words, Croce is a kind of lay pope), but the greater importance of the pope comes from the fact that he is at the head of a thoroughly centralized and disciplined ruling apparatus. One cannot say the same of Croce. Furthermore, the pope influences countless masses of people by setting down norms of life that touch on even the most elementary aspects of existence. Croce's "morality," on the other hand, is of the Renaissance type; it cannot become popular.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.iv.

§<18>. *The unity in the component parts of Marxism*. The unity comes from the dialectical development of the contradictions between man and matter (nature—material forces of production). In economics, the center of unity is value, that is, the relation between the worker and the industrial forces of production. (Those who negate this theory of value fall into crass vulgar materialism by considering machines in themselves—as constant or technical capital—as the producers of value independent of the man who operates them.) In philosophy—praxis, that is, the relation between human will (superstructure) and the economic structure. In politics—the relation between the state and civil society, that is, the intervention of the state (centralized will) to educate the educator, the social milieu in general. (To be developed and put in more precise terms.)¹

§<19>. *Ideologies*. One of the factors that, in my view, contributes to error when considering the value of ideologies derives from the fact (which is not casual, either) that the term "ideology" is applied both to the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and to the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals. The pejorative

sense of the term has become widespread, and this in turn has modified and perverted the theoretical analysis of the concept of ideology. The course of this error can be easily reconstructed: (1) ideology is defined as distinct from structure, and then there is the assertion that it is not ideologies that change structures but vice versa; (2) a certain political solution is declared to be "ideological," in other words, it does not have the wherewithal to modify the structure; though it is believed that the structure can be changed, the effort to change it is dismissed as useless, stupid, etc.; (3) next comes the assertion that every ideology is "pure" appearance, useless, stupid, etc.

One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies—that is, ideologies that are necessary to a given structure—and arbitrary, rationalistic, "willed" ideologies. Insofar as they are historically necessary, ideologies have a validity that is "psychological"; they "organize" the human masses, they establish the ground on which humans move, become conscious of their position, struggle, etc. As for "arbitrary" ideologies, they produce nothing other than individual "movements," polemics, etc. (but they are not completely useless, either, because they function like the error that by opposing truth affirms it).

§<20>. *The Popular Manual*. The fundamental issue is not dealt with: how does the historical movement arise out of the structures? Yet this is the crucial point of the whole question of historical materialism; it is the problem of the unity between society and "nature." The two propositions—(1) society does not set itself tasks unless the necessary and sufficient conditions [premises] for their successful completion already exist; (2) no form of society disappears until it has exhausted all its possibilities of development¹—should have been analyzed so as to bring forth their full significance and all their implications. Only on these grounds can all mechanistic views and every trace of superstitious belief in "miracles" be eliminated. On these grounds also one must pose the problem of the formation of social groups and of political parties and, in the final analysis, of the function of great personalities in history.

Cf. Notebook 11, §22.

§<21>. *The validity of ideologies*. Recall the assertion frequently made by Marx about the "solidity of popular beliefs" being a necessary element of a specific situation. He says, more or less:

"when this mode of thinking acquires the force of popular beliefs," etc.¹ (Look up these observations by Marx and analyze them in the context wherein they are expressed.) Marx also stated that a popular conviction often has as much energy as a material force, or something similar,² and it is very important. The analysis of these statements, in my view, lends support to the concept of "historical bloc" in which in fact the material forces are the content and ideologies are the form. This distinction between form and content is just heuristic because material forces would be historically inconceivable without form and ideologies would be individual fantasies without material forces.

§<22>. *The theory of comparative [and declining] costs.* One should check whether this theory—which, together with the other theory of static and dynamic equilibrium, occupies such an important place in modern official economics—is not perfectly compatible with [or the equivalent in different language of] the Marxist theory of value [and of the fall of the rate of profit]; in other words, whether it is its scientific equivalent in "pure" and official language (stripped of all political force for subaltern productive classes).

§<23>. *Graziadei's land of Cocaigne.* Finally, after thirty-five years, in his little book *Sindacati e salari*,³ Graziadei remembers to refer to the note on the land of Cocaigne that Croce had devoted to him in the essay "Recenti interpretazioni della teoria marxistica del valore" (p. 147 of the volume *Materialismo storico, etc.*, 4th ed.).¹ "Somewhat clumsy" is how Graziadei now describes his own example that Croce analyzed. In fact, Graziadei's notion of "a society in which profits exist not indeed with surplus labor but with no labor" is typical of all of Graziadei's recent work, and Rudas did well to quote it at the beginning of his essay in *Unter dem Banner* in 1926, in which he discusses *Prezzo e sovrapprezzo*.² (I no longer remember whether Rudas attributed this idea of essential value to him.) Graziadei's whole conception is based on this rickety principle that machines and material organization (by themselves) produce profit, that is, value. In 1894 (the article in *Critica Sociale* analyzed by Croce),³ his hypothesis was sweeping (all profit exists

³ In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "*Capitale e salari*."

without labor); now, the hypothesis is qualified (not all profit exists through labor), but the "clumsiness" (to call the primitive hypothesis merely "clumsy" is a sweet euphemism) remains, even if qualified. Graziadei's whole way of thinking is "clumsy"; he thinks like a pettifogging lawyer not like an economist. When dealing with Graziadei, one really needs to return to the fundamental principles of economics, to the logic of this science. Graziadei is a master in petty logic, in the art of caviling and sophistic casuistry, but he has no mastery of the art of grand logic, whether it be the logic of economics or the logic of any other branch of knowledge.

Graziadei's principle of the land of Cocaigne is the same principle that underlies the introduction of tariff barriers as a measure that "creates" profit margins and salary margins. Indeed, it is demonstrated (compare this with antiprotectionist literature) that without producing any "value" and without making a single worker do any work (except those who type the certificates for nonexistent shares), one can obtain large "profits" and distribute high "dividends" (cf., for ex., L. Einaudi and E. Giretti, "Le società anonime a catena," *Riforma Sociale*, January–February 1931).⁴ It remains to be seen who should deal with this "economic" activity (though it is "economic" in the Crocean sense, like brigandage, the mafia, etc.): economic science or the criminal courts?

Recall a polemic in *Critica Sociale* (before 1900, I think) between Graziadei and Luigi Negro in which Negro observed that Graziadei tends to accept public declarations by industrialists about their activity as "accurate" and to use them as a basis for scientific speculation.⁵

§<24>. *Structure and superstructure*. Economy and ideology. The assumption (put forward as an essential postulate of historical materialism) that one can present and explain every political and ideological fluctuation as a direct expression of the structure must be combated on the theoretical level as a primitive infantilism, or it should be combated in practice with the authentic testimony of Marx, the author of concrete political and historical works. Especially important, in this respect, are *The 18th Brumaire* and the writings on the Eastern Question but also others (*Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, *The Civil War in France*, and minor works).¹ An analysis of these works allows one to get a better grasp of Marx's historical method, integrating, illuminating, and interpreting the the-

oretical affirmations scattered throughout his works. It will make one aware of the many real precautions Marx introduces into his concrete researches, precautions that could have no place in the general works. (They could have a place only in a systematic, methodical exposition, such as Bernheim's. Bernheim's book can be regarded as a "model" for an educational handbook or "popular manual" of historical materialism that, in addition to the philological and scholarly method—which Bernheim adheres to, even while his presentation implicitly contains a conception of the world—also explicitly addresses the Marxist conception of history.)² From among Marx's precautions, the following can be listed as examples:

1. The difficulty of identifying the structure at any moment, statically (like an instantaneous photographic image). Politics is in fact always a reflection of the way the structure is tending to develop, but there is no guarantee that these tendencies will necessarily reach their fulfillment. A structural phase can be studied concretely and analyzed only after it has completed its whole process of development and not during the process itself, except hypothetically and with the explicit admission that one is only dealing with a hypothesis.

2. From (1) it can be inferred that a particular political act may have been an error of calculation on the part of the leaders of the dominant classes, an error that historical development corrects and moves beyond through the governmental parliamentary "crises" of the ruling classes. Mechanical historical materialism does not take the possibility of error into account; it assumes that every political act is determined directly by the structure and is therefore the reflection of a real and permanent (in the sense of secured) modification of the structure. The principle of "error" is complex: it could consist in an individual impulse stemming from a mistaken calculation, or it could also be the manifestation of the attempts (which may fail) of specific groups or cliques to attain hegemony within the leading group.

3. Not enough attention is given to the fact that many political acts are due to internal necessities of an organizational character; in other words, they are tied to the need to give coherence to a party, a group, or a society. The history of the Catholic Church provides a clear example of this. Imagine trying to find in the structure the primary, immediate explanation of every struggle that has taken place within the church—what a mess that would be! This is the stuff of much politico-economic fiction. It is obvious that most

discussions of this nature are connected with sectarian and organizational necessities. In the debate between Rome and Byzantium on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, it would be ridiculous to look in the structure of the European East for the affirmation that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father and equally ridiculous to look in the structure of the Western church for the affirmation that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.³ The two churches, whose existence [and whose conflict] is dependent on the structure and on the whole of history, posed questions that for each one of them are principles of distinction and internal cohesion, but it could have happened that each of the two churches affirmed what the other one did. The principle of distinction and conflict would have been maintained all the same; it is this problem of distinction and conflict that constitutes the historical problem, and not the banner that the opposing sides happen to unfurl.

The "asterisk" who writes ideological serial novels in *Problemi del Lavoro* (who must be the notorious Franz Weiss) touches on these very same controversies of early Christian times in his amusing, rambling piece "Il dumping russo e il suo significato storico."⁴ He asserts that the controversies were connected with the immediate material conditions of the time and that if we are unable to identify the direct connection, it is either because the facts are very far removed from us or because of some other intellectual shortcoming. This is a convenient position but scientifically irrelevant. In fact, every real historical phase leaves traces of itself in the succeeding phases, which in turn become its best document, in a certain sense. The process of historical development is a unity in time, which is why the present contains the whole of the past and what is "essential" of the past realizes itself in the present, without any "unknowable" residue that would constitute its real "essence." Whatever is lost—that is, what was not transmitted dialectically in the historical process—was in itself irrelevant, it was casual and contingent "dross," it pertained to chronicle not history, a superficial episode and, in the final analysis, negligible.

§<25>. *The objectivity of the real.* In order to understand precisely what significance this concept might have, it seems to me opportune to dwell on the example of the concepts of "East" and "West," which never cease to be "objectively real" even though when analyzed they turn out to be nothing more than a "historical" or "conventional construct." (The terms

"artificial" and "conventional" often indicate "historical" facts, products of the development of civilization and not just rationalistically arbitrary or individually arbitrary constructions.) Recall Bertrand Russell's little book (Ed. Sonzogno, in a new series on science, number 5 or 6) on neorealistic philosophy and the example he gives. Russell says, more or less: "Without the existence of men on earth, we cannot think of the existence of London and Edinburgh, but we can think of the existence of two spots, one to the North and one to the South, where London and Edinburgh now are."¹ It could be objected that without thinking of the existence of man, one cannot think of "thinking," one cannot think of any fact or relationship that exists only insofar as man exists.

From this perspective, however, the most typical situations are the North-South and, in particular, the East-West relationships. These are real relations, and yet they would not exist without man and without the development of civilization. It is obvious that East and West are arbitrary and conventional [(historical)] constructions,² since [outside of real history] every spot on the earth is simultaneously East and West. Japan is probably the Far East not only for the European but also for the American from California, and even for the Japanese himself, who, through English political culture, might call Egypt the Near East, which from his viewpoint should be the far West, etc. Furthermore, the purely historical nature of the significance attached to these terms can be seen from the fact that the words "East" and "West" have now acquired a supernumerary meaning and even refer to relations between whole civilizations. Thus the nations of Mediterranean Europe that are to the east of Morocco designate Morocco as an Oriental country—and in this case "Oriental" means "Muslim," "Arab," even "Asiatic," etc. Yet these references are real, they correspond to real facts, they allow one to travel by land and by sea and to arrive at the predetermined destination, to foresee the future, to "objectivize reality," to understand the "real objectivity of the external world." The rational and the real become one and the same thing. It seems to me that unless one understands this relationship, it would be impossible to understand historical materialism, its philosophical position vis-à-vis traditional materialism and idealism, and the importance and significance of superstructures. Notwithstanding what Croce says, Marx did not replace the Hegelian "idea" with the "concept" of structure.² The Hegelian idea is [resolved] both in the structure and in the superstructures, and the whole [traditional (and not just Hegelian)] conception of philosophy is "historicized"; it has been made a reality by a different linguistic articulation and therefore by a different philosophy—[if] philosophy is taken to mean [a system of] "concepts" concerning reality.

Cf. Notebook 11, §20.

¹ In the manuscript, Gramsci at first wrote "*fissazioni*" (fixations); he inserted "*costruzioni*" (constructions) as a variant between the lines.

§<26>. *On the Popular Manual*. A list of the intellectuals whose philosophy is broadly challenged and annotations on their significance and scientific importance. Very fleeting references to great intellectuals. The question arises: was it not necessary, instead, to deal exclusively with the great intellectual adversaries, or even with just one of them, and to ignore the minor ones? One gets the impression that the book seeks to combat only the weakest adversaries or the weakest positions (or those positions that have been most inadequately expressed by the weakest adversaries) in order to secure an easy victory (if there is any victory at all). It imparts the illusion that there is more than just a formal resemblance between an ideological front and a politico-military front. In a political and military struggle, it might be appropriate to adopt the tactic of breaking through the points of least resistance in order to be able to strike at the most important point with maximum forces, which one would have at one's disposal thanks, precisely, to the elimination of the weaker "auxiliaries," etc. Political and military victories are, to a certain extent, permanent; the strategic goal can be attained decisively, up to a certain point. On the ideological front, however, the defeat of auxiliaries and minor supporters is infinitely less important; on the ideological front, one must do battle with the most eminent of one's adversaries, not the weaker ones. Otherwise, one mistakes newspapers for books and daily polemics for scientific work. The minor figures in fact must be abandoned to polemics of the journalistic type. A new science, on the other hand, proves its efficacy and vitality when it demonstrates its ability to confront the great champions of the opposite camp, when it solves the crucial problems they have posed while relying only on its own means, or when it shows decisively that theirs are false problems.

It is true that average intellectuals, that is, mediocre intellectuals, are the most representative of a given epoch and a given civilization. Widespread, mass ideology, however, must be distinguished from scientific works, from the great philosophical syntheses that are the real cornerstones. And it is the latter that must be definitively surpassed—either negatively, by showing them to be unfounded, or positively, by offsetting them with equally significant and important philosophical syntheses. The negative and the positive critiques cannot be separated, other than for heuristic purposes. Reading the *Popular Manual* one has the impression of someone who is bored, who is kept from sleeping by the moonlight, and who busies himself slaying fireflies in the belief that the brightness will dim or go away.

Cf. Notebook 11, §22.

§<27>. *Graziadei and the land of Cocaigne*. See in Papini's *Gog* (interview with Ford, p. 24) the words attributed to Ford: "Manu-

facture, with no workers, an ever greater number of objects that cost almost nothing."¹

§<28>. *Civil society and political society*. The separation of civil society from political society: a new problem of hegemony has been posed; in other words, the historical basis of the state has been displaced. There is an extreme form of political society: either to combat the new and preserve what is tottering by consolidating it coercively or, as an expression of the new, to smash the resistances it encounters in its expansion, etc.

§<29>. *On the Popular Manual*. Is it possible to write a basic textbook, a handbook, a popular manual of a doctrine when it is still at the stage of discussion, controversy, and elaboration? A popular manual cannot be conceived other than as a formally dogmatic, stylistically dispassionate, and scientifically objective exposition of a given subject. It is an introduction to scientific study and not the exposition itself of the original scientific research. It is intended for young people or for a public whose scientific training is not any more advanced than that of young people. This public, then, has an immediate need for "certainties," for opinions that appear as veracious and indisputable, for the moment. If a particular doctrine has not yet reached this "classical" phase of its development, every effort to put it in the form of a manual is bound to fail; its logical systemization will be a mere facade. It will be just like the *Popular Manual*: a mechanical juxtaposition of disparate elements that remain inexorably isolated and disjointed. Why, then, not pose the question in its correct historical and theoretical terms and be content with publishing a book in which each essential problem of the doctrine is treated in a monographic way? That would be more serious and more "scientific." But there are those who believe that science must absolutely mean "system," and therefore they construct all kinds of systems that have only the mechanical outward appearance of a system.

It is remarkable that the *Popular Manual* lacks an adequate treatment of dialectics. The dialectic is presupposed but not expounded. This is absurd because a manual should contain the essential elements of the doctrine it treats, and its bibliographical references should be aimed at stimulating a broader and deeper knowledge of the subject and not at replacing the manual itself. The problem of the failure to deal with the "dialectic" could have two sources:

1. The first is the fact that historical materialism is not conceived as a philosophy whose theory of knowledge is the dialectic but rather as a "so-

ciology" whose philosophy is philosophical, or metaphysical, or mechanical (which Marx called vulgar) materialism. Once this view is adopted, it is no longer possible to understand the importance and significance of the dialectic, which gets downgraded to a subspecies of formal logic and elementary scholastics. One cannot truly understand the fundamental function and significance of the dialectic unless historical materialism is conceived as an integral original philosophy that initiates a new phase of history and a new phase in the development of world thought—in the sense that it surpasses both traditional idealism and traditional materialism (and in surpassing them retains their vital elements), which were the expressions of old societies that have succeeded one another in the course of world history. If one can only conceive of the philosophy of historical materialism in subordination to [another] philosophy, then it is impossible to understand the Marxist dialectic, which is, precisely, the realization and the expression of the surpassing of traditional idealism and traditional materialism by historical materialism.

2. The second source, it seems to me, is psychological. One gets the sense that the dialectic is something very arduous and difficult insofar as it goes against vulgar common sense that expresses itself through formal logic, is dogmatic, and eagerly seeks absolute certainties. To take a concrete example, imagine what would happen if in primary and secondary schools the natural and cosmographic sciences were taught on the basis of Einsteinian relativity and the traditional notion of the "law of nature" was accompanied by that of "statistical law" or the "law of large numbers." The children and the adolescents would not understand a thing, and the clash between school teaching and the way of thinking within the family and among the populace would be such that the school would become an object of mockery, skepticism, and caricature. I believe that this resulted in a psychological brake for the author of the *Popular Manual*: he really capitulated before common sense and vulgar thought, for he did not pose the issue in correct theoretical terms and was therefore practically disarmed and impotent. The uneducated and crude environment has exercised control over the educator; vulgar common sense has imposed itself on science instead of the other way round. If the environment is the educator, it must in turn be educated, as Marx wrote,¹ but the *Popular Manual* does not comprehend this revolutionary dialectic.

Cf. Notebook 11, §22.

§<30>. *On Graziadei*. In order to refute Graziadei, one has to go back to the basic concepts of economics. (1) It must be acknowledged that economic science starts from the hypothesis of a particular market (whether it be a purely competitive market or a monopo-

listic market), except that one must then determine what variations might be introduced into this constant by this or that element of reality, which is never "pure." (2) What one studies is the real production of new wealth and not the redistribution of existing wealth (unless one really wants to study this redistribution)—that is, the production of value and not the redistribution of value that has already been distributed on the basis of a determined production.

Furthermore, Graziadei's political and scientific biography must be thoroughly researched. His book on Chilean nitrates: he was incapable of thinking of the possibility of the synthetic production of nitrogen that breached the Chilean monopoly.¹ It would be interesting to take another look at the peremptory assertions he made on this monopoly. As for his political position, see Graziadei's response to the survey conducted by *Viandante* in 1908-1909: Graziadei was the most right-wing and opportunistic.² His pamphlet on trade unionism: the model for Graziadei—he, the liquidator of the party—was the English labor movement.³ His postwar position: a curious phenomenon of the psychology of an intellectual who, "intellectually" convinced of the asininity of political reformism, detached himself from it and opposed it. But the sphere of abstract intelligence is one thing, whereas the sphere of practice and action is something else. In the scientific field: after 1922 he found the grounds for withdrawal and a return to his prewar position. Hence the question: is it fair to look into a man's past for all the errors he made and then use the information against him in a current polemic? Is it not human to err? Indeed, have the prominent scientists of our time not been formed through trial and error? And isn't everyone's life story, for the most part, a struggle against the past and an overcoming of the past? Is it fair to remind someone who is now an atheist that he was once baptized and that he had practiced his religion up to a certain age? Graziadei's case, however, is entirely different. He has been very careful not to criticize his past and to put it behind him. In the field of economics, he kept quiet for a while, or, rather, he maintained that "current practice" confirmed his theories on the rate of centralization of capital in the countryside. (He arrived at his conclusions on the superiority of sharecropping over centralized capitalist enterprise—which is tantamount to arguing for the superiority of artisan production over the factory system—based on his analysis not only of the Romagna but even of Imola. He failed to take into account the fact that, as the 1911 census revealed,⁴ the *obbligato* had all but disappeared

between 1901 and 1910.⁵ Moreover, Graziadei failed to consider the political-protectionist factors that determined conditions in the Po Valley; capital was so scarce in Italy that it would have required nothing less than a miracle to get large amounts of capital for agricultural use.)

In politics he used a sophisticated dodge, claiming that he was a "historicist" or "in touch with the times" [if the hangman rules, make sure you're the hangman's assistant—that's Graziadei's historicism]; in other words, he never had any principles. During the years 1895–1914, one "had to be" a laborite; after the war, one had to be antilabor, etc. Remember how boringly repetitive Graziadei was with his declarations about "unproductive military expenditures," which, he boasted, he had always opposed as foolhardy and demagogic. How did he oppose it when he was in favor of joining the government? Similarly, one should take note of his pessimistic-gossipy view of "Italians" in general: they are all shiftless, cowardly, socially inferior beings, etc.—a stupid, banal and defeatist view, a form of antirhetoric that, in reality, is the truly depressing rhetoric of a fake shrewdness, in the manner of Stenterello-Machiavelli.⁶ It is undeniable that in Italy there exists a particularly repugnant petty bourgeois stratum, but does this stratum constitute the whole of Italy? A stupid generalization. Graziadei's historical materialism resembles Ferri's, Niceforo's, Lombroso's, and Sergi's,⁷ and there is no need to spell out what historical function their biological conception of "barbarism" applied to Southerners (rather, to filthy Southerners)⁸ has had in the politics of Italy's ruling class.

§<31>. *On literary criticism*. De Sanctis's model of criticism. When dealing with this topic, recall De Sanctis's essay *Scienza e Vita*¹ (which also provides a way for raising the issue of the unity of theory and practice) and the debates it instigated—e.g., L. Russo's 1928 (or 1929) article in *Leonardo*.² See also Russo's study *Francesco De Sanctis e l'Università di Napoli*, Casa Ed. La Nuova Italia.³

§<32>. *Henri De Man*. Arturo Masoero's article "Un americano non edonista" (in *Economia*, February 1931)¹ shows that many of the views propounded by H. De Man in *Gioia del lavoro*—and therefore in other books of his as well²—are derived from the theories of the American economist Thorstein Veblen, who brought into

economics some sociological principles of positivism, in particular Comte's and Spencer's; Veblen is especially keen to introduce evolutionary theory into economics. Thus we discover that Veblen's "instinct of workmanship" becomes what De Man calls the "creative instinct."³ In 1890 W. James had set forth the notion of an "instinct of constructiveness,"⁴ and even earlier Voltaire had spoken of a mechanical instinct. (Compare De Man's crude conception of "instinct" to what Marx wrote about the instinct of bees and what distinguishes humans from this instinct.)⁵ It appears that De Man has also borrowed from Veblen the crude and astonishing conception of "animism" in workers to which he keeps returning in *Gioia del lavoro*. This is how Masoero describes Veblen's concept:

Among primitive peoples, mythic interpretation ceases to be an obstacle, and it often becomes a help in the development of techniques of agriculture and animal husbandry. The belief that plants and animals are endowed with a soul or have divine characteristics works to the advantage of development because it leads to the kind of care and attention that can bring about technical improvements and innovations. An animist mentality, on the other hand, is definitely inimical to technical progress in manufacturing, to the exercise of the worker's instinct on inert matter. Thus Veblen explains how in Denmark, at the beginning of the Neolithic age, agricultural technique was already at an advanced stage whereas no advances were made in manufacturing technique for a long time. At the present time, the instinct of the worker, freed from belief in the operations of providential and mysterious forces, must be joined to a positive spirit and achieve the kind of progress in the industrial arts that typifies the modern era.⁶

It appears, then, that De Man took the idea of an "animism of the worker" from Veblen, who believes that this "animism" existed in the Neolithic age but no longer exists today, and De Man, with great originality, has rediscovered it in the modern worker.

It is remarkable, given these Spencerian roots of De Man's, that Croce has so consistently regarded De Man as someone who has superseded Marxism, etc. Standing between Spencer and Freud, who goes back to a more mysterious form of sensualism than that of the eighteenth century,⁷ De Man has deserved, of all things, to be eulogized by Croce, who enjoined intelligent Italians to study him.⁸ A translation of Veblen, promoted by the Hon. Bottai, has been announced.⁹ In any case, this article by Masoero contains a note that provides the essential bibliography. From the treatment of Veblen

in this article, it is possible to see a certain influence of Marxism on Veblen. It seems that Veblen has also influenced Ford's theories.

§<33>. *Posing the issue*. Production of [new] weltanschauungen that enrich and nourish the culture of a historical epoch and the kind of production that is philosophically oriented along the lines of the original weltanschauungen. Marx is the creator of a weltanschauung, but what is Ilyich's position?¹ Is it purely subordinate and subaltern? The answer is to be found in Marxism itself—science and action. The passage from utopia to science and from science to action (remember Karl Radek's^a pamphlet on this subject).² The establishment of a class of leaders (that is, of a state) is equivalent to the creation of a weltanschauung. The statement that the German proletariat is the heir of German classical philosophy: how is it to be understood?³ Was it not Marx's intention to indicate that the function of his philosophy—which became a theory of class—would become a state? For Ilyich, this actually transpired in a particular territory. I have referred elsewhere to the philosophical importance of the concept and fact of hegemony, attributable to Ilyich.⁴ The realization of hegemony means the real critique of a philosophy, its real dialectic. Cf. Graziadei's^b introduction to *Prezzo e sovrapprezzo*.⁵ [Graziadei is backward in comparison with Mons. Olgiati, who, in his small book on Marx, finds that he can only compare him with Jesus—a comparison that, coming from a prelate, is really the greatest possible concession, since he believes in the divine nature of Christ.]⁶ Graziadei places Marx as just one individual in a series of great learned men.⁷ Fundamental error: none of the others has produced an original and integral conception of the world. Marx initiates intellectually a historical era that will probably last for centuries, that is, until the demise of political society and the advent of regulated society. Only then will his conception of the world be superseded (the conception of necessity <superseded> by the conception of liberty). To set up a comparison between Marx and Ilyich in order to establish a hierarchy is foolish and pointless. They are the expression of two phases: science and action, that are simultaneously homogeneous and heterogeneous. Likewise, from a

^a In the manuscript, "Carlo Rad."

^b At this point in the manuscript, Gramsci placed a reference to a footnote that is inscribed at the bottom of the page; this is here incorporated into the body of the text in square brackets like other interlinear insertions and additions made by Gramsci in the manuscript.

historical standpoint, a parallel between Christ and St. Paul would be absurd. Christ—weltanschauung; and St. Paul—organization, action, expansion of the weltanschauung. They are both equally necessary and of the same historical stature. Christianity could be called, historically, Christianity-Paulinism, which would be a more accurate appellation. (The only thing that has prevented this from happening is the belief in the divinity of Christ, but this belief is itself a historical factor, not a theoretical one.)

§<34>. *The tendential fall in the rate of profit.* This may be called (perhaps) a theorem of first approximation, but does that make it less important? This theorem should be studied on the basis of Taylorism and Fordism. Don't these two modes of activity constitute an effort to overcome the first approximation? Constant capital is increased, but in this increase there is a variable that immediately erases the effect of the law—one or more variables, such as the production of more perfect machines, of more resistant metals, of a different type of worker or the reduction of waste and the utilization of by-products (that is, in general, the saving of [unavoidable] waste made possible by its great quantity). With each one of these innovations, the industrialist passes from a period of increasing costs to a period of declining costs, insofar as he comes to enjoy a monopoly of initiative that can last a (relatively) long time. The long duration of the monopoly is also due to the "high wages" that these progressive industrialists can and "must" pay in order to be able to recruit, from the existing mass of workers, those who are most "psycho-physically" suitable for the new forms of work and production. The extension of the new model of production leads to a series of crises, giving rise once again to the same problems as "the tendential fall in the rate of profit," problems that one can envisage recurring cyclically until: (1) one runs up against the mathematical limit of the resistance of the material; (2) the use of automatic machines reaches its limit; (3) world industrialization reaches the point of saturation (bearing in mind the rate of increase in population and the production for the renewal of consumer goods and equipment).

The tendential law discovered by Marx could thus be seen to underlie Americanism, that is, the accelerated pace of progress in the methods of work and of production and in the modification of the typical worker.¹

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.vii.

§<35>. *Materialism and historical materialism.* If isolated, Feuerbach's statement "Man is what he eats,"¹ can be interpreted

in various ways. A narrow and stupid interpretation: man is what he eats materially on each occasion; that is, food has an immediate determining influence on the way of thinking. Remember Amadeo's assertion that if one knew what a man had eaten before making a speech, for example, one would be better able to interpret the speech itself.² An infantile assertion that does not even properly belong to positivist science because the brain is not nourished by beans and truffles; instead, food reconstitutes the molecules of the brain only after it has been transformed into homogeneous and assimilable substances that are potentially of the "same nature" as the molecules of the brain. If this assertion were true, the determining matrix of history would be the kitchen, and revolutions would coincide with radical changes in nutrition among the masses. Historically, the opposite has happened: it is revolutions and the complex developments of history that have brought about changes in nutrition and created the successive "tastes" in the choice of foods. It was not the regular sowing of wheat that brought about the end of nomadism, but vice versa; the emergence of conditions unfavorable to nomadism spurred regular sowing. (Compare Feuerbach's assertion with His Excellency Marinetti's campaign against pasta and His Excellency Bontempelli's polemic in defense of pasta—all of this in 1930, at the height of the international crisis.)³

On the other hand, it is also true that "man is what he eats" insofar as nutrition is one expression of the ensemble of social relations and every social group has its own basic dietary system. This, however, is just like saying that "man is what he wears,"⁴ "man is his housing," or "man is his particular way of reproducing himself, that is, his family," for nutrition, clothing, housing, and reproduction are components of social life that do indeed reveal the ensemble of social relations in the most obvious and broadest (that is, at a mass level) manner.

The problem of what man is, then, is always the so-called problem of "human nature," or of so-called man in general; in other words, it is the attempt to create a science of man (a philosophy) that has for its starting point a "unitary" concept, an abstraction capable of containing everything "human." But is the "human"—as a concept and as a unitary fact—a starting point or a point of arrival? Or, rather, isn't the attempt to posit the "human" as a starting point a "theological" and "metaphysical" residue? Philosophy cannot be reduced to a naturalistic "anthropology"; that is to say, the unity of humankind is not given by the "biological" nature of man. In

history, the biological differences that matter are not reducible to biology. (Race, cranial structure, skin color, etc.—this is what the affirmation “man is what he eats” boils down to. In other words, man eats wheat in Europe, rice in Asia, etc.—and this in turn is reducible to the assertion that “man is the country he lives in,” since one’s nutritional system is generally connected with the land one inhabits.) Furthermore, “biological unity” has never counted for much in history. (Man is the animal that has eaten himself precisely when he came closest to the “state of nature,” in other words, when he could not “artificially” multiply the production of natural goods.) Nor have the “faculty of reason” or the “mind” created unity, and they cannot be regarded as a unitary fact since they are a formal, categorical concept. It is not “thought” but what people really think that unites humans or makes them different.

That “human nature” is the “ensemble of social relations” is the most satisfying answer, because it includes the idea of becoming—man becomes, he changes continuously with the changing of social relations—and because it negates “man in general.” Indeed, social relations are expressed by diverse groups of men that presuppose one another, and their unity is dialectical, not formal. Man is aristocratic insofar as man is a serf, etc. (Cf. Plekhanov’s pamphlet on the libertarians; see whether he focuses on the dialectical character of this.)⁵ One could also say that the nature of man is “history” (and, in this sense, since history = spirit, that the nature of man is the spirit), if history is taken to mean, precisely, “becoming” in a “concordia discors” that does not have unity for its point of departure but contains in itself the reasons for a possible unity. Therefore, “human nature” cannot be found in any particular human being but in the entire history of the human species (and the use of the word “species,” with its naturalistic timbre, is itself significant). In each single individual, on the other hand, one finds characteristics that are brought into relief by their discrepancy with the characteristics of others. The conceptions of “spirit” in traditional philosophy and “human nature” in biology should be explained as “scientific utopias” that took the place of the greater utopia of “human nature” that was sought in God (and in men—sons of God), and they serve to point out the continual travail of history, a rational or sentimental aspiration. It is true that the religions that affirm the equality of men as God’s sons as well as the philosophies that affirm the equality of men as participants in the faculty of reason have been expressions of complex revolutionary movements (the

transformation of the classical world—the transformation of the medieval world) that put in place the most powerful links in the chain of historical development.

Underlying the most recent philosophies with a utopian basis, like Croce's, is the view that Hegel's dialectic was the [last] reflection of these great historical nodes and that the dialectic, an expression of social contradictions, should become, with the disappearance of these contradictions, a pure conceptual dialectic. In history, true equality—that is, the degree of "spirituality" attained by the historical process of "human nature"—is to be identified in the system of explicit and implicit "private and public" associations that are woven together in the "state" and in the world political system. These are "equalities" that are felt as such among the members of an association and "inequalities" that are felt between associations—equalities and inequalities that count insofar as individuals and groups are conscious of them. Thus one arrives also at the equality of, or the equation between, "philosophy and politics," thought and action, that is, at a philosophy of praxis. Everything is political, even philosophy or philosophies (see the notes on the character of ideologies),⁶ and the only "philosophy" is history in action, life itself. It is in this sense that one can interpret the thesis that the German proletariat was the heir of classical German philosophy⁷—and one can affirm that Ilyich's theorization and realization of hegemony was also a great "metaphysical" event.⁸

§<36>. *The Popular Manual. Metaphor and language.* (Cf. another note on the crude and unqualified assertion made in the *Popular Manual*, as a self-sufficient explanation, that Marx uses the terms "immanence" and "immanent" only as metaphors.)¹ All language is metaphor, and it is metaphorical in two senses: it is a metaphor of the "thing" or "material and sensible object" referred to, and it is a metaphor of the ideological meanings attached to words in the preceding periods of civilization. (A treatise on semantics—for ex., Michel Bréal's²—can provide a catalog of the semantic mutations of different words.) The failure to take this into account leads to major errors in approach (not to mention errors of a more specific sort, such as maintaining that certain words as opposed to others are "beautiful" in themselves insofar as they are analyzed historically and etymologically: the bookish "joy" of the philologist who swoons over his little words with aesthetic "joy," as in the case of the return to rhetoric in Giulio Bertoni's little book *Linguaggio e poesia*):³ (1) the error of regarding languages as fixed or universal; (2) the misguided questions raised by

Pareto and the pragmatists about "language as a source of error." Pareto and the pragmatists, as well as others of lesser importance, believe that they have originated a new conception of the world (and hence that they have given words a new meaning or at least a different nuance) and thus find themselves confronted with the fact that words as they are commonly used—and also as they are used by the educated classes and by learned people working in the same discipline—continue to retain their old meaning. They react: Pareto creates his own "dictionary" that epitomizes the tendency to create a mathematical language, that is, a totally abstract language. The pragmatists make a philosophical issue out of this, and they theorize about language as a source of error.⁴

But is it possible to strip language of its metaphorical meaning? It is impossible. Language is transformed with the transformation of the whole of civilization, and it absorbs the words of previous civilizations and cultures as, precisely, metaphors. Nobody today thinks that "dis-aster" is related to astrology or claims to be misled about the views of those who use the word. The new metaphorical meaning spreads with the spread of the new culture, which moreover coins new words or gives a precise meaning to words acquired from other languages. It is probable that for many people the word "immanence" is known, understood [and used] for the first time only in the sense given to it by historical materialism.

Cf. Notebook 11, §24.

§<37>. *Goethe*. Find out where and in what sense Goethe stated: "How can a man arrive at self-knowledge? Through contemplation? Certainly not; rather, by action."¹

§<38>. *Examination of the concept of human nature*. Origins of the feeling of "equality": religion with its idea of God-father and men-sons and therefore equal; philosophy according to the aphorism: "Omnis enim philosophia, cum ad communem hominum cogitandi facultatem revocet, per se democratica est; ideoque ab optimatibus non iniuria sibi existimatur perniciosa."¹ Biological science, which affirms the "natural," that is, psycho-physical, equality of all the individual members of the human "species": everyone is born in the same way, etc. "Man is mortal; John Doe is a man; John Doe is mortal." John Doe = all men. Herein lies the origin of the empirical-scientific (empirical = folkloristic science) formula: "we are all born naked."

Remember Chesterton's short story in *The Innocence of Father Brown* about the postman and the little man who constructs fabulous machines. In the story, there is an observation of the following sort: "An old lady lives in a castle with twenty servants. She is visited by another lady to whom she says, 'I am always so lonely, etc.' The doctor tells her that the plague is spreading, people are getting infected, etc., and then she says, 'There are so many of us.'"² (Chesterton uses this vignette purely for the purposes of the narrative plot.)

§<39>. Croce. One cannot fully endorse Croce's theorization of the element of "passion" as source of the political act. Croce states, apropos of Sorel: "The 'sense of cleavage' was not enough to safeguard it [syndicalism], maybe because among other things a theorized cleavage is a superseded cleavage; nor did the 'myth' get him sufficiently enthused, maybe because in the very act of creating the 'myth' and explaining it doctrinally, Sorel dissipated it" (cf. *Cultura e Vita morale*, 2d ed., p. 158).¹ The observations on Sorel are also applicable to Croce: is "passion," once theorized, not superseded as well? Is "passion" not similarly "dissipated" when explained doctrinally? And one cannot say that Croce's "passion" is a different thing from Sorel's "myth," that "passion" means "the category or the spiritual moment of practice" whereas "myth" is a "specific" passion that, insofar as it is "specific," can be dissipated and superseded while, at the same time, the "category" is not dissipated and "superseded." The objection is only partially true, in the obvious and banal sense that Croce is not Sorel. Sorel did not theorize a specific myth but "the myth" as the substance of practical action, and then he went on to identify the specific myth that was most fitting for a certain reality from a historical and psychological point of view. Sorel's approach, then, has two aspects: a strictly theoretical aspect, pertaining to political science, and a practical-political aspect. It is possible, though debatable, that the practical-political aspect has been dissipated and superseded; today, one can say it has been superseded, though only in the sense that it has been integrated, but the specific myth had a real basis. In any case, there is still the "theory of myths," which is nothing other than the "theory of passions" articulated in less precise and formally coherent language. If theorizing myth means dissolving all myths, then theorizing the passions means dissipating all passions and constructing a new medicine of the passions. One can see that Croce has not escaped these contradictions and that he is aware of it by looking at his attitude toward "political parties" as evinced by the chapter "Il partito come giudizio e come pregiudizio" in *Cultura e Vita morale* and, even more significantly, by what he says about the parties in *Elementi*

di politica.² Croce reduces parties to "individual" party leaders whose "passion" motivates them to construct the instrument that would carry them to victory.³ But this does not explain anything, either. The issue is this: parties have always existed, albeit in other forms and under different names, and furthermore there has always been a permanent military organization, which is the "political actor" par excellence. How does one reconcile "passion" with "permanence, order, discipline, etc."? Political will must have some other mainspring besides passion.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.v.

§<40>. *Nationalizations and state takeovers*. Cf. M. Saitzew, *Die öffentliche Unternehmung der Gegenwart*, Tübingen, Mohor, 1930, RM. 3.40.¹ Saitzew is a professor at the University of Zurich. According to Saitzew, the scope of the operations of public enterprises is much more extensive than is generally believed, and this is especially true of certain branches. In Germany, the capital of public enterprises amounts to one-fifth of the total national wealth (public enterprise expanded during the war and the immediate postwar period). Saitzew does not believe that public enterprises are a form of socialism; in his view, they are an integral part of capitalism. Objections leveled against public enterprises can also be directed against joint-stock companies. Arguments that were applicable to individually owned private companies are still repeated, even though joint-stock companies are now prevalent, etc.

This booklet will be useful for examining the expansion of public enterprises in certain countries. According to Saitzew, the main purpose of public enterprises is not to produce revenue; rather, they are meant to prevent the establishment of private monopolies in certain sectors in which competition is technically impossible—monopolies that would be dangerous for the community.

§<41>. *Economics*. This should be a very interesting book: Henryk Grossmann, *Des Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems (Zugleich eine Krientheorie)*, in "Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt a. M.," Verlag C. L. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1929, xvi-628pp., RM. 20. It has been reviewed by Stefano Samogyi in the *Economia* of March 1931 (pp. 327-32).¹ The review is not very bright, and perhaps one should not trust its summaries (Samogyi uses "tend-

ing toward" and "tendentious" interchangeably, and "collapse" for "catastrophe," and he inserts pseudotheoretical assertions that only Gino Arias would agree with, etc.).² Nevertheless, I will extract some points from it (while bearing in mind that they will be revised later in light of Grossmann's text). [See further on.]³

§<42>. *Elliptical comparison!* The theory of value set forth by M<arx> is not an elliptical comparison, contrary to the way Croce would like to explain it;¹ in fact, it is (as Graziadei pointed out in *Sindacati e Salari*)^a a development of the theory of Ricardo, who was certainly not making an "elliptical comparison."² Even so, this way of correcting Croce is not, in my view, entirely satisfactory. Is the theory of M<arx> arbitrary? If so, wherein lies its arbitrariness? Could it be that there is inadvertently a grain of truth in the way Croce unfolds his demonstration of the elliptical comparison? Ricardo's theory must be studied thoroughly, especially his theory of the state as the guarantor of property, that is, of the monopoly of the means of production. Doesn't the study of the hypothesis of pure "economics"—which is what Ricardo probably meant to conduct—require that one set aside any consideration of "states" (I say "states" intentionally) and of the "legal" monopoly of property? Thus we are not dealing in any way with an "elliptical comparison" made by M<arx> as the "proponent" of a future social structure different from the one he studied but with a theory that ensues from the reduction of economic facts to their pure "economic nature"—that is, to the maximum determination of the "free play of economic forces." There is no doubt that Ricardo, like the other classical economists, was extremely open-minded and his labor theory of value was not at all shocking to his contemporaries. (Cf. Gide and Rist's *History*;³ it was not dangerous in any way, because it appeared to be and was a purely objective account, it acquired its polemical value, without losing its objectivity, with M<arx>, etc.) This problem is tied to the fundamental problem of "pure" economic science—that is, to the problem of searching for and identifying the economic concept and economic fact that are independent of other concepts and facts that pertain to other sciences. And the economic fact means nothing other than the fact of "production and distribution of material economic goods"; it does not mean all those facts that can be embraced by the concept of "economy" as it is employed by Croce (for whom even love, for ex., is an economic fact, etc.).⁴

Apropos of "elliptical comparisons," it should also be pointed out that the whole of language is a series of "elliptical comparisons" and that history is an implicit comparison between the past and the present (historical

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "*Capitale e salari*."

actuality). And why is ellipsis illegitimate when one makes a comparison with a hypothesis about the future, whereas it is legitimate when one makes a comparison with a past fact? (When, as in this case, the past is taken as a "hypothesis," that is, as a point of reference that enables one to better understand the present?) (This point needs to be probed.)

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §38 and 41.vi.

§<43>. *Reformation and Renaissance*. The more I reflect on these models of cultural development, the more they seem to be a comprehensive and important critical point of reference (because of their pedagogical value of suggestion). It is clear that one cannot understand the molecular process by which a new culture asserts itself in the contemporary world unless one has understood the Reformation-Renaissance historical nexus. The superficiality of Liefscitz's article introducing the bibliographical periodical published by Rivière (*La Critique Sociale*).¹ Liefscitz, it seems to me, has a poor grasp of Marxism; his understanding of it can truly be called "bureaucratic." Clichés abound, uttered with the haughtiness of a self-satisfied individual who believes himself to be above criticism and never doubts that he is invariably the source of extraordinarily brilliant and original verities. He provides a (superficial) critique from the point of view of the (half-baked) intellectual. The politician, as Liefscitz sees him, is not so much the great statesman as the great intellectual, in the literary sense. But who was the greater intellectual, Bismarck or Barrès?² Who brought about the greatest changes in the cultural world? Liefscitz has no clue what this is all about; he does not even understand the issue, which he formulates badly. For sure, this is about the effort to develop an elite, but that effort cannot be separated from the effort to educate the great masses. Indeed, these efforts are in fact one and the same, and that is precisely why this is a difficult problem (recall Rosa's article on the scientific development of Marxism and the reasons why it stagnated).³ In short, this is about having a Reformation and a Renaissance at the same time. For Liefscitz, this problem is simply a reason for defeatism, and is it not in fact plainly defeatist to find that everything is going badly without pointing out, in a critical manner, how one might solve the problem? An "intellectual"—and Liefscitz believes himself to be one—has a way of formulating the problem and resolving it: by working concretely to produce those scientific works

that he bitterly laments are lacking, instead of just calling on others (whom?) to do the work. Nor can Liefscitz pretend that his periodical constitutes such work—though it could be a useful undertaking if it were written with modesty, more self-critically, and with a better critical sense overall. A periodical is a “ground” for initiating work on a solution to a cultural problem; it is not itself the solution. Furthermore, a periodical must have a precise direction and thus enable the collective work of an intellectual group—there is no evidence of any of this in Liefscitz’s periodical. It is much easier to review books than to write them. Nevertheless, it is a useful activity, but can a career “book reviewer” be anything other than a defeatist when he wails inconsolably over the fact that “others” do not write books? What if the others, too, prefer to write “reviews”?

§<44>. *Reformation and Renaissance*. To show that the process of the molecular formation of a new civilization currently under way may be compared to the Reformation movement, one could analyze, among other things, selected aspects of the two phenomena. The historico-cultural node that needs to be sorted out in the study of the Reformation is the transformation of the concept of grace from something that should “logically” result in the greatest fatalism and passivity into a real practice of enterprise and initiative on a world scale that was [instead] its dialectical consequence and that shaped the ideology of nascent capitalism. But now we are seeing the same thing happening with the concept of historical materialism. For many critics, its only “logical” outcome is fatalism and passivity; in reality, however, it gives rise to a blossoming of initiatives and enterprises that astonish many observers (cf. the *Economist* supplement by Michael Farbman).¹ If one were to produce a study of the Union,² the first chapter or even the first section of the book should really develop the material collected under this rubric of “Reformation and Renaissance.” Recall Masaryk’s book on Dostoyevsky and his thesis about the need for a Protestant Reformation in Russia, as well as Leo Davidovich’s critique in the *Kampf* of August 1914.³ It is noteworthy that, in his memoirs (*La Résurrection d’un Etat. Souvenirs et réflexions, 1914–1918*: Paris: Plon), Masaryk acknowledges the positive contribution made by historical materialism through the group that embodies it, and he does so when dealing with a sphere wherein the Reformation

should have been operative, determining a new attitude toward life, an active attitude of enterprise and initiative.⁴ (Apropos of Catholicism and Protestantism and their reciprocal positions vis-à-vis grace and "good works": bear in mind that "good works" in Catholic discourse have little to do with activities and initiatives that entail labor and industriousness; rather, they have a restricted and "corporative" meaning.)

§<45>. *When can it be said of a philosophy that it is historically important?* Much of the scholarly work on the historical significance of different philosophies is completely sterile and bizarre because it ignores the fact that many philosophical systems are entirely (or almost entirely) individual expressions and that whatever part of them may be called historical is often minimal and buried under an ensemble of abstractions that are purely rationalistic and abstruse. It could be said that the historical value of a philosophy can be "calculated" from the "practical" (in the broadest sense of the word) efficacy it has acquired. If it is true that every philosophy is an expression of a society, then it should react back on society and have certain effects, both positive and negative. The extent to which it reacts back is precisely the measure of its historical importance—i.e., of what makes it a "historical fact" rather than an individual "elucubration."

§<46>. *On the Popular Manual. Teleology.* Are the phrase and the concept of "historical mission" not rooted in teleology?¹ Indeed, in many cases, it assumes an ambiguous and mystical meaning. But in other instances it means something that, following Kant's qualifications,² can be defended by historical materialism.

Cf. Notebook 11, §23.

§<47>. *On the Popular Manual.* The way in which the problem of the "objective reality of the external world" is posed is superficial and irrelevant to historical materialism. The author has no knowledge of the Catholic tradition and is unaware that religion in fact vigorously upholds this thesis against idealism; in this case, then, the Catholic religion would be "materialist." The author makes the same mistake in the paper he presented at the Congress of the History of Science and Technology, held in

London in 1931 (cf. the publication of the proceedings).¹ He asserts that the subjectivist and idealist view is linked to the notion of . . . Adam who opens his eyes for the first time in the world and believes that it was created by him in that instant (or something of the sort).² He forgets that according to the Bible—and therefore according to the religious view—not only was the world created before Adam, but God created it for him. Religion, then, cannot distance itself from the view that “reality” exists independently of the thinking individual. The church has made an effort (through the Jesuits and especially the neoscholastics—the University of Louvain and of the Sacro Cuore in Milan) to assimilate positivism, and it even uses the following argument to ridicule the idealists among the multitudes: “Idealists are those who believe that this or that bell tower exists only because you think it; if you did not think it, the bell tower would cease to exist.” Cf. Mario Casotti, *Maestro e scolaro*: “The research carried out by naturalists and biologists presupposes that life and real organisms already exist” (p. 49)³—it is reminiscent of a statement by Engels in the *Anti-Dühring*.⁴

Cf. Notebook 11, §17 and §20.

§<48>. *Georges Sorel*.^a See Gaëtan Pirou’s book on Sorel for a complete bibliography of Sorel’s writings.¹

^a This concludes the “Notes on Philosophy, Materialism and Idealism. Second Series.” The final note ends a few lines short of the bottom of the last lined page (73v) of the notebook Gramsci was using.

§<49>. *Popular literature. Serial novels.* In the *Nouvelles Littéraires* of July 1931 and subsequent issues, cf. G. Charensol's "Les illustres inconnus"—a review of current French authors of serial novels. Brief sketches that have appeared thus far include M. Leblanc (creator of Arsène Lupin), Allain (creator of Fantomas), and four or five others (the creator of Zigomar, etc.).¹

§<50>. *Popular literature.* On the non-national-popular character of Italian literature. The attitude toward the people in *The Betrothed*. The "aristocratic" character of Manzoni's Catholicism manifests itself in the facetious "compassion" shown toward the figures of the common people (which is absent in Tolstoy); for example, Fra Galdino (compared with Fra Cristoforo), the tailor, Renzo, Agnese, Perpetua, and even Lucia, etc. (I have written another note on this topic.)¹ See if there are any interesting points in A. A. Zottoli's book *Umili e potenti nella poetica del Manzoni*, Rome-Milan: Ed. La Cultura, 1931.²

On Zottoli's book, cf. Filippo Crispolti, "Nuove indagini sul Manzoni," in the *Pègaso* of August 1931.³ Crispolti's article is interesting in itself for understanding the attitude of Jesuitic Christianity toward the "humble." Still, even though Crispolti argues "jesuitically," it seems to me that he is right in his criticism of Zottoli. Crispolti says of Manzoni: "He is full of affection for *the people*, but he never stoops to flatter them; in fact, he casts the same severe eye on them that he casts on *the majority* of those who do not belong to the people."⁴ The question, though, is not whether one wants Manzoni to "flatter the people"; rather, the issue is his psychological attitude toward the individual characters who are "common people"—it is a caste attitude, notwithstanding its Catholic religious form. For Manzoni, the common people do not have an "inner life," they lack a deep moral disposition; they are "animals," and Manzoni is benevolent toward them, with the kind of benevolence appropriate to a Catholic society for the protection of animals. In a way, Manzoni is reminiscent of an epigram about Paul Bourget: for Bourget, a woman must have an income of 100,000 francs in order to have a psychology.⁵ In this respect, Manzoni and Bourget are entirely Catholic. They are totally devoid of Tolstoy's "popular" spirit, the evangelical spirit of earliest Christianity. Manzoni's attitude toward the common people in his novel is the attitude of the Catholic Church toward the people: an attitude

of benevolent condescension, as opposed to the notion of human identity. Crispolti, in the sentence quoted, unwittingly acknowledges this "partiality" (or "partisanship") of Manzoni's. Manzoni casts his "severe eye" on *all* the people but only on "*the majority of those who do not belong to the people*"; he finds "magnanimity," "elevated thought," and "lofty feelings" only in some members of the upper class but never among the people, who as a whole are inferior, like animals.

As Crispolti rightly says, the fact that the "humble" have a leading role in Manzoni's novel is not very significant. Manzoni puts "the people" in his novel both as main characters (Renzo, Lucia, Fra Galdino, etc.) and as the masses (the Milan riots, rustic people, the tailor, etc.), but in fact his attitude toward the people is aristocratic, not "national-popular."

When studying Zottoli's book, one should go back to Crispolti's article. It can be shown that "Catholicism," even among superior and non-"jesuitical" men like Manzoni (and there certainly is a Jansenist, anti-Jesuit streak in Manzoni), did not help create a "people-nation" in Italy, not even in the romantic movement; quite the reverse, Catholicism was an anti-national-popular and purely aristocratic element. Crispolti only mentions the fact that, for a time, Manzoni accepted Thierry's view (for France) of racial conflict among the people (Longobards and Romans, like Franks and Gauls in France) as a struggle between the humble and the powerful.⁶

[Zottoli tries to respond to Crispolti in the *Pègaso* of September 1931.]⁷

§<51>. *History of the subaltern classes*. The element of racial conflict that Thierry inserted into class conflict in France:¹ what importance has it had, if any, in France, in determining the nationalistic bent of subaltern class movements? Proudhon's working-class "Gallicism" needs to be examined as the fullest expression of the democratic-Gallicist tendency represented by Eugène Sue's popular novels.²

§<52>. *Popular literature. Catholic section. The Jesuit Ugo Mioni*. Recently (August 1931) I read a novel by Ugo Mioni, *La ridda dei milioni*, published by the Opera di S. Paolo di Alba.¹ Apart from the plainly jesuitic (and anti-Semitic) elements that quite specifically

typify this bad novel, I was struck by the stylistic and grammatical sloppiness of Mioni's prose. The print is awful; misprints and errors abound—and this alone is a serious matter in small books aimed at young people, who often learn literary language from such books. Yet, even though Mioni's style and grammar may have suffered from the poor printing, there is no doubt that the author is objectively dreadful, that he is objectively a blunderer and grammatically inept. In this respect, Mioni has broken away from the tradition of decorousness or, rather, of false elegance and propriety of Jesuit writers like Father Bresciani. It seems that Ugo Mioni (now Msgr. U. M.) is no longer a member of the Society of Jesus.

§<53>. *Past and present. Germany's debts and payments to America.* It seems that Lord Balfour, in his famous note of 1922, was the very first person to say that the payments to America and Germany's war debts should be interrelated. All that Senator D'Amelio did at the conference in London in 1923 was endorse the Balfour note.¹

§<54>. *Past and present. The land problem.* The obvious fragmentation of land in Italy: the land, however, does not belong to the peasants who cultivate it but to the rural bourgeoisie, which is often more cruel and usurious than the big landowner. In addition, there is the phenomenon of the parceling of the small amount of land owned by the peasants who work it (and which, for the most part, is on high slopes or in mountainous areas). This parceling of land occurs for a variety of reasons: (1) the poverty of the peasant, who is compelled to sell a part of his already small plot of land; (2) the tendency to have a number of very small plots in different agricultural zones of a municipality or in a series of municipalities—this is done to guard against the dangers of monoculture, which is susceptible to total devastation in a bad year; (3) the principle of inheritance of land by offspring, each of whom wants a piece of every inherited field (this parceling of land does not show up in the public records because it is carried out through "bona fide" rather than the formal legal process). It appears that in Italy, too, the new Civil Law has introduced the Homestead (or family property) principle, which, in many countries, is aimed at preventing the exces-

sive breaking up of land into smaller and smaller plots as a result of inheritance.¹

§<55>. *Past and present*. In the collection of the issues of *Gerarchia*, look at the important phases of the 1920s and after and especially at the series of studies on the new institutions created by the Fascist regime.¹

§<56>. *The Hon. De Vecchi*. Cf. in the *Gerarchia* of October 1928, Umberto Zamboni's article "La marcia su Roma. Appunti inediti. L'azione della colonna Zamboni,"¹ where it is said that De Vecchi was the sole member of the quadrumvirate who stayed in Rome "to make one more last ditch effort to reach a peaceful solution."² This statement has to be compared with M. Bianchi's article in the special issue of *Gerarchia* on the March on Rome, in which some rather strange things are said about De Vecchi.³ Zamboni went to Perugia with Bianchi and must have heard about this version of the communications between Bianchi and De Vecchi on 27 October.

§<57>. *Past and present*. The nutrition of the Italian people. In the *Gerarchia* of February 1929, p. 158, Prof. Carlo Foà provides the figures for Italian nutrition in comparison with other countries: Italy has 909,750 calories available per capita; France 1,358,300; England 1,380,000; Belgium 1,432,500; the United States 1,866,250. The scientific Commission on Food has established that the minimum consumption of an average person is 1,000,000 calories a year.¹ Italy's national average falls short of this figure. One must consider the fact that the available food is not distributed equally among average individuals; rather, the distribution differs by social groups. Thus certain social groups, such as farmhands in the South (landless peasants), hardly manage to get 400,000 calories per annum, or two-fifths of the average established by experts.

§<58>. *The popular novel*. The dissemination of *Le Juif errant* in Italy during the period of the Risorgimento.¹ See Baccio M. Bacci's article, "Diego Martelli, l'amico dei 'Macchiaioli,'" in the *Pègaso* of

March 1931.² Bacci reproduces and summarizes (pp. 298-299) some previously unpublished pages from *Ricordi della mia prima età*, in which Martelli recounts that (between 1849 and 1859) his father's friends—all of them patriots and learned men like his father—often gathered in his house.³ They included Atto Vannucci; Giuseppe Arcangeli, a Greek and Latin teacher; Vincenzo Manteri, a chemist who brought gas lighting to Florence; Pietro Thouar; Antonio Mordini; Giuseppe Mazzoni, a member of the triumvirate with Guerrazzi and Montanelli; Salvagnoli; Giusti, etc.⁴ They talked about art and politics, and on occasion they read books that circulated clandestinely. Vieusseux introduced them to *Le Juif errant*, which was read in Martelli's house in the presence of friends from Florence and elsewhere.⁵ Diego Martelli recounts: "Some were pulling their hair out, others stamped their feet, others shook their fists at the sky. . . ."⁶

§<59>. *Saint-Simonism in Italy*. Study the spread of Saint-Simonism: there are some publications in Italy. It is possible that the ideas of vulgar Saint-Simonism were disseminated through Sue.¹

§<60>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. Cf. the allusion in Girolamo Vitelli's "Ricordi di un vecchio normalista," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 April 1930.¹ For three centuries (up to the second half of the nineteenth century), classical philology was totally ignored in Italy. "Those who have some knowledge of the history of scholarship in our country also know that after the Renaissance—after the Italians of the fifteenth century (or the end of the sixteenth century, with the last great school of Pier Vettori)²—hegemony in the field (albeit with somewhat different tendencies) belonged successively to the French, the Dutch, the English, the Germans."³ Why the absence of the Italians? Vitelli offers no explanation, other than "mercantilism." But who was more mercantilist than the Dutch and the English? It is strange that it was precisely the Protestant nations (and it seems to me that in France the Estiennes were Huguenots) that upheld the stature of scholarship on the ancient world.⁴ One needs to look at the organization of scholarship in these nations and compare it with the centers of scholarship in Italy. Was the Counter-Reformation a factor? etc.

§<61>. *Cultural issues. Libraries.* Cf. Ettore^a Fabietti's interesting article "Per la sistemazione delle Biblioteche pubbliche 'nazionali' e 'popolari,'" in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 April 1930.¹

§<62>. *The question of the intellectuals.* When did cultural life begin in the various countries of the world and in Europe? How can one apply to different countries our divisions of history—"ancient," "medieval," and "modern"? These different phases of world history have also been assimilated by modern intellectuals, even in countries that have only recently become part of cultural life. Still, this has been a source of friction. The civilizations of India and China resist the introduction of Western civilization, which, in some form or another, is still going to prevail. Is it possible that they will suddenly revert to the level of folklore? Of superstition? If that were to happen, though, would it not accelerate the rupture between the people and intellectuals and the bringing forth, by the people, of new intellectuals formed in the sphere of historical materialism?

§<63>. *History of Italian intellectuals.* Cf. Giuseppe Tucci's article, "Del supposto architetto del Taj e di altri italiani alla corte del Mogul," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 May 1930.¹ The supposed architect of the Taj is presumed to have been Jeronimo Veroneo, who died in 1642, that is, before the Taj was completed (1648); he supposedly produced the design that was then finished by a Muslim (see the article for the details).

§<64>. *Robert Michels.* From Alberto Giaccardi's article, "Il pangermanismo coloniale tra le cause del conflitto mondiale" (*Nuova Antologia*, 16 May 1930),¹ p. 238: "Germany's demand for a 'place in the sun' soon became so extensive that it would have relegated everyone else to the shade, or nearly so. Robert Michels,² a German scholar, refuted the right to demand colonies, including the right of the Italians (whose situation was analogous to that of the German^b people), on the grounds that 'Italy, though demographically strong, is poor in capital.'" Giaccardi does not provide a bibliographic source for Michels's statement.

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "Alfredo."

^b In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "*italiano*" (Italian)—an obvious slip of the pen.

In a subsequent issue of *Nuova Antologia* (1 July), Giaccardi published a "correction" of his statement, apparently at Michels's urging. He cites Michels's *L'imperialismo italiano*, Milan: Società Editrice Libreria, 1914, and "Elemente zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Imperialismus in Italien," in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, January-February 1912, pp. 91-92. Giaccardi concludes: "This corresponds perfectly to the Italianism constantly [!] exhibited by the distinguished University of Perugia professor; though originally from the Rhineland, he has chosen Italy as his adopted homeland and has always worked hard and effectively in our favor."³

§<65>. *Feminism*. Cf. Vittorio Cian's article, "Femminismo patriottico del Risorgimento," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 June 1930.¹ Written in a high-flown style but interesting because of the objective information it provides on the participation of women in political life during the Risorgimento.

One of the footnotes quotes the following passage from Gioberti's *Apologia del libro intitolato "Il Gesuita Moderno,"*² ch. III of part I: "The participation of women in the national cause is virtually a new phenomenon in Italy, and the fact that it is occurring in all the provinces is especially noteworthy because, in my view, it is one of the most telling signs that we have arrived at civil maturity and a full consciousness of ourselves as a nation."³ Gioberti's observation does not apply solely to national life: every innovative historical movement only achieves maturity when those participating in it are not just the old but also the young, adults, and women, so that its influence is felt even in childhood.

§<66>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. On p. 494 of his article (speech) "Il primo anno dell'Accademia d'Italia" (*Nuova Antologia*, 16 June 1930), Gioacchino Volpe mentions the books [on history] that the Academy (the division of moral and historical sciences) would like to see written, specifically those "devoted to the wonderful effulgence of our culture between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries that radiated from Italy toward Europe, whereas what flowed from Europe toward Italy were new invasions and rulers."¹

§<67>. *History of Italian intellectuals*. Cf. Renaud Przewdziecki, "Ambasciatori veneti in Polonia," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 July 1930: "The absence of national unity and of a single dynasty produced among the Italians an *independent* state of mind. As a result, whoever possessed political and diplomatic skills considered such skills to be a *personal talent* that, in keeping with one's self-interest, could be put to the service of whatever cause, in the same way that *soldiers of fortune* made use of their swords. This view of diplomacy as a freelance profession gave rise, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to a type of diplomat without nationality—the most classic example of this type was probably Cardinal Mazzarino."¹

According to Przewdziecki, diplomacy found in Italy a natural terrain for it to sprout and flourish: (1) an old culture; (2) a fragmented "state" that generated political and commercial disputes and conflicts that favored the development of diplomatic skills.

Italian diplomats of this type working for other states are encountered in Poland: Monsignor Bonzi, a Florentine prelate, was the French ambassador in Warsaw from 1664 to 1669; a marquis, de Monti, from Bologna, was Louis XV's ambassador to Stanislaus Lesczynski; a marquis, Lucchesini, was the king of Prussia's ambassador plenipotentiary in Warsaw at the end of the eighteenth century. The kings of Poland made frequent use of the diplomatic skills of Italians, even though the Polish nobility had passed laws that prohibited the monarchy from entrusting public offices to foreigners. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Ladislaus Jagiello assigned a certain Giacomo de Paravesino a number of diplomatic missions as his ambassador to Venice, Milan, and Mantua. The Florentine humanist Filippo Buonaccorsi of Fiesole, called Callimachus, served Kasimir III, first as the tutor of his sons and then as his ambassador to Sixtus IV, Innocent VIII, the Republic of Venice, and the sultan. In the sixteenth century, Luigi del Monte, Pietro degli Angeli, and the Magni brothers from Como served as Polish ambassadors to various states. In the sixteenth century, Domenico Roncalli was Ladislaus IV's minister in Paris and negotiated that king's marriage to Luisa Maria Gonzaga; Francesco Bibboni was Polish ambassador in Madrid; Andrea Bollo was Poland's minister to the Republic of Genoa. A certain Dall'Oglio was the *chargé d'affaires* in Venice. Even in the second half of the eighteenth century, among the Polish representatives to the Holy See, one finds a cardinal Antici and count di Lagnasco.²

Italians created modern diplomacy. The Holy See, which for centuries was the arbiter of a good part of the political world, was the first to establish permanent nunciatures, and the Republic of Venice was the first state to organize a regular diplomatic service.

§<68>. *History of Italian intellectuals. Humanism and Renaissance.* Cf. Luigi Arezio, "Rinascimento, Umanesimo e spirito moderno," *Nuova Antologia*, 1 July 1930.¹

Arezio deals with G. Toffanin's book *Che cosa fu l'Umanesimo* (Florence: Sansoni, 1929),² which, judging by the quotations from it, appears to be very interesting for my topic. I will just take note of some ideas, because I must read the book. (Voigt and Burckhardt believed that humanism was aimed against the church; Pastor—whose book on the history of the popes, which relates to humanism, has to be read—does not believe that humanism was *initially* directed against the church.)³ For Toffanin, the principle of *irreligion* or of the *new religion* is not the best way to unlock the secret of the humanists, and it is of no use to talk about their individualism because "the supposed effects of the reevaluation of the human personality" brought about by a culture are much more surprising in an epoch that in turn has remained famous for having "*widened the gap between scholars and the rest of the people.*" The truly characteristic phenomenon of humanism "remains that passion for the ancient world that led, almost suddenly, to *the effort to supplant a popular language, hallowed by the genius of the people, with a dead language;* it led to the invention, one might say, of philological science and to the renovation of taste and culture. The pagan world was reborn." Toffanin asserts that *humanism must not be confused with the progressive reawakening that came after the year 1000;* humanism is an essentially Italian phenomenon, "independent of these false adumbrations"—France and the whole world drew on it to acquire classical culture. In a certain sense, it is the thirteenth-century civilization of the communes that may be called *heretical*; it appeared as an irruption of the most refined sentiments and thoughts in plebeian form. And "that impulse toward individualism was initially heretical, even though the people were less conscious of heresy than one might at first be inclined to think." The vernacular literature emanating from the civilization of the communes and independently of classicism was indicative of a society "in which the leaven of heresy fermented"—a leaven that,

among the masses, weakened respect for ecclesiastical authority, while, among the few, it became an open break with the "Romanitas" that was characteristic of the period between the Middle Ages (in the precise sense) and humanism. Some intellectuals appear to have been conscious of this *historical discontinuity*: they claimed to be cultured without reading Virgil, that is, without liberal studies, the general abandonment of which, according to Boccaccio, justified the use of the vernacular, rather than Latin, in the *Divine Comedy*. The greatest of these intellectuals was Guido Cavalcanti. In Dante, "the love of the plebeian language, born out of the virtually heretical state of mind of the communes," was bound to clash with a quasi-humanistic concept of knowledge. "The humanists were characterized by the awareness of an irremediable separation between the man of culture and the multitude: for them, imperial and papal power were abstract ideals, but their faith in the universality of culture and its reasons was real." The church favored the separation of culture from the people brought about by the revival of Latin; it saw it as a salutary reaction against every form of mystical unruliness. Humanism, from Dante until just before Machiavelli, is a distinctly separate epoch, and, contrary to what some people think, the affinity between humanism and scholasticism is not superficial—they have the same *antidemocratic* and *antiheretical* impulse. Thus Toffanin denies that humanism infused the Reformation in a vital way. With its detachment from Romanism, the rebellious reassertion of the common people, and its many other aspects, the Reformation reinvigorated the culture of the communes, it fomented heresy—opposition to which had given rise to humanism in the first place. With the end of humanism came heresy; Machiavelli, Erasmus (?), Luther, Giordano Bruno, Descartes, and Jansen do not belong to humanism.⁴

Toffanin's theses often coincide with the notes I have already written in other notebooks.⁵ Toffanin, however, confines himself exclusively to the cultural-literary sphere, and he does not consider the connection between humanism and the economic and political phenomena that were unfolding during the same period: the transition to principalities and seigniories, the loss of bourgeois enterprise, and the transformation of the bourgeois into landowners. Humanism was a reactionary phenomenon in culture because the whole of Italian society was becoming reactionary.

Arezio tries to raise some objections to Toffanin, but they are trivial and superficial. The fact that the whole period of the com-

munes was a ferment of heresy seems unacceptable to Arezio, who takes heresy to mean solely Averroism and Epicureanism. But the commune was in itself a heresy because it was bound to clash with the papacy to become independent. Thus Arezio is not pleased that Toffanin portrays all of humanism as faithful to Christianity, but he does acknowledge that even skeptics made an ostentatious display of religiosity. In reality, humanism was the first "clerical" phenomenon in the modern sense; it was a Counter-Reformation in advance (besides, it was a Counter-Reformation vis-à-vis the commune period). The humanists opposed the breakdown of medieval and feudal universalism that the commune implied and that was smothered in its infancy, etc. Arezio adheres to the old views on humanism, and he repeats the positions of Voigt, Burckhardt, Rossi, De Nolhac, Symonds, Jebb, etc., that have now become standard.⁶

§<69>. *Catholic Action*. In order to understand the true significance and the overt and mediated politics of Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* [marking the fortieth anniversary of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*] as they pertain to the relations between Catholicism and social democracy, one must bear in mind the attitude of the English cardinal Bourne and his speech in Edinburgh [in the first half of June 1931] on the Labour Party.¹ Cf. the English Catholic newspapers of the time.

§<70>. *History of the subaltern classes. Italian intellectuals*. From an article by Alfredo Panzini ("Biancofiore" in the *Corriere della Sera* of 2 December 1931) on Severino Ferrari and his short poem "Il Mago": "Like many sons of the petty bourgeoisie, especially those who attended university, he was more drawn to the baptismal font of Bakunin, perhaps, than to Marx's. On entering life, young people demand a baptism. All that was left of Giuseppe Mazzini was his tomb and its luster, but the word of the great apostle was no longer enough for the new generations."¹ Where does Panzini get the idea that the young, etc., are more drawn to Bakunin, etc.? Maybe Panzini is relying on personal memories of his university days, even though he attended the University of Bologna many years after Ferrari. (Severino Ferrari was born in 1856; "Il Mago" was published in 1884.)

§<71>. *Intellectuals. On Indian culture.* Cf. the series of articles on "Sistemi filosofici e sette dell'Induismo" published by *Civiltà Cattolica* in July 1930 and the following months.¹ The Jesuits pose the following problem: in India, Catholicism manages to make few converts and only from among the lower castes. Indian intellectuals resist propaganda, but the pope has said that it is important to work among them as well, especially because the masses would convert if the nuclei of important intellectuals converted. (The pope understands the processes of cultural reform of the popular-peasant masses better than many members of the secular Left. He knows that a great mass cannot be converted molecularly; in order to hasten the process, one has to win over the natural leaders of the great masses, that is, the intellectuals, or, one needs to form groups of intellectuals of a new type that would make it possible to create indigenous bishops.) This requires an exact knowledge of the ideologies and ways of thinking of these intellectuals, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the organization of cultural and moral hegemony and thus be able to destroy it or to assimilate it. These studies by the Jesuits, then, have a special objective importance, in the sense that they are not "abstract" and academic but are undertaken for concrete practical purposes. They are very useful for an understanding of the organizations of moral and cultural hegemony in large Asian countries like China and India.

§<72>. *Past and present. The rural bourgeoisie.* An article by Alfredo Rocco, "La Francia risparmiatrice e banchiera," in *Gerarchia*, October 1931.¹ The article contains many inaccuracies, but the main point that should be noted is this: why is the accumulation of savings so high in France? Is it simply because the French are stingy and avaricious, as Rocco seems to believe? It would be hard to prove, at least conclusively. The Italians are "sensible, hard-working, thrifty": what, then, prevents the accumulation of savings in Italy? The standard of living in France is definitely higher than in Italy (cf. Camis's study on nutrition in Italy);² the Italians should therefore be saving more than the French. What happens in France cannot happen in Italy because of the existence in Italy of absolutely parasitic classes that are not to be found in France, and most important of all is the rural bourgeoisie. (Cf. Serpieri's book on the Italian rural classes during the war and determine how much such a class "costs" Italian peasants.)³

§<73>. *Catholic Action*. In addition to the *Annuario Pontificio*, which is of an official nature, and other publications, such as almanacs, etc., see the *Annali dell'Italia Cattolica*, which in 1930 was published by the "Pro Familia" press in Milan (in 16°, 416pp., L. 8).¹

§<74>. *Past and present. Industrialists and the Catholic missions*. It is known that Italian industrialists have formed an organization to aid *directly* and systematically the Catholic missions in their work of cultural and economic infiltration in backward countries. A special bulletin is published concerning this activity: *Bollettino ufficiale del Comitato nazionale industriali e commercianti per le Missioni Cattoliche*, Rome, in 8°.¹ Naturally, even Jewish and misbelieving industrialists and businessmen will contribute, including Fiat, which in postwar years supported the YMCA and the Methodists in Turin.²

§<75>. *Popular literature*. In an article on Paolina Leopardi and her relations with Prospero Viani ("Tutta-di-tutti," *Corriere della Sera*, 6 December 1931), Antonio Baldini mentions that Viani used to send Leopardi the novels of Eugène Sue (*Les Mystères de Paris* and also *Le Juif errant*), which Paolina found "delightful"—this is gleaned from a set of letters published by C. Antona Traversi (*Civiltà moderna*, III, no. 5, Florence: Vallecchi). Remember P. Viani's disposition—erudite, correspondent of the Crusca Academy—and the milieu in which Paolina lived, close to the ultrareactionary Monaldo who wrote the periodical *Voce della Ragione* (which Paolina edited) and was opposed to railroads, etc.¹

§<76>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*. Gather the bibliographical data on encyclopedic publications specializing in politics, sociology, philosophy, economics. One could start with Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique*, where "philosophical" means, precisely, "encyclopedic" in terms of the ideology of encyclopedism or the Enlightenment. Remember Maurice Block's *Dictionnaire politique*, which is the "philosophical dictionary" of French liberalism.¹ Charles Maurras's *Dictionnaire politique et critique* (from the *Nouvelle Littéraires* of 14 November 1931, one gathers that twenty installments of this work by Maurras have already been

published; each 96 pp. installment costs 10 francs, published by La Cité des Livres press).²

§<77>. *The intellectuals. Political parties.* One of the most important questions regarding political parties is their "opportuneness" or "rightness for the times"; that is to say, the question of how they react against "habitude" and the tendency to become mummified and anachronistic. In practical terms, political parties come into existence [as organizations] in the wake of historical events that are important for the social groups they represent, but they do not always know how to adapt to new epochs or historical phases, or they are unable to develop in accordance with the ensemble of the relations of force [and therefore with congruous forces] in their particular country or in the international sphere. In this analysis, one must make distinctions: the social group; the mass of the party; the bureaucracy or general staff of the party. The latter is the most dangerous in terms of habitude: if it organizes itself as a separate body, compact and independent, the party will end up being anachronistic. This is what brings about the crises of parties that sometimes suddenly lose their historical social base and find the ground taken from under their feet. This is what happened in Germany, especially with the rise of Hitlerism. The French parties are most suited for a study of how political organizations become anachronistic: spawned by the 1889 revolution and subsequent movements, they reiterate an antiquated terminology that makes it possible for the leaders to preserve the adherence of the old base while making compromises with utterly dissimilar and often contrary forces and bowing to the plutocracy.

Cf. Notebook 13, § 23.

§<78>. *Catholic Action.* Apropos of the measures taken against Catholic Action in Italy in 1931,¹ there is an interesting article, "Una grave questione di educazione cristiana: A proposito del Primo Congresso Internazionale dell'Insegnamento medio libero di Bruxelles (28-31 July 1930)," published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 20 September 1930.²

It is no secret that the *Codice Sociale* of Malines does not exclude the possibility of armed insurrection by Catholics. Naturally, it limits the cases when such an insurrection becomes a possibility, but the positive conditions for such a possibility are left vague and uncertain. It is understood, however, that this possibility applies to certain extreme cases of suppression and limitation of the

privileges of the church and the Vatican.³ On its very first page, the *Civiltà Cattolica* article quotes, without comment, a passage from Ch. Terlinden's book *Guillaume I, roi des Pays bas, et l'Église Catholique en Belgique (1814-1830)*, Brussels: Dewit, 1906, Vol. 2, p. 545: "Had William I not violated the liberties and rights of Catholics, they—faithful to a religion that mandates respect for authority—would never have thought of rising up or of joining forces with the liberals, their irreconcilable enemies. Nor would the liberals, who were few in number and had little influence among the people, have been able by themselves to shake off the yoke of the foreigner. Without the participation of the Catholics, the Belgian revolution would have been a useless rebellion, a dead end." The entire quotation is striking in each and every one of its three sentences, and, similarly, the whole article, in which Belgium represents a polemical reference point for the present, is interesting.

§<79>. *Past and present*. There are two studies on Gioberti that need to be looked at in connection with the question of the importance that Gentile attaches to Gioberti in identifying an unbroken and consistent current in national philosophy.¹ One study is by the Catholic writer Palhoriès (*Gioberti*, Paris: Alcan, in 8°, 408pp.); the other is by the idealist Ruggero Rinaldi, *Gioberti e il Problema religioso del Risorgimento*, with an introd. by Balbino Giuliano, Florence: Vallecchi, in 8°, XXVIII-180pp. Even though their points of departure are different, both works arrive at similar conclusions: i.e., that Gioberti is by no means the Italian Hegel, but rather he stays within the confines of ontologism and Catholic orthodoxy. One must bear in mind the important place that the idealistic interpretation of Gioberti occupies in "Gentilianism"—basically, it is an instance of *Kulturkampf* or an attempt at Catholic reform. Giuliano's introduction to Rinaldi's book is noteworthy, for it seems that Giuliano brings up some of the cultural problems posed by the concordat in Italy and, in particular, the question of how, once the political agreement between church and state has been reached, there can be an "agreement" between transcendence and immanence in the sphere of culture and philosophical thought.²

§<80>. *Past and present*. The debate on force and consent has shown that political science in Italy is relatively advanced and that

there is a certain frankness of expression in the manner in which it is discussed, even by high-ranking statesmen. This debate is about the "philosophy of the epoch," about the central theme in the lives of states in the postwar period. How to reconstruct the hegemonic apparatus of the dominant group, an apparatus that disintegrated in every state throughout the world as a result of the war? But why did this apparatus disintegrate? Was it perhaps because of the growth of a strong antagonistic collective political will? If that were the case, the problem would have been resolved in favor of such an antagonist. Instead, however, the disintegration resulted from a variety of purely mechanical causes: (1) because the previously passive great masses went into motion, but it was chaotic, disorganized motion, without leadership, that is, without a precise collective political will; (2) because, with the advent of peace, the middle classes lost the positions of authority and responsibility they had held during the war and found themselves unemployed, precisely after having completed their apprenticeship in positions of authority, etc.; (3) because the antagonistic forces turned out to be incapable of organizing the actual disorder to their advantage. The problem was to reconstruct the hegemonic apparatus of these previously passive and apolitical elements; this could not be done without the use of force—but such force could not have been "legal" force, etc. Since the ensemble of social relations was different in each state, the political methods of using force and the combining of legal and illegal forces had to be different as well. The greater the mass of the apolitical, the greater the role of the illegal forces has to be. The greater the politically organized and educated forces, the more one must "cover" the legal state, etc.

§<81>. *Types of periodicals. Foreign contributors.* One cannot do without foreign contributors, but foreign collaboration should also be organic and not anthological, sporadic, or casual. In order for this kind of collaboration to be organic, the foreign contributors must not only be knowledgeable about the cultural currents in their country; they also have to be able to "compare" them with the cultural currents in the country where the periodical is published, that is, they need to know that country's cultural currents and understand its national "discourse." The periodical (or, rather, the editor-in-chief of the periodical), then, must also mold the foreign contributors so that this organic integration can be achieved.

During the Risorgimento, this happened very rarely, and, as a result, Italian culture remained rather provincial. Besides, France may have been the only country in which international collaboration was organic because, even before the liberal period, French culture was hegemonic in Europe. Hence, there was a relatively <large number> of German, English, etc., intellectuals capable of employing a French "discourse" when providing information on the culture of their respective countries. Indeed, the fact that Vieusseux's *Antologia* published articles by French, German, or English "liberals" was not enough to convey useful knowledge to Italian liberals and to arouse or reinforce ideological currents in Italy; the way of thinking remained generic, abstract, cosmopolitan.¹ It failed because it was unable to produce contributors who had a specialized knowledge of Italy, its intellectual currents, its problems—in other words, contributors capable of also informing France about Italy.

The type of contributor being discussed here does not exist "spontaneously" but must be formed and cultivated. Opposed to this rational way of thinking about collaboration is the superstition of having among one's foreign contributors leading figures, the great theoreticians, etc. One cannot deny the usefulness (especially the commercial usefulness) of having marquee names. But from a practical point of view, the advancement of culture is much better served by the type of contributor who is totally in tune with the periodical and who knows how to translate a cultural world into the discourse of another cultural world; someone who can discover similarities even where none are apparent and can find differences even where everything appears to be similar, etc.

§<82>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. *Enrico Corradini*. The newspapers that published an obituary (Corradini died on 10 December 1931) will have to be checked. One should look at Corradini's theory of the "proletarian nation" in a struggle with the plutocratic and capitalist nation.¹ The theory served as a bridge for trade unionists to cross over to nationalism before and after the Libyan war. The theory is connected to the phenomenon of the emigration of great masses of peasants to America, thus it is also related to the Southern question. Corradini's novels and plays fall under Brescianism.²

§<83>. *Encyclopedic notions. Public opinion.* What is called "public opinion" is tightly connected to political hegemony; in other words, it is the point of contact between "civil society" and "political society," between consent and force. When the state wants to embark on an action that is not popular, it starts to create in advance the public opinion that is required; in other words, it organizes and centralizes certain elements of civil society. History of "public opinion": naturally, elements of public opinion have always existed, even in the Asiatic satrapies, but public opinion as we think of it today was born on the eve of the collapse of the absolutist state, that is, during the period when the new bourgeois class was engaged in the struggle for political hegemony and the conquest of power.

Public opinion is the political content of the public's political will that can be dissentient; therefore, there is a struggle for the monopoly of the organs of public opinion—newspapers, political parties, parliament—so that only one force will mold public opinion and hence the political will of the nation, while reducing the dissenters to individual and disconnected specks of dust.

§<84>. *Encyclopedic notions. Mysticism.* The Italian word "*mistico*" does not correspond to the French "*mystique*," but the French meaning of the word has begun to spread in Italy as well. This is happening in a strange way: the French meaning of the word, which is clearly^a critical and pejorative, is now being accepted in an unqualified "positive" sense. "Mysticism" cannot be separated from the phenomenon of "ecstasy," that particular excitable state in which the subject "feels" that he has entered into direct contact with god, with the universal, and without any need for mediators (which is why Catholics distrust mysticism, which diminishes the importance of the church as mediator). One understands why the French introduced the word "mysticism" into political discourse. What they mean by it is a state of nonrational and nonlogical political elation, a durable fanaticism that is impervious to any evidence that may contradict it; this is nothing other than how logical Cartesian minds view the "passion" of which Croce speaks or what

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci inserted "*prevalentemente*" (mostly) as a variant between the lines.

Sorel calls "myth"—and so, one hears talk of a democratic mysticism, a parliamentary mysticism, a republican mysticism, etc. Mysticism is used in a positive sense (as in the "School of Fascist Mysticism" in Milan)¹ in order to avoid employing the language of religiosity or even the word "religion" itself. In a speech inaugurating the third year of the School of Fascist Mysticism ("Coscienza e dovere," published in the weekly *Gente Nostra* of 13 December 1931), Arnaldo Mussolini stated, among other things:

It has been said that your School of Fascist Mysticism is not appropriately named. Mysticism is a word that refers to something divine, and when it is taken out of the strictly religious sphere, it becomes adaptable to too many restless, vague, and irresolute ideologies. Distrust words, and especially words that might have multiple meanings. Certainly, one can respond by saying that the word "mysticism" was used to highlight the necessary relations between the divine and the human spirit that derives from it. I accept this thesis, but I do not wish to dwell on questions of words. Ultimately, these are not the things that matter: it is the spirit that counts. And the spirit that animates you is in harmony with the flow of time that is unstoppable and knows no boundaries. Mysticism recalls an ideal tradition that lives again, transformed and re-created in your program of young fascist renovators.²

["Religion" as used by Croce in his *Storia d'Europa* comes close to the French meaning of "mysticism."]³

§<85>. *Encyclopedic notions. Doctrinairism and doctrinaire.* What it means, in the end, is "enemy of compromises," "faithful to principles." A word that comes from French political discourse. "Partie de doctrinaires" under Charles X and Louis-Philippe: Royer-Collard, Guizot, etc.¹

§<86>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliographies.* In the bibliography of a critical and political dictionary, one must keep in mind: (1) general dictionaries and encyclopedias insofar as they provide the most common and widespread explanations of the terminology of moral and political science; (2) special encyclopedias, that is, encyclopedias published by the various political and intellectual currents, such as the Catholics, etc.; (3) political, philosophical, economic, etc., dictionaries that exist in different countries; (4) spe-

cialized and general etymological dictionaries, such as Guarnerio's dictionary of words with a Greek derivation that was published by Vallardi (I think).¹

Since terminology changes with the times and with different cultural, intellectual, and political currents, the general bibliography is theoretically limitless because it embraces the whole of general literature. This is a question of setting down limits: a political and critical dictionary that is basic and aimed specifically at a certain cultural level and that should be presented like a partial essay.

Among the general books, remember Mario Govi's *Fondazione della Metodologia. Logica ed Epistemologia*, Turin: Bocca, 1929, 579pp.,² for the [historical] notions on the classification of the branches of knowledge and other methodological problems, etc.

§<87>. *Encyclopedic notions. Agnosticism.* This term is used frequently in political discourse in ways that are often strange and surprising. This occurs especially in "provincial" polemics in which the author uses difficult words to show off. Thus, for example, when somebody refuses to discuss something because he does not take it seriously, he is said to be agnostic on the issue.

The word is religious in origin, and it refers to θεός αγνώστος (deus ignotus; ignoramus, ignorabimus god, etc.). Sect of agnostics, etc. Agnosticism is therefore the same as empiricism and materialism (nominalism, etc.); the impossibility of knowing the absolute, universals, etc., insofar as they are connected to religious metaphysics, etc.

§<88>. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists. Robert Bellarmine.* On 13 May 1923, Pius XI conferred the title "Blessed" on Bellarmine and later (on the fiftieth anniversary of his ordination as priest—an especially important date) canonized him together with the Jesuit missionaries who died in North America; finally, in September 1931, Pius XI declared Bellarmine a doctor of the Universal Church.¹ This special attention to the highest Jesuit authority after Ignatius of Loyola allows one to say that Pius XI, who has been called the pope of the missions and the pope of Catholic Action, should be called, first and foremost, the pope of the Jesuits (the missions and Catholic Action are, after all, the twin apples of the Society of Jesus's eye). It is noteworthy

that the apostolic letter [that has been translated] declaring Bellarmine a doctor (see the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 7 November 1931), talks of the Compagnia in general and calls Bellarmine "a true companion of Jesus."² Why "companion" rather than "soldier," which should be the accurate appellation? Is the name "Compagnia" just a translation of "Societas"; does it not have a military connotation? The Latin word "*societas*" cannot have a military meaning, but what was Ignatius of Loyola's intention? (Remember Bellarmine's connection with the trial of Galileo.) The *Civiltà Cattolica* article-comment on the "Apostolic Letter" mentions the fact that Bellarmine's "cause" (for beatification and canonization) had been held up by the "plotting and the threats [!] of those misguided politicians and adversaries of the papacy, some of them supporters of absolute monarchy ["the integralists"], others supporters of demagogic subversion ["the modernists"]."³ The *Civiltà Cattolica* touches on eighteenth-century events, but then it speaks of "their wretched successors and present-day imitators."⁴ (It appears that in the eighteenth century, Bellarmine's beatification was a factor in the struggle that led to the suppression of the Jesuits by order of the Bourbons.)

The Jesuits today regard the canonization of Bellarmine and his designation as "doctor" as a form of revenge (even though the last papal action coincided with the suppression of the Jesuits in Spain), but they are cautious: "Certainly, no one wishes to overestimate this event or to exaggerate its importance, significance, purposefulness, or 'timeliness' with respect to the present moment or, even more, with respect to the extraordinary storm—not only unexpected but unforeseeable—that erupted when the decree to declare Bellarmine a doctor was first deliberated and then discussed," etc.⁵

§<89>. *Past and present. Religion in the schools.*

This is why, following the Gentile reform,¹ the new school curricula assign art and religion solely to elementary school, whereas philosophy is entrusted for the most part to secondary school. In the philosophical rationale of the elementary curricula, the words "the teaching of religion is considered to be the foundation and the summit of all primary education" mean precisely that religion is a necessary but lower category that education must pass through because, according to Hegel's notion, religion is a mythological and lower form of philosophy that corresponds

to the mental capacity of the child, who is not yet capable of rising to the level of pure philosophy—into which, at a later stage, religion must be absorbed and resolved. Let us point out straight away that in fact this idealist theory has failed to pollute the teaching of religion in the elementary school by having it treated as mythology. It has failed *because the teachers either do not understand or they do not care for such theories* and also because the Catholic teaching of religion is intrinsically historical and dogmatic and *the curricula, texts and teachings, are externally supervised and directed by the church*. Furthermore, the words “foundation and summit” have been accepted by the church in their obvious meaning and repeated in the concordat between the Holy See and Italy,² according to which (art. 36) religious instruction is extended to the middle schools. This extension is now thwarting the aims of idealism, which wanted to exclude religion from the middle schools, where philosophy alone would predominate—a philosophy destined to supersede and absorb the religion learned in the elementary schools.

Civiltà Cattolica, 7 November 1931. (“Il buono e il cattivo nella pedagogia nuova,” unsigned, but by Father Mario Barbera.)³

§<90>. *Past and present. State and parties*. By looking at the internal development of the parties, one can evaluate their hegemonic role or political leadership. If the state represents the coercive and punitive force of a country’s juridical order, the parties—representing the spontaneous adherence of an elite to such regulation, considered as a type of collective society that the entire mass must be educated to adhere to—must show in their specific interior life that they have assimilated as principles of moral conduct those rules that in the state are legal obligations. Within the parties, necessity has already become freedom; herein lies the source of the enormous political value (that is, the value of political leadership) of the internal discipline of a party and hence the value of such discipline as a yardstick for assessing the potential for growth of the various parties. From this point of view, the parties can be seen as schools of state life. Components of party life: character (resistance to the urges of superseded cultures), honor (fearless will in upholding the new type of culture and life), dignity (awareness of striving for a higher goal), etc.

§<91>. *Past and present. Postwar tendencies in the external organization of human productive factors*. It seems to me that the

ensemble of these tendencies should lead one to think of the Catholic economic movement of the Counter-Reformation that found its practical expression in the Jesuit state of Paraguay.¹ All the organic tendencies of modern state capitalism should be traced back to that Jesuit experience. In the postwar period, there has been an intellectual and rationalist movement that corresponds to the efflorescence of utopias during the Counter-Reformation. This movement is related to old protectionism but is different from it and goes beyond it; it results in many attempts to set up "organic" economies and organic states. Croce's verdict on the state of Paraguay is applicable here;² in other words, this is a clever mode of capitalist exploitation in the new conditions that render the politics of economic liberalism (or at least its full development and expansion) impossible.

§<92>. *Risorgimento. Southern Italy.* Study the origins and the reasons behind the conviction, found in Mazzini, that the national insurrection was bound to start—or that it was easier to get it started—in southern Italy (the Bandiera brothers, Pisacane).¹ It seems that this conviction was shared by Pisacane, who, as Mazzini wrote (*Opere*, vol. LVIII, *Epist.*, XXIV, 1931), even had a "strategic concept of the War of Insurrection."² Was this a desire (to counterpoise the initiative of the Piedmontese monarchy with the initiative of the people in the South) that became a conviction? Or did it have rational and positive beginnings? And what could they have been?

Reconnect this conviction with the conviction held by Bakunin and the First Internationalists even before 1870; but Bakunin's was a response to a political conception of the subversive effectiveness of certain social classes. Where should one look for Pisacane's strategic concept of the national war of insurrection? In Pisacane's political-military essays,³ in all his surviving writings, and in the different practical attitudes he assumed, as well as in Mazzini's writings (in Mazzini's complete works, but especially in the *Epistolario*—one could write an essay on Pisacane and Mazzini). One of the most important moments to look at, it seems to me, has to be Pisacane's opposition to Garibaldi during the Roman Republic. Why such opposition? Was Pisacane opposed, as a matter of principle, to military dictatorship? Or was his opposition political-ideological in nature? In other words, was Pisacane opposed to the fact that the dictatorship would have been purely military, with only a vague national content, whereas he wanted to endow the war of

insurrection not only with a national content but also, and especially, with a social content? In any case, Pisacane's opposition was a mistake in that specific case because what was at issue was not some vague and indefinite dictatorship but a dictatorship in an already established Republican regime with a functioning Mazzinian government (it would have been a government for the public good with a distinctively military character, but for that very reason, perhaps, the ideological prejudices against the experiences of the French Revolution were a major determining factor in Pisacane's opposition).

§<93>. *Political terminology. Privileges and prerogatives.* Establish the historical meanings of these two words. It seems to me that while it may be absurd, in a modern state, to talk of privileges apropos of certain social groups, it is not so absurd to talk of prerogatives. Besides, one can talk of prerogatives only with reference to constituted bodies and to political functions and not as benefits of economic life. A prerogative is, and cannot but be, "closely" linked to a social function and to the exercise of certain duties. One should check, then, whether "privileges" are anything but decayed "prerogatives," hollow shells without social or functional content—benefits that were parasitically preserved even when the function that justified them had ceased to exist or had shifted to a new social group that then ended up with the functional burden but without the juridical-political means to exercise the function properly. It should be stressed that originally privilege and prerogative were juridical concepts; indeed, they were at the heart of an entire epoch of the history of states. They became morally reprehensible concepts only when they no longer corresponded to necessary social and state services. Nowadays, the word "prerogative" is encountered most commonly in the phrase "prerogatives of the Crown." According to one constitutional theory, the function of the Crown—i.e., to embody sovereignty both in the sense of state and in the sense of cultural-political administration (in other words, to be the arbiter in the internal conflicts of the dominant groups, the hegemonic class and its allies)—is now being transferred to the big, "totalitarian" types of parties. If this theory is correct, then it is obvious that the corresponding prerogatives are also handed over to such parties. For this reason, one must study the function of the Grand Council, which aims to become a "council of state" in the

old sense (that is, with the old attributes) but with a much more radical and decisive function.¹

§<94>. *The English Labour movement. The archbishop of Canterbury, primate of the Anglican Church, and the Labour movement.* During the 1931 elections in England, W. T. Colyer,^a a Labour Party candidate, declared at a meeting that the archbishop of Canterbury was a subscriber to the Labour Party fund. When the archbishop was asked whether the statement was correct, his secretary replied: "The archbishop directs me to say that he was a subscribing member of the Labour Party from 1919 to 1925 or 1926, when he found that growing uneasiness with the movement and the party's spirit and temper made a continuance of such membership impossible." (Cf. the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of 30 October 1931, p. 357.)¹

§<95>. *Political terminology. Reich, etc.* Search the precise historical and ideological origin of this term, which is badly translated as "empire." Similarly, the term "commonwealth" in the phrase British Commonwealth of Nations cannot be translated as "republic"—though "commonwealth" also means "republic."¹

§<96>. *Political terminology. Artisan workshop; small, medium-sized, and big industry.* Quantitative concepts and qualitative concepts. From a quantitative perspective, one starts with the number of workers employed by the individual companies, establishing the average figures for each category: from 1 to 5 workers, artisan workshop; from 5 to 50, small industry; from 50 to 100, medium-sized industry; over 100, big industry. These are very loose comparative generalizations or types that may differ from country to country. The qualitative concept would be more scientific and precise, but it is much more complex and presents many difficulties. In qualitative terms, the various categories should be established by a combination of disparate factors: not just the number of workers but also the type of machinery and the synchronization of one machine with another, the degree of division of labor, the ratio between different

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "Collyer."

types of worker (manual, specialized manual or machine operator, semiskilled, and skilled), and the degree of rationalization (and of industrialization) of the productive and administrative apparatus as a whole. A rationalized company employs fewer workers, and thus with 50 workers it can be more of a "big industry" than a nonrationalized company with 200 workers. (This occurs when certain companies farm out parts of their production to another company that functions as a kind of specialized department for a whole series of companies that are not organically related to one another, etc.) The relative weight one attaches to each of these factors depends on the branch of industry one is dealing with. In the construction industry, mechanization will never reach the same levels as in automated industries. The kind of machine used in textile production does not undergo the same kind of development as the machinery in the mechanical engineering industry, etc.

The concept of size in industry is connected to the concept of "machine," as well as to the concept of the "extended factory,"¹ which is an aspect of artisan production, piecework, and small industry. But even in the case of a [big] construction company: can't it be considered to be, in a certain sense, an "extended factory"? And what about the tramway and the railroad? (In terms of territorial organization or technical concentration, these industries are dispersed, and this has a certain impact on the psychology of the workers. A signalman working for the railroad will never have the same psychology as the manual worker in a big factory, etc.)

Another important factor is the energy source used: is the artisan who uses electric power still an artisan in the traditional sense? The modern phenomenon of the easy distribution of electric power—even to small establishments—transforms and revitalizes industries and companies of all sorts.

§<97>. *Political terminology. Hierocracy-theocracy.* "A government in which the clergy, the pope, or other ecclesiastical authorities have the legal authority to participate and intervene" is properly called hierocratic. But one could also have a government that, though not composed of clergymen, "acts according to religious impulses to which it subordinates the laws, civic relations, customs, and religious precepts"—such a government is theocratic.¹ In reality, elements of theocracy subsist in all those states in which the separation between church and state is not thorough and clear-

cut—states in which the clergy exercises all kinds of public functions, where the teaching of religion is compulsory, or which have concordats. (Reversal of Machiavelli's maxim: "Regnum instrumentum religionis.")

§<98>. *Catholic Action*. Cf. the annotation in another notebook on two studies published in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of August 1930:¹ "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia" and "La fortuna di La Mennais e le prime manifestazioni di Azione cattolica in Italia."² These studies refer specifically to the flourishing of Catholic periodicals in various Italian cities during the Restoration; their purpose was to combat the ideas of the Encyclopedia and the French Revolution, which nevertheless persisted, etc. This political-intellectual movement epitomizes the beginning of Italian neo-Guelphism, which cannot be separated from the Society of Sanfedisti.³ (The *éminence grise* behind these periodicals was the prince of Canosa, who lived in Modena, where one of the most important periodicals of the group was published.)⁴ There were two main tendencies in Italian Catholicism: (1) a clearly pro-Austrian tendency that saw the salvation of the papacy and of religion in the imperial gendarmerie as a protection of the political status quo in Italy; (2) the strictly Sanfedist tendency that upheld the politico-religious supremacy of the pope first and foremost in Italy. The Sanfedist tendency was therefore a surreptitious adversary of Austrian hegemony in Italy and favored some sort of national independence movement (if one can speak of national in this case). The Sanfedist movement is what the *Civiltà Cattolica* refers to in its arguments against the liberals of the Risorgimento and its defense of the "patriotism [and unitary spirit]" of the Catholics of that period. But what was the Jesuits' position? It seems that they were more pro-Austrian than "proindependence" Sanfedisti.

One can say, then, that this preparatory period of Catholic Action found its fullest expression in neo-Guelphism, that is, in a period of totalitarian return to the political position of the church in the Middle Ages, to papal supremacy, etc. The catastrophic setback of neo-Guelphism in 1848 reduced Catholic Action to the role that it was to play in the modern world: an essentially defensive role, notwithstanding the apocalyptic prophecies of Catholics about the catastrophe of liberalism and the triumphant return of church rule

over the wreckage of the liberal state and of its historical antagonist, socialism (hence clerical abstentionism and the creation of the Catholic reserve army).

In this period of restoration, militant Catholicism adopted different positions in different states. The most interesting position was that of the Piedmontese Sanfedisti (De Maistre, etc.),⁵ who supported Piedmontese hegemony and the Italian role of the monarchy and of the Savoy dynasty.

§<99>. *Political terminology. Faction.* The word is now generally used to refer to a certain degeneration of party spirit, a kind of extremist, fanatical unilateralism that is exclusivist and averse to compromises even—or, rather, especially—on secondary and subordinate issues. This viewpoint comes from a national mind-set, that is, from a certain conception of a country's political direction. "Faction" and "factious" are used by the right-wing parties against their adversaries, who have retorted with the words "clique," "cliquishness," etc., in order to point out how certain political groupings in government seek to equate their own special interests with the interests of the state and the nation and to protect them with equal fanaticism and exclusivity.

The word "faction," which (probably) originated in the military, is now commonly used in Italy to refer to the conflicting parties in the medieval communes, etc.; implied in its usage is the notion that those conflicts prevented the unification of the country before the Risorgimento—a totally antihistorical understanding of Italian national development. "Faction" is indicative of the nature of the political struggles of the Middle Ages: exclusivist, aimed at physically destroying the enemy rather than creating an equilibrium of parties within an organic whole in which the strongest party would be hegemonic, etc. "Party" means part of a whole; "faction" is an armed force that follows the military laws of exclusivity, etc.

§<100>. *Past and present.* Recall B. Croce's publication on the relations between Maria Sophia and Malatesta (and the earlier publication in *L'Unità* of Florence, in 1914 or 1915).¹ From an article by Alberto Consiglio, "Giro per l'Aspromonte," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 24 December 1931:

The exploit of Fabrizio Ruffo,² who had assembled these highlanders and led them to "eat the heart" of the Neapolitan Jacobins, created within the Kingdom a reputation of loyalty to the Bourbons that the Calabrians shared in equal measure with the fishermen of Santa Lucia and with the *lazzaroni* of the outlying districts of Naples. This myth [!] gave rise to and sustained much of the political brigandage during the first decade of unification, and it was still alive among the last straggling Bourbons at the beginning of the century. In fact, it is said that from her exile in Paris, Queen Maria Sophia sent some money to Mussolini to keep the rebellion in Calabria alive.³

(In Naples, a pro-Bourbon leaflet continued publication until 1907 or 1908; Eugenio Guarino published an article on its demise in Monicelli's *Viandante*.)⁴

§<101>. *Journalism. Foreign correspondents*. Cf. another note on the same topic under the heading "Types of periodicals."¹ It touches upon foreign contributors to Italian periodicals. The "foreign correspondent" of a daily newspaper is something different, but some of the remarks in the earlier note are germane. The foreign correspondent must not be regarded as a mere reporter or transmitter of the day's news by telephone or telegram, that is, as a collater of the wire services. The most accomplished modern type of foreign correspondent is the party journalist, the political critic who observes and comments on the most important political currents in a foreign country and aims to become an "expert" on the problems of that particular country. (The big newspapers therefore have "bureaus" in various countries, and the bureau chief is the "political writer," the manager of the bureau.) The correspondent must be good enough to be able, within a certain amount of time, to write a book on the country to which he is permanently assigned, a complete work on the crucial aspects of the country's national and international status. (This is not to be confused with the correspondent at large, who travels to a country in order to provide information about events of great moment that are taking place there at the time.)

Criteria for the formation and preparation of a correspondent: (1) To assess events within the historical framework of the country where they occur and not solely as they relate to his native country. In other words, the situation of a given country must be gauged by the advances and regressions that have taken place within that

same country; it cannot be compared mechanically to the situation of other countries at the same point in time. The comparison of one state to another is important because it measures the relative position of each state; in fact, a country may advance, but if the advances in other countries have been superior, or if they lagged behind, the relative position changes and so does the international influence of that country. We would judge England differently if we were looking at its prewar status rather than its current position vis-à-vis Germany; still, comparative views are very important, too. (2) In every country, the parties have a national as well as an international character: English liberalism is not the same as French or German liberalism, even though they have much in common, etc. (3) Is the conflict between the younger and older generations at the level one would normally expect in the struggle of the young against the old? Or do the older generations have a cultural monopoly that has become artificial and noxious? Do the parties respond to the new problems, or are they obsolete, and there is a crisis? Etc.

The biggest and most widespread error consists in the failure to step outside one's own cultural shell, applying to foreign countries a yardstick that is not pertinent to them; the failure to perceive the differences underneath the apparent similarities and the similarities underneath the apparent differences.

§<102>. *Past and present. Clarity of mandate and authoritative mandate.* No clear mandate in Italian elections, because there were no clearly differentiated parties embracing definite programs. The government was always a coalition; coalition governments with a strictly parliamentary basis and therefore often made up of very dissimilar parties: conservatives with radicals, while the liberal democrats were out of the government, etc. The elections dealt with very vague issues because the deputies represented personal and local positions, not the positions of national parties. Every election seemed to be for a constituent assembly, and at the same time it seemed to be an election for a hunters' club. The strange thing is that all this appeared to be the acme of democracy.

§<103>. *Encyclopedic notions. Public opinion.* The yellow press and radio (in those areas where it is widespread) have to be placed at the top of the list of factors that recently have disturbed

the normal control of public opinion by organized and distinctive parties with definite programs. They make it possible to stir up extemporaneously outbreaks of panic or of false enthusiasm that allow one to attain certain goals, as in elections, for example. All this is related to the nature of the sovereignty of the people, which is exercised once every three, four, or five years. It is enough to hold the ideological (or, better, the emotive) upper hand on that particular day in order to obtain a majority that will hold sway for three, four, or five years, even though, once the emotion is over, the electoral mass detaches itself from its legal expression (the legal nation is not the same as the real nation). The entities that [can] prevent or limit this public opinion boom are not so much the parties as the free professional unions, hence the struggle against free unions and the effort to place them under the control of the state. Nevertheless, the segment of public opinion that cannot be organized (especially women, where women have the right to vote) is so huge that electoral booms and coups de main are always possible where the yellow press has a very wide circulation and radio (in a government-controlled monopoly) is very widespread. One of the problems of political technique that present themselves today and that democracies have no way of resolving is precisely this: how to create intermediate organisms between the great masses that cannot be organized (or are hard to organize) along professional lines and the professional unions, the parties, and the legislative assemblies. In the past, town councils and provincial councils performed a function somewhat similar to this, but they have now lost their importance. Modern states aim at the highest degree of centralization, while, as a reaction, federalist and provincial tendencies gain strength; as a result, the state oscillates between centralized despotism and total fragmentation (to the extreme of the confederation of the three oppressed).¹

§<104>. *History of the intellectuals. Struggle between church and state.* This struggle assumed a different character in different historical periods. In the modern phase, it is the struggle for hegemony in the education of the people; at least, this is its most salient characteristic, to which all others are secondary. It is therefore a struggle between two categories of intellectuals, a struggle

to subordinate the clergy, as a typical category of intellectuals, to the directives of the state, that is, to the directives of the dominant class (freedom of teaching—youth organizations—women's organizations—professional organizations).

§<105>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Ardengo Soffici. Derivation of Lemmonio Boreo from Romain Rolland's Jean-Christophe.*¹ Why was *Lemmonio Boreo* not completed? The resemblances between *Lemmonio Boreo* and *Don Quixote* are superficial and contrived. In fact, it lacks epic-lyrical substance; it is a little rosary of small events, not an organic whole.

Could a book like *Jean-Christophe* be written in Italy? Come to think of it, *Jean-Christophe* brings to a close an entire period of French popular literature (from *Les Misérables* to *Jean-Christophe*). Its content goes beyond that of the preceding period: from democracy to syndicalism. *Jean-Christophe* is an attempt at a "syndicalist" novel, but it fails. Rolland was anything but antidemocratic, even though he strongly felt the moral and intellectual influences of the syndicalist climate.

From a national-popular viewpoint: what was Soffici's attitude? A superficial imitation of *Don Quixote*, lacking the elements of reconstruction; a superficial and aesthetical critique.

§<106>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography. A London Bibliography of the Social Sciences. Comp. under the direction of B. M. Headicar and C. Fuller, with an introd. by S. Webb. Vol. III, from P to Z, in 8° gr., xi-1232 pp., has been published. There will be four vols.; London, School of Economics and Political Science.*¹

§<107>. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists.* In another note, there is a reference to *Fede e Ragione* as an "integralist" type of periodical (in fact, the *Civiltà Cattolica* cites it in one of its polemics against the integralists).¹ *Fede e Ragione* is a Catholic weekly that has been published in Fiesole for the past fourteen years or so. It is edited by a priest, Paolo De Toth (at least it was edited by De Toth in 1925); in 1925 a subscription cost 15 lire, which means that it must be a semiperiodical.

§<108>. *Risorgimento. Popular initiatives.* Cf. in the periodical *Irpinia* (published in Avellino) of July 1931 (recapitulated in the *Marzocco* of 26 July 1931), Nicola Valdimiro Testa's lecture on the events that took place in Avellino in the years 1848-49.¹ The account seems very interesting for understanding the people's feelings and the passions that coursed through the great masses; the masses, however, lacked direction, they had no program, and they exhausted themselves rioting and committing brutal acts of random violence. Some members of the clergy shared the passions of the masses,² which explains the attitude of some priests regarding the so-called gangs of Benevento.³ There is the usual confusion between "communism" and "agrarian reform," which Testa (as it appears from the summary in *Il Marzocco*) was unable to expound in a critical manner (as the majority of archival researchers and historians also fail to do). It would be interesting to compile a bibliography of all publications of this type for the years of the Risorgimento.

NOTEBOOK 8
1930-1932

Loose notes and jottings for a history of Italian intellectuals.

(1) Provisional character—like memoranda—of these kinds of notes and jottings. (2) They may result in independent essays but not in a comprehensive organic work. (3) There can be no distinction yet between the main part of the exposition and the secondary elements, between what would end up being the “text” and what should be the “notes.” (4) These notes often consist of assertions that have not been verified, that may be called “rough first drafts”; after further study, some of them may be discarded, and it might even be the case that the opposite of what they assert will be shown to be true. (5) That said, one should not be put off by the enormity of the topic and its unclear boundaries; there is no intention to assemble a jumbled miscellany on intellectuals, an encyclopedic compilation aimed at filling all possible and imaginable “lacunae.”¹

Principal essays: General introduction. Development of Italian intellectuals up to 1870: different periods.—The popular literature of serial novels.—Folklore and common sense.—The question of literary language and dialects.—Father Bresciani’s progeny.—Reformation and Renaissance.—School and national education.—B. Croce’s position in Italian culture up to the World War.—The Risorgimento and the Action Party.—Ugo Foscolo and the formation of the national rhetoric.—Italian theater.—History of Catholic Action: Catholics, integralists, Jesuits, modernists.—The medieval commune: the economic-corporative phase of the state.—Cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals up to the 18th century.—Reactions to the absence in Italy of a culture that is national-popular in character: the futurists.—The unitary school and its significance for

the entire organization of national culture.—“Lorianism” as one of the characteristics of Italian intellectuals.—The absence of “Jacobinism” in the Italian Risorgimento.—Machiavelli as a technician of politics and as a complete politician or a politician in deed.²

*Appendices: Americanism and Fordism.*³

² This briefest of entries appears on the first line at the top of p. 1v of the manuscript. The rest of the page is blank.

GROUPINGS OF SUBJECTS:

1. *Intellectuals. Scholarly issues.*
2. *Machiavelli.*
3. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics.*
4. *Introduction to the study of philosophy and critical notes on a Popular Manual of Sociology.*
5. *History of Catholic Action. Catholic integralists—Jesuits—modernists.*
6. *A miscellany of various scholarly notes (Past and present).*
7. *The Italian Risorgimento (in the sense of Omodeo's *L'età del Risorgimento Italiano* but emphasizing the more strictly Italian motifs).*
8. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Popular literature. (Notes on literature).*
9. *Lorianism.*
10. *Notes on journalism.*^a

§<1>. *Risorgimento*. From an article by Gioacchino Volpe, "Una scuola per la storia dell'Italia moderna" (an important article in the *Corriere della Sera* of 9 January 1932):

Everyone knows that to understand the "Risorgimento" it is not enough to go back to 1815 or even to 1796, the year Napoleon burst into the peninsula and stirred up the storm. The "Risorgimento," as the renewal of Italian life, as the formation of a new bourgeoisie, as a growing consciousness of national (and not merely municipal and regional) problems, as a sensitivity to certain spiritual needs, has to be traced back to well before the Revolution. It, too, is a symptom, one of the symptoms of a revolution on the march—not just French but, in a certain sense, global. Similarly, everyone knows that the history of the Risorgimento cannot be studied only through Italian documents and as a uniquely Italian event; it has to be studied within the framework of European life. The Risorgimento is about cultural movements, economic changes, new international situations that spurred the Italians on to new thoughts, new activities, and a new political order.¹

Cf. Notebook 9, §101, and Notebook 19, §3.

^a This list occupies the top half of p. 2r of the manuscript. The rest of the page and all of p. 2v are blank.

§<2>. *The state and the concept of law.* The revolution that the bourgeois class brought about in the concept of law and therefore in the function of the state consists primarily in the will to conformism (hence the ethical character of the law and the state). In former times, the dominant classes were essentially conservative in the sense that they did not seek to enable other classes to pass organically into theirs; in other words, they did not seek to enlarge, either "technically" or ideologically, the scope of their class—they conceived of themselves as an exclusive caste. The bourgeois class posits itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the whole of society, assimilating it to its cultural and economic level: the entire function of the state is transformed, the state becomes "educator," etc. When things come to a standstill, there is a return to the concept of the state as pure force, etc. The bourgeois class is "saturated": it has not only stopped growing, it is breaking down; not only has it stopped assimilating new elements, but it is losing a part of itself (or at least the losses are much more numerous than the assimilations). A class that posits itself as apt to assimilate the whole of society—and, at the same time, is truly capable of embodying this process—would take this notion of the state and of the law to such a level of perfection as to conceive of the end of the state and the law, for the state and the law would serve no purpose once they had accomplished their task and been absorbed by civil society.

§<3>. *The formation and spread of the new bourgeoisie in Italy.* In another note,¹ I pointed out that one could conduct a "molecular" study of Italian writings from the Middle Ages to understand the process of intellectual formation of the bourgeoisie, whose historical development would reach its high point in the communes but would subsequently break up and dissolve. One could do a similar study for the 1750-1850 period, which saw the formation of a new bourgeoisie that culminated in the Risorgimento. Here, too, Groethuysen's model (*Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France: I. L'Église et la Bourgeoisie*) could be useful²—provided, of course, that it be enriched by those themes that are specific to the social history of Italy. The conceptions of the world, of the state, and of life that the bourgeois spirit had to battle in Italy were not the same as in France.

Foscolo and Manzoni can, in a certain sense, be taken as Italian types. Foscolo exalts the literary and artistic glories of the past (cf. the *Sepolcri* and the *Discorsi civili*, etc.).³ His concept is essentially rhetorical (though it should be noted that in his time this rhetoric had a practical effectiveness and was therefore "realistic").

In Manzoni, we find new departures that are more strictly bourgeois (technically bourgeois). Manzoni glorifies commerce and devalues poetry (rhetoric). Letters to Fauriel.⁴ In the *Opere inedite*,⁵ there are passages in which Manzoni criticizes the one-sidedness of poets who scorn the merchants' "thirst for gold" and ignore the fearlessness of navigators while they speak of themselves as superhuman. In a letter to Fauriel, he writes: "Think what would make the world worse off: to find itself without bankers or without poets? Which of these two occupations is more useful to the culture of humanity, not to mention its comfort?" (Cf. Carlo Franelli, "Il Manzoni e l'idea dello scrittore," in the *Critica Fascista* of 15 December 1931.)⁶ Franelli remarks: "He values works of history and political economy more highly than a rather [?!] lightweight literature. In the letters to his friend Fauriel, he makes very explicit statements about the quality of Italian culture at the time. As for the poets: their traditional megalomania offends him. He observes that today they are losing all the great esteem they had enjoyed in the past. He repeatedly recalls that he loved poetry in his 'youth.'"⁷

§<4>. *The cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals. In Hungary.* The *Marzocco* of 4 October 1931 summarizes an article (from *Illustrazione Toscana*) by Dr. Ladislav Holik-Barabàs on Filippo Scolari (known as Pippo Spano) who was "one of the most typical figures among those Italians who carried their extraordinary energy far from their homeland and gained eminence in their adopted countries." Scolari was, successively, supervisor of mines; liberator of the sovereign, King Sigismund of Hungary; count of Temesvar; governor general of Hungary; and condottiere of the Hungarians against the Turks. Pippo Spano died on 27 December 1426.¹

§<5>. *Risorgimento. The Action Party.* Apropos of the history of the Action Party and Italian "transformism" in general, there is a very interesting letter from Francesco De Sanctis to Giuseppe

Civinini that has been published by Filippo Civinini in the *Bullettino Storico Pistoiese* and is summarized in the *Marzocco* of 4 October 1931.¹ The letter is undated, but it appears to have been written sometime between the latter half of 1866 and the beginning of 1868. De Sanctis writes, among other things: "The transformation of the parties, the formation of a progressive party in opposition to a conservative party, has been an old idea of mine for which I have been fighting for three years and which is the banner issue of my newspaper."

As far as I am concerned, the Moderate Party and the Action Party had ceased to exist since the catastrophe of Aspromonte. The old Left died the day Mordini and Crispi,² like many of their colleagues, refused to resign over the events in Sicily. From that day, the Left embarked on a course of transformation and became a progressive constitutional opposition. Mordini's program, as well as Crispi's, reaffirmed this orientation at the time of the general elections. This was the party that emerged much strengthened by the polls and was joined by a very large number of the new men who came to Parliament expecting to establish the *consorteria*.³ In the programs of that period, there was no longer any trace of hatred of Napoleon, rebellion in the streets, insurrections against the government, republican whimsies, etc.

It seems to me that the dating of the letter is erroneous: De Sanctis writes that he sits with the Left—"in the new Left"—and De Sanctis, I think, crossed over to the Left at a later date.

§<6>. *Jacobinism*. To get an idea of how the French were viewed during the Jacobin and Napoleonic period, one could cite Alexandre Andryane's book (*Memorie di un prigioniero di Stato*, selections by Rosolino Guastalla, Barbéra, Florence, p. 214): when Andryane was able to have the shackles removed from his feet because of a sprain, the warder, Schiller, said: "Bloody French! They *used to be* called *Messrs. Where-there's-a-will-there's-a-way* for a good reason."¹ This reputation of being "willful" or "voluntarist" that the French had among foreigners during the time of the great revolution has a certain historical significance.

§<7>. *Journalism*. Referring to the Catholic press, this is how the *Annali dell'Italia Cattolica* of 1926 describes the different types of newspa-

per: "In a broad sense, the 'Catholic' newspaper (or, rather, the newspaper 'written by Catholics') is one that does not contain anything against Catholic doctrine and morals and follows and defends its norms. Within this framework, the newspaper can pursue political, socioeconomic, or scientific objectives. Strictly speaking, however, the 'Catholic' newspaper is one that, in agreement with the Ecclesiastical Authority, has as its direct purpose an effective Christian social apostolate in the service of the church and in support of Catholic Action. Implicitly, at least, it assumes the responsibility of the Ecclesiastical Authority, but it must also follow its rules and directives."¹ In short, there is a distinction between the so-called newspaper of information, or the nonpartisan newspaper, and the newspaper of opinion, the official organ of a particular party; between the newspaper for the popular masses, or the "popular" newspaper, and the newspaper that is aimed at a necessarily restricted public.

In the history of journalistic technique, the *Piccolo* of Trieste—as described in the book Silvio Benco devoted to it—can be considered "exemplary."² Another very interesting type was the *Corriere della Sera* during the Giolitti era—very interesting if one takes into account the journalistic and political situation in Italy, which is totally different from the French situation and from the situations of the other European countries in general. The clear division, in France, between popular newspapers and newspapers of opinion is not possible in Italy, which lacks a center as heavily populated and dominant as Paris (and where the political newspaper is less "indispensable" even among the upper classes). It would be interesting to look in the history of Italian journalism for the technical-political-cultural reasons that account for the success of the old *Secolo* of Milan.³ It seems to me that the history of Italian journalism can be divided into two periods: (1) the "primitive" period of generic political and cultural indistinctness that made possible the large circulation of *Il Secolo* based on a generic-indistinct program of vague "secularism" (against Catholic influence) and vague "democratism" (against the preponderant influence of right-wing forces in the life of the state); (2) the subsequent period in which the forces of the right "nationalized" and "popularized" themselves and the *Corriere della Sera* surpassed *Il Secolo* in circulation: in the *Corriere*, the vague secularism-democratism of *Il Secolo* became a vague national unitarianism that took the form of a less plebeian and less vulgar secularism—hence a less populist and democratizing nationalism. It is noteworthy that none of the parties that separated themselves from the inchoate populism of *Il Secolo* attempted to re-create the democratic unity on a higher politico-cultural level than that of the primitive period; this task was abandoned almost without a struggle to the conservatives who expressed themselves through the *Corriere*. Yet this is what always needs to be done once the positions have become clear and distinct: to re-create the unity, broken during the forward movement, on a higher level exemplified by the elite

that has overcome generic indistinctness to acquire its own personality and exercise a leading function over the old ensemble from which it distinguished and detached itself.

The same process was repeated in the Catholic world with the formation of the Popular Party,⁴ a democratic "distinction" that the rightists were able to subordinate to their own programs. In both cases, the petty bourgeoisie had the majority of leading intellectuals, and yet they were overwhelmed by elements of the fundamental class. In the lay camp, the industrialists of the *Corriere* overwhelmed the political professionals of *Il Secolo*; in the Catholic camp, the agrarian bourgeoisie in alliance with the big landowners overwhelmed the Popular Party. This happened in spite of the fact that *Il Secolo* and the Popular Party represented the great masses of the two camps: the rural and urban semiproletariat [and the petty bourgeoisie].

Cf. Notebook 24, §2.

§<8>. *Catholic Action. Catholic periodical publications.* (Figures extracted from the *Annali dell'Italia Cattolica* of 1926; they were last updated in September 1925.) The Catholics published 627 periodicals, classified by the *Annali* as follows: (1) *Dailies*: 18, of which 13 in northern Italy, 3 in central Italy, 1 in Naples, 1 in Sardinia; (2) *Periodicals of Catholic formation and propaganda*: 121, of which 83 in the North, 22 in the Center, 12 in the South, 1 in Sardinia, 4 in Sicily; (3) *Official bulletins of Catholic Action* (central council and national organizations): 17, of which 1 in Bologna, 5 in Milan, 11 in Rome; (4) *Catholic Action publications in the dioceses*: 71, of which 46 in the North, 15 in the Center, 5 in the South, 1 in Sardinia, 3 in Sicily; (5) *Official periodicals of various societies and organizations*: 42, of which 26 in the North, 15 in the Center (all of them in Rome), 1 in the South; (6) *Diocesan bulletins*: 134, of which 44 in the North, 33 in the Center, 43 in the South, 2 in Sardinia, 9 in Sicily; (7) *Religious periodicals*: 177, of which 89 in the North, 53 in the Center, 25 in the South, 3 in Sardinia, 6 in Sicily; (8) *Cultural periodicals* (art, science, and literature): 41, of which 17 in the North, 16 in the Center, 5 in the South, 3 in Sicily; (9) *Periodicals for young readers*: 16, of which 10 in the North, 2 in the Center, 2 in the South, 2 in Sicily.

Of the 627 publications, 328 come from the North, 161 from the Center, 94 from the South, 8 from Sardinia, 27 from Sicily.¹ These are the statistical figures, but if one were to consider the importance

of individual publications, the weight of the North would increase considerably. In 1925 there were about 280 dioceses and about 220 diocesan Councils of Catholic Action.² These figures need to be compared with 1919–1920 and with the postconcordat period. The number and nature of the periodicals must have changed significantly: the dailies and the periodicals of formation and propaganda lost a lot of ground because they were more closely linked to the fortunes of the Popular Party and to political activity. Recall that, in certain provinces, weeklies were prohibited from publishing advertisements, the timetables of trams and trains, etc.

§<9>. *The absence of national-popular characteristics in Italian literature.* From an article by Paolo Milano in the *Italia Letteraria* of 27 December 1931: "The value of the content of a work of art cannot be overestimated, Goethe wrote. A similar aphorism may come to mind when one thinks of the *effort* set in motion [*sic*] so many generations ago [?], and still going on today, to create a tradition of the modern Italian novel. What society or, rather, what class should be depicted? Don't recent attempts constitute, perhaps, a desire to move away from the folk characters that occupy the stage in the works of Manzoni and Verga? Is their partial success attributable to the difficulty and uncertainty of choosing a setting (idle upper bourgeoisie, ordinary people, or the bohemian periphery)?"¹

The passage is astonishing: the questions are posed in such a mechanical and superficial manner. So, do the "generations" of writers coldly *attempt* to determine the milieu they want to describe without thereby manifesting their "ahistorical" character and their moral and emotional hollowness? In any case, "content" does not just mean the choice of a particular milieu; what is essential to the content is the *attitude* that the author and his generation bring to that milieu. Attitude alone determines the cultural world of a generation and an epoch and therefore its style. Even in Manzoni and in Verga,² the determining factor is their attitude toward their "folk characters," not the characters themselves, and their attitudes are antithetical. Manzoni's is an attitude of Catholic paternalism; his implicit irony is indicative of the absence of deep instinctive love for those characters. Manzoni's attitude is dictated by an extraneous feeling of abstract duty decreed by Catholic morality but corrected and enlivened by pervasive irony. Verga's is an attitude of cold, scientific, and photographic impassivity dictated by

the canons of *verismo*, applied more rationally than by Zola. Manzoni's is the more pervasive attitude in the literature that depicts "folk characters"; one need only recall Renato Fucini.³ It is still superior but poised on a razor's edge, and in the work of inferior writers it degenerates into the stupid and Jesuitical sarcastic attitude of "Brescianism."

§<10>. *Risorgimento. Cavour's realism.* The relatively strong influence of international factors on the unfolding of the Risorgimento was an effect of Cavour's realism—a realism that attached to diplomatic activity a degree of importance that seemed monstrous to the Action Party. Crispi thought he was diminishing Cavour's importance when he told Ferdinando Martini that Cavour had done nothing other than "diplomatize the revolution";¹ in reality, though, he was acknowledging, albeit unwittingly, Cavour's indispensability. Crispi could not possibly accept the fact that the management of international relations was more important and essential than the structuring of internal relations; otherwise, he would have had to admit that the internal forces of the nation were much too weak in comparison to the magnitude of the tasks that needed to be accomplished and, moreover, they had shown themselves to be unequal to their mission, in addition to being politically unprepared and abulic (abulic on the terrain of concrete political will as opposed to formal Jacobinism). The question of "Cavour's realism," then, has still to be examined without prejudice and without rhetoric.

§<11>. *Risorgimento. 1848-1849.* It seems to me that, given their spontaneity, the events of 1848-1849 can be considered typical for the purposes of studying the political and social forces of the Italian nation. In those years, we find some basic formations: the Moderate Party reactionaries, municipalists; the neo-Guelphs—Catholic democracy; and the Action Party—national bourgeois Left liberal democracy. The three forces fought among themselves, and all three were successively defeated in the course of those two years. Following their defeat, each one of these forces went through an internal process of clarification and scission and in their reconfiguration shifted rightward. The most serious defeat was suffered by the neo-Guelphs, who disappeared as Catholic democracy and reorganized themselves as urban and rural bourgeois social elements

that together with the reactionaries constituted the new force of the conservative liberal right. One can draw a parallel between the neo-Guelphs and the Popular Party,¹ the new attempt at creating a Catholic democracy that failed in the same way and for similar reasons. Likewise, the failure of the Action Party resembles that of the "subversivism" of 1919-1920.

§<12>. *Popular literature. Bibliography.* Réginald W. Hartland, *Walter Scott et le roman "frénétique,"* publ. Honoré Champion. Gothic novel or horror novel: its origins are traceable to Horace Walpole and his *Castle of Otranto*. *The Castle of Otranto* inspired the novels of Ann Radcliffe (1764-1823),^a Clara Reeve, Lewis (*The Monk*), etc. *The Castle of Otranto* identified a current of the imagination that was in the air and of which it was the earliest manifestation. "Le Moine" par M.G. Lewis, raconté par Antonin Artaud, publ. Denoël et Steele. Cf. Alice Killen, *Le Roman terrifiant*, Champion, 1924.¹

§<13>. *Past and present. Manzoni dialectician.* Chap. VIII of the *Promessi Sposi*, the episode in which Renzo and Lucia attempt to surprise Don Abbondio and get themselves married in his house: "Renzo, who was creating an uproar at night in another man's house, which he had entered by fraud, and was keeping the owner of the house besieged in one of his own rooms, had all the look of an oppressor; yet he was really the oppressed party. Don Abbondio, surprised, put to flight, and terrified when he was peacefully minding his own business, appeared to be the victim; yet he was really the abuser. Often, this is how things are in this world; or, rather, this is how things were in the seventeenth century."¹

§<14>. *Cultural topics. I. On the Catholic preacher.* The Counter-Reformation produced a type of preacher described in *De Predicatore Verbi Dei*, Paris, 1585. Some basic rules: (1) the sermon must be pitched to the level of the listeners: thus different sermons for peasants and citizens, for the nobility and the plebeians, etc.; (2)

^a In the manuscript: "(1798-1831)." Gramsci transcribed the erroneous dates from his source for this note.

the preacher must not indulge in showy rhetoric or in excessive formal refinement; (3) he must not get into extremely subtle issues or make an ostentatious show of his erudition; (4) he must not mention the arguments of heretics in front of an uninformed crowd, etc.¹ The modern version of the type of preacher produced by the Counter-Reformation is the Catholic journalist, for journalists are in fact a cultural variety of preacher and orator. Point 4 is especially interesting, and it helps one understand why, in most cases, polemics with Catholic newspapers are fruitless: they not only refrain from reporting the "arguments of heretics," but also, in combating them indirectly, they distort and disfigure them, because they do not want their uninformed readers to reconstruct them from the polemic itself. Often, they even let a "heresy" go without objection because they deem it a lesser evil to let it circulate in a given milieu than making it known—by attacking it—in milieus that are not yet infected.

II. *Apostates and their disloyal polemical methods.* Catholics often complain, with good reason, that Catholic apostates appropriate the arguments of heretics, omitting any mention of their refutation and presenting them to the uninformed as original, if they were novelties that have not been refuted. In the seminaries, these arguments are specifically expounded, analyzed, refuted in the courses on apologetics; with remarkable intellectual disloyalty, the defrocked priest presents those same arguments as if they were his own, as if they had not been refuted and were incontrovertible, etc.

§<15>. *Catholic testimonies.* "The religious unity of the nation is being slowly imperiled and undermined; people are being taught to rebel against the church, which is depicted as just another human organization that arrogates unto itself rights that it does not have; this, in turn, is echoed in civil society, where people are being taught not to tolerate any yoke. Once the yoke of God and the church is shaken loose, what else is there to restrain man and compel him to abide by the difficult obligations of everyday life?"—the last paragraph of the article "Il regno di Dio secondo alcuni filosofi moderni," *Civiltà Cattolica*, 2 January 1932.¹ Expressions of this kind have become increasingly frequent in *Civiltà Cattolica* (alongside expositions that present the philosophy of St. Thomas as Italy's "national philosophy," as a "national product" that must be preferred to foreign products)—this is, to say the least,

strange because it is the explicit theorization of religion as an instrument of political action.²

§<16>. *Past and present. Gentile's philosophy.* Savage attack against Gentile and his disciples launched by the *Roma Fascista* of October 1931.¹ Gentile is accused of "high treason," of disloyal and dishonest methods. The attack was stopped by the authorities, but the attacker (G. A. Fanelli) seems to have escaped censure, despite the extreme severity of the accusations, which were obviously unproven because Gentile has retained all the offices he holds. Recall the earlier attack by Paolo Orano, etc.² It seems that Gentile's official position in the sphere of the national culture—which has accumulated such power as to become an institution—is no longer unquestioned. Gentile's philosophy is not recognized as official and national; if it were, it would signify the explicit subordination of Catholicism and its demotion to a subaltern role, etc.

§<17>. *Past and present.* A generation can be judged by the same standard it applies to the previous generation; a historical period can be judged by its way of looking at the period that preceded it. A generation that devalues the previous generation and is incapable of recognizing its great achievements and its essential significance is bound to be mean and lacking in self-confidence, even if it displays gladiatorial postures and a craving for greatness. It is the usual type of relationship between a great man and his valet.¹ Pretend to have been abandoned in order to arise and distinguish oneself. A strong and vital generation that intends to work and assert itself is inclined, rather, to overestimate the previous generation because its energy gives it the confidence that it will go even further; simply vegetating is already an improvement on what is portrayed as dead.

The past is blamed for not having accomplished the task of the present: how much more convenient it would be if the parents had already done the work of their children. Implicit in the devaluation of the past is a justification of the insignificance of the present: who knows what we would have achieved had our parents done this or that . . . but they did not, and so we have not done more. Is a garret on the ground floor any less of a garret than one on the tenth floor or the thirtieth? A generation that knows only how to make garrets complains that its predecessors had not already built ten- or thirty-

story buildings. You say that you are capable of building cathedrals, but you are not able to build anything but garrets.

Contrast with the *Manifesto* that praises the greatness of the moribund class.²

§<18>. *Past and present. Lawyers in Italy*. Cf. Mariano D'Amelio's article "La classe forense in cifre," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 26 January 1932.¹ He cites a study by Rodolfo Benini, published in the proceedings of the Accademia dei Lincei, "full of wise and penetrating remarks on the class of barristers, solicitors, and pettifoggers, pertaining to the years 1880-1913." A book by Piero Calamandrei (entitled *Troppi avvocati!* published by La Voce, I think). A recent study (of about 20 pp.) by Spallanzani, "L'efficienza della classe forense sulla vita italiana" (with no bibliographical references). In the three Law Lists of 1880, the total number of registered barristers and solicitors was 12,885; that is, 45.17 for every 100,000 people. In 1913 the total was 21,488; 61.97 for every 100,000 people. In 1923 it was 23,925; 54.41 per 100,000. In 1927, following the extraordinary revision of the Law Lists required by the new law, the number climbed to 26,679; 68.85 per 100,000; more than 2,000 were removed from the lists. In 1929 the revision and the new restrictive norms reduced the number to 25,353; 64.21 per 100,000. Now, an average of 10 lawyers are added every year; fewer than the vacated spots.

In other countries: *France*: in 1911, the *avocats* and *avoués* totaled 10,236, or 29 per 100,000 people; in 1921: 15,236, or 39 per 100,000. In postwar *Germany*: in 1925, there were 13,676 *Rechtsanwälte* (barristers and solicitors), 22 per 100,000; in 1913: 18 per 100,000. *Austria*: before the war, 15 per 100,000; after the war, 18. *England*: in 1920, 17,946, or 47 per 100,000; before the war, 45 per 100,000.

Every year, 9,000 students are enrolled in law schools in Italy; in the years 1911-14, 1,900 received a law degree; in 1928-29 there were 2,240. Between 1911-14, an average of 4,943 graduated from the lycées every year; in 1926-29, 5,640. In the higher courts (Appeals Court, Court of Assizes, Court of Cassation), there were 2,666 members of the bench in 1880; in 1913, 2,553; in 1922, 2,546; in 1929, 2,557.

§<19>. *Common sense*. Manzoni distinguishes between *common sense* and *good sense* (cf. *Promessi Sposi*, Chpt. XXXII on the

plague and the anointers.) He mentions the fact that there were some people who did not believe the stories about the anointers but they could not say so publicly, for fear of going against widespread public opinion; then he adds: "This was clearly a secret disclosure of the truth, a family confidence. Good sense was not lacking; but it stayed in hiding, in fear of common sense."¹

Cf. Notebook 11, §56.

§<20>. *Risorgimento. The Tuscan Moderates*. Cf. Mario Puccioni's lecture "Uomini del Risorgimento in Toscana," published in the *Miscellanea Storica della Valdelsa* and summarized in the *Marzocco* of 15 November 1931.¹ Puccioni's defense of the Tuscan Moderates is an interesting characteristic of modern Tuscan culture: it reveals the extent to which the national consciousness of Tuscany's ruling class is still unstable and its "dignity and prestige" debatable. The Tuscan Moderates found help and support only among the cultured bourgeoisie, small property owners, and the urban population; the aristocracy, along with the agrarian classes, represented absenteeism and apathy. "With the outbreak [!] of the revolution, it was providential that on the evening of April 27 Ubaldino Peruzzi agreed to join the triumvirate,² reassuring the diffident elements of the Grand Duchy and the diplomatic corps—all of whom opposed the movement—that he would not permit a repetition of the excesses of 1849." What, in all this, could be considered "national"? The Moderates, then, were an expression of the "trepidation" of the aristocracy and affluent people, who feared "excesses," and of the diplomatic corps. In what way could this be an expression of anything "national"? And why were the agrarian classes absent? Did they not constitute the majority of the Tuscan people, the "national force"? As for the fear of "excesses": was it not fear of the classes that would mobilize to assert their progressive demands? And the "fearful": were they not the reactionary protectors of an antinational status quo—so much so that it was the status quo of the old regime? In other words, this was a repetition of the old adage: France or Spain, what does it matter as long as one gets to eat? Grand Duchy or a unified Italy: what does it matter as long as things stay the same? The political and national element is immaterial; what matters is the preservation of the socioeconomic order, which must be protected from the progressive

national forces. The same is true of the fear of the diplomatic corps. How can a revolution be afraid of diplomats? Doesn't this fear indicate a sense of subordination to foreigners, of feeling compelled to ignore national needs because of foreign expectations? Puccioni's apologia has base and pitiable premises, but why call a subaltern and servile position "national"?

The Moderates were late in embracing the idea that inspired the revolutionaries and in understanding the need to join Piedmont, but once they did—after a process of reconstruction—they were all the more resolute [?] in supporting it, disseminating it, making it come true, in spite [?] of the diplomats' opposition and in contrast to the improper [?] meddling of the followers of the fugitive ruler. The question is not whether the Moderates joined the revolution belatedly [—or were not its precursors?—]; instead, one should observe how their support was useful and indispensable, if for no other reason [!] because they showed [!] foreigners that the terrible revolutionaries were in fact represented by men from the cream of society who had *everything to lose and nothing to gain* from a revolution if it did not turn out to be *serious* and to promise a brighter future.

Brighter for whom? And in what way? Puccioni becomes funny, but what is really funny is the fact that he is encouraged to say such things and that his affirmations and his way of thinking are applauded.

§<21>. *The Modern Prince*. This can serve as the general title for the collection of ideas on political science that may be assembled into a work of political science that would be conceived and organized along the lines of Machiavelli's *Prince*.¹ The fundamental characteristic of the *Prince* is precisely that it is not a systematic treatment; it is, rather, a "living" book in which ideology becomes "myth," a fantastic and artistic "image" between utopia and scholarly treatise in which the doctrinal and rational element is personified by the "condottiere," the "anthropomorphic" and plastic symbol of the "collective will." In describing the process of formation of a "collective will," Machiavelli does not resort to pedantic disquisitions on the principles and criteria for a method of action; instead, he presents it in terms of the "qualities and duties" of a concrete personage and thus stimulates the artistic imagination and arouses passion.

Machiavelli's *Prince* could be studied as a historical example of the Sorelian "myth," that is, of a political ideology that is not presented as a cold utopia or as a rationalized doctrine but as a concrete "fantasy" that works on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organize its collec-

tive will. The utopian character of the *Prince* comes from the fact that the "prince" did not really exist historically and did not appear before the Italian people in a historically immediate form; he was, rather, a "theoretical abstraction," the symbol of the generic leader, of the ideal "condottiere." One can study how and why Sorel never advanced from the concept of "myth," via the concept of trade unions, to the concept of political party. For Sorel, however, the myth finds its embodiment not in the trade union as an expression of the collective will but in the practical action of the union and of a collective will that is already organized and in operation—a practical action whose greatest achievement was to have been the general strike,² which is, so to speak, a "passive activity" that has yet to enter an "active or constructive" phase. But can a myth be "nonconstructive"? Is it possible to imagine, along the lines of Sorel's intuitions, an action being effective if it leaves the "collective will" in its primitive formative phase, the phase of differentiating itself (of cleavage) for destructive purposes?

The modern Prince, the myth-Prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a social component in which a collective will—one that is recognized and, to some extent, has asserted itself in action—has already begun to take shape. Historical development has already produced this organism, and it is the political party—the modern formation that contains the partial collective wills with a propensity to become universal and total. Only an immediate historico-political action that necessitates moving at lightning speed can be embodied by a concrete individual. Such speed can only be generated by a great and imminent danger, precisely the kind of great danger that, in an instant, generates flaming passions and fanaticism, annihilating the critical sense and irony that can destroy the "charismatic" character of the *condottiere* (Boulangier an example).³ By its very nature, however, an immediate action of this sort cannot be long lasting; neither can it have an organic character. In almost every case, it typifies a restoration or reorganization; it is not typical of the founding of new states or new national and social structures (as was the case in Machiavelli's *Prince*, in which the restoration factor was at most a rhetorical facade, associated with the concept of an Italy descended from Rome and destined to restore the order of Rome). It is a "defensive" rather than creative type of action. It is based on the assumption that an already existing "collective will" has dispersed, lost its nerve, and needs to be regrouped and reinforced, as opposed to the assumption that a "collective will" has to be created *ex novo* and directed toward goals that are concrete, to be sure, but whose concreteness has not yet been tested by experience. The "abstract" (spontaneist) character of Sorel is apparent from his aversion (which takes the emotional form of ethical repugnance) for the *Jacobins*, who were a "categorical" "incarnation" of Machiavelli's *Prince*. The Modern Prince must have a section devoted to *Jacobinism* (in the complete sense of this notion that has already been established in other

notes), as an example of how a concrete and operative collective will is formed. It is also necessary to define "collective will" and *political will* in general in the modern sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real and immediate historical drama. The first chapter [part] in fact should be devoted to the "collective will," posing the question as follows: do the basic conditions exist for the awakening of a national-popular collective will? Hence a historical (economic) analysis of the social structure of the given country and a "dramatic" representation of the attempts made over the centuries to awaken this will and the reasons for the successive failures. Why was there no absolute monarchy in Italy in Machiavelli's time? One must go back to the Roman Empire (the question of the intellectuals and the language question) in order to understand the medieval communes and the role of the church. The reason for the successive failures of the attempts to create a national-popular creative will is to be found in the existence of certain classes and in the particular character of other classes conditioned by the international position of Italy (seat of the universal church). This position determined an internal situation that can be called "economic-corporative" that, politically, is a particular form of anarchic feudalism. There never was an effective "Jacobin" force—precisely the force that creates the national-popular collective will, the foundation of all modern states. Do the conditions for this will finally exist? Or, rather, what is the present relation between these conditions and the forces that oppose them? Traditionally, the forces of opposition have been the landed aristocracy and, more generally, landed property as a whole, in other words, that special "landowning bourgeoisie" that is the legacy of parasitism bequeathed to modern times by the disintegration of the communal bourgeoisie (the hundred cities, the cities of silence).⁴ No formation of a national popular will is possible unless the masses of peasant farmers enter *simultaneously* into political life. This was what Machiavelli wanted to happen through the reform of the militia; it is what the Jacobins achieved in the French Revolution. This is what Machiavelli's [precocious] Jacobinism consists of, the fertile germ of his conception of national revolution. All history since 1815 consists in the effort of the traditional classes to prevent the formation of a collective will in order to maintain "economic-corporative" power in an international system of inert equilibrium, etc.

An important component of the Modern Prince is the question of moral and intellectual reform, that is, the question of religion or worldview. In this field, too, we find an absence of "Jacobinism" and a fear of "Jacobinism" expressed in philosophical terms (latest example: Benedetto Croce). The modern Prince must be the promoter of moral and intellectual reform, which constitutes the terrain for a subsequent development of the national popular collective rooted in a complete and accomplished form of modern civilization.

In the end, the modern Prince should focus entirely on these two basic points: the formation of a national popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is the active and operative expression, and intellectual and moral reform. The concrete points of programmatic action should be incorporated in the first part; in other words, they should arise "dramatically" from the discourse and not be an exposition of cold ratiocination. (Can there be cultural reform and a cultural improvement of the depressed members of society before there is an economic reform and a change in living standards? Intellectual and moral reform is therefore always tied to a program of economic reform; indeed, the program of economic reform is the concrete way in which every intellectual and moral reform expresses itself. As it grows, the modern Prince upsets the entire system of intellectual and moral relations, for its development means precisely that every act is deemed useful or harmful, virtuous or wicked, depending on whether its point of reference is the modern Prince and whether it increases the Prince's power or opposes it. The Prince takes the place, in people's consciousness, of the divinity and of the categorical imperative; it becomes the basis of a modern secularism and of a complete secularization of life and of all customary relations.)

Cf. Notebook 13, §1.

§<22>. *History of the intellectuals. Starting points for research.* Plato's republic. When saying that Plato yearned for a "republic of philosophers," one must understand the term "philosophers" "historically"; today, the term should be translated as "intellectuals." (Of course, Plato was thinking also of the "great intellectuals" who were the intellectual types of his time, in addition to highlighting the specific content of intellectuality, which, in concrete terms, one could call "religiosity": the intellectuals who governed, in other words, were specifically the intellectuals closest to religion, whose activity was characterized by religiosity in the general sense of the time and in Plato's specific sense; therefore, it was in a certain sense a "social" activity for the improvement and education [and intellectual direction, thus having a hegemonic function] of the polis.) Perhaps, then, one might say that Plato's "utopia" prefigures medieval feudalism, with the role that was played within it by the church and the ecclesiastics, the intellectual category of that phase of sociohistorical development. Plato's aversion for "artists" must therefore be understood as an aversion for "individualistic" spiritual activities that lean toward the "particular" and thus are "areligious" and "asocial".

The intellectuals in the Roman Empire. The change in the social position of the intellectuals in Rome from the time of the Republic to the Imperial period (from an aristocratic-corporative regime to a democratic-bureaucratic regime) is connected to Caesar, who granted citizenship to doctors and to masters of the liberal arts so that they would be more willing to live in Rome and so that others would be drawn back: "Omnesque medicinam Romae professos et liberalium artium doctores, quo libentius et ipsi urbem incolerent et coeteri appeterent civitate donavit." Suetonius, *Life of Caesar*, XLII.¹ So, Caesar proposed: (1) To have the intellectuals who were already in Rome settle there, thus creating a permanent category of intellectuals, since without their permanent residence no organization of culture was possible. There had probably been fluctuations that needed to be stopped, etc. (2) To attract to Rome the best intellectuals from all over the Roman Empire, thus promoting centralization on a massive scale. This gave rise to the category of "imperial" intellectuals that would be kept going by the Catholic clergy and would leave many traces in the entire history of Italian intellectuals, including the "cosmopolitanism" that was one of their characteristics until the 18th century.

§<23>. *Federico Confalonieri.* Apropos of Federico Confalonieri,¹ I extract from A. F. Andryane's *Memorie di un prigioniero di Stato allo Spielberg*, chapters selected and annotated by Rosolino Guastalla (Florence: Barbèra, 1916) some bibliographical information:² Rosolino Guastalla, "Letteratura spielberghese," in the annotated *Le mie prigioni*, Livorno, Giusti, 1912;³ Giorgio Pallavicino, *Spilbergo e Gradisca* (1856), reprinted in his *Memorie* (Loescher, 1882);⁴ Federico Confalonieri, *Memorie e Lettere* (Milan, Hoepli, 1890);⁵ Alessandro Luzio, *Antonio Salvotti e i processi del Ventuno*, Rome, 1901;⁶ Domenico Chiattono, commentary on Pellico's *Le Mie Prigioni*.⁷ Andryane's *Mémoires* have been translated into Italian by F. Regonati (four volumes, 1861, Milan) supplemented with documents.⁸

Luzio's attitude against Andryane, while he defends Salvotti (!); cf. other observations by Luzio, as well as the tendentious and acrimonious character of his writings on the Risorgimento. Cf. G. Trombadori, "Il giudizio del De Sanctis sul Guicciardini," in the *Nuova Italia* of 20 November 1931; Trombadori writes: "The legitimate admiration that all of us have for Luzio, especially for the

work he has carried out in the field of study of our Risorgimento, must not blind us to the boundaries within which his vision of history is trapped, namely, a rather exclusivist moralism and a mentality so unabashedly juridical [but is it correct to say "juridical"? is it not, rather, "judicial"?] that it has made him the peerless investigator of court documents, etc., etc."⁹ (check the text if necessary). But this is not simply a question of temperament; it is, above all, a question of political tendentiousness. Luzio can be said to be the Cesare Cantù of the conservative Moderates (cf. Croce on Cantù in the *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo XIX*).¹⁰ I continue Trombadori's passage on Luzio: "They are two attitudes that merge and complete one another, which is why sometimes it seems that the amazing skill he brings to the analysis of depositions, testimonies, and 'interrogations' has only one purpose: to exonerate someone from the charge of being a coward or a traitor or to confirm the charge, to condemn or to absolve. As a result, when he brings up the names of men who played their great or a minor role in history, he rarely resists the temptation of adding such adjectives as cowardly, generous, noble, unworthy, and so on."¹¹ This is why, years ago, Luzio joined the controversy on Guicciardini, opposing De Sanctis's view, in order, of course, to *defend* Guicciardini—believing that there was a need to defend him, as if De Sanctis had conducted some kind of prosecutorial indictment against Guicciardini when in fact De Sanctis was giving an account of a period of Italian culture, the period of the "the man of Guicciardini."¹² In this case, too, Luzio's intervention was not an instance of a scholar's "temperament" but an instance of political tendentiousness; in fact, "the man of Guicciardini" is the ideal type of the "Italian Moderate"—be he Lombard, Tuscan, or Piedmontese—between 1848 and 1870 and of the clerical-Moderate, the "historiographical" facet of which is Luzio.

It is noteworthy that in his *Storia della storiografia italiana del secolo XIX* (1921 edition) Croce never mentions Luzio, not even incidentally, even though some of Luzio's work predates 1900, but, I think, he talks about him in the appendix that was recently published in *La Critica* and subsequently included in the new edition of the book.¹³

§<24>. *History of the intellectuals*. Mosca's *Elementi di scienza politica* (new enlarged edition of 1923) needs to be examined for

this survey.¹ What Mosca calls the "political class" is nothing other than the category of intellectuals of the dominant social group. Mosca's concept of "political class" has to be placed alongside Pareto's concept of the *elite*,² which is another attempt to explain the historical phenomenon of the intellectuals and their function in the life of the state and society. Mosca's book, a huge miscellany, is sociological and positivistic in character; the tendentiousness of immediate politics makes it less indigestible and, from a literary point of view, more lively.

§<25>. *Risorgimento*. Look up in Quinet the meaning and justification of the formula according to which revolution and restoration are equivalent in Italian history.¹ According to Daniele Mattalia ("Gioberti in Carducci" in the *Nuova Italia* of 20 November 1931), Quinet's formula was adopted by Carducci by way of Gioberti's concept of national classicism (*Rinnovamento*, III, 88; *Primato*, III, 1, 5, 6, 7. . . ; *Rinnovamento* in the Laterza edition and *Primato* in the Utet edition).² Is it possible to establish a similarity between this concept of Quinet's and Cuoco's concept of "passive revolution"?³ One would say that both Quinet's "revolution-restoration" and Cuoco's "passive revolution" express the historical fact that popular initiative is missing from the development of Italian history, as well as the fact that "progress" occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and incoherent rebelliousness of the popular masses—a reaction consisting of "restorations" that agree to some part of the popular demands and are therefore "progressive restorations," or "revolutions-restorations," or even "passive revolutions." Carrying this idea over to the "Past and present" survey, one might say that this is about the "revolutions of Guicciardini's man" and that Cavour in fact "diplomatized" Guicciardini's man.⁴

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.xiv.

§<26>. *Past and present*. *The politics of Luigi Cadorna*. Fermi's article "La Spagna cattolica," in the *Gerarchia* of December 1931, mentions the Spanish constitution and states: "One of the glorious pages of history records how under the guidance of the clergy, which was itself aroused, most if not all of the nation's classes confronted the French with unyielding resistance from 1808 to 1813. Ferdinand VII and the Cortes of 1812 took it upon themselves to annul the outcome. With a constitution copied from the French model of 1791, they imposed a forgery on the country: a copy of a bad copy, as L.

Cadorna once said about a similar fraud."¹ When and where did Cadorna use such terms? Fermi's opinion on the Spanish Constitution of 1812 is the usual superficial opinion of reactionary demagoguery.

§<27>. *Conservation and innovation.* A certain historicist current sets itself on its foundations and declares that there is only one historicist method of action: the one in which historical progress (development) stems from the dialectic of conservation and innovation.¹ The tempering of conservation and innovation constitutes the "national classicism" of Gioberti,² just as it constitutes the literary and artistic classicism of Croce's latest aesthetic theory. This is the historicism of the moderates, not so much a scientific theory as a practico-political or ideological tendency. But why must conservation be just that specific "conservation," that particular dialectical element of the past? And why is it that not conserving a specific element of the past makes one "irrational" and "antihistoricist"? In reality, if it is true that progress is the dialectic of conservation and innovation and innovation conserves the past by superseding it, it is also true that the past is a complex thing and that, given this complexity, choices have to be made. A choice, however, cannot be made arbitrarily, a priori by an individual or by a current; if a choice were made in this way, it would be a matter of "ideology," of unilateral practico-political bias, which cannot provide the basis for a science. Presenting such a choice as if it were science is in fact an ideological factor, since every ideology tries to present itself as science or as philosophy. What of the past will be conserved in the dialectical process will be determined by the process itself; it will be a necessary fact, not an arbitrary choice by so-called scientists and philosophers. Meanwhile, one should point out that the innovatory force, insofar as it was constituted in the past, is itself a fact of the past; indeed, it is itself conservation-innovation, it contains within itself all of the past that is worth developing and perpetuating. For these sorts of moderate historicists (and "moderate" is used here in the political, class sense—in other words, those classes involved in the restoration after 1815 and 1848), the irrational was Jacobinism, and antihistory equaled Jacobinism. But who can prove historically that the Jacobins were guided solely by whim? And as for the affirmation that neither Napoleon nor the Restoration destroyed the *faits accomplis* of the Jacobins: is this not a banal historical statement? Or perhaps the antihistoricism of the Jacobins consists in whatever initiatives of theirs that were less than 100 percent "conserved"? This does not seem like a plausible argument since one cannot do history with mathematical calculations. Furthermore, no innovatory force in history immediately fulfills itself 100 percent. Such a force is in fact always rational and irrational, historicist and antihistori-

cist; in other words, it is "life" with all the weaknesses and the strengths of life, with all its contradictions and antitheses.³

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.xiv.

§<28>. *Political terminology. Theorists, doctrinaires, abstractionists, etc.* In ordinary language, "theorist" is used in a pejorative sense, like "doctrinaire" or, better still, like "abstractionist." It has suffered the same fate as the technical-philosophical term "idealist," which has come to mean "head in the clouds," etc. It is no accident that certain words have acquired this pejorative connotation. It has to do with a reaction by common sense against certain cultural degenerations, etc. But "common sense" in turn has been the agent of philistinism; it has mummified a justified reaction into a permanent attitude, into an intellectual laziness that is as degenerative and repulsive as the phenomenon it sought to combat. "Good sense" has reacted, but "common sense" has embalmed the reaction and made out of it a "theoretical," "doctrinaire," and "idealistic" canon.

§<29>. *Good sense and common sense.* The representatives of "good sense" are "the man in the street," the "average Frenchman" who has become the "common man," "monsieur Tout-le-monde." Bourgeois theater, in particular, is where one should look for representatives of good sense.

§<30>. *History of Italian intellectuals. Gioberti.* The importance of Gioberti in the formation of the modern national character of Italian intellectuals.¹ His role alongside Foscolo.² In a previous note,³ observations on Gioberti's formal solution to the national-popular problem as a tempering of conservation and innovation, as a "national classicism." Formal solution not only to the major sociopolitical problem but also to corollary problems, such as that of a national-popular literature. For the purposes of this study, one must take another look at Gioberti's most important polemical publications: the *Primato* and the *Rinnovamento*,⁴ the writings against the Jesuits (*Prolegomini* and the *Gesuita moderno*).⁵ Anzilotti's book on Gioberti.⁶

§<31>. *Risorgimento. "Carboneria" and Freemasonry.* An article by A. Luzio, "Le origini della Carboneria," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 7 February 1932.¹ Luzio discusses two books by Eugen Lennhoff, fr. ∴ leader of Austrian Freemasonry (the *Civiltà Cattolica* regular contributor on Freemasonry has written often about Lennhoff): *Die Freimaurer* and *Politische Geheimbünde* (publ. Amalthea, Vienna).² Luzio begins by pointing out the lapses in Italian found in Lennhoff's political references, as well as other more serious errors (Mazzini confused with the grandmaster Mazzoni on p. 204 of *Freimaurer*,³ thus promoting him to grandmaster; but is this a historical error or just a misprint?). As a review of Lennhoff, the article by Luzio is worthless. On the origins of the *Carboneria*: Alberti's writings on the Italian constitutional assemblies and on the Neapolitan revolution of 1820,⁴ published by the Lincei; the studies by Sòriga, *Risorgimento Italiano*, January–March 1928, and his article on the *Carboneria* in the *Enciclopedia Treccani* (vol. VIII);⁵ and Luzio's book on Freemasonry.⁶ In this article, Luzio quotes from the unpublished memoirs of General Rossetti (on whom Guido Bustico had written in the *Nuova Antologia* in 1927)⁷ a report that Rossetti himself had given to Murat (in June 1814) wherein he talks about the early years of the *Carboneria*, which was very well known in France, especially in Franche-Comté, and which Rossetti joined in 1802 when he was living in Gray. (But these things are vague, and they are lost in the darkness of the past; Francis I was supposedly among the founders of the *Carboneria*, etc.)⁸ In the Kingdom of Naples, according to Rossetti, the *Carboneria* began to spread in the province of Avellino in 1811 but started extending its reach only toward the middle of 1812.

§<32>. *Risorgimento. Origins.* "Tendentious" issues that are raised concerning the origins of the national Risorgimento movement: (1) a Francophile-democratic thesis: the movement owes its origins to the French Revolution—a view that has determined the second thesis; (2) the French Revolution, with its intervention in the peninsula, interrupted the "authentically" national movement; this thesis has a double aspect: the Jesuitical aspect and the Moderate aspect that makes reference to reformist principles. The reformist movement, however, was never interrupted out of fear of the French Revolution; therefore (3) the French Revolution, with its intervention, did not interrupt the indigenous movement, but, rather, it enabled its renewal and its accomplishment.

Cf. Notebook 9, §101 and Notebook 19, §3.

§<33>. *The 1848-49 historical nexus. The federalism of Ferrari-Cattaneo.* It was the political-historical way of dealing with the contradictions that existed between Piedmont and Lombardy. Lombardy did not want to be annexed by Piedmont, like a province: it was intellectually, politically, and economically more advanced than Piedmont. It had used its own forces and its own resources to carry out its democratic revolution in the Five Days;¹ it was perhaps more Italian than Piedmont, in the sense that it was more representative of Italy than Piedmont. Cattaneo's presentation of federalism as immanent in all of Italian history was nothing other than an ideological, mythical element meant to reinforce the political program of the day. Why *accuse* federalism of having slowed the progress of the national unification movement? It is necessary to stress, yet again, the methodological criterion that the history of the Risorgimento is an altogether different thing from the hagiography of the patriotic forces, much less of a fraction of them, the unification forces. The Risorgimento is a complex and contradictory historical development that is made complete by all its antithetical elements, by its protagonists and its antagonists, by their struggles and the reciprocal modifications that the struggles themselves determined, and also by the role of passive and latent forces, such as the great rural masses—in addition, of course, to the very important function of international relations.

§<34>. *Past and present. Bibliography.* Government Stationery Office: Publications printed by the state or in cooperation with it: *Spoglio dei periodici e delle opere collettive 1926-1930* (Part I: *Scritti biografici e critici*; Part II: *Ripartizione per materia*), Ed. Libreria dello Stato, Roma.¹

§<35>. *Risorgimento. Giuseppe Ferrari.* How historical Jacobinism (unity of town and country) becomes diluted and abstract in Giuseppe Ferrari. The "agrarian law," a concrete and actual programmatic item,¹ clearly delimited in space and time, became a vague ideology, a principle of the philosophy of history. One should point out that the French Jacobins' policy concerning the peasantry was nothing other than immediate political intuition (a weapon in the struggle against the landed aristocracy and against Girondist federalism); the Jacobins were opposed to every utopian "exag-

generation" of abstract "agrarianism." The way in which he outlined "agrarian reform" accounts for the relative popularity that Ferrari enjoyed and continues to enjoy among anarchists. There are many similarities among Ferrari, Bakunin, and the Russian *narodniks* in general: the landless peasants are mythologized for the "pandestruction." Unlike Bakunin, however, Ferrari remained vividly aware of the liberalizing nature of the reform. Ferrari's ideas on agrarian reform as a way of grafting the agrarian masses on to the national revolution must be compared with the ideas of Carlo Pisacane.² Pisacane is closer to Machiavelli, a more limited and concretely political conception. (Ferrari against the inheritance of land ownership, against the residues of feudalism, but not against inheritance of the capitalist kind; compare with the ideas of Eugenio Rignano.)³

§<36>. *Risorgimento. Transformism.* Transformism as one of the historical forms of "revolution-restoration" or "passive revolution," already mentioned in relation to the process of formation of the modern state in Italy. Transformism as a "real historical document" of the true nature of the parties that appeared as extremist during the period of militant action (Partito d'Azione).¹ Two periods of transformism: (1) from 1860 to 1900, "molecular" transformism; that is, individual political figures molded by the democratic opposition parties were incorporated one by one into the conservative-moderate "political class" (characterized by its aversion to any intervention by the popular masses in state life, to any organic reform that would replace crude dictatorial "dominance" with a "hegemony"); (2) from 1900 onward, transformism of whole groups of extremists who crossed over to the moderate camp (the first event was the formation of the Nationalist Party with ex-syndicalist and anarchist groups that culminated in the Libyan war, followed by interventionism).² Between these two periods, one can insert an intermediate period (1890–1900) during which a mass of intellectuals joined the parties of the Left—called socialist but in fact simply democratic. This is how Guglielmo Ferrero—in his booklet *Reazione* (Turin: Roux, 1895)—describes the movement of Italian intellectuals in the 1890s (I am reproducing the passage from G. Mosca's *Elementi di scienza politica*, 2d ed., 1923):

There is always a certain number of individuals who need to become passionate about something that is not immediate or personal, something

that comes from afar; their personal affairs, science, art are not enough to occupy their minds fully. What was left for them in Italy, other than the socialist idea? It came from afar, which is always seductive. In some respects, at least, it was sufficiently complex and sufficiently vague to satisfy the very different moral needs of its numerous converts. On the one hand, it brought with it a broad spirit of brotherhood and of internationalism that addresses a real modern need. On the other hand, it bore the imprint of a scientific method, which was reassuring to the minds that were educated in the experimental schools. It is not at all surprising, then, that a large number of young men joined the party—a party in which one might have risked meeting some humble ex-convict or some small-time *repris de justice* but in which there was certainly no risk of running into a Panama Canal profiteer, a political speculator, a hawk of patriotism, or a member of that band of shameless and amoral adventurers who upon creating Italy proceeded to devour it. It is immediately obvious, even to the casual observer, that nowhere in Italy do the economic and social conditions exist to permit the formation of a genuine and sizable socialist party. Furthermore, a socialist party should logically find its strongest recruits among the working classes, not the bourgeoisie, as happened in Italy. Now, if a socialist party did grow in Italy under such unfavorable conditions and in such an illogical manner, it was primarily because it responded to the moral needs of a certain number of young men who were nauseated by so much corruption, ignobility, and meanness and who would have sold themselves to the devil in order to escape the old parties that were putrefied down to the marrow of their bones.³

One should look into the role that the Italian senate played in the process of “molecular” transformism. Notwithstanding his federalist republicanism, etc., Ferrari entered the senate, just as many others during the period up to 1914; recall the comic statements of Senator Pullé, who entered the senate with Gerolamo Gatti and other followers of Bissolati.⁴

§<37>. *The Modern Prince*. This series of observations might be the right place for the notes on the study of situations and on what is meant by “relations of force.” The study of how “situations” should be analyzed—that is, how to go about establishing the various levels of relations of force—could serve as a basic exposition of political science, understood as an ensemble of practical rules for research. Alongside this: an explanation of what is meant in politics by strategy and tactics, by “plan,” by propaganda and agitation; organizational principles, etc.

Insofar as they are not abstract or imaginary, the practical elements—usually treated in a haphazard fashion in political treatises (Mosca's *Elementi di scienza politica* may serve as an example)¹—ought to be included in the study of the various levels of the relations of force. One could start with international relations of force (incorporating the notes concerning the definition of a great power) and then move on to objective relations within society—that is, the degree of development of productive forces—to the relations of force in politics [[or hegemony]] or between political parties and to military relations or, better, to direct political relations.

Do international relations precede or follow fundamental social relations? Surely, they follow. Absolute and relative relations in the international field are modified organically by every organic change in the structure through its technical-military expressions. Even the geographical position of a national state does not precede but follows structural changes, even though it reacts back on them to a certain extent (the extent, precisely, to which superstructures react on the structure or politics on economics). On the other hand, international relations react both passively and actively on political relations (relations of hegemony among the parties) in particular. The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will end up representing the situation and exploiting it to prevent rival parties from gaining the upper hand. From these facts, one can conclude that often the so-called foreigner's party turns out to be, in reality, not the party that is commonly regarded as such but rather the most nationalistic party [[G. Volpe's articles in the *Corriere della Sera* of 22 and 23 March allude to this international factor that has a "repressive" effect on domestic energies]]²—a nationalistic party that indeed represents not so much the vital forces of its country as the country's subordination and economic enslavement to a hegemonic nation or group of nations.

Cf. Notebook 13, §2.

§<38>. *Past and present. The fear of Kerenskyism.* It is one of the most important features of the postwar period. To some extent, perhaps, it corresponds to the fear of Lafayetteism in the period after the French Revolution. A "negative myth" has taken shape around Kerenskyism. All the negative qualities, the weaknesses, the indecisiveness, the shortcomings of an entire historical epoch have been attributed to Kerensky. Numerous heads of government are obsessed with the fear of becoming the Kerensky of their respective country. This fear animates some of the political maxims of today's Machiavellianism and the critical principles that guide

political mass propaganda. But is there anything real in this fear? An overlooked component of Kerenskyism is precisely the fear of being Kerensky; in other words, the fact that a negative approach in political life replaces a positive approach, with the result that one thinks of what "not to do" rather than of what "to do" concretely. The obsession with the rival is such that one senses the rival dominating one's own personality. Besides, just as one does not become a "Kerensky" voluntarily, so also one does not escape being a Kerensky just by willfully refusing to be a Kerensky. Kerensky was the manifestation of a specific relation of immediate political, organizational, and military forces that he did not himself create and that he failed to correct despite his desperate efforts—so desperate and disorganized that they made him look like a clown. People have taken seriously the moral and intellectual portrait of Kerensky drawn by his enemies as a tool to use against him, to isolate and liquidate him; out of this portrait, they created a straw man who exists outside of time and space, a kind of "helot" to parade before the "Spartans" in order to educate them. One can disprove the belief that Kerensky never resorted to force; indeed, perhaps it was precisely his recourse to force that accelerated the political course of events that overwhelmed him. Kerensky in fact had many relative successes, and his political line was not wrong per se, but this mattered little when it came to the conglomeration of forces that had been unleashed around him and that could not be controlled by politicians of Kerensky's type—that is, by the conglomeration of those social forces of which Kerensky was the most adequate expression.

§<39>. *Croce's "historicism."* Croce's historicism has to be placed in relation to what has been observed in previous notes apropos the concepts of "passive revolution," "revolution-restoration," "conservation-innovation," and Gioberti's concept of "national classicism."¹ This "historicism" is a salient feature and consistent motif in all of Croce's intellectual and philosophical work, and it is one of the reasons for the success and influence he has had over the last thirty years.² Croce fits into the cultural tradition of the new Italian state; he brings the national culture back to its origins, enlivening [and enriching] it with the whole of European culture and ridding it of all the grandiloquent and bizarre dross of the Risorgimento. Establishing accurately the political and historical significance of Croce's historicism means, precisely, cutting it down to size, stripping it

of the great splendor that is attributed to it—as if it were an exemplar of objective science, of serene and impartial thought perched above the miseries and contingencies of quotidian struggle, a disinterested contemplation of the endless unfolding of human history.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §41.xiv.

§<40>. *Renaissance. The living statues of Cuneo.* A most charming anecdote about Cuneo: for Vittorio Emanuele II's visit, the town administration rounded up the area's most good-looking young men; before the king's parade through the town, they were covered in plaster and placed on pedestals posing as old statues. Meanwhile, all the town idiots were locked up in cellars. As the king went through, all the "statues" assumed the right poses, providing the illusion of a great display of art and beauty, but the town idiots yelling in the cellars made themselves heard as a discordant note: "We are the people of Cuneo; Cuneo is us," etc. Potemkin villages, then, are not a unique characteristic of old, feudal, and bureaucratic Russia; entire historical periods can be said to be Potemkin villages.

§<41>. *Intellectuals.* Cf. Valeria Benetti Brunelli, *Il rinnovamento della politica nel pensiero del secolo XV in Italia* (Turin, Paravia, 20 lire).¹ An analysis of the political thought of Leon Battista Alberti. An attempt at revising certain views on humanism and the Renaissance.

§<42>. *France—Italy.* (I) Did Francophilia ever really exist in Italy? And, despite their general reputation as brazen Francophiles, were the radicals-freemasons of *Il Secolo* really Francophiles?¹ I believe that if one were to take a closer look, one would find that not even that current was Francophile in the true sense. France represented a myth for Italian democracy: the transfiguration into a foreign model of what Italian democracy was never able to achieve and never planned concretely to achieve; the feeling of impotence and ineptitude within one's own national sphere. France meant the French Revolution and not its actual regime; it meant participation of the popular masses in political life and the life of the state, the

existence of strong currents of opinion, the deprovincialization of the political parties, the decorous conduct of parliamentary affairs, etc.—things that Italy lacked and craved but neither knew how nor wanted to attain through specific, coordinated, and persistent action. The French example was displayed to the Italian people almost in the expectation that they would achieve on their own, by the spontaneous initiative of the masses, what the French had attained through a whole series of revolutions and wars and at the cost of torrents of blood. But this was not Francophilia in the technical and political sense; those democrats in fact looked at France with great envy and blind hatred. The true Francophiles were the Moderates; they maintained that France was duty bound to help Italy at all times, like a guardian, and they would have subordinated themselves to French policy—out of disillusion they threw themselves into the embrace of Germany.

§<43>. *Machiavelli*. Apart from the example of the great absolute monarchies of France and Spain, one thing that led Machiavelli to his political conception of a unified principedom was the memory of the Roman past, not as an abstraction but as seen through the events of humanism and the Renaissance: "this province [Italy] seems born to resuscitate dead things, as has been seen in poetry, painting, and sculpture," he wrote in book VII of *L'arte della guerra*;¹ why, then, could it not rediscover the military qualities?, etc. See if there are other remarks of this kind in Machiavelli.

Cf. Notebook 13, §3.

§<44>. *A collection of Machiavellian maxims*. Taking a cue from Foscolo's affirmation in *Dei Sepolcri* that Machiavelli, "even as he tempers the scepter of the rulers, strips them of their laurels and lets the people see how it drips with tears and blood,"¹ one could produce a collection of all of Machiavelli's "universal" maxims, popularizing them and commenting on them in a suitable manner.

Cf. Notebook 13, §4.

§<45>. *Encyclopedic notions. Commanding and obeying*. To what extent is it true that it is easier to obey than to command? Commanding is characteristic of corporalship. Waiting passively for orders. In obedience there is an element of command, and in

command there is an element of obedience (self-command and self-discipline). The "perinde ac cadaver" of the Jesuits.¹ The nature of command and of obedience in the structure of the military. Does one have to obey even without understanding where obedience would lead to and what its ultimate purpose is? In that case, one obeys willingly or freely upon understanding that it is a question of absolute necessity, but for one to be convinced of absolute necessity, there must be effective collaboration when absolute necessity is not at issue.

To command for the sake of commanding is corporalship, but one commands in order to attain a certain goal, not just to fulfill one's legal responsibilities: "I have issued the order. If the order has not been carried out or has been poorly executed, etc., that is not my responsibility. Responsibility lies with whoever failed to carry out the order."

The command of the orchestra conductor: agreement reached in advance, collaboration; command is a distinct function, not imposed hierarchically.²

§<46>. *Encyclopedic notions. The operatic conception of life.* It is not true that a bookish and conventional sense of life can be found only among certain inferior strata of intellectuals. Among the popular classes, too, there is a "bookish" degeneration of life that comes not only from books but also from other means of dissemination of culture and ideas. Verdi's music—or, rather, the libretti and the plots of the plays set to music by Verdi—is responsible for a whole range of "artificial" attitudes, for ways of thinking, and for a "style" in the life of the people. "Artificial" may not be the right word because among the members of the popular classes this artificiality assumes naive and affecting forms. The baroque and the operatic seem, to many common people, an extraordinarily fascinating way of thinking and behaving that helps them escape whatever they consider coarse, mean, and despicable in their lives and education, so that they may enter a more exclusive sphere of high sentiments and noble passions. The serial novel and maid-servant literature (all saccharine, mellifluous, mournful literature) provide heroes and heroines, but opera is the most contagious because words set to music are easier to memorize—they become like matrices in which the fluidity of thought is molded into shape. Observe how many common people write: they recycle clichés.

On the other hand, sarcasm is too corrosive. One must bear in mind that this is not factitious snobbery but something that is deeply felt and experienced.

§<47>. *American blacks*. A report from New York by Beniamino De Ritis in the *Corriere della Sera* of 18 February 1932 ("Colonie a contanti?"). American tendency to link the problem of European debts with the politico-strategic needs of the United States in the Caribbean Sea: demanding the cession of the European possessions in the Antilles and also of African colonies. The economist Stephen Leacock^a published an article in the *Herald Tribune* in which he wrote that the cession of the Congo would be sufficient to pay off the entire war debt: "A big dream would come true. Six generations ago, the natives of the Congo were brought to America as slaves. Six generations of history, labor, and tears have passed, and now millions of workers educated in the arts and the science of the white man would be able to return to the land that their ancestors left as slaves, and they would return there free and civilized. All that is needed to make this happen is a restructuring of the reparations and debts on the basis of territorial compensation."¹

§<48>. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince*. Big politics and minor politics. Big politics encompasses issues related to the founding of new states and to the struggle for the defense and preservation of a given sociopolitical structure. Minor politics concerns quotidian, partisan issues that arise within an already established structure in the struggles for preeminence among various factions of the same political class. Big politics, then, entails the effort to keep big politics itself out of the domain of the life of the state and to reduce everything to minor politics. By contrast, it is amateurish to raise issues in such a way as to make of every element of minor politics an inevitable question of big politics—that is, a question that brings into play the reorganization of the state. International politics reflects both forms: (1) big politics for questions pertaining to the relative stature of individual states in their reciprocal relations; (2) minor politics for small diplomatic issues within a structure that is already firmly established. Machiavelli studies only questions of big politics: the creation of new states, the preservation and defense of new structures; questions

^a In the manuscript: "Leacok."

of dictatorship and hegemony on a very broad scale—that is, questions regarding the domain of the state in its entirety. In his *Prolegomeni*, Russo treats *The Prince* as a treatise on dictatorship (the moment of authority and of the individual) and the *Discourses* as a treatise on hegemony (the moment of the universal and of liberty).¹ But *The Prince*, too, touches on the moment of hegemony and consensus, along with the moment of authority and force; still, the observation is correct. Similarly correct is the observation that there is no opposition in principle between principedom and republic; rather, this has to do with the hypostasis of the two moments of authority and universality.

Cf. Notebook 13, §5.

§<49>. *Past and present*. The saying that “to stay in Rome, one must have ideas,” which is cited in another note and has been attributed to Mommsen,¹ was invoked by Giuseppe Ferrari on 26 March 1861 (in parliament): he maintained that it was necessary to go to Rome “with the ideas proclaimed by the French Revolution,” ideas that “can deliver us from the pope because they reinstate reason.” In 1872 (16 December, in parliament), Ferrari observed that just as so many other things in Italy are done “slowly, little by little, through a series of ‘almost there,’” so also “a way was found to come to Rome little by little.” And he added that he did not wish to see “our institutions perverted little by little and for us to find ourselves in some other world—in the Middle Ages, for example.”² Recall that among the Moderates, Quintino Sella found it “necessary to go to Rome” with a universal idea, and for him the idea was “science.”³

[Cf. B. Croce, *Storia d'Italia*, p. 4 (3d ed.) and the note for page 4 on p. 305.⁴ In an article published (in the *Italia* of Naples or in the *Diritto*? check) on 22 December 1864—when it was announced that the vote had been taken to move the capital from Turin to Florence—Francesco De Sanctis wrote: “We are going to Rome to build there the third civilization, to make her for the third time the queen of the civilized world. The capital of the pagan world and of the Catholic world is truly worthy of being the capital of the modern spirit. For us, then, Rome is not the past but the future.”]^{5a}

¹ In the manuscript, Gramsci had originally written: “See if phrase used by Ferrari was first uttered by Mommsen, as seems to be the case, or whether this is mistaken.” At some later time, he crossed out this sentence and replaced it with the above.

§<50>. *Encyclopedic notions. Epigoni and Diadochi.* Someone uses the term "Epigoni" in a rather curious way and embroiders it with a whole sociological theory that is quite bizarre and incoherent. Why should the Epigoni be inferior to the ancestors? Why should Epigone be associated with the notion of degeneration? In Greek tragedy, in fact, the Epigoni successfully completed the venture that the "Seven against Thebes" failed to accomplish.¹ The concept of degeneration is associated, instead, with the Diadochi, the successors of Alexander.²

§<51>. *Risorgimento.* Alongside the concepts of passive revolution and of Revolution-Restoration, one should place the following statement by Giuseppe Ferrari: "We are the freest government that Italy has had in five hundred years; if I were to leave this parliament, I would no longer be part of the orderly, legal, official revolution."¹

§<52>. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince.* The question of the political class (cf. Gaetano Mosca's books). But in Mosca the question is posed in an unsatisfactory way: one cannot even understand what Mosca means exactly by political class, since his notion fluctuates so much and is so elastic. It seems to embrace all the propertied classes, the whole middle class; so, then, what is the function of the upper class? At other times, he seems to be referring solely to a political aristocracy, to the "political personnel" of a state, and again to that segment that operates "freely" within the representative system—this excludes even the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, which, according to Mosca, must be controlled and guided by the political class. Mosca's shortcoming is apparent in the fact that he fails to confront the overall problem of the "political party"; one can understand why, given the nature of his books and especially of the *Elementi di scienza politica*.¹ Mosca's interest oscillates between the "objective" and disinterested position of a scientist and the impassioned position of a committed party man who is distressed by and wants to react against the course of events he witnesses. The two parts of the book were written during two typical moments of Italian sociopolitical history: 1895 and 1923,² when the political class disintegrated and was unable to find a solid basis of organization.

In the *Modern Prince*, the question of the collective man; in other words, the question of "social conformism" or of the goal of creating a new level of civilization by educating a "political class," the ideation of which already embodies this level. Hence the question of the role and atti-

tude of every physical individual in the collective man; also, the question of what is the "nature" of law in a new, realistic, and positive conception of the state.

Also, the question of so-called permanent revolution, a political concept that emerged around 1848 as a scientific expression of Jacobinism,³ at a time when the great political parties and economic trade unions had not yet come into existence—a concept that would subsequently be absorbed and superseded by the concept of "civil hegemony."

The question of the war of position and of the war of movement, as well as the question of *arditismo*,⁴ insofar as they pertain to political science; in politics, the 1848 concept of the war of movement is precisely the concept of permanent revolution; in politics, the war of position is the concept of hegemony that can only come into existence after certain things are already in place, namely, the large popular organizations of the modern type that represent, as it were, the "trenches" and the permanent fortifications of the war of position.

Also, the question of the value of ideologies; the Malagodi-Croce polemic;⁵ Croce's observation on Sorel's "myth" that can be turned against Croce's "passion";⁶ "ideologies" as a "practical instrument" of political action must be studied in a treatise on politics.

Cf. Notebook 13, §6 and §7.

§<53>. *Past and present*. Hegel asserted that slavery is the cradle of liberty. For Hegel, as for Machiavelli, the "new principedom" and the slavery that goes with it are justified only as education and discipline of man who has yet to be free. Spaventa (*Principi di etica*, appendix, Naples, 1904) commented: "But the cradle is not life. Some would like to have us in the cradle forever."¹ The same can be said about customs protectionism, which was always presented as a cradle, but life became forever a cradle.

Cf. Notebook 11, §5.

§<54>. *Past and present*. *Sardinia*. Three articles by Francesco Coletti in the *Corriere della Sera*, under the general title "La Sardegna che risorge"; they identify some of the most important Sardinian issues and provide a succinct account of the measures being taken by the government. The third article appeared on 20 February 1932; the other two appeared a week or so before.¹ Coletti has always devoted his attention to Sardinia, even in the prewar years, and his writings are always useful because they are orderly and re-

capitulate much factual information.² I do not know if he has collected his earlier writings in a book. Check.

§<55>. *Encyclopedic notions. Self-government and bureaucracy.* Self-government is an administrative-political institution or custom that presupposes very specific conditions: the existence of a social stratum that lives on rent, conducts business along traditional lines, and enjoys a certain prestige among the great popular masses because of its rectitude and impartiality (and also because of certain psychological qualities, such as the ability to exercise authority with a firm hand but also with dignity and without arrogance or haughtiness). One understands why, therefore, self-government has been possible only in England, where the landowning class, in addition to being economically independent, was never drawn into a fierce struggle with the population (which is what happened in France); nor did it have a strong military class tradition (as Germany did), with the authoritarian attitude and sense of separateness that stem from it. Self-government acquires a different meaning in non-Anglo-Saxon countries: on the one hand, a struggle against the centralism of the upper echelons of the civil service and, on the other hand, institutions that are entrusted to a bureaucracy controlled from below. Bureaucracy that has become a necessity: the issue that needs to be raised concerns the formation of an honest and impartial bureaucracy that does not abuse its role in order to make itself independent from the control of the representative system. [One can say that each type of society has its way of posing or solving the problem of bureaucracy; each one is different.]

§<56>. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince.* Croce's conception of politics—passion excludes parties because it is impossible to think of an organized and permanent "passion"—permanent passion is a spasmodic state.¹ It excludes parties, and it excludes any "plan" of action worked out in advance. But the conception has to be applicable also to war, and therefore it needs to explain the existence of standing armies. War is an aspect of political life; it is the continuation, in other forms, of a given policy. It is necessary to explain, then, how "passion" can become a moral "duty," a matter of political morality.

Apropos of "political plans," which are related to parties (that is, to permanent formations), recall what Moltke said of military plans: that they

cannot be elaborated and finalized in advance down to the last detail; only their nucleus and general design can be worked out in advance, since the particularities of the action depend, to a certain extent, on the moves of the enemy.² For Croce, all this would be absurd, since it is precisely in the details that "passion" manifests itself. A useful concept that could be brought to bear in the critique of Croce is that theory must be in agreement with history, with the facts of history. What is not and cannot be useful is a negative position aiming to disprove the philosophical validity of a specific view or explanation that has been set forth; such a position constitutes only a first step in criticism and cannot be satisfactory since it leaves the problem unresolved.

Cf. Notebook 13, §8.

§<57>. *Types of periodicals*. No individual can follow all the literature published on a set of topics or even on a single topic. It is absolutely necessary to provide a general public of average culture or at the threshold of cultural life with a service of critical information about all the publications on the cluster of topics most likely to be of interest to it. People in high office have a secretariat or a press office that provides them with daily or periodic briefings on everything published that is indispensable for them to know about; a periodical has to do the same for its readers. This is the service it has to provide, however it may define and circumscribe its task: it must deliver a complete and organic body of information—limited but organic and complete. Book reviews should not be casual and disconnected but systematic; they must also be accompanied by retrospective "digests" of the most important topics.

A periodical, like a newspaper, a book, or any other medium of didactic expression that is aimed at a certain level of the reading or listening public, cannot satisfy everyone equally; not everyone will find it useful to the same degree. The important thing is that it serve as a stimulus for everyone; after all, no publication can replace the thinking mind or create *ex novo* intellectual and scientific interests where people are only interested in idle chatter at the coffee shop or believe that life is all about having a good time. Criticism coming from many different quarters should not be a reason for concern; on the contrary, criticism from many quarters only proves that one is on the right track. When the criticism is univocal, however, one must stop and think: (1) there might be a real deficiency; (2) one might have misjudged the "average" reader the

periodical is aimed at—in which case, one is working in a vacuum, “for eternity.”

§<58>. *Machiavelli*. Schopenhauer compares the political teaching of Machiavelli with that of the fencing master, who teaches the art of killing (“and of not getting killed”) but does not teach how to become a cutthroat and an assassin.¹

Cf. Notebook 13, §9.

§<59>. *Popular literature*. On theoretical issues, cf. Croce, *Conversazioni critiche*, second series, pp. 257ff., “I romanzi italiani del Settecento,” where he takes his cue from Giambattista Marchesi’s book *Studi e ricerche intorno ai nostri romanzieri e romanzi del Settecento* (Bergamo, Istituto italiano d’arti grafiche, 1903), which also has a bibliography of novels published in Italy in the eighteenth century.¹

§<60>. *Types of periodicals. Book reviews*. I have already referred to different types of book reviews.¹ My approach is concerned with the cultural needs of a specific public and an equally specific cultural movement that one would like to generate: hence the need for reviews that are “digests” of those books that one thinks cannot be read and critical reviews of those books that, in one’s view, need to be recommended for reading—not in an unqualified manner but after pointing out their limitations, shortcomings, etc. From a scholarly point of view, the critical review is the most important and valuable form; it should be regarded as the reviewer’s contribution to the topic of the book under review. It is therefore necessary to have specialized reviewers and actively to resist critical judgments that are generic and off the cuff.

These notes and observations on types of periodicals and on other topics related to journalistic technique may be collected and organized coherently under the title: *A Small Manual of Journalistic Technique*.

§<61>. *Machiavelli*. The question: what is politics; that is, what place should political activity occupy in a systematic (coherent and logical) conception of the world, in a philosophy of praxis? This is the first question that has to be resolved in a treatment of Machiavelli, since it is the question of philosophy as science. In this regard, Croce has helped advance the study of Machiavelli and of political science; the advancement consists essentially of the dismissal of a series of false and fictitious problems. Croce's approach is based on his distinction of the moments of the spirit and his affirmation of a moment of practice—a practical spirit that is autonomous and independent, albeit circularly linked to all of reality through the mediation of the dialectic of distincts.¹ In a philosophy of praxis, wherein everything is practice, the distinction will not be between the moments of the absolute spirit but between structure and superstructure; it will be a question of establishing the dialectical position of political activity as a distinction within the superstructures. One might say that political activity is, precisely, the first moment or first level of the superstructures; it is the moment in which all the superstructures are still in the unmediated phase of mere affirmation—willful, inchoate, and rudimentary.

In what sense can one speak of the identity of history with politics and say that therefore all of life is politics? How could one conceive of the whole system of superstructures as (a system of) political distinctions, thus introducing the notion of distinction into the philosophy of praxis? Can one even speak of a dialectic of distincts? Concept of historical bloc; that is, unity between nature and spirit, unity of opposites and of distincts. If distinction is introduced into the superstructure, does it get introduced into the structure? How is structure to be understood? How does one go about distinguishing, within the economic fact, the "element" of technique, science, work, class, etc.—in a "historical" and not in a "metaphysical" sense? Critique of Croce's position: for polemical reasons, he treats the structure as a "hidden god," a "noumenon," as opposed to the superstructures as "appearances."² "Appearances" in a metaphorical sense and in a positive sense. Why was the term "appearances" used "historically"? From this general conception, in fact, Croce derived his own theory of error and of the practical origin of error. Error, for Croce, originates in immediate "passion," which can be individual passion or the passion of a group. But can there not be a "passion" of broader historical significance? The passion-interest that, for Croce, determines error is the moment that in the Theses on Feuerbach is called "*schmutzig-jüdisch*."³ Just as "*schmutzig-jüdisch*" passion determines immediate error, so does the passion of the larger social group determine the philosophical error ("error"-ideology lies in between, and Croce deals with it separately). What matters in this series, then, is not "egoism," ideology, or philosophy but the term "error," not in the moralistic or theoretical-metaphysical sense but in the

purely "historical" dialectical sense of "that which is historically decayed and deserves to disappear"—in the sense of the "nondefinitive" character of philosophy, of "death-life," of "being-non-being," or of the term of the dialectic to be superseded by the individual (moral level), the group (with-in itself), society-history.

In this study, one can start from the same position adopted by Marx vis-à-vis Hegel. According to *The Holy Family*, it is possible to arrive at a view of reality in Hegel, even if it is turned upside down, as in a camera, so to speak, where the images are upside down, with the sky where the ground should be—all one has to do is put man back on his feet.⁴ In other words, one has to take Croce's "reality" and put it on its feet, etc.

Cf. Notebook 13, §10.

§<62>. *Machiavelli*. A conception of criminal law that has to be fundamentally innovative. It therefore cannot be found ready-made in any preexisting theories, though many of them contain it implicitly. (Still, it cannot be implicit in the so-called positive school, and certainly not in Ferri's ideas.)¹ In what sense? In the sense that criminal law has a particular function in the life of the state; its relation to other aspects of life is such that even if the content changes, the relation and the form do not. If every state aims to create or maintain a certain type of civilization and therefore of social cohesion, justice (the law) will be a means toward this end; it has to be elaborated in the manner best suited to achieve this goal and to produce positive results most effectively. It will have to be rid of any trace of the transcendent and the absolute; in practice, of any moralistic fanaticism. Law, however, cannot be based on the notion that the state has no right to "punish" (if this term is reduced to its human meaning); nor can it be viewed solely from the vantage point of a struggle against "dangerousness." In reality, one must conceive of the state as "educator" insofar as it aims to create a new type or level of civilization. How does this come about? Despite the fact that the state essentially operates on economic forces, reorganizes and develops the apparatus of economic production, and innovates the structure, it does not follow that the elements of the superstructure are left alone to develop spontaneously through some kind of aleatory and sporadic germination. In this field, too, the state is a "rationalization," an instrument of acceleration and Taylorization; it operates according to a plan, pushing, encouraging, stimulating, etc. The negative or repressive aspect of this activity is, precisely, penal justice, criminal law, which cannot be separated from the whole ensemble of positive or civilizing activities. Moreover, if one were to eschew an abstract approach, it would be evident that "criminal law" has been broadened, it has

assumed original forms, and has been integrated by meritorious activity (by a kind of "pillory of virtue" that is not the philistine institution imagined by E. Sue).²

Cf. Notebook 13, §11.

§<63>. *Catholic Action*. On Catholic litterateurs, cf. *Il Raggiungimento dell'attività culturale e letteraria dei cattolici in Italia*. 1932, Florence, Edizione del Raggiungimento, 1932; 490 pp. L.10. Published since 1930.¹ (Preface by G. Papini.)²

§<64>. *Past and present. The Pact of London*. According to Article 13 of the Pact of London, in the event of France and Britain expanding their colonial rule in Africa at Germany's expense, the two countries agreed in principle that Italy could claim equitable compensation, especially in the settlement of questions pertaining to the borders of colonies, etc.¹ The imprecision and the ambiguity of the formulation are connected to the nature of the treaty, as a result of which Italy took measures to declare war against Austria, not Germany.² This element remained the central factor in Italy's foreign policy and alliances during that period. Why did they make this decision? And how did they know what position Germany would adopt—in other words, that Germany would not declare itself at war with Italy? Questions that remain unsolved. Elements for solving them: (1) Cadorna's document: Salandra writes that he was not aware of it;³ (2) the stance of Salandra-Sonnino,⁴ dissociating themselves from Giolitti and presuming to "make history" on their own—that is, for the benefit of their party, though unable to master the dominant political forces of the country; (3) Giolitti's stance in 1918–19—that is, Giolitti's push for a constitutional assembly or at least for limiting executive power,⁵ from which it appears that the agreements and promises made to Giolitti behind Salandra's and Sonnino's backs were not honored.

§<65>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*. Fausto Squillace's *Dizionario di Sociologia* was published by Remo Sandron of Palermo and then brought out in a completely revised second edition.¹ Squillace is a very superficial writer with trade union lean-

ings who has never succeeded in acquiring the same visibility as his comrades.

§<66>. *History of the subaltern classes. Bibliography.* Numerous books from the Remo Sandron publishing house that are pertinent to the series of notes on this topic.¹ Two directions. Sandron had a phase that was "national" in character: it published many books concerning national and international culture (original editions of Sorel), and it is a "Sicilian" publisher that has brought out books on Sicilian questions, especially on issues related to the events of 1893-94. On the one hand, Sandron's publications are of a positivist nature, and, on the other hand, they have a syndicalist character. Many editions were completely sold out and can only be found in antiquarian bookshops. It appears that the publication of the collected writings of Marx-Engels-Lassalle—of which the general editor was Ettore Ciccotti and later Luigi Mongini—was first launched (with *Capital*) by Sandron (check this detail of cultural history).² Bonomi's book *Vie nuove del socialismo*,³ A. Zerboglio's *Il socialismo e le obbiezioni più comuni*,⁴ Enrico Ferri's *Discordie positiviste sul socialismo*,⁵ Gerolamo Gatti's *Agricoltura e socialismo* (French ed. with a preface by Sorel),⁶ G. E. Modigliani's *La fine della lotta per la vita fra gli uomini*,⁷ A. Loria's *Marx e la sua dottrina*,⁸ E. Leone's book *Sindacalismo*,⁹ Arturo Labriola's *La teoria del valore di Carlo Marx* (on book III of *Capital*),¹⁰ E. Bruni's *Socialismo e diritto privato*,¹¹ Carlo F. Ferraris's *Il materialismo storico e lo Stato*,¹² etc. Books on the Southern question. By Captain Francesco Piccoli, *Difesa del Dr. Nicola Barbato innanzi al Tribunale di Guerra*, enunciated in Palermo, May 1894.¹³

§<67>. *Education.* Cf. C. M. Derada, *Gli uomini e le riforme pedagogiche della Rivoluzione Francese. Dall'Ancien Regime alla Convenzione*, Palermo, Remo Sandron, L. 7.50.¹

§<68>. *Reformation and Renaissance.* Domenico Guerri's very well received and acclaimed book *La corrente popolare nel rinas-*

¹ Gramsci made a slight error in transcribing the book title, writing "del socialismo" (of socialism) instead of "sul socialismo" (on socialism).

cimento has to be looked at.¹ In his review (in the *Nuova Italia* of January 1932) of Luigi Ponnelle and Luigi Bordet's book—*San Filippo Neri e la società del suo tempo (1515–1595)*, trans. by Tito Casini, pref. by Giovanni Papini, Ediz. Cardinal Ferrari—Giulio Augusto Levi raises the wrong question;² he writes:

It is commonly believed that humanism arose and developed entirely within the chambers of learned men, but Guerri has recalled the important role played by ordinary people in the town square; I, for one, had already drawn attention to the popular spirit of that movement in my *Breve storia dell'estetica e del gusto* (2d ed., 1925, pp. 17–18).³ Also, and even more so, the Catholic Counter-Reformation is believed to have been the work of prelates and princes and rigorously imposed by means of laws and tribunals; grand and dull (so it seems to most people), it is respected but not loved. But if that religious renewal was in fact carried out solely under compulsion, then how is it that great sacred music was born precisely in that period, in a Catholic land and specifically in Italy? Fear of punishment subdues the will, but it does not give birth to works of art. In order to see how much freshness, liveliness, purity, and sublimity of inspiration, as well as how much love for the people there was in that movement, one should read the story of this saint, etc., etc.

To cap it all, he draws a comparison between St. Ignatius and St. Philip as follows: "The former thought about the Christian conquest of the entire world, the latter did not look *beyond the boundary of the circle within which he could carry out his personal activity, and it was with great reluctance that he allowed his order to branch out into Naples.*" And again: "The work of Jesuits had more far-reaching and more enduring effects; Philip's work, committed to the inspirations of the heart, depended too heavily on his own person: what is attained through inspiration can *neither be sustained nor repeated* except through a new inspiration, which is never the same."⁴ It seems, then, that Philip was not part of the Counter-Reformation but flourished despite the Counter-Reformation, though he cannot be said to have opposed it.

§<69>. *Machiavelli*. (The "King-Magi"; that is what Bacon called the three kings who forcefully established absolute monarchies: Louis XI of France, Ferdinand the Catholic of Spain, and Henry VII of England.¹ Machiavelli is the theoretician of the King-Magi.)

Cf. Notebook 13, §12.

§<70>. *History of the subaltern classes. Bibliography.* The Sandron catalog also lists a book by Filippo Lo Vetere on agriculture in Sicily. Lo Vetere (cf. *Problemi del Lavoro* of 1 February 1932) belonged to the generation of the Sicilian Fasci. He edited *Problemi Siciliani*, a periodical that would be worth looking for and examining. He died in September 1932.¹ He was a member of the Rigola group.²

§<71>. *Past and present. Personal polemics and arguments.* Who do they benefit? Those who want to reduce general issues and matters of principle to skirmishes, peevish instances of personal ambition, literary and artistic bagatelles (in the case of artists and litterateurs). The interest of the public is diverted; partly as a result of this, the public becomes merely the "spectator" of a gladiatorial contest, waiting in anticipation of the successful delivery of a "fine blow" as a pleasure in and of itself—politics, literature, science are all degraded to the level of a "sport." In this sense, then, personal polemics have to be conducted in such a manner as to make the public feel that "de te fabula narratur."

§<72>. *Past and present. The error of the antiprotectionists of the Left* (writers in *La Voce*, *Unità*,¹ trade unionists, etc.). They framed the questions as if they were matters of (scientific) principle, as if the issue at stake was the general direction of state policy or, rather, of national government policy. They divided industrialists into two categories—free traders and protectionists, etc.—inviting people to choose between them. But could they be categorized in this way? Were their interests not already closely linked through the banks? And was it not their tendency always to intensify their links through financial groups and industrial cartels? If the purpose was to create an effective political force for "free trade," it was wrong to aim at unattainable goals—such as creating a split in the industrial camp and giving one side hegemony over the popular masses (especially over the peasantry). What needed to be aimed at, instead, was the creation of a bloc among the popular classes under the hegemony of the historically most advanced class. (Rerum Scriptor's book, *Tendenze vecchie e bisogni nuovi del movimento operaio italiano*,² could be reviewed along these lines.) In fact, Rerum Scriptor and his ilk have succeeded in their

mean-spirited effort to redirect peasant bitterness against relatively "innocent" social groups, etc.

§<73>. *Encyclopedic notions. Exponents of doctrines, etc.* The "doctrinal" [in the strict sense] character of a group can be ascertained by looking at its concrete activity (political and organizational) rather than at the "abstract" content of the doctrine itself. The very fact that a group of "intellectuals" becomes sizable demonstrates that it represents "social problems" the conditions for whose solution already exist or are in the course of formation. It is called "doctrinal" because it represents not only immediate interests but also the future (foreseeable) interests of a certain group. A group is "doctrinal" in the pejorative sense when it holds a purely abstract and academic position and does not make an effort to organize, educate, and lead a political force that corresponds to "the conditions that are already present or are in the course of formation." In the latter sense, the "Jacobins" were not "doctrinal" in the least.

§<74>. *Lorianism. E. Ferri.* Enrico Ferri's approach to music and to Verdi is first mentioned by Croce in *Conversazioni Critiche* (2d series, p. 314), in a short chapter—that must have appeared in one of the early issues (1903 or 1904) of *La Critica*—on Alessandro D'Ancona's *Ricordi ed affetti*: "I noticed that in the one ["reminiscence"] on Leopardi's centenary there is a felicitous diatribe against literary critics of the Lombroso school, a diatribe that, in any case, now seems to me superfluous, for a few weeks ago I heard one of these solemn critics, Enrico Ferri, speak at a commemoration of Zola that was held in Naples. Ferri held forth on the question of whether Verdi was a genius: Ferri declared that since he is not an expert on music—or, rather, he has not been exposed to the seduction of the charms of that form of art—he could provide 'a judgment that is *sincere in its objectivity*' and affirm with tranquility that Verdi was not a 'genius' but 'ingenious'—so much so that in the handling of personal business his bookkeeping was impeccable!"¹ There is also another version of the anecdote: Ferri believed himself to be the one best suited to determine objectively and dispassionately whether Wagner or Verdi was the greater genius, precisely because he was not by any means an expert on music.²

§<75>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Giulio Bechi. Cf. Croce's short article ("*I seminatori di G. Bechi*") reproduced in *Conversazioni critiche*, second series, pp. 348ff.¹ Croce expresses a favorable judgment on the novel and on Bechi's literary work in general and specifically on *Caccia grossa*—though he distinguished between the "programmatic and apologetic" part of the book and its more specifically artistic and dramatic part. But isn't *Caccia grossa* essentially also the work of a political opportunist—and one of the worst imaginable?²

§<76>. *Lorianism*. I believe that in this survey I have failed to enter, as a reminder, the name of A. O. Olivetti, who in all respects and by every right belongs here: as an inventor of the most clever thoughts and as an incoherent, pretentious know-it-all.¹

§<77>. *Lorianism*. G. A. Borgese. "In the final analysis, almost all wars and rebellions boil down to stolen buckets; the important thing is to find out what the plunderers and the defenders saw in the bucket." *Corriere della Sera*, 8 March 1932 ("*Psicologia della proibizione*").¹ Borgese's brilliant aphorism could be quoted as an authentic comment on the booklet in which G.A.B. discusses the new currents in scientific thought (Eddington) and declares that they have dealt historical materialism a mortal blow.² One can choose between the economic "final analysis" or the stolen bucket "final analysis."

§<78>. *Machiavelli*. In Machiavelli, the program and the goal of linking the city with the countryside could be expressed only in military terms—this is understandable, if one reflects on the fact that French Jacobinism would be inexplicable if it were not for the physiocratic school with its demonstration of the economic and social importance of the farmer.¹ Machiavelli's economic theories have been studied by Gino Arias (in the *Annali di Economia* published by the Bocconi University):² they were confined within the framework of mercantilism. (Likewise, would Rousseau have been possible without the physiocrats? etc. I do not think it is correct to say that the physiocrats merely represented the interests of agriculture; they represented the bourgeoisie, which was at an advanced stage of development and was the organizing force of a far more complex future society than the one they lived in—they certainly did not represent mercantilism and the guild system, etc. Historically, the physiocrats did in fact represent

the break with the guild system and the expansion of capitalist economic activity into the countryside; theirs was the "language" of the time, an unmediated expression of the contrast between city and country.)

Cf. Notebook 13, §13.

§<79>. *Machiavelli*. The notion of great power (of power in general, a subsidiary element of the notion of great power) should also comprise the notion "internal stability"—that is, the level and the intensity of the function of hegemony of the ruling class. One might say that the greater the strength of the political police and of the police in general, the weaker the army; and the weaker (that is, relatively redundant) the police, the stronger the army.¹

Cf. Notebook 13, §15.

§<80>. *The colonies*. Examine whether and to what extent colonization has served the purpose of populating the colonies, bearing in mind that colonialism has been linked to overpopulation in the colonizing nations. Certainly more English people went to the United States after its independence than when it was still an English colony, etc.—i.e., more English people in the independent United States than in the English colonies, etc. The colonies have enabled an expansion of the productive forces and thus have absorbed the surplus population of a number of countries, but this cannot be attributed to "direct domination." Emigration follows its own laws of an economic nature; in other words, waves of migration head to various countries according to the different labor and technical needs of those same countries. A state does not become a colonizer because of its high fertility rate but because it is rich in capital that can be invested abroad, etc. Therefore, find out which countries have been at the receiving end of waves of migrants from states that have no colonies and which of those countries "could" (in the abstract) themselves become colonies. The overwhelming majority of German, Italian, and Japanese migrations to countries that are not "colonizable."

§<81>. *Encyclopedic notions*. *Esprit de corps*. In the best sense, the term could signify the harmony of wills and purposes, the solid

moral unity that values the good things done for the benefit of the whole—regardless of whether the action was carried out by this or that particular component of the whole. Meanwhile, however, “esprit de corps” has acquired a pejorative sense: the “defense” of the whole against sanctions brought about by the malfeasance of individual members. One can see what lies at the root of this degeneracy: a false understanding of what the “whole” is. A faction that is in fact only a subordinate part of the whole assumes that it stands for the “whole”; using the “force” that it derives from the esprit de corps, the (subordinate) part attempts and aims to prevail over the whole in order to exercise indirect power (if direct power is not possible) and obtain privileges. Further analysis would reveal that at the root of this kind of esprit de corps lies the ambition of an individual or a small group of individuals (which is therefore called “faction,” “clique,” “cabal,” “coterie,” etc.). The strongest esprit de corps tendencies that lead to the formation of “castes” are found in the bureaucracy, the civil service, and especially the military. The most powerful psychological and moral aspect of the esprit de corps is the point of honor—the honor of the group, that is—which gives rise to the most misguided and worst passions. The struggle against a degenerate esprit de corps is the struggle of the whole against the part, of the collective against the ambitions of individuals; it is the struggle against privileges, as well as the struggle of the state against castes and against “criminal associations.”

§<82>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. Gita, the “ilustre fregona” (short story by Cervantes).¹

§<83>. *Past and present*. *Events of 1917*. The Salandra government fell on 10 June 1916 [backlash from the declaration of war against Germany] while the Austrian army in Trentino remained a threat.¹ Boselli formed a national union government (check the attitude of the Giollitians toward this). On 12 June 1917, a government crisis: the cabinet ministers hand their portfolios back to Boselli to give him a chance to improve the organization of the government's operations. Conflicts in domestic as well as foreign policy: Bissolati and others opposed Sonnino's policy—they wanted the war objectives to be modified and clearly defined; they opposed Cadorna's military policy (Douhet's memorandum to Bissolati); and

they opposed domestic policy, which they deemed too liberal and lenient toward the government's adversaries (socialists, Giolittians, Catholics).² Cadorna in turn opposed the government's domestic policy, etc. It is noteworthy that in Turin bread started to become scarce precisely during the second half of June. (Cf. the articles that the *Gazzetta del Popolo* actually published;³ but one needs to know whether the *Gazzetta del Popolo* had wanted to intervene even earlier but was prevented from doing so by censorship, leaving no visible trace of such an effort in the newspaper—perhaps more concrete evidence in the state archives. Cf. also the self-defense of the prefect Verdinois, which, however, is faint and vague.)⁴ Boselli's cabinet fell on 16 October 1917, on the eve of Caporetto.

(Could a government that did not include Giolitti call itself national? The events of 1917 were the fruition of the policies of Salandra-Sonnino, who wanted to monopolize for themselves and their party the glory of joining the war, and, by not hindering the attacks on Giolitti,⁵ they determined the posture he subsequently adopted.)

The memoranda written by Douhet, who was a colonel at the time, have been published as a book: Giulio Douhet, *Le profezie di Cassandra*, edited by General Gherardo Pantano, Genoa, Soc. Ed. Tirrena, 1932, in 8°, 443pp. On this volume, cf. the astounding review by Giacomo Devoto in the *Leonardo* of February 1932. Devoto asks: "Why is it, then, that such well-founded criticism did not have the success it deserved, especially since it came from such a first-rate man as Douhet certainly was?" He answers:

Not because men are wicked; not because of the inflexible character of the author; nor even because of a cruelly adverse destiny. Italy needed the moral and material losses caused by the ineptitude of the commanders. Italy has had a long history of losing its composure whenever there was the slightest hint of defeat or uncertainty in a colonial battle; it therefore needed to learn to face genuinely difficult trials with patient endurance. A good half of our soldiers have been sacrificed needlessly, from a military point of view. But just as one is destined to make errors in order to learn how to succeed, so also a country must be hardened by disproportionate sacrifices in order to learn to make beneficial sacrifices. No apologia will make us believe that the old supreme command led the army well.⁶

One must find out who this Giacomo Devoto is and whether he is a military man (a certain G. Devoto is professor of linguistics at the University of Padua).⁷ His reasoning resembles that of the

Hon. Giuseppe Canepa who in 1917 was the commissioner for provisions; after the events of Turin, Canepa justified the disorganization of his commissariat by recalling the Cimento Academy's "try and try again."⁸ But this is Monsignor Perrelli's philosophy of training horses.⁹ Devoto fails to bear in mind that the army rank and file is not some kind of vile and passive body that one subjects to such experiences; it reacts and in fact disbands. It is therefore worth finding out who Devoto is, whether he belongs to military circles, and whether his views are widespread or mere idiosyncrasies.

Paolo Boselli could be called the "national chatterbox."¹⁰ The fact that he was chosen to head the government of national unity in 1916 was a sign of the weakness of the alliance that was formed on the basis of loquacious rhetoric rather than political realism. Underneath the veneer of unity created by Boselli's speeches, the government was lacerated by irresolvable differences which, in any case, it wanted only to disguise rather than to remedy.

The postwar politics of the Giolittians: Giolitti's speech at Dronero in which he raised the issue of suppressing article 5 of the Statute; in other words, he raised the question of broadening the powers of parliament vis-à-vis executive power.¹¹ The characteristic of Giolitti's politics was that it lacked the courage of its own convictions. (But then what did Giolitti aim for? Was he not, after all, content with obtaining no more than he in fact obtained, namely, the breakup of Salandra's party?) The Giolittians wanted a Constituent Assembly without a Constituent Assembly; in other words, they did not want the public political commotion that accompanies the convocation of a Constituent Assembly—they wanted the normal parliament to function as a tame and harmless minimal version of a Constituent Assembly. It is necessary to look into the role played by Nitti to remove further whatever venom was left in Giolitti's slogan by drowning^a it in the marasmus of parliament,¹² and, as a matter of fact, the question of the suppression of article 5 made its official appearance in parliament only for it to be forgotten. Before Giolitti's return to government,¹³ the Giolittians launched the slogan calling for "a political investigation of the war." It is difficult to understand exactly the meaning of this formula, but it is in fact just a pseudonym for the reduced version of the Constituent Assembly that Giolitti wanted so that he could use it as a weapon with which to intimidate his adversaries. One

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci inserted "diluting" between the lines directly above "drowning."

must remember that the Giolittians placed all their political hopes on the Popular Party as a centrist party with a mass following that was supposed to serve (and indeed did serve) as an instrument in Giolitti's stratagem.¹⁴ Luigi Ambrosini's articles in *La Stampa*; Ambrosini joined the Popular Party (cf. the selection of these articles collected in the booklet *Fra Galdino alla cerca*).¹⁵ This whole period in the history of Italian politics and political parties needs to be studied and examined in depth.

§<84>. *Machiavelli. What is and what ought to be.* "Too much" political realism has often led to the assertion that the politician should only work within "effectual reality,"¹ that he should not be interested in what "ought to be" but only in what "is." This erroneous approach has led Paolo Treves to find the exemplar of the "true politician" in Guicciardini and not in Machiavelli.² One must distinguish between the political scientist and the politician in action. The scientist must operate only within effectual reality, insofar as he is just a scientist. But Machiavelli is not just a scientist; he is a passionate man, an active politician, and therefore he must concern himself with what "ought to be" [not in the moralistic sense]. The question is more complex: one must determine whether the "ought to be" is an arbitrary act or a necessary fact, whether it is concrete will or passing fancy, desire, daydream. The active politician is a creator, but he does not create out of nothing, and neither does he draw his creations out of his brain. He bases himself on effectual reality; but what is this effectual reality? Could it be something static and immobile? Is it not, rather, a reality in motion, a relation of forces in continuous shifts of equilibrium? When applying one's will to the creation of a new equilibrium among really existing and active forces—basing oneself on the force with a progressive thrust in order to make it prevail—one is always moving on the terrain of effectual reality, but for the purpose of mastering it and superseding it. The "ought to be" comes into play not as an abstract and formal idea but as a realistic interpretation and as the only historicist interpretation of reality—as that which alone is active history or politics. The Savonarola-Machiavelli opposition is not the opposition between what is and what ought to be but between two different notions of "ought to be": Savonarola's, which is abstract and nebulous, and Machiavelli's, which is realistic—realistic, even though it did not become direct reality, for one cannot expect an individual or a book to change reality but only to interpret it and to indicate a line of action. Machiavelli had no thought or intention of changing reality; he only wanted to show concretely how the concrete historical forces ought to have acted to change existing reality in a concrete and historically significant manner. (Russo has piled up a lot of

words on this topic—in the *Prolegomeni*³—but Machiavelli's limitations and narrowness amount to nothing more than the fact that Machiavelli was a single individual, a writer, as opposed to a head of state or the leader of an army who, albeit individuals, have the forces of a state or an army available to them and not just armies of words.)

Cf. Notebook 13, §16.

§<85>. *Past and present. Agrarian questions.* "The farmer is thrifty: he knows that land arrangements, installations, and buildings are perishable things; he also knows that adverse factors over which he has no control can wipe out his harvest; he does not calculate rates of depreciation, or insurance rates, or risk levels; instead, he accumulates savings, and in difficult times he exhibits an economic resilience that astonishes anyone who examines the contingencies." (Antonio Marozzi, "La razionalizzazione della produzione," *Nuova Antologia*, 16 February 1932.)¹ It is true that the peasant is generically thrifty, and that in very specific circumstances this is an advantage; but one must also point out at what cost the peasant accumulates these "generic" savings that are made necessary by the impossibility of precise economic calculations and also how these savings are siphoned off by the stratagems of finance and speculation.

§<86>. *Machiavelli.* Another issue that needs to be defined and developed: the "dual perspective" in political action and in the life of the state.¹ The dual perspective can manifest itself at various levels from the most rudimentary to the most complex. But this, too, is related to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur²—force and consent, domination and hegemony, violence and civility ("church and state," as Croce would say),³ agitation and propaganda, tactics and strategy. Some have reduced the theory of the "dual perspective" to something that is narrow-minded, petty, and banal; in other words, they have reduced it to nothing more than two forms of "immediacy" that succeed each other. Instead, the opposite might take place: the more the first perspective is "absolutely immediate" and absolutely rudimentary, the more the second perspective might be distant, complex, and lofty. In other words, it might turn out, as it does in human life, that the more an individual is compelled to defend his own immediate physical existence, the more he will uphold and identify with the loftiest and most complex values of humanity.

Cf. Notebook 13, §14.

§<87>. *Brief notes on Japanese culture.* Cf. the other note on religions vis-à-vis the state in Japan,¹ on the reform brought about in Shintoism: while, on the one hand, Shintoism has been reduced to a popular religion (or superstition), on the other hand, it has been stripped of its "cult of the emperor" component, which has become a separate principle and established as a civic duty, a moral coefficient of state unity. Examine how this reform came about; it is extremely important, and it is related to the birth and development of parliamentarism and democracy in Japan. After the extension of the suffrage (when and in what form?), every election—with the shifts in the political powers of the parties and all the changes that the results could bring about in the government—actively contributes to the dissolution of the "theocratic" and absolutist mentality of the great masses of the Japanese people. The conviction that authority and sovereignty do not rest in the person of the emperor but in the people leads to a real intellectual and moral reform of the kind that took place in Europe by way of the Enlightenment and classical German philosophy; this enables the Japanese people to attain a status commensurate with their country's modern economic structure and to get out from under the political and ideological influence of the barons and the feudal bureaucracy.

§<88>. *Encyclopedic notions. Commanding heights—levers of power.* Expressions used in different languages to say the same thing. The phrase "commanding heights" may have military origins; "levers of power" clearly originated in industry. In the struggle, one must have the commanding heights or the levers of power—what is called the key to the situation, etc. In other words, when handling a limited and specific set of forces, one must distribute them in such a way as to occupy the strategic positions that dominate the totality of the situation and permit one to control the course of events. (A captain who sets up camp at the bottom of a valley without first taking pains to occupy and fortify the surrounding heights and passes can be easily surrounded, taken prisoner, and destroyed, even if he has a numerical advantage; a huge piece of artillery at the bottom of a ravine and another one on a hilltop do not have the same potency, etc.)

§<89>. *Brief notes on American culture.* In "Strano interludio" (*Corriere della Sera*, 15 March 1932), G. A. Borgese divides the population of the United States into four strata: the financial class, the political class, the intelligentsia, the Common Man. Compared to the first two, the intelligentsia is minute in the extreme: some tens of thousands, a few thousand of them writers, and mostly concentrated in the East. "One should not draw conclusions based simply on numbers. They are among the best-equipped minds in the world. One of them thinks they are comparable to the Encyclopedists in eighteenth-century France. For those who do not like hyperbole, the American intelligentsia at the present time seems like a brain without a body, a soul that lacks operational strength; its influence on public affairs is almost nonexistent." He points out that in the wake of the crisis, the financial class that had previously dominated the political class has in the past few months been "subjected" to the assistance—that is, the virtual control—of the political class. "The Congress props up the banks and the stock exchange; the Capitol in Washington buttresses Wall Street. This is undermining the old equilibrium of the American state, and no new order is emerging." Since the financial class and the political class in America are in fact one and the same, or two aspects of the same thing, this would only mean that a real differentiation has taken place, in other words that the economic-corporative phase of American history is in crisis and the country is about to enter a new phase. This will only become clear if the historic parties (Republicans and Democrats) undergo a crisis and some powerful new party is created that permanently organizes the masses of Common Man. The germs of such a development already existed (the Progressive Party),¹ but thus far the economic-corporative structure has always reacted against them effectively.²

The observation that the historical position of the American intelligentsia resembles that of the French Encyclopedists in the 18th century is very acute and could be developed.

§<90>. *Encyclopedic notions. The machine.* Article by Metron, "La diffusione della machina," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 15 March 1932. Broader meaning of the concept of machine: in the East, the safety razor and the automobile are both machines. In the West, the "contraption" used for sewing and the one used for writing are both called machines,¹ and so are the electric motor and the

steam engine. For Metron, they are different things; in his view, for something to be truly a machine it must "permit the utilization of natural energies" (an ambiguous definition, since even the safety razor and the Archimedean lever permit the use of previously untapped natural energies), while the other things are, properly speaking, merely "tools or transmissions." "The machines that are tools improve and perfect human labor; motorized machines replace human labor completely. The real revolution in the world is not due to machines like the sewing machine or the typewriter, which always need the human motor, but to those machines that totally eliminate muscular effort."

Metron writes: "According to the calculations contained in a study published on the occasion of the World Power Conference, held in Berlin in 1930, the mechanical energy from all sources (coal, mineral oils, waterfalls, etc.) consumed each year by the entire human population can be estimated to be in the region of 1 trillion and 700 billion kilowatt hours, that is, 900 kilowatt hours per person. Now, 900 kilowatt hours represent nearly ten times the amount of work a strong man can perform in a year. In essence, for every man of flesh and bone, ten other metallic men have been working for his benefit. If this process were to continue, it is bound to result in an ideal form of leisure—not of the degrading type but an ennobling leisure; in other words, muscular force will be left completely at the disposal of man, who should work only with his brain—the noblest and most desirable form of work."² This is written in 1932, at a time when, in those very same countries where "metallic men" work for other men in a proportion far above the world average, there exists the most terrible crisis of enforced leisure and degrading poverty. This, too, is an opium of poverty!

In fact, Metron's distinction between machine-motors and machine-tools—with the former as more revolutionary—is not accurate. Machine-motors have "enlarged" the field of work and production; they have made possible things that, before their invention, were for the most part impossible. It is the machine-tools, however, that have really replaced human labor and turned the entire human organization of production upside down. A correct observation: since 1919 the most important innovation has been the introduction into the factory of the mechanical transport of materials, of men, and of conveyors.

Furthermore, beyond a certain point, the question of the relative importance of machine-motors and machine-tools is useless. It mat-

ters insofar as it helps establish the disjunction between antiquity and modernity. Also, differentiations among machine-tools, etc.

§<91>. *Confalonieri*. In a chapter of his book *Certezze* (Teves-Treccani-Tumminelli, forthcoming soon; the chapter was reproduced in the newspapers of 16 March 1932, *Resto del Carlino*), Silvio d'Amico writes that preserved among a collection of papers in the Spielberg museum is the "petition addressed to Francis I by Count Confalonieri of Milan who, as is known, was imprisoned while still in the full bloom of youth:¹ he wrote to the emperor like a broken man, pleading for mercy and compassion. An appalling document, I say, because even allowing for the servile manners of the time [? on Confalonieri's part?], the imploring words in fact betray a violation of the spirit a hundred times more humiliating than a death sentence; they are the groan of defeat by a shattered will. It is no longer the bold patrician who speaks but a child whose fragile hand is crushed within the iron fist of the giant, who compels him to write on command; he is the most pitiable creature, who has been left dazed and intoxicated so as to make a spectacle of his delirium."² D'Amico writes that this museum of the Spielberg has been set up, with the permission of the Czech government, by Doctor Aldo Zaniboni, an Italian physician who lives or used to live in Brno. Did he publish anything about it? And has this petition of Confalonieri's been published?³

§<92>. *Past and present. Nationalizations*. Cf. A. De Stefani's article ("La copertura delle perdite") in the *Corriere* of 16 March 1932: "Even in normal times, under the current protectionist regimes, the whole country contributes to balancing the books of businesses and to creating their profits. . . . The problem of covering a company's losses is precisely that they are distributed among people who do not belong to the circle of those who legally should bear them: owners (shareholders) and creditors (lenders, contractors, and suppliers). In those cases in which the state covers the losses of a business, this process could be called a nationalization of losses—an extension of the principle of compensation for war damage and natural disasters."¹ Losses are nationalized but not profits; compensation is available for the damage wreaked by speculation

(voluntary) but not for unemployment (involuntary)—yet De Stefani does not find this ludicrous.

§<93>. *The Italian Risorgimento. The 1848-1849 nexus.* On Carlo Alberto and the efforts made in 1931 to revise the traditional view (unfavorable),¹ cf. Pietro Silva's study in *La Cultura* of August-September 1931.²

§<94>. *Encyclopedic notions. "Homo homini lupus."* The fortunes of this phrase in political science but especially in the political science of provincial philistines. This phrase, it seems, comes from a longer saying in vulgar Latin that befits medieval ecclesiastics: *Homo homini lupus, foemina foeminae lupior, sacerdos sacerdoti lupissimus.*¹

§<95>. *Catholic integralists—Jesuits—Modernists.* Some parts of Alfred Loisy's memoirs are pertinent to this topic: Alfred Loisy, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de notre temps*, published in 1930 or 1931 (circa 2000 pp., in 8°).¹

§<96>. *Past and present. Giolitti.* In the obituary of Giolitti (died 17 July 1928) written for the *Journal des Débats*, Maurice Pernot states: "His point of departure was an original and perhaps correct idea: since two new forces—that is, an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and an organized working class—loomed over Italy, it became necessary to replace the old Governments of political parties with a Government of public opinion and to make these two forces participate in the political life of the nation."¹ The assertion is incorrect both in general and in some of its details. What does it mean "to replace the old Governments of political parties with a Government of public opinion"? It means replacing government by "certain" parties with government by "other" parties. In the concrete case of Italy, this meant destroying the very restricted circles of old cliques and cabals that subsisted parasitically on the police force of the state that protected their privileges and their parasitism and bringing about through parliament a broader participation by "certain" masses in the life of the state. Giolitti, who represented the

North and Northern industry, needed to destroy the reactionary and stifling power of the big landowners in order to give the new bourgeoisie more space within the state and even put it at the helm of the state. Giolitti achieved this by means of liberal laws on freedom of association and the right to strike; it is also noteworthy that in his *Memorie* Giolitti draws special attention to the poverty of the peasantry and the meanness of the landowners.² Giolitti, however, created nothing: he "understood" that he had to concede certain things in order to avoid bigger problems and control the nation's political development—which he succeeded in doing. In reality, Giolitti was a great conservative and a very capable reactionary who obstructed the formation of a democratic Italy, consolidated the monarchy with all its prerogatives, and strengthened the ties between the monarchy and the bourgeoisie by reinforcing the power of the executive, which made it possible to place all the economic forces of the country at the service of the industrialists. It was Giolitti who thus created the present structure of the Italian state; his successors have done nothing other than continue his work while accentuating some secondary aspects of it.

That Giolitti discredited parliamentarianism is a fact, but not exactly in the sense his critics maintain he did. Giolitti was anti-parliament, and he tried systematically to prevent the government from becoming, *de facto* or by right, an expression of the national assembly (which in Italy was weak, in any case, because of the way in which the senate is set up). This is how one explains the fact that Giolitti was the man of "extraparliamentary crises." It was inevitable that the disparity between parliament as it was supposed to be and parliament as it really was (i.e., almost a nonentity) would discredit parliamentarism, but what really discredited parliamentarism was Giolitti's battle against it and the fact that he did not believe in the parliamentary system. (Giolitti made a "proparliament" gesture in his speech at Cuneo³ on art. 5 of the constitution,³ but that was a maneuver meant to confuse his political adversaries—in fact, Giolitti did nothing about it when he returned to power.)⁴

² In the manuscript, Gramsci first wrote "Dronero" but then crossed it out and next to it wrote "Cuneo." The Giolitti speech Gramsci refers to here was in fact delivered at Dronero.

§<97>. *Past and present*. When reading, one often comes across the observation that Christianity spread through the world without recourse to arms. This is incorrect, in my view. One can say this was true until Christianity became the state religion (that is, up to the time of Constantine), but, once Christianity became the overt way of thinking of a dominant group, its fortunes and its spread cannot be separated from general history and hence from wars. Every war has also been a religious war, in all cases.

§<98>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. G. Papini. In March 1932, Papini wrote an article in *Nuova Antologia* (against Croce),¹ as well as an article on A. Gide's *Œdipe* in the *Corriere della Sera*.² Thus far I have only read the latter; it is jumbled, prolix, pompous, and hollow. March is the deadline for nominations of new members to fill the vacant seats in the *Accademia d'Italia*; these two articles are evidently Papini's "thesis" and "minithesis" for the degree.

§<99>. *Past and present*. I read a passage quoted from *Il Tevere* in which Prof. Orestano, who represents Italian philosophy in the *Accademia*, is called a "ridiculous" person or something of the sort.¹ And *Il Tevere* carries some weight in the cultural world today. But how could they still expect the *Accademia d'Italia* to unify and centralize the intellectual and moral life of the nation?

§<100>. *Past and present*. *The belch of the parish priest and other supercountryisms*. Cesare De Lollis (*Reisebilder*, pp. 8ff.) wrote some interesting notes on the relations between the "minority" that made Italy and the people:

A few days ago I happened to read in a newspaper that for a long time Italy has been much too concerned with elementary schools and with public schools in general (Credaro was named among those most responsible for this),¹ whereas it is the education of the upper classes that must be attended to in the true interest of the nation. This takes us back, or should take us back, to the concept of education as a class privilege; a concept that emanates wholly from the *ancien régime* (Counter-Reformation included), which was similarly very careful not to allow culture to get close to life and hence to the people. And yet: in order for

the nation to be fashioned into a unified whole, it is necessary for all its members to attain a certain level of education. The lower classes should be able to recognize in the upper classes the traits of the perfection to be aimed at; the upper classes should recognize perfectibility in the lower classes. < . . . > Now, nobody can say that much has been done about this, except those superficial observers and rectors who fill their own speech and the heads of others with big words like "race" and "folk"—words that by conferring titles of noble lineage tend to abolish the sense of personal effort and responsibility, just as the currently fashionable and entirely romantic admiration of traditional mores and local practices tends to rigidify and ossify rather than spur one on the path of progress.²

(The implied similarity between the supercountry movement and the culture of class privilege is shrewd.)

A similar issue is the naming of streets (cf. Corrado Ricci, "I nomi delle strade," *Nuova Antologia* of 1 March 1932): in June 1923, during a Senate debate on an ordinance pertaining to the changing of the names of town streets and piazzas, Ricci proposed a review of the old and new names to determine whether it might not be better, in certain cases, to *return to antiquity*.³ (This was done in many cases, and the fact that at times it was appropriate does not change the significance of the trend.)

Hence the many Meneghino,⁴ Turinese, Bolognese, etc., "families" that flourished during this period. All efforts at blocking change, ossifying, etc.

§<101>. *Past and present. Italian parliament.* Examine precisely what political maneuver made it possible to interpret the Statute in such a way as to expand the function of parliament and its attributes.¹ In reality, the government formation emanating from parliament constituted itself as a cabinet with its own premier, etc.; it is a practice that goes back to the early days of the constitutional era; it is the "authentic" mode of interpreting the Statute. Only later, in order to satisfy the democrats, was this interpretation given a leftist bent (perhaps the political discussions at the time of the Moncalieri proclamation may be used to test the accuracy of this analysis).² An initiative of the Right culminated in an opposition between the letter of the Statute and the longstanding normal practice that used to be taken for granted (Sonnino's article "Torniamo allo Statuto" in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 January 1897—and the

date must be kept in mind because it is a prelude to the reactionary push of 1898).³ This initiative is a historical marker because it represents the manifesto of the cliquish alliance that was formed and over the course of about twenty years was never able to acquire and maintain power in a stable fashion and yet played a fundamental role in the "real" government of the country. One could say that gradually, as the demands for a democratic Constitutional Assembly and a radical revision of the Statute grew weaker, the opposite tendency gained strength—namely, the effort to have a "constitutional assembly in reverse" that would produce a restrictive interpretation of the Statute, thus posing the threat of a reactionary coup d'état.

§<102>. *Past and present*. Cf. Gioacchino Volpe, "23 marzo 1919 : 27 ottobre 1922," in the *Corriere della Sera* of 22 March 1932 (on the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the Fascio of Milan).¹ An interesting and rather comprehensive article. It is worth compiling a bibliography of all of Volpe's writings on post-war events; some of them have already been collected in a book.² The *Corriere* of 23 March published a second article by Volpe, "Fascismo al Governo: 1922-1932,"³ that is much less interesting than the first but contains some noteworthy elements; he is clearly making an effort to write as a critic with a historical perspective rather than as a mere apologist, but he does not appear to be succeeding very well.

§<103>. *On China*. M.T.Z. Tyau, *Two Years of Nationalist China*, Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai (1930 or 1931). A documentary work (of about 500 pp.) that seems to be very interesting and well done. Kuomintang, formation of the Nationalist government, statistics on life in China, appendix of documents. The author is editor of a daily newspaper, the *Peking Leader*, and of the *Chinese Social and Political Review*; one of the most capable and well-informed Chinese political journalists.¹

§<104>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. A. Luzio. An article by A. Luzio ("La morte di Ugo Bassi e di Anita Garibaldi") in the *Corriere della Sera* of 25 March 1932,¹ in which he attempts to rehabilitate

Father Bresciani.² "As for their content," Father Bresciani's works "cannot be summarily dismissed, after all." Luzio lumps together De Sanctis's essay and an epigram by Manzoni (who, when asked if he knew *L'Ebreo di Verona*, is said to have replied, according to the diary of Margherita di Collegno: "I have read the first two sentences; they seem like two sentries saying: 'Go no further'"), and then he calls them summary condemnations.³ Is this not a somewhat Jesuitical cunning trick?

And again: "When, as spokesman of the reaction that followed the 1848-49 uprisings, he portrayed and passed judgment on the champions of national aspirations, his tone was certainly not sympathetic; but in more than one of his narratives, and especially in *Don Giovanni ossia il Benefattore occulto* (volumes 26-27 of *La Civiltà Cattolica*),⁵ there are indications of human and Christian compassion for the victims; parts of certain episodes, such as the death of Ugo Bassi and the heartbreaking end of Anita Garibaldi, are treated with sympathetic fairness." But did Father Bresciani have any choice? As for Luzio, it is remarkable that what he admires in Bresciani is precisely his Jesuitism and his cheap demagoguery.

§<105>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Papini as a Jesuit apprentice.* In my view, Papini's article ("Il Croce e la Croce") in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 March 1932,¹ demonstrates that, even as a Jesuit, Papini will never amount to anything more than a mediocre apprentice. He is an old jackass who wants to go on behaving as if he were still young, despite the burdens of age and infirmity; he prances around disgracefully. The characteristic feature of this article, it seems to me, is its insincerity. Observe how Papini opens the article with the usual mechanical and stereotypical gibes at Croce and how toward the end he adopts the pose of a paschal lamb and announces unctuously that in his collected works he will expurgate all the "banter" from his writings on Croce and publish only the "theoretical" discussion. It is obvious that the article was written carelessly and that in the course of its composition Papini shifted his stance; he never bothered to harmonize the barking of the opening pages with the bleating of the last. The litterateur, satisfied with himself and with his witticisms (which he thinks have hit their mark), always prevails over the pseudo-Catholic and over the Jesuit (oh him!), and he did not want to sacrifice what was already written. But the whole piece looks clumsy, strained, mechan-

ically constructed, strung out—especially in the second part, where the hypocrisy is transparent to the point of being repugnant. Still, I think Papini is obsessed with Croce. Croce functions as his conscience, like Lady Macbeth's "bloody hands," and Papini's reaction to this obsession is at times defiant, while at other times he tries derision and mockery, or he whimpers pathetically. The spectacle is always pitiful. The very title of the article is symptomatic: the fact that Papini uses "croce" for his punning games is indicative of the literary quality of his Catholicism.²

§<106>. *Past and present. The Italian language in Malta.* As the events of the early months of 1932 have shown (cf. the article in the *Corriere della Sera* of 25 March 1932),¹ the existence of the concordat has made it more difficult to defend the Italian language and culture in Malta.² As long as the Italian state was in conflict with the church, an organized Italian presence in Malta (as in many other countries across the world) did not represent any danger for the hegemonic states: it was unlikely to spread into the national and political sphere; it remained confined to the sphere of folklore and dialectal cultures. With the concordat, the situation has changed: the church—administered by Italians and locally represented by Italians, who are no longer in conflict with the state—is now really confused with the Italian state and no longer with the folkloristic mental image of the Catholic cosmopolis. Thus, instead of enabling the spread of Italian culture, the concordat is making it more difficult; furthermore, it has created a situation of opposition to traditional Italianized nuclei. This shows that in the modern world a cultural and spiritual imperialism is utopian; only political power based on economic expansion can provide the basis for cultural expansion.

§<107>. *Encyclopedic notions. Reich.* On the meaning of the word "*Reich*," which definitely does not mean "empire" (I have noticed that in *Gerarchia* it has even been translated sometimes as "kingdom").¹ Point out that it exists in all the Germanic languages and that it appears in the term that corresponds to "*Reichstag*" in the Scandinavian languages, etc. In fact, "*Reich*" is a Germanic term that seems to refer to the territorial "state" in general.

§<108>. *The bureaucracy.*^a It seems to me that, from a socio-economic vantage point, the problem of the bureaucracy and of functionaries needs to be considered within a much larger framework: the framework of social "passivity"—that is, relative passivity—and seen from the viewpoint of the activity that produces material goods. In other words, from the viewpoint of those goods and valuables that the liberal economists call "services." In a given society, what is the distribution of the population with respect to "commodities" and with respect to "services"? ("Commodities" in the narrow sense of the word, in the sense of material "commodities," of physical goods that are consumable in "space and volume.") Undoubtedly, the more extensive the service sector, the more poorly organized a society is. One of the goals of "rationalization" must certainly be the reduction of the service sector to what is absolutely necessary. Parasitism definitely grows in this sphere. Commerce and distribution in general belong to this sphere. Unemployment in the field of "production" causes an "inflation" in services (proliferation of small business).

§<109>. *The intellectuals. Church Latin and the vernacular in the Middle Ages.*

In France, preaching in the vernacular goes back to the very origins of the language. Latin was the language of the church, thus sermons to clerics ("clerics"), friars, and also to nuns were delivered in Latin<. . .>. But sermons to the laity were delivered in French. As far back as the ninth century, the councils of Tours and Reims ordered priests to instruct the people in the language of the people. They had to do so in order to be understood. In the twelfth century, preaching in the vernacular was energetic, lively, and persuasive; it swept older and younger people off to the Crusades, filled the monasteries, and brought entire towns down to their knees and to every manner of penitential excess. From their high pulpits, in the public squares and in the fields, preachers were the public supervisors of the consciences of individuals and of the multitudes. Everything and everyone was subjected to their severe censure: whether it was women's brazen hairstyles or any other hidden or visible element of the corruption of the century, they never wavered from their overbearing thought or language. (Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, Hachette, 19th ed., pp. 160-61)¹

^a In the manuscript, "The bureaucracy," which is underlined, appears immediately after "Machiavelli," which is also underlined but crossed out.

Lanson provides the following bibliographic information: abbé L. Bourgain, *La Chaire française au XII^e siècle*, Paris, 1879; Lecoy de la Marche, *La Chaire française au Moyen Âge*, 2d ed., Paris, 1886; Langlois, "L'Éloquence sacrée au Moyen Âge," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 January 1893.²

§<110>. *Journalism. Review of the press.* In traditional Italian journalism, "review of the press" coverage has never been well developed, even though its polemical aspect has often been excessively prominent—but this has been a matter of petty, occasional polemics that have more to do with the argumentative character of Italian individualism than with some programmatic plan to provide a service to the reading public.

One must distinguish the review of the press provided by newspapers from reviews of the press in nonindependent publications. The former is itself a news service; in other words, every day the newspaper in question would provide its readers with a methodical account of the views on current events published in other newspapers (many French papers do this; Italian newspapers provide this information as it is supplied by the Rome wire services for the capital city's papers, etc., which means that it appears in the body of the newspaper and in the form of separate news items). In a nonindependent publication, the review of the press has a different function: it provides the occasion to reiterate one's viewpoints, rehash them, and present all their facets in the casuistic refutation of other views. One can see how "didactically" useful this method is for "repeating" one's opinions nonmechanically and without pedantry: "repetition" acquires the almost "dramatic" and directly relevant character of an obligation to respond to an adversary. To my knowledge, the best "review of the press" is the one in *Action Française*, especially if one were to consider Maurras's daily article as a review of the press (which it really is).¹ One notices that there is a division of labor between Maurras's article and the explicit "review of the press" in the *Action Française*: Maurras assigns himself the polemical "pieces" that are of greater theoretical importance. It must be pointed out that the review of the press cannot be left to just any hack in the editorial office, as some newspapers often do; it requires the highest degree of political and intellectual

² In the manuscript, "G.M.S."

responsibility, the best literary skills, and the most inventive way of using subtitles, picking up on certain cues, etc., since the necessary repetitions have to be articulated with as much formal and stylistic variation as possible. (For example, G. M. Serrati's^a "Scampoli,"² which, in their own way, were a review of the press—widely read and perhaps the first thing the reader looked for every day, even though they were not systematic and not always of a high intellectual caliber; [Missiroli's "Opinioni" in the *Resto del Carlino* and in *La Stampa*—now collected in a book]³ similarly the regular column by the "slinger" of the *Popolo d'Italia*; the "Dogana" in *Critica Fascista*; the "Rassegna della Stampa" in *L'Italia Letteraria*.)

§<111>. *Religion*. The contradiction created by those nonbelieving intellectuals who arrived at atheism and "life without religion" through science and philosophy but maintain that religion is necessary for social organization—in their view, science is against life, and there is a contradiction between science and life. How can the people love these intellectuals and regard them as components of the nation's character?

This situation is reflected in Croce, though less scandalously than in the case of certain French intellectuals (Taine is a classic example, and he produced the Maurras-types of extreme nationalism).¹ I think that Croce somewhere mentions Bourget's *Disciple* with disdain,² but is this not precisely the issue that Bourget addresses, albeit with the rationalistic logic typical of French culture?

Kant's position between the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* on the question of God and religion.

§<112>. *History as the history of liberty and liberalism*. The ambiguity of Croce's most recent historical writings stems precisely from this confusion between history as the history of liberty and history as an apologia of liberalism.¹ If history is the history of liberty—according to Hegel's proposition—the formula applies to the entire history of the human race, and all currents, all parties are expressions of liberty. What, then, is the specific characteristic of the history of the 19th century? That in the 19th century there was a critical consciousness that did not exist before; history was made with the knowledge that it was being made and that history is the history of liberty. But was this just a speculative or contemplative

position? Certainly not: there was a current of practical activity, a party that reduced Hegel's philosophy to an unmediated "political ideology," an instrument of domination and social hegemony—this was "liberalism" or the liberal party in the broad sense. It is known that the term "liberal" had a very broad meaning and encompassed antithetical political camps. In Pietro Vigo's *Annali d'Italia*, all the "nonclericals" are "liberals," and even the Internationalists and the Marxists are included in liberalism.²

[(Cf. *Eternità e storicità*, p. 51.)]³

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §10.

§<113>. *History of the intellectuals. Humanism.* Study the pedagogical reform introduced by humanism; the replacement of "oral disputation" by "written composition," for example, which is one of its most significant "practical" features. (Recall certain notes on the oral dissemination of culture through dialogic discussion and through rhetoric, which results in less than rigorous argumentation and produces immediate persuasion that is primarily emotive.)¹

§<114>. *Machiavelli. Jean Bodin* (1530–1596) was a delegate at the Estates-General of Blois in 1576, and he made the Third Estate reject the demand for subsidies to the civil war. Works: *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566), in which he deals with the influence of climate, the idea of progress, etc.; *La République* (1576), in which he expresses the views of the Third Estate on absolute monarchy and its relations with the people; *Heptaplomeres* (unpublished until the modern era), in which he compares all religions and justifies them as different expressions of natural religion, the only reasonable religion and as all equally worthy of respect and tolerance.¹ During the civil wars in France, Bodin was the exponent of the third party, known as the party of the "politicians," that positioned itself as representing the viewpoint of the national interest. Bodin is classified among the "anti-Machiavellians," but this is clearly an extrinsic and superficial aspect of his historical significance. Bodin laid the foundations of political science in France on a terrain that was much more advanced than that which Italy had to offer to Machiavelli. The question that concerned Bodin was not the founding of a territorial and unified (national) state but the balancing of conflicting social forces within a state that was already strong and firmly in place. It is not the moment of force that interested Bodin but the moment of consent. It is noteworthy that in the Italy observed by Machiavelli there were no significant representative institutions like the Estates-General in France. When people remark now-

adays that parliamentary institutions have been imported into Italy from abroad, they overlook the fact that this reflects a condition of weakness in Italy's past—in other words, that the structure of the state remained stuck in the communal phase and did not move into the modern territorial (national) phase. Moreover, representative institutions did exist, especially in the South and in Sicily, but they were of a much more limited kind than in France, because in those regions the Third Estate was poorly developed (the Sicilian parliaments basically an instrument of the barons against the monarchy). Recall Antonio Panella's study on the "Antimachiavellici" published in the *Marzocco* of 1927 (or even 1926—eleven articles);² see how Bodin is judged in comparison to Machiavelli. (One can look at how Machiavelli alludes to representative institutions *in nuce*.)

Cf. Notebook 13, §13.

§<115>. *Father Bresciani's progeny*. According to Luigi Tonelli ("Pietro Mignosi," *L'Italia che Scrive*, March 1932), Mignosi's volume *Epica e santità* (Palermo: Priulla, 1925) contains a "most beautiful 'Canto,' somewhat à la Rimbaud, in praise of the 'poor animals,'" from which he quotes: "Worms and mice, flies, lice, and poets that all the weapons on earth are unable to wipe out."¹

§<116>. *Past and present. Phlipot*. The farce, *Trois Galants et Phlipot*, included in Le Roux de Lincy and F. Michel's *Recueil de farces*, etc. (Paris: Techener, 1837; in 4 vols.) (no. 12 in vol. 4). When Phlipot hears the "Qui vive?" he immediately answers, "Je me rends!" and then he yells: "Vive France! Vive Angleterre! Vive Bourgogne!" Finding himself under threat from all sides and not knowing where to turn, he cries out: "Long live the strongest!" A French farce from the 15th-16th century.¹

§<117>. *Americanism. Criminality*. The growth of organized crime on a grand scale in the United States is normally explained as a consequence of Prohibition and the bootlegging associated with it. The life of the bootleggers, their fights, etc., have created a widespread climate of romanticization in society that gives rise to imitations, daring exploits, etc. This is true. There is, however, an additional factor: one has to look at the incredibly brutal methods of the American police; police brutality always creates "brigand-

age." This factor has a much greater effect than might appear: it is a catalyst for making professional criminals out of many individuals who would have otherwise carried on with their normal working lives. Even the brutality of the "third parties" helps conceal the corruption of the police, etc. The illegality of the executive organism raised to the level of a system leads the victims, etc., to wage a fierce battle.

§<118>. *The Italian Risorgimento*. Cf. Antonio Lucarelli, *La Puglia nel Risorgimento*, a documented history, Vol. 1, Bari, Commissione Provinciale di Archeologia e Storia Patria, 1931, 455 pp., L. 30.¹ This first volume goes up to the Jacobin conspiracy of 1793-94,² after providing a picture of 18th century life in Apulia. A necessary book for understanding the Southern question. It appears that the author succeeds in providing an impressive depiction of the terrible living conditions of the people of Apulia. The events of 1793-94, though not very serious per se, acquired importance from the fact that they unleashed a fierce reaction: first political emigration to the North, preparation for the Neapolitan revolution of 1799.

§<119>. *Past and present. The events of June 1914*. Recall Rerum Scriptor's article on the nonprogrammatic character of those events.¹ It is strange that Rerum Scriptor was unaware of the great importance of those events, which renewed the relations between North and South, between the Northern urban classes and the Southern rural classes. Though the incident that set the events in motion occurred in Ancona,² one must bear in mind that the true beginning was the typically "Southern" massacre at Roccagorga.³ It had to do with opposition to the traditional policies of Giolitti and of the governments of all the other parties, namely, their immediate violent repression of Southern peasants even when they mounted peaceful protests against misrule and against the bad administrations of the friends of every government. One should also recall Adolfo Omodeo's use of the adjective "ignoble" in describing those events (cf. "Momenti della vita di guerra," *La Critica* of 20 January 1932, pp. 29-30). Omodeo speaks of "Ignazio di Trabia (second son of Prince Pietro)," a cavalry officer who on, June 14, "during the ignoble red week, had to charge the crowd through the streets of Rome. It thoroughly disgusted him. He wrote: 'It was a really ugly

moment for all of Italy, and we should all regret it. Italy has produced a truly barbaric spectacle. It was not, etc.'"⁴ The words of the little prince of Trabia must be contrasted to the depositions by the peasants of Roccagorga at the trial of Mussolini and Sciarini that was held in Milan.⁵ It is noteworthy, however, that in commenting on the events that took place in defense of Southern peasants, Adolfo Omodeo, a classic liberal, uses the words of a Sicilian big landowner who is one of the organizers of the brutish living conditions of the Southern peasants. [For Omodeo's superficiality as a historian and his political inconsistency, one has to compare his attitude on this issue with what emerges from his book *L'età del Risorgimento italiano*,⁶ where Omodeo highlights the humiliating conditions of the Southern peasantry as a cause for the belatedness of the Italian Risorgimento.]

§<120>. *Past and present. 1915*. In order to understand the relation of forces at the moment Italy joined the war and to assess the political skill of Salandra-Sonnino,¹ one must look at the situation not as it was not on May 24 but, rather, as it was at the time when May 24 was chosen as the date for the outbreak of hostilities.² It is clear that once this date was fixed, by treaty, it was no longer possible to change it because in the meantime the situation on the eastern front had changed. The question is whether it would have been opportune for Italy's entry into the war to have coincided with the beginning of the Russian offensive rather than to have counted "absolutely" on the success of the offensive itself. Salandra insists on and highlights the fact that Italy's entry into the war coincided with the Russian reversal,³ which is close to saying that it was not seeking to go to the aid of the victor—this is hardly evidence of political seriousness and historical responsibility.

The question of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From Count Czernin's memoirs, it appears that he believed the existence of the Pact of London meant the destruction of the Hapsburg monarchy, because without Trieste the monarchy would no longer exist. The Austrian efforts to achieve a separate peace (Sixtus of Bourbon's initiative—the Clemenceau-Czernin polemic in the early months of 1918—Czernin's resignation) supposedly failed because of Italy's opposition and the Pact of London, despite the latent Austrophilia in France and England (Czernin even wrote that Italy had "diplomatic control of the war").⁴ Czernin's affirmations,

however, do not change the way one judges Sonnino's handling of the Austrian problem; the question is not whether the Hapsburg Empire would have been "mechanically" dead as a result of the amputation of Trieste but whether Sonnino wanted the Hapsburg Empire to come to an end. It is also doubtful that the empire would have collapsed with the loss of Trieste; it might have even provided a jolt of energy and led to a new war with Italy. Sonnino's position has to be examined in relation to the national issues that existed within Austria and therefore as an immediate politico-military problem. Would a politics of nationality (which is also what General Cadorna wanted) have accelerated Italian victory by causing the internal dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian army?⁵ This is the problem that should be at the center of the debate on the responsibilities of Salandra-Sonnino, and especially of Sonnino.

§<121>. *Bibliographies. The Rivista Militare Italiana.* Founded in Turin in March 1856 by Carlo and Luigi Mezzacapo, Neapolitan exiles who took refuge in Turin after participating in the sieges of Rome and Venice. (Apropos of the so-called military traditions of Piedmont, this fact is worth noting: the major Italian periodical on military affairs was founded in Turin by two Neapolitans. The technical-scientific military tradition of Naples that developed with the events that followed the French Revolution constitutes the major element in the formation of the structure of the modern national army.) Editor in 1859, Mariano D'Ayala,¹ etc. Publication of the *Rivista* was suspended in 1918; it resumed publication in 1927 by the order of General Badoglio,² who also defined its general orientation. In 1906 (fiftieth anniversary of its founding) it published a special issue that included a survey of its history.³

§<122>. *Popular literature.* One of the most typical attitudes of the readers of popular literature is the following: the name and personality of the author do not matter, but the figure of the protagonist does. The heroes of popular literature—once they enter the intellectual life of the people—are detached from their "literary" origins and acquire the validity of historical figures. Their entire lives, from birth to death, become interesting; this explains the success of "sequels," even spurious ones. In other words, the original creator of the figure may have his hero die, but the "se-

quel" writer brings him back to life, to the great satisfaction of the public, which rediscovers its enthusiasm and revives the hero's image, enriching it with the new material provided. "Historical figures" is not to be taken literally—even though it is also true that certain popular readers have lost the ability to distinguish between the real world of history and the fantasy world, and they discuss fictional characters as they would those who have actually lived. Still, one should take "historical figure" in the figurative sense in order to understand how the fantasy world acquires a particular fabulous concreteness in the intellectual life of the people. Thus, for example, different novels are sometimes blended together, because of the resemblances among the characters they portray; the popular narrator brings together in a single hero the exploits of many heroes and is convinced that this is the "intelligent" thing to do.

§<123>. *Past and present. Balance sheet of the war.* In the *Corriere della Sera* of 7 April 1932, Camillo Pellizzi announces the publication of Luigi Villari's book *The War on the Italian Front* (London: Cobden-Sanderson, 1932; with a foreword by Sir Rennell Rodd). Comparative statistics on the war are published in an appendix; Pellizzi reproduces the following: Italy mobilized 14.48 percent of its population, France 20.08 percent, England 12.31 percent; 14 percent of the Italians mobilized were killed, 16.15 percent of the French, 11.05 percent of the English; Italy spent more than one-fourth of its wealth in the war, France less than one-sixth; Italy lost 58.93 percent of its merchant marine tonnage, Great Britain 43.63 percent, France 39.44 percent.¹

One must examine how these statistics were obtained and whether the figures are truly comparable. The percentage of population mobilized may be inaccurate given that the numbers of people mobilized in various years are added up and the percentage is calculated on the basis of the total population in a given year. Similarly, with regard to the tonnage, one needs to know the age of the ships that were lost since certain countries are known to keep their ships in service longer than others—hence their higher number of losses even in peacetime. Calculations of a country's wealth vary significantly, depending on the degree of fiscal honesty in the declarations of income—a form of honesty that is quite rare.

§<124>. *The economic-corporative phase in Italian history. The Lepanto enterprise.* A. Salimei, *Gli italiani a Lepanto* (Rome, under the auspices of the Naval League). Salimei has diligently collected all the data pertaining to the organization of the forces that participated in the Lepanto enterprise, and he has shown that the majority of the forces, from ships to men, were Italian. In the Vatican archives, there are documents with the ledgers for the division between the king of Spain and the Republic of Venice of the expenditures for the Holy League of 1571—s that were passed on to the successor of Pius V for him to settle the controversies that arose concerning the amounts owed to or by the respective parties. With such documents, it is possible to know precisely the number and the names of galleons, ships, frigates, etc.; the number of regiments and their respective companies; the names of the colonels and the captains of the fleet as well as the infantry—and this includes not only those who were present at the battle of Lepanto but also those who, though not there, were mobilized for the expedition that same year, 1571.

Of the more than two hundred ships that took part in the battle, only fourteen were Spanish; all the others were Italian. There were 34,000 men under arms, of which only 5,000 infantrymen "came from Spain" and 6,000 were Germans (but 1,000 of these did not engage in combat); the rest were of Italian "nationality." From the list of "officers, mercenaries, and soldiers," who are subdivided by nationality and, "in the case of Italy," by region and town of origin, Salimei deduced that there is no part of the peninsula and the islands that did not participate in the enterprise—from the Alps to Calabria, including Dalmatia and the islands under Venetian rule, from Sicily to Sardinia, to Corsica, to Malta. This is very interesting research, and it might be worth analyzing when the occasion arises. Salimei encloses his account within a rhetorical frame, using modern concepts when dealing with facts that are not comparable. He claims that the Lepanto enterprise was "national" in character, whereas it is usually credited to Christianity (that is, to the pope) and the leading role of Spain. Salimei asserts that at Lepanto, for the last time, Italians—indeed, all Italians—"fought for a cause that was not foreign" and that "Lepanto marked the end of the era of our naval and military prowess as an Italian people, until 1848."¹ One would have to figure out, in this matter, what led to the argument between Venice and Spain over the division of

expenses and also under what flags soldiers from diverse regions of Italy enrolled.

On the Lepanto League, cf. A. Dragonetti De Torres, *La lega di Lepanto nel carteggio diplomatico di don Luys de Torres nunzio straordinario di SS. Pio V a Filippo II*, Turin, Bocca, 1931.² By looking at the diplomatic groundwork for the League, one can arrive at a more concrete understanding of the nature of the enterprise.

§<125>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*. This might serve as the general title for the survey that gathers together all the points and themes that have been noted thus far under different headings. Ideas for a dictionary of politics and criticism, encyclopedic notions in the strict sense, themes of moral life, cultural topics, philosophical fables, etc.

1. *Ultra*. Different names given in France and Germany to Catholics who favor the influence exercised by the papacy in their respective countries, which means, above all: they fought to strengthen themselves as a party with the assistance of a foreign power (not just a "spiritual and cultural" power but also a temporal power—and how!—because it wanted to collect taxes, tithes, etc., and to have control over international politics). In certain periods, it was a form of "foreigners' party" [as opposed to a "Gallic" party in France].

2. *Artisan. Artisanhip*. I extract some points from an article by Ugo Ojetti ("Arti e artigiani d'Italia," in the *Corriere* of 10 April 1932): according to Italian law, an artisan is someone who employs no more than five workers if his trade is artistic in nature and no more than three workers if he is a common craftsman. An inaccurate definition. "The artisan, in the strict sense, is someone who works with his own hands at his art or craft. The fact that he employs five or ten persons does not alter what characterizes him as an artisan—in other words, what immediately distinguishes him from an industrialist." But this definition, too, is inaccurate, because the artisan does not necessarily work; he might supervise the work of a workshop. To arrive at a definition, one must look at the mode of production and of work.

A licensing system for craftsmen exists in Germany, and it has three levels: the apprentice "whom we would call lad or novice"; the "journeyman" who has completed his initial apprenticeship; and the "master."¹

Ojetti uses the word "journeyman" when referring to the artisan worker who has already completed his professional formation.² But how does one justify this term? Not historically; in Italian, unlike German and French, the word that once had a precise legal meaning is no longer used—its meaning today does not pertain to one's "profession" but to one's "economic" status. Professionally, the "journeyman" is a "master," except for the fact that he does not own a workshop and must work for someone else who is in fact an owner.

§<126>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*. Cf. Luigi Sorrento, *Medio Evo, il termine e il concetto* (Milan, Soc. Ed. Vita e Pensiero, 1931, 54 pp., in 8°). Sorrento is a professor at the Sacro Cuore University (and this publication is in fact a lecture he delivered at that university). One imagines that his study of the subject is not exclusively Catholic and apologetic in its perspective, even though it does not go beyond the literary and the historical—that is, it does not concern itself with the socioeconomic content of the concept of Middle Ages.¹ What needs to be done instead is study the issue thoroughly in order to arrive at a distinction between the Middle Ages and the age of mercantilism and of absolute monarchies, which, in the popular mind, are considered part of the Middle Ages. (In the popular mind, the ancien régime is confused with the Middle Ages when in fact it is the age of mercantilism and of absolute monarchies, which was brought to an end by the French Revolution.) Sorrento's booklet is more useful for its references to literary sources.

It might be worth devoting a paragraph to a summary of what the word "Italy" meant in different periods, using as a point of departure the study on the subject by Prof. Carlo Cipolla, published in the Proceedings of the Turin Academy of Sciences.²

§<127>. *History of the subaltern classes. La bohème. Charles Baudelaire*. Cf. C. Baudelaire, *Les Fleurs du Mal et autres poèmes*, texte intégral précédé d'une étude inédite d'Henri de Régnier ["La Renaissance du Livre," Paris, n.d.]. In his study, Régnier recalls (on pp. 14–15, counting from the first printed page, since the text [of the introduction] is not paginated) that Baudelaire participated [actively] in the events of February and June 1848. "Fait étrange de

contagion révolutionnaire, dans cette cervelle si méticuleusement lucide," writes Régnier. Together with Champfleury, Baudelaire launched a republican paper in which he wrote fiery articles.¹ He subsequently edited a local paper in Châteauroux.

Cette double campagne typographique [*sic*] et la part qu'il prit au mouvement populaire suffirent, il faut le dire, à guérir ce qu'il appela plus tard sa "folie" et que, dans *Mon coeur mis à nu*, il cherche à s'expliquer à lui-même quand il écrit: "Mon ivresse de 1848. De quelle nature était cette ivresse? Goût de la vengeance, plaisir naturel de la démolition. Ivresse littéraire. Souvenirs de lectures." Crise bizarre qui transforma cet aristocrate d'idées et de goûts qu'était foncièrement Baudelaire en un énergumène que nous décrit dans ses notes son camarade Le Vavas seur et dont les mains "sentaient la poudre," proclamant "l'apothéose de la banqueroute sociale"; crise bizarre d'où il rapporta une horreur sincère de la démocratie mais qui était peut-être aussi un premier avertissement physiologique.²

Etc.[It was an early symptom of Baudelaire's neurasthenia] (but why not the reverse? In other words, why was it not Baudelaire's ailment that caused his detachment from the popular movement? etc.).

In any case, check whether Baudelaire's political writings have been collected and studied.

§<128>. *Economic science*. Concept and fact of "determined market"; that is, the discovery that specific forces have risen historically and their operation manifests itself with a certain "automatism" that gives individual initiatives a certain degree of "predictability" and certainty. "Determined market" can therefore be said to be a "determined relation of social forces in a determined structure of the productive apparatus" that is guaranteed by a determined juridical superstructure. In order to be able to talk of a new "science," one must first show that new relations of force, etc., exist and that they have determined a new type of market with its own "automatism" and phenomena that manifest themselves as something "objective," comparable to the automatism of the laws of nature.

Economic science and "critique of an economic science." The "critique" of economic science starts from the concept of the historicity of the "determined market" and of its "automatism," whereas pure economists take these elements to be "eternal" and "natural." The critique analyzes the relations of forces that "determine" the market, it evaluates their capacity for "modification" when new factors emerge and gain strength, and

it reveals the "transitory" and "replaceable" nature of the "science" it criticizes; it studies it as "life" but also as "death" and finds at its core the elements of its own inevitable supersession by an "heir" who will remain "presumptive" until he manifestly proves his vitality, etc. From these considerations, one can derive an approach for establishing what is meant by "regularity," "law," "automatism" in historical events. This is not a question of "discovering" a metaphysical "law" of determinism or of establishing a "general" law of causality. It is a question of understanding how in the general development <of history> relatively "permanent" forces are constituted that operate with a certain regularity and a certain automatism. Even the law of large numbers, though very useful for making comparisons, cannot be taken to be the "law" of social affairs.

One must study David Ricardo's procedure (the so-called method of "let us suppose that . . .")¹ in the formulation of economic laws; therein one would certainly find one of the points of departure of Marx's and Engels's philosophical experiences that led to the development of historical materialism.

Chance and law. Philosophical concepts of "chance" and "law": between the concept of a "providence" that has fixed the purpose of the world and of man and the concept of historical materialism that "ascribes the world to chance."

Cf. Notebook 11, §52.

§<129>. *Catholic Action.* The weakness of every single national organization of Catholic Action consists in the fact that their activities are constricted and continually disrupted by the national and international political exigencies of the Holy See within each state. To the extent that every national Catholic Action grows and becomes a mass organization, it tends to become a regular political party whose direction is determined by the internal necessities of the organization, but this process can never become organic, precisely because of the intervention of the Holy See. Perhaps herein lies the reason why Catholic Action has never been very well received in Germany. The Center was already so well developed as a politico-parliamentary force engaged in Germany's domestic battles that any broad-based Catholic Action formation under the strict control of the Episcopate would have compromised the power it already had and its potential for further growth.¹ One should recall the conflict that broke out between the Center and the Vatican when the Vatican wanted the Center to approve Bismarck's military laws, which the Center strenuously opposed.²

A similar development in Austria, where clericalism has always been politically strong as a party and had no need for a large permanent organization like that of Catholic Action; it was enough to have unorganized electoral flocks under the traditional control of parish priests.

§<130>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics. Statolatry.* Attitude of each particular social group toward its own state. The analysis would not be accurate unless one took into account the two forms in which the state manifests itself in the language and culture of particular epochs, namely, as civil society and as political society, as "self-government" and as "official government." Statolatry is the term applied to a particular attitude toward the "official government" or political society, which in ordinary language is the form of state life that is called the state and is commonly understood as the entire state.

The assertion that the state can be identified with individuals (with the individuals of a social group), as an element of active culture (that is, as a movement to create a new civilization, a new type of man, and a new type of citizen)—this assertion must serve to generate the will to construct within the shell of political society a complex and well-articulated civil society in which the single individual governs himself, provided that his self-government does not enter into conflict with political society but becomes, rather, its normal continuation, its organic complement. Some social groups rose to autonomous state life without first having had an extended period of independent cultural and moral development of their own (which in medieval society and under absolute regimes was rendered possible by the legal existence of privileged estates or orders); for such social groups, a period of statolatry is necessary and indeed appropriate. Such "statolatry" is nothing other than the normal form of "state life" or, at least, of initiation into autonomous state life and into the creation of a "civil society," which historically could not be created before the ascent to independent state life. Nevertheless, this kind of "statolatry" must not be abandoned to itself; above all, it must not become theoretical fanaticism or come to be seen as "perpetual." It must be criticized, precisely in order for it to develop and to produce new forms of state life in which individual and group initiative has a "state" character even if it is not

indebted to the "official government" (makes state life "spontaneous"). (Cf. p. 45, the topic of "Individual initiative.")¹

§<131>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics.* 1. *The motto of "Civiltà Cattolica": "Beatus populus cuius Dominus Deus eius" (Ps., 143, 15).* The writers of the periodical translate it thus: "Blessed is the nation whose Lord is God."¹ But is this accurate? The translation is this: "Blessed is the nation whose own God is its Lord." In other words, the motto reproduces the exaltation of the Jewish nation and the Jewish national God who was its Lord. Now, does *Civiltà Cattolica* want to have national churches, as the motto implies? (Cf. the translation of the Bible by Luzzi² in order to verify the text.)²

2. *Religion and politics.* The following issue should be examined: whether there exists a relationship—and what would such a relationship be?—between the religious unity of a country and the multiplicity of parties and, vice versa, between the relative unity of parties and the multiplicity of churches and religious sects. Notably, in the United States, which effectively has two or three political parties, there are hundreds of churches and religious sects; in France, where religious unity is quite marked, there are scores of parties. A case that calls for attention is czarist Russia: political parties in the normal and legal sense did not exist or were repressed, while religious sects thoroughly imbued with fanaticism tended to multiply. One possible explanation is that both the party and religion are forms of worldview and that religious unity, as much as political unity, is only apparent. Religious unity masks a real multiplicity of worldviews that find their expression in the parties because of religious "indifferentism." Similarly, political unity masks a multiplicity of tendencies that find their expression in the religious sects, etc. Everyone tends to have one organic and systematic worldview; since cultural differentiations are so numerous and deep, however, society acquires a bizarre kaleidoscope of currents that appear in a religious hue or in a political hue, depending on historical tradition.

² In the manuscript, Gramsci erroneously wrote "Luzzi."

§<132>. *Machiavelli. Passion.* Croce's concept of passion as a moment of politics runs into difficulties when it comes to explaining and justifying permanent political formations,¹ such as the parties and, even more so, the national armies and General Staffs, since it is impossible to conceive of a permanently organized passion that does not become rationality and deliberate reflection—in other words, that ceases to be passion. The solution can be found only in the identification of politics and economics. Politics is permanent action, and it gives rise to permanent organizations precisely insofar as it identifies itself with economics. Yet politics and economics are also distinct, which is why it is possible to speak of economics and of politics separately. One can say of "political passion" that it is an unmediated impulse toward action that is born on the "permanent and organic" terrain of economic life but goes beyond it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in whose incandescent atmosphere even the calculations of individual human life will follow laws different from those of individual profit, etc.

§<133>. *Lorianism. Giuseppe De Lorenzo.* Some aspects of De Lorenzo's intellectual activity belong to the category of Lorianism. In his case, however, one has to be careful.¹

§<134>. *Past and present. A judgment on Paolo Boselli.* In the obituary of Paolo Boselli that he wrote for *Gerarchia* (March 1932), Filippo Caparelli makes the following remark: "It may seem somewhat strange, perhaps, that during those years [of the Risorgimento], so full of wonderful events, he did not think of drawing from other sources, even though they were abundant and most worthy; in other words, he did not seek direct contact with life, with these bountiful enthusiasms. There is no need to be alarmed [*sic*], however, because that was his temperament [!]; his inclination [!] led him to cultivate his patriotic impulses in the peaceful spaces of literature rather than in the exceedingly [!] uncomfortable field of action."¹

§<135>. *Popular literature.* Cf. E. Brenna, *La letteratura educativa popolare italiana nel secolo XIX* (Milan, F.I.L.P., 1931, 246 pp., L. 6). The following points are taken from Prof. E. Formiggini-Santamaria's book review (*L'Italia che Scrive*, March 1932).¹ Brenna's

book received an honorable mention in the Ravizza contest that had for its topic, precisely, "popular educational literature." Brenna has produced a description of the evolution of the novel, the short story, popular writings on morals and society, drama, and dialectal writings that were most widely circulated in the 19th century—this is also accompanied by references to the 18th century and placed in relation to the general direction of literary development.

Brenna's definition of "popular" is very broad, "so that it even includes the bourgeoisie, for whom culture is not the purpose of life but that can be attracted to the arts"; therefore, what she considers to be "literature that educates the people includes all that was written in a nonpompous, nonprecious style, including, for ex., *I Promessi Sposi*,² D'Azeglio's novels³ and others of the same kind, Giusti's poetry,⁴ and the light verse or pastoral poetry of such writers as Pascoli and Ada Negri."⁵ Formigini-Santamaria makes some interesting remarks:

This interpretation of the topic is justified when one bears in mind that in the first half of the last century very few artisans and peasants were literate [popular literature, however, does not spread only through reading by individuals but also through collective reading; other activities: the *Maggi* in Tuscany,⁶ the *cantastorie* of southern Italy⁷ are characteristic of backward areas where illiteracy is widespread; also the poetry contests in Sardinia and Sicily]⁸ and that there was a scarcity of books suitable [what does "suitable" mean? Doesn't literature create new needs?]⁹ for the limited frame of mind of manual workers; the author must have thought that if she had dwelt solely on these aspects, her study would have been very narrow. Yet it seems to me that the implied intention of the assigned topic was to draw attention not only to the scarcity of writings of a popular nature in the 19th century but also to the need to write books that are suitable for the people and to search—through an analysis of the past—for those criteria that would serve as a source of inspiration for popular literature. This is not to say that there was no need to look at publications that were intended by their authors to help educate the people, even though they failed to do so; but such a survey should have yielded a more explicit reason why the good intentions remained mere intentions. On the other hand, there were other works (especially in the second half of the 19th century) intended, first and foremost, to achieve success and, second, to educate, and they were very well received by the popular classes. It is true that, in order to examine such works, Brenna would have had to distance herself repeatedly from the artistic sphere, but by analyzing those works that circulated, and still circulate, among the people (for ex., the illogical, complicated, gloomy novels by

Invernizio),¹⁰ by studying the melodramas that drew tears and applause from the public that attended the minor theaters on Sundays (and that are always inspired by a love of justice and courage), she would have been better able to identify the salient feature of the soul of the people, the secret of what can educate the popular soul when it is transported to a realm of action that is less one-dimensional and more serene.

Formiggini goes on to point out that Brenna ignored the study of folklore, and he reiterates the need to study fables and tales such as those of the Grimm brothers.

Formiggini stresses the word "educational" but does not specify what the substance of the concept should be—yet this is the crux of the issue. The "tendentiousness" of purportedly [educational] popular literature is so insipid and faked, it is so out of tune with the interests of the popular mind that its lack of popularity is deserved.

§<136>. *Characteristics of Italian literature*. Cf. Piero Rébora's article, "Libri italiani ed editori inglesi," in *L'Italia che Scrive* of March 1932. Why contemporary Italian literature is hardly ever read in England: "Poor skills of observation and objective narration, morbid egocentrism, old-fashioned erotic obsession, and, at the same time, linguistic and stylistic chaos, as a result of which many of our books are written with a muddy lyrical impressionism that annoys the Italian reader and stupefies the foreign reader. Hundreds of words used by contemporary writers are not found in the dictionary, and nobody knows what they mean exactly." "Above all, perhaps, portrayals of love and of women that are basically incomprehensible to Anglo-Saxons; a provincial, semidialectal verism; the lack of linguistic and stylistic unity." "European types of books are needed instead of hackneyed provincial verism." "I have learned from experience that often the foreign reader (and probably the Italian reader, too) finds in our books something chaotic, irritating, almost repugnant that is somehow inserted here and there in the midst of pages that are otherwise admirable and indicative of sound and deep talent." "There are very successful novels, books of prose, and plays ruined unforgivably by two or three pages, a single scene, or even some remark of embarrassing vulgarity, clumsiness, or bad taste that spoils everything." "The fact remains that an Italian professor abroad, even with all the goodwill he can summon,

finds it impossible to put together a dozen good contemporary Italian books that do not contain some page so repugnant, shameful, destructive of our basic dignity, or painfully trivial that it is best not to place it under the nose of intelligent foreign readers. Some people have the unfortunate habit of labeling this sense of shame and repugnance with the defamatory term 'puritanism'; in fact, however, this is purely and simply a matter of 'good taste.'"

In Rébora's view, publishers should intervene more actively in literary matters and not be mere merchants-entrepreneurs; they should function as primary critics, especially with regard to the "sociality" of the work, etc.¹

§<137>. *Popular literature*. Cf. Ernesto Brunetto, "Romanzi e romanzieri d'appendice," in the *Lavoro Fascista* of 19 February 1932.¹

§<138>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*. Every nation has its poet or writer who epitomizes the intellectual glory of the nation and race. Homer for Greece, Dante for Italy, Cervantes for Spain, Camões for Portugal, Shakespeare for England, Goethe for Germany. It is noteworthy that France does not have a single great figure that is its indisputable representative; the same is true of the United States. As for Russia, should Tolstoy be mentioned? For China: Confucius?

The French phenomenon is remarkable because traditionally France is the unified country par excellence (Victor Hugo?), even, indeed especially, in the cultural sphere. The date of these figures' appearance in the history of each nation is an interesting factor when it comes to determining the contribution of each nation to a common civilization and its "cultural relevance." As an "ideological element" currently at work, does the greatness of Homer reflect glory on Greece? Homer's admirers have habitually distinguished ancient Greece from modern Greece.

§<139>. *Risorgimento. Garibaldi and the phrase "cubic meter of dung."* In his article "Garibaldi e Pio IX" (*Corriere della Sera* of 15 April 1932), A. Luzio writes: "One can be absolutely sure that he [Garibaldi] did not write the letter in which the old pontiff was in-

sulted with the vulgar epithet 'cubic meter of dung.'" Luzio recalls that he had written previously on the topic (*Profili*, I, 485).¹ G.C. Abba is said to have told Luzio that he had heard from Garibaldi "the most indignant protests against the most despicable abuse of his name."²

The issue is unclear because this has to do with the fact that somebody is said to have written an "entire letter" over Garibaldi's name, and yet Garibaldi did not immediately protest against this abuse; he uttered his "indignant protests" privately to Abba in a private conversation of which Abba left no trace, other than his private conversation with Luzio. Since Luzio's article is an effort at the popular rehabilitation of Pius IX and is quite at odds with other reconstructions of Pius IX's character, one is led to think that while Luzio is not making all this up, he has somewhat "exaggerated" some statement of Garibaldi's that attenuated his harsh phrase.

Luzio writes apropos of Pius IX: "Unimpeachable diplomatic documents confirm, in every way, something in Pius IX that went beyond the 'solitary will to love' chanted by Carducci;³ the reality was perhaps even more poetic [sic!] and dramatic. In fact, they show us the pope, surrounded by Cardinal Antonelli and other hardliners, asking them breathlessly [!!] and in unsuccessfully repressed [!!] rebellion [!]: 'But if Providence has decreed the unification of Italy, should I be the one to oppose it, to hinder [!] divine decisions by refusing to be conciliatory?'"⁴

Other documents, however, show that Antonelli had very little influence, etc. In any case, so pronounced is the "novelistic" and serial novel character of Luzio's reconstruction that it is even disrespectful of the personality of the pope, who could not have posed in such terms the question of a possible providential decree; nor could he have talked of "hindering" divine decisions.

§<140>. *Past and present. Malta*. Check whether the Hon. Nerik Mizzi, one of the leaders of the Maltese Nationalist Party, was among the founders of the Partito Nazionale Italiano.¹ This assertion, made by some English newspaper, is probably related to the fact that Mizzi is said to have sent notice of his membership to the organizing committee or to some other prominent figure, such as Corradini, Federzoni, or Coppola.²

§<141>. *Machiavelli*. (1) Another element to study: the organic relations between the domestic policy and the foreign policy of a state. Is it domestic policy that determines foreign policy, or vice versa? In this case, too, distinctions are necessary: between great powers with relative international autonomy and other powers; as well as between different forms of government (the government of Napoleon III, for example, apparently had two policies—reactionary at home and liberal abroad).

(2) Conditions in a state before and after a war. It is obvious that, in an alliance, what counts are the conditions that prevail in a state in peacetime. It is therefore possible that whoever has hegemony during the war ends up losing it as a result of being debilitated by the struggle and will then have to watch a "subaltern" that has been "luckier" or more skilful become hegemonic. This occurs in "world wars" when the geographic situation compels a state to throw all its resources into the crucible: it wins through its alliances, but victory finds it prostrate, etc. This is why, when dealing with the concept of "great power," one must take many factors into account, especially those factors that are "permanent"—that is, especially, "economic and financial potential" and population.

§<142>. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics. Individual initiative*. (Topic related to that on "statolatry" on p. 41.)¹ Elements for formulating the issue: identity-distinction between civil society and political society; hence, organic identification between individuals (of a particular group) and the state, so that "every individual is a functionary," not insofar as he is a salaried employee of the state and under the "hierarchical" control of the state bureaucracy but insofar as, when "acting spontaneously," his action is identified with the aims of the state (that is, of the particular social group, or civil society). Individual initiative, then, is not a hypothesis of "goodwill" but a necessary assumption. "Individual initiative," however, is understood as something that pertains to the economic sphere; specifically, it is taken to mean, precisely, an initiative of a strictly personal and directly "utilitarian" character with the appropriation of the profit that the initiative itself determines within a given system of juridical relations. However, this is not the only form of "economic" initiative that has manifested itself in history (catalog of the great individual initiatives during

the last few decades that have ended in disaster: Kreuger, Stinnes; in Italy: the Perrone brothers;² Lewinsohn's books may be useful on this).³ There are examples of such initiatives that are not "immediately interested," in other words, initiatives that have a loftier kind of "interest" in the state or in the group that makes up civil society. For an admirable example, one need only look at the "upper bureaucracy" in Italy; if its members wanted to use their organizational abilities and specialized skills to engage in an economic activity that makes them personally rich, they would have the opportunity to attain a much superior financial status than they do working for the state—nor can one say that the idea of a pension is what keeps them working for the state, as is the case with the lowest stratum of the bureaucracy.

§<143>. *Journalism. Headlines.* Tendency toward grandiloquent and pedantic headlines, and the contrary reaction of so-called journalistic—that is, anodyne and irrelevant—headlines. Difficulty of the art of writing headlines that fulfill certain needs: to indicate succinctly the central issue treated, to rouse the interest and curiosity that compel the reader to read on. Headlines are also conditioned by the kinds of readers that the newspaper aims to reach and by the attitude of the newspaper toward its readership: a demagogic-commercial attitude when the goal is to exploit the basest tendencies; an educational[-didactic] attitude that is free of pedantry when one wants to take advantage of the prevailing public opinion as a starting point for raising it to a higher level. A caricature of a pedantic and pretentious headline: "News Briefs on the Universe."

§<144>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography.* Rezasco, *Dizionario del linguaggio italiano storico e amministrativo*, Florence, 1881.¹ [I am not familiar with it. Find out how it is compiled, its political leaning, etc. [praised by Einaudi].]²

§<145>. *The non-national-popular character of Italian literature.* Consent of the nation or of the "elect." What should be of greater concern to the artist, the approval of his work by the "nation" or by the "elect"? Can there be a separation between the "elect" and the "nation"? The very fact that the question has been posed, and

continues to be posed, in these terms manifests a historically determined separation between intellectuals and the nation. Besides, who are these reputedly "elect" individuals? Every writer or artist has his own "elect"; in other words, intellectuals are in fact broken up into cliques and sects of the "elect"—a fragmentation that is a consequence of their separation from the people-nation and of the fact that the emotive "content" of art, the cultural world, is disconnected from the deep currents of national-popular life, which itself remains fragmented and without expression. Every intellectual movement becomes or returns to being national if a "going to the people" has taken place, if there has been a phase of "Reformation" and not just a "Renaissance" phase, and if the "Reformation-Renaissance" phases follow one another organically and do not coincide with distinct historical phases (as was the case in Italy where, from the viewpoint of popular participation in public life, there was a historical hiatus between the movement of the communes [-reformation-] and the Renaissance movement). Even if one has to begin by writing "serial novels" and operatic lyrics, without a period of going to the people there can be no "Renaissance" and no national literature.

§<146>. *Encyclopedic notions. University.* A word that has retained its medieval meaning of collective body or community; for ex., the "*università israelitiche*" or the "*università agrarie*" in those regions where the land and forests have civic uses that are recognized and regulated by law (as in Lazio).¹ In everyday language, "university" continues to be used for certain institutions of higher learning (*Università degli Studi*) and recalls the old corporative organization of learning.

§<147>. *Journalism. News coverage of the law courts.* It is fair to say that, in the major newspapers, the reports from the law courts are written in the mode of an endless *Thousand and One Nights*, conceived along the lines of a serial novel. They have the same type of emotional schemes and motifs: tragedy, frenetic drama, clever and intelligent plots, farce. The *Corriere della Sera* does not publish serial novels, but its law courts page has all the attractions of a serial novel, in addition to the underlying sense that these are true stories.

§<148>. *Encyclopedic notions*. Bibliography. Roberto Michels, *Introduzione alla storia delle dottrine economiche e politiche*, in 16^o, XIII-310 pp., Bologna, Zanichelli, 1932, L. 15.¹

Dictionaries: by Guillaumin [*Dictionnaire de l'Économie Politique*, published by the Librairie de Guillaumin and Co., Paris (4th ed. of 1873)^a]; by Palgrave.²

Cossa, *Introduzione allo studio delle dottrine economiche*; Ricca-Salerno, *Storia delle dottrine finanziarie*.³

§<149>. *Cultural topics*. The critical description of some of the big cultural publishing ventures could yield a series of "topics"; for example, Custodi's Italian economists series [50 volumes]; Ferrara-Boccardo's Economist's Library [80 volumes]; Pareto-Ciccotti's economic history collection [8 volumes]; the new series planned by Bottai [Attilio Brunialti's political writers series].¹

§<150>. *Encyclopedic notions*. *Demiurge*. From its original meaning of "one who works for the people, for the community" (artisan) to today's meaning of "creator," etc. (cf. the writings of Filippo Burzio).¹

§<151>. *Cultural topics*. *Unnatural, natural, etc.* What does it mean to say of a certain action that it is "natural" or that it is "unnatural"? Deep down, everybody thinks they know exactly what this means, but if one were to ask for an explicit answer, it becomes clear that the question is not so simple. It must be made clear from the start that one cannot speak of "nature" as if it were something fixed and objective; in this case, "natural" means what is legitimate and normal according to our current historical consciousness—which, after all, is our "nature." Many acts that our conscience deems unnatural are natural to others because animals do them, and aren't animals "the most natural beings in the world"? These are the kinds of arguments one hears sometimes apropos of questions pertaining to sexual relations. Why should incest be regarded as "unnatural" when it is commonplace in "nature"? Even these assertions about animals, however, are not always accurate; they are based on the observation of animals that have been domesticated by man for his use and that are forced

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci inserted the title and bibliographical details of the Guillaumin dictionary between the lines at the end of this note.

to live in a manner that is not natural for them because it is controlled by human will. Yet, even if this were true, what is its significance for humans? Human nature is the ensemble of social relations that determines a historically defined consciousness, and this consciousness indicates what is "natural" and what is not [and human nature is contradictory because it is the ensemble of social relations].

People also speak of "second nature"; a certain habit becomes second nature, but was the "first nature" really "first"?¹ Is there not in this commonsense mode of expression some indication of the historicity of human nature? (continued below.)²

Cf. Notebook 16, §12.

§<152>. *Past and present.* One might say that the French bourgeoisie is the "pimp of European civilization."

§<153>. *Cultural topics. Unnatural, natural, etc.* Since the ensemble of social relations is contradictory, human historical consciousness is contradictory; having said that, the question arises of how this contradictoriness manifests itself. It manifests itself all across the body of society through the existence of the different historical consciousnesses of various groups, and it manifests itself in individuals as a reflection of these group antinomies. Among subaltern groups, given the lack of historical initiative, the fragmentation is greater; they face a harder struggle to liberate themselves from imposed (rather than freely propounded) principles in order to arrive at an autonomous historical consciousness. How will this consciousness be formed? How does one go about choosing the elements that would constitute the autonomous consciousness? Does it mean that every "imposed" element will have to be repudiated a priori? It will have to be repudiated only insofar as it is imposed, but not in itself; in other words, it will be necessary to give it a new form that is affiliated with the given group. The fact that education is "mandatory" does not mean that it ought to be repudiated: "necessity" has to be transformed into "freedom." In order to do so, however, a necessity has to be recognized as "objective"; in other words, it has to be objectively necessary also for the group in question. One must therefore look at the technical relations of production, at a specific mode of production that, in order to be kept up and developed, requires a specific way of life and hence specific rules of conduct. One must be persuaded that not only is a certain apparatus "objective" and necessary but also a certain mode of behavior, a certain education, a certain civilization. In this objectivity and necessity, one can posit the universality of moral principle; indeed, there has never been a universal-

ity other than this objective necessity that has been interpreted through transcendental ideologies and has been presented time and again in ways deemed most effective for the desired ends. (Continued on next page.)¹

Cf. Notebook 16, §12.

§<154>. *Past and present*. Franz Weiss, the "asterisk" of *Problemi del Lavoro*, could call himself the "new Windbag" and the collection of his writings, the new book of the Seven Trumpets.¹

The other "asterisk," the one who writes for *Il Lavoro* (Weiss has six asterisks and Ansaldo five; Ansaldo is also known as the "black asterisk" of *Il Lavoro*),² is more "aristocratic" both in style and in thematic content. The "popularity" of Weiss's style consists primarily in the fact that his articles are full of proverbs and popular expressions [he spews out more proverbs than Sancho Panza;³ one can make a collection of his "nuggets of wisdom"]: "going to the well once too often; old flag, captain's honor; an old chicken makes good soup; to know by hindsight; comparing apples and oranges, etc." Note also the "sham" folksiness and the brio of a weary coctte. One gets the impression that Weiss has a stock of proverbs and idioms to put into circulation, like a traveling salesman with his stock of catchphrases. When he wants to write an article, he is not concerned with its content but with the number of phrases he can hawk. The development of his written exposition is not governed by the inherent requirement to prove a point but by the need to insert the precious pearls of popular wisdom. Compare to Corso Bovio,⁴ who, in place of proverbs, peppers his articles with famous names; every little column of his resembles a stroll in a pantheon of the League of Nations—every column calls for the appearance of at least fifty names, from Pythagoras to Paneroni,⁵ from *Ecclesiastes* to Tom Thumb. One can analyze an article by Weiss and another by Bovio in this manner as examples of literary slavishness. (There is moreover a little of Bovio in Weiss and a little of Weiss in Bovio; both of them ensure that the workingmen they write for remain blockheads.)

§<155>. *Past and present*. *Fables*. *Ideas on religion*. The current view is this: religion must not be destroyed unless there is something to replace it with in people's souls.¹ But how do we

know when a replacement has taken place and the old may be destroyed?

Another way of thinking related to the above: religion is a necessity for the people or for the "plebes," as they say. Naturally, nobody believes that they are still "plebeian," but everybody believes that the people around them are plebes; therefore, they say, it is necessary for them to pretend to be religious as well, so as not to disturb the minds of others and plunge them into doubt. Thus, many people are no longer believers; every one of them is convinced that he is superior to the others because he no longer needs to be superstitious in order to be honest—and yet everyone is convinced of the need to appear to "believe" out of respect for others.

§<156>. *Cultural topics. Unnatural, natural, etc.* A notion like the one expounded above might appear conducive to a form of relativism and therefore to moral skepticism.¹ The same can be said of all the previous notions: their categorical imperativeness and objectivity has always been reducible by "bad faith" to a form of relativism. In order for religion to have at least the appearance of being absolute and objectively universal, it would have been necessary for it to manifest itself as monolithic or, at the very least, as intellectually uniform among all believers—which is very far from reality (different doctrines, sects, tendencies, as well class differences: the simple and the cultured, etc.). The same is said of Kant's categorical formula: behave as you would want everybody else to behave in the same circumstances.²

Obviously, every single person may think that everyone should behave as he does: a jealous husband who kills his unfaithful wife thinks that all husbands should kill unfaithful wives. Analyzed realistically, Kant's formula is only applicable to a specific milieu, with that milieu's moral superstitions and barbaric mores; it is a static, empty formula into which one can pour any actual historical content (with its contradictions, naturally, so that what is a truth on the other side of the Pyrenees is a falsehood on this side of the Pyrenees). The argument about the danger of relativism and skepticism is therefore invalid. The question that needs to be addressed is another: Does a given conception have the inherent characteristics that make it endure? Or does it change from one day to the next and give rise, within the same group, to the formulation of the theory of dual truth? If these problems are resolved, the conception is justified. But there will be a period of laxity, even of libertinism and moral dissolution—though this cannot be excluded, it is not a valid argument, either. There have been many periods of laxity and dissolution in the course of history with the same moral concept always dominant. Such periods are the result

of real historical causes, not of moral concepts; they are in fact indicative of the disintegration of an old conception and the emergence of a new one—but the disintegrating conception attempts to remain in place coercively, driving society to forms of hypocrisy, the reactions against which are, precisely, the periods of laxity and libertinism.

The danger of moral lassitude is to be found, instead, in the fatalistic theory of those very same groups that define naturalness in terms of the nature of brutes, as a result of which everything is justified by the social environment; all individual responsibility thus becomes submerged by social responsibility. If this were true, the world and history would be forever static. If, for an individual to change, all of society must change, mechanically, through some extrahuman force, then no change would ever take place. History is a continuous struggle by individuals or groups to change society, but in order to succeed, such individuals and groups must consider themselves superior to society, educators of society, etc. The environment, then, does not justify but "explain" the behavior of individuals, especially of those who are historically most passive. Explanation sometimes allows for indulgence toward individuals, and it also provides material for education, but it must never become "justification" because that would necessarily result in one of the most hypocritical and repulsive forms of conservatism and "regression." (Continued on p. 49.)³

Cf. Notebook 16, §12.

§<157>. *Cultural topics*. An utterance by General Gazzera in his speech to parliament as minister of war (22 April 1932; cf. the newspapers of the 23d): "Bravery comes from passion, wisdom from the intellect, equipoise from knowledge."¹ Commenting on this, it would be particularly interesting to try to understand how, through the organization of the army, the personal qualities of bravery, wisdom, and equipoise become the collective qualities of an organic and articulated ensemble of officers, noncommissioned officers, lance corporals, and privates—when engaged in action, they all have, whatever their rank, their own intense lives, and, at the same time, they together constitute an organic collectivity.

§<158>. *Cultural topics*. *The tendency to belittle the enemy*. It seems to me that exhibiting this tendency is itself proof of one's inferiority. Belittling one's enemy is in fact an effort to enable oneself to believe that he can be vanquished; such a tendency therefore is also an instinctive judgment on one's own inability and weakness. In other words, it is the begin-

ning of a self-criticism that is ashamed of itself and is afraid to manifest itself explicitly and with systematic coherence because of the belief in the "will to believe" as a condition of victory. None of this would be misguided if it were not conceived of mechanically and did not become a form of self-deception. (It contains an unjustifiable confusion between the mass and the leaders that, in the end, demeans the function of the leader, reducing it to the same level as the role of the most humble and clumsy subordinate.) In one respect, this tendency is like opium: it is typical of the weak to indulge in reveries, to dream with their eyes open that their desires are reality, that everything will happen as they envisage it. On the one hand, impotence, stupidity, barbarity, fear; on the other hand, the highest qualities of fortitude and intelligence—the outcome of the struggle must not be in doubt, and victory appears to be already in one's grasp. The struggle remains a dreamed struggle as is the victory; in reality, no matter where one starts, the difficulties seem severe, and since one must necessarily start with small things (after all, big things are always an ensemble of small things), the "little thing" comes to be regarded with disdain—it is better to continue dreaming and to defer everything until the moment of the "big thing." The sentry's job is irksome, boring, tiring; why "waste" human energy in this manner instead of conserving it for the great heroic battle? And so on.

Another thing is overlooked: if the enemy dominates you and you belittle him, do you acknowledge being dominated by someone you consider inferior? But how did he manage to dominate you? How come he defeated you and proved superior to you at precisely the decisive moment that should have revealed the degree of your superiority and his inferiority? The devil must have thrown a monkey wrench into the works. Well, learn to have the devil with the monkey wrench on your side.

Cf. Notebook 16, §17.

§<159>. *Cultural topics. Natural, unnatural, etc.* The opposite of "natural" is taken to be "artificial" or "conventional." But what is the meaning of "artificial" and "conventional" when used with reference to the great multitudes? It means "historical," and it is useless to search for a pejorative meaning in something that has entered consciousness as a "second nature." It is legitimate to employ the notions of artifice and convention when discussing personal idiosyncrasies but not when referring to mass phenomena that are already entrenched. Traveling by train is artificial, but not in the same sense as a woman's use of cosmetics.

As for the issues raised in the earlier paragraphs:¹ from a positive angle, the question arises as to who should decide that a given moral attitude is the most appropriate for a given stage of development of the productive

forces. To be sure, no bureau will be set up for the purpose. The leading forces will emerge by virtue of the fact that the way of thinking will be oriented toward this realistic direction, and they will arise out of the clash of different views, without "conventionality" and "artifice."

Cf. Notebook 16, §12.

§<160>. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Papini.* Catholicism shapes Papini's style. He no longer says "seven" but "as many as there are deadly sins": "Not that we did not already have Italian translations of Goethe's masterpiece: counting integral as well as partial editions, Manacorda recalls as many as there are deadly sins"¹ ("Il Faust svelato" in the *Corriere della Sera* of 26 April 1932).²

§<161>. *The question of the intellectuals. Sicily and Sardinia.* To understand the unequal effects of big landownership in Sicily and Sardinia and hence the different relative position of intellectuals—which in turn explains the different nature of the political-cultural movements—the following statistics are useful: in Sardinia, only 18 percent of the land belongs to public entities, and the rest is private property; 50 percent of arable land consists of properties that are smaller than 10 hectares, while only 4 percent comprises properties larger than 200 hectares.

Sicily: in 1907 Lorenzoni counted 1,400 properties larger than 200 hectares, covering a total area of 717,729.16 hectares, so that 29.79 percent of the registered landed property was owned by 787 landowners.¹ In 1929 Molè counted 1,055 large estates of over 200 hectares, covering a total area of 540,700 hectares, or 22.2 percent of all arable and forested land (but is it really a splitting of large estates?)²

Furthermore, one must take into account the historical-social-cultural difference between the Sicilian and the Sardinian big landowners: the Sicilians have a great tradition and are strongly united. Nothing of the sort in Sardinia.

§<162>. *Machiavelli.* Specific studies on Machiavelli as an "economist": a study by Gino Arias in the *Annali di Economia della Università Bocconi* contains some references.¹ (A study by

Vincenzo Tangorra.)² In one of his writings on Machiavelli, Chabod apparently found that the almost total absence of economic references in the Florentine's works evinced a weakness in comparison to, for ex., Botero.³ (On Botero's importance for the study of the history of economic thought, cf. Mario De Bernardi and L. Einaudi's review in the *Riforma Sociale* of March–April 1932.)⁴

This calls for some general remarks on Machiavelli's political thought and its continuing relevance, in comparison with Botero's thought, which is more systematic and organic, though less lively and original. It is also necessary to take into account the nature of economic thought of the time (some points in the cited article by Einaudi) and the discussion on the nature of mercantilism (economic science or economic policy?). If it is true that mercantilism is [merely] economic policy—insofar as it cannot presuppose a “determinate market” or the existence of a prior “economic automatism,” the elements of which emerge historically only at a certain stage of the development of a world market—it is obvious that economic thought cannot be blended into general political thought, that is, into the concept of the state and the forces that are supposed to be its components. If one can show that Machiavelli's goal was to create links between the city and the country and to broaden the role of the urban classes—to the point of asking them to divest themselves of certain feudal-corporative privileges with respect to the countryside, in order to incorporate the rural classes into the state—one will also be able to show that, in theory, Machiavelli had implicitly gone beyond the mercantilist phase and evinced traits of a “physiocratic” nature.⁵ In other words, Machiavelli was thinking of the political-social milieu presupposed by classical economics.⁶

Prof. Sraffa draws attention to a possible comparison between Machiavelli and the 17th-century English economist William Petty, whom Marx called “the founder of classical economy” and whose [complete] works have also been translated into French.⁷ (Marx refers to him in the volumes on *Mehrwert*, *Storia delle dottrine economiche*.)⁸

§<163>. *Machiavelli. Relations of force, etc.* It is fundamentally important to point out that these analyses are not ends in themselves; rather, they must serve to justify practical work, in that their purpose is to identify the points at which the force of will can be applied. Therefore, the fundamental factor remains always the permanently organized force that can

be pushed forward when the situation is propitious [collapse of the enemy, crises, etc]. The essential task is to work systematically to form, develop, and enlarge this force and to make it ever more homogeneous, compact, and self-aware.

Cf. Notebook 13, §17.

§<164>. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography.* H. E. General Carlo Porro, *Terminologia geografica*, a collection of terms in geography and kindred sciences for use in the study of general and military geography, in 8°, x-74, 91 pp.,^a Turin, Utet, 1902, L. 7.50.

L'avvocato di tutti. Piccola enciclopedia legale, in 8°, viii-1250 pp., L. 120, Turin, Utet.¹

§<165>. *Oriani*. He needs to be studied as the most honest and passionate advocate of Italy's national-popular greatness among the Italian intellectuals of the old generation. His position, however, is not critical-reconstructive, which accounts for his poor reception and his failures.¹ Whom did Oriani really address? Not the ruling classes, from whom he nevertheless expected recognition and honors, in spite of his corrosive diatribes. Not the republicans, even though his recriminatory mentality is similar to theirs. His *Lotta politica* resembles a manifesto for a great national popular democratic movement,² but Oriani is too steeped in the kind of idealist philosophy that was fashioned during the Restoration period to know how to speak to the people as simultaneously a leader and an equal or to make the people join in a criticism of themselves and of their weaknesses without making them lose faith in their own strength and their own future. Oriani's weakness lies in this purely intellectual character of his criticisms—criticisms that give rise to a new form of dogmatism and abstractionism. Still, there is a rather healthy current running through his thought that merits further study. The favorable reception that Oriani has enjoyed of late is more of a funerary embalmment than an expression of excitement at the resuscitation of his thought.^{3b}

^a In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "x-794 pp.," in fact, the book is made up of two sections: the first comprises seventy-four pages, and the second ninety-one.

^b This note ends about halfway down p. 50v of the manuscript; the rest of the page is blank.

NOTES ON PHILOSOPHY.
MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM.

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§<166>. *Graziadei*. Find out whether, apart from Loria's theories,¹ the theories of Rodbertus could have been the source of the questions raised by Graziadei.² In their *Histoire des doctrines économiques* (5th ed., 1929 reprint), Gide and Rist write on p. 504: "Remarquons aussitôt la différence d'attitude entre Rodbertus et Marx. Le second, tout imprégné de l'économie politique et du socialisme anglais, part de la théorie de *l'échange* et fait du travail la source de toute *valeur*. Rodbertus, inspiré par les Saint-Simoniens, part de la *production* et fait du travail l'unique source de tout *produit*, proposition plus simple et plus vraie que la précédente, quoique encore incomplète. Non seulement Rodbertus ne dit pas que le travail seul crée la valeur, mais il le nie expressément à diverses reprises, en donnant les raisons de son opinion."⁴ In a footnote, Rist supplies the pertinent bibliographical references and quotes a letter Rodbertus wrote to R. Meyer on 7 January 1872 in which he alludes to the fact that the "demonstration pourrait, le cas échéant, s'utiliser contre Marx."⁵

§<167>. *De Man's book*. Is the highlighting of the "psychological and ethical values" of the workers' movement supposed to be a refutation of the theories of historical materialism?¹ That would be like saying that highlighting the fact that the [great] majority of the world's population is still Ptolemaic is tantamount to refuting the theories of Copernicus. Marx asserts that people become conscious of their social position on the terrain of the superstructures;² has he by any chance excluded the proletarians from this way of acquiring consciousness of themselves? Historical materialism seeks to modify this cultural stage, moving self-awareness to a higher level, etc.; doesn't this mean that, in fact, the historical materialists themselves work on that same terrain that De Man believes he has discovered? De Man's discovery is a commonplace, and his refutation consists of a logical fallacy (or *ignoratio elenchi*).³

Cf. Notebook 11, §66.

§<168>. *Antonio Labriola and Hegelianism*. Study how Labriola moved from his initial Herbartian and anti-Hegelian positions on to historical materialism.¹ In a word, Labriola's dialectics.

§<169>. *Unity of theory and practice*. The average worker has a practical activity but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his activity in and understanding of the world; indeed, his theoretical consciousness can be "historically" in conflict with his activity. In other words, he will have two theoretical consciousnesses: one that is implicit in his activity and that really unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the world and a superficial, "explicit" one that he has inherited from the past. The practical-theoretical position, in this case, cannot help becoming "political"—that is, a question of "hegemony." Consciousness of being part of a hegemonic force (that is, political consciousness) is the first stage on the way to greater self-awareness, namely, on the way to unifying practice and theory. The unity of theory and practice is not a mechanical fact; it is, rather, a historical process, the elementary and primitive phase of which consists in the sense of being "distinct," "apart," and "independent." This is why I pointed out elsewhere that development of the concept-fact of hegemony represented a great "philosophical" as well as a political-practical advance.¹

Nevertheless, in the new development of historical materialism, the probing of the concept of the *unity* of theory and practice has only just begun; there are still residues of mechanistic thinking. People still speak of theory as a "complement" of practice, almost as an accessory, etc. I think that in this case, too, the question should be formulated historically, that is, as an aspect of the question of the intellectuals. Self-consciousness in the historical sense means the creation of a vanguard of intellectuals: a "mass" does not "distinguish" itself, does not become "independent" without organizing itself, and there is no organization without intellectuals, that is, without organizers and leaders. But this process of creating intellectuals is long and difficult, as has already been pointed out.² And for a long time—that is, until the "mass" of intellectuals grows sufficiently (which means until the larger mass has attained a certain level of culture)—a separation will continually appear between the intellectuals (or some of them, or a group of them) and the great masses—hence the impression of "accessory and complement." The insistence on "practice"—that is, the separating of theory from practice (a purely mechanical operation), instead of distinguishing between the two after having affirmed their "unity"—means that one is still in a relatively rudimentary historical phase; it is still the economic-corporative phase in which the general framework of the "structure" is transformed.

With regard to the intellectuals, one can also point out the fundamental difference between the pre- and post-French Revolution period and the present time: the economic individualism of the earlier period was itself a structural phenomenon, since the old structure developed through the contributions of individuals. The "industrialist," the organizer of production, was the unmediated intellectual of capitalism. In the mass economy, the choice of the individual takes place in the intellectual and not in the economic sphere. The main issue is the unification of theory and practice—that is, the leadership of the "entire economically active mass," and initially this can only take place on the individual level (individual membership in the political parties, and not the Labor Party or trade unions). It is the parties that elaborate the new integral and all-embracing intelligentsia; the traditional intellectuals of the earlier phase (clergy, professional philosophers, etc.) will necessarily disappear, unless—following a long and difficult process—they are assimilated.

Cf. Notebook 11, §12.

§<170>. *Scientific ideologies*. Eddington's assertion: "If we eliminated all the unfilled space in a man's body and collected his protons and electrons into one mass, the man would be reduced to a speck just visible with a magnifying glass" (cf. *La nature du monde physique*, French ed., p. 20).¹ This assertion has captured G. A. Borgese's imagination (cf. his booklet).² But what does Eddington's assertion mean, concretely? I think it is utterly meaningless. If one were to carry out the reduction described above and then do the same to the whole world, relations would not change, and things would stay just as they are. Things would only change if, hypothetically, this kind of reduction were carried out exclusively on humans [or certain humans]; one would then get a new edition of *Gulliver's Travels*, with the Lilliputians, the giants, etc.

Apropos of this man reduced to a speck, visible only through a microscope, one might also recall the Jewish story about the girl who felt a tiny, tiny pain . . . just like the merest flick of a fingernail. Furthermore, what is the significance of the microscope in this case? Who would be looking through the microscope, if man were just a speck, etc.? This is only word-play, really; it has nothing to do with scientific or philosophical thought. This way of framing things only serves to fill empty heads with fantasies. Somebody once wrote that man is an "errant mold," as if such a revelation was supposed to change the world. Empty heads who mistake words for facts really believe that the world has changed and that man is no longer what he had always been in history; they fail to see that man has changed only in the sense that he has advanced, thanks to a [really] new discovery

he has made that enables him to understand better the world and his relations with the world.

In Eddington's physics, the surprise of the a-philosophical reader comes from the fact that the words used to indicate certain facts are arbitrarily twisted to denote utterly different facts. A body remains "massive" in the traditional sense, even if the new physics shows that the same body is made up of a million parts of "unfilled space" and only one part in a million of matter. A body is "porous" in the traditional and not in the new sense; it is "porous" if water is allowed to seep into it, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §36.

§<171>. *The Popular Manual. The question of terminology and content.* One characteristic of the intellectuals as a crystallized social category (a social category that thinks of itself as the continuation of an uninterrupted history that places it above the struggles of groups and not as an expression of a dialectical process through which every dominant social group elaborates its own category of intellectuals) is precisely that of reattaching itself, in the ideological sphere, to a prior category of intellectuals, and it does so by means of a common conceptual terminology. A new historical situation creates a new ideological superstructure whose representatives (the intellectuals) must be regarded as "new intellectuals" brought forth by the new situation and not as a continuation of the preceding intelligentsia. If the "new" intellectuals position themselves as the direct continuation of the previous intelligentsia, they are not "new" at all; they are not tied to the new social group that represents the new historical situation but to the residues of the old social group of which the old intelligentsia was the expression. Nevertheless, no new historical situation, regardless of how radical the change that caused it, transforms language completely, at least not in its external formal aspect. But the content of language is changed, and it is difficult to have a clear understanding of the change instantaneously. Moreover, the phenomenon is historically complex and complicated by the fact that the different strata of the new social group have their own *typical* cultures; in the ideological sphere, many of these strata are still steeped in the culture of past historical situations. Even though many of its strata still have a Ptolemaic worldview, a class can be the representative of a very advanced historical situation; though ideologically backward, these strata are very advanced on a practical level (that is, as an economic and political factor). If the task of the intellectuals is to bring about and to organize the cultural revolution—that is, to make the culture adequate to the practice—it is obvious that "crystallized" intellectuals are reactionary, etc. The problem of terminology is, so to speak, "active and passive": on the one hand, acceptance of a term together with

the content of a concept that belonged to an intellectual milieu now superseded; on the other hand, rejection of a term from another intellectual milieu of the past, even though its content has changed and it has become effective for expressing the new sociocultural content. This is what happened to the term "materialism"—accepted with its past content—and to the term "immanence"—rejected because in the past it had a particular historical-cultural content. The difficulty of adapting literary expression to conceptual content and of confusing lexical questions with question of substance, and vice versa, is typical of philosophical dilettantism, of a lack of a historical sense capable of grasping the different moments of a process of cultural development and therefore of the development of history as a whole; in other words, it is typical of an antidialectical, dogmatic way of thinking, prisoner of the abstract schemes of formal logic.

Cf. Notebook 11, §16.

§<172>. *Bibliographies*. See the bibliography of A. Chiappelli (died this November 1931). It seems that around the middle of the decade of 1890–1900 (when the studies by Antonio Labriola and B. Croce were published),¹ he wrote on historical materialism in a book or article: *Le premesse filosofiche del socialismo*, etc.²

Cf. Notebook 11, §3.

§<173>. *On the Popular Manual*. A work like the *Popular Manual*, that is aimed at a community of readers who are not professional intellectuals, should have as its point of departure an analysis and a critique of the philosophy of common sense, which is the "philosophy of nonphilosophers"—in other words, the conception of the world *acritically* absorbed from the various social environments in which the moral individuality of the average person is developed. Common sense is not a single conception, identical in time and place. It is the "folklore" of philosophy, and, like folklore, it appears in countless forms. The fundamental characteristic of common sense consists in its being a disjointed, incoherent, and inconsequential conception of the world that matches the character of the multitudes whose philosophy it is. Historically, the formation of a homogeneous social group is accompanied by the development of a "homogeneous"—that is, systematic—philosophy, in opposition to common sense. The main components of common sense are provided by religions—not only by the religion that happens to be dominant at a given time but also by previous religions, popular heretical movements, scientific concepts from the past, etc. "Realistic, materialistic" elements predominate in

common sense, but this does not in any way contradict the religious element. These elements are "acritical" and "superstitious." Herein lies one of the dangers represented by the *Popular Manual*: it often reinforces these acritical elements that are grounded in mere direct perception—which is why common sense has remained "Ptolemaic," anthropomorphic, and anthropocentric.

"Common sense" has been treated more extensively in French philosophical culture than in other cultures. This is due to the "popular-national" character of French culture. In France, more than elsewhere and because of specific historical conditions, the intellectuals tend to approach the people in order to guide it ideologically and keep it linked with the leading group. One should therefore be able to find in French literature a lot of useful material on common sense. The attitude of French philosophical culture toward "common sense" might even provide a model of hegemonic cultural construction. English and American culture might also offer many cues, but not in the same complete and organic sense as the French. "Common sense" has been treated in two ways: (1) it has been placed at the base of philosophy; (2) it has been criticized from the point of view of another philosophy. In reality, however, the result in each case has been to surmount one particular "common sense" in order to create another that is more compliant with the conception of the world of the leading group.

Croce's attitude toward "common sense": it seems unclear to me. The thesis that "all men are philosophers" has thus far weighed too heavily on Croce's judgment concerning "common sense." Croce often seems to take pleasure in the fact that certain philosophical propositions are shared by common sense.¹ But what can this mean, concretely? In order to prove that "all men are philosophers," there is no need to resort to common sense in this way. Common sense is a disorderly aggregate of philosophical conceptions in which one can find whatever one likes. Furthermore, Croce's attitude toward common sense has not led to a cultural attitude that is fruitful from a "popular-national" point of view. In other words, Croce's attitude has not led to a more concretely historicist conception of philosophy—but that, in any case, can only be found in historical materialism. Works by Léon Brunschvicg: *Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique*; *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique*; *Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale*; *La connaissance de soi*; *Introduction à la vie de l'esprit*. I quote from an article by Henri Gouhier on Brunschvicg in the *Nouvelles Littéraires* of 17-10-1931: "Il n'y a qu'un seul et même mouvement de spiritualisation, qu'il s'agisse de mathématiques, de physique, de biologie, de philosophie et de morale; c'est l'effort par lequel l'esprit se débarrasse du sens commun et de sa métaphysique spontanée qui pose un monde de choses sensibles réelles et l'homme au milieu de ce monde."²

Cf. Notebook 11, §13.

§<174>. *On the Popular Manual*. Can one derive a critique of metaphysics from the *Popular Manual*? It seems to me that the author fails to grasp the very concept of metaphysics, inasmuch as the concept of movement in history, of becoming, and therefore of the dialectic eludes him. To think of an affirmation as true in a particular historical period—that is, as the necessary and inseparable expression of a particular action, a particular praxis—but “false” in a subsequent period is a very difficult thing to do without falling into skepticism and relativism (moral and ideological opportunism). The author is unable to avoid dogmatism and therefore metaphysics; in fact, his entire book is vitiated by dogmatism and metaphysics. This is evident from the outset, from the way he frames the issue of the possibility of constructing a “sociology” of Marxism. In this case, sociology means, precisely, metaphysics. In one of his notes, the author tries without success to respond to the objection of certain theorists who maintain that historical materialism can live only in concrete works of history.¹ He is unable to elaborate the concept of historical materialism as a “historical methodology” and the concept of “historical methodology” as a “philosophy”—as the only concrete philosophy. In other words, he fails to pose and to resolve, from the point of view of historical materialism, the problem that Croce has raised and has attempted to resolve from the viewpoint of idealism. Instead of a “historical methodology” or a “philosophy,” the author constructs a sociology, a casebook of problems that are conceptualized and resolved dogmatically or empirically. It seems that, in the author’s mind, “metaphysics” means a specific philosophic formulation rather than any formulation of solutions that posits itself as an abstract universal outside time and space.

Cf. Notebook 11, §14.

§<175>. *Gentile*. See his article “La concezione umanistica del mondo” (in the body of the periodical, the printed title is “La concezione umanistica nel mondo,” but in the table of contents the “nel” is “del”), in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 June 1931.¹ The article begins as follows: “Philosophy could be defined as a great effort by reflective thought to ascertain critically the truths of common sense and of naive consciousness; of those truths that all men can be said to feel naturally and that constitute the solid structure of the mentality that helps man deal with life.” This, it seems to me, is another example of the disordered crudity of Gentile’s thought. It is “naively” derived from some assertions by Croce on how popular ways of thinking confirm the validity of certain philosophical propositions. The quotation can be used in the sequence of notes on “common sense.” (Giusti’s epigram: “Good sense that was once the leading light / In our schools is now completely dead / Science, its little child / Killed it to see how it

was made."² One should consider whether it was not necessary for science to kill traditional "good sense" in order to create a new "good sense.") Thus Gentile talks of an ahistorical "human nature" and of the "truth of common sense," as if one couldn't find whatever one wanted in "common sense" and as if there were just one, immutable, eternal "common sense." The phrase "common sense" is used in a variety of ways; for ex., by way of contrast to the abstruseness, the convolutions, and the obscurity of scientific and philosophical expositions—in other words, as a "style," etc. Gentile's article can yield other pearls, such as when he goes on to say: "A sound man believes in God and in the freedom of his spirit." In this statement alone, we already find ourselves facing two "common senses": a "common sense" of the sound man and a "common sense" of the sick man. (And what does he mean by "sound man"? Physically sound? Or one who is not mad?, etc.)³ When Marx alludes to "fixed popular opinion," he is making a historical-cultural reference in order to point out the "solidity of beliefs" and their effectiveness in regulating human behavior;⁴ implicitly, however, he is affirming the need for "new popular beliefs," that is, for a new "common sense" and thus for a new culture, a new philosophy.

Cf. Notebook 11, §13.

§<176>. *The "new" science.* "While we were reflecting on the unsurpassed minuteness of these research methods, we recalled the statement made by one of the participants at the last Philosophy Congress at Oxford. According to Borgese, this person, when talking about the infinitesimal phenomena that are now attracting everyone's attention, pointed out that 'they cannot be said to exist independently of the subject that observes them.' These are words that induce many thoughts and, from a completely new set of perspectives, bring back into play the big problems of the subjective existence of the universe and of the meaning of sensory information in scientific thought." This is what Mario Camis wrote in his note "Scienze biologiche e mediche: Gösta Ekehorn, *On the Principles of Renal Function*, Stockholm, 1931," in the *Nuova Antologia* of 1 November 1931, p. 131.¹ The curious thing is that in this very same article Camis implicitly explains why the assertion that Borgese raved about [could and] should be interpreted in a metaphorical and not in a philosophical sense.² The discussion here is about items so minute that they cannot be described (relatively speaking) in words [to other people] and that therefore the scientist cannot abstract from his own subjective personality. Every single research scientist has to arrive at a perception using his own methods, directly. Ekehorn pierces a glomerule of frog's kidney with a cannula, "the preparation of which requires work of such fineness and *depends so much on the indefinable and inimitable manual intuitions* of the research sci-

entist that Ekehorn himself, when describing how the glass capillary tube needs to be cut obliquely, says that he is unable to give verbal instructions and has to content himself with providing vague indications."³ If it were true that the infinitesimally small phenomena [discussed here] "cannot be said to exist independently of the subject that observes them," they would not be "observed" but "created," and they would belong to the sphere of personal intuition. In that case, the object of science would not be the phenomena but, rather, these intuitions—like "works of art." If the phenomenon is repeated and can be *observed* by various scientists independently of one another, the assertion would mean only one thing: metaphor is used in order to indicate the difficulties inherent in the description and representation of the phenomena themselves. The difficulty can be accounted for by: (1) the lack of literary skill of scientists who have been *didactically* trained to describe and represent macroscopic phenomena; (2) the inadequacy of ordinary language, fashioned for macroscopic phenomena; (3) the relatively slender development of these submicroscopic sciences that are awaiting a further development of their methods in order to be understood by the *many* through literary communication (not through direct experimental observation).

This transitory phase of science produces a form of "sophistry" that recalls the classical sophisms of Achilles and the tortoise, the heap and the grain, etc.—sophisms that nonetheless represented a phase in the development of philosophy and logic. (See the earlier note on the same topic: Borgese-Eddington, etc.)⁴

Cf. Notebook 11, §36.

§<177>. "*Objective*" reality. What does "objective" mean? Does it not mean "humanly objective" and therefore also *humanly* "subjective"? It follows, then, that *objective* means *universal subjective*. In other words: the subject knows objectively insofar as knowledge is real for the whole human race *historically* unified in a unitary cultural system. The struggle for objectivity is thus the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race. This unification process is the process of the objectivization of the subject, who becomes increasingly a concrete universal, historically concrete. Experimental science is the terrain on which this objectivization has reached its maximum realization; it is the cultural element that has contributed the most to unifying humanity. It is the most objectivized and concretely universalized subjectivity.

In vulgar materialist philosophy, the concept "objective" appears to mean an objectivity that transcends man and can be known even apart from man—this is just a banal form of mysticism and nebulous abstraction. When it is said of a *thing* that it would exist even if man did not,

one is either speaking metaphorically or falling into mysticism. We know phenomena in relation to man, and since man is a becoming, knowledge is a becoming, as well, and so is objectivity, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §17.

§<178>. *Gentile*. On Gentile's philosophy, see the article "Cultura e filosofia dell'ignoto," in *La Civiltà Cattolica* (16 August 1930),¹ which is interesting because it shows how scholastic logic can be used to criticize some banal sophism of actualism that presents itself as the perfection of the dialectic. Now why should formal dialectics be superior to formal logic? Often this is a case of "instruments" that are much cruder than those of formal logic. It would therefore be interesting to read the neo-scholastic critiques of Gentile.

Cf. Notebook 11, §6.

§<179>. *The ethical or cultural state*. The most sensible and concrete thing that can be said about the ethical and the cultural state, in my view, is this: every state is ethical insofar as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a certain cultural and moral level, a level (or type) that corresponds to what the productive forces need in order to develop—and hence a level that corresponds to the interests of the ruling classes. The school, with its positive educative function, and the courts, with their repressive and negative educative function, are the most important state activities in this regard. In reality, though, numerous other so-called private initiatives and activities have the same goal, and they constitute the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes. Hegel's conception belonged to a period when the widespread growth of the bourgeoisie might have seemed limitless, and therefore one could affirm its ethical and universal character: the entire human race will be bourgeois.¹ But, in reality, only the social group whose declared aspiration is the end of the state and of itself can create an ethical state—a state whose aim is to put an end to the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally unitary social organism.

§<180>. *Past and present. Great ideas*. Great ideas and vague formulas. Ideas are great to the degree that they are feasible. Great ideas, in other words, make a relation that is immanent in the situation clear, and they do so to the extent that they show concretely the course of action by means of which an organized collective

brings that relation into the open (creates it) or, having brought it into the open, destroys it by replacing it. Windbags with grand schemes are incapable of perceiving the relation between the "great idea" that is put forward and concrete reality; they are unable to establish a concrete course of action for the realization of the idea. The first-rate statesman intuits both the idea and the concrete process of its realization simultaneously: he draws up the project together with the "regulations" for carrying it out. The windbag grand schemer proceeds along the lines of "try and try again"; his is the kind of activity about which it is said, "doing and undoing is a job in itself." What does it mean that in the "idea" the project must be linked to regulations? That the project has to be understood by every active element in such a way that everyone can see what his role is in the carrying out of the project and bringing it to fruition; that in suggesting an action, the project also enables one to foresee the positive and negative consequences of endorsing it and of reacting against it, and the project contains in it the response to these endorsements and reactions and thus provides the basis of organization. This is an aspect of the unity of theory and practice.

Corollary: every great politician is also bound to be a great administrator; every great strategist a great tactician; every great theorist a great organizer. In fact, this can be a criterion of evaluation: the theorist, the author of plans, is to be judged by his skills as an administrator. To administer means to foresee which actions and operations—even the "molecular" (and of course the most complex) ones—are needed to realize the plan.

Naturally, the opposite is also true: one must be able to trace a necessary action back to its corresponding principle. From a critical point of view, this process is of the utmost importance. Judgment is based on deeds, not words. State constitutions > laws > regulations: it is the regulations or, rather, their application (carried out by virtue of circulars) that reveal the true political and juridical structure of a country and a state.

§<181>. *Hegelianism in France*. A. Koyré's "Rapport sur l'état des études hégéliennes en France" is reproduced in the *Verhandlungen des ersten Hegelskongresses, vom 22 bis 25 April 1930 im Haag*, Mohr, Tübingen, 1931, in 8° gr., 243pp. Among other things, Koyré talks of "Lucien Herr, who spent twenty-five years of his life studying Hegel's thought and who died before he was able to write the book that he planned to give us and that

would have occupied a place alongside the books of Delbos and Xavier Léon"; but he did leave us an essay in the form of the remarkably lucid and insightful article on Hegel published in the *Grande Encyclopédie*.¹ Charles Andler has published "Vie de Lucien Herr" in *Europe* of 15 October 1931 and subsequent issues. Andler wrote: "Lucien Herr est présent dans tout le travail scientifique français depuis plus de quarante ans, et son action a été décisive dans la formation du socialisme en France."²

Cf. Notebook 11, §4.

§<182>. *Structure and superstructures*. The structure and the superstructures form a "historical bloc." In other words, the complex and discordant³ ensemble of the superstructures reflects the ensemble of the social relations of production. From this, one can conclude that only a comprehensive system of ideologies rationally reflects the contradiction of the structure and represents the existence of the objective conditions for revolutionizing praxis. If a group is formed that ideologically is 100 percent homogeneous, it means that the premises for this revolutionizing exist at 100 percent—the "rational" is actively and actually real. This reasoning is based on the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructures (a reciprocity that is, precisely, the real dialectical process).

§<183>. *Dialectics*. See the booklet *Dialetica* by Fathers Liberatore and Corsi S.J., Naples, Tip. Commerciale, 1930, in 8°, 80 pp., L. 7.¹ It consists of extracts from the work of the renowned Jesuit polemicist Father Liberatore. It may be interesting for establishing what the scholastics mean by "dialectics."

Cf. Notebook 11, §41.

§<184>. *Formal logic*. Cf. Mario Govi, *Fondazione della Metodologia. Logica ed Epistemologia*, Turin, Bocca, 1929, 579 pp.¹ Govi is a positivist; his book is part of the effort to revive the old positivism and create a neopositivism. This effort, it seems, is comparable to that of mathematician-philosophers like Bertrand Russell.² What "mathematics" is to Russell, "methodology" is to Govi, that is, the construction of a new formal logic, divorced from any content, even when he is dealing with the various

¹ In this manuscript, directly above the word "discordant," Gramsci inserted the word "contradictory."

sciences, which are presented in their particular abstract (specialized but abstract) logic—what Govi calls “epistemology.” Govi in fact divides methodology into two parts: general methodology, or logic in the strict sense; and special methodology, or epistemology.

The primary and principal aim of epistemology is the exact knowledge of the specific cognitive goal toward which each different inquiry is directed, in order then to establish the means and procedures for attaining that goal. Govi reduces the number of different legitimate cognitive goals of human inquiry to three. These three goals constitute what is humanly knowable and cannot be reduced to one; in other words, they are fundamentally different. Two of them are final cognitive goals: theoretical knowledge, or knowledge of reality; and practical knowledge, or knowledge of what or what not to do. The third consists of the kinds of knowledge by means of which one acquires the other two. Epistemology is thus divided into three parts: theoretical science, or science of reality; practical science; and instrumental science. Out of this comes a whole analytical classification of the sciences. The concept of the *legitimate* occupies a very important place in Govi's system (it is part of general methodology, or the science of judgment). Every judgment, considered by itself, is either true or false; considered subjectively, as a product of the thinking activity of the one who makes it, the judgment is legitimate or illegitimate. A judgment can be known to be true or false only insofar as it is recognized to be legitimate or illegitimate. Judgments that are common to everyone (either because they are innate or made by all) and are formed in the same way by everyone are legitimate judgments. The following are therefore legitimate: primitive concepts that are naturally formed and without which thinking is impossible; methodologically formed scientific concepts; primitive judgments; and judgments derived methodologically from legitimate judgments. (This is obviously derived from Russell, with some methodological “seasoning” added. In Russell, the reference to mathematics makes the system less tiresome and confused.)

I have derived this outline from an article, “Metodologia o agnosticismo,” in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 15 November 1930.³ Govi's book seems to be interesting because of the historical material assembled in it, especially on the content of general and special logic; on the problem of knowledge and the theories on the origin of ideas; on the classification of the sciences and the various divisions of human knowledge; on the various conceptions and divisions of science as theoretical, practical, etc. Govi calls his philosophy “empiricist-integralist,” distinguishing it from the “religious” conception and from the “rationalist” conception, the leading example of which is Kantian philosophy. He also distinguishes it, albeit in a secondary way, from the “empiricist-particularist” conception, which is positivism. He differentiates himself from positivism in the sense that he refutes some of its excesses, specifically its negation not only of any religious or

rationalist metaphysics but also of the very possibility and legitimacy of metaphysics. Govi, for his part, accepts the legitimacy of metaphysics, but only if its foundations are purely empirical and if it is constructed in part from or on the basis of particular real sciences.

Cf. Notebook 11, §40.

§<185>. *The economic-corporative phase of the state.* If it is true that no type of state can avoid passing through a phase of economic-corporative primitivism, one can deduce that the content of the political hegemony of the new social group that has founded the new type of state must be predominantly of an economic order. This would entail the reorganization of the structure and of the real relations between people and the sphere of the economy or of production. The superstructural elements will inevitably be few in number; they will typify struggle and farsightedness, though the component parts of "plans" will still be meager. The cultural plan will be mostly negative: a critique of the past aimed at destruction and erasure of memory. Constructive policy will be still at the level of "broad outlines," sketches that could (and should) be changed at all times in order to be consistent with the structure as it takes shape. This, however, did not happen during the period of the communes. Instead, culture remained the function of the church; its character was, indeed, antieconomic (against the nascent capitalist economy); and its thrust was to prevent rather than enable the acquisition of hegemony by the new class. Humanism and the Renaissance were thus reactionary; they signaled the defeat of the new class, the negation of the economic world characterized by the new class, etc.

§<186>. *On the Popular Manual.* The philosophy of the *Popular Manual* is pure [positivistic] Aristotelianism. It is, in other words, a new adaptation of formal logic in accordance with the methods of the natural sciences: the dialectic is replaced by the law of causality; abstract classification by sociology, etc. If "idealism" is the science of the a priori categories of the spirit—that is, a form of antihistoricist abstraction—this popular manual is idealism turned upside down, in the sense that it replaces the categories of the spirit with empirical categories that are equally a priori and abstract. [*Causality* and not dialectics. The search for the law of "regularity,

normality, uniformity," without the possibility of supersedure because, in mechanical terms, the effect can never supersede the cause.]

Cf. Notebook 11, §14.

§<187>. *Intellectuals*. The position that Hegel ascribed to the intellectuals has been of great importance, not only in the conception of politics [political science] but also in the entire conception of cultural and spiritual life; this must be studied in detail. With the advent of Hegel, thinking in terms of castes and "states" started to give way to thinking in terms of the "state," and the aristocrats of the state are precisely the intellectuals. The "patrimonial" conception of the state (that is, thinking in terms of "castes") was what Hegel needed to destroy (disparaging and sarcastic polemics against von Haller) before anything else.¹ Unless one takes into account Hegel's "valorization" of the intellectuals, it would be impossible to understand anything (historically) about modern idealism and its social roots.

§<188>. *The intellectuals. The organization of cultural life*. Study the history of the formation and activities of the Società Italiana per il progresso della Scienza. Study also the history of the British Association, which, I believe, was the prototype for private organizations of this sort.¹ The most fruitful characteristic of the Società Italiana lies in the fact that it brings together all the "friends of science," professionals and laymen, specialists and "amateurs." It is the embryonic type of the kind of entity I have sketched out in other notes, an entity in which the work of the academies and the universities will have to be consolidated and merged with the scientific cultural needs of the national-popular masses, thus uniting theory and practice, intellectual and industrial labor—an entity that might find its root in the *common school*.²

The same can be said of the touring club, which is basically a broad association of people who like geography and travel—it integrates the two areas of interest in certain sporting activities (tourism = geography + sport). This is the most popular and amateur form of the love of geography and the sciences related to it (geology, mineralogy, botany, speleology, crystallography, etc.). Why then should the touring club not be organically linked with the

geographical societies and institutes? There is the international question: the touring club operates within essentially a national framework, whereas the geographical societies are concerned with the whole geographical world. Connection of tourism with sports societies, with mountain climbing, canoeing, etc., and with excursion activities in general; connection with the figurative arts and art history in general. In fact, it could establish connections with practical activities of all kinds, if national and international trips were linked with periods of days off (as a reward) for work in industry and agriculture.

§<189>. *Formal logic and methodology*. Formal logic or abstract methodology is the "philology" of philosophy;^a it is the "erudition" (the method of erudition) of history. Aesthetics and philology as dialectics and formal logic. But these comparisons fail to provide an exact idea of the place occupied by formal logic. The best comparison would be with mathematics, but that is also a source of countless errors because it gives rise to an infinite extension of logic and of logical or methodological figures. Mathematics has been capable of great advances in various directions (geometry, algebra, different types of calculus) that cannot be emulated by formal logic since formal logic cannot and must not develop beyond the limits of immediate necessity (whereas mathematics cannot be limited). (A concept for further study.)

Cf. Notebook 11, §42.

§<190>. *The concept of the state*. In the introduction to his little book *Technique du coup d'État*, Curzio Malaparte seems to assert the equivalence of the formula "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state" with the proposition "Where there is freedom, there is no state."¹ In the latter proposition, the term "freedom" is not used in the normal sense of "political freedom," "freedom of the press," etc., but as the opposite of "necessity," and it is related to what Engels said on the passage from the rule of necessity to the rule of freedom.² Malaparte does not have even the faintest notion of what the proposition means.

^a In this manuscript, directly above the words "of philosophy," Gramsci inserted the phrase "of thought."

§<191>. *Hegemony and democracy*. Among the many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and concrete one, in my view, is that which can be brought into relief through the connection between democracy and the concept of hegemony. In the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the leading group and the groups that are led to the extent that [the development of the economy and thus] the legislation [which is an expression of that development] favors the [molecular] transition from the groups that are led to the leading group. In the Roman Empire, an imperial-territorial democracy existed in the form of the granting of citizenship to conquered peoples, etc. In feudalism, democracy was impossible because of the establishment of exclusive groups, etc.

§<192>. *Originality and intellectual order*. A maxim by Vauvenargues: "It is easier to say original things than to reconcile things that have already been said."¹

Cf. Notebook 11, §55.

§<193>. *Relations between city and country*. To obtain data on the relation between industrial nations and agrarian nations and thus get some ideas concerning the situation of the semicolonies of agrarian countries (and the internal colonies in capitalist countries), see the book by [Mihail] Manoilescu, *La teoria del protezionismo e dello scambio internazionale*, Milan, [Treves], 1931. Manoilescu writes that "the product of the labor of one industrial worker is, in general, always exchanged for the product of the labor of several agricultural workers; the average ratio is one to five."¹ For this reason, Manoilescu speaks of an "invisible exploitation" of agricultural countries by industrial countries. Manoilescu is the current governor of the Romanian National Bank, and his book is an expression of the ultraprotectionist leanings of the Romanian bourgeoisie.

§<194>. *Formal logic*. See the book by Tobias Dantzig, professor of mathematics at the University of Maryland: *Le nombre* (Payot, Paris, 1931—or 1932), a history of numbers and the subsequent development of mathematical methods, concepts, and research.¹

Cf. Notebook 11, §43.

§<195>. *The proposition that "society does not set itself problems for whose solution the material preconditions do not already exist."*¹ This proposition immediately raises the problem of the formation of a collective will. In analyzing critically what this proposition means, it is important to study how permanent collective wills are in fact formed and how these wills set themselves concrete goals that are both immediate and intermediate—in other words, how they set themselves a collective course of action. This has to do with processes of development that are more or less long; sudden, "synthetic" explosions are rare. "Synthetic" explosions do occur, but looking at them closely one sees that they are more destructive than constructive; they remove external and mechanical obstacles to autochthonous and spontaneous development—the Sicilian Vespers can be taken as an example.

One could undertake a concrete study of the formation of a collective historical movement, analyzing it in all its molecular phases. This is rarely done for fear that it would weigh down any analysis. Instead, it is customary to study currents of opinion that are already formed around a group or a dominant personality. This is an issue that in modern times is expressed in terms of party or coalition of kindred parties: how a party is initially formed, how its organizational strength and social influence grow, etc. A study of this kind entails an extremely minute, molecular process of exhaustive, capillary analysis. The documentation it requires consists of an enormous number of books, pamphlets, newspaper and journal articles, conversations and oral debates endlessly repeated; in their gigantic ensemble, they represent the intense activity that gives birth to a collective will with a certain degree of homogeneity—the degree of homogeneity that is necessary and sufficient to generate an action that is coordinated and simultaneous in the time and geographical space in which the historical event takes place.

Importance of utopias and of confused and rationalistic ideologies in the initial phase of the historical processes thorough which collective wills are formed. Utopias or abstract rationalism have the same importance as old conceptions of the world that were historically elaborated through the accumulation of successive experiences. What matters is the criticism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first representatives of the new historical phase. This criticism results in a process of differentiation and of change in the relative weight that the adherents of the old ide-

ologies used to possess. What was once considered secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, comes to be seen as primary and becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will break up into its contradictory component parts, because those parts of it that were subordinate develop socially, etc.

Following the formation of the party system, a historical phase linked to the standardization of huge masses of the population (communications, newspapers, big cities, etc.), the pace of the molecular processes is faster than in the past, etc.

§<196>. *The Popular Manual*. One thing worth noting about many references in the *Manual* is the failure to recognize the possibility of error on the part of the individual authors who are cited. This is related to a broader methodological criterion: it is not very "scientific," or it is simply not "very serious," to choose from among all one's adversaries the most stupid and mediocre ones, or to choose the least essential and the most occasional of their opinions, and then to presume to have destroyed the enemy "completely" just because one has destroyed a secondary and occasional opinion of his—or to presume to have destroyed an ideology or a doctrine with a demonstration of the theoretical deficiencies of its third- or fourth-rate proponents. Furthermore, one must be fair to one's enemies, in the sense that one must make an effort to understand what they really meant to say and not dwell on the superficial immediate meaning of their expressions. It has to be so, if the proposed goal is to raise the tone and intellectual level of one's followers, as opposed to the immediate goal of using every means possible to create a desert around oneself. The approach that must be adopted is this: one's follower has to be able to discuss and uphold his position when faced with capable and intelligent adversaries and not just with unsophisticated and unprepared people who are convinced "by authority" or by "emotion." The possibility of error must be declared and accepted without thereby compromising one's position. What matters is not the opinion of Tom, Dick, and Harry but the ensemble of opinions that have become collective and a powerful factor in society. It is these collective opinions that must be refuted by confronting their most representative theoretical exponents—those most worthy of respect for the high caliber of their thought and for their "disinterestedness" in immediacy. It would be wrong to believe, however, that just by doing so one has destroyed the corresponding social component and its strength in society (which would be pure enlightenment rationalism). Rather, one would have only contributed to: (1) maintaining the spirit of cleavage and differentiation among one's own ranks; and (2) creating the

ground for one's own side to absorb and activate an original doctrine of its own, corresponding to its conditions of life.

Cf. Notebook 11, §15.

§<197>. *The Popular Manual*. The point of departure, the way the problem is posed: as a search for laws, for constant, regular, and uniform lines. This is linked to the problem of the predictability of historical events. The perspective of abstract natural sciences. The only predictable thing is the struggle, but not its concrete moments brought about by continuous movement of the balance of forces that are not reducible to a fixed quantity. This is not dialectics but purely mechanical causal thinking. Predictability applies only to broad generalizations; it corresponds to the general laws of probability, to the law of large numbers. It is the concept of "science" itself as it appears in the *Popular Manual* that must be criticized; it is taken root and branch from the natural sciences, or from certain natural sciences, along with their positivistic conception.

Cf. Notebook 11, §15.

§<198>. *Philosophy of praxis*. In *Conversazioni Critiche*, First Series, pp. 298ff., Croce analyzes some propositions from the *Glosses on Feuerbach* to arrive at the conclusion that one cannot speak of Marx as a philosopher and therefore one cannot speak of a Marxist philosophy since what Marx proposed was, precisely, to turn philosophy upside down—not just Hegel's philosophy but philosophy as a whole—and to replace philosophizing with practical activity, etc.¹ But Croce appears to be objectively wrong, and his criticism is unsatisfactory. Suppose that Marx wanted to supplant philosophy with practical activity: why, then, did not Croce resort to the peremptory argument that philosophy cannot be negated except through philosophizing, which would reaffirm that which one is seeking to negate? It is true that, in a note in his book *Materialismo storico, etc.*, Croce himself explicitly acknowledges that Antonio Labriola was justified in pointing out the need to construct a "philosophy of praxis" on the basis of Marxism.² If one were to examine, as one large whole, everything that Croce has written both systematically and en passant on Marxism, one would become aware of how incoherent and contradictory he is from one text to another and in the various stages of his career as a writer.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §31.i.

§<199>. *Unity of theory and practice*. Research, study, and critique the various forms in which the concept of the unity of theory and practice has been presented in the history of ideas. "Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus" [by St. Thomas]: theory by simple extension becomes practice—an affirmation of the necessary connection between the order of ideas and the order of facts that is found in Aristotelian philosophy and in scholasticism.¹ Likewise, the other aphorism [on science (by Leibniz) that is quoted as]: "quo magis speculativa magis practica."² Vico's proposition "verum ipsum factum,"³ which Croce develops in the idealistic sense, namely, that knowing is doing and that one knows that which one does (cf. Croce's book on Vico and other polemical writings by Croce).⁴ Historical materialism is certainly indebted to this concept (as originally found in Hegel and not in its Crocean derivation).

Cf. Notebook 11, §54.

§<200>. *Antonio Labriola*. In order to compose a thorough study on Antonio Labriola,¹ one needs to take into account, among other things, the bits and pieces of conversations that have been reported by his friends and students. A number of them can be found scattered in Croce's books. For example, in *Conversazioni Critiche* (Second Series), pp. 60–61: "How would you go about the moral education of a Papuan?" one of our fellow students asked Prof. Labriola years ago during one his lectures on pedagogy; the student was arguing against the effectiveness of pedagogy. The Herbartian professor replied,² with the harshness of a Vico or a Hegel: 'Provisionally, I would make him a slave, and that would be the pedagogy in his case; but then I'd want to see whether it would be possible to start using something of our pedagogy with his grandsons and great-grandsons.'³ This reply of Labriola's should be compared to the interview he gave on the colonial question (Libya) around 1903 that was published in the volume *Scritti vari di filosofia e politica*.⁴ It could also be compared to Gentile's way of thinking in organizing the reform of education that brought religion into the primary schools, etc.⁵ What we are dealing with here, it seems to me, is a form of pseudohistoricism, a mechanical and rather empiricist way of thinking. One might recall what Spaventa said about those who do not want men ever to leave the cradle (that is, ever to get out from under the sway of authority, which, however, also educates immature peoples to liberty) and who regard the whole of life (of other people's lives) as a cradle.⁶ It seems to me that historically the problem should be formulated differently, that is: whether a nation or social group that has reached a higher level of civilization can (and therefore should) "accelerate" the civil education of the more backward nations and social groups, universalizing its own experience. In short, it seems to me that the

mode of thinking encapsulated in Labriola's reply is not dialectical or progressive but somewhat reactionary. The introduction of religion in the elementary schools in fact goes hand in hand with the notion that "religion is good for the people" (people = child = backward stage of history that corresponds to religion, etc.)—which means renouncing the education of the people. This kind of historicism is well known: it is the historicism of the jurists, for whom the knout is not a knout when it is a "historical knout."⁷ Furthermore, this is very nebulous and confused thinking. The fact that a "dogmatic" exposition of scientific notions may be necessary in the elementary schools does not mean that dogma should also be taken to connote "religious" dogma. The fact that a backward people or group may need a coercive "external" discipline of a military kind in order to be educated in the ways of civilization does not mean that they should be reduced to slavery—unless one thinks that the state is always "slavery," even for the class of which it is an expression, etc. The concept of a "labor army,"⁸ for instance, provides an example of the type of "pedagogy" appropriate for the "Papuan"; there is no need to resort to "slavery" or to colonialism as a "mechanically" inevitable historical stage, etc. With his sarcasm, Spaventa, who looked at things from the standpoint of the liberal bourgeoisie against the "historicist" sophisms of the reactionary classes, expressed an idea that was much more progressive and dialectical.

Cf. Notebook 11, §1.

§<201>. *The Popular Manual. On art.* The section devoted to art contains a statement to the effect that even the most recent works on aesthetics assert the unity of form and content.¹ This can be taken as one of the most glaring examples of the critical inability to establish the history of concepts and to identify the real significance of the concepts themselves in the cultural sphere. In fact, the identification of content with form is affirmed by idealist aesthetics (Croce), based on idealist premises and terminology. Therefore, neither "content" nor "form" means what the *Manual* supposes. The identity of form and content means nothing more than the fact that in art the content is not the "abstract subject"—that is, the novelistic plot or some generic complex of sentiments. Rather, the content of art is art itself, a philosophical category, a "distinct moment" of the spirit, etc. Nor does form mean "technique," as the *Manual* supposes, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §19.

§<202>. *The Popular Manual.* What can "science" be taken to mean when dealing with the *Manual*? And when is the concept of "science"

upheld—or, better still, implicit—in the *Manual* not acceptable? It can be taken to mean method, but it cannot mean method in general, which does not exist or is just philosophy in general (for some) and for others is formal logic or the mathematical method. Method, then, would have to mean a specific method that pertains to a specific field of research, a specific science, a method that has developed and been elaborated in tandem with the development and the elaboration of the same specific field of research and science, so that they are inseparable. There are, however, some general criteria that can be said to constitute the critical consciousness of the scientist and should always be vigilant and spontaneous in his work. Thus one can say someone is not a scientist if he is unsure about his criteria; if he does not fully grasp the concepts he is using; if he has a poor understanding of the history of the problems he is dealing with; if he is not very cautious in his assertions; if he does not proceed in the required manner but is arbitrary and illogical; if, instead of taking into account the gaps that exist in the current state of knowledge, he silently ignores them and contents himself with purely verbal solutions and connections, without saying anything about the provisional nature of his positions, which may be taken up again, developed, etc. Every one of these points can be developed with appropriate examples, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §15.

§<203>. *History and antihistory*. Note that the current debate on “history and antihistory” is nothing other than the repetition, in the language of modern culture, of the debate that took place at the end of the last century in the language of naturalism and positivism; in other words, the debate about whether history and nature proceed by “leaps” or only by gradual and progressive evolution.¹

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §28.

§<204>. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*. [(Cf. ntbk. III, p. 5 verso)]^{1a} In preparing an introduction to the study of philosophy, certain preliminary principles need to be kept in mind: (1) One must destroy the prejudice that philosophy is a difficult thing just because it is the specific activity of a particular category of learned people, of professional or systematic philosophers. It is therefore necessary to show that all men are philosophers, by defining the characteristics of this [“spontaneous”]

¹ Gramsci added this parenthetical cross-reference at a later time. In the manuscript, it is inserted directly above the first three words of the note.

philosophy that is "everyone's," namely, common sense and religion. Having shown that everyone, in his own way, is a philosopher, that no normal human being of sound mind exists who does not participate, even if unconsciously, in some particular conception of the world, since every "language" is a philosophy—having shown this, one moves on to the second stage, which is that of criticism and consciousness. Is it preferable to "think" without being conscious of doing so, in a disjointed and inconsistent manner? Is it preferable to "participate" in a conception of the world "imposed" from the outside by some social group (which can range from one's village to one's province or can come from one's parish priest, or the old patriarch whose "wisdom" is law, or the little old woman who practices witchcraft, or the minor intellectual embittered by his own stupidity and ineffectiveness)? Or is it preferable to elaborate consciously and critically one's own conception of the world and, through the labors of one's own intellect, choose one's sphere of activity, participate actively in the creation of universal history, etc.?

(2) Religion, common sense, philosophy. Find out how these three intellectual orders are connected. Note that religion and common sense do not coincide, but religion is a component of disjointed common sense. There is not just one "common sense," but it, too, is a product of history and a historical process. Philosophy is the critique of religion and of common sense, and it supersedes them. In this respect, philosophy coincides with "good sense."

(3) Science and religion—common sense.

(4) Nor is there such a thing as "philosophy" in general; there are many philosophies, and it is necessary to choose among them. How does one choose? On what criteria is one's choice based? Why is it that many philosophical systems and currents coexist in every period? How are they born and how do they spread? Why do they fracture along certain lines and directions as they become widespread?

(5) The systemization of one's own conception of the world and one's life. Is this systemization important? And what should one take "system" to mean?

(6) Transcendence. Immanence, absolute historicism. Significance and importance of the history of philosophy.

(7) Is philosophy independent from politics? Ideology and philosophy (see no. 4).

Cf. Notebook 11, §12.

§<205>. *Mechanistic determinism and action-will*. A propos of the study by Mirsky^a on recent philosophical debates.¹ How a mechanistic conception changed into an activist conception—this is, therefore, a polemic against mechanistic thought. The “deterministic, fatalistic, mechanistic” element was a mere ideology, an ephemeral superstructure from the very beginning. What justified it and made it necessary was the “subaltern” character of certain social groups. For those who do not have the initiative in the struggle and for whom, therefore, the struggle ends up being synonymous with a series of defeats, mechanical determinism becomes a formidable force of moral resistance, of cohesion, of patient perseverance. “I am defeated, but in the long run history is on my side.” It is an “act of faith” in the rationality of history transmuted into an impassioned teleology that is a substitute for the “predestination,” “providence,” etc., of religion. In reality, though, even in this case, the will is active; it intervenes directly in the “force of circumstances,” albeit in a more covert and veiled manner. But when the subaltern becomes leader and is in charge, the mechanistic conception will sooner or later represent an imminent danger, and there will be a revision of a whole mode of thinking because the mode of existence will have changed. The reach and the ascendancy of the “force of circumstance” will diminish. Why? Basically, because the “subaltern” who yesterday was a “thing” is now no longer a “thing” but a “historical person”; whereas yesterday he was not responsible because he was “resisting” an extraneous will, he is now responsible, no longer a “resister” but an active agent. But was he ever mere “resistance,” mere “thing,” mere “nonresponsibility”? Certainly not. That is why the ineptitude and futility of mechanical determinism, of passive and smug fatalism must be exposed at all times, without waiting for the subaltern to become leader and take charge. Invariably, there is a part of the whole that is “always” in a position of leadership and responsibility, and the philosophy of the part always precedes the philosophy of the whole as a theoretical anticipation.

Cf. Notebook 11, §12.

§<206>. *Lange's history of materialism*. This book by Lange may be rather useful even today (after almost three-quarters of a century—it is that old, I believe), although in the interim the history of philosophy has produced many new works, at least in the form of scholarly writings on individual materialist philosophers.¹ In any case, it remains useful for the study of the history of culture since a whole series of historians of materialism have turned to it for information on earlier works and on a number of concepts of materialism. A study has to be conducted to find out how

^a In this manuscript, Gramsci wrote “Mirschi.”

many and which concepts of historical materialism from a certain period were prompted by a reading of Lange's history. The search is made even more interesting by the fact that Lange's concept of materialism is quite precise and limited (for Lange, neither historical materialism nor even Feuerbach's philosophy is materialist).² Thus one will be able to see how terminology has its importance: errors and deviations ensue when one forgets that terminology is conventional and that one must always go back to cultural sources to identify the precise import of concepts, since different contents may nestle under a single conventional formula. It should be pointed out that Marx always avoided calling his conception "materialist" and whenever he spoke of materialist philosophies he criticized them and asserted that they are criticizable. Marx never used the formula "materialist dialectic"—he called it "rational" as opposed to "mystical," which gives the term "rational" a very precise meaning.

A notice appeared announcing an Italian translation of Lange's history to be published by the Casa Ed. Athena of Milan in small volumes for 5 lire each.³ Until now, the French edition has been the most widely circulated (there is no earlier Italian edition). [An edition has been published by Monanni of Milan.]^a

Cf. Notebook 11, §16.

§<207>. *Questions of terminology.* Is the concept of structure and superstructure—which is the basis for the saying that the "anatomy" of society is constituted by its "economy"¹—linked to the debates stirred up by the classification of animals, a classification that entered its "scientific" stage precisely when anatomy, rather than secondary and incidental characteristics, came to be regarded as fundamental? The origin of the metaphor that was used to refer to a newly discovered concept helps one to understand better the concept itself by tracing it back to the historically determined cultural world from which it sprang. There is no doubt that the social sciences have always tried to find an objective and scientifically suitable foundation that would give them the same self-assurance and vigor as the natural sciences; it is quite understandable, then, that they resorted to these sciences to create a language.

Recall the other point related to the development of the juridical sciences: "one cannot judge a historical epoch by what it thinks of itself,"² just as a judge cannot judge the accused by what the accused says to explain his criminal or allegedly criminal conduct.

Cf. Notebook 11, §50.

^a As is obvious from the context, Gramsci inserted the final parenthetical observation some time after he completed the rest of this note.

§<208>. *The [mutual] translatability of national cultures.* Marx's observation, in the *Holy Family*, that French political language is equivalent to German philosophical language is echoed by Carducci's lines, "Immanuel Kant decapitated God/And Maximilien Robespierre the king."¹ Apropos of this comparison by Carducci, Croce (*Conversazioni Critiche*, Second Series, p. 292) has gathered a number of very interesting "sources."² Carducci derived the motif from Heinrich Heine (book three of *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*, 1834).³ But Heine was not the first to compare Kant and Robespierre. Croce, who has researched the origin of the comparison, writes that he discovered a distant allusion to it in a letter of 21 July 1795 from Hegel to Schelling (*Briefe von und an Hegel*, Leipzig, 1887, I, 14–16), which Hegel later developed in his lectures on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of history. In the first set of lectures (on the history of philosophy), Hegel says that "in the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, the revolution to which in Germany mind has in these latter days advanced, was formally thought out and expressed." That is to say, in a great epoch of universal history, "two nations only have played a part, the German and the French, and this in spite of their absolute opposition, or rather because they are so opposite." So, whereas in Germany the new principle "has burst forth as thought, spirit, Notion," in France it has manifested itself "in the form of actuality" (*Vorles. Über die Gesch. D. Philos.*, 2d ed., Berlin, 1844, III, 485).⁴ In the lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel explains that according to the principle of formal will, of abstract freedom, "the simple unity of Self-consciousness, the Ego, constitutes the absolutely independent Freedom, and is the fountain of all general conceptions" and that "among the Germans this view assumed no other form than that of *tranquil theory*; but the French wished to give it practical effect" (*Vorles. Über die Philosophie der Gesch.*, 3d ed., Berlin, 1848, pp. 531–2).⁵ (This passage from Hegel is, I believe, the same one that Marx specifically refers to in the *Holy Family* when he cites Proudhon against Bauer.⁶ But the passage from Hegel, it seems to me, is much more important as the "source" of the view, expressed in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, that the philosophers have explained the world and the point now is to change it;⁷ in other words, that philosophy must become "politics" or "practice" in order for it to continue to be philosophy. The "source," then, of the theory of the unity of theory and practice.) A. Ravà, in his book *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia di Fichte* (Modena, Formiggini, 1909, pp.6–8n), draws Croce's attention to the fact that Baggesen had already juxtaposed the two revolutions in a letter to Reinhold, written as far back as 1791, and that Fichte's 1792 piece on the French Revolution is animated by this sense of affinity between philosophical writings and the political event. Ravà also observes that in 1794 Schaumann developed this comparison quite specifically, pointing out that the political revolution in France "makes the need for a fundamental determination of the rights of man felt

from the *outside*," while the philosophical reform in Germany "shows from the *inside* the sole means and way by which this need may be satisfied." The same comparison, according to Ravà, even inspired a 1797 satirical work against Kant's philosophy. Ravà concludes that "the comparison was prevalent." The comparison was repeated very often in the course of the 19th century (by Marx, for ex., in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*),⁸ and Heine helped spread it farther. In Italy, it appears some years before Carducci, in a letter of Bertrando Spaventa's, entitled "Paolottismo, positivismo e razionalismo," that was published in the *Rivista Bolognese* of May 1868 (reprinted in *Scritti filosofici*, ed. by Gentile, p. 301).⁹ Croce concludes by expressing some reservations about the comparison insofar as it is "an affirmation of a logical and historical relation." "For, if it is true that in the realm of events, the French Revolution responded quite well to Kant the natural law theorist, it is also true that the same Kant belongs to the philosophy of the eighteenth century that preceded and informed that political upheaval. On the other hand, the Kant who opens up the future, the Kant of the *synthesis a priori*, is the first link in a new philosophy, which goes beyond the philosophy incarnated in the French Revolution." Croce's reservation is understandable. The whole issue has to be revisited; the references provided by Croce and Ravà must be studied further, and others have to be tracked down so that they can be placed within the context of the issue under consideration here—namely, that two similar structures have equivalent and mutually translatable superstructures. Contemporaries of the French Revolution were aware of this, and that is of the greatest interest.

Cf. Notebook 11, §49.

§<209>. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people*. In his *Conversazioni critiche* (Second Series, pp. 300-301), Croce searches for the source of Matilde Serao's *Il paese di cuccagna* and finds it in a thought of Balzac's.¹ This is interesting also because it is the probable source of the expression "opium of the people" that was used by Marx,² who is known to have been a great admirer of Balzac and even intended to write a book on his literary work. In his 1841 novel *La Rabouilleuse*, later entitled *Un ménage de garçon*, in the course of writing on Madame Descoings, who for twenty-one years had bet on the same three numbers, the "novelist-philosopher and sociologist" comments: "Cette passion, si universellement condamnée, n'a jamais été étudiée. Personne n'y a vu l'opium de la misère. La loterie, la plus puissante fée du monde, ne développerait-elle pas des espérances magiques? Le coup de roulette qui faisait voir aux joueurs des masses d'or et de jouissances ne durait que ce que dure un éclair: tandis que la loterie donnait cinq jours d'existence à ce magnifique

éclair. Quelle est aujourd'hui, la puissance sociale qui peut, pour quarante sous, vous rendre heureux pendant cinq jours et vous livrer idéalement tous les bonheurs de la civilisation?"³ Croce had already pointed out that *Il paese di cuccagna* (1890) was generated by an idea found in a passage from Serao's other book, *Il ventre di Napoli* (1884),⁴ in which "the lottery is highlighted as 'the great dream of happiness' that the people of Naples 'dream over and over again every week,' living 'for six days in a growing hope that invades their lives and grows to such a point that it spills over the boundaries of real life'; the dream 'in which all they were once deprived of is now theirs: a clean house, healthy and fresh air, warm sunlight shining on the ground, a high white bed, a gleaming chest of drawers, meat and pasta every day, the litre of wine, the cradle for the baby, linen for the wife, and a new hat for the husband.'"⁵

(On Marx's admiration for Balzac, Lafargue wrote in his memoirs of Marx (cf. Riazanov's anthology, p. 114 of the French ed.): "He admired Balzac so much that he planned to write a critical essay on *La Comédie humaine*, etc.")⁶ [(See p. 75.)]⁷

Cf. Notebook 16, §1.

§<210>. *History and antihistory*. If the debate over history and antihistory is the same debate as the one over whether the processes of nature and history are invariably "evolutionary" or could also include "leaps," then Croce ought to be reminded that even the tradition of modern idealism is not against "leaps," that is, against "antihistory." (See the pertinent citations of Hegel in Plekhanov's article.)¹ This, after all, is the debate between reformists and revolutionaries over the concept and the fact of historical development and progress. The whole of historical materialism is a response to this question.

The question is posed badly. The real debate is over what is "arbitrary" and what is "necessary," what is "individual" and what is "social" or collective. Should one regard as "revolutions" all those movements that describe themselves as "revolutions" in order to endow themselves with dignity and legitimacy? There is an inflation of concepts and of revolutionary concepts. People believe that clothes make the man, that the cowl makes the monk. De Sanctis had noted this attitude with disdain in his essay on *L'Ebreo di Verona*.² The phraseology of "revolution" should be looked into to see whether it was purposely chosen in order to create the "will to believe" and whether it is a "creation" supported by truly solid "collateral" arguments (courts, police, etc.). It is absolutely true that all those Nietzschean charlatans, rebelling against the status quo, against social conventions, etc., have made certain attitudes nauseating and ridiculous, but one must not allow one's judgments to be shaped by these charlatans.

The advice on the need for "sobriety" in words and conduct is meant to foster greater substantial strength of character and concrete will. Against capriciousness, against abstractness, against swaggering, etc.—this is a question of habit and style, not a "theoretical" issue.

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §28.

§<211>. The term "*materialism*," in certain periods of the history of culture, should not be understood in its narrow technical philosophical sense but in the sense it acquired in the cultural polemics of the Encyclopedists. Every mode of thinking that excluded religious transcendence was labeled materialism. This included, in effect, all of pantheism and immanentism and, closer to our time, all forms of political realism as well. Even today, in Catholic polemics, the word is often used in this sense: whatever is not "spiritualism" in the strict sense—i.e., religious spiritualism—is materialism, and that includes Hegelianism and classical German philosophy in general, in addition to the philosophy of the Encyclopedists and the French Enlightenment. Likewise, in social life, any tendency to locate the purpose of life on this earth rather than in paradise is labeled materialism. It is interesting that this conception of materialism, which derives from feudal culture, is now used by modern industrialists against whom it was once directed. Any form of economic activity that went beyond the bounds of medieval production was "materialism" because it seemed to be "an end in itself," economics for the sake of economics, activity for the sake of activity, etc. (Traces of this conception can still be found in language: *geistlich*, which means "clerical" in German; similarly, *dukhoviez* in Russian; *direttore spirituale* in Italian—in short, spirit meant the Holy Spirit.)

One of the reasons, and perhaps the most important reason, for the reduction of historical materialism to traditional materialism resides in the fact that historical materialism could not but represent a primarily critical phase of philosophy, whereas there is a perennial demand for complete and perfect systems. Complete and perfect systems, however, are always the work of individual philosophers. The historically relevant aspect of these philosophical systems—namely, the aspect that corresponds to contemporary conditions of life—is always accompanied by an abstract component that is "ahistorical," in the sense that it is tied to earlier philosophies (thought that generates thought abstractly) because of external and mechanical systemic requirements (internal harmony and architecture of the system) and personal idiosyncrasies. But the philosophy of an epoch is not the philosophy of an individual or a group. It is the ensemble of the philosophies of all individuals and groups [+ scientific opinion] + religion + common sense. Can such a philosophy be created "artfully"? Through the

work of an individual or a group? The only possible way is through critical activity, and specifically through posing and critically resolving specific philosophical problems. In the meantime, though, one must start with the idea that the new philosophy is different from every previous philosophy, etc.

Cf. Notebook 11, §16.

§<212>. *Studies in economic history*. Recall the Einaudi-Croce polemic (Einaudi in *La Riforma Sociale*) following the publication in 1917 of the 4th edition of *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica* with its new preface.¹ It may be interesting to study the formation in different countries of the various scholarly and research trends in the field of socioeconomic history, as well as their orientations, etc. It is a well-known fact that in England there has been a school of thought in economic history with ties to classical economics. But have its subsequent developments been influenced by historical materialism or not? (Is Seligman's book part of such a trend?² And does it in fact express the need for such a trend to assess its relation with historical materialism?) Similarly, a juridical-economic current in France influenced historical materialism (Guizot, Thierry, Mignet)² and in turn was subsequently influenced by it (Henri Pirenne and the modern Frenchmen Henri Sée, Hauser, etc.).³ In Germany, the current is more closely tied to economics (with List),⁴ but Sombart has been influenced by historical materialism, etc.⁵ In Italy, closer ties with historical materialism (but influence of Romagnosi and Cattaneo).⁶

§<213>. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*.

<I.> *The problem of "the simple."* The strength of religions, and especially of Catholicism, resides in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the unity of the whole mass of believers and do their utmost to forestall the detachment of the upper echelons from the lower strata. The Roman church is the most relentless in the struggle to prevent the "official" formation of two religions, one for the intellectuals and another for the "simple." This has had and continues to have serious drawbacks, but these "drawbacks" are connected with the historical process that totally transforms civic life and not with the rational relationship between the intellectuals and the "simple." The weakness of immanentist philosophies in general consists precisely in the fact that they have been unable to cre-

ate an ideological unity between the bottom and the top, between the intellectuals and the mass (cf. the theme "Renaissance and Reformation"). The efforts of cultural movements "to go to the people"—the Popular Universities and the like—have always degenerated into forms of paternalism; besides, they utterly lacked coherence in philosophical thought as well as in organizational control. One got the impression that their efforts were like the contacts of English merchants with the Negroes of Africa, offering trinkets in exchange for nuggets of gold. Nevertheless, it is an effort worth studying; it had some success, in the sense that it responded to something people needed. The question is this: Should a movement be deemed philosophical just because it devotes itself to developing a specialized culture for a restricted group of intellectuals? Or is a movement philosophical only when, in the course of elaborating a superior and scientifically coherent form of thought, it never fails to remain in contact with the "simple" and even finds in such contacts the source of the issues that need to be studied and resolved? Only through this contact does a philosophy become "historical," cleanse itself of elements that are "individual" in origin, and turn itself into "life."

II. *Christian religion*. "Faith in a secure future, in the immortality of the soul destined to beatitude, in the certainty of attaining eternal happiness, motivated the intense effort to achieve inner perfection and spiritual nobility. This is what spurred true Catholic individualism to victory. All the strength of the Christian was gathered around this noble purpose. Freed from the flux of speculation that exhausts the soul with doubt and illuminated by immortal principles, man felt his hopes reborn; secure in the knowledge that a superior force supported him in the struggle against evil, he did violence to himself and conquered the world" ("Individualismo pagano e individualismo cristiano," in the *Civiltà Cattolica* of 5 March 1932).¹ In other words, in a certain historical period and in certain specific historical conditions, Christianity was "necessary" for progress; it was the specific form of the "rationality of the world and of life," and it provided the general framework for human practical activity. This passage should be compared with another one by Croce ("Religione e serenità" in *Etica e politica*).²

III. *Philosophy and common sense or good sense*. Perhaps it is useful to make a "practical" distinction between philosophy and common sense in order to be better able to show what one is trying to arrive at. Philosophy means, rather specifically, a conception of the world with salient individual traits. Common sense is the conception of the world that is most widespread among the popular masses in a historical period. One wants to change common sense and create a "new common sense"—hence the need to take the "simple" into account.

Cf. Notebook 11, §12.

§<214>. *The Popular Manual. Points on aesthetics and literary criticism.* Gather together all the points on aesthetics and literary criticism that are scattered in the *Popular Manual* and discuss them. One of those points is about Goethe's "Prometheus."¹ The views expressed on it are superficial and extremely generic. As far as one can tell, the author does not know the exact history of this ode of Goethe's, nor does he know the history of how the Prometheus myth was treated before Goethe and, particularly, in the period leading up to Goethe and in Goethe's own time. Without knowing these things, how can one express an opinion, as the author does? Without knowing these things, one cannot tell the difference between what is personal to Goethe and what is representative of an epoch and of a social group. Opinions of this kind are justified only to the extent that they are not generic but specific, precise, proven. Otherwise, they only serve to discredit a theory and to encourage slipshod, superficial types who believe that they know everything just because they can regurgitate formulas that have become clichéd and banal. (Always recall what Engels said in a letter to a student that was published in the *Sozialistische Akademiker*.)^{2a}

Cf. Notebook 11, §19.

(One can produce an exposition of the literary, artistic, and ideological fortunes of the Prometheus myth, examining what shape it takes in various periods and what ensemble of sentiments and ideas it serves to express synthetically in each case.) As far as Goethe is concerned, I recapitulate some basic points extracted from an article by Leonello Vincenti ("Prometeo," in the *Leonardo* of March 1932).³ Is Goethe's ode simply an effort to produce versified "mythology," or is it an expression of his actual, conscious attitude toward the divinity, toward the Christian god? In the autumn of 1773 (when he wrote "Prometheus"), Goethe definitely rebuffed his friend Lavater's efforts to convert him:⁴ "Ich bin kein Christ." A modern critic (H. A. Korff) observes (in Vincenti's words): "In order to appreciate the degree to which the ode is imbued with a revolutionary spirit, one need only think of those words as directed against a [!!] Christian God, and replace the name of Jove with the anonymous [!!] concept of God." (Opening lines of the ode: "Cover your heaven, Zeus, / With cloudy vapours / And like a boy / Beheading

¹ In the manuscript, there is no break between the end of this parenthesis and the opening of the next. The segment of this note reproduced above, however, is crossed out; Gramsci incorporated it, with some modifications, into Notebook 11, §19. The rest of the note was left intact, and the contents were not reused in any other note.

thistles/Practice on oaks and mountain peaks—/Still you must leave my earth intact/And my small hovel, which you did not build,/And this my hearth/Whose glowing heat/You envy me./I know of nothing more wretched/Under the sun than you gods!"⁵

Goethe's religious life. Development of the Prometheus myth in the 18th century, starting with Shaftesbury ("a poet is indeed a second maker, a just Prometheus under Jove"), and on to the Sturm und Drang writers, who transposed Prometheus from the religious to the artistic experience. Walzel has specifically stressed the purely artistic nature of Goethe's creation. But the general view is that the point of departure was the religious experience. Prometheus has to be placed within the context of a group of works written in 1773-1774 ("Mahomet's Song," "Prometheus," "Satyros," "The Eternal Jew," *Faust*). Goethe intended to write a play on Prometheus, of which he left a fragment. Julius Richter ("Zur Deutung der Goetheschen Prometheus-dichtung," in *Jahrbuch des freien deutschen Hochstifts*, 1928) maintains that the ode predates the play and foreshadows only a few of its elements; previously, however, E. Schmidt and others believed that the ode is the quintessence of the homonymous dramatic fragment—the quintessence distilled by the poet after he had abandoned his plans for the play. (This clarification is psychologically important; one can see how Goethe's inspiration subsides: (1) the first part of the ode, in which the Titanic and rebellious aspects are salient; (2) the second part of the ode, in which Prometheus turns his attention to himself and certain features of human weakness come to the fore; (3) the failed effort to write the play, maybe because Goethe was no longer able to find the fulcrum of his image, which had already shifted in the ode, creating an internal contradiction.) Richter looks for correspondences between the literary works and the psychological states of the poet, as they can be ascertained from his letters and from *Poetry and Truth*. In *Poetry and Truth*, a general observation provides the starting point: men must always, ultimately, rely on their own strength; the divinity cannot reciprocate the veneration, trust, and love of man in his moments of greatest need—man must rely on himself. "Looking round for means of establishing my independence, I found that my *creative talent* was my surest basis for it." "This conception changed itself into a distinct form; the old mythological figure of Prometheus . . . who, *separated from the gods*, peopled a world from his own workshop. I felt quite clearly that one can only create anything of impor-

tance *when one is isolated*. Having to exclude the help of men, I also, like Prometheus, separated myself from the gods"—as his extreme and exclusive states of mind required, Vincenti adds. It seems to me, however, that when it comes to Goethe one cannot speak of extremism and exclusiveness. "I tailored the old Titanic garments to my size and without further reflection began to write a play portraying the difficulties Prometheus experienced with the gods when he formed with his own hand and brought them to life with Minerva's help."⁶ (Vincenti writes: "When Goethe wrote these words, the dramatic fragment had disappeared for many years—what does 'disappeared' mean?⁷—and he did not remember it well. He believed that the ode, which he still had, should appear in the play as a monologue.") The ode stands on its own; the situation it expresses is different from that of the fragment. In the ode, the rebellion matures at the same moment that it is enunciated; it is a declaration of war that closes with the beginning of hostilities: "Here I sit, forming men . . ." In the play, the war has already started. Logically, the fragment comes after the ode, but Vincenti is not as categorical as Richter. In his view, "if it is true that, ideologically, the dramatic fragment represents progress beyond the ode, it is equally true that a poet's imagination may return to positions that seemed superseded and re-create something new out of them. We should also abandon the notion that the ode is the quintessence of the play and be content to say that the one is related to the other in the way that something more complex is related to something simpler." Vincenti points out the antinomy that exists in the ode: the first two stanzas are scornful and the final stanza is defiant, but the middle part of the poem has a different tone. Prometheus recalls his childhood, his bewilderment, his doubts, the anguish of his youth; "it is the voice of disillusioned love." "These vivid reveries stay with us despite the reversion to anger in the final stanza. At the outset, Prometheus speaks as a Titan, but then the *tender* (!) traits of a young man with a heart starved of love emerges from under the Titan's mask." There is a passage in *Poetry and Truth* that is especially important for understanding Goethe's personality: "The spirit of the Titans and Giants storming heaven afforded no material for my poetic art. I felt it more suitable to portray that type of peaceful, formative, passive resistance that acknowledges the superior authority but desires equality with it."⁸ (This passage justifies and sheds light on Marx's short article on Goethe.)⁹

The dramatic fragment, in my view, proves that Goethe's Titanic bent must in fact be placed within a literary context and associated with the aphorism "In the beginning there was action"—if action is taken to mean Goethe's specific activity, artistic creation. An observation by Croce, responding to the question of why the play was not completed: "Perhaps in the very trajectory of the scenes one sees the difficulty and the obstacle that prevented completion, that is, the dualism of Goethe the rebel and Goethe the critic of rebellion."¹⁰ (If necessary, reread Vincenti's essay, which offers some acute specific observations, despite its many inaccuracies and contradictions.)

In fact, it seems to me, the dramatic fragment ought to be studied on its own; it is much more complex than the ode, and its relation to the ode does not rest on a close and necessary connection but on the Prometheus myth as an external factor. Prometheus's rebellion is "constructive." Prometheus appears not just as a Titan in revolt but above all as "homo faber," conscious of who he is and of the significance of his work. The Prometheus of the fragment does not in any way regard the gods as immortal and omnipotent. "Can you compress the breadth / Of heaven and earth into the space / Of my clenched fist? / Can you divide me / From myself? / Can you expand me, / Stretch me out to make a world?" Mercury responds with a big shrug: Fate. And therefore the gods, too, are vassals. But is Prometheus not already happy in his workshop with his creations? "Here's my world, my all! / Here—all my wishes." He had told Mercury that he became conscious of his physical existence in his childhood when he became aware that his feet supported his body and his arms extended into space to touch. Epimetheus had accused him of particularism, of ignoring the joys of forming a single whole that included the gods, his people, the world, and heaven. "I know, I know," is Prometheus's response, because he can no longer be satisfied with the kind of unity that encompasses everything from the outside; he must create a unity that springs from within. It can only spring from "the space filled by his energies."¹¹

§<215>. *The Popular Manual. The reality of the external world.* The entire polemic about the "reality of the external world," it seems to me, is badly framed and mostly pointless (and I am also referring to the paper presented at the Congress of the History of Science held in London.)¹

1. From the point of view of a "popular manual," it is a superfetation, something an intellectual has to have [itches for], more than a necessity. Indeed, the populace is hardly inclined to raise the question of whether the external world exists objectively or is a construction of the spirit. The populace "believes" that the external world is objective, and it is this "belief" that needs to be analyzed, criticized, and scientifically superseded. This belief in fact has a religious origin, even when the person who "believes" it is indifferent to religion. Since people have believed for centuries that god created the world before he created man and that man found the world already made and cataloged, defined once and for all, this belief has become a "commonsense" fact, even in those cases where religious feeling is dead or asleep [dulled]. Thus the use of this experience of common sense as the basis for a destruction of the theories of idealism by ridicule has something rather "reactionary" about it—an implicit return to religious sentiment. As a matter of fact, Catholic writers resort to the same method to obtain the same effect of corrosive ridicule.

2. Search for the reasons behind the emergence of theories that do not acknowledge the objective reality of the world. Were such theories symptoms of madness, delirium, etc.? Too simplistic. Historical materialism not only explains and justifies itself, it also explains and justifies all the theories that preceded it, etc.; herein lies its strength. Now, idealist theories constitute the greatest effort at intellectual and moral reform that has ever been made to eliminate religion from the sphere of civilization. This is related to the question of how and to what degree the concept of superstructures of historical materialism is in fact a realization of idealism and of its assertion that the reality of the world is a construction of the spirit.

3. The place of the natural or exact sciences within the framework of historical materialism. This is the most interesting and urgent question that needs to be resolved in order to avoid falling into fetishism, which is, precisely, a rebirth of religion in a different guise.

Cf. Notebook 11, §17.

§<216>. *Jottings on economics. Ugo Spirito and Co.* The accusation that the way in which traditional political economy is conceived is "naturalistic" and "deterministic." A baseless accusation because classical economists need not concern themselves much with the metaphysical question of "determinism"; their deductions and calculations are all based on the premise "suppose that . . ." What is this "suppose"? In his review of Spirito's book in *La Riforma Sociale*, Jannaccone defines "suppose that" as a "determinate market"¹—within the discourse of classical economists, this is correct.

But what is the "determinate market," and what is it in fact determined by? It will be determined by the fundamental structure of the society under consideration; one must therefore analyze this structure and identify within it those elements that are [relatively] constant, determine the market, etc., as well as those other "variable and developing" elements that determine conjunctural crises up to the point when even the [relatively] constant elements get modified and the crisis becomes organic.

Under the surface of its abstractions and mathematical language, classical economics is in fact the only "historicist" economics. Spirito is the one who actually dissolves the historicism and drowns economic reality in a flood of words and abstractions. Nevertheless, the tendency represented by Spirito and other members of his group is a "sign of the times." The demand for an "economy based on a plan"—not just on a national level but on a world scale—is interesting in itself, even if the justification for it is purely verbal: it is "a sign of the times." It is the expression, albeit still "utopian," of the developing conditions that call for an "economy based on a plan."

The current interest of writers like Spirito is especially noteworthy for its approach toward certain exponents of classical economics, such as Einaudi. Einaudi's articles on the crisis, especially those published in the *Riforma Sociale* of January-February 1932,² often seem to be the product of an enfeebled mind. Einaudi reproduces passages from century-old economists, oblivious to the fact that the "market" has changed, that the premises of the "suppose that" are not what they once were. International production has grown so much and the market has become so complex that certain ways of thinking now appear literally infantile. Could it be that no new industries have come into existence these last few years? Suffice it to mention the aluminum and synthetic silk industries. What Einaudi has to say is generically right, in the sense that it means that past crises have been overcome by: (1) an extension of the ambit of capitalist production worldwide; (2) a rise in the standard of living of certain strata of the population or a relative improvement of the standard of living of all strata. Einaudi, however, fails to take into account that the kind of mass production on a large scale that has increasingly become the crux of economic life is in crisis. It is impossible to control this crisis, precisely because it is so broad and so deep; its scale is such that quantity becomes quality. In other words, the crisis is now *organic* and no longer *conjunctural*. Einaudi's reasoning is

applicable to conjunctural types of crises, because he wants to deny the existence of an organic crisis. This, however, is not scientific analysis; it is, rather, the "politics of the moment," the "will to believe," a "medicine for the soul," a puerile and comic exercise.

§<217>. *Reality of the external world*. In his *Linee di filosofia critica*, Bernardino Varisco writes, on p. 519: "I open the newspaper to get the news. Do you want to say that I created the news by opening the paper?"¹ The amazing thing is that Varisco should write this, for, even though he is now oriented toward religious transcendence [and dualism], he used to be an "idealist" after distancing himself from positivism. Can Varisco possibly believe idealism to mean something so trivial and banal? How did he conceive of the "subjectivity" of the real when he was an idealist? (One would have to read Varisco's book for its critical side.) This quotation from Varisco brings to mind what Tolstoy wrote in his memoir, *Childhood, Boyhood, and Youth*. He recounts how he used to make himself dizzy, turning his head suddenly to find out if there had been a moment of "nothingness" before his "spirit" "created" reality (or something of the sort; this passage in Tolstoy is very interesting from a literary point of view).² That Tolstoy should have conveyed the significance of the idealist proposition in such an unmediated and tangible fashion is understandable. But Varisco? It should be pointed out that these are precisely the types of "commonsense" critiques that idealist philosophers ignore, but in fact they are extremely important when it comes to disseminating a mode of thinking or a culture.

Recall Missiroli's statement, reported in *L'Italia Letteraria*,³ and recall also Roberto Ardigò's "pumpkin polemic," which is found in his *Scritti vari*, collected and edited by G. Marchesini (Lemonnier, 1922). The polemicist (a priest from the Episcopal Curia), writing for some minor religious paper, sought to destroy Ardigò in the eyes of the populace by describing him, more or less, as "one of those philosophers who believe that the cathedral (or local church) exists only because they think it, and when they cease to think it the cathedral disappears." It is not hard to imagine its comic effect on the readers and how it angered Ardigò, who is a positivist and agrees with the Catholics' conception of physical reality.⁴

It must be demonstrated that the "subjectivist" conception finds its "historical" and nonspeculative interpretation [(and supersedes its speculative form)] in the concept of superstructures; it has served the purpose of superseding transcendence on the one hand and "common sense" on the other, but in its speculative form it is a mere philosophical romance. A reference to a more realistic interpretation of subjectivism in classical German philosophy can be found in G. De Ruggiero's review of the writings

of B. Constant (I think) on Germany and German philosophy (the review appeared some years ago in *La Critica*).⁵

Cf. Notebook 11, 17.

§<218>. *Alessandro Levi*. Look for his writings on philosophy and history. Levi, like R. Mondolfo, started out as a positivist (of the Padua school associated with R. Ardigò).¹ As a point of reference, I am reproducing a passage from his essay on Giuseppe Ferrari (*Nuova Rivista Storica*, 1931, p. 387):²

No; I do not think there was "a certain"—or even an uncertain—historical materialism in Ferrari. Rather, it seems to me, Ferrari's conception of history and his supposed philosophy of history is separated by a huge abyss from historical materialism, properly understood—that is, not as mere economism (of which, in fact, one finds more vague traces in Ferrari's than in the concrete history of a Carlo Cattaneo).³ Historical materialism, properly understood, is really dialectical; in understanding history, it moves beyond it through action, and it does separate history from philosophy, but by putting men back on their feet it makes out of them conscious artificers of history as opposed to the playthings of fate—in other words, their ideals, sparks emitted by social struggles, are for them, in fact, a stimulus for praxis that, thanks to their efforts, turns things around. Ferrari's knowledge of Hegelian logic was superficial; as a critic, he was so steeped in the idealist dialectic that he could not move beyond it to the real dialectic of historical materialism.⁴

Cf. Notebook 11, §2.

§<219>. *The Popular Manual. Residues of metaphysics*. The manner of judging past philosophical concepts as delirium is not just an error of antihistoricism—that is, the anachronistic pretension that people in the past should have thought as we do today—it is, really and truly, a residue of metaphysical conceptions, because it supposes that there is a dogma of thought valid for all times and all places, a standard by which to judge the whole past. In fact, "antihistoricism" as a method is nothing other than a remnant of metaphysics. The notion that past philosophical systems become obsolete does not exclude the fact that they were historically valid; they are considered transitory from the point of view of the entire development of history and the life-death dialectic. That they *deserved* to fall by the wayside is not a moral judgment or a matter of objective "truth" but a historical-dialectical judgment. (Cf. Engels' presentation of Hegel's propo-

sition that "all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real."¹ In the *Manual*, the past is judged as "irrational" and "monstrous"; the history of the past is a treatise on teratology, because the starting point is a "metaphysical" conception. [By contrast, the *Manifesto* eulogizes even that world that it presents as moribund.]²

Thus one must say that the concept of an external [and mechanical] "objectivity" corresponds to a kind of "point of view of the cosmos in itself"—which, after all, is the point of view of philosophical materialism, of positivism, and of a certain scientism. But what is this point of view, if not a residue of the concept of god and specifically of the mystical concept of an "unknown god"?

Cf. Notebook 11, §18.

§<220>. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*. A philosophy of praxis must initially adopt a polemical stance, as superseding the existing mode of thinking. It must therefore present itself as a critique of "common sense" (but only after it has based itself on common sense in order to show that "everyone" is a philosopher and that the point is not to introduce a totally new form of knowledge into "everyone's" individual life but to revitalize an already existing activity and make it "critical"). It must also present itself as a critique of the philosophy of the intellectuals, out of which the history of philosophy arises. Insofar as the history of philosophy is the history of "individuals" (in fact, it develops essentially in the activity of exceptionally gifted individuals), it can be considered as the history of the "high points" of the progress of "common sense"—or, at least, of the common sense of the most culturally refined strata of the society. Thus an introduction to the study of philosophy must provide a synthesis of the "problems" that arose in the course of the history of philosophy, in order to criticize them, demonstrate their real value (if they still have any) or their importance as links in a chain, and define the new problems of the present time.

The relation between "high" philosophy and common sense is assured by "politics" in the same way that politics assures the relationship between the Catholicism of the intellectuals and of the "simple." The fact that the church finds itself facing a problem of the "simple" means that there has been a rupture within the community of the faithful, a rupture that cannot be healed by raising the simple to the level of the intellectuals (and the church no longer plans to undertake such a task, which is "economically" beyond its current means). The church instead exercises an iron discipline to prevent the intellectuals from going beyond certain limits of "differentiation," lest they make the rupture catastrophic and irreparable. In the past, such "ruptures" within the community of the faithful gave birth to new religious orders centered on strong personalities (Dominic, Francis,

Catherine, etc.).¹ After the Counter-Reformation, this outburst of new forces was rendered impotent. The Society of Jesus was the last of the great orders, but its character was repressive and "diplomatic"; it was the onset of the hardening of the ecclesiastical organism. (Cf. the list of new religious orders cited by Papini to rebut Croce:² their religious significance is minimal, but they are very important insofar as they "discipline" the masses of the "simple" and as the extensions and tentacles of the Society of Jesus, instruments of "passive resistance" for preserving the ground that has already been gained—they are not emerging forces of renovation. Modernism has not created "religious orders" but "political orders"—Christian Democracy.) Recall the anecdote, recounted by Steed in his memoirs, about the cardinal who explains to a pro-Catholic English Protestant that the miracles of San Gennaro are useful for the common people of Naples but not for the intellectuals and that even the gospels contain "exaggerations." In response to the question, "But are you Christian?" the cardinal says, "We are *prelates*"—in other words, "politicians" of the Catholic religion.³

Cf. Notebook 11, §12.

§<221>. *Gentile* and his followers, Volpicelli, Spirito, etc.,¹ one might say, have established a seventeenth-century type of philosophy.² (Cf. also comparison with Bruno Bauer and *The Holy Family*.)³

Cf. Notebook 11, §6.

§<222>. *Introduction to the study of philosophy*. On the concept of regularity and law in historical events. Cf. the note on economic science on p. 40.¹

Cf. Notebook 11, §52.

§<223>. *Croce and Loria*. When one thinks about it, there is not that big of a difference, after all, between Croce's and Loria's ways of interpreting historical materialism.¹ Croce, too, reduces historical materialism to an empirical canon of interpretation in order to draw the attention of historians to economic factors; by doing so, Croce has found a way to reduce historical materialism to a partial form of "economism."² If Loria were stripped of all his stylistic oddities and wild fantasies (which, of course, would mean losing much of what typifies Loria), one would be able to see that the core of his interpretation is close to Croce's.

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §13.

§<224>. *Theology—metaphysics—speculation*. Croce always tries to bring into relief the way in which, in his activities as a thinker, he has sought to “expel” from the sphere of philosophy every residue of theology and metaphysics. He even goes so far as to negate every philosophical “system” and instead presents philosophy as the solution to those philosophical problems that are brought forth and posed by historical development as it unfolds. But isn’t every “speculative” philosophy itself a theology and a metaphysics? This “residue” is not a residue, it is “whole”; it is the whole method of doing philosophy and therefore every affirmation of “historicism” is hollow, since it is nothing more than speculative “historicism,” the “concept” of history rather than history. (Nevertheless, Croce’s critique of the residues of theology and metaphysics must be recapitulated and studied carefully.)

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §8.

§<225>. *Points for an essay on B. Croce*. 1. What are the predominant intellectual and moral (and therefore social) interests in Croce’s cultural activities at the present time? In order to understand them, it is necessary to recall Croce’s attitude toward the World War. He opposed the popular view (and the propaganda associated with it) that it was a war of civilization and therefore religious in nature. Peace follows war, and peace may require quite different groupings from those of war. But how would it be possible for nations to collaborate after unleashing the “religious” fanaticisms of war? Croce sees the moment of war in the moment of peace and that of peace in the moment of war; he strives to ensure that the [possibility of] mediation between the two moments is never destroyed.¹ No immediate political criterion may be raised to a universal principle.

2. Croce as leader of the revisionist tendencies: the early phase (at the end of the 19th century,⁴ he inspired Bernstein and Sorel) and now the second phase, which is no longer the moment of revisionism but of liquidation (ethico-political history in opposition to economic-juridical history).²

3. [[cf. n. 7]]^b Why Croce is “popular”; how and through what channels certain specific solutions of his to particular problems (not his central ideas) are disseminated. Croce’s style—erroneously compared to Manzoni;³ Croce’s prose should be reconnected to the scientific prose of Galileo; his Goethean attitude after the war. While many people were losing their head, Croce never wavered in his serenity and in his belief that

¹ In an obvious slip of the pen, in the manuscript Gramsci wrote “*fine del 900*” (i.e., end of the twentieth century).

² In the manuscript, “[cf. n. 7]” is inserted directly above “Why Croce”—Gramsci is clearly referring to the last paragraph of this same note.

metaphysically evil cannot prevail and that history is rationality. Hence Croce's popularity among the Anglo-Saxons, who—unlike the Germans, with their preference for grand systems—have always favored the type of conception of the world that presents itself as an expression of common sense, as a solution to moral and practical problems. Croce's idealist thought courses throughout his minor works, but each one of them stands on its own and appears acceptable even to those who do not accept his whole system. That is why many of Croce's theories have made inroads among Catholics (Olgiati, Chiocchetti) as well as positivists.⁴ One of the reasons for Croce's favorable reception—and this is related to his serenity—is that he has made no concessions to mysticism and religion (even though, as minister, he deemed it necessary to introduce religion in elementary schools).⁵ Nevertheless, the Catholics are currently his major adversaries, precisely because they understand that Croce's importance is not the same as that of the philosophers of old; rather, he is a religious reformer who upholds the detachment of the intellectuals from religion. Articles in the *Nuova Antologia* by two militant Catholics, Papini and Ferrabino.⁶

4. The Italian tradition of the moderates. Theory of revolution-restoration, a domesticated dialectic because it "mechanically" presupposes that the antithesis should be preserved by the thesis in order not to destroy the dialectical process, which is therefore "foreseen" as an endless mechanical repetition. In real history, though, the antithesis tends to destroy the thesis. The result is a supersession, but one cannot "tally" in advance the blows that will be delivered—this is not a boxing ring with its established rules. As the antithesis gains ground, implacably, the more so does the thesis—in other words, it will manifest all its potential vitality (Croce's position is similar to Proudhon's that was criticized in *The Poverty of Philosophy*; domesticated Hegelianism.)⁷ [(continued in 6.)]⁸

5. Papini—the religious orders.⁹ Croce is right, for after the Council of Trent and the Jesuits there has been no great religious order; Jansenism and modernism have not produced new orders or renovated old ones. The futility and inept wit of Papini, Croce's old adversary (an asinine figure); as a young polemicist, Papini seemed to have the potential to become a "noble steed," but he ended up an "ass." Repugnant hypocrisy: reminds Italians of the verses of *Strapaese*.¹⁰

6. Continuation of 4. This notion raises the question of whether, for Croce, even the position he fights against is necessary and justified. And so: What are the limits [and the characteristic features] of his struggle? Croce conceives of his position as the distinctive position of intellectuals. In the case of the war, one cannot be sure that Croce disagreed with the "political" (that is, immediate) need for the kind of propaganda that would elicit from the people the maximum military effort. But he would

not want the intellectuals to commit the error of mistaking the merely contingent for the "eternal." Deep down, perhaps, this is a new way of interpreting the assertion that religion is an instrument of politics and beneficial for the people.

7. Continuation of 3. One reason for the spread of certain opinions of Croce's: Croce's activity was seen as a critique that set out to demolish a series of traditional prejudices by declaring a whole set of problems "false"; it was therefore seen as an activity that "integrated" good sense.

Cf. Notebook 10, I, Summary and §1-§6.

§<226>. *Cruder terms*. Leon Battista Alberti: "They [the mathematicians] measure the shape and form of things in the mind alone and divorced entirely from matter. We, on the other hand, who wish to talk of things that are visible, will express ourselves in cruder terms."¹

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §13.

§<227>. *Points for an essay on Croce*. 8. What does "ethico-political" history mean? History of the aspect of "hegemony" in the state; and, since it is the role of intellectuals to represent the ideas that constitute the terrain on which hegemony is exercised, history of the intellectuals and specifically of the great intellectuals, all the way to the top—to the intellectual who has expressed the central nucleus of the ideas that are dominant in a given period. "Hegemony" means a determinate system of moral life [conception of life, etc.], and therefore history is "religious" history along the lines of Croce's "state-church" principle.¹

Has there ever been a state without "hegemony"? Why, then, not produce the history of the principle of (imperial) authority because of which the Croatian peasants fought against the Milanese liberals and the Venetian-Lombard peasants against the Viennese liberals? And didn't the Bourbon regime also represent a hegemony over the *lazzaroni* and the Southern peasants?² ("It's written for you all to read, King Frankie's the one we need.")³ There is a struggle between two hegemonies—always. Why does one of them triumph? Because of its intrinsic "logical" qualities? [The ethico-political hegemonic element appears in the life of the state and the nation in the form of "patriotism" and "nationalism," which is the "popular religion," in other words, the nexus where the unity between the rulers and ruled occurs.]

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §7 and §13.

§<228>. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people* (see p. 66).¹ Another thing that perhaps should be made part of this "topic" is Pascal's so-called wager that suggests similarities between religion and games of chance. One should not overlook the very subtle way in which Pascal gave a literary form and a logical justification to this gambling argument. In fact, this is the way many people think about religion, but it is also a way of thinking that "is ashamed of itself" because it seems base and unworthy. Pascal confronted the "shame" and sought to confer some dignity and justification on a popular way of thinking. (How many times has one heard: "What's to lose by going to church, believing in God, etc.? If he doesn't exist, too bad; but if he does exist, believing would have really been worth it, etc.") This way of thinking—and Pascal's "wager," too—is suggestive of Voltaire and recalls Heine's jest: "I believe the eternal father has some pleasant surprise in store for us after we die"—or something like that.²

See how Pascal scholars interpret the "wager." I believe there is an essay by P. P. Trompeo, in his volume *Rilegature Gianseniste*,³ that discusses the "wager" in relation to Manzoni.

One would also have to find out whether there was some renewed interest in and widespread familiarity with the topic of Pascal's "wager" during the period when Balzac used his expression about the lottery.⁴ This can also be ascertained through the recently published research on Manzoni's Jansenism by such serious scholars as Ruffini and Trompeo.⁵

Cf. Notebook 16, §1.

§<229>. *The Popular Manual*. In the remarks on the *Popular Manual*—insofar as they are comprehensive and pertain to the general method—one can also draw attention to the logical superficiality inherent in the system of "oral" diffusion of culture and science. (In the *Manual* [preface], the author recalls with pride the "spoken" origin of the work.)¹ It may be worth mentioning the logical principles of *ignoratio elenchi* and of *mutatio elenchi*, for there are numerous examples of both.

Cf. Notebook 11, §15.

§<230>. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people*. In a previously unpublished letter—which appeared in print only recently (perhaps in 1931)—Engels speaks at length of Balzac and why he is important.¹ Pascal developed his argument on the "wager" in *Pensées*, which comprises the fragments of the *Apologie de la religion chrétienne* that Pascal never completed [cf. at the back of the notebook]. Pascal's line of thought (as quoted by Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed., p. 464):

"Les hommes ont mépris pour la religion, ils en ont haine et peur qu'elle soit vraie. Pour guérir cela, il faut commencer par montrer que la religion n'est point contraire à la raison; ensuite, qu'elle est vénérable, en donner respect; la rendre ensuite aimable, faire souhaiter aux bons qu'elle fût vraie, et puis montrer qu'elle est vraie."² After the discourse against the indifference of the atheists, which serves as a general introduction to the work, Pascal develops his thesis on the impotence of reason: incapable of knowing everything or of knowing anything with certainty, reason is reduced to basing its judgment on the way things appear in their surroundings. Faith is a superior means of knowing; it is exercised beyond the limits accessible to reason. But even if this were not true, even if there were no means of reaching God, whether through reason or in any other way, in the absolute impossibility of knowing, it would nevertheless be necessary to act as if one did know. For, according to the theory of probability, there is an advantage to betting that religion is true and regulating one's life accordingly. By living a Christian life, one risks almost nothing—some years of turbid pleasures (*plaisir mêlé*) in order to gain infinity, eternal joy.

From an article by the Hon. Arturo Marescalchi ("Durare! Anche nella bachicoltura," *Corriere della Sera* of 24 April 1932): "For every half-ounce of seed used to cultivate them, one can compete for prizes ranging from a modest sum (400 prizes of 1000 lire each), to several prizes of 10,000 to 20,000 lire, all the way up to five prizes of between 25,000 and 250,000 lire. Italians have always been strongly inclined to try their luck; in the countryside, even today, nobody passes up a chance to play tombola or the lottery. In this case, the ticket to try one's luck is free."³

Connection between the lottery and religion—and even superstition associated with some particular saint; winning has to be some special grace bestowed by one's saint or the Madonna [(winning proves that one has been "chosen")]. One could contrast the Protestants' [activist] conception of grace that gave rise to the spirit of enterprise and provided it with its moral form with the passive and *lazzarone*-like conception of grace [typical] of the Catholic populace. [Check also whether the title and content of Baudelaire's *Les Paradis artificiels* were inspired by the "opium of the people";⁴ the phrase may have reached him indirectly through literature.]

Cf. Notebook 16, §1.

§<231>. *Introduction to the study of philosophy. The relation between structure and superstructure.* Cf. in *La Critica* of 20 March 1932 (G. de Ruggiero's review of a book by Arthur Feiler), p. 133: "One is faced with the *paradox* of a narrowly and barrenly materialistic ideology that, in practice, gives rise to a passion for the ideal, to an ardor for renewal that, in a certain sense, is undeniably sincere. In principle, this is all true and even

providential because it shows that humanity has great inner resources that come into play at the very moment when a superficial reason expects to negate them."¹ Yet, truly, there is nothing paradoxical and providential here (whenever they are unable to explain a fact, these speculative philosophers resort to the usual stratagem of providence); the superficiality is De Ruggiero's "philological" information. He would be ashamed of himself if he did not know every existing document on some minute fact in the history of philosophy, but he ignores the [exhaustive] information available on momentous events, such as the ones he touches upon in this review.

The position discussed by De Ruggiero—i.e., that a "narrowly . . . materialistic ideology" gives rise, in practice, to a passion for the ideal, etc.—is not new in history, and it should be explained differently from the way De Ruggiero does. One possible example is the Protestant theory of predestination and grace and how it gave rise to a vast expansion of the spirit of initiative. It is, in religious terms, the same phenomenon alluded to by De Ruggiero, whose "Catholic" mentality incapacitates his insight. Cf. Max Weber, *L'etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalismo* in the *Nuovi Studi* of 1931 (especially the segment in the November-December 1931 issue) for an exposition of the development of the theory of grace that can serve as a representation of the phenomenon mentioned by De Ruggiero.² (The fact that a Catholic mentality opposes this understanding can be seen in Jemolo—his history of Jansenism; he ignored this activist conversion of the theory of grace and wanted to know where Anzilotti came across such nonsense.)³

Cf. Notebook 10, II, §31.i.

§<232>. *The Popular Manual. Judging the philosophies of the past.* Conceiving of past thought as delirium has no theoretical significance; indeed, it is a deviation from the philosophy of praxis. Could it have any educational or motivational value? It would seem not; it gives one the notion of being "somebody" simply by virtue of the fact of having been born at the present time rather than in some past century. In every age, there has been a past and a present. Calling oneself a "contemporary" cannot be anything but a joke. (There is an anecdote about a French bourgeois who put "Contemporary" on his calling card; he had discovered that he was a "contemporary" and bragged about it.)

Cf. Notebook 11, 18.

§<233>. *Points for an essay on Croce.* 9. Religion: "after Christ, we are all Christians."¹ In other words, the moral teachings of Christianity, in-

so far as they are a historical necessity and not ecclesiastical-corporatist elements, have been incorporated into modern civilization, and they circulate within it. If there is an opposition between church and state, it is an opposition between two politics and not between religion and politics. But there is an eternal opposition between church and state in a speculative sense, which is to say that there is an opposition between the political and the moral that is also speculative, which is the dialectical substance of the process of development of civilization itself. The conception of the state as hegemony leads to paradoxical affirmations: the state is not to be found only where it appears to be "institutionalized";² in this case, in fact, the state identifies itself with the "free" intellectuals and with that particular group of "free" intellectuals that represents the ethico-political principle around which society is united for the progress of civilization. Politics is an aspect of force, but it either prepares the ground for moral life, or it is an instrument and a form of moral life—hence the political and the moral are not in conflict but almost identical.

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §5 and §7.

§<234>. "*Appearances*" and *superstructures*. It is true that there has been a tendency to regard superstructures as mere unstable appearances. In my view, this tendency can be said to be a basically reductive psychological approach that is almost entirely devoid of theoretical substance; it stems primarily from unmediated political passion reacting against an exaggeration or a distortion in the opposite direction. This attitude is comparable to the attitude toward "woman" and love during certain epochs. There is a graceful young woman, fair, rosy, etc., etc. The "practical" man evaluates her "skeletal" structure and the width of her pelvis, he tries to get to know her mother or grandmother to find out what [likely] process of hereditary deformation the young woman would undergo as she aged, he wants to know what kind of "wife" he will have in ten, or twenty, or thirty years' time. The "satanic" young man, with his pessimistic and ultrarealistic attitude, looks at the young woman with the eyes of a Stecchetti:¹ she, too, is a sack of excrement; he imagines her dead and buried, putrefying, her hollow and fetid eye sockets crawling with worms; her rosy complexion will become the pallor of a corpse, her nimbleness will give way to decay, the elegance of her motion a mere arrangement of sinews and bones; she will become a stack of lifeless bones, etc. This kind of psychological attitude is associated with adolescence, with the first reflections. However, life overcomes this, and a "particular" woman will dispel such thoughts.

Cf. Notebook 11, §50.

§<235>. *Introduction to the study of philosophy*. In addition to the series "transcendence, theology, speculation—philosophical speculation," the other series "transcendence, immanence, speculative historicism—philosophy of praxis." All historicist theories of a speculative character have to be reexamined and criticized. A new *Anti-Dühring* needs to be written from this point of view, and it could be an Anti-Croce, for it would recapitulate not only the polemic against speculative philosophy but also, implicitly, the polemic against positivism and mechanistic theories—degenerations of the philosophy of praxis.

Cf. Notebook 11, §51.

§<236>. *Points for an essay on Croce*. 10. Given that the *Storia d'Europa* is a kind of paradigm of ethico-political history for world culture, a critique of the book is necessary.¹ It can be pointed out that Croce's basic "trick" is this: he begins his historical narrative from after the fall of Napoleon. But could there be a "19th century" without the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars? Can the events treated by Croce be thought of organically without taking into account those earlier events?² Croce's book is a treatise on passive revolutions (to use Cuoco's phrase),³ and they cannot be explained or understood in the absence of the French Revolution, which was a European and world event, not just a French one. (Is it possible that Croce's approach has something to do with the present time? A new "liberalism" under modern conditions—wouldn't that be, precisely, "fascism"? If liberalism was the form of "passive revolution" specific to the 19th century, wouldn't fascism be, precisely, the form of "passive revolution" specific to the 20th century? I have alluded to this in another note,⁴ and the whole argument needs to be dealt with in greater depth.) (One could think of it thus: a passive revolution takes place when, through a "reform" process, the economic structure is transformed from an individualistic one to an economy according to a plan [administered economy] and when the emergence of an "intermediate economy"—i.e., an economy in the space between the purely individualistic one and the one that is comprehensively planned—enables the transition to more advanced political and cultural forms without the kind of radical and destructive cataclysms that are utterly devastating. "Corporativism" could be—or, as it grows, could become—this form of intermediate economy that has a "passive" character.) This idea can be juxtaposed to the concept of what, in political terms, one might call "war of position," as opposed to war of movement. Thus one might say that, in the previous historical cycle, the French Revolution was a "war of movement," whereas the liberal epoch of the 19th century was a long war of position.

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §9.

§<237>. *Introduction to the study of philosophy*. A fundamental concept that needs to be defined is that of historical "necessity." In the speculative-abstract sense. In the historical-concrete sense: necessity comes from the existence of an efficient *premise* that has become operative in collective consciousness, similar to a "popular belief." The premise contains the sufficient material conditions for the realization of the impulse of collective will.

Another concept that needs to be brought down from the speculative realm and historicized is that of "rationality" (and therefore of "irrationality") in history, a concept that is connected with the concepts of "providence" and "fortune," in the sense in which they are employed (speculatively) by Italian idealist philosophers and especially by Croce. It is therefore necessary to study Croce's book on G.B. Vico,¹ in which the concept of "providence" is transformed into a speculative concept, thus initiating the idealist interpretation of Vico's philosophy. For the meaning of "fortune" in Machiavelli, cf. L. Russo's note in his major edition of the *Prince* [p. 23].²

(For Machiavelli, "fortune" has a double meaning, objective and subjective. "Fortune" is the natural force of circumstances, the propitious concurrence of events; it is what Vico meant by Providence. Alternatively, it is that transcendent power fabled by old medieval doctrines—i.e., god; and for Machiavelli this is nothing other than individual *virtù* itself,³ with its power rooted in man's will. As Russo says, Machiavelli's *virtù* is no longer the virtue of the scholastics, which has an ethical character and derives its power from heaven; nor is it Livy's virtue, which generally means military valor. Machiavelli's is the *virtù* of Renaissance man, which is capacity, ability, industriousness, individual strength, sensibility, acumen, and a proportionate sense of one's own potential.)⁴

After this, Russo's analysis wavers. In his view, "the concept of *fortune*, as force of circumstance, which in Machiavelli as in the humanists still has a *naturalistic and mechanical character*, will only reach its *true meaning* and deeper historical significance in the *rational providence* of Vico and Hegel. It should be pointed out, however, that in Machiavelli these concepts never have a metaphysical character as they do in the most typical philosophers of humanism, but they are simple and profound intuitions (and therefore philosophy!) of life that should be taken and interpreted as symbols of sentiments."⁵ On the slow metaphysical formation of these concepts before Machiavelli, Russo refers to Gentile, *Giordano Bruno e il pensiero del Rinascimento* ("Il concetto dell'uomo nel Rinascimento" and the appendix), Florence, Vallecchi. On these same concepts in Machiavelli, cf. F. Ercole, *La politica di Machiavelli*.⁶

Cf. Notebook 11, §52.

§<238>. *Introduction to the history of philosophy. Speculative philosophy.* Something to think about: whether the "speculative" element is a characteristic of every philosophy or else is a phase in the development of philosophical thought, along the lines of the general process of development of a given historical period. One could say, then, that every culture has its speculative or religious moment that coincides with the period of complete hegemony of the social group of which the culture is an expression. And perhaps it even coincides with the moment in which the real hegemony disintegrates while the system of thought perfects and refines itself—which is what happens in periods of decadence. Criticism reformulates speculation into its own real terms of ideology, but the critique itself will have its own speculative phase, which will mark its apogee. The question is this: whether this apogee is the beginning of a historical phase in which necessity-freedom are organically fused in the social fabric and there will be no dialectic other than the dialectic of ideas.

Cf. Notebook 11, §53.

§<239>. *The Popular Manual. Teleology.* In another note, I quoted an epigram by Goethe against teleology.¹ Goethe repeats the same idea in another way (find out where) and says that he derived it from Kant: "Kant is the most eminent of the modern philosophers, and his theories have had the greatest influence on my culture. The distinction between subject and object and the scientific principle that everything exists and develops by virtue of its own and intrinsic^a purpose (or, to put it in terms of a proverb, cork does not grow in order to serve as a stopper for our bottles) are ideas that I shared with Kant, and I subsequently applied myself seriously to the study of his philosophy."²

Cf. Notebook 11, §35.

§<240>. *Points for an essay on Croce. Ethico-political history or speculative history?* One can argue that, in Croce, history in the making is not even ethico-political but speculative history; it is a regression—albeit in a literary form made wiser and less naive by advances in criticism—to old approaches that have been discredited as hollow and rhetorical. Not even ethico-political history can divorce itself from the concept of "historical

¹ In the manuscript, Gramsci wrote "extrinsic." It is an obvious slip of the pen, as is clear from the context and from the later version of this note (Notebook 11, §35).

bloc" in which the organism is individualized and rendered concrete by the ethico-political form but cannot be thought of without its "material" and practical content. It must be shown that content and form are identical, but there is no need to show this in every single individual action otherwise, one would end up with philosophemes rather than history. In the natural sciences, this would be the equivalent of a return to the time when classifications were based on the color of the skin, the plumage, or the fur rather than anatomy. History is not natural science; nor is classification its purpose. So, the reference to the natural sciences and to the need for an "anatomy" of society was no more than a metaphor and a prod to deepen methodological and philosophical research. In human history [in the making], "skin color" is not coincidental; this has nothing to do with classifications and polemics but is a question of reconstruction, and it is a known fact that, in every individual, skin color forms a "bloc" with the anatomical structure and with all the physiological functions. One cannot think of an individual who has been "flayed" as a real individual—the reality is he's dead, no longer an active and functioning entity but an object for the anatomical table. The other extreme is equally erroneous, abstract, and antihistorical. One can see this in the *Storia d'Europa*, specifically in the fact that the period chosen for study is mutilated: it is the period of passive revolutions, in Cuoco's phrase;¹ it is a period in search of [superior] forms, a period of struggle for forms because the content has already been established by the English and French revolutions and by the Napoleonic Wars.

[Cf. p. 36].² Another point: the concept of "liberty" identical to history and to the dialectical process, and hence always present in every history, and the concept of liberty as ideology or religion (or fanaticism, according to the clericals, for ex.)—according to Croce's philosophy, dangerous confusion between philosophy and ideology, as a result of which even philosophy becomes an "instrument of politics" (i.e., an "error" of practical origin, or an illusion, according to historical materialism; in other words, a formation of unmediated origin and immediately ephemeral). (A sculptor, Rodin, said—according to M. Barrès, in *Mes Cahiers*, 4th series: "Si nous n'étions pas prévenus contre le squelette, nous verrions comme il est beau.")^{3a}

Cf. Notebook 10, I, §13.

² This marks the end of the third series of "Notes on Philosophy, Materialism, and Idealism" for which Gramsci set aside and used the pages of the entire second half of this notebook. The final sentence of this note ends on the very last line at the bottom of p. 79v in the manuscript, which is also the last lined page of the notebook. Facing this page is the white, unlined inside of the back cover of the notebook. Gramsci used this space for a very short bibliographical list (see "Description of the Manuscript" for Notebook 8) and for the five miscellaneous notes that follow.

<§241>.^a Pascal's *Pensées* was first printed in 1670 by his Port Royal friends, and it was riddled with errors. In 1843 Victor Cousin called attention to the authentic text [manuscript], and it was printed in 1844 by the publisher Faugère.¹

Cf. Notebook 16, §1.

<§242>. 1. *The popular origins of "superman."* One finds it in the late romanticism of the serial novel; in Dumas père: the Count of Monte-Cristo, Athos, Joseph Balsamo, for example. So then: many self-proclaimed Nietzscheans are nothing other than . . . Dumasians who, after dabbling in Nietzsche, "justified" the mood generated by the reading of *The Count of Monte-Cristo*.

Cf. Notebook 16, §13.

<§243>. 2. *Italian Risorgimento.* A certain sectarianism in the Italian mind-set and the tendency to consider oneself misjudged and misunderstood come from the system of interpretations of the Risorgimento.

Cf. Notebook 14, §16.

<§244>. 3. *Machiavelli. Against "voluntarism" and Garibaldism.* Against, of course, if one wants to perpetuate oneself as an organic form of historical-practical activity and not as the initial moment of an organic period. Likewise, against "vanguards" without an army behind them, against commandos without infantry and artillery, but not against vanguards and commandos if they are functions of a complex and regular organism. Similarly, against intellectuals removed from the masses but not against the intellectuals of a mass. In favor of homogeneous formations made up of compact social blocs and in favor of intellectuals, vanguards, and commandos that work in order to give rise to such blocs rather than to perpetuate their own Gypsy-like domination.

Cf. Notebook 14, §18

^a In the manuscript, the beginning of this note (and of the four notes that follow it) is not marked by the customary "§." This particular note is separated from the other four by a line that is drawn under it. The other four notes are atypically numbered (1 to 4) by Gramsci.

<§245>. 4. *Popular literature*. If it is true that novelized biography follows in the footsteps of the historical novel typified by Dumas, etc., then one can say that from this point of view and in this particular sector "a gap is being filled" in Italy. Cf. the historical novels, etc., published by Corbaccio.¹ But it is only in this respect that popular literature has developed in Italy, for it is not more popular in the true sense, since it is aimed only at certain strata of the people, at the more snobbish ones, at those who pretend or aspire to be intellectuals. Detective novels of any kind—zero, yet this is the modern popular. "Adventure" novels in general: zero.

Cf. Notebook 14, §17.

NOTES

NOTEBOOK 6 (1930-32)

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

A ruled school notebook (14.7 x 19.8 cm) with hard black covers and a gray spine. A label on the front cover carries the imprint of the stationer: "Gius. Laterza e figli, Bari." Inside the blank space of the label, Gramsci's prison number ("7047") is written in black pencil. After Gramsci's death, Tatiana Schucht glued another label on the upper right-hand corner of the front cover; on it, she wrote: "Completo da pg. 1 a 79. VIII" (Complete from p. 1 to 79. VIII). The roman numerals indicate the number Schucht assigned to the notebook according to the cataloging system she had devised when organizing Gramsci's papers soon after his death. This notebook has the same external characteristics as Notebooks 3 and 5.

The notebook consists of seventy-eight leaves with twenty-one lines on each side and unlined endpapers in front and back. The recto side of the front endpaper is stamped with the prison seal and with the seal of the prison warden. A signature directly underneath the latter is indecipherable; it is identical to the signature on the front endpaper of Notebook 5 and probably belongs to one of the warden's substitutes. The recto side of each leaf is numbered (1-78) in black ink and stamped with the prison seal: "Casa penale speciale di Turi" (Special prison of Turi). Gramsci wrote on both sides of the lined leaves and filled them entirely with his notes, except for the last five lines of p. 78r and all of 78v, which are blank. This notebook thus contains 155 manuscript pages. In addition, Gramsci

jotted down the following three bibliographical entries on the recto of the back endpaper:

prof. Bettanini, *Lo stile diplomatico*, Soc. ed. "Vita e Pensiero," Milan, 1930.

Paul Einzig, *Behind the Scenes of International Finance*, London, Macmillan, 1931.

Richard Lewinsohn, *L'argent dans la Politique*, N. Revue Française. Fr. 24.

In all, the notebook comprises 211 notes, or sections. Of these, 25 are crossed out but remain perfectly legible, and Gramsci later incorporated them into other notebooks; following Valentino Gerratana's denomination, these are called A texts. The other 186 notes, called B texts, were neither crossed out nor used again in other notebooks.

Most of the notes on miscellaneous topics in this notebook are based on Gramsci's more or less systematic review of publications he received in prison, some before he started this notebook and others during the same period when he was making entries in it. It appears that Gramsci started writing this notebook sometime in November or December 1930 and completed it by the end of January 1932. In §9, Gramsci cites the *Nuova Italia* issue of November 20, 1930, and, in the next note, he refers to the same date's issue of *La critica*. (These two notes are on pp. 2r and 2v of the manuscript.) About one-third of the way into the notebook, Gramsci starts reviewing some materials published in 1931: in §76 (p. 30v in the manuscript), his source of information is an article published in *Nuova antologia* on March 1, 1931; and, in §78 (p. 33r), he refers to *La nuova Italia* of January 30, 1931. When writing §89 (pp. 41r-41v), he seems to have had in front of him the *Nuova rivista storica* of May-August 1931, while, in §113 (p. 49v), one of his sources of information appears to be *Nuova rivista storica* of September-December 1931. In §179 (pp. 68v-69r) and in §181 (p. 69v), Gramsci alludes to articles published in the *Corriere della sera* of November 26 and December 2, 1931. A parenthetical remark in §197 (p. 74r) reveals that it was written in 1931. Toward the very end of the notebook, in §206 through §208 (pp. 76v-78r), Gramsci comments on articles that appeared in the *Corriere della sera* on January 7 and January 8, 1932.

In *L'officina gramsciana: Ipotesi sulla struttura dei "Quaderni del carcere"* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1984), pp. 141-42, Gianni Francioni offers the following chronology of the composition of Notebook 6:

- §§ 1-11: between November and December 1930
 12-40: December 1930
 41-74: between December 1930 and March 13, 1931
 75-76: March 1931
 77-136: between March and August 1931
 137-142: August 1931
 143-157: October 1931
 158-163: between October and November 1931
 164-172: November 1931
 173: between November and December 1931
 174-202: December 1931
 203-205: between December 1931 and January 1932
 206-211: January 1932

NOTES TO THE TEXT

§1. *Risorgimento. The events of February 1853 and the moderates of Milan*

1. Luca Beltrami, "Rievocazioni dell'Ottocento. Francesco Brioschi" (Recalling the nineteenth century. Francesco Brioschi), *Il marzocco* 35, no. 14 (April 6, 1930).

On Luca Beltrami, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 2.

2. Francesco Brioschi (1824-97), a mathematician and engineer, was also very active in politics. He had been a professor at the University of Pavia for over a decade when he was first elected to parliament in 1861. Brioschi served as secretary general for public education and was made senator in 1865. In 1863 he helped establish the polytechnic institute of Milan, which he administered for the rest of his life. His stature as an intellectual was confirmed in 1865 when he was elected president of the Lincei Academy.

3. Gramsci discusses the obsequiousness of the Milanese moderates during a period of harsh repression (including the execution of Mazzinian revolutionaries at Belfiore) by the Austrians in Notebook 1, §43, and Notebook 3, §125. See also the corresponding notes to the text: Notebook 1, §43, n. 24, and Notebook 3, §125, n. 1.

§2. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Giulio Bechi*

1. Gramsci expresses his views on Giulio Bechi and his book on Sardinia, *Caccia grossa*, in Notebook 1, §50; see also n. 6 there.

2. Mario Puccioni, "Militarismo ed italianità negli scritti di Giulio Bechi" (Militarism and the Italian spirit in the writings of Giulio Bechi), *Il marzocco* 35, no. 38 (July 13, 1930). Puccioni alludes to an article on Bechi by Guido Biagi published in *Il marzocco* in 1917 and to Ermenegildo Pistelli's book of biographical sketches, *Profili e caratteri* (Florence, 1921).

Mario Puccioni (1887-1940), a lawyer from Tuscany, was best known for his numerous books and articles on the history of the Risorgimento (a couple of which Gramsci cites in other notes), including some editions of source materials related to the national unification movement. He also had a keen interest in nature and hunting, to which he devoted a short book of memoirs, *Cacce e cacciatori di Toscana* (Turin: Vallecchi, 1934). Puccioni was an active member of the cultural circle associated with the periodical *Il Leonardo*.

Guido Biagi (1855-1925) was born and died in Florence, where for twenty-eight years he was the director of the Medici library. A founding member of the Italian Bibliographical Society, as well as a member and librarian of the Crusca Academy, he also served as the director of the literary division of the publisher Sansoni.

On Ermenegildo Pistelli, see Notebook 3, §109, n. 5.

§3. *Encyclopedic notions. Cleopatra's nose*

1. Gramsci is referring to the following segment (no. 162 in most editions) in Blaise Pascal's *Pensées* (1670): "Whoever wants to gain a thorough understanding of human vanity needs only to consider the causes and effects of love. The cause is a *je ne sais quoi* (Corneille), and the effects are frightful. This *je ne sais quoi*, an element so minute that it cannot be identified, stirs up a whole country, princes, armies, the entire world. Cleopatra's nose: had it been shorter, the whole face of the earth would have changed."

There are several dependable English translations of Pascal's work; see, for example, *Pensées*, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).

§4. *Popular literature*

1. This biographical work by the German writer Oskar Maria Graf (1894-1967), *Wir sind Gefangene* (Munich: Drei Masken, 1927), was translated into French under the title *Nous sommes prisonniers* (Paris: Gal-

limard, 1930). Gramsci, most probably, learned about the French edition of Graf's book from a short review of it (signed Ph. Neel) in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 421 (November 8, 1930).

§5. Popular literature. Serial novels

1. The bibliographical data on Henry Jagot's book and the other information in this note on the legendary (and, in the eyes of many, notorious) French detective François-Eugène Vidocq (1775-1857) are extracted from an article by Georges Mongredien, "Vidocq," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 422 (November 15, 1930). Marx alludes in passing to Vidocq's memoirs in chapter 5 of *The Holy Family*.

2. Vautrin appears in several of Honoré de Balzac's novels, including *Le père Goriot* (1834); Balzac also wrote a play entitled *Vautrin* (1840). Jean Valjean is the central character in Victor Hugo's *Les misérables* (1862). Rocambole was the fictional creation of the nineteenth-century French serial novelist Pierre-Alexis Ponson du Terrail, whom Gramsci mentioned several times in his notes on popular literature.

3. There exist several versions and editions of the *Mémoires* attributed to François-Eugène Vidocq, some of which were published during his lifetime. The full title of one such edition provides a good indication of the general nature of the contents: *Vie et aventures de Vidocq, ancien chef de la police de Sûreté: Sa naissance, son éducation, ses services militaires, ses désertions, ses divers emprisonnements et condamnations, ses évasions des bagnes et des prisons, ses amours, son mariage, ses duels, ses déguisements, ses dénonciations, ses découvertes importantes, ses relations avec la police, les arrestations qu'il a faites, etc.* (Paris, 1830). For an English version, see *Vidocq: The Personal Memoirs of the First Great Detective*, ed. and trans. Edwin Gile Rich (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935).

§6. Risorgimento. Italy in the eighteenth century

1. See the article (signed "Z") "Studi su Italia e Francia nel Settecento" (Studies on Italy and France in the eighteenth century), in the "Biblioteca di cultura" (Cultural library) section of *Il marzocco* 35, no. 20 (May 18, 1930), which is Gramsci's source of information on Henri Bédarida's book, *Parma dans la politique française au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Alcan, 1930), and on Giuseppe Ortolani's study, "Italie e France au XVIIIe siècle," in *Mélanges de littérature et d'histoire publiés par l'Union intellectuelle franco-italienne* (Paris: Leroux, 1929). This same article by "Z" also cites an article by Antonio Panella, "Parma e la Francia nella seconda metà del secolo XVIII" (Parma and France in the second half of the eighteenth century), *Il marzocco* 33, no. 20 (May 13, 1928), that refers to the "two earlier works" by Henri Bédarida: *Parma et la France de 1748 a 1789* (Paris:

Champion, 1928), and *Les premiers Bourbons de Parme et l'Espagne: 1731-1802* (Paris: Champion, 1928).

§8. *The Italian Risorgimento. The Parthenopean Republic*

1. Gramsci's source of information on Antonio Manes's book about the military exploits of Cardinal Ruffo is the article (signed "Z"), "Studi su Italia e Francia nel Settecento" (Studies on Italy and France in the eighteenth century), in the "Biblioteca di cultura" (Cultural library) section of *Il marzocco* 35, no. 20 (May 18, 1930).

2. On Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo's role in overthrowing the Parthenopean Republic and restoring the Bourbon monarchy in Naples, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 6.

3. See Notebook 2, §62, which, however, is not entitled "Past and present" but "Joseph De Maistre" and does not refer to the "polemics" against Settembrini, although it does comment on the effort to rehabilitate Solaro della Margarita through the republication of his *Memorandum storico-politico*.

On Count Clemente Solaro della Margarita, see Notebook 2, §62, n. 4.

Luigi Settembrini (1813-76) was very active from an early stage in the antimonarchical republican movement in Naples. In 1847 he publicly attacked the Bourbon government in a political pamphlet, *Protesta del popolo delle Due Sicilie* (Protest from the people of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). A founding member of the secret society *Unità Italiana*, he was arrested and imprisoned after the collapse of the 1848 revolution. At the end of a long trial, he received a death sentence that, however, was commuted to life imprisonment. In 1859 he was released on condition that he emigrate to America, but during a stop in Ireland he managed to disembark from the ship in which he was being deported and made his way to Turin instead. Settembrini returned to Naples in 1861, as a university professor of Italian literature. He was named senator in 1873. His best-known works are *Lezioni di letteratura italiana* (Lectures on Italian literature) and the unfinished memoirs *Ricordanze della mia vita*.

4. The Sanfedisti were the bands of armed peasants organized by Cardinal Ruffo as his "Army of the Holy Faith."

5. These allusions to Niccolò Rodolico's writings are drawn from the article (signed "Z"), "Studi su Italia e Francia nel Settecento."

Gramsci also cites Niccolò Rodolico's book on the people's role during the early stages of the Risorgimento movement in southern Italy—*Il popolo agli inizi del Risorgimento nell'Italia meridionale* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1925)—in Notebook 3, §107.

On Niccolò Rodolico, see Notebook 2, §62, n. 1.

§9. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Lina Pietravalle*

1. Lina Pietravalle's novel, *Le catene* (The chains), was reviewed by Giulio Marzot in *La nuova Italia* 1, no. 11 (November 20, 1930): 464–65.

Lina Pietravalle (1890–1956) wrote novels and short stories portraying peasants and their ways of life in the Molise region. She also wove elements of the local dialects into her narratives. Pietravalle's depiction of the ostensibly primordial passions of her rural characters bears some superficial resemblances to certain features commonly associated with verismo, the Italian novelistic tradition of which Verga was the major exponent.

Giulio Marzot (1901–75), a literary critic and professor of Italian literature at the University of Bologna, wrote for various important literary journals, including *Belfagor* and *Nuova antologia*. Two of his books and many of his essays deal with Verga and the verismo movement.

2. See Giulio Marzot, *L'arte del Verga: Note ed analisi* (Verga's art: Notes and analyses), published by the Istituto Magisteriale of Vicenza in 1930.

On Giovanni Verga, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 28.

3. Carl Hagenbeck, *Von Tieren und Menschen: Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen* (Berlin: Vita, 1908). Gramsci had probably come across this book many years before his imprisonment, which would explain why he mistakenly remembers its title as being *Io e le belve* (The beasts and I). Hagenbeck's autobiographical account of his experiences as an animal tamer and merchant was translated into Italian as *Le mie memorie di domatore e mercante* (Milan: Quintini, 1910). For an abridged English version of this work, see *Beasts and Men*, trans. Hugh S. Elliot and A.G. Thacker (London: Longmans, Green, 1909).

Carl Hagenbeck (1844–1913) was an internationally famous animal trainer and trader. He traveled widely with his collection of wild animals, publicly displaying his techniques of befriending and controlling them. He is credited with pioneering the idea of putting animals on display in open-air zoos rather than cages.

§10. *Past and present*

1. Otto Westphal's *Feinde Bismarcks: Geistige Grundlagen der deutschen Opposition, 1848–1918* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1930) was reviewed by Benedetto Croce in *La critica* 28, no. 6 (November 20, 1930): 453–54. Taking his cue from the opening chapter ("Der Fall 'Emil Ludwig'") of Westphal's book, Croce makes some deprecatory remarks about the kind of popular treatment of history exemplified by the very successful works of the German writer Emil Ludwig. Croce belittles such works and labels them "bellettristica storica" (historical belles-lettres or bellettristic

history)—in other words, dilettantish as opposed to being professional, scholarly historiography.

Emil Ludwig (1881-1948), who started his career as a foreign correspondent for a German newspaper during World War I, achieved international success with his numerous historical-biographical works that appealed to a large, popular readership in several countries. Many of Ludwig's works were translated into English, including his novel *Diana* (1929) and his biographies of Napoleon, Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Goethe, Christ, Lincoln, Cleopatra, Roosevelt, and Beethoven. His interviews with Mussolini were published in several languages, including English: *Talks with Mussolini*, trans. E. Paul and C. Paul (Boston: Little, Brown, 1933). Gramsci owned a copy of the French translation of Ludwig's biography of Wilhelm II; see Notebook 1, §117, n. 1.

2. Croce published the text of "Antistoricismo" (Antihistoricism), which he wrote for the Philosophy Congress held at Oxford in 1930, in *La critica* 28, no. 6 (November 20, 1930):401-9—that is, in the same issue as his review of Westphal's book that Gramsci cites at the beginning of this note. "Antistoricismo" was also published in a book, together with another text on modern philosophy that Croce wrote for the Congress of Philosophy held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1926; see B. Croce, *Punti di orientamento della filosofia moderna: Antistoricismo* (Bari: Laterza, 1930), of which Gramsci had a copy.

3. A central aspect of Giovanni Gentile's philosophy of actualism was the identification of history with philosophy, together with the notion that actual thinking creates being. For Gentile's philosophy of "actual idealism," see, inter alia, his systematic exposition in *Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro* (Pisa: Mariotti, 1916), translated into English as *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, trans. and intro. H. Wildon Carr (London: Macmillan, 1922).

4. See Luigi Einaudi, "Se esista, storicamente, la pretesa ripugnanza degli economisti verso il concetto dello Stato produttore: Lettera aperta a R. Benini" (Does it exist, historically, the supposed repugnance of economists toward the concept of state as producer: An open letter to R. Benini), *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 3, no. 5 (September-October 1930): 302-14. This article is followed (in the same issue of *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica*) by a response from Rodolfo Benini, "Coesione e solidarietà" (Cohesiveness and solidarity, pp. 315-20); and by Ugo Spirito's article "La storia della economia e il concetto di Stato" (The history of economics and the concept of State, pp. 321-24).

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §111, n. 1; and on Ugo Spirito, see Notebook 1, §132, n. 2.

§12. *The state and regulated society*

1. Ugo Spirito, "La libertà economica" (Economic freedom), *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 3, no. 5 (September–October 1930): 292–301.

On Ugo Spirito, the cofounder with Arnaldo Volpicelli of the journal *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica*, see Notebook 1, §132, n. 2.

2. See Gramsci's observations on Ludovico Zuccolo and his utopia, *Il Belluzzi*, in Notebook 5, §158, and nn. 1 and 3 there.

3. Gramsci refers to this opinion of Maurras's in Notebook 5, §144.

§13. *The medieval communes as an economic-corporative phase of modern development*

1. Bernardino Barbadoro's tome on the finances (and specifically on the system of direct taxation and the public debt) of the Florentine Republic, *Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina: Imposta diretta e debito pubblico fino all'istituzione del Monte* (Florence: Olschki, 1929), was reviewed by Antonio Panella in *Pègaso* 2, no. 7 (July 1930): 110–12. Panella's review is the source of the bibliographical data and all the other information on Barbadoro's work contained in this note.

Antonio Panella (1878–1954), an administrator of archives with a historicist orientation, spent almost his entire career in Florence, where he also conducted important research on primary sources pertaining to the history of Florence and of the Medicis. His noteworthy work on Machiavelli includes an edition of Machiavelli's complete works (published by Rizzoli of Milan in 1939) and *Gli antimachiavellici* (Florence: Sansoni, 1943).

2. Giuseppe Canestrini (1807–70) produced a large body of work on various aspects of medieval and early Renaissance Italian history, as well as on the Risorgimento. The volume to which Gramsci alludes here is *La scienza e l'arte di Stato: Desunta dagli atti ufficiali della Repubblica fiorentina e dei Medici. Ordinamenti economici—della finanza* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1862); it is a study of official documents relating to the taxation of real estate and personal property in Florence during the republican period and under the Medicis.

3. Two of the works by the German historian Heinrich Sieveking (1871–1946) that deal directly with finance, banking, and accounting in Genoa between the thirteenth and the fifteenth century are *Aus genueser Rechnungs- und Steuerbuchern: Ein Beitrag zur mittelalterlichen Handels- und Vermögensstatistik* (Vienna: Im Kommission bei A. Holder, 1909); and *Genueser Finanzwesen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Casa di S. Giorgio*, 2 vols. (Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr, 1898–99).

4. A professor at the Venice Institute for Advanced Studies in Economics and Commerce, Fabio Besta (1845–1923) was best known for his work

on accountancy, but he also conducted some historical research on Venetian finance.

Roberto Cessi (1885-1969) published numerous books on the history of Venice, including a collection of essays on the politics and economics of fourteenth-century Venice, *Politica ed economia di Venezia nel trecento* (Rome: Storia e Letteratura, 1952), and an edition of documents on monetary policies in the Venetian Republic during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, *Problemi monetari veneziani* (Padua: Milani, 1937).

Among the many volumes that Gino Luzzatto (1878-1964) wrote on the economic history of Italy from antiquity to the modern era, three are devoted entirely to Venice: one is an economic history of Venice between the eleventh and the sixteenth century, *Storia economica di Venezia dall'XI al XVI secolo* (Venice: Centro Internazionale delle Arti e del Costume, 1961); another is on the public debt of the Venetian Republic from the twelfth century to the end of the fifteenth, *Il debito pubblico della Repubblica di Venezia dagli ultimi decenni del XII secolo alla fine del XV*, 2d ed. (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1963); and the third is a collection of essays on Venetian economic history, *Studi di storia economica veneziana* (Padua: Milani, 1954).

5. The term "Monte" referred to the total amount (the "heap" or "mountain") of debt incurred by a government; the use of the term in this sense first emerged in the maritime republics of Genoa and Venice. As an institution, the Monte was something between a treasury and a bank: it kept an account of the amounts of money borrowed by the government and it made interest payments to the creditors.

Walter de Brienne, titular duke of Athens, governed Florence for brief periods on two separate occasions. In 1325-1326, the Florentines were in serious danger of being overwhelmed by their Ghibelline enemies, and, as a protective measure, they conferred sovereignty over their city on Charles, the duke of Calabria, son of the king of Naples, Robert of Anjou. However, as Machiavelli explains in chapter 6 of his *History of Florence*, "Charles, being engaged in the wars of Sicily and therefore unable to undertake the sovereignty of the city, sent in his stead Walter, by birth a Frenchman and duke of Athens. He, as viceroy, took possession of the city." In July 1326, Charles himself entered the city; his authoritarian rule and the enormous amounts of money he extracted from the Florentines rendered him most unpopular. His death was a cause for celebration. For over a decade afterward, Florence prospered in an atmosphere of relative tranquility. In 1340, however, it started to experience serious difficulties again. Strife among the various factions, a very severe financial crisis (including the collapse of the Bardi and Peruzzi banks in 1342, caused in large measure by the king of England, Edward III, defaulting on his debts), and the failure of a crucial effort to acquire dominion over the city of Lucca brought the city

to the brink of disaster. As they had done before, the Florentines turned to the king of Naples for help, and Robert of Anjou sent them Walter de Brienne, duke of Athens. Walter had himself proclaimed prince of Florence for life, but his despotic rule quickly became intolerable, and after a year in office he was driven out of the city.

On the "signoria," see Notebook 5, §123, n. 9.

6. Marx discusses the importance of public—that is, national—debt in chapter 31 ("The Genesis of the Industrialist Capitalist") of book 1 of *Capital*. Among other things, he writes:

The system of public credit, i.e. of national debts, the origins of which are to be found in Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took possession of Europe as a whole during the period of manufacture. The colonial system, with its maritime trade and its commercial wars, served as a forcing house for the credit system. Thus it first took root in Holland. The national debt, i.e. the alienation of the state—whether the state is despotic, constitutional or republican—marked the capitalist era with its stamp.

...
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter's wand, it endows unproductive money with the power of creation and thus turns it into capital, without forcing it to expose itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury. The state's creditors actually give nothing away, for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands just as so much hard cash would. (Karl Marx, *Capital*, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Penguin, 1990], 1:919)

§14. *The international function of Italian intellectuals. Monsignor Della Casa*

1. See the second part of Benedetto Croce's study "La lirica del Cinquecento" (The fifteenth-century lyric) in *La critica* 28, no. 6 (November 20, 1930): 410–29.

Galateo, a treatise on etiquette and polite conversation, is named in honor of Galeazzo (Galathea) Florimonte, bishop of Sessa, who prompted Giovanni Della Casa (1503–56) to write it. Della Casa, who was named bishop of Benevento and served as papal nuncio in Venice, had a successful ecclesiastical career that culminated in his appointment as secretary of state by Pope Paul IV. A worldly man given to sensual pleasures, Della Casa also produced a diverse body of writing, including a volume of lyrical

poetry, *Rime*, and political works, such as the *Orazioni politiche* (Political discourses) and, in Latin, *De officiis inter potentiores et tenuiores amicos*. The latter work was translated into English in the seventeenth century; see *The Arts of Grandeur and Submission; or, A discourse concerning the behaviour of great men towards their inferiors, and of inferior personages towards men of greater quality*, trans. Henry Stubbe, 2d ed. (London: William Lee, 1670). It was, however, *Galateo* that brought Della Casa widespread renown. Written between 1550 and 1555, it was published in 1558 and first translated into English by Robert Peterson in 1576. For a modern English translation, see *Galateo: A Renaissance Treatise on Manners*, 3d ed., rev., ed., and trans. Konrad Eisenbichler and Kenneth R. Bartlett (Toronto: Center for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1994).

2. See Gramsci's remarks on Alberti and Castiglione in Notebook 5, §55 and §91, and the corresponding Notes to the Text.

3. Gramsci is quoting Benedetto Croce's description of *De officiis* in "La lirica del Cinquecento," p. 414.

§15. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. Ugo Bernasconi, "Parole alla buona gente" (Words for respectable people), *Pègaso* 2, no. 8 (August 1930): 186-94. The two aphorisms quoted by Gramsci appear on p. 188 and p. 190, respectively.

Ugo Bernasconi (1874-1960), a painter and illustrator, was also an art critic and a writer of fiction and nonfiction. Furthermore, he translated some of the aphoristic writings of Pascal, Bossuet, and La Rochefoucauld and composed hundreds of aphorisms of his own. A collection of Bernasconi's aphorisms was published posthumously with some of his illustrations; see *Parole alla buona gente*, ed. Clelia Martignoni (Pistoia: Niccolai, 1988).

§16. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Italian national culture*

1. Ugo Ojetti, "Lettera a Umberto Fracchia sulla critica" (Letter on criticism to Umberto Fracchia), *Pègaso* 2, no. 8 (August 1930): 207-11. This open letter/article by Ojetti is part of a protracted controversy (already mentioned by Gramsci in Notebook 3, §63) that arose when Umberto Fracchia, in an open letter, "A S.E. Volpe" (To H[is] E[xcellency] Volpe) in *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 25 (June 22, 1930), criticized a speech given by Gioacchino Volpe in his capacity as secretary of the Italian Academy. Volpe's speech was published as an article, "Il primo anno dell'Accademia d'Italia" (The first year of the Italian Academy) in *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1398 (June 16, 1930): 490-96. Gramsci refers again to this speech and the polemic it generated in Notebook 6, §38; he also quotes a brief

extract from Volpe's speech in Notebook 7, §66. The controversy generated numerous articles in *L'Italia letteraria*, as well as in other newspapers and periodicals. Ugo Ojetti intervened with his "Lettera a Umberto Fracchia sulla critica," which is discussed here. Fracchia, in turn, responded to Ojetti with "Ojetti e la critica" (Ojetti and criticism) in *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 32 (August 10, 1930).

On Ugo Ojetti, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 4; on Umberto Fracchia, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 18; and on Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

2. The French critic Albert Thibaudet (1874–1936) proposed this tripartite classification of criticism in his book *Physiologie de la critique* (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1930); see especially pp. 20–21.

3. Gioacchino Volpe's statements are quoted in Ojetti, "Lettera a Umberto Fracchia sulla critica."

4. See Notebook 7, §66.

§17. *Popular literature. The detective novel*

1. Aldo Sorani, "Conan Doyle e la fortuna del romanzo poliziesco" (Conan Doyle and the fortunes of the detective novel), *Pègaso* 2, no. 8 (August 1930): 212–20.

2. Gramsci articulates his views on Chesterton and Arthur Conan Doyle at somewhat greater length in a letter to Tatiana Schucht, October 6, 1930:

Chesterton has written a most delicate caricature of detective stories rather than detective stories per se. Father Brown is a Catholic who pokes fun at the mechanical thought processes of the Protestants and the book is basically an apologia of the Roman Catholic Church as against the Anglican Church. Sherlock Holmes is the "Protestant" detective who finds the end of the criminal skein by starting from the outside, relying on science, on experimental method, on induction. Father Brown is the Catholic priest who through the refined psychological experiences offered by confession and by the persistent activity of the priests' moral casuistry, though not neglecting science and experimentation, but relying especially on deduction and introspection, totally defeats Sherlock Holmes, makes him look like a pretentious little boy, shows up his narrowness and pettiness. Moreover, Chesterton is a great artist while Conan Doyle was a mediocre writer, even though he was knighted for literary merit; thus in Chesterton there is a stylistic gap between the content, the detective story plot, and the form, and therefore a subtle irony with regard to the subject being dealt with, which renders his stories so delicious. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from*

Prison, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 1:354)

3. Gabriel Gale is the protagonist in the eight stories that make up G. K. Chesterton's *The Poet and the Lunatics*, originally published in 1929.

4. *La morte civile* (Civil death), first staged in 1861, was the most successful work of the prolific Italian playwright Paolo Giacometti (1816-82), most of whose eighty some comedies and tragedies betray a very strong French influence. The play is about a man serving a life sentence who manages to escape and discovers that his wife and daughter had been able to rebuild their lives successfully in his absence. Rather than disrupt their happiness, he commits suicide.

The melodrama *Les crochets du père Martin* by Eugène Cormon (1810-1903) and Eugène Grangé (1810-87) was performed for the first time in Paris in 1858. Its popularity spread well beyond France—it was even performed on Broadway in 1907, under the title *Papa Martin*.

Gramsci attended a performance of *La gerla di papà Martino* (the Italian title of the play) at the Alfieri theater in Turin and reviewed it in the March 16, 1916, issue of *Avanti!*. Gramsci's review is full of praise for the actor, Ermete Novelli, who played the role of Martin, and it contains a number of observations that anticipate some of his comments in this note.

§18. *Father Bresciani's progeny. The national sentiment of writers*

1. Ugo Ojetti, "Lettera a Piero Parini sugli scrittori sedentari" (Letter to Piero Parini on sedentary writers), *Pègaso* 2, no. 9 (September 1930): 340-42; the quoted passage is on p. 341.

On Ugo Ojetti, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 4.

§19. *Encyclopedic notions. On truth or on telling the truth in politics*

1. Gramsci read this anecdote in an article by Francesco Flora, "Freud e i motti di spirito" (Freud and jokes), *Pègaso* 2, no. 9 (September 1930): 348-56; the anecdote is recounted on p. 348. Flora cites as his source a French translation of Sigmund Freud's *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten* (1905). For an English translation of the original, see *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 8, *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1960), p. 115.

§20. *Problems in linguistics. Giulio Bertoni*

1. Giulio Bertoni's book *Linguaggio e poesia* (Language and poetry) was reviewed by Natalino Sapegno in *Pègaso* 2, no. 9 (September 1930): 368-69.

Natalino Sapegno (1901–90), literary historian and critic, was born in Turin, where, in his formative years, he was a friend of Piero Gobetti. His early work betrays a strong Crocean influence, but after the war his scholarly work had more of a Marxist tincture. A celebrated literary scholar and a member of the Lincei Academy, he would later also write some essays on Gramsci.

See also Gramsci's earlier note on Bertoni, Notebook 3, §74, and the accompanying Notes to the Text.

2. See Notebook 3, §74, n. 6.

3. "Pomo" is Italian for "apple."

Carlo Dossi (1849–1910), a writer with a distinctive, innovative style, a lively sense of humor, and an experimental and often satirical bent, was loosely associated with the nineteenth-century Milanese *scapigliatura* (bohemianism) movement. Gramsci owned a volume of his selected writings, *Opere di Carlo Dossi* (Milan: Treves, 1910). The anecdote recounted here is from the second section of the third chapter of Dossi's 1868 ironic (and somewhat autobiographical) narrative on childhood *L'altrieri: Nero su bianco* (The day before yesterday: Black on white); the chapter is entitled "Panche di scuola" (School benches).

§21. *The cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals*

1. Domenico Petri, "Politici e moralisti del Seicento" (Seventeenth-century politicians and moralists), *Pègaso* 2, no. 8 (August 1930): 229–36.

Domenico Petri (1902–31) was a close follower of Croce. Among other things, he published a volume, *Note sul barocco* (Rieti: Bibliotheca, 1929), that was meant to be a companion to Benedetto Croce's *Storia dell'età barocca*.

Benedetto Croce's study of the baroque period in Italy, *Storia dell'età barocca* (Bari: Laterza, 1929), was among the books Gramsci had while in prison at Turi.

§22. *The English and religion*

1. "L'opera della grazia in una recente conversione dall'anglicanismo" (The work of grace in a recent conversion from Anglicanism), *La civiltà cattolica* 81 (January 4, 1930): 33–49.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 38. Rather than translating Gramsci's Italian version of this quotation, I have taken it directly from Vernon Johnson, *One Lord, One Faith: An Explanation* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1929), p. 49.

3. *Ibid.* This is a paraphrase of a passage in Johnson, *One Lord, One Faith*, p. 51; Gramsci's interpolations are in brackets.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 36. This is a paraphrase of pp. 22–24 in Johnson, *One Lord, One Faith*; Gramsci's interpolations are in brackets.

article (already analyzed)⁴ that endorses a part of Toffanin's thesis but only in order to be in a better position to oppose it. It seems to me that the question of what humanism was cannot be resolved, except within a more comprehensive framework of the history of Italian intellectuals and their function in Europe. Toffanin has also written a book on the *Fine dell'umanesimo*, as well as a volume on *Il Cinquecento* in the Collezione Vallardi.⁵

§<161>. *Encyclopedic notions*. "Ascaro." This is what they used to call the deputies who belonged to the parliamentary majorities and had neither a program nor a defined course of action: that is, deputies always ready to defect.¹ The word is connected to the early encounters with indigenous mercenary troops in Eritrea. Similarly, the word "*crumiro*" is connected to the French occupation of Tunisia that was carried out under the pretext of driving back the Krumiri tribe that was raiding Algeria from Tunisia to commit plunder. It would be interesting to find out who introduced the word into the vocabulary of trade unionists.²

Cf. Notebook 26, §10.

§26. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Pirandello*

1. Between 1916 and 1920 (and therefore not only during the war but after it as well), Gramsci wrote close to two hundred articles in his regular theater column ("Cronache teatrali") in the Turin edition of *Avanti!* During that period, he reviewed performances of the following plays by Pirandello (followed by date of publication in *Avanti!*): *Pensaci Giacomino!* March 24, 1917; *Liolà*, April 4, 1917; *Così è (se vi pare)*, October 5, 1917; *Il piacere dell'onestà*, November 2, 1917; *'A berretta ccu li ciancianeddi*, February 27, 1918; *Il giuoco delle parti*, February 6, 1919; *L'innesto*, March 29, 1919; *La ragione degli altri*, January 13, 1920; *Come prima, meglio di prima*, April 8, 1920; *Cecé*, December 16, 1920. Six of these reviews—*Pensaci Giacomino!* *Liolà*, *Così è (se vi pare)*, *Il piacere dell'onestà*, *Il giuoco delle parti*, and *La ragione degli altri*—have been translated into English in Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985): 77–86.

In his letter of March 19, 1927, Gramsci told Tatiana Schucht of his abiding interest in Pirandello and of his wish to write a book about his plays: "A study of Pirandello's theater and of the transformation of Italian theatrical taste that Pirandello represented and helped to form. Did you know that I discovered and contributed to the popularity of Pirandello's theater long before Adriano Tilgher? I wrote about Pirandello from 1915 to 1920, enough to put together a book of 200 pages, and at the time my judgments were original and without precedent: Pirandello was either amiably tolerated or openly derided" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 1:84).

2. Gramsci's own review of Pirandello's *L'innesto* (which was first staged in Milan in January 1919), though it conveys quite clearly the crux of the plot on which the moral and philosophical interest of the play depends, was not favorable. The concluding paragraph of Gramsci's review is especially harsh: "Each of the three acts is labored; they are dry and dense, and they run on. The theme is set forth, but it is not enlivened; the passion and the folly are presupposed, but they are not represented. Pirandello has not even provided one of his typical dramatic 'conversations,' which may not count for much in the history of art but which have a very important function in the history of Italian culture."

No documents or oral accounts shed light on what Gramsci refers to as "Berrini's offers." Gramsci wrote generally favorable reviews of three plays by Nino Berrini (1880–1962), all of them in his theater column in *Avanti!*: *La signora innamorata*, December 5, 1918; *Una donna moderna*,

July 5, 1919; and *Il beffardo*, April 4, 1920. Gramsci also makes some observations on Berrini's formulaic techniques of playwriting in Notebook 14, §61.

3. Gramsci's review of Pirandello's *Liola*, in the *Avanti!* of April 4, 1917, opens with a sardonic comment on its poor reception by the theatergoing public:

The new three-act play by Luigi Pirandello was not a success at the Alfieri [theater in Turin]. It did not even meet with that success a play needs to make a profit. In spite of this, though, *Liola* remains a fine play, perhaps the best that the Sicilian dialect theater has created. The failure of the third act, which caused the work to be momentarily withdrawn, was due to extrinsic reasons: *Liola* does not end in the traditional way, with a knifing or a marriage. Therefore, it was not received enthusiastically. But it could not have ended any other way than it did and therefore it will eventually find favor. (*Selections from the Cultural Writings*: 79)

Similarly, in another of his theater columns—*Avanti!* March 29, 1918—Gramsci writes: "Pirandello's *Liola* [is] one of the most beautiful modern plays that the crass pseudomoralizing critics have done almost everything to eliminate from the repertory."

Gramsci also discusses Pirandello at some length in Notebook 14, §15.

4. "Lazzaro ossia un mito di Luigi Pirandello" (Lazarus or a myth of Luigi Pirandello), in the "Rivista della stampa" (Review of the press) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81 (April 5, 1930): 52-57. This article, ostensibly occasioned by Pirandello's play *Lazarus* (1929), denounces the playwright as a "master of unbelief and immorality, ruinous to young people who are already being led astray by the materialistic or idealist encroachment of modern art and philosophy."

§27. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Supercity and supercountry*

1. Massimo Bontempelli, "Il Novecentismo è vivo o è morto?" (Is twentieth-centuryism alive or is it dead?), *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 46 (November 16, 1930).

"Novecentismo" in the title of Massimo Bontempelli's open letter refers to the movement associated with the periodical '900 (i.e., *Novecento*, which is Italian for "twentieth century") that was founded by Bontempelli and Curzio Malaparte in 1926. For the first two years, the periodical was published in French as *Cahiers d'Italie et d'Europe*. The writers, artists, and critics linked to this movement, several of whom had earlier been attracted to futurism, regarded themselves as part of the cosmopolitan avant-garde or modernist movement in the arts that was sweeping Western Europe. De-

spite their vaunted cosmopolitanism (hence the "Stracittà," or supercity, label), they were nationalist and decidedly fascist. Curzio Malaparte had a falling-out with Bontempelli very early on, and he quickly established close ties with the weekly *Il selvaggio*, which had been founded by Mino Maccari in 1924. No less nationalist or fascist, Maccari and his circle decried what they regarded as the corrupting influence of foreign fashions. Anticosmopolitan and antimodern, they sought to defend and promote Italy's rural character and mores—hence "Strapaese," or supercountry. Bontempelli's open letter, discussed by Gramsci in this note, was just one salvo in a bitter polemic that filled the pages of many cultural publications of the time.

On Massimo Bontempelli, see Notebook 1, §136, n. 1.

Gian Battista Angioletti (1896–1961) was coeditor with Curzio Malaparte of *L'Italia letteraria* between 1928 and 1931 and continued as sole editor until 1934.

2. *L'Italiano*, one of the organs of the supercountry movement with which Curzio Malaparte was closely associated for some years, was founded by Leo Longanesi (1905–57) in 1926.

On Curzio Malaparte, see Notebook 1, §9, n. 1.

3. The newspaper *Il mondo*, which had been critical of fascism (and edited for a time by Giovanni Amendola), was suppressed by the regime in 1926.

Corrado Alvaro (1895–1956), novelist and essayist, started his career as a journalist. After working for the *Corriere della sera*, he became the Paris correspondent for *Il mondo*. His best-known novel, *Gente in Aspromonte*, was published in 1930.

§28. Popular literature

1. See "I tre moschettieri" (The three musketeers), in the "Rassegna della stampa" (Review of the press) section of *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 45 (November 16, 1930).

On Filippo Burzio, see Notebook 1, §28, n. 3.

2. See Notebook 5, §54. Gramsci touches on the same topic again in Notebook 6, §134.

§29. Father Bresciani's progeny

1. "Cose viste" (Things witnessed) was the title of a regular column by Ugo Ojetti in the *Corriere della sera*. It first appeared in October 1921 and was continued until 1941. In 1923 the columns were collected in a homonymous volume published by Treves of Milan. Other volumes and reeditions followed over the years.

On Ugo Ojetti, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 4.

2. Giuseppe Prezzolini, *Mi pare . . .* (Florence: Delta, 1925), p. 16. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison.

On Giuseppe Prezzolini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§30. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. *L'idea nazionale*, the mouthpiece of the Italian National Association, started as a weekly in 1911 and became a daily in 1914. In 1926, three years after the Nationalists merged with the Fascists, *L'idea nazionale* was absorbed by *La tribuna*, which like other major newspapers of the time had come under Fascist control.

§31. *Past and present*

1. Giuseppe Prezzolini, *Mi pare . . .* (Florence: Delta, 1925), p. 69. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison.

On Giuseppe Prezzolini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§32. *Brief notes on Indian culture*

1. Frédéric Lefèvre, "Une heure avec Aldous Huxley," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 420 (November 1, 1930).

A translation of the passage transcribed by Gramsci:

What do you think of the revolts and all that is going on in India?

I believe that civilization has gotten off on the wrong foot there. They have created top universities but no primary schools. They thought it was enough to enlighten one caste that would then be able to elevate the masses, but the results have not been very good, in my view. Only the Kshatris and the Brahmins have benefited from Western civilization. Once they have been educated, they stop working and become dangerous. They are the ones who want to take over the government. As a result of visiting India, I was better able to understand the difference between a *villein* and a *cardinal* in the Middle Ages. India is a country where the superiority of divine right is still accepted by the untouchables, who acknowledge their own unworthiness.

2. See Notebook 1, §25, n. 13

§33. *The intellectuals*

1. The series of interviews published in *Les nouvelles littéraires* was collected in five volumes that appeared under the title *Une heure avec . . .* in the book series "Les documents bleus" published by the Nouvelle revue

française (NRF) in Paris. Gramsci learned about these volumes from the "Correspondence" section in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 420 (November 1, 1930).

On December 15, 1930, Gramsci wrote to Tatiana Schucht: "The periodicals *Pègaso* and *Les nouvelles littéraires* have always arrived regularly, and I do find them interesting; you can confirm the subscription with the bookstore."

§34. *Georges Renard*

1. Gramsci extracted the information on Georges Renard (1847–1930) from the obituary published in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 419 (October 25, 1930).

The full title of Renard's "theoretical book" mentioned by Gramsci is *Le régime socialiste: Principes de son organisation politique et économique* (Paris: Alcan, 1921).

"Les cités imaginaires" was, in fact, the title of a course rather than a book by Renard.

§35. *Italian Culture*

1. See Curzio Suckert, *Italia barbara* [Barbarian Italy] (Turin: Gobetti, 1925), and *L'arcitaliano* [The arch-Italian] (Rome: La Voce, 1928); the latter is a book of poems.

Kurt Erich Suckert published his early works under the name Curzio Suckert but later adopted the name Curzio Malaparte by which he is now generally known. See Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

2. Arturo Foà (1877–1944), a poet and publicist, was a fierce nationalist who vigorously supported Italy's intervention in the world war, a founder of Alleanza Nazionale in Turin in 1917, and later an ardent Fascist. Although he was Jewish, he remained a Fascist even after the publication of the Manifesto of Fascist Racism in 1938 and the enactment of the discriminatory anti-Semitic racial laws that followed it. In 1943 Foà was captured and deported from Turin to Auschwitz, where he died.

In his journalistic writings, Gramsci had criticized Foà on a number of occasions. In "La predica di Frate Agostino Gemelli" (The sermon of Brother Agostino Gemelli) in the Piedmont edition of *Avanti!* April 29, 1916, Gramsci remarks that "in seven lines one of the bards of Turin, Arturo Foà, managed to squeeze in twelve Latin tribes—and that's not counting the little details." A book of verse by Foà, *Mentre la guerra dura* (1917), elicited a scathing critique by Gramsci in one of his "Sotto la Mole" columns; see "Letteratura Italica," *Avanti!* April 19, 1917. It was, however, Foà's exaltation of militarism and war and his self-promoting patriotism that elicited Gramsci's harshest attack on him. In an article dripping with

sarcasm—"Disciplina" in the "Sotto la mole" column of *Avanti!* April 25, 1918—Gramsci wrote, among other things: "Arturo Foà did not go to the front line. It is true. But he was on the verge of going. Do not be malicious! Do not think of the choruses at the opera that sing 'Andiamo, andiam' [let's go, we're going] for half an hour and then retire behind the wings! Arturo Foà was on the verge, but while he was on the verge an order came from above [to go back]—and Foà obeyed."

§36. *Lorianism. Trombetti and Etruscan*

1. Luigi Pareti, "Alla vigilia del 10 Congresso Internazionale etrusco" (On the eve of the 1st International Etruscan Congress), *Il marzocco* 33, no. 18 (April 29, 1928); "Dopo il Congresso etrusco" (After the Etruscan Congress), *Il marzocco* 33, no. 20 (May 13, 1928); "Consensi e dissensi storici archeologici al Congresso etrusco" (Historical and archaeological agreements and disagreements at the Etruscan Congress), *Il marzocco* 33, no. 21 (May 20, 1928).

The first International Etruscan Congress was held in Florence on April 27–May 3, 1928. Gramsci writes about it in Notebook 3, §86. For the connection between Alfredo Trombetti and Etruscan studies, alluded to in the title of this note, see Notebook 3, §156.

On Luigi Pareti, see Notebook 3, §86, n. 3.

§37. *Past and present*

1. See Mario Missiroli, "Gli studi classici" (Classical studies), *L'Italia letteraria* 1, no. 31 (November 3, 1929); "Lo studio del latino" (The study of Latin), *L'Italia letteraria* 1, no. 32 (November 10, 1929); and "Abbasso l'estetica" (Down with aesthetics), *L'Italia letteraria* 1, no. 33 (November 17, 1929).

On Mario Missiroli, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

§38. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. Gramsci is referring to Notebook 6, §16. For all the bibliographical information on Fracchia's open letter, as well as Gioacchino Volpe's speech, see Notebook 6, §16, n. 1.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

2. Giuseppe Giusti (1809–50), a Tuscan poet, is remembered mostly for his ironic wit and his satires against all forms of demagoguery and corruption and especially against Austrian imperial rule.

3. See Notebook 3, §63, n. 4.

David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith point out: "The publication of foreign works and translations increased under the regime. 818 were

published in 1935 as against 443 in 1932, and a total of 2,849 translated books came out in 1932–36." See A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), p. 253n.

4. Gramsci read Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (first published in Germany in 1928) in a French translation: *À l'ouest rien de nouveau*, trans. A. Hella and O. Bournac (Paris: Stock, 1929). It is listed among the "Books delivered from Turi to Carlo on 11 November 1929" in the manuscript of Notebook 1; see 1:369.

5. See Notebook 6, §16.

6. On Carolina Invernizio, see Notebook 3, §63, n. 11.

§39. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. Gramsci is here recalling something he had read many years earlier and had mentioned in one of his articles, specifically in "La mano dello straniero" (The hand of the foreigner), *L'ordine nuovo*, March 3, 1922: "Before the war, as Bourget put it, there were three bulwarks of 'classical civilization' in Europe: the Vatican, the Prussian General Staff, and the British House of Lords."

On Paul Bourget, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 4.

§40. *Past and present. The English government*

1. Gramsci very often uses "inglese" (English) where one would normally use "britannico" (British), although he does occasionally use the latter. Here, as elsewhere in this edition, it has been deemed preferable not to "correct" this idiosyncrasy.

2. See *Rassegna settimanale della stampa estera*, 5, no. 49 (December 9, 1930): 2752–53.

In 1930 Ramsay Muir also published a book on the same topic: *How Britain Is Governed: A Critical Analysis of Modern Developments in the British System of Government* (London: Constable, 1930).

3. Gramsci makes a similar point about Lord Carson in Notebook 1, §43. In his preprison writings, Gramsci mentions Lord Carson briefly in "I contadini e la dittatura del proletariato" (The peasants and the dictatorship of the proletariat), *L'unità*, September 17, 1926, and at some greater length in "Russia, Italia, e altri paesi" (Russia, Italy, and other countries), *L'unità*, September 26, 1926. The relevant passage from the second article: "In 1914 . . . the English parliament was checkmated by a simple 'detail': Lord Carson armed 100,000 soldiers in Ulster to oppose the implementation of the law on Irish freedom. The regular army, made up of professional mercenaries, refused to march against Carson, who ended up the victor. Yet, during the war, the same parliament

appointed Lord Carson minister, though he was guilty of a coup d'état and high treason."

§41. *Religion*

1. Gramsci transcribed this quotation from Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem* (the parenthetical interjections are his) from the preface of a book on the history of religions by Nicola Turchi, *Manuale di storia delle religioni*, rev. ed. (Turin: Bocca, 1921). Gramsci had a copy of this book, which was sent to him toward the end of 1926 (the invoice from the bookseller Sperling and Kupfer is preserved in the archives of the Istituto Gramsci in Rome). It is listed among the "Books delivered to Carlo on 13 March 1931" in the manuscript of Notebook 2; see 1:529.

Plutarch's critique of Epicureanism, *Adversus Colotem*, together with all his writings other than the *Lives*, is conventionally published alongside his many other treatises under the general heading of *Moralia*. This translation (by B. Einerson and P.H. De Lacy) is taken from the Loeb edition of Plutarch, *Moralia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 14:301.

Nicola Turchi (1880-1964), a Catholic priest and professor of history at the University of Rome, wrote many important books on religion in the ancient world. In 1916 he was severely reprimanded by the Holy Office of the Vatican for publishing his work in a journal, *Scienza delle religioni*, that was considered "modernist."

2. Turchi, *Manuale di storia delle religioni*, p. 1.

3. This sentence, from Salomon Reinach's *Orpheus: Histoire générale des religions* (Paris: A. Picard, 1909), is quoted in French in Turchi, *Manuale di storia delle religioni*, p. 2 n. 1. In transcribing it, Gramsci rendered it into Italian. The text here translates Gramsci's Italian, and it differs somewhat from the published English version: *Orpheus: A General History of Religions*, trans. F. Simmonds (London: Heinemann, 1909).

§42. *Tendencies in Italian literature. Giovanni Cena*

1. Arrigo Cajumi, "Lo strano caso di Giovanni Cena" (The strange case of Giovanni Cena), *L'Italia letteraria* 1, no. 34 (November 24, 1929).

On Giovanni Cena, see also Notebook 2, §53, and note 1 there.

2. That is, "cavaliere" and "commendatore."

3. Gramsci is referring here to Aristide Briand (1862-1932), several times prime minister of France and foreign minister from 1926 to 1932, who strongly supported the League of Nations and whose many peace initiatives earned him the Nobel Peace Prize (with Gustav Stresemann) in 1926.

4. Enrico and Arrigo Cajumi were in fact cousins but had different political orientations. In 1925 Enrico Cajumi, originally from Sicily, became the political editor of *L'Ambrosiano*, a pro-Fascist periodical based

in Milan but controlled by the vice president of FIAT, Riccardo Gualino (see Notebook 1, §50, n. 2). Arrigo Cajumi (1899–1955), born in Turin, was not a Fascist; among the journals and newspapers he published in was Piero Gobetti's *Rivoluzione liberale*. At his cousin Enrico's invitation, Arrigo Cajumi also contributed some articles to *L'Ambrosiano*—and this, it seems, is what confused Gramsci. See A. Gramsci, *Cahiers de prison (Cahiers 6–9)*, ed. Robert Paris (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 527.

5. In all likelihood, Gramsci is referring to Camillo Berra, a friend and fellow student at the University of Turin. In November 1913 Gramsci rented a room from Camillo Berra's widowed mother and "was to remain there [at 14 Via San Massimo] as Signora Berra's only lodger for nearly nine years, until his trip to Russia in May 1922. See Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, trans. Tom Nairn (London: Verso, 1990), p. 89.

6. Cesare De Lollis (1863–1928), a romance philologist, was a professor at the University of Genoa before moving to the University of Rome. The author of many books on French, Spanish, and Italian literature, he was also the editor of *La cultura*. He was one of the signers of the 1925 Manifesto of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals.

7. All the quoted passages and the information pertaining to Cena contained in this note are derived from Cajumi, "Lo strano caso di Giovanni Cena." All the bracketed interjections are Gramsci's.

8. Camillo Prampolini (1859–1930) was a figure of seminal importance in the political organization of peasants, especially in the region of Reggio Emilia, where he was born. He helped found cooperatives and various associations for mutual aid. He also launched the militant periodical *La giustizia*. A member of the Socialist Party from the time it was founded, he was elected to parliament in 1892 and remained active in politics until the advent of Fascism.

9. Augusto Monti (1881–1966) was a prominent figure in Turin cultural circles. A professor at the Liceo Massimo D'Azeglio, he taught many students who would later become prominent, among them Cesare Pavese and Giulio Einaudi. *La voce* and *La rivoluzione liberale* were among the periodicals to which he contributed. *I sansoussi* (The carefree ones), one of several novels he wrote, was first published in 1929.

10. On Edmondo De Amicis, see Notebook 1, §50, n. 3.

Lorenzo Stecchetti was the pseudonym of Olindo Guerrini (1845–1916), a poet influenced by Carducci but with a distinctive ironic voice, skillful in the literary use of dialect. He was a worldly poet with liberal leanings.

11. On Ravachol, see Notebook 1, §2, n. 1.

12. On Mario Missiroli, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12; on Jean Jaurès, see Notebook 2, §75, n. 4; and on Alfredo Oriani, see Notebook 4, §68, n. 2.

13. Giovanni Cena, "Che fare?" (What is to be done?), *La voce* 2, no. 30 (July 7, 1910).

§43. *The commune as an economic-corporative phase of the state*

1. The Bardi and Peruzzi families, both Florentine, were two of the greatest financial powerhouses in Europe during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. They both went bankrupt for related reasons around 1345. Edward III of England could not repay the huge amounts he borrowed from them to finance his military ventures, the king of France confiscated their properties, and the king of Naples defaulted on his debts. The financial crisis that ensued had far-reaching effects, well beyond Florence.

§44. *On Italian literature*

1. Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, "Il senso della letteratura italiana" (The meaning of Italian literature), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1387 (January 1, 1930): 20-40. The quoted passage is on pp. 22-23.

On Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, see Notebook 1, §93, n. 2.

2. Borgese, "Il senso della letteratura italiana," p. 34.

The book discussed here is Ruggero Bonghi, *Perchè la letteratura italiana non sia popolare* (Milan, 1859), which seventy years earlier had already raised the issue of the failure of Italian literature to attract or generate a wide readership.

On Ruggero Bonghi, see Notebook 2, §8, n. 1.

3. Borgese, "Il senso della letteratura italiana," p. 38. All the bracketed interjections are Gramsci's.

§45. *Past and present*

1. Gramsci read the quotation from Francesco Guicciardini's *Ricordi* in Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, "Il senso della letteratura italiana" (The meaning of Italian literature), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1387 (January 1, 1930): 29.

This maxim of Guicciardini's is in fact in his *Ricordi* (C: 110). For the English translation, see Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections*, trans. Mario Domandi (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), p. 69.

2. Gramsci's source of information on Franco Ciarlantini is, again, Borgese, "Il senso della letteratura italiana," p. 36.

§46. *The function of czarism in Europe*

1. Alessandro Luzio, "I carteggi cavouriani—con lettere inedite" (Cavour's correspondence—with unpublished letters), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 149-69. The quoted passage from Cavour's letter is on p. 166.

On Alessandro Luzio, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 45.

2. On the Bollea affair, see Notebook 3, §38, n. 6.

§47. *Past and present*

1. See Raoul Ghezzi, *Comunisti, industriali e fascisti a Torino: 1920-1923. Cronistoria degli avvenimenti principali e commento di critica interpretativa e ricostruttiva* (Turin: Eredi Botta, 1923).

§48. *Portrait of the Italian peasant*

1. The allusion to Giuseppe Pitré's collection of popular Sicilian fables and tales, *Fiabe e leggende popolari siciliane* (1888) is in a short article by Domenico Bulferetti, "La volontà di dio" (The will of God), *La fiera letteraria* 4, no. 5 (January 29, 1928).

§49. *Americanism. Babbit again*

1. This note may have been prompted by two articles in a periodical Gramsci was reading at the time: A. Scalero, "Nuovi orientamenti della letteratura Americana" (New orientations of American literature), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 259-65; and Arturo Calza, "L'americanizzazione dell'Europa?" (The Americanization of Europe?), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 266-69.

On Gramsci's firsthand knowledge of Sinclair Lewis's novel *Babbit* (1922) and for his other observations on it, see Notebook 4, §21, and n. 2 there; and Notebook 5, §105.

§50. *Machiavelli*

1. These brief indications regarding the "practical fortune" of Machiavelli are derived from an article by Antonino D'Elia, "Il cardinale Richelieu e lo spirito egemonico francese" (Cardinal Richelieu and the French hegemonic spirit), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 234-51; see especially pp. 235 and 247.

2. On Gramsci's view of Machiavelli as expressing the philosophy of his epoch, see Notebook 1, §10.

§51. *The siege of Florence in 1529-1530*

1. Following the series of defeats and setbacks he inflicted on Francis I of France and his allies, the emperor Charles V achieved dominance over Italy, which was formalized by the Treaty of Cambrai in 1529. That same year, with the Treaty of Barcelona, Pope Clement VII (Giulo de' Medici),

who had allied himself with the defeated French monarch, agreed to acknowledge Charles V's control over Italy, invest him as king of Naples, and crown him emperor. In return, however, the pope obtained from the emperor a commitment to overthrow the Republic of Florence and restore the Medicis to power. The imperial forces invaded Florentine territory and besieged the city in November 1529. Despite resisting fiercely, the republicans succumbed in early August of the following year.

2. The polemic started with an article by Antonio Panella, "Le anticipazioni di un centenario" (In anticipation of a centenary), *Il marzocco* 34, no. 38 (September 22, 1929). This was followed by a letter from Aldo Valori that was published (together with a response by Panella) under the heading "L'assedio di Firenze e la critica storica" (The siege of Florence and historical criticism), *Il marzocco* 34, no. 41 (October 13, 1929). Valori then wrote yet another letter, which was published (again accompanied by a response from Panella) under the title "Ancora l'assedio di Firenze e la critica storica" (More on the siege of Florence and historical criticism), *Il marzocco* 34, no. 42 (October 20, 1929). The argument was picked up again in an article by Aldo Valori, "Un centenario: La difesa della Repubblica Fiorentina (A centenary: The defense of the Florentine Republic), *Critica fascista* 8, no. 2 (January 15, 1930): 33-35.

What had triggered Antonio Panella's article in the first place was a book by Aldo Valori, *La difesa della repubblica fiorentina* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1929), that was typical of much Fascist historiography insofar as it attempted to fit the bravery of the Florentine republicans into a larger narrative of an uninterrupted glorious tradition of "italianità" (Italianness) stretching back to antiquity. In his article, Panella criticized the historical distortions that such a revisionist approach entailed. In his *Critica fascista* article, Valori did not mention Panella by name; instead, he inveighed against all those supposedly hypercritical, purist, and by implication unpatriotic historians who chose to privilege the point of view of the foreigner (in this specific case, Charles V, a Spaniard).

On Antonio Panella, see Notebook 6, §13, n. 1.

3. Francesco Ferrucci was in command of troops outside the besieged city, engaging the imperial forces in a variety of places and attempting to break their encirclement of Florence. He was severely wounded in Gavinana, fell into enemy hands, and was killed by Fabrizio Maramaldo, an Italian from Calabria, who was a captain in the imperial army. Legend has it that Ferrucci's last words, addressed to Maramaldo, were: "You are killing a dead man."

§53. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. Augur, "Britannia quo vadis?" *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 252-58; see especially pp. 354-55. The phrase "no representation without labor" is in English in the original.

On the pseudonymous Augur, see Notebook 2, §32, and n. 1 there.

§54. *On the English empire*

1. Since the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy, the Privy Council—that is, the private council of the British king or queen—has no political weight. The judicial committee of the Privy Council, on the other hand, functions as the court of final appeal for certain clearly delineated juridical matters pertaining to the United Kingdom, for British overseas territories and Crown dependencies, and, now, for those Commonwealth countries that have voluntarily opted to continue recognizing its authority.

2. See Augur, "Britannia quo vadis?" *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 252–58, especially pp. 256–58.

§55. *Past and present. Arturo Calza*

1. "Il farmacista" (The pharmacist) was the title of Arturo Calza's regular column in the *Giornale d'Italia*. On Arturo Calza, see Notebook 3, §121, n. 1.

2. Alberto Bergamini (1871–1961) was appointed editor-in-chief of the *Giornale d'Italia* when it was launched by Sidney Sonnino in 1901. The mouthpiece of conservative liberalism, the paper supported the Libyan war as well as Italy's intervention in World War I. Although he had supported Mussolini's appointment as prime minister, Bergamini's relations with the regime became strained, and he resigned from the newspaper in 1923. He was succeeded by his protégé Vittorio Vettori who had served as the paper's political editor since 1907. The *Giornale d'Italia* was taken over by backers of the Fascist regime in 1926, and Vettori was replaced by Virginio Gayda, one of the most militant and conspicuous propagandists of the Fascist movement.

3. Arturo Calza, "'La 'questione dei giovani' e il manifesto dell'Universalismo'" (The "question of youth" and the manifesto of "Universalism"), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1389 (February 1, 1930): 299–301.

4. See the short unsigned article "Giovani pazzi e vecchi imbecilli" (Crazy young men and old imbeciles), *Critica fascista* 8, no. 4 (February 15, 1930): 70.

5. On Tommaso Tittoni, see Notebook 2, §6, n. 1.

6. See Arturo Calza, "Leone Tolstoy nelle confessioni delle donne che lo hanno amato" (Tolstoy in the confessions of the women who loved him), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1390 (February 16, 1930): 528–30.

§56. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. On Filippo Crispolti, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 5.

2. See Notebook 5, §101.

3. Filippo Crispolti, "Ombre di romanzi manzoniani" (Shades of Manzoni in the novel), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1390 (February 16, 1930): 433-50.

4. Filippo Crispolti, *Un duello* (Milan: Treves, 1900). Gramsci remembered the novel's title as "Il duello" (The duel), whereas its title actually is *Un duello* (A duel).

5. Gramsci had been involved in a polemic with Crispolti over issues concerning the relations of religion (Catholicism), socialism, and politics. See, especially, Gramsci's article, "Rispondiamo a Crispolti" (A response to Crispolti), *Avanti!* June 19, 1917.

6. On the Law of Papal Guarantees, see Notebook 3, §97, n. 1.

§57. *So-called social poetry in Italy*

1. On Mario Rapisardi, see Notebook 1, §45, n. 3.

2. Nunzio Vaccalluzzo, "La poesia di Mario Rapisardi" (Rapisardi's poetry), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1390 (February 16, 1930): 481-92.

3. Mario Rapisardi's collection of poems *Giustizia* (Justice) was first published in 1883.

4. Vaccalluzzo, "La poesia di Mario Rapisardi," p. 487.

§59. *Southern Italy*

1. Gramsci read this anecdote in Carlo Segré, "Il viaggio dell'Addison in Italia. II" (Addison's journey to Italy II), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1392 (March 16, 1930): 164-80; see especially p. 171.

Segré's source is Joseph Addison, *Remarks on Several Parts of Italy* (London: Jacob Tomson, 1705), p. 207.

Innocent XI was pope from 1676 to 1689.

The marquis of Carpio, Gaspar de Haro, was the viceroy of Naples from 1683 to 1687.

§60. *Naval issues*

1. Gramsci's observations on this topic may have been prompted by an article signed Beta, "Disarmo ed equilibrio marittimo" (Disarmament and naval equilibrium), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1392 (March 16, 1930): 232-40.

The broader context of this discussion on naval power is the set of agreements reached at the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) to limit or control the naval arms race among Britain, the United States, and Japan. Italy and France were also participants in the conference. One of the treaties signed as a result of the conference stipulated that Britain and the United States would maintain parity in naval power.

2. Mr. Panera (or Sor Panera in Milanese dialect) was a creation of the actor and playwright Edoardo Ferravilla (1846–1916). A farcical character, Mr. Panera spoke in dialect and almost entirely in clichés, and he frequently displayed his comical stupidity precisely when he thought he was being clever. The popularity of the Panera character in vaudevillian theater induced Ferravilla to portray him on the screen. At one point in the film, *El duell del sur Panera* (Mr. Panera's duel), Panera is disconcerted by his adversary's movements and exclaims: "If he keeps on moving like that, I can't kill him!" See the annotation by Robert Paris in A. Gramsci, *Cahiers de prison* (*Cahiers* 6–9), ed. Robert Paris (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 532.

§61. *Frederick II*

1. Raffaello Morghen, "Il tramonto della potenza sveva e la più recente storiografia" (The twilight of Swabian power and the most recent historiography), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1392 (March 16, 1930): 219–31.

One of the many books that the eminent medievalist Raffaello Morghen (1896–1983) wrote on various aspects of the Middle Ages is devoted specifically to the decline of Swabian power in Italy: *Il tramonto della potenza sveva in Italia* (Rome: Tummirelli, 1936).

2. On Frederick II, see Notebook 5, §31, n. 2.

3. Gramsci's source of information on Michelangelo Schipa's book on Sicily and Italy under Frederick II is Morghen, "Il tramonto della potenza sveva e la più recente storiografia"; see especially p. 223.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 219, with emphasis added by Gramsci.

§62. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

2. Giuseppe Prezzolini, *Mi pare . . .* (Florence: Delta, 1925); see especially the chapter on the state of the Italian theater and its failure to revitalize itself, pp. 71–79. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison.

On Giuseppe Prezzolini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§64. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. Benedetto Croce, *Cultura e vita morale*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926). Gramsci had a copy of this edition of Croce's book, and the references he provides are to its pages. The quoted passage is in the chapter "Fede e programmi" (Faith and programs), which was originally published as an article in 1911.

2. Here, again, Gramsci is quoting from the edition of Croce's *Cultura e vita morale* cited above, and specifically from the chapter entitled "Troppa filosofia" (Too much philosophy), originally published as an article in 1922.

§65. *Journalism*

1. Gramsci's source for the bibliographical reference to Paul Guériot's book and the other information on Napoleon III in this paragraph is an article by Lorenzo Gigli, "Napoleone III prigioniero" (Napoleon III in prison), *I libri del giorno* 11, no. 2 (February 1928): 70-72.

§66. *Machiavelli*

1. Gino Arias, "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli" (Machiavelli's economic thought), in *Annali di economia* (Milan: Università Bocconi, 1928), 4:1-31. In all likelihood, Gramsci learned of this article from a review by C. E. Ferri in *I libri del giorno* 11, no. 9 (September 1928), p. 560.

In a letter to Tatiana Schucht on March 14, 1932, Gramsci requested a copy of Arias's article (which he later received) and explained his interest in Machiavelli's economic thought:

If you happen to write to Piero [Sraffa], tell him on my behalf that I would like to know whether there exist any publications on Machiavelli's opinions on economics and political economy and whether he can, without inconvenience, obtain for me the memorandum published on the subject a few years ago by Professor Gino Arias in *Annali di economia* of Bocconi University. Is it possible to say that Machiavelli was a "mercantilist," if not in the sense that he consciously thought like a mercantilist, at least in the sense that his political thought corresponded to mercantilism, that is, he expressed in political language what the mercantilists said in terms of political economy? Or could one go even so far as to maintain that in Machiavelli's political language (especially in the *Art of War*) there appears the first germ of a physiocratic conception of the state and that therefore (though not in Ferrari's or even in Foscolo's sense) he might be considered a precursor of the French Jacobins? (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:150-51.)

Tatiana Schucht transcribed this letter (as she did many others) for Piero Sraffa and then transmitted Sraffa's response to Gramsci in her letter of April 27, 1932:

Piero wrote saying that he knows absolutely nothing about Machiavelli's economic thought; what little he learned from reading the article by Arias that you indicated seems, in his view, to confirm what you said. Piero thinks there is a strong analogy with a seventeenth-century English economist, William Petty, whom Marx called "the founder of clas-

sical economics." His works are impossible to find, but perhaps some bookstore might have a French translation of his complete works. We have had the Arias article sent to you and asked the bookstore to look for the book by Tangorra (cited by Arias) that contains an essay on Machiavelli as economist. There does not seem to be anything else (the only reference that was found is in an Italian translation of Schmoller, *Lineamenti di economia nazionale*, vol. 1, p. 129, which alludes to Machiavelli as a mercantilist).

To which Gramsci responded on May 2, 1932: "I certainly don't need the works of William Petty to pursue the question of Machiavelli's ideas on economics. The reference is interesting, but it is enough."

For the complete text of Tatiana Schucht's April 27, 1932, letter to Gramsci, see A. Gramsci and T. Schucht, *Lettere: 1926-1935*, ed. A. Natoli and C. Daniele (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), pp. 989-90. For Piero Sraffa's April 21, 1932, letter to Tatiana Schucht, who, in turn, relayed almost verbatim his comments on Machiavelli and economics in her letter to Gramsci, see Piero Sraffa, *Lettere a Tania per Gramsci*, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Rome: Riuniti, 1991), pp. 58-59.

Gino Arias (1879-1940) held several academic appointments, including the directorship of the Syndicalist School in Florence. A prolific writer, he was a regular contributor to leading Fascist periodicals such as *Gerarchia* (which listed Mussolini as editor), *Educazione fascista* (edited by Giovanni Gentile), and *Critica fascista*. A prominent theorist and exponent of corporativist economics, he wrote, among many other things, *L'economia pura del corporativismo* (1930) and *Corso di economia politica corporativa* (1937). Arias also wrote a book on the economy of the medieval communes, *Il sistema della costituzione economica e sociale italiana nell'età dei comuni* (1905). Arias was Jewish, and despite his fervent support of the Fascist regime (he was one of the signers of the "Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals" in 1925), he was compelled to leave Italy and emigrate to Argentina after Mussolini's promulgation of the racial laws in 1938.

§67. Italian culture. Valentino Piccoli

1. See Valentino Piccoli, "Un libro per gli immemori" (A book for the forgetful), *I libri del giorno* 11, no. 10 (October 1928): 600-601. This is a book review of Mario Giampaoli, *1919* (Rome: Libreria del Littorio, 1928).

Valentino Piccoli was a tireless Fascist propagandist. After serving as editor of the *Giornale di Sicilia*, he took charge of the *Popolo d'Italia*. He was also engaged in many book projects as author and general editor. In 1928-1929, he helped launch the book series "I prefascisti" (The prefascists) for the publisher Augustea; he authored a book on Alfredo Oriani for the series. Piccoli also wrote several books on "illustrious" Italians,

such as Dante, Leopardi, and Foscolo, all of which were meant to extol the greatness of the Italian national heritage. He was also entrusted with overseeing the complete "definitive" edition of Mussolini's writings and speeches, the first volume of which appeared in 1934: Benito Mussolini, *Scritti e discorsi* (Milan: Hoepli, 1934).

Mario Giampaoli participated in the birth of the Fascist movement, that is, in the founding of the first "fascio di combattimento" in Milan on March 21, 1919. (As its title, 1919, suggests, his book is a glorification of the early history of Fascism.) He was a ringleader of the gangs that habitually intimidated and often physically attacked individuals and organizations or institutions deemed inimical to the Fascist cause. Eventually, Giampaoli's extremism became a liability, and his intrigues an embarrassment, even to a movement so steeped in violence and so disdainful of the law; he fell into disgrace and by the mid-1930s he was an outcast.

§68. *Alfredo Oriani*

1. Floriano Del Secolo, "Contributo alla biografia di Oriani. Con lettere inedite" (A contribution to Oriani's biography. With unpublished letters), *Pègaso* 2, no. 10 (October 1930): 385-405.

On Alfredo Oriani, see Notebook 4, §68, n. 2.

§69. *Caporetto*

1. Gioacchino Volpe's book on the catastrophic Italian military defeat at Caporetto, *Ottobre 1917: Dall'Isonzo al Piave* (Rome: Libreria d'Italia, 1930), was reviewed by Antonio Panella in *Pègaso* 2, no. 10 (October 1930): 495-97.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

On Antonio Panella, see Notebook 6, §13, n. 1.

On Caporetto, see Notebook 3, §20, n. 2.

2. See Adolfo Omodeo, "Problemi storici: Ottobre 1917" (Historical problems: October 1917), *La nuova Italia* 1, no. 7 (July 20, 1930): 274-77. This article is a severe critique of Gioacchino Volpe's book.

On Adolfo Omodeo, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 7.

3. Gramsci is relying on memory, and the phrase he quotes is not quite identical to the original—"un outil tactique de premier ordre"—in Anatole France's *L'anneau d'améthyste* (1899). The relevant passage occurs in chapter 2 of the novel, where, at one point, General Cartier de Chalmot intervenes in a conversation about the army and praises the French troops: "And if, like myself, you had spent the greater part of your life among soldiers, you would be agreeably surprised to note the qualities of endurance, good discipline, and good temper which make of the French trooper a

first-class implement of war. I never tire of repeating it: such units are equal to any task. With the authority of an officer whose life's career is drawing to a close, I maintain that any one who takes the trouble to inquire into the spirit which animates the French Army will find it worthy of the highest praise" (Anatole France, *The Amethyst Ring*, trans. B. Dril-
lien [New York: Wise and Co., 1930], pp. 49-50).

4. Gramsci returns to a discussion of some of the main issues raised in this note in Notebook 6, §74.

§70. *Risorgimento*

1. Niccolò Rodolico, "La prima giovinezza di Carlo Alberto" (Carlo Alberto's early youth), *Pègaso* 2, no. 11 (November 1930): 556-72.

Carlo Alberto (1798-1849) became king of Sardinia in 1831.

On Niccolò Rodolico, see Notebook 2, §62, n. 1.

2. Rodolico's article in fact reappeared with some modifications as the first two chapters of Niccolò Rodolico, *Carlo Alberto principe di Carignano* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1931).

3. On the neo-Guelph movement, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 3.

4. On Joseph De Maistre, see Notebook 1, §71, n. 1.

§71. *Linguistics*

1. Antonio Pagliaro's book on historical and theoretical issues in Aryo-European linguistics, *Sommario di linguistica arioeuropea*, part 1, *Cenni storici e quistioni teoriche* (Rome: Libreria di scienza e lettere del dott. G. Bardi, Rome, 1930), was reviewed by Goffredo Coppola in *Pègaso* 2, no. 11 (November 1930): 622-26.

On Antonio Pagliaro, see Notebook 5, §29, n. 1.

Goffredo Coppola (1898-1945) was professor of Greek literature at the University of Cagliari before moving to the University of Bologna. He wrote several books, including monographs on Epicurus, Augustus, Callimachus, and the plays of Aristophanes and Terence. An unwavering Fascist and admirer of Mussolini till the bitter end, he was a member of the small group accompanying Il Duce on April 27, 1945, when he was captured by partisans. Like his leader, he was executed the following day.

2. See Notebook 3, §74.

3. This is a slip of the pen by Gramsci; he is almost certainly referring to Coppola since the sentences that follow closely parallel what Coppola wrote on p. 623 of his review: "The assertion of identity between art and language leads to quite noteworthy results. Above all, the problem of the origin of language, which has troubled philosophers, psychologists, and linguists, turns out to be insoluble, since sound is itself an element of

intuition or, rather, of man who intuitis. Thus to ask what the origin of language as a faculty might be is the same as asking why man has an imagination, why man thinks, why man is man."

4. Coppola review, p. 623.

§72. *Risorgimento*

1. Angelo Ottolini, "Il centenario di Melchiorre Gioia" (The centenary of Melchiorre Gioia), *I libri del Giorno* 12, no. 1 (January 1929): 21-25.

Melchiorre Gioia (1767-1829) abandoned the priesthood early in his career and devoted his life to the promotion of republicanism and the study of economics. He had already spent time in jail for his Jacobin allegiances when in 1796 he wrote the essay "Quale dei governi liberi meglio convenga alla felicità dell'Italia" (Which of the free forms of government is most suitable for Italy). Only as a unitary republic, he argued, would Italy be able to take charge of its own destiny and bring an end to a long history of rule by foreigners. He would later be arrested again for anti-Austrian activities. Gioia, a critic of Adam Smith and a sympathetic reader of Bentham, produced a number of important works on economics and statistics, among them the 1818 treatise *Del merito e delle compense* (On merit and rewards) and the multivolume *Filosofia della statistica* (1826).

§73. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. Carlo Linati, "Dell'interesse" (On interest), *I libri del giorno* 12, no. 2 (February 1929): 65-68.

On Carlo Linati, see Notebook 3, §109, n. 3.

2. Gramsci is referring to Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876-1944), who launched the futurist movement with the publication of his "Manifeste de Futurisme" in the Paris newspaper *Le Figaro* (February 20, 1909). He was a Fascist supporter from the moment the first "fascio di combattimento" was formed at a meeting in Milan in March 1919, which Marinetti attended. In 1929 he was inducted into the newly established Accademia d'Italia together with Luigi Pirandello, Enrico Fermi, and Pietro Mascagni. In 1930 Marinetti and his follower Luigi Fillia published a "Manifesto of Futurist Cookery" (in the *Gazetta del popolo*, December 28) that enjoined Italians to develop modern, healthy eating habits and fulminated against the consumption of pasta, which it declared responsible for the nation's lethargy, pessimism, nostalgia, and other deficiencies. Not surprisingly, the attack on pasta provoked a furor, which Gramsci alludes to in Notebook 7, §35. Marinetti and Fillia also published a cookbook, *La cucina futurista* (Milan: Sonzogno, 1932), which contains a section on the polemics the manifesto had generated. For an English translation, see F. T. Marinetti, *The Futurist Cookbook*, trans. S. Brill (San Francisco: Bedford Arts, 1989).

For references to Gramsci's writings on futurism before his imprisonment, see Notebook 1, §124, n. 1.

§74. *Caporetto*

1. Gramsci obtained all his information on Alberto Baldini's book *Diaz* (Florence: Barbèra, 1929) from a review article by Vittorio Giglio, "Il volto del vincitore" (The face of the victor), *I libri del giorno* 12, no. 7 (July 1929): 413-15.

2. Armando Diaz (1861-1928) replaced General Luigi Cadorna as Army Chief of Staff after the military disaster at Caporetto in October 1917. He was able to reinforce his defenses and rebuild his forces, and, after repulsing an Austrian attack in midsummer, he went on the offensive on October 24, 1918. Ten days later, he defeated the Austrian Army at Vittorio Veneto, bringing an end to the conflict. Diaz served as war minister in Mussolini's government from 1922 to 1924.

On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10.

3. On Caporetto, see Notebook 3, §20, n. 2.

4. With this observation and much of what follows, Gramsci is picking up the thread of his reflections on the significance of Caporetto that he had started a few pages earlier (i.e., Notebook 6, §69).

§75. *Past and present*

1. Mario Camis, "Intorno alle condizioni alimentari del popolo Italiano: Considerazioni statistico-fisiologiche" (On the nutritional conditions of Italians: Statistical-physiological considerations), *La riforma sociale* 33, no. 1-2 (January-February 1926): 52-81. Gramsci refers to this same article in Notebook 1, §61.

§76. *The function of czarism in Europe in the nineteenth century*

1. Gramsci's source of information on this episode appears to have been the review article on the third volume of Bernhard Fürst von Bülow's *Denkwürdigkeiten* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1931) by Manfredi Gravina, "Il terzo volume delle memorie di Bülow" (The third volume of Bülow's memoirs), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1415 (March 1, 1931): 78-91. Gramsci's version of the quotation, however, differs slightly from Gravina's: "Otherwise I would not have been able to have the socialists on my side."

This is the relevant passage from the English translation of von Bülow's memoirs:

Why was there this precipitate haste to declare war on Russia on August 1st? The reason for our blunder in diplomacy, like those for so many oth-

ers we committed, must be sought in our domestic situation, or rather in the anxieties I caused the Chancellor. Albert Ballin gave me a very vivid description of a scene he witnessed that day, in the Chancellor's palace. . . . Ballin allowed himself the question: "Why such haste to declare war on Russia, Your Excellency?" And Bethmann answered: "If I don't, we sha'n't get the Socialists to fight."

Ballin and I both gave this answer the same psychological explanation. The Chancellor had perceived the horrible situation he had brought upon himself and Germany. He shrank from responsibility. His first instinctive reaction was the desire to disarm the Left Wing elements he so dreaded, and he felt that this could only be achieved by making the War look anti-tsarist, now that he had not managed to keep clear of it. (Bernhard Fürst von Bülow, *Memoirs of Prince von Bülow* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1931-32], 3:187)

On Bernhard Fürst von Bülow, see Notebook 2, §126, n. 2.

Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-1921) had already served as Prussian minister of the interior when, following the resignation of von Bülow in 1909, Wilhelm II appointed him chancellor. He resigned from office in July 1917.

§78. *The Italian Risorgimento*

1. Regalism is the assertion of the authority of a monarch over the church in all temporal matters, including the control of ecclesiastical benefices. In Lombardy, this was sometimes called Josephism, after the Austrian emperor Joseph II, who claimed such authority. In theory and practice, regalism sought to diminish the power and privileges of the papacy. Its roots go back to Gallicanism, a late-seventeenth-century movement within the Catholic Church in France to restrain or more narrowly define the authority of the pope.

2. On Solaro della Margarita, see Notebook 2, §62, n. 4.

3. On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

On the neo-Guelphs, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 3.

4. See, especially, Notebook 1, §44.

5. Peter Waldo (ca. 1140-ca. 1217), also known as Valdes, was a merchant from Lyon who underwent a religious conversion in 1176, gave up his property, which he distributed to the poor, and devoted himself to the preaching of the gospel in the vernacular. He gathered a large following, and his disciples came to be known as the "poor men" or "Christ's poor." Despite violent persecution, the Waldenses spread across many parts of Europe. They were excommunicated in 1184.

6. See Ezekiel 3:18–20. As Derek Boothman has pointed out, Gramsci's source erroneously attributed "to King Ezekias or Hezekiah what is in fact a summary or paraphrase of the words of Ezekiel" (*Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. D. Boothman [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995], p. 535 n. 131).

7. Antonio Viscardi, "Problemi di critica francescana: Francesco d'Assisi e la legge della povertà evangelica" (Problems in Franciscan criticism: Francis of Assisi and the law of evangelical poverty), *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 1 (January 20, 1931): 9–13; the passage quoted by Gramsci is on p. 12.

§80. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. On Leonida Répaci (1898–1985), see Notebook 1, §24, n. 17.

§81. *Hegemony (civil society) and separation of powers*

1. See the chapter entitled "Stato e Chiesa in senso ideale e loro perpetua lotta nella storia" (State and Church in the ideal sense and their perpetual conflict in history), in Benedetto Croce, *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), pp. 339–44. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison. The same chapter had been published earlier in another volume of Croce's, *Elementi di politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1925), of which Gramsci owned a copy before his imprisonment. *Elementi di politica* (which was later incorporated into *Etica e politica*) has been translated into English; see B. Croce, *Politics and Morals*, trans. S. Castiglione (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945). In the English translation, the chapter that Gramsci is referring to is entitled "The Unending Struggle Between Church and State" (pp. 183–191).

2. This could also be translated, in terms more commonly used in the United States, as: "(1) legislature [or Congress]; (2) judiciary; (3) executive."

§82. *Past and present*

1. Many of Ugo Spirito's writings on the economic and political questions discussed in this note appeared in a journal he founded with Arnaldo Volpicelli, *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica*, the first issue of which came out in November 1927. They are now collected (with other essays that Spirito originally published in the same journal and with responses to his critics, including those mentioned in this note by Gramsci) in Ugo Spirito, *Il corporativismo: Dall'economia liberale al corporativismo. I fondamenti della economia corporativa, Capitalismo e corporativismo* (Florence: Sansoni, 1970).

On Ugo Spirito, see Notebook 1, §132, n. 2.

2. On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1.

3. On the concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

4. Gentile's article "La questione romana" (The Roman question), published in the *Corriere della sera* of September 30, 1927, was later included in Giovanni Gentile, *Fascismo e cultura* (Milan: Treves, 1928), pp. 182-88. The volume also contains some other writings by Gentile on the same topic; see pp. 189-205. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison.

5. Gramsci is referring to a speech that Paolo Orano delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on March 29, 1930, in the course of a debate on the budget for public education. Orano argued that Fascism had no ties with idealist philosophy; the terminology he used (e.g., "philosophy of immanence") left no doubt that he was criticizing Gentile, who in many circles was regarded as the philosopher of Fascism. In its report on the speech, the *Corriere della sera* (March 30, 1930) quoted some parts of it, including the following: "It would be wrong to say that Fascism has entrusted any particular philosophy with the task of representing it and of determining its system of knowledge and interpretation of the world. The philosophy of immanence is conducive to teaching young people that the world is nothing other than a part of their selves, which results in a strictly individualistic conception of the world." Other reports and comments on Orano's speech appeared in the press. See, inter alia, the comments that appeared under the heading "Cronache del pensiero filosofico. Religione e filosofia nelle scuole" (Chronicles of philosophical thought. Religion and philosophy in the schools), *Gerarchia* 10, no. 4 (April 1930).

On Paolo Orano, see Notebook 1, §30, n. 1.

6. See the review of Ugo Spirito, *La critica dell'economia liberale* (Milan: Treves, 1930), by Alfonso De Pietri Tonelli in *Rivista di politica economica* 20, no. 12 (December 31, 1930): 1014-15. Gramsci had a copy of Spirito's book at Turi di Bari.

7. The *Rivista di politica economica* (which until 1920 had been published as the *Rivista delle società commerciali*) was codirected by Gino Olivetti, the founder and general secretary of Confindustria (the association of industrialists).

8. See Pasquale Jannaccone, "Scienza, critica e realtà economica" (Science, criticism and economic reality), *La riforma sociale* 27, no. 6 (December 1930): 521-28.

Pasquale Jannaccone (1872-1959) studied jurisprudence at the University of Turin, where he came to know Luigi Einaudi. Together, they founded the periodical *La riforma sociale* in 1894. Jannaccone was a professor of economics at the universities of Cagliari, Siena, and Padua before returning to the University of Turin in 1916. He was elected to the Accademia d'Italia in 1930.

9. See Benedetto Croce, "L'economia filosofata e attualizzata" (The economy philosophized and actualized), *La critica* 29, no. 1 (January 20,

1931): 76–80. In this short article, Croce's critique is clearly aimed at Ugo Spirito, even though it does not mention his name.

10. Massimo Fovel's *Economia e corporativismo* (Ferrara: SATE, 1929) was amply praised in Ugo Spirito, "Verso l'economia corporativa" (Toward the corporativist economy), *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 2, no. 5 (September–October 1929): 233–52; see especially pp. 239–46. Gramsci comments at length and contemptuously on Fovel in Notebook 1, §135. For Gramsci's severe criticism of Fovel in his preprison writings, see Notebook 1, §135, nn. 4 and 8.

11. On Giuseppe Bottai, see Notebook 5, §157, n. 1.

12. Spirito, *La critica dell'economia liberale*, p. 180.

13. See, especially, chapter 8 of Gustave Flaubert's *Bouvard et Pécuchet*. Gramsci's point here is that Spirito and Volpicelli are disciples of Gentile in the same way that Bouvard and Pécuchet are disciples of Hegel.

14. On Giovanni Gentile's speech in Palermo on March 31, 1924, see Notebook 5, §124, n. 3. For an almost complete English version of Gentile's speech, in which he states that "the maximum of liberty coincides with the maximum force of the state," see Herbert W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 344–53.

15. The obeisance of the Milanese aristocracy to the Austrian emperor is mentioned by Gramsci several times in the notebooks; see especially Notebook 1, §43, and n. 24 there; Notebook 3, §125; and Notebook 19, §5. Gramsci also refers to it in his letter of August 8, 1927, to Giuseppe Berti.

16. Benedetto Croce, *Cultura e vita morale*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926), p. 45. See Notebook 4, §45, n. 4. See also Notebook 7, §38.

§83. *Italian intellectuals*

1. See Paul-Henri Michel, *Un idéal humaine au XVe siècle: La pensée de L. B. Alberti (1404–1472)* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930). See Gramsci's comments on this book in Notebook 6, §149.

§84. *Past and present. Continuity and tradition*

1. Gramsci is referring here to his pagination of the manuscript. See Notebook 6, §79.

§85. *The medieval commune as an economic-corporative phase of the modern state. Dante and Machiavelli*

1. Dante articulated his political views and theories in some parts of the *Convivio* (written ca. 1304–6 and never completed), in his political epistles, and most systematically in the polemical treatise *De monarchia*

[ca. 1310-13, in Latin]. As Gramsci points out, however, Dante's treatise on the merits of the vernacular language, *De vulgari eloquentia* (ca. 1304 and left unfinished), is also "an act of national-cultural politics" (Notebook 29, §7). In the treatise on monarchy, Dante refutes the claim of the church that the temporal ruler (i.e., the monarch or emperor) derives his authority from the pope and argues for the kind of proper relation between church and empire that was exemplified by the Roman emperor Constantine the Great.

2. See Francesco Coppola, "La croce e l'aquila" (The cross and the eagle), *Politica* 11, no. 84-85 (February-April 1929): 35-53. This article praises the Lateran Accord (commonly called the concordat) between the Vatican and the Fascist regime. With his bombastic, nationalistic rhetoric, Coppola invokes Dante's political thought in a manner that makes it foreshadow the new treaty between church and state: "The idea of universal Monarchy alongside the universal Church, both of which God willed to govern the world, the Eagle and the Cross find their loftiest philosophical and poetic expression in the Italian genius of Dante who, moreover, turned on one side toward Caesar, an Italian, and on the other side toward St. Thomas, an Italian" (p. 50).

On Francesco Coppola, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 1.

3. "The Blacks" refers to the Guelphs.

§86. *Economic-corporative phase of the state*

1. Paolo Treves, "Il realismo politico di Francesco Guicciardini" (Guicciardini's political realism), *Nuova rivista storica* 14, no. 6 (November-December 1930): 525-37. The article criticizes Francesco De Sanctis for misinterpreting Guicciardini and casting him in a bad light while exalting Machiavelli. According to Treves, "Machiavelli was a political man, but he was also a revolutionary; Guicciardini was a political man, but above all he was a diplomat. One must pay attention to these differences in order to understand Guicciardini" (p. 525). A primary target of Treves's critique is the influential essay by De Sanctis, "L'uomo del Guicciardini," that was originally published in the *Nuova antologia* of October 1869 and later collected in Francesco De Sanctis, *Saggi critici*, ed. P. Arcati (Milan: Treves, 1924). (For a more recent edition that also includes "L'uomo del Guicciardini," see Francesco De Sanctis, *Saggi critici*, ed. Luigi Russo [Bari: Laterza, 1979], 3:1-25.) Also important are the many pages devoted to Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and a comparison of the two in De Sanctis's *Storia della letteratura italiana* (1870-71); see in particular chapter 15. Gramsci was very familiar with (and owned copies of) both works, as is evident from the many references to them scattered throughout the notebooks.

Paolo Treves (1908-58) was born in Milan, the son of the prominent socialist Claudio Treves. He studied at the universities of Turin and Milan

The utmost it can do today is to safeguard bourgeois culture from the vandalism of the bourgeois reaction, and create the social conditions requisite for a free cultural development. . . .

Only in proportion as our movement progresses, and demands the solution of new practical problems do we dip once more into the treasury of Marx thought, in order to extract therefrom and to utilize new fragments of his doctrine. But since our movement, like all the campaigns of practical life, inclines to go on working in old ruts of thought, and to cling to principles after they have ceased to be valid, the theoretical utilization of the Marxist system proceeds very slowly. (Waters, 109-11.)

8. On Andrea Costa, see Notebook 3, §8, n. 5, above.

§32. "Rendre la vie impossible"

1. Eugène D'Ors, *La vie de Goya* (Paris: Gallimard, 1928). Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison; it is listed in Notebook 2 among the "Books delivered to Carlo on 2 October 1930" (see Description of the Manuscript, 1:529).

2. See D'Ors, *La vie de Goya*, p. 54: "Fuyant l'Inquisition—au moins l'Inquisition diffuse, qui tue elle aussi en 'rendant la vie impossible'—Goya a laissé Saragosse pour Madrid."

§34. *Past and present*

1. See Notebook 1, §127.

2. Gramsci is referring to an article by Benito Mussolini, "Preludio al Machiavelli" (Preface to Machiavelli), *Gerarchia* 3, no. 4 (April 1924). It has been published in English as "Prelude" in the edition of Machiavelli's *Prince* translated with an introduction by George Bull (London: Folio Society, 1970). Among other things, Mussolini writes:

Well then, what emerges clearly, even from a superficial reading of *The Prince*, is the acute pessimism of Machiavelli in the face of human nature. Like all those who have occasion for continuous and extensive intercourse with their own kind, Machiavelli is a despiser of men and likes to present them to us . . . in their most negative and humiliating aspects.

. . . It is also evident that Machiavelli, in judging men as he did, did not refer only to those of his own time, to the Florentines, Tuscans, Italians who actually straddled the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but to men irrespective of time and place. Time has

reflection and criticism, which for him are (or should be) the hallmarks of culture, especially socialist culture. In his article "Socialismo e cultura" (in *Il grido del popolo* of January 29, 1916), Gramsci wrote:

We need to free ourselves from the habit of seeing culture as encyclopedic knowledge, and men as mere receptacles to be stuffed full of empirical data and a mass of unconnected raw facts, which have to be filed in the brain as in the columns of a dictionary. . . . This form of culture really is harmful, particularly for the proletariat. It serves only to create maladjusted people, people who believe they are superior to the rest of humanity because they have memorized a certain number of facts and dates and who rattle them off at every opportunity, so turning them almost into a barrier between themselves and others. . . . Culture is something quite different. It is organization, discipline of one's inner self, a coming to terms with one's own personality; it is the attainment of a higher awareness, with the aid of which one succeeds in understanding one's own historical value, one's own function in life, one's own rights and obligations. But none of this can come about through spontaneous evolution. . . . The fact is that only by degrees, one stage at a time, has humanity acquired consciousness of its own value and won for itself the right to throw off the patterns of organization imposed on it by minorities at a previous period in history. And this consciousness was formed not under the brutal goad of physiological necessity, but as a result of intelligent reflection, at first by just a few people and later by a whole class. . . . It was through a critique of capitalist civilization that the unified consciousness of the proletariat was or is still being formed, and a critique implies culture, not simply a spontaneous and naturalistic evolution. A critique implies precisely the self-consciousness that Novalis considered to be the end of culture. . . . To know oneself means to be oneself, to be master of oneself, to distinguish oneself, to free oneself from a state of chaos, to exist as an element of order—but of one's own order and one's own discipline in striving for an ideal. ("Socialism and Culture," in *Selections from Political Writings: 1910-1920*, ed. Q. Hoare, trans. J. Mathews [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990], pp. 11-13)

§88. *Gendarme or night-watchman state, etc.*

1. In his *Arbeiterprogramm* (1863), Ferdinand Lassalle derided the bourgeoisie for conceiving of the state as a night watchman. An Italian translation of Lassalle's *Arbeiterprogramm* was included in the eight-volume edition that Gramsci owned of K. Marx, F. Engels, and F. Lassalle, *Opere*, 2d rev. ed., ed. Ettore Ciccotti (Milan: Avanti!, 1922).

In the English version of Lassalle's text, "Nachtwächter" is rendered as "policeman," but the point Gramsci is stressing still comes through quite clearly:

According to the Bourgeoisie, the moral idea of the State is exclusively this, that the unhindered exercise by himself of his own faculties should be guaranteed to each individual. . . . The moral idea of the State according to the working class on the contrary is this, that the unhindered and free activity of individual powers exercised by the individual is not *sufficient*, but that something *must be added* to this in a morally ordered community—namely, solidarity of interests, community and reciprocity in development. In accordance with this difference, the Bourgeoisie conceive the moral object of the State to consist solely and exclusively for the protection of the personal freedom and the property of the individual. This is a policeman's idea, gentlemen, a policeman's idea for this reason, because it represents to itself the State from the point of view of a policeman, whose whole function consists in preventing robbery and burglary. Unfortunately this policeman's idea is not only familiar to genuine liberals, but is even to be met with not infrequently among so-called democrats, owing to their defective imagination. If the Bourgeoisie would express the logical inference from their idea, they must maintain that according to it if there were no such thing as robbers and thieves, the State itself would be entirely superfluous. (Ferdinand Lassalle, *The Working Man's Programme*, trans. E. Peters [London: Modern, 1884], pp. 52–53)

§89. *Politics and diplomacy*

1. Gramsci is referring to his pagination of the manuscript; see Notebook 6, §86.

2. On Ferdinando Martini's memoirs, *Confessioni e ricordi, 1859–1892* (Milan: Treves, 1928), see Notebook 3, §38, n. 5. Some aspects of this book are also discussed by Gramsci in Notebook 6, §114.

On Ferdinando Martini, see Notebook 2, §51, n. 2.

3. On Francesco Crispi, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 10.

4. See Notebook 1, §44.

5. On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

6. On Agostino Depretis, see Notebook 3, §119, n. 1.

7. When Gramsci was writing this notebook (1931), the forthcoming publication of the volume of Cavour's correspondence dealing with the Southern question had been announced, but the book was not yet out. Gramsci probably learned about it indirectly from an article by Alessandro Luzio, "Studi cavouriani" (Studies on Cavour), *Rivista storica italiana* 48,

no. 1 (January 1931): 1-18, and/or from an earlier article, also by Luzio, "I carteggi cavouriani" (Cavour's correspondence), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1388 (January 16, 1930): 149-70. It is also possible, however, that Gramsci was thinking of the fourth volume of the correspondence between Cavour and Costantino Nigra, which also deals with the South; see Camillo Benso di Cavour, *Carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861*, vol. 4, *La liberazione del Mezzogiorno* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1929).

8. Giuseppe Ferrari's parliamentary speeches on the situation of the South were discussed in an article by Alessandro Levi, "Il pensiero politico di Giuseppe Ferrari" (Ferrari's political thought), *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931): 217-259; see especially pp. 253-255. Gramsci quotes from this article in Notebook 8, §49 and §218.

§92. Past and present

1. All efforts to find a copy of the issue of the periodical 19 that Gramsci refers to have been unsuccessful.

On Mario Giampaoli, see Notebook 6, §67, n. 1.

Antonio Aniante was the pseudonym of Antonio Rapisarda (1900-83), born in Catania. He wrote experimental drama, as well as novels and biographies. In 1928 he published a biography of Mussolini in France. Rapisarda moved in circles associated with the avant-garde in the arts, contributed to Bontempelli's modernist journal '900, and was part of the *stracittà* (supercity) movement.

2. Gramsci is referring to Emilio Lussu and, most probably, to Camillo Bellieni.

Camillo Bellieni (1893-1975), a major figure in the left wing of the Sardinian Action Party (of which he was a founding member), was widely regarded as the primary theoretician of the movement for Sardinian autonomy.

Emilio Lussu (1890-1975), a founding member of the Sardinian Action Party, was first elected to parliament in 1921. Toward the end of 1924 and in the early months of 1925, both Lussu and Gramsci were in Rome and used to get together on occasion. From Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, trans. Tom Nairn (London: Verso, 1990): "Among non-communists, he saw Emilio Lussu of the Sardinian Action Party most often. They would go and eat together, and Lussu would ask about the Soviet Union while Gramsci inquired about the state of the peasant movement in Sardinia" (pp. 189-90). In 1926 Lussu was assaulted (not for the first time) by a Fascist gang that went on a rampage following a failed attempt to assassinate Mussolini in Bologna. Lussu fired a shot in self-defense and killed one of the assailants. He was exonerated by the courts, but the regime used the provisions of "the exceptional laws for the defense of the state" to sentence him to five years of exile on the island of Lipari.

In 1929 he managed to escape and took refuge in Paris, where he joined the expatriate anti-Fascist movement.

§95. *Italian culture. Regionalism*

1. The bibliographical data and the comment on Leonardo Olschki's article are extracted from an item, "L'Italia all'estero" (Italy abroad), in the "Notiziario" (Bulletin) section of *Leonardo* 3, no. 2 (February 20, 1927): 48.

§96. *Types of periodicals. Economics. A review of Italian economic studies*

1. On Giorgio Mortara's *Prospettive economiche*, see Notebook 1, §61, n. 3.

Gramsci had a copy of the bilingual (French and English) publication of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook 1929* (Geneva, 1930).

The Dresdner Bank publication to which Gramsci is referring here was an annual entitled *Les forces économique du monde*, the first of which came out in Berlin in 1927. The third volume appeared in 1930. There is no record of Gramsci having had a copy of any of the Dresdner Bank annuals, nor is there any direct reference to their content in his notebooks and letters. He may have come across references to this publication in the *Annali di economia* 4, no. 2 (October 1928): 74, which cites the first volume in the series; and in *Annali di economia* 6, no. 2 (July 1930): 61, which cites the third.

§97. *Past and present. Lofty ambition and petty ambitions*

1. It is not known where Arturo Vella uttered or wrote this statement. It is entirely possible that Gramsci heard him say it in a speech or in a private conversation.

Arturo Vella (1886–1943) was a member of the so-called intransigent wing of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). After the party schism at the Congress of Livorno in January 1921, Vella was among the most adamant opponents of the Communist International's call for the unification of the Italian Socialist and Communist parties, which had the support of the Socialists' leader, Giacinto Serrati. In April 1923, with Serrati being held in jail by the Fascist government, the PSI held its national congress in Milan, where it formally endorsed the maximalist position advocated by Vella, Pietro Nenni, and others opposed to collaboration with the Communists.

2. See Gramsci's long note on political parties, "charismatic" leadership, and Roberto Michels's theories: Notebook 2, §75, and notes 1–3 there.

On Roberto Michels, see Notebook 2, §45, n. 2.

§99. *The concept of great power*

1. See, in particular, Notebook 4, §67.

2. In a speech he delivered in Rome on March 10, 1929, at the first quinquennial assembly of the Fascist regime, Mussolini said: "One must take into account that, in peacetime, the navy is the element that determines the hierarchy among states." The text of the speech is reproduced in Benito Mussolini, *Discorsi del 1929* (Milan: Alpes, 1930), p. 31. Though Gramsci had a copy of this volume in prison, it appears that here he is quoting Mussolini from memory.

3. This "epigram" is in fact Gramsci's paraphrase or condensation of the opening paragraph of book 5, chapter 4, of Anatole France's *L'île des pingouins* (1908), which Gramsci had probably read before his imprisonment:

The Penguins had the finest army in the world. So had the Porpoises. And it was the same with the other nations of Europe. The slightest amount of thought will prevent any surprise at this. For all armies are the finest in the world. The second finest army, if one could exist, would be in a notoriously inferior position; it would be certain to be beaten. It ought to be disbanded at once. Therefore, all armies are the best in the world. . . . And it should be noticed that even after suffering the most terrible reverses an army does not fall from its position of being the finest in the world. For if nations ascribe victories to the ability of their generals and the courage of their soldiers, they always attribute their defeats to an inexplicable fatality. On the other hand, navies are classed according to the number of their ships. There is a first, a second, a third, and so on. So that there exists no doubt as to the result of naval wars. (Anatole France, *Penguin Island*, trans. A. W. Evans [New York: Heritage, 1947], p. 168.)

§100. *Past and present*

1. On the "hundred cities," see also Gramsci's comments in Notebook 1, §43, and Notebook 3, §39.

§101. *Italian culture*

1. See Bernard Groethuysen, *Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France*, vol. 1, *L'église et la bourgeoisie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927). For a condensed English translation of this volume, see *The Bourgeois: Catholicism vs. Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Mary Ilford (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

For Gramsci's comments in his letters on the value of this work by Groethuysen, see Notebook 5, §55, n. 8.

2. Franco Sacchetti (ca. 1332–1400), member of a prominent Florentine family, was a merchant before devoting himself to public life and serving Florence as an ambassador as well as in other important official capacities. He produced a substantial body of verse, including a number of pieces that were songs or readily adaptable to singing. His best-known prose work is *Trecentonovelle*, a sequence of short stories, many of which consist of anecdotes and vignettes; well over two hundred of them have survived. His other major prose work is *Spozioni di vangeli* (Expositions of the gospels) which is sometimes referred to as "Sermoni evangelici." Gramsci's views on Sacchetti were probably strongly influenced by Francesco De Sanctis, who, in chapter 10 of his *Storia della letteratura italiana*, describes Sacchetti as a man of average culture and little imagination whose best qualities were good sense, simplicity, and naturalness. Sacchetti's mediocrity, according to De Sanctis, was a true reflection of his times, the triteness and crude form of his writings manifestations of a traditional and exhausted world. Sacchetti's moral and political reflections evince a desire for the tranquillity and equilibrium that supposedly typify or are a reward for occupying a middle station in life.

3. Benedetto Croce, "Il Boccaccio e Franco Sacchetti" (Boccaccio and Sacchetti), *La critica* 29, no. 2 (March 20, 1931): 81–99.

§103. *Risorgimento*

1. Gramsci raised this same issue in §78 of this notebook.

2. The basic thesis put forward by Arrigo Solmi in his booklet *L'unità fondamentale della storia italiana* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1927) is typical of many nationalistic tracts of the time, namely, that Italy had an essentially unbroken history stretching from as far back as classical antiquity to the fascist present—hence "fundamental unity" in the title.

On Arrigo Solmi, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 2.

3. Francesco Collotti, "Pretesti oratori" (Rhetorical pretexts), *Leonardo* 3, no. 5 (May 20, 1927): 115–17.

4. Arrigo Solmi, "Metodologia storica" (Methodology of history), *Leonardo* 3, no. 8 (August 20, 1927): 204–6. Solmi's response was accompanied by a "Post-scriptum" by Luigi Russo supporting Collotti.

On Luigi Russo, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 2.

5. Carlo Cattaneo, *La città considerata come principio ideale delle istorie italiane*, ed. G.A. Belloni (Florence: Vallecchi, 1931). In this short work (originally published in segments in the periodical *Crepuscolo* in 1858), as in other writings, Cattaneo underlines the paradigmatic importance of the Italian medieval city-states, or communes; in his view, they

gave rise to modern, bourgeois civilization and its liberal ideals. This work may not have been published yet when Gramsci wrote this note, but he would have come across advertisements announcing its publication in the journals he had access to. It was not long, however, before the book was published and reviewed, and the reviews probably prompted Gramsci's comments in Notebook 6, §113.

On Carlo Cattaneo, see Notebook 2, §22, n. 4.

§105. *Types of periodicals. Tradition and its psychological sedimentations*

1. Pietro Gori (1865-1911), a lawyer born in Messina, was an indefatigable anarchist organizer and agitator who on more than one occasion used his legal skills to defend fellow anarchists. Arrested and imprisoned several times, he spent stretches of time away from Italy, avoiding persecution while continuing his militant activities. In 1895 Gori traveled to the United States, where for a year he crisscrossed the country from Boston to San Francisco, holding meetings and giving speeches promoting the anarchist cause. Later, he spent time in Argentina, where he helped found the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA). Gori also wrote plays and poetry, including a small book of verse, *Alla conquista dell'avvenire* (To the conquest of the future), that was reprinted numerous times. As a writer, he was most successful with his songs—including the memorable "Addio Lugano bella" (Farewell beautiful Lugano)—that were immensely popular, especially among anarchists and militant workers.

Felice Cavallotti (1842-98) was born in Milan and fought with Garibaldi in the 1860s. A radical republican and fierce antimonarchist, Cavallotti was elected to parliament in 1873 and became one of the most popular leaders of the radical Left and a severe critic of Agostino Depretis's transformism and of Francesco Crispi's policies. His steadfast advocacy of democracy earned him the nickname "bard of democracy." An eloquent speaker, he also attacked his adversaries relentlessly, which led to endless lawsuits and numerous duels. In fact, he died in a duel with Count Macola, a conservative. Cavallotti produced a substantial body of poetry and drama (including verse drama); though not regarded by any means as a major literary figure, much of his poetry had a politically rousing quality, and some of his plays enjoyed considerable success.

§106. *Journalism. News editor*

1. That is, "tips."
2. See, for example, Notebook 6, §58.

3. See the unsigned review of Walter P. Hedden, *How Great Cities Are Fed* (Boston: Heath, 1929), in the "Recenti pubblicazioni" (Recent publications) section of the *Giornale degli economisti* 45, no. 1 (January 1931): 73–75.

§107. Past and present

1. Croce contributed three "Postille politiche" (Political notes) that were published in *Politica* 1, no. 2 (January 19, 1919): 206–12; 1, no. 4 (April 24, 1919): 48–59; and 1, no. 7 (November 24, 1919): 13–17. The first two of these "Postille politiche" were later divided into four separate pieces with different titles—"Sopravvivenze ideologiche" (Ideologies that lived on), "La guerra italiana, l'esercito e il socialismo" (Italy's war, the army, and socialism), "Disegni di riforma nazionale" (Plans of national reform), and "La vittoria" (Victory)—and included in Benedetto Croce, *Pagine sulla guerra*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1928), pp. 250–55, 218–26, 263–70, 287–90. The third of the "Postille politiche" became two pieces—"L'onestà politica" (Political honesty) and "La nausea per la politica" (Nauseated by politics)—that were included in Benedetto Croce, *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), pp. 165–69, 169–73.

When Gramsci wrote this note he had in his possession a copy of the tenth-anniversary issue of *Politica* that included a list of its past contributors. See *Politica* 11, no. 84–85 (February–April 1929): 26–34.

On Francesco Coppola, the cofounder of *Politica*, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 1.

2. Guido De Ruggiero published the following articles in *Politica*: "Vico e Giannone" (Vico and Giannone) in 1, no. 6 (September 30, 1919): 355–76; "Economia e legislazione" (Economics and legislation), which appeared in two parts, in 1, no. 8 (December 31, 1919): 148–70, and in 2, no. 14 (June 30, 1920): 142–59; and "L'idea italiana nella Repubblica partenopea" (The idea of Italy in the Parthenopean Republic), which also appeared in two parts, in 2, no. 16–17 (September 30, 1920): 38–56, and in 3, no. 19 (December 1930): 15–36.

On Guido De Ruggiero, see Notebook 4, §2, n. 2.

3. Three articles that Croce wrote for these journals—"Metodi polemici del nazionalismo italiano" (Polemical methods of Italian nationalism), in *Italia nostra* 2, no. 2 (January 9, 1915); "Sulla storia d'Italia" (On Italian history), in *La critica* 14 (1916): 399–400; and "Il pensiero italiano e la guerra" (Italian thought and war), in *La critica* 15 (1917): 130–32—were republished in *Pagine sulla guerra* (Bari: Laterza, 1919), pp. 31–33, 131–42, 153–57.

Gramsci did not have a copy of Croce's *Pagine sulla guerra* but was familiar with its contents, on which he comments in a letter to Tatiana Schucht (April 18, 1932):

Croce's activity has distant origins and indeed goes back to the period of the war. To understand his recent works one must reexamine his writings on the war, which are gathered in two volumes (*Pagine sulla guerra*, second enlarged edition). <In fact, the 1928 enlarged 2nd edition consisted of a single volume of 358 pages.> I do not have these two volumes but I have read these essays as they were published. Their essential content can be briefly summarized as follows: a struggle against the orientation given to the war under the influence of French and Freemasonic propaganda, owing to which the war became a war of civilization, a war similar to the Crusades with the unleashing of popular passions that are close in character to religious fanaticism. After the war comes peace, that is, the conflict must be followed not only by renewed collaboration among the peoples, but the warring alliances must be replaced by peace alliances and it does not follow that these two coincide; but how could this renewed overall and specific collaboration be possible if an immediate criterion of utilitarian politics becomes a universal and categorical principle? It is therefore necessary for intellectuals to resist such irrational forms of propaganda and, though not weakening their country in war, resist demagoguery and save the future. Croce always sees the moment of war in the moment of peace and that of peace in the moment of war and he addresses his efforts to preventing the destruction of all possibilities of mediation and compromise between the two moments. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:162-63)

These observations are incorporated in Notebook 8, §225.

4. For the polemic against Francesco Coppola that Gramsci is referring to here, see Cesare De Lollis, "Guerra per la guerra" (War for the sake of war), *Italia nostra* 2, no. 5 (January 31, 1915), as well as the unsigned article "La cena del Trimalcione" (Trimalchio's supper), *Italia nostra* 2, no. 19 (May 9, 1915).

On Cesare De Lollis, see Notebook 6, §42, n. 6.

§108. *Popular literature*

1. See Vladimir Pozner, "Dostojevskij e il romanzo di avventure" (Dostoyevsky and the novel of adventures), *La cultura* 10, no. 2 (February 1931): 128-50.

On Eugène Sue, see Notebook 1, §27, n. 1.

2. Mario Praz, *La carne, la morte e il diavolo nella letteratura* (Milan: La Cultura, n.d. [1930]) was translated into English as *The Romantic Agony*, trans. Angus Davidson (New York: Meridian, 1956). Luigi Foscolo Benedetto's review appeared in *Leonardo* 2, no. 3 (March 1931): 112-16.

§110. *Machiavelli and Guicciardini*

1. See chapter 14, "Les critiques de l'escalier" (Critics after the event), in Georges Clemenceau, *Grandeur et misères d'une victoire* (Paris: Plon, 1930), pp. 213–31. This work by Clemenceau is not among the books of Gramsci's that have been preserved, nor has any record been found of him having received it in prison. While this does not exclude the possibility that Gramsci did have direct access to Clemenceau's book, he may have read chapter 14 or an extract from it in some French periodical.

2. See Notebook 6, §86.

3. See, for example, the opening of chapter 14. The following is an excerpt from the English translation, G. Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930):

I have been so bold as to liken M. Poincaré's articles on the Treaty to the lesson of a very careful master who shows up the trifling or serious mistakes of the good and bad pupils guilty of having set to work while the *deus ex machina* was philosophically twiddling his thumbs at the gates of the Elysée palace *Nirvana*.

I have patiently read through this universal indictment by a man who, knowing everything, did nothing: which allows him to make up for lost time by falling foul of those who attempted to do something. Everyone knows that *ex post facto* critics have the great advantage of putting us in a position to foresee the thing that has happened. This makes discussion much easier. (p. 250)

4. Clemenceau, *Grandeur et misères d'une victoire*, p. 217n. The English version in Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* reads, "Diplomacy is an institution more for the maintenance of incompatibles than for the initiation of things not consecrated by tradition. In the word diplomat there is the root *double*, with the meaning *to bend*" (p. 255n).

§111. *Popular literature. Serial novels*

1. See Notebook 6, §108.

2. The source of everything in this note up to this point (except for the allusion to Pozner) is a bibliographical survey by Edmond Jaloux in the section "L'esprit des livres," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 435 (February 14, 1931).

Gramsci's transcription of the bibliographical information is incorrect, probably because of the somewhat confusing references provided by Edmond Jaloux. Thus the author of *Le roman terrifiant* is Alice Killen and not Reginald W. Hartland, as recorded by Gramsci. The correct bibliographical information is Étienne Servais, *Le genre romanesque en*

France depuis l'apparition de la "Nouvelle Héloïse" jusqu'aux approches de la Révolution (Paris: Colin, 1922); Reginald William Hartland, *Walter Scott et le roman frénétique* (Paris: Champion, 1928); and Alice M. Killen, *Le roman terrifiant du roman noir de Walpole à Anne Radcliffe et son influence sur la littérature française jusqu'en 1840* (1915; reprint, Paris: Champion, 1924).

Gramsci refers to Alice Killen's *Le roman terrifiant* accurately in Notebook 8, §12, where his source is a later issue of *Les nouvelles littéraires*.

The source of information on Jacques Rivière's essay is, again, Jaloux's bibliographical survey. The essay referred to here was published in three parts; see Jacques Rivière, "Le roman d'aventure," *Nouvelle revue française* 5, no. 53 (May 1, 1913): 748-65; 5, no. 54 (June 1, 1913): 914-32; and 5, no. 55 (July 1, 1913): 56-77.

3. André Moufflet's essay "Le style du roman-feuilleton" is cited in a different part of the same issue of *Les nouvelles littéraires* that contains Edmond Jaloux's bibliographical survey. See the unsigned "Du roman-feuilleton au sinanthropos pekinensis" in the "Revue des revues" section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 435 (February 14, 1931). Gramsci alludes to Moufflet's essay again in Notebook 17, §29, where his source of information is an unsigned note, "Stile e fortuna del romanzo d'appendice" (The style and reception of the serial novel) in the "Marginalia" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 6 (February 8, 1931).

§112. Past and present. The Crocean utopia

1. See Notebook 6, §107.

2. See Benedetto Croce, *Cultura e vita morale*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926), especially pp. 293-300 and 265-71. Gramsci had a copy of this book in prison. The chapter "Fissazione filosofica" (Philosophical fixation) was first published in *La critica* 23, no. 4 (July 20, 1925): 252-56; and the chapter "Fatti politici e interpretazioni storiche" (Political facts and historical interpretations) was first published in *La critica* 22, no. 3 (May 20, 1925): 189-92.

3. On Giovanni Gentile's speech in Palermo (March 31, 1924), which Croce is attacking in the passage quoted here by Gramsci, see Notebook 5, 124, n. 3, and Notebook 6, §82, n. 14.

4. Gramsci is alluding, in particular, to the chapter "La libertà di coscienza e di scienza" (Freedom of conscience and of science) in Croce, *Cultura e vita morale*, pp. 95-102. This chapter was originally published (as a critique of a book by Luigi Luzzatti with the same title) in *Giornale d'Italia* 9, no. 186 (July 8, 1909).

5. In *Cultura e vita morale*, Croce writes:

It is clear that the principle of tolerance that has been invoked cannot be extended to political struggles fought under the banner of religion. Do we lament the massacre of St. Bartholomew, or the burnings at the stake by the Inquisition, or the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, or the burning alive of Servet? By all means, let us lament them; but we should also be fully aware that it is the stuff out of which poetry is made, not history. Those things happened, and no one can change them; just as no one can say what would have happened if those things had not taken place. The expiations that France and Spain made or should make for the supposed *delicta maiorum* are a demand of a vindictive Judaism that should be left to the preachers; it has no meaning whatsoever. I would even call it immoral because those past struggles brought forth our present world, which now presumes to stand up before its forbear to insult it or, at the very least, to proclaim to it, "I have seen those faces myself! . . .

But even when it comes to theoretical struggles that resort to practical measures, the principle still does not apply, because to apply it one would first have to refute the doctrine of the volitional character of theoretical affirmation. I will not repeat what I have expounded elsewhere to support that doctrine and to prove that all of us, in every instant, exert pressure on the will of others in order to ensure that they think in the way that seems good to us. Everyone: including Luzzatti, who is no different with his many exclamation points and question marks that he makes part of his style and that are a way of repeatedly pulling the ear and poking the chest of his listeners and readers. (pp. 97–98)

§113. *Risorgimento. The country and the city*

1. Carlo Cattaneo, *La città considerata come principio ideale delle istorie italiane*, ed. G. A. Belloni (Florence: Vallecchi, 1931). Gramsci had already taken note of the work by Cattaneo in Notebook 6, §103.

On Carlo Cattaneo, see Notebook 2, §22, n. 4; and on his work *La città considerata come principio ideale delle istorie Italian*, see Notebook 6, §103, n. 5.

When he wrote this note, Gramsci had just read two reviews of Belloni's edition of Cattaneo's *La città considerata*, in *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 5–6 (September–December 1931): 583–85, and in *L'Italia che scrive* 14, no. 8 (August 1931): 227. Information that Gramsci gleaned from these reviews is woven into the opening three sentences of this note.

2. This is a reference to the seven-volume edition of Cattaneo's complete works: *Opere edite ed inedite di Carlo Cattaneo*, ed. Agostino Bertani (Florence: Monnier, 1881–1892). Gabriele Rosa and Jessie Meriton White Mario helped Bertani with his research and editing.

3. Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835), born in the Romagna region, was the author of important works in legal and political theory (as well as other books on statistics, economics, the history of mathematics, and other subjects) whose teachings and writings had a strong influence on some of the major intellectuals of Risorgimento and post-Risorgimento Italy. He published his first major work, *Genesi del diritto penale* (Origins of penal law), in 1791. Romagnosi was drawn to Jacobinism early in his career, joined a clandestine club, and wrote booklets that were bound to rouse suspicion, such as *Cosa è l'uguaglianza* (What equality is) in 1792 and *Cosa è libertà* (What freedom is) in 1793. In 1799 he was accused of treason and imprisoned briefly in Innsbruck by the Austrians. When the French regained power in northern Italy, Romagnosi was appointed professor of law, first at the University of Parma and then, in 1807, at the University of Pavia, before becoming director of the Special School of Politics and law in Milan; he exercised considerable influence as a ministerial adviser. In 1815 he published *Della costituzione di una monarchia nazionale rappresentativa*, which was deemed subversive by the Austrians, who, restored to power, banned him. He continued teaching privately between 1817 and 1821; Carlo Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari were among his students and faithful followers during this period. Arrested for treason in 1821, Romagnosi was banished to Venice for a while and, although his guilt was never proven, forbidden from teaching, even privately; he also had his passport confiscated, which made it impossible for him to accept the offer of a professorship at the University of Corfu. He spent the last decade of his life studying and writing in Milan, where he died.

4. On Eugène Sue, see Notebook 1, §27, n. 1.

§114. *Risorgimento*

1. On the memoirs of Ferdinando Martini, *Confessioni e ricordi, 1859-1892* (Milan: Treves, 1928), see Notebook 3, §38, n. 5.

On Ferdinando Martini, see Notebook 2, §51, no. 2.

2. See Antonio Panella, "Le rivelazioni di un appendice al carteggio Ricasoli" (The revelations of an appendix to Ricasoli's correspondence), *Il marzocco* 32, no. 49 (December 4, 1927). The polemic started with an article critical of Panella by Mario Puccioni, "Per un appendice al carteggio Ricasoli" (For an appendix to Ricasoli's correspondence) in the "Commenti e frammenti" (Comments and fragments) section of *Il marzocco* 32, no. 50 (December 11, 1927), that was accompanied by a response from Panella. The argument was kept going by Mario Puccioni, "Ancora Ricasoli, Salvagnoli e il 27 Aprile" (More on Ricasoli, Salvagnoli, and April 27th) in the "Commenti e frammenti" section of *Il marzocco* 32, no. 51 (December 18, 1927).

On Antonio Panella, see Notebook 6, §13, n. 1.

3. Martini, *Confessioni e ricordi*, p. 13: "When the war was over, a rumor went around that the irritated urgings coming from Cavour had in turn irritated one of the ministers, who openly declared: 'We cannot take on the jobs of generals, let the emperor [i.e., Napoleon III] take care of the war.'"

4. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

5. Giovanni Nicotera (1828–94), a republican and follower of Mazzini, participated in the defense of the Roman republic against the French in 1849. He also played a leading role in Carlo Pisacane's 1857 expedition to Naples that ended tragically in Sapri. Severely wounded and captured by the Bourbon troops, he was to be executed, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He regained his freedom in 1860 when Garibaldi's "expedition of the thousand" toppled the Bourbon regime. Nicotera joined Garibaldi in Palermo and fought alongside him in all his subsequent campaigns. Elected to parliament in 1861, he became a prominent and vociferous leader of the Left and served briefly as interior minister between 1876 and 1877. After that, Nicotera became increasingly conservative and authoritarian, and in 1891–1892 he again served as interior minister, this time in the first government of the Right, led by Antonio Di Rudini.

On Luigi Settembrini, see Notebook 6, §8, n. 3.

6. The known existing library collections of the periodical *Vela latina* all have significant gaps, and the article that Gramsci alludes to here has not been found. *Vela latina* was first launched in December 1913 under the editorship of Ferdinando Russo; it was published in Naples and appeared every fortnight until June 1917. It was revived as a weekly at the end of May 1918.

On Ferdinando Russo, see Notebook 5, §153, n. 1.

7. Gramsci mentions the same anecdote in Notebook 3, §38.

On Quintino Sella, see Notebook 2, §29, n. 2.

On Giovanni Lanza, see Notebook 2, §29, n. 3.

§115. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Angelo Gatti*

1. See Angelo Gatti, *Ilia e Alberto* (Milan: Mondadori, 1930).

Angelo Gatti (1875–1948), a military officer, was assigned to the supreme command in 1917 and served General Cadorna as a special secretary during the period of the Caporetto debacle. After retiring from the army, he wrote some books on military policy, before becoming a fiction writer and producing several novels and short stories. In 1937 Gatti was inducted into the Accademia d'Italia.

2. Gatti's novel *Ilia e Alberto* was reviewed in numerous newspapers and periodicals. In all likelihood, Gramsci read the review by Benedetto Migliore in the "Notizie e commenti" (News and comments) section of *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1416 (March 16, 1931): 248–54, and possibly the

very favorable review by Attilio Momigliano in *Pègaso* 3, no. 2 (February 1931).

§116. *The Renaissance*. (The economic-corporative phase of Italian history.) *The origins of vernacular literature and poetry*

1. Ezio Levi, *Uguccione da Lodi e i primordi della poesia italiana* (Florence: Battistelli, 1921); *Poeti antichi lombardi*, ed. Ezio Levi (Milan: L. F. Cogliati, 1921).

Little is known about the thirteenth-century poet Uguccione da Lodi. His surviving work of certain attribution, *Libro*, consists of a poem or poems (the form and organization are unclear) written in two different verse styles in the Lombard-Venetian vernacular. It is a religious and didactic work of meditations on God's justice, the sinfulness of man, the corruption of contemporary society, eternal damnation, and the need for penance.

On Ezio Levi, see Notebook 4, §92, n. 1.

2. Salvatore Battaglia, "Gli studi sul nostro duecento letterario" (Studies on thirteenth-century Italian literature), *Leonardo* 3, no. 2 (February 20, 1927): 30-33. This is the second of a three-part survey of published scholarly work on thirteenth-century literature in Italy. The discussion of Levi's contributions to the field and the brief quotations in Gramsci's note are all found in this segment of Battaglia's survey.

3. The Patarin reformist movement emerged in Milan in the second half of the eleventh century. Its adherents were pious and zealous lay-people who braved persecution in their drive to cleanse the clergy, the papacy, and the church in general of corruption. By the late twelfth century, other reformist movements considered heretical were also labeled Patarins.

4. See Felice Tocco, *L'eresia nel Medioevo* (Florence: Sansoni, 1884); and Gioacchino Volpe, *Movimenti religiosi e sette ereticali nella società medievale italiana: Secoli XI-XIV* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1922).

Felice Tocco (1845-1911), who studied with Bertrando Spaventa and Luigi Settembrini, was professor of the history of philosophy at the University of Pisa and later at the University of Florence. In addition to his work on medieval heresies, he also wrote books on Plato, the Franciscans, Giordano Bruno, and Nietzsche.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

5. The other two segments of Battaglia's survey were published in *Leonardo* 3, no. 1 (January 20, 1927): 6-8; and *Leonardo* 3, no. 3 (March 20, 1927): 58-61.

§117. *Past and present*

1. As he indicates, Gramsci translated this passage from volume 8 (p. 22) of the French edition of Karl Marx, *Oeuvres politiques* (Paris: Costes, 1931), a copy of which he had at the Turi prison. The English translation here is taken from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 14, 1855–1856 (New York: International Publishers, 1980), p. 552. The article by Marx and Engels from which this excerpt is translated was originally published in German under the title "Zu den Angelegenheiten in der Krim" in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* of September 18, 1855, and was dated September 14, 1855. In the French edition that Gramsci was using, the article was given the title "La question d'Orient," which Gramsci rendered into Italian as "Quistione orientale" (Oriental question). In order to avoid confusion, it seemed preferable in this case to reproduce the title of the article that appears in the English edition of Marx and Engels's complete works—that is, "Events in Crimea."

§118. *The Renaissance*

1. Gramsci is referring to his pagination of the notebook. See Notebook 6, §116.

2. On the Patarins, see Notebook 6, §116, n. 3.

§119. *Risorgimento*

1. See Notebook 5, §12, and n. 3 there.

2. See Camillo Benso di Cavour, *Discorsi parlamentari*, vol. 4, 1851, ed. Luigi Russo (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1934), pp. 9–10. At the time he made this speech, Cavour was finance minister.

§120. *Types of periodicals. The final evolutionary being*

1. See Notebook 3, §76, n. 1.

2. *La voce*, a political and literary review published in Florence, was launched by Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini in December 1908. Prezzolini remained its editor until 1914, when he passed it on to Giuseppe De Robertis. It ceased publication in 1916. *L'unità*, a weekly, was founded in 1911 by Gaetano Salvemini, who broke away from the *Voce* group with which he had been closely associated. *L'unità* ceased publication in 1920. In 1912 Papini had a falling-out with Prezzolini, and the following year, together with Ardengo Soffici, he started *Lacerba*, a nationalistic and futurist periodical that folded in 1915.

On Giuseppe Prezzolini, Giovanni Papini, and Ardengo Soffici, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§121. *Journalism*

1. Gramsci derived his information on Albert Rival's book from its publisher's advertisement in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 438 (March 7, 1931).

§122. *Types of periodicals. Reviews*

1. *Il foro italiano* was founded in 1876 by Vittorio Scialoja and remains to this day one of the most important resources for law practitioners and researchers in Italy.

On Vittorio Scialoja, see Notebook 3, §27, n. 1.

§123. *Past and present*

1. In 1931 the journal *Economia* invited a number of economists—Albert Aftalion, Mario Alberti, André Andréades, Maurice Ansiaux, Georges de Leener, Charles Gide, Pasquale Jannaccone, F.W. Taussig, and C. A. Verrijn Stuart—to respond to a set of questions about the economic depression. Their responses were published under the title "La depressione economica mondiale: Opinioni degli economisti interrogati" (The world economic depression: The opinions of the economists who were questioned), *Economia* 7, no. 3 (March 1931). The two articles Gramsci is referring to are Pasquale Jannaccone's response on pp. 297-306 and, commenting on the responses, Gino Arias, "La crisi e i giudizi degli economisti" (The crisis and the views of the economists), on pp. 315-20.

On Pasquale Jannaccone, see Notebook 6, §82, n. 8.

On Gino Arias, see Notebook 6, §66, n. 1.

2. See Jannaccone's response in "La depressione economica mondiale," p. 301, which is also quoted in Arias, "La crisi e i giudizi degli economisti," p. 316.

3. Jannaccone maintained that in the United States "the steep rise in the standard of living of all social classes slowed down the accumulation of savings"; see "La depressione economica mondiale," p. 300. According to Arias, the policy of high wages in the United States, which was meant to stimulate consumption, helped create the crisis; see "La crisi e i giudizi degli economisti," p. 316.

4. According to Arias, "the disproportionate rise in consumption by the working classes has slowed down savings and hurt production that one would want to protect and help grow" ("La crisi e i giudizi degli economisti," pp. 316-17).

5. Here Gramsci is directly refuting Arias's assertion that "the roots of the crisis are deeply moral and political," the decline in savings being only one facet. The other facets, in his view, included lack of economic disci-

pline and “the anticorporativism that remains dominant in contemporary economics.” See *ibid.*, pp. 318–19.

§124. Croce and literary criticism

1. Benedetto Croce wrote the entry “Aesthetics” for the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1929). The Italian version of the text was first published in Italian with the title *Aesthetica in nuce* in a privately printed book (Naples, 1929). It was subsequently brought out by Laterza of Bari and also included in collections of Croce’s essays. For the English version, see “Aesthetica in Nuce,” in Benedetto Croce, *Philosophy, Poetry, History: An Anthology of Essays*, trans. Cecil Sprigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1966): 215–247; the passage quoted by Gramsci is on p. 237.

Gramsci most probably extracted the information about Croce’s text, as well as the brief quotation, from a review by Natalino Sapegno, *Pègaso* 2, no. 12 (December 1930): 758–59.

§125. Types of periodicals. History and “progress”

1. Gramsci is referring to King Alfonso XIII of Spain (1886–1941). Since Alfonso XII died before the birth of his son and successor, Alfonso XIII was literally born king. His mother, Queen Maria Christina, was the regent until 1902. Alfonso XIII abandoned both his throne and his country in 1931; his departure marked the beginning of the Second Spanish Republic.

§127. Industrial issues

1. Eugène Schneider, “Les relations entre patron et ouvriers: Les délégués de corporation,” *Revue des deux mondes* 7, no. 55 (November 15, 1930): 372–88.

2. Gramsci is alluding to the factory councils he helped organize in Turin.

§128. Organic centralism, etc.

1. Eugène Schneider, “Les relations entre patron et ouvriers: Les délégués de corporation,” *Revue des deux mondes* 7, no. 55 (November 15, 1930): 377.

“Being in command is nothing. What matters is understanding the persons you deal with and making sure they understand you. Understanding well—that’s the secret of life.”

2. Gramsci elaborates his critique of organic centralism at considerable length in Notebook 9, §68.

§129. *Past and present. D'Annunzio's politics*

1. Gabriele D'Annunzio's book *Per l'Italia degli italiani* (Milan: Bottega di Poesia, 1923) resembles a miscellany; its contents consist of speeches, public "messages," extended comments, "love documents," and other texts. The title of the book (For the Italy of the Italian people) comes from a public speech D'Annunzio made in Milan on August 3, 1923, in which he declared his support for Mussolini and fascism.

2. In a meandering passage in a section of *Per l'Italia degli italiani* entitled "Messaggio del convalescente agli uomini di pena" (Message of the convalescent to suffering men), D'Annunzio alludes to the exaltation of peasants in his grandiose play *La gloria* (1899) and then goes on to say: "The supremacy of the peasant today seems right to me. In the midst of the decadence of all classes, isn't the peasant—strong, rugged, sober, tenacious, hale—the best today? Since he is the best, he should reign. It is right that he should reign" (p. 154).

3. In the summer of 1921, following an appeal made by Maksim Gorky for international assistance to alleviate the plight of the victims of the Russian famine, an international campaign was launched to raise funds to provide aid. In Italy, the Communist Party set up a committee to collect donations and forward them to the Soviet authorities. D'Annunzio made a substantial donation that caused quite a stir at the time. In *Per l'Italia degli italiani*, he explains and justifies his gesture:

Many charitable people were scandalized when I sent my donation to the famished Russians through the legitimate channel of the Communist Party. I know that these people were scandalized because one of my indiscreet friends revealed my "deep and fraternal compassion" for the extremely unfortunate Russians. He should have said "deep and fraternal gratitude." The Russian people, whose torment has been far more atrocious than Alexis had prophesied, have rid the world forever of a puerile illusion and a sterile myth. As a result of the most far-reaching and terrible experience connected to a human doctrine, it has now been proven, once and for all, that a government born out of class dictatorship is powerless when it comes to creating tolerable living conditions. The field has now been cleared for the builders. (p. 286)

4. On Giovanni Pascoli, see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3.

§130. *Encyclopedic notions. Conjunction*

1. On the same topic, see Notebook 15, §16.

§131. *Past and present. Characters*

1. This is also the title of a book by Benedetto Croce, *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), a copy of which Gramsci had at Turi. Though it does not appear that Gramsci is referring directly to Croce's work here, it is possible that his comment on "bad faith" and lack of conviction was prompted by an essay in Croce's volume entitled "La 'buona fede'" ("Good faith"); see pp. 47-50.

§132. *History of the subaltern classes*

1. Ferdinando Petruccelli della Gattina, *La rivoluzione di Napoli nel 1848*, ed. Francesco Torraca, Biblioteca storica del Risorgimento italiano (Milan: Dante Alighieri, 1912). The historian Ferdinando Petruccelli della Gattina (1816-90) first published his autobiographical account of the 1848 Neapolitan upheaval in 1850.

2. Gennaro Mondaini, *I moti politici del '48 e la setta dell'"Unità italiana" in Basilicata*, Biblioteca storica del Risorgimento italiano (Milan: Dante Alighieri, 1902). In addition to this book on nationalist political activists during the 1848 political turmoil in the Basilicata region, Gennaro Mondaini (1874-1948) wrote a number of influential books on colonialism and Italian colonial law.

3. Guido De Ruggiero, *Il pensiero politico meridionale nei secoli XVIII e XIX* (Bari: Laterza, 1922), a study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political thought in the Italian South.

On Guido De Ruggiero, see Notebook 4, §2, n. 2.

§133. *For a new literature (art) through a new culture*

1. In the opening pages of "Poesia latina nel seicento," chapter 11 of Benedetto Croce's book on seventeenth-century Italian literature, *Nuovi saggi sulla letteratura italiana del seicento* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), Croce argues that in the seventeenth century, Latin poetry was composed primarily by priests, and especially by Jesuits, "for practical purposes, for edification and propaganda, and not out of any poetic motivation." He then goes on:

The two enormous volumes of the *Parnassus Societas Jesu*, published in 1654, collects the poetry produced up to that year exclusively by Jesuits (leaving out, among others, the popes who were poets, Urban VIII and Alexander VII), and not even all of it. One finds confirmation of the entirely practical nature of such versifying in the pleasure and satisfaction with which the Jesuits (no differently from the poetasters of every period or from the "futurists" in our own time) celebrated the sheer volume of

it and admired themselves for having been able in such a short span of time to bring forth so huge a mass of poetry in comparison to the sparse poetic production of the ancient and classical writers. The old Parnassus seemed like a hillock compared to high mountains or, rather, the chains of mountains that now stretched across one's field of vision. . . . And this self-conscious satisfaction (which is, after all, one of the strangest forms of unawareness that one can find) does not only remind us of the "futurists," it also makes one think, naturally and without any effort, of the schools and academies opened by the Jesuits and other priests in which poetry was produced voluminously and of the "schools of poetry" opened by the Bolsheviks in Russia where, even as they mock the wretched and stunted bourgeois past, they produce a continuous flood of Communist poetry based on a scheme that is astonishingly easy and proliferous.

Croce's *Nuovi saggi sulla letteratura italiana del seicento* is not among the books owned by Gramsci that have been preserved, but it is quite likely that he had a copy of it when he was in the Turi prison.

2. The connection between Croce and René Fülöp-Miller (1891-1963)—the author of, among many other things, a harshly critical book on Soviet culture—goes back to the year of publication of Fülöp-Miller's *Geist und Gesicht des Bolschewismus: Darstellung und Kritik des kulturellen Lebens in Sowjet-Russland* (Vienna: Amalthea, 1926). Croce wrote a very favorable review of the book almost as soon as it came out; see *La critica* 24, no. 5 (September 20, 1926): 289-91. Gramsci read Croce's review and remarks on it in Notebook 10, II, §1. As Gramsci surmises, Croce's derisory comment on the "schools of poetry" in the Soviet Union was most probably prompted by what he read in the chapter "The Mechanization of Poetry" in Fülöp-Miller's book; indeed, it almost seems as if Croce took Fülöp-Miller's description of Bolshevik practice and used it to describe Jesuit poetic production. The relevant passage from the English translation of Fülöp-Miller's book reads:

Equally abstruse are the experiments which have been going on for a considerable time in the "Briusov Institute." There poetry is separated into its elements, analysed, and reformed; it is claimed that during the process it loses all kind of mysterious magic. Here receipts for poems are prepared, and the hope is openly expressed that soon writing poetry will be imparted to everybody, just like piano playing, reading, or writing. Henceforth, the art of poetry is to be a subject in the elementary schools, as drawing used to be; the children will be taught all the knacks and tricks, the mastery of which formerly brought undeserved fame to only a few.

In its aim of forming geniuses, the Briusov Institute has two sections at its disposal, the productive and the instructive; the one trains writers,

poets, translators, and critics of the "highest quality" in a three years' course. . . .

Out of five hundred and fourteen students, the Institute was able, after only a year's working, to point proudly to thirty-six graduate poets. . . .

This is in truth the great achievement of revolutionary thought: that the connection between art and conditioned reflexes . . . has been definitely fixed, and that poetry has been defined as the mechanical combination of sounds and tones according to a chemical formula. However much opinions differ on whether poetry is better written by technical, physiological, or chemical methods, there is complete agreement that poetry has nothing whatever to do with intuition, endowment, or talent, for these are bourgeois and counter-revolutionary prejudices. (René Fülöp-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia*, trans. F.S. Flint and D.F. Tait [London: Putnam, 1927], pp. 154-55)

In a letter to Tatiana Schucht on May 2, 1932, Gramsci again refers to Fülöp-Miller in the course of a discussion of Croce's anti-Communism: "I've already mentioned how much importance Croce assigns to his theoretical activity as a revisionist and how, by his own admission, all of his efforts as a thinker during these last twenty years have been aimed at completing this revision [of Marxism], to the point of bringing about its liquidation. . . . It seems to me that Croce is not up-to-date on the research and bibliography of his favorite studies or has lost his capacity to be critically oriented. Apparently his information is based especially on a notorious book by a Viennese journalist, Fülöp-Miller" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:169).

When Fülöp-Miller's book appeared in Italian translation—*Il volto del bolscevismo*, with a preface by Curzio Malaparte (Milan: Bompiani, 1930)—Gramsci was very keen to obtain a copy but was forbidden from doing so by the prison censor. After appealing the prohibition (see the letter of August 25, 1930, to his brother Carlo and the letter to Mussolini of September 30, 1930), he was eventually allowed to have it, and he wrote to Tatiana Schucht on December 1, 1930, asking her to have the bookstore send him a copy. The draft of Gramsci's letter to Mussolini is in the manuscript of Notebook 2 (see Description of the Manuscript for that notebook in vol. 1).

§134. *Popular literature. The serial novel*

1. See Notebook 5, §54.

2. Gramsci seems to have had no more than a vague general impression of Freud's ideas and of psychoanalytic theory in general; see Notebook 1, §33, n. 1.

§135. *Past and present. Fordism*

1. See Notebook 4, §52. On the "open shop" (which is in English in the original), see Notebook 5, §2, n. 1.

2. The English word "dumping" is in the original.

§136. *Organization of national societies*

1. Gramsci is probably referring to Notebook 1, §47.

2. This was Gramsci's contention in his parliamentary speech of May 16, 1925, against the proposed law to ban secret societies. The law was ostensibly aimed at Freemasonry, but in fact it was a thinly veiled attempt by the Fascist government to suppress all oppositional organizations. An extract from Gramsci's speech:

Fascism has not yet succeeded in completely absorbing all other parties into its own organization. With the Freemasons it first tried the political tactic of infiltration, then the terroristic approach—burning down lodges; and, finally, legislative action, which will lead to numbers of key people in the big banks and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy going over to the winning side in order to safeguard their jobs. But the fascist government will have to compromise with the Freemasons. What does one do with a strong enemy of this sort? First break his legs, then when he is down force an agreement with him from a position of evident superiority. . . . Hence, we say that in fact this law is directed specially against the organizations of the workers. We demand to know why for many months now, although the Communist Party has not been declared an illegal organization, our comrades are arrested by the carabinieri every time they are found together in groups of three or more. . . . Since the Freemason movement will go over *en masse* to the Fascist Party and become one of its currents, it is clear that you intend to stop the development of large-scale worker or peasant organizations with this law. This is the real point, the real meaning of the law. Somebody in the fascist movement still has a nebulous recollection of the teachings of his former mentors, of the time when he too was a revolutionary and a socialist; he knows that a class cannot remain itself, cannot develop itself to the point of seizing power, unless it possesses a party and an organization which embodies the best, most conscious part of itself. Here is the grain of truth in this muddled, reactionary perversion of Marxist teaching.

Substantial parts of Gramsci's parliamentary speech are quoted in Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, trans. Tom Nairn (London: Verso, 1990), from which the extract above is taken (with a couple of small modifications); see especially pp. 194–96. The transcript of Gramsci's speech was printed in *L'unità* of May 23, 1925, and was published more recently in Antonio Gramsci, *Contro la legge sulle associazioni segrete*, ed. Antonio A. Santucci (Rome: Manifestolibri, 1997); see especially pp. 29–30 and 33.

3. Luigi Einaudi, review of Étienne Martin-Saint-Léon, *Les sociétés de la nation: Étude sur les éléments constitutifs de la nation française* (Paris: Spes, 1930), *La riforma sociale* 38, no. 3 (May–June 1931): 318–20.

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §11, n. 1.

4. In his parliamentary speech, Gramsci also said: "We have had what we might call the program of the *Corriere della sera*, which represents a far from negligible national political force: 800,000 readers—they, too, are a party" (Gramsci, *Contro la legge sulle associazioni segrete*, p. 27).

§137. *Concept of state*

1. Edmond Jaloux, review of Daniel Halévy, *Décadence de la liberté* (Paris: Grasset, 1931), "L'esprit des livres," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 459 (August 1, 1931).

2. One of Georges Sorel's best-known works, *Réflexions sur la violence* (1908) opens with "Introduction: Letter to Daniel Halévy." See Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth (New York: Free, 1950).

On Charles Maurras, see Notebook 1, §14, n. 1.

§138. *Past and present. Transition from the war of maneuver (and frontal assault) to the war of position—in the political field as well*

1. That is, Trotsky.

2. On this contentious issue, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 53, and Notebook 7, §16, and the notes there.

§139. *Conflict between state and church as an eternal historical category*

1. See the chapter entitled "Stato e Chiesa in senso ideale e loro perpetua lotta nella storia" (State and Church in the ideal sense and their perpetual conflict in history), in Benedetto Croce, *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), pp. 339–44. Gramsci had a copy of this book in the Turi prison.

See also Notebook 6, §81, n. 1.

§140. *Past and present*

1. See the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *Non abbiamo bisogno* (We do not need), promulgated on June 29, 1931. The encyclical was written at a time when Catholic Action and other religious organizations were reeling from a coordinated assault (in many instances violent) by fascists. In the beginning of June 1931, the regime dissolved all youth organizations that were not affiliated with the Fascist Party's youth movement. Pius XI's encyclical not only defended Catholic Action against accusations that it was interfering in politics to the detriment of the regime but also took aim at the government's coercive and totalitarian policies. The pope's characterization of the regime is at its harshest in the paragraphs that address the question of how Catholics should respond to the regime's demand that citizens take an oath of loyalty, an issue with a direct bearing on the claim (made by the Fascists) that the church had become a haven for the opposition if not even a *de facto* foreign power:

You ask us, Venerable Brethren, in view of what has taken place, what is to be thought about the formula of the oath, which even little boys and girls are obliged to take, that they will execute orders without discussion from an authority which, as we have seen and expected, can give orders against all truth and justice and in disregard of the rights of the Church and its souls, which are already by their very nature sacred and inviolable. Takers of this oath must swear to serve with all its strength, even to the shedding of blood, the cause of a revolution which snatches the young from the Church and from Jesus Christ, and which inculcates in its own young people hatred, violence and irreverence without respecting (as recent occurrences have superabundantly proved) even the person of the Pope.

When the question is posed in such terms, the answer from the Catholic point of view, as well as from a simply human point of view, is inevitably only one. . . . Such an oath is unlawful. . . .

Realizing the many difficulties of the present hour and knowing that membership in the party and the oath are for countless persons a necessary condition of their career, of their daily bread, and even of their life itself, We have sought to find a way which would restore tranquillity to these consciences, reducing to a minimum the external difficulties of the situation. It seems to Us that such a means for those who have already received the membership card would be to make for themselves before God, in their own consciences, a reservation such as "Saving the laws of God and of the Church" or "In accordance with the duties of a good Christian," with the firm proposal to declare also externally such a reservation if the need of it arose. (*The Papal Encyclicals*, ed. C. Carlen [Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath, 1981], p. 455)

The text of the encyclical was published in *La civiltà cattolica*, 82, no. 3 (July 18, 1931): 97–122.

2. See the editorial “Dallo Stato alla Chiesa” (From the State to the Church), *Critica fascista* 9, no. 14 (July 15, 1931): 261–62, which basically reiterated the injunction that the church should concern itself exclusively with spiritual matters.

3. On the concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

§141. *On national sentiment*

1. See the review of Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, *Lettres de jeunesse* (Paris: Grasset, 1931), by Edmond Jaloux in the “Esprit des livres” section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 460 (August 8, 1931). This review is Gramsci’s source of the information on Lyautey and the quoted passage from his work that he recorded in this note.

Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854–1934), a career soldier who rose to the rank of marshal, served in Indochina, Madagascar, and Algeria. In 1912 he went to Morocco, then a French protectorate, which he administered for over a decade. He served briefly as war minister of France in 1916–1917.

2. The count of Chambord (1820–1883) was the grandson of Charles X, and for one brief moment in 1830 it seemed possible that he would be named monarch; instead, Louis-Philippe ascended to the throne in a constitutional monarchy. He again came close to being enthroned in 1873, when the two royalist parties (the Legitimists and the Orleanists) held a majority in the parliament and sought to install Chambord as king. In the end, however, his rigidity and intransigence proved insurmountable as he refused to recognize the tricolor as the national flag—for the diehard monarchist it was a symbol of the Revolution.

3. On Pope Leo XIII, see Notebook 1, §77, n. 2.

On the *ralliement*, see Notebook 5, §18, n. 3.

4. Count Albert de Mun (1841–1914), a politician and prominent Catholic leader, was inspired by Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) to establish Catholic workers’ associations in France.

5. “A gentleman with a perfect education and charming manners, he thinks as we do on all matters religious and political. We speak the same language and understand each other wonderfully. What can I say? My heart burns with a fierce hatred of turmoil and revolution. I certainly feel much closer to those who fight against revolution, whatever their nationality, than to those of our compatriots with whom I do not have a single idea in common and whom I regard as public enemies.”

§142. *Past and present. Corsica*

1. Augusto Garsia, "Canti d'amore e di morte nella terra dei Corsi" (Songs of love and death in the land of the Corsicans), *L'Italia letteraria* 3, no. 32 (August 9, 1931), from which Gramsci extracts the information contained in the first paragraph of this note.

2. The newspaper *Il telegrafo* was published in Livorno.

3. On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

4. A group of Corsican autonomists launched the newspaper *A muvra* in 1920 and three years later formed the Corsican Action Party.

5. The veterinarian Vittore Nessi was taken in as a lodger by Gramsci's mother not long after her husband was jailed and the family was in financial straits. See Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, trans. Tom Nairn (London: Verso, 1990), p. 17.

6. In Cagliari, the feast of the Sardinian martyr St. Efsio (La Sagra di Sant'Efsio) is celebrated every year with a four-day festival that starts on May 1.

§143. Guido Calogero

1. Guido Calogero, "Il neohegelismo nel pensiero italiano contemporaneo" (Neo-Hegelianism in contemporary Italian thought), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1402 (August 16, 1930): 409-27. Gramsci quotes a long passage from this article in Notebook 10, I, §4.

Guido Calogero (1904-86) studied philosophy at the University of Rome, where Giovanni Gentile was his mentor. He worked for the *Enciclopedia Treccani* (which was directed by Gentile) while continuing his research in German philosophy. Calogero was, despite his close ties to Gentile, an antifascist and in the early 1940s was sentenced to internal exile.

§144. *G. Pascoli and Davide Lazzaretti*

1. This passage is from a preface that Giovanni Pascoli wrote for a school anthology, *Sul limitare* (Palermo, 1885). It is quoted in Giuseppe Papini, "Un poeta e un filosofo: Lettere di G. Pascoli e G. G. Barzellotti" (A poet and a philosopher: Letters by G. Pascoli and G. G. Barzellotti), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1404 (September 16, 1930): 162-77; see especially p. 167. Gramsci transcribed the passage from Papini's article and underlined "uncertain" in the first sentence; the other emphasis is in Papini's article.

On Giovanni Pascoli, see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3.

On Davide Lazzaretti, see Notebook 3, §12, n. 1.

On Giacomo Barzellotti and his book on Lazzaretti, see Notebook 3, §12, n. 2.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§145. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. Emilio Zanette, "Il numero come forza nel pensiero di Giovanni Botero" (The power of numbers), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1403 (September 1, 1930): 89–103.

2. On Giovanni Botero, see Notebook 3, §141, n. 2.

3. In his article (p. 90n), Zanette refers to the third volume of Carlo Gioda's *La vita e le opere di Giovanni Botero* (Milan: Hoepli, 1895). Prompted by this reference, Gramsci must have been thinking of looking for more recent work by Gioda on Botero. He was obviously unaware that Carlo Gioda (1836–1903) had been dead for almost three decades.

4. On what Gramsci means by "petty Italians," see Notebook 1, §14.

§146. *History of Italian intellectuals. The Jews*

1. See Yoseph Colombo, "Lettere inedite del padre Hyacinthe Loyson" (Unpublished letters of Father Hyacinthe), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1403 (September 1, 1930): 57–65.

2. Charles Loyson (1827–1912), better known in his time as Père Hyacinthe, was a French theologian, Carmelite friar, and acclaimed preacher with a large following who adamantly opposed the dogma of papal infallibility enunciated at the first Vatican Council (1869–1870). He broke away from the Catholic Church, which excommunicated him, and founded a Gallican Church with a liberal orientation. Loyson corresponded with the rabbi Elia Benamozegh and wrote the preface to the French edition of Benamozegh's posthumously published *Israël et l'humanité: Étude sur le problème de la religion universelle et sa solution* (Paris: Leroux, 1914).

Born in Livorno, Elia Benamozegh (1823–1900) devoted his life to the study of theology as well as philosophy. He served the Jewish community of Livorno as rabbi and was also professor of theology at the rabbinical school in the same city. His voluminous writings include tomes on the kabbalah, extensive commentaries on the scriptures, and a comparative study of Jewish and Christian ethics. Benamozegh also studied and wrote on European philosophers, most notably Spinoza but also Rosmini and Gioberti. For an English translation of his posthumous book, see Elia Benamozegh, *Israel and Humanity*, ed. and trans. Maxwell Luria (New York: Paulist, 1995).

§147. *Popularity of Italian literature*

1. Ercole Reggio, "Perchè la letteratura italiana non è popolare in Europa" (Why Italian literature is not popular in Europe), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1405 (October 1, 1930): 298–307. The quoted passage is on p. 298, and the bracketed interjection is Gramsci's.

§148. *The genius in history*

1. See Niccolò Tommaseo, "Pio IX e Pellegrino Rossi" (Pius IX and Pellegrino Rossi), ed. Teresa Lodi, *Pègaso* 3, no. 10 (October 1931): 402-25, especially pp. 407 and 415.

Pellegrino Rossi (1787-1848), a nationalist and a liberal, fled Italy following the defeat of Murat, whom he had served as a provincial administrator. After spending several years in Geneva, where he was a professor of law and a prominent political figure, he moved to Paris and was appointed professor of political economy at the Collège de France. In 1845 Louis Philippe appointed him ambassador to the Vatican. After Louis Philippe's abdication in 1848, Pope Pius IX appointed Rossi minister of interior. He was assassinated in November of that year in the midst of the turmoil that culminated in the establishment of the very short-lived Roman Republic in 1849.

On Niccolò Tommaseo, see Notebook 5, §25, n. 1.

§149. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. Gramsci's source of information on Paul-Henri Michel, *Un idéal humain au XVe siècle: Le pensée de L. B. Alberti* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930) was a book review by Mario Bonfantini in *Leonardo* 2, no. 9 (September 1931): 395.

On Leon Battista Alberti, see Notebook 5, §55, n. 9.

2. On *Le cento novelle antiche; o, Libro di novelle e di bel parlar gentile, detto anche Novellino*, ed. and introd. Letterio di Francia (Turin: UTET, 1930), see the review essay by Angiolo Orvieto, "Un nuovo 'Novellino'" (A new *Novellino*), *Il marzocco* 36, no. 1 (January 4, 1931), from which Gramsci almost certainly derived the information in the note.

Novellino is a collection of a hundred tales written in the late thirteenth century by an unknown but probably Florentine author.

3. See, for example, Notebook 3, §76.

§150. *Past and present*

1. See Emilio Debono, "Diario di campagna" (Campaign diary), and Italo Balbo, "Da Perugia a Roma" (From Perugia to Rome), *Gioventù fascista* 1, no. 32 (October 25, 1931).

Emilio Debono and Italo Balbo, together with Michele Bianchi and Cesare Maria De Vecchi, were appointed quadrumvirs by Mussolini in the preparations leading up to the March on Rome (October 1922), which started in Perugia. The March on Rome was first conceived as a seizure of the state, and the quadrumvirs were supposed to be in control of the

Fascist forces. In the end, events unfolded quite differently, and the quadrumvirs did not play the decisive roles they had envisaged.

Before being named quadrumvir, Emilio De Bono (1866–1944) had participated in a number of military campaigns, with mixed success. The commander of the Fascist Militia when the Socialist member of parliament, Giacomo Matteotti, was murdered, he immediately found himself accused of complicity. Though indicted, he was ultimately exonerated. Subsequently, he was appointed governor of Tripolitania, and in 1935 he was at the head of the Italian forces that invaded Ethiopia, only to be replaced some time later by General Badoglio. Arrested in 1943 on the charge of participating in the conspiracy against Mussolini, he was executed early the following year.

A leader of violent Blackshirt squads in and around Ferrara, Italo Balbo (1896–1940), who had distinguished himself as member of the elite Alpini corps during World War I, rose to the uppermost levels of the Fascist hierarchy. During his term as minister of aviation (1929–33), he became a legendary figure in Italy by successfully leading a fleet of seaplanes across the Atlantic and back. In 1934 Mussolini appointed him governor of Libya. In the Second World War, he was given command of the Italian forces in North Africa. He was killed by Italian gunners who mistakenly shot down his airplane near Tobruk.

§151. *Catholic Action*

1. The process of canonization of Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) was formally started in 1627, but it was all but forgotten until Pope Pius XI revived it. On Robert Bellarmine, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 10.

2. Guido De Ruggiero, review of Antonio Banfi, *Vita di Galileo Galilei* (Milan: Soc. Ed. La Cultura, 1930), *La critica* 29, no. 1 (January 20, 1931): 52–54.

On Guido De Ruggiero, see Notebook 4, §2, n. 2.

3. See Antonio Bruers, "San Roberto Bellarmino," *Gerarchia* 11, no. 9 (September 1931): 765–70; especially p. 767: "The pontiff [i.e., Pius XI], who on June 29, 1930, canonized Bellarmine, author of the famous formula of the 'indirect power' of the pope over all civil sovereignties, is the same pontiff who five years earlier designated the last Sunday of October of every year as the feast of Christ the King." This was written in the periodical directed by Mussolini at a time of growing tension between the regime and the Vatican. The Fascists claimed that the church was infringing upon and perhaps even undermining Italy's national sovereignty. Gramsci comments on this problem in a number of different notes; see, for example, Notebook 6, §140.

On Antonio Bruers, see Notebook 1, §99, n. 1.

§153. *The national popular character of Italian literature.*
Goldoni

1. Carlo Goldoni (1707-93), a Venetian, revitalized Italian drama when he infused a strong element of realism into his plays at a time when the commedia dell'arte tradition was lapsing into tedium and formulaic predictability. He wrote some plays in Venetian dialect, and he excelled in the comedy of manners—see, for example, *La locandiera* (1753). Goldoni's innovations drew severe criticism from, among many others, Carlo Gozzi. He eventually moved to Paris, where he directed the Comédie-Italienne and tutored Louis XVI's sisters in Italian.

Preserved among Gramsci's books is a volume of Goldoni's plays: Carlo Goldoni, *Commedie*, ed. Piero Nardi, vol. 2 (Milan: Unitas, 1926); he did not, however, have this book with him during his years in prison.

2. The playwright Carlo Gozzi (1713-86), a Venetian like Goldoni, adhered firmly to the commedia dell'arte tradition and actively defended it against innovators such as Goldoni. It was not only Goldoni's departure from tradition that drew Gozzi's ire but also his supposedly dubious morals, his sympathy for the popular classes, and his apparent disdain for the aristocracy. Gozzi wrote a set of extremely successful plays that are known as the *Fiabe* (Fairy tales), one of which, *Turandot*, was the basis of the famous opera by Giacomo Puccini (first performed 1926). The *Fiabe* evince the influence of, among other things, *A Thousand and One Nights*. Gozzi was widely acclaimed in his time, both in Italy and abroad; Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and the Schlegels were among his admirers.

§154. *The Saint-Simonians*

1. Gramsci transcribed this quotation from the first segment of the fourth series of Maurice Barrès's *Mes cahiers* in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 468 (October 3, 1931).

This observation of Goethe's, however, is not in his memoirs but recorded by Johan Peter Eckermann in his transcription of an October 3, 1828, conversation with Goethe. For an English translation (slightly different from the one provided here), see Johan Peter Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe*, trans. John Oxenford (New York: Dutton, 1930), especially p. 264.

On Maurice Barrès, see Notebook 3, §2, n. 6.

§156. *On ancient capitalism . . .*

1. The polemic Gramsci is referring to centered on the significance of the two ships built for the emperor Caligula that archaeologists were able to raise from the bottom of Lake Nemi (in the Alban Hills, southeast of

Rome) in 1929–1932. The ships were not seafaring vessels but actually two very large barges that had been built specifically for use on the lake. Still, they provided archaeologists and historians with valuable insights into the technical capabilities of Roman shipwrights. Their size as well as the methods used in their construction revealed a higher level of sophistication than had hitherto been suspected.

The article that triggered the polemic was Giuseppe Lugli's "A che serviva la nave di Nemi?" (What was the Nemi ship used for?), *Pègaso* 2, no. 10 (October 1930): 419–29. Lugli's views were criticized in an article by G. C. Speziale, "Delle navi di Nemi e dell'archeologia navale" (On the ships of Nemi and naval archaeology), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1407 (November 1, 1930): 87–100. Speziale's attack elicited another article by Giuseppe Lugli, "Ancora sulla nave di Nemi" (On the Nemi ships again), *Pègaso* 2, no. 12 (December 1930): 744–50. This, in turn, led to one more article by G. C. Speziale, "Realtà e fantasia nella questione delle navi Nemi" (Reality and fantasy in the debate over the ships of Nemi), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1411 (January 1, 1931): 117–31.

2. See Notebook 1, §25, n. 18.

3. On Corrado Barbagallo, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 17.

4. See Vitruvius, *De Architectura*, book 10, I, i: "A machine is a combination of materials that is most suitable for moving heavy things" (*Machina est continens e materia coniunctio maximas ad onerum motus habens virtutes*).

§157. *Philosophical novels, utopias, etc.*

1. The first part of Miguel De Cervantes's *Don Quixote* was published in 1605, and the second in 1615.

On Ludovico Ariosto, whose first version of *Orlando Furioso* was published in 1516, see Notebook 5, §95, n. 6.

Thomas More (1477–1535) wrote his *Utopia* in 1515–1516. It was first published in Louvain in December 1516.

On Tommaso Campanella and his *Città del sole*, first published in Latin in 1623, see Notebook 1, §62, n. 1.

§158. *History of the subaltern classes*

1. Armando Cavalli, "Correnti messianiche dopo il '70" (Messianic currents after 1870), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1408 (November 16, 1930): 209–15.

2. Piero Gobetti launched the weekly *Rivoluzione liberale* in February 1922 and continued editing it until the Fascist government ordered it shut down in November 1925. Gobetti also founded the literary journal *Il*

Baretti (named after an eighteenth-century writer and critic), which started publication in December 1924. *Il Baretti* appeared twice a month until Gobetti's death in February 1926, after which it continued to be published monthly until 1928.

Armando Cavalli was a very frequent contributor to Gobetti's periodicals. He published over twenty-five articles in *La rivoluzione liberale* between 1924 and 1926, in addition to nine articles in *Il Baretti* between 1925 and 1928.

On Piero Gobetti, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 29.

3. On Davide Lazzaretti, see Notebook 3, §12, n. 1.

4. In April 1877, a group of anarchists led by Errico Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero attempted to stir up a rebellion by the peasantry in a mountainous area in the province of Benevento. They succeeded in occupying the villages of Letino and Gallo, where they raised the red and black anarchist flag. Troops were sent in, the uprising was quickly squashed, and all the ringleaders were arrested.

5. In the spring of 1870, there were a number insurrections in the South (Catanzaro) as well as the north (Pavia, Piacenza, and the Romagna). Pietro Barsanti, a fervent follower of Mazzini, led a rebellion in Pavia in March that was quickly suppressed. Barsanti was arrested, taken to Milan, and executed five months later. The "internationalists" Gramsci refers to were the anarchists who had drifted away from Mazzinian republicanism in the early 1870s.

6. On Ruggero Bonghi, see Notebook 2, §8, n. 1.

7. The daily *La perseveranza*, founded in 1860, represented the views of the Moderates in Lombardy. Ruggero Bonghi edited it for many years, starting in 1866. It ceased publication in 1920.

§159. *Risorgimento*

1. Emanuele Librino, "Agostino Depretis prodittatore in Sicilia" (Depretis, prodictator in Sicily), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1410 (December 16, 1930): 462-509.

On Agostino Depretis, who was named pro-dictator of Sicily in 1860, during Garibaldi's campaign in the island, see Notebook 3, §119, n. 1.

Luigi Carlo Farini (1812-66), at first a Mazzinian, was exiled from the papal states for revolutionary activities. Subsequently, he joined the Moderates and was close to Cavour, who entrusted him with many important posts and sent him as viceroy to Naples during Garibaldi's campaign in the South. The relationship between the statesman and the soldier was strained at best. He served briefly as prime minister in 1862-63.

On Francesco Crispi, who was opposed to the immediate annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 10.

On Nino Bixio, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 26.

Agostino Bertani (1812–86), a surgeon from Milan, participated in the uprising against the Austrians in Milan in 1848 and was a strong supporter of Mazzini and Garibaldi. Bertani took part in the Expedition of the Thousand in Sicily, overseeing medical needs and logistics. A prominent leader of the Left, he served in parliament almost continuously from 1860 until the year of his death.

2. See Francesco Crispi, *I mille*, with documents from the Crispi archive, ed. T. Palamenghi-Crispi, 2d ed. (Treves: Milan, 1927). Gramsci received a copy of this book during the period of his imprisonment in Milan. See Gramsci's letters of November 21, 1927, to Tatiana Schucht, and of January 31, 1928, to his friend Giuseppe Berti.

§160. *On morals*

1. See Denis Diderot, "Lettres à Grimm et à Mme d'Épinay," ed. André Babelon, *Revue des deux mondes* 101, no. 4 (February 15, 1931): 851–87. The quotation is from p. 852: "Diderot, who had the same respect for posterity that others have for the immortality of the soul . . ."

§161. *Risorgimento. Garibaldi*

1. Emanuele Librino, "L'attività politica di Garibaldi" (Garibaldi's political activity), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1414 (February 16, 1931): 473–87.

2. General Giacomo Medici (1819–82) was a friend of Garibaldi's who fought with him in the 1859 war against the Austrians, the Expedition of the Thousand, and again against the Austrians in 1866. After the 1866 insurrection in Palermo, Medici was named prefect of the city.

§164. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists*

1. When King Alfonso XIII abandoned the throne in April 1931, Niceto Alcalá Zamora (1877–1949), a Catholic former monarchist turned moderate republican, became prime minister of the Second Spanish Republic. Before long, however, he ran into trouble with the Constituent Assembly. In the drafting of the new constitution, the leftist republicans and socialists insisted on articles that would ensure a secular state, including the abolition of religious instruction in the schools and drastic restrictions on the rights of the clergy, as well as other provisions that did not sit well with antiliberal and integralist Catholics, such as voting rights for women. Zamora's efforts, backed by the Vatican, to dilute or attenuate the constitutional clauses that most directly impinged on and diminished the status of the church in Spain were rebuffed, and in October 1931 he was forced to resign, as was his minister of the interior, Miguel Maura. Two months later, however, he was elected the first president of the republic.

The antimodernist, integralist Catholics, meanwhile, led by Cardinal Pedro Segura y Saenz (1880-1957), archbishop of Toledo, battled fiercely against the forces of secularization. Segura, who was close to the fugitive King Alfonso and a diehard monarchist, fulminated against the republic in pastoral letters and other forums using rhetoric that left no room for compromise or accommodation. He was forced to leave Spain in 1931 and spent the following six years in the Vatican Curia.

All these events were amply covered in the major Italian newspapers, which enabled Gramsci to follow the course of events.

2. Enrico Carlo Lea, *Storia della Inquisizione: Fondazione e procedura*, trans. P. Cremonini (Torino: Bocca, 1910). For the original in English, see Henry Charles Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1906-7). On the convoluted story of the struggle between the Jesuits and the Inquisition in Spain, which culminated in the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain in 1767 and subsequently the suppression of the Society of Jesus, in 1773, by Pope Clement XIV, see 4:284-97. It is not likely that Gramsci had access to this book in Turi.

An article that Gramsci almost certainly read around the time he wrote this note was "La bufera anticlericale spagnola" (The anticlerical storm in Spain), *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (November 7, 1931): 213-28.

§165. *Encyclopedic notions. Science and scientific*

1. See Henri [sic] Dubreuil, *Standards: Il lavoro americano visto da un operaio francese*, ed. A. Schiavi (Bari: Laterza, 1931). Gramsci had a copy of this book in Turi. For the English version of this work (originally published in French in 1929), see H[yacinth] Dubreuil, *Robots or Men? A French Workman's Experience in American Industry*, trans. Frances Merrill and Mason Merrill (New York: Harper, 1930). This work, an authorized translation for the Taylor Society, deals at considerable length with issues related to Taylorism and industrial practices in the United States; it must have been an especially interesting book to Gramsci in view of his extensive inquiries into Americanism and Fordism. Gramsci's comments in this note were prompted by the following observation in Dubreuil's book:

Because of certain abuses and blunders, the expression "scientific management" has become almost a synonym for barbarous exploitation. It may be observed that in America the word "scientific" is used in a sense that cannot be translated exactly by *scientifique*, which has in French not only a more strict but a more abstract meaning than the corresponding American term. Thus one may construe the phrase "scientific management" as designating a set of methods aimed to embody the greatest possible common sense and logic, as distinct from the negligence of traditional routine. Such a phrase demonstrates the danger of translations

that do not penetrate to the core of the meaning which every people puts into a term. (p. 64n)

§166. *Past and present. Apolitical attitude*

1. The exact title of Emilio De Bono's book on the Italian army before the Great War is *Nell'esercito nostro prima della guerra* (Milan: Mondadori, 1931). The book was reviewed by Aldo Valori in the *Corriere della sera* of November 17, 1931.

On Emilio De Bono, who was minister for the colonies when he wrote this book, see Notebook 6, §150, n. 1.

2. See Giuseppe Cesare Abba, *Uomini e soldati: Letture per l'esercito e pel popolo* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1890).

On Giuseppe Cesare Abba, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 27.

3. Just months before Mussolini appointed him a quadrumvir for the March on Rome, De Bono published a series of articles on political-military affairs in the antifascist newspaper *Il mondo*; see the issues of February 28, March 21, April 28, May 19, and June 6, 1922.

§167. *Encyclopedic notions. Bog and bogati*

1. In this case, Gramsci is avoiding the censor. The "someone" he alludes to is Nikolai Bukharin; the "somewhere" is Bukharin's booklet *Programma kommunistov (bolshevikov)*, first published in Moscow in 1918. (An English translation of Bukharin's pamphlet appeared the same year it was first published in Moscow; see N. Bukharin, *Program of the Communists [Bolshevists]* [New York: Communist Labor Party, 1918].) Gramsci had published an extract from this work, "Chiesa e scuola nella Repubblica dei Soviet" (Church and school in the Soviet Republic), in *L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 16 (August 30, 1919): 121-22. At one point in this segment, Bukharin makes an observation about the root of the word for "God" in Russian (*Bog*):

It is interesting that all the words that refer to the divinity testify eloquently to these origins [of religion]. What does "Bog" mean? It comes from the same root as "bogaty" [i.e., "rich"]. God is the one who is great, powerful, and rich. How is God glorified? As the "Lord." What is a "Lord"? He is a master, the opposite of a "slave." In fact, when we pray, we say: "We are your servants." God is also glorified as "the king of the heavens." All the other words for God have a similar meaning: conqueror, "dominus," etc. A "dominus" is a person who dominates, rules over many others, possesses great wealth. What is God, then? God is, so to speak, really rich, a powerful lord, an owner of slaves, "ruler of the heavens," a judge—in short, God is the perfect copy, the exact equiv-

alent of the earthly power of the chief, or the prince. When the Jews were ruled by princes who punished and tormented them in every possible way—that is when the idea of a cruel and malevolent God emerged. Such is the God of the Old Testament: a ferocious old man who inflicts cruel punishments on his subjects. (p. 121)

Gramsci published additional segments of Bukharin's *Program of the Communists (Bolsheviks)*, under the general heading "Il programma del Partito comunista" (Program of the Communist Party), in *L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 19 (September 20-27, 1919): 146; 1, no. 28 (November 29, 1919): 217-18; 1, no. 29 (December 6-13, 1919): 225-26; 1, no. 30 (December 20, 1919): 239; 1, no. 31 (December 27, 1919): 247; 1, no. 32 (January 3, 1920): 253-54; 1, no. 34 (January 17, 1920): 268-69; 1, no. 35 (January 24-31, 1920): 276-77; 1, no. 36 (February 7, 1920): 284-85; 1, no. 37 (February 14, 1920): 292. A complete Italian version of Bukharin's booklet, *Il programma dei comunisti (bolscevichi)*, was published in 1920 by the *Avanti!* publishing house in Turin.

2. The Italian equivalent of the German word "reich" (rich, in English) is "ricco." The Italian words "dovizio" and "dovizioso" are translatable as "wealth" and "wealthy."

3. The full title of Giacomo Leopardi's 1830 poem is "Canto notturno di un pastore errante nell'Asia" (Night song of a wandering shepherd in Asia).

4. Alessandro Chiappelli, "Come si inquadra il pensiero filosofico nell'economia del mondo" (How philosophical thought fits within the framework of the world economy), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1417 (April 1, 1931): 307-18; the quoted passage is on p. 312.

On Alessandro Chiappelli, see Notebook 5, §125, n. 2.

§168. Popular literature

1. Alberto Consiglio, "Populismo e nuove tendenze della letteratura francese" (Populism and new currents in French literature), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1417 (April 1, 1931): 380-89.

2. "Lettre de Francis Jammes à Henri Pourrat sur le roman paysan," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, no. 406 (July 26, 1930), which was followed by "Les grandes enquêtes des *Nouvelles littéraires*: Roman paysan et littérature prolétarienne," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 9, nos. 407-413 (August 2-September 13, 1930).

3. See Giambattista Vico, *Scienza nuova*:

[132] Legislation considers man as he is in order to turn him to good uses in human society. Out of ferocity, avarice, and ambition, the three vices which run throughout the human race, it creates the military, merchant,

and government classes, and thus the strength, riches, and wisdom of commonwealths. Out of these three great vices, which could certainly destroy all mankind on the face of the earth, it makes civil happiness.

[133] This axiom proves that there is divine providence and further that it is a divine legislative mind. For out of the passions of men each bent on his private advantage, for the sake of which they would live like wild beasts in the wilderness, it has made the civil institutions by which they may live in human society. (*The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968], p. 62)

§169. *Journalism*

1. Luigi Villari, "Giornalismo britannico di ieri e di oggi" (British journalism yesterday and today), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1419 (May 1, 1931): 121-34.

§171. *Risorgimento*

1. Gian Pietro Vieusseux (1779-1863), a successful merchant of Swiss ancestry, moved to Florence in 1819 and devoted the rest of his life to cultural and intellectual activities and publishing. In 1821 he established a scientific-literary club that attracted liberal intellectuals who in turn became contributors to Vieusseux's publishing initiatives, including the periodicals he helped launch, such as the influential *Antologia* (that first appeared in 1821), *Il giornale agrario* (1827), the *Guida dell'educatore* (1836), and the *Archivio storico italiano* (1842).

2. On *Il politecnico*, see Notebook 3, §31, n. 1.

3. Francesco Baldasseroni's book on the revival of cultural and political life in nineteenth-century Tuscany, *Il rinnovamento civile in Toscana* (Florence: Olschki, 1931), was reviewed by Ersilio Michel in *L'Italia che scrive* 14, no. 11 (November 1931): 311. Michel's review is the source of the information in this note.

§172. *Popular literature*

1. Antonio Baldini, "Stonature di cinquant'anni fa: La Farfalla petroliera" (Discordances fifty years ago: The incendiary Farfalla), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1422 (June 16, 1931): 503-8. Much of what follows in this note is culled from this article.

Antonio Baldini (1889-1962), a critic and writer with ties to the La Ronda school of literary classicism, became editor-in-chief of *Nuova antologia* in 1931.

2. An unorthodox, bold, and innovative writer and publisher, Angelo Sommaruga (1857-1914) launched the iconoclastic and anticlerical *La farfalla* in Cagliari in 1876 but very soon after moved it to his native city of Milan. Sommaruga initiated many other publications, including the notorious *Cronaca bizantina* (founded in Rome in 1881), and founded a publishing house that brought out the works of some of the leading writers of the time, among them, Giosuè Carducci, Gabriele D'Annunzio, and Giovanni Verga.

3. Paolo Valera (1850-1926), who at the age of sixteen participated in Garibaldi's military campaign against the Austrians, was later a militant anarchist and socialist. He edited and contributed to various antiestablishment papers and periodicals, including *La farfalla*, and wrote popular novels depicting the life of the destitute and of social pariahs. The novels mentioned by Gramsci, *Milano sconosciuta* (The unknown Milan, in which the setting is the city's underworld) and *Gli scamicciati* (The shirtless) were published in 1879 and 1881, respectively. In addition to *La plebe*, mentioned in this note by Gramsci, Valera also edited two Milan papers *La lotta* (1880-83) and *La folla* (1901-4). In 1898 he was accused of subversion and had to spend time in prison. Toward the end of his life, Valera was a fascist sympathizer and even wrote a book on Mussolini (*Mussolini* [Milan: La Folla, 1924]).

On Filippo Turati, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15.

4. In the late nineteenth century, a number of periodicals and papers in Italy were called *La plebe*. The one with which Paolo Valera was associated was founded by Enrico Bignami in Lodi in 1868. It was moved to Milan in 1875; it ceased publication in 1883.

5. Cesario Testa, a minor poet, who also published an Italian translation of the Latin poems of Pope Leo XIII, used the pseudonym Papiliunculus. He was employed for some time at *Cronaca bizantina*, where, among other things, he proofread Carducci's work. His verse is marked by a tone of defiance against divinity.

Ulisse Barbieri (1842-99) was a prolific writer, mostly of plays and opera libretti, many of them exalting the rebellion of the oppressed and nonconformists. One iconoclastic work of his is a composite of narrative prose, verse, and drama entitled *Lucifero: Fantasia romantica* (Lucifer: A romantic fantasy, 1871).

6. Antonino De Bella, *Almanacco degli atei pel 1881* (Milan: Ambrosoli, 1881).

7. The French naturalists were highly praised in *La farfalla*. They were regarded as writers who spoke for the oppressed masses.

8. On Lorenzo Stecchetti (pseudonym of Olindo Guerrini), see Notebook 6, §42, n. 10.

9. Giuseppe Aurelio Costanzo (1843-1913), born in Sicily, was a poet who also wrote some plays, the best known of which is *I ribelli* (1875).

Gli eroi della soffitta (The heroes of the attic) is a long poem exalting the downtrodden that was quite popular in its time. First published in 1880, it went through several editions from the late nineteenth century until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century.

10. Giosuè Carducci wrote "A Satana" (Hymn to Satan) in 1863. The poem is a diatribe against religious obscurantism in which Satan is identified with the rebellion and triumph of reason. The poem concludes:

Hail, Satan, O rebellion,
O avenging force of reason!
Let holy incense and vows rise to you!
You have vanquished the Jehovah of the Priests.

11. These lines are from a love poem by Filippo Turati, "Fiori d'Aprile" (April flowers), that was published in *La farfalla* on April 24, 1881. It was included in an anthology of leftist poetry, *Labor: Fiorita di canti sociali* (Milan: Avanti, 1925), compiled by Alessandro Schiavi (who years later would write a book on Turati's final years).

12. The article by Raffa Garzia, who was Gramsci's Italian teacher at the lycée in Cagliari, is mentioned in a note by Luigi Piccioni, "Storia del giornalismo" (History of journalism), in the "Note e rassegne" (Notes and review) section of *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1424 (July 16, 1931): 262-67.

Raffa Garzia played an important role in Gramsci's life. When Gramsci was his student,

Garzia was also the editor of *L'Unione Sarda*, which—in spite of its very antiquated printing machinery—was still the largest circulation paper on the island. Garzia was strongly anti-clerical and inclined towards radicalism, and while he took good care to distinguish his position from that of the socialists, he did not hesitate to discuss them and their ideas in his pages, and sometimes even supported them. . . .

Gramsci became Garzia's favourite pupil at once. . . . He would even invite him to his studio on Viale Regina Margherita, where the staff of *L'Unione Sarda* held their meetings. At length the relationship between the two became a friendship.

At the end of the school year, in 1910,

Gramsci went to see Garzia before returning home. He was nineteen now, and wanted to try his hand at journalism; he had thought of writing brief pieces of local news from his home during the summer. Raffa Garzia agreed. . . . The young man left with an assurance that his first journalist's presscard would soon be sent on to him. And indeed it was. . . .

Gramsci's first piece appeared in *L'Unione Sarda* five days later, on 26 July, and is certainly his first published writing. It was twenty-five lines of straightforward reporting. . . . It was signed with the abbreviation "gi." (Giuseppe Fiori, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, trans. Tom Nairn [London: Verso, 1990], pp. 55, 59)

§173. *Catholic Action*

1. "Azione Cattolica e associazioni religiose" (Catholic Action and religious organizations), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (April 19, 1930): 167-72. The article deals with an issue at the center of the tensions between the Vatican and the Fascist regime, namely, the role of religious organizations (Catholic Action, in particular) in civil life. The Fascists feared that religious organizations, protected by the Vatican, could function as a cover for oppositional political forces. Gramsci touches on this issue in other notes in this notebook.

2. Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, who would become Pope Pius XII in 1939, was the Vatican's secretary of state at this time.

3. Among the documents reproduced in the *Civiltà cattolica* article is a note that had appeared in the Vatican newspaper *L'osservatore romano* on March 30, 1930: "We know that the secretary of the Fascist National Party has issued a circular to the Provincial Authorities indicating that simultaneous membership in Catholic Action cannot be deemed in any way incompatible with membership in the Fascist National Party and hence, as has been expressly declared, with participation in the initiatives of the Regime. We are pleased to take note of this laudable provision that will serve to eliminate all conflicts and difficulties at the local level" (quoted in "Azione Cattolica e associazioni religiose," p. 172).

§174. *The Catholic Church*

1. Gramsci obtained this bibliographic information from the article "Qualche considerazione statistico-religiosa: La nuova edizione dell'*Atlas hierarchicus* del R. P. C. Streit S.P.D." (Some statistical-religious considerations. The Rev. Streit's *Atlas hierarchicus*), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (June 7, 1930): 422-32.

2. On the concordat, which contained provisions for the financial support of the clergy by the government, see Notebook 4, §53, n 1.

§175. *Catholic Action*

1. This citation is derived from the "Bibliografia" section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (June 21, 1930): 537.

2. On the "semaines sociales," see Notebook 4, §90, n. 3.

§176. *Past and present*

1. The memoirs and diaries of Clemente Solaro della Margarita were first published in Turin in 1851, with a second, revised edition appearing a year later. Gramsci obtained the information on the 1930 reprint from the "Bibliografia" section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (June 21, 1930): 537.

2. Giuseppe Brunati (1881–1949), a journalist and publicist who also wrote poetry and novels in the D'Annunzian mold, was the editor-in-chief of the weekly *Monarchia* (not *Il sovrano*), published in Milan. (In Notebook 17, §4, Gramsci recalls correctly that the periodical was entitled *Monarchia*.) In 1925, after Brunati and his associates at *Monarchia* broke away from the Italian Monarchist Imperial Association (AIMI), Brunati took charge of another monarchist weekly, *Il sabaudo* (The Savoyard), that had been founded in Turin the year before. As Gramsci correctly remembered, some of the propagandistic dicta emitted by *Il sabaudo* were bizarre. For example, "Purely communistic distribution is only possible under the Monarchy" and "Full-fledged Communism is to be found in its pure form in monarchic absolutism" are two proclamations that appeared in *Il sabaudo* 2, no. 19 (January 17, 1925).

§177. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. Gramsci learned of this article by Angelo Scarpellini through a citation in the "Bibliografia" section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (June 21, 1930): 543–44.

§178. *Encyclopedic notions. Theopanism*

1. "L'Induismo" (Hinduism), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (July 5, 1930): 13–26; the quoted passage is on pp. 17–18.

§179. *Past and present. The vocational school*

1. Gramsci read the report on the parliamentary debate in the *Corriere della sera* of November 26, 1931, and he later brought it up in a letter he wrote to his mother on February 1, 1931: "I don't know how the preparatory school in Ghilarza is organized and what exactly the subjects for the entire course are. I've read in the *Corriere della sera* the discussion that took place in parliament concerning this type of school, but the topics that were dealt with were too general and vague for anyone to form a precise notion of it. The only important point that one could draw from this is that the preparatory school is not an end in itself but affords the possibility of a further scholastic career" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:133–34).

It is also likely that this note was prompted by Arrigo Solmi's article "Le scuole d'avviamento professionale" (Vocational training schools) in *Gerarchia* 11, no. 12 (December 1931): 965-69.

2. Gramsci had almost certainly read the article on the rural schools that Eugenio Faina started establishing in 1912, written by Claudio Faina (Eugenio's son), "Il 'rinascimento agrario' in Italia e le 'scuole rurali Faina'" (The "agrarian renaissance" in Italy and the "Faina rural schools"), in *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1397 (June 1, 1930): 392-400. Gramsci also comments on Faina's agrarian initiatives in Notebook 2, §65.

§180. *Encyclopedic notions. "Scientific." What is "scientific"?*

1. The Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932), a professor at the University of Turin, made major contributions to symbolic logic and set theory. Bertrand Russell, who met Peano at an International Congress of Philosophy in 1900, found Peano's notation system a valuable instrument of logical analysis and partly adopted it in his and Alfred North Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*.

2. Gramsci is referring to F. Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1892).

3. Filippo Turati's journal *Critica sociale* changed its subtitle. From the third to the eighth year of its publication (i.e., between January 1, 1893, and May 1, 1898), it was subtitled "Rivista quindicinale del socialismo scientifico" (Bimonthly review of scientific socialism). Its publication was suspended for a while after that, and when it restarted on July 1, 1899, "scientific" was dropped from its subtitle, which became "Rivista quindicinale del socialismo" (Bimonthly review of socialism).

On Filippo Turati, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15.

§181. *The Catholic Church. The canonized and the beatified*

1. The information is culled from a news report, "Beati e Santi dell'avvenire" (The Saints and the Beatified of the future), in the *Corriere della sera* of December 2, 1931.

§182. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, and modernists. Giovanni Papini*

1. Giovanni Papini, *Sant'Agostino*, 2d ed. (Florence: Vallecchi, 1930), was reviewed in an unsigned article, "Intorno alla vita e agli scritti di S. Agostino" (On the life and writings of Saint Augustine), in *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (July 19, 1930): 152-58. Gramsci also comments on this article in Notebook 3, §57.

For a translation of Papini's book, see *Saint Augustine*, trans. Mary Prichard Agnetti (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930).

- On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.
2. On Adriano Tilgher, see Notebook 1, §28, n. 2.
3. On Enrico Rosa, see Notebook 3, §164, n. 2.

§183. *Catholic Action*

1. "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia" (Cesare D'Azeglio and the dawn of the Catholic press in Italy), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (August 2, 1930): 193-212.

Marquis Cesare Taparelli D'Azeglio (1763-1830), a devout Catholic and defender of papal authority, joined the Amicizie Cristiane (Christian friendship circles) when he was still in his youth. Later, when the movement modified its name to Amicizie Cattoliche (Catholic friendship societies or circles), D'Azeglio was one of its most active members and vigorous promoters. King Vittorio Emanuele sent him as a special envoy to Pope Pius VII in 1807 and again in 1814 (when Pius VII returned to Rome following the fall of Napoleon). In 1822 he founded the periodical *L'amico d'Italia*. He was the father of Massimo D'Azeglio.

2. The letter was from Filippo Crispolti to a priest, Tommaso Piatti, who had written a book in which he portrayed the organizational work of Pio Bruno Lanteri among the Catholic laity and clergy as an anticipation of (and as laying of the groundwork for) the formation of Catholic Action. See Tommaso Piatti, *Un precursore dell'azione cattolica: Il servo di Dio Pio Brunone Lanteri apostolo di Torino, fondatore degli Oblati di Maria Vergine*, intro. Enrico Rosa, S.J. (Turin: Pontificia Marietti, 1926).

On Filippo Crispolti, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 5.

3. "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia," p. 193.

Pio Bruno (or Brunone) Lanteri (1759-1830) was studying for the priesthood in Turin when he met and became a follower of Nikolaus von Diessbach (1732-98), a Swiss convert from Calvinism who had been a Jesuit until the order was suppressed. Von Diessbach had founded the Amicizie Cristiane (Christian friendship) groups, and Lanteri participated in the work of these groups until they were banned. After the fall of Napoleon in 1817, Lanteri revived the movement as the Amicizie Cattoliche. One of the characteristics of the movement was the special attention its members devoted to cultural work through, among other things, the dissemination of edifying books and periodicals. Cesare D'Azeglio and Joseph De Maistre were among the prominent and influential figures affiliated with the Amicizie. The movement was suppressed in 1829 by King Carlo Felice, who, though sympathetic toward its leaders, feared that its continuing existence would serve as a pretext for the formation of other associations

with subversive or secret agendas. Lanteri also founded a religious order, the Oblates of the Virgin Mary.

4. Alessandro Manzoni wrote a long letter to Cesare D'Azeglio on September 22, 1823, in which he politely and very elaborately declined the invitation to collaborate in the periodical *L'amico d'Italia*. It was a private letter, and the matter was somewhat delicate because Cesare D'Azeglio's son, Massimo, was married to Manzoni's eldest daughter, Giulia. In 1846, however, the letter was published without authorization in *L'ausonio*, the paper of Italian émigrés in Paris. Afterward, Manzoni published it with some revisions, and it came to be generally known as the *Lettera sul romanticismo* (Letter on romanticism).

5. "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia," p. 200.

§184. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. The historian Gramsci is alluding to has not been identified.

2. Agnellus of Ravenna, who lived in the first half of the ninth century, is the author of *Liber pontificalis ecclesiae Ravennatis*, an account of the church, the churches, and the bishops of Ravenna from the fourth to the ninth century. Though by no means a reliable chronicle, Agnellus's work, with its many anecdotes and asides, is a very valuable source of information on various aspects of life in medieval Italy.

3. On Ludovico Antonio Muratori, see Notebook 5, §140, n. 6.

4. The national labor union Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL) was founded in Milan in 1906; though autonomous, it had close ties with the Socialist Party.

5. Before Mussolini adopted it for his movement, the term "*fascio*" (plural, "*fasci*") was used by a number of workers' and peasants' groups, such as the "*fasci siciliani*" (see Notebook 1, §43, n. 8). Here, Gramsci is referring specifically to the Partito Operaio Italiano (Italian Labor Party), which called the paper it launched in Milan in 1885 *Il fascio operaio*.

§186. *Catholic Action. In Spain*

1. Gramsci came across this bibliographical item in the "Opere pervenute" (Books received) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (September 20, 1930): 572.

§187. *Catholic Action. The United States*

1. All the information recorded here is derived from the "Cronaca contemporanea" (Current events) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (September 20, 1930): 568-71.

§188. *Catholic Action*

1. "La fortuna del Lamennais e le prime manifestazioni d'Azione Cattolica in Italia" (The reception of Lamennais and the first manifestations of Catholic Action in Italy), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (October 4, 1930): 3-19. The second part of the article (promised at the end of the first) was published under the title "Il movimento lamennesiano in Italia" (The Lamennais movement in Italy), *La civiltà cattolica* 83, no. 3 (August 20, 1932): 313-27; Gramsci did not refer to it in any of his notes.

On Hughes-Félicité-Robert de Lamennais, see Notebook 1, §71, n. 1.

2. See Notebook 6, § 183.

3. Here, as elsewhere, Gramsci's "*totalitario*" has been translated as "totalitarian" to avoid any possibility of interpreting the meaning of the term in a manner that obscures or veils its nuances. As the contexts in which Gramsci uses the term suggest, he employs it consistently in the sense of "all-embracing" or "all-encompassing."

§189. *Lorianism*

1. In all likelihood, Gramsci's source of information on this exchange in the senate is the parliamentary news article "La riforma penitenziaria approvata dal Senato" (Prison reform approved by the senate) in *Il corriere della sera*, December 13, 1931.

On Achille Loria, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 1.

§190. *South American culture*

1. "Il protestantismo degli Stati Uniti e l'Evangelizzazione protestante nell'America latina" (Protestantism in the United States and Protestant evangelization in Latin America), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (October 18, 1930): 136-43.

§191. *America and Freemasonry*

1. "La Massoneria americana e la riorganizzazione della Massoneria" (American Freemasonry and the reorganization of Freemasonry), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (November 1, 1930): 193-208; and 82, no. 1 (January 3, 1931): 21-36.

2. The Association Maçonique Internationale was founded in 1921 under the leadership of Charles Magnette (1863-1937), the Grand Master of the Grand Orient of Belgium.

3. Pietro Pirri, S.J., *L'internazionale massonica di Ginevra nel suo primo quinquennio di vita* (Rome: Civiltà Cattolica, 1930). This booklet, first published in 1927, consists of articles previously published in *La*

civiltà cattolica, supplemented by some bibliographical information. The booklet was advertised in *La civiltà cattolica*, which is how Gramsci must have learned about it.

4. Ossian H. Lang (1865-1945) was also the author of several historical works on Freemasonry, including *The History of Freemasonry in the State of New York* (New York: Grand Lodge of New York, 1922).

5. The Swiss Jesuit Herman Gruber (1851-1930) was the author of, among other things, *Mazzini, Massoneria e rivoluzione* (Rome: Desclée, Lefebvre, 1901), and the article on Freemasonry in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913).

§192. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. Gramsci obtained the bibliographical information on this booklet by the medieval historian Gino Masi on the relations of the different political factions to the social strata of Florentine society in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries from the "Opere perventute" (Books received) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 20, 1930): 569-70.

§193. *Catholic Action. Spain*

1. Gramsci's source of information on this two-volume work by Narciso Noguer is the "Opere perventute" (Books received) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 20, 1930): 569-70. A third volume of this work was published by the same publishing house in 1933.

§194. *Past and present. The Gentile reform and religion in the schools*

1. "L'ignoto e la religione naturale secondo il senator Gentile" (The unknown and natural religion according to Senator Gentile), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 6, 1930): 422-33.

On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1; and on Gentile's school reform, see Notebook 4, §50, n. 1, and §53, n. 5.

§195. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists. The Turmel case*

1. "La catastrofe del caso Turmel e i metodi del modernismo critico" (The Turmel case disaster and the methods of critical modernism), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 6, 1930): 434-45.

In historical accounts of the modernist controversy, the name of Joseph Turmel (1859-1943) almost always turns up alongside those of George Tyrrell and Alfred Loisy; they are taken to be the three principal exponents of modernism, the major heretics in the eyes of the orthodox. Turmel, a

theologian and church historian, wrote numerous scholarly works, including the six-volume *Histoire des dogmes* (Paris: Rieder, 1931–36), published after his excommunication. The index of prohibited books of 1948 lists all twenty-one books Turmel had published up to 1930, and, for good measure, it also lists a book on him by Félix Sartiaux, *Joseph Turmel: Prêtre, historien des dogmes* (Paris: Rieder, 1931).

Gramsci owned one of the books that Joseph Turmel wrote under a pseudonym that was published as the twenty-fourth volume in the “Christianisme” book series mentioned in this note: Louis Coulange [Joseph Turmel], *La messe* (Paris: Rieder, 1927). Gramsci’s copy of this volume is preserved with his books, and it bears the stamp of the Turi prison and the signature of the warden at the time, G. Parmeggiani.

On the Turmel case, see also Notebook 20, §4.

2. George Tyrrell and Cardinal Billot are not mentioned in the *Civiltà cattolica* article that Gramsci cites at the beginning of this note. Since he had a keen interest in the modernist controversy, he learned about them from a variety of sources. An article that discusses George Tyrrell and that Gramsci very probably read appeared in the fascist periodical *Gerarchia*; see Fermi [sic], “La Spagna cattolica: Ieri e oggi” (Catholic Spain: Yesterday and today), in a section entitled “Cronache di pensiero religioso” (Chronicles of religious thought), in *Gerarchia* 11, no. 12 (December 1931): 1072–73. (Elsewhere in this notebook, Gramsci cites another article from this issue of *Gerarchia*.)

George Tyrrell (1861–1909), born in Dublin in a family that adhered to the Church of Ireland, converted to Catholicism and in 1880 joined the Jesuits as a novice; he was ordained priest in 1891. A Thomist at first, his orientation shifted toward modernist thought by way of the philosophy of Maurice Blondel. After some of his writings raised serious questions about his orthodoxy, he was asked to recant his views, which he refused to do. Tyrrell was dismissed from the Society of Jesus in 1906. In 1907 he published two letters in the *Times* of London criticizing the encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* (Feeding the Lord’s flock), in which Pius X formally condemned modernism, describing it as “the résumé of all heresies.” He was excommunicated. Tyrrell provided the most thorough exposition of his modernist position in *Christianity at the Crossroads*, which he completed just before he died and which was published posthumously very soon afterward.

On Louis Billot, see Notebook 5, §14, n. 10.

3. “Lo spirito dell’*Action Française* a proposito di ‘intelligenza’ e di ‘mistica’” (The spirit of *Action Française* with regard to ‘intelligence’ and ‘mystique’), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 20, 1930): 531–38.

4. See Henri Massis, *Défense de l’occident* (Paris: Plon, 1927). Gramsci had a copy of this book that he read when he was imprisoned in Milan and wrote about it to his friend Giuseppe Berti; see Notebook 5, §89, n. 4.

5. On Charles Maurras and the Action Française, see Notebook 1, §14, n. 1.

6. On the *ralliement*, see Notebook 5, §18, n. 3.

7. Émile Combes (1835-1921) was president of the council and minister of the interior between 1902 and the beginning of 1905. He spearheaded a struggle against clericalism with bills limiting the prerogatives of religious congregations and measures ensuring the secularization of public education. Combes's vigorous pursuit of strict separation between church and state led to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the Vatican and France in 1904. The alienation of French Catholics from the state was eventually remedied by the *ralliement*.

§196. *Vatican politics. Malta*

1. "Nel decimo anno della diarchia maltese" (In the tenth year of diarchy in Malta), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 20, 1930): 489-505.

In the wake of deadly riots that erupted on June 7, 1919, Britain granted the people of Malta a limited form of self-government. According to a constitution adopted in 1921, an elected Maltese government would have jurisdiction over local affairs (with, however, many restrictions on matters as diverse as trade and language policy), whereas the "Maltese Imperial Government" (i.e., the British colonial administration) would retain control over everything else. The constitution also safeguarded interests and prerogatives of the Catholic Church on the island.

§197. *The intellectuals*

1. The courses offered by Eugenio D'Ors at the University of Madrid and the possibility of their being turned into books are brought up by Marcel Brion in the section "L'actualité littéraire" in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 472 (October 31, 1931).

Gramsci had almost certainly also read the series of articles by Eugenio D'Ors, "La lettre, l'esprit et l'esprit de la lettre" that appeared in the *Nouvelles littéraires* between February 15 and March 15, 1930 (nos. 383, 385, 386, and 387).

§198. *Past and present. "Importuning the text"*

1. Sergio Caprioglio has suggested that Gramsci derived the phrase "sollecitare i testi" (importuning the text) from an article by Paolo Vita-Finzi, "Piani quinquennali ed economia a 'piano'" (Five-year plans and a 'planned' economy), *La cultura* 11, no. 1 (January-March 1932): 560-80. According to Vita-Finzi, the statistics on productivity published by the Soviets were

suspect because local officials supplied the government with inflated figures or distorted interpretations of data out of fear; they did not want to be regarded as laggards or subversives undermining the five-year plan. The data coming out of the Soviet Union, Vita-Finzi asserts, were unreliable because the "government and the party had a political interest in imprompting the texts [sollecitare i testi]." See Sergio Caprioglio, "Gramsci e l'URSS: Tre note nei *Quaderni del carcere*" (Gramsci and the USSR: Three notes in the *Prison Notebooks*), *Belfagor* 46, no. 1 (January 1991): 65–75, especially pp. 66, 68. Caprioglio's attribution has been disputed by, among others, Valentino Gerratana, in *Gramsci: Problemi di metodo* (Rome: Riuniti, 1997); see especially p. 155 n. 6.

§199. *Risorgimento. The Spanish Constitution of 1812*

1. The Spanish Constitution of 1812 is also known as the Constitution of Cadiz, after the city where the Cortes had assembled while the country was at war with the French occupiers who had also imprisoned King Ferdinand VII. It was a paradigmatic liberal document that limited the power of the monarchy, established a unicameral parliament, and abolished many of the privileges of the nobility and the church. When Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne in 1814, he almost immediately repudiated the constitution and imprisoned the leading liberals.

2. On the Parthenopean Republic, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 6.

3. A letter from Gramsci to Tatiana Schucht on June 29, 1931, provides explicit confirmation of his firsthand familiarity with Marx's writings on Spain that prompt his comments in this note:

Quite a lot of time has passed since I received the three volumes of Marx's *Oeuvres philosophiques*, which are translated in a most wretched manner. Of the *Oeuvres politiques*, I've received only two volumes and I don't know to which numbers they correspond because I don't have them here in my cell right now: one is dedicated to Lord Palmerston . . . , the other does not have a single title (I'm quite sure it is the eighth volume of the political works) and it contains three brief series of writings: one about the English army during the Crimean war, one about General Espartero and Spanish politics during the early years of the 1850–1860 decade, and one on the capture of the Kars during the Crimean war. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:44)

The second of the two volumes Gramsci alludes to in this letter is the French edition of Karl Marx, *Oeuvres politiques*, trans. J. Molitor, vol. 8 (Paris: Costes, 1931).

Marx's article "Espartero" was first published in the *New York Tribune*, August 19, 1854. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 13, 1854-1855 [New York: International, 1980], pp. 340-46.

It is, however, Marx's discussion of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 in an article entitled "Revolutionary Spain" published in the *New York Tribune* of November 24, 1854, that bears most directly on Gramsci's observations:

How are we to account for the curious phenomenon of the Constitution of 1812, afterward branded by the crowned heads of Europe, assembled in Verona, as the most incendiary invention of Jacobinism, having sprung up from the head of an old monastic and absolutist Spain at the very epoch when she seemed totally absorbed in waging a holy war against the Revolution? How, on the other hand, are we to account for the sudden disappearance of this same Constitution, vanishing like a shadow . . . when brought into contact with a living Bourbon [i.e., Ferdinand VII]? . . .

The Constitution of 1812 has been accused on the one hand . . . of being a mere imitation of the French Constitution of 1791, transplanted on the Spanish soil by visionaries, regardless of the historical traditions of Spain. On the other hand, it has been contended . . . that the Cortes unreasonably clung to antiquated formulas, borrowed from the ancient *fueros*, and belonging to feudal times, when the royal authority was checked by the exorbitant privileges of the grandees.

The truth is that the Constitution of 1812 is a reproduction of the ancient *Fueros*, but read in the light of the French Revolution and adapted to the wants of modern society. . . . The formation of a State Council from a list of 120 persons presented to the King by the Cortes and paid by them—this singular creation of the Constitution was suggested by the remembrance of the fatal influence exercised by the *camarillas* of all epochs of the Spanish monarchy. . . .

The meeting of the representatives in one single house was by no means copied from the French Constitution of 1791, as the morose English Tories will have it. . . . But even at the time when they were divided into *brazos* (arms, branches), representing the different estates, they assembled in one single hall, separated only by their seats, and voting in common. . . .

The separation of the judiciary from the executive power, decreed by the Cadiz Cortes, was demanded as early as the eighteenth century, by the most enlightened statesmen of Spain; and the general odium which the *Consejo Real*, from the beginning of the revolution, had concentrated upon itself, made the necessity of reducing the tribunals to their proper sphere of action universally felt. . . .

On a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we arrive at the conclusion that, so far from being a servile copy of the French Constitution of 1791, it was a genuine and original offspring of Spanish intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions, introducing the measures of reform loudly demanded by the most celebrated authors of the eighteenth century, making inevitable concessions to popular prejudice. (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 13, 1854-1855 [New York: International, 1980], pp. 424-25, 429-30, 431, 433)

4. The Sicilian Constitution of 1812 was the outcome of a struggle between the barons and the king of the island. With the support of the English commander, Lord Bentinck, the barons prevailed and produced a constitution that abolished feudal rights and guaranteed freedom of speech and the press; it also established a parliament but ensured that it would remain under the control of the nobility. The Sicilian constitution was suspended in 1814 when the realms of Sicily and Naples were merged in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

5. On the Albertine Statute, see Notebook 5, §70, n. 7.

§200. *Italian intellectuals*

1. Pietro Giannone (1676-1744), a contemporary of Vico's and like him a Neapolitan, studied law and brought his legal theories to bear on the relations between the church and the state. In *Istoria civile del regno di Napoli* (1723), he interpreted the history of the Italian South in terms of a constant church-state conflict in which the state represented or embodied progress and civilization, while the church stood for reaction and regression. The church, in Giannone's view, is free and autonomous as a religious or spiritual entity, but in temporal matters it is subordinate to the state. *Istoria civile* was a major and certainly bold intervention in the jurisdictionalist debates of the time. It was placed in the index of prohibited books, and Giannone was excommunicated. He took refuge in Vienna, where he received a stipend from the emperor Charles VI. While there, he wrote his three-volume magnum opus *Il triregno, ossia del regno del cielo, della terra, e del papa* (The triple crown; or, The reign of heaven, earth, and the pope) in which he argued that the free development of the secular sphere cannot occur unless ecclesiastical power is curbed and the clergy is made to submit to the authority of the state. The work circulated in manuscript but was not published until 1895. Giannone had hoped to return to Naples after the restoration of Bourbon rule there, but in 1736, while passing through Piedmont, he was arrested and imprisoned for the rest of his life. He continued studying and writing in prison, producing several books, including an autobiography.

On regalism, see Notebook 6, §78, n. 1.

2. On neo-Guelphism, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 3.

3. The Sanfedisti were the bands of armed peasants organized by Cardinal Ruffo as his "Army of the Holy Faith." The term acquired a broader meaning over time and was used to refer to reactionary groups that supported papal power.

§201. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Bruno Cicognani*

1. Bruno Cicognani's novel *Villa Beatrice* was first published in serial form in the periodical *Pègaso* 3, nos. 6-12 (June-December 1931) and later in book form by Treves of Milan in 1931.

On Bruno Cicognani, see Notebook 3, §154, n. 1.

2. Enrico Pea (1881-1958) was born near Lucca and spent some of his youthful years in Egypt. Several of his novels are autobiographical. Pea also tried his hand at writing plays. Some of his works, such as the play *La Passione di Cristo* (1923), evince his religious inclination, while his fiction is often animated by an attachment to or a nostalgia for traditional mores and values.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

On Domenico Giuliotti, see Notebook 1, §72, n. 1.

3. On Edoardo Agostino Gemelli, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 7.

4. See the defense of Cicognani in a note by Ugo Ojetti, "Contro il romanzo" (Against the novel), in the "Settimanali" (Weeklies) section of *Pègaso* 3, no. 7 (July 1931): 90.

§202. *The concordat*

1. On the concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

2. Gramsci is alluding to a speech Mussolini gave at the capitol on December 31, 1925, at the inauguration of the first governor of Rome. The newspapers published the speech on January 1, 1926. The speech contains no reference to negotiations with the Vatican. See "La nuova Roma," in Benito Mussolini, *Opera omnia*, ed. E. Susmel and D. Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1954), 22:47-49.

3. The bibliographical information (with some minor inaccuracies) and a brief note on Wilfrid Parsons, *The Pope and Italy* (New York: American, 1929) appeared in the "Bibliografia" section of *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (December 19, 1931): 547-48.

§205. *Encyclopedic notions. Direct action*

1. Gramsci is referring to two major strands of anarchism: individualist anarchism and mutualism, generally associated with Proudhon, and the

anarcho-communism (also called anarchist communism) generally associated with the Italian section of the First International and its leaders, Carlo Cafiero, Errico Malatesta, and Andrea Costa. The anarcho-communists, who stressed egalitarianism and collectivism, formally enunciated their principles at a clandestine meeting in Florence in 1876.

2. An example of this is provided by James Joll in his account of the aftermath of the riots that broke out in Ancona in 1898:

[Malatesta] had gone to the port of Ancona, where there was an active anarchist group among the dockers and several anarchist publications, opposing those anarchists like Saverino Merlino who felt that in an emergency anarchists should participate in elections to support the liberal and social-democratic cause. . . . Malatesta was arrested after riots in Ancona and charged with "criminal association"—a charge, with its implication that anarchists were no better than common criminals, which brought a cry of rage from the international anarchist community. In the event, Malatesta and his friends were convicted of belonging to a "seditious association." (James Joll, *The Anarchists* [Boston: Little Brown, 1964], p. 175)

§206. *Educational issues*

1. Metron, "Argomenti di cultura: Il facile e il difficile" (Cultural topics: The easy and the difficult), *Il corriere della sera*, January 7, 1932.

§207. *Popular literature. Guerin meschino*

1. Radius, "I classici del popolo: Guerino detto il Meschino" (The people's classics: Guerino known as the Humble [or Servant]), *Il corriere della sera*, January 7, 1932.

On Andrea da Barberino's *Guerin meschino* (also known as *Guerino* and sometimes spelled *Guerrin*), see Notebook 3, §63, n. 15. Andrea da Barberino is also the author of, among many other works, *I reali di Francia*, another popular romance mentioned by Gramsci in this note.

2. Bertoldo, a coarse, ungainly, but astute and crafty peasant, and his slow-witted son, Bertoldino, are the main characters in the popular tales by Giulio Cesare Croce (1550–1609), a Bolognese storyteller. Croce first published the stories (which over the years have been adapted for the theater and the cinema) in two booklets: *Le sottilissime astuzie di Bertoldo* (The most subtle cunning of Bertoldo) and *Le piacevoli e ridicolose semplicità di Bertoldino* (The amusing and ridiculous simplicities of Bertoldino).

3. For the use of "meschino" in Dante's *Vita nuova*, see chapter 9, sonnet 5, line 5.

§208. *Popular literature. R. Giovagnoli's Spartaco*

1. Garibaldi's letter to Raffaele Giovagnoli was reproduced in a news story published under the headline "La lettera di Garibaldi donata dal Duce al Museo del Risorgimento" (The letter of Garibaldi donated by the Duce to the Museum of the Risorgimento) in *Il corriere della sera*, January 8, 1932.

David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith provide some very interesting information in their annotation of this note:

See Raffaele Giovagnoli, *Spartaco*, ed. L. Russo, Florence, 1955, where Garibaldi's letter is reprinted in the prefatory material. Giovagnoli (1838-1915), who fought with Garibaldi in 1860 and 1863, wrote one of the first histories of the Risorgimento [*Risorgimento italiano dal 1815 al 1848* (Milan: F. Vallardi, 1912)] and a book on the Roman revolution of 1848-49. *Spartaco* (1874) deals with the liberation of the slaves by Spartacus and the rebel gladiators in 73-71 B.C. Gramsci's suggestion in this note about republishing a modernized version of the novel was followed to the letter by the PCI in the early 1950s when the review *Vie Nuove* serialized it. The party began serializing fiction in 1949 on the pages of *L'Unità*, polling readers' choices. The first two were Gorky and Jack London. (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985], p. 352n)

2. Garibaldi wrote two historical novels, *Cantoni il volontario* (Milan: E. Politti, 1870) and *Clelia: Il governo del Monaco* (Milan: Fratelli Rechiedi, 1870), which was translated into English as *The Rule of the Monk; or, Rome in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Harper, 1870).

3. "Molodaia Gvardia" (Young Guard), a Russian revolutionary song, was sung to the tune of the "Andreas Hofer Lied," also known as "Zu Mantua in Banden," which is actually the poem "Der Sandwirth Hofer," by Julius Mosen, set to a traditional folk tune. (Beethoven used the folk tune in the final rondo of his Piano Concerto No. 1.) Andreas Hofer (1767-1810) was the leader of the 1809 Tyrolese rebellion against Bavarian rule and Napoleon's forces. The French captured him, took him to Mantua, in Italy, and executed him. The "Hofer Lied" is the Tyrolese anthem.

§209. *Intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals*

1. Arturo Castiglioni, *Storia della medicina* (Milan: Unitas, 1927). A short review of this book appeared in *Nuova antologia* 63, no. 1342 (February 16, 1928): 541. It is more likely, however, that this note was prompted by a review of the French translation of Castiglioni's book: René A.

Gutmann, "La médecine et les livres: *L'histoire de la médecine* de A. Castiglioni," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 474 (November 14, 1931).

For an English translation, see Arturo Castiglioni, *A History of Medicine*, 2nd ed., trans. E. B. Krumbhaar (New York: Knopf, 1958).

§210. *Intellectuals*

1. Gramsci probably extracted the information on Louis Halphen's *Les universités au XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Alcan, 1931) from the "Semaine bibliographique" section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 473 (November 7, 1931).

§211. *Intellectuals. The academies*

1. The number of Italian academies in the eighteenth century is mentioned in a note in a report from Italy by Léon Kochnitzky, "Le laurier toujours vert: La semaine de Petrarque à Arezzo," *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 473 (November 7, 1931).

NOTEBOOK 7 (1930-31)

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

A ruled school notebook (14.7 x 19.8 cm) with hard black covers and a gray spine. A label on the front cover carries the imprint of the stationer: "Gius. Laterza e figli, Bari." Inside the blank space of the label, Gramsci's prison number (7047) is written in blue pencil. After Gramsci's death, Tatiana Schucht glued another label on the upper right-hand corner of the front cover; on it, she wrote: "Completo da pg. 2 a 76. VII" (Complete from p. 2 to 76. VII). The Roman numerals indicate the number Tatiana Schucht assigned the notebook according to a cataloging system she had devised when organizing Gramsci's papers soon after his death. This notebook has the same physical characteristics as Notebooks 3, 5, and 6.

The notebook consists of seventy-six leaves with twenty-one lines on each side and unlined endpapers in front and back. The recto side of each leaf is numbered (1-74) in green ink. An error evidently occurred in the original numbering of the pages; the leaves between pp. 31-32 and pp. 69-70 were skipped but subsequently numbered 31a and 69a in a different hand and different ink. The recto side of each leaf is stamped with the prison seal: "Casa penale speciale di Turi" (Special Prison of Turi). The back endpaper is also numbered (75) and stamped with the prison seal on the recto side. All pages of the notebook are used, except for the following: p. 1 (entirely blank on both recto and verso), p. 73v (bottom five lines are blank), and p. 74v (entirely blank).

The notebook contains 108 notes or sections. Of these, 21 are crossed out, but they remain perfectly legible, and all of them were later incorporated by Gramsci in other notebooks; following Valentino Gerratana's denomination these are called A texts. The other 87 notes, called B texts, were neither crossed out nor used again in other notebooks.

Almost half the pages of this notebook—specifically pp. 2r to 34v—were used by Gramsci for exercises in translation. He translated almost the entire contents of a small volume of selections from the writings of Karl Marx (edited by E. Drahm), *Lohnarbeit und Kapital: Zur Judenfrage und andere Schriften aus der Frühzeit*, 2d ed. (Leipzig: Ph. Reclam, n.d.; Reclams Universal Bibliothek, nos. 6068, 6069). The following is a list of the passages translated by Gramsci in the same order (and with the same underlined headings, italicized here) as they appear in the notebook; this arrangement is different from that of the German anthology:

pp. 2r-3r:

1. *Ludwig Feuerbach*. This is the text of Karl Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" in the version that was published by Frederick Engels as an appendix to his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (1888).

pp. 3r-4r:

2. *Il materialismo storico* (Historical materialism). This comprises the middle paragraphs of Marx's preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859).

pp. 4r-10v:

3. *Teoria della storia* (Theory of history). The first section, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," of *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) is translated in its entirety here.

pp. 10v-11v:

4. *Esigenze della politica tedesca prima del 1848* (Exigencies of German politics before 1848). This consists of the complete text of *Demands of the Communist Party in Germany*, the leaflet by Marx and Engels that was published in Cologne in 1848.

pp. 12r-27r:

5. *Salario e capitale* (Wages and capital). Gramsci prefaces his translation of this selection with a brief notation: "Originated as a lecture in Brussels in 1847 and later published in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*." The text that Gramsci translates is, in fact, Marx's article "Lohnarbeit und Kapital" ("Wage Labour and Capital"), which appeared in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of April 5, 1849.

pp. 27r-29v:

6. *Sulla questione degli ebrei* (On the Jewish question). As is obvious from Gramsci's rubric, this is an extract from Marx's *On the Jewish Question* (1844).

pp. 29v-32v:

7. *Il materialismo francese del 18° secolo* (Eighteenth-century French materialism). Here Gramsci translates all but a few paragraphs of subsection D ("Critical Battle Against French Materialism") of part 3 ("Absolute Criticism's Third Campaign") of chapter 6 ("Absolute Critical Criticism") of Marx and Engels's *The Holy Family* (1844).

pp. 32v-33r:

8. *Su Goethe* (On Goethe). Between 1846 and 1847, Engels wrote two essays under the common title "German Socialism in Verse and Prose." The discussion in the first essay centers on a book by Karl Beck, *Lieder vom armen Mann* (1845); the second essay deals with Karl Grün's book *Über Göthe vom menschlichen Standpunkte* (1846). The essays were published in segments between September and December 1847 by the *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung*. The extract translated by Gramsci is from the second essay, specifically from the segment published on November 28, 1847. The editor of the anthology from which Gramsci translated this extract erroneously attributed its authorship to Marx. Thus when Gramsci refers to this same text in Notebook 8, §214, he wrongly assumes it is by Marx.

p. 33v:

9. *Il suonatore* (The musician). This is a prose translation of Marx's poem "Der Spielmann" (1837).

pp. 33v-34v:

10. *Lettera a suo padre* (A letter to his father). This is a partial translation of Marx's letter of November 10, 1837, to his father.

The notebook also contains other materials not included in the main text of this edition. On p. 74r, Gramsci made a list of periodicals; they are the same periodicals itemized in Gramsci's draft of the petition he sent to "H.E. the Head of Government" in October 1931. (See Notebook 2, "Description of the Manuscript," 1:527-28). In this list, the items are numbered; some of the titles are underlined, but most are not; and the numbers of certain items are preceded by a sign, in some cases an "x" and in other cases (all of them foreign publications) a square bracket. The list is reproduced here as it appears in the manuscript:

- 1° *La Nuova Italia*—Monthly crit. Review—Editors, E. Codignola, Franc. Ercole, C. Pellegrini, N. Sapegno, Florence.
- 2° *L'Italia che Scrive*—of A. F. Formiggini.
- 3° *Rassegna della Stampa Estera*—Rome. Ed. Libreria di Stato
- x4. *Nuova Antologia*.
- x5. Gerarchia.
- x6° Critica fascista.
7. Riforma sociale—on econ. and finance—Turin
8. La Critica—of B. Croce.
9. Civiltà Cattolica
- x10. Pègaso—of Ugo Ojetti
11. La Cultura—Milan-Rome.
- x12. Educazione fascista—edit. Gentile
13. Nuova Rivista Storica—Editors Barbagallo, Porzio, Luzzatto.
14. *Marzocco*—Florence
15. Italia Letteraria—Rome
- [16. Das Deutsche Buch—bibliographic review
- [17. Nimm und Lies!—id.
- [18. Labour Monthly
- [19° Manchester Guardian Weekly
- x20° Politica—of F. Coppola
- [21. Les Nouvelles Littéraires—ed. Larousse.
- [22. Nouvelle Revue Française—Gallimard
23. Nuovi Studi di Econ., Diritto, Politica—Spirito and Volp.<icelli>
- [24° La Critique Sociale—bibliographic review of the publ. Marcel Rivière.
- 25° *Leonardo*—edit. F. Gentile. Treves
- 26° Problemi del Lavoro.

On the recto of the back endpaper (which in the manuscript is numbered "75") Gramsci jotted some very brief notes that are followed by a series of bibliographical items. They are reproduced below as they appear in the manuscript (i.e., with Gramsci's numbering, which precedes all but the last three items separated from the other entries by a straight line):

- 1° question of the disallowed books
- 2° question of the study on Croce's philosophy of the practical
- 3° question of the reading of the daily newspapers
- 4° conditions of isolation; same means of control as in Milan
- 5° reference books: atlas, yearbook of commercial bank, League of Nations yearbook, Mortara's *Prospettive <economiche>*

- 1° *Le procès du Parti industriel de Moscou*—an abridged report, pref. by Pierre Dominique.
- 2° K. Marx, *Lettres à Kugelmann (1862–1874)*—Pref. by Lenin from p. 27 to p. 37 written in 1907 and publ. under czarism.
- 3° M. N. Pokrowsky, *Pages d'histoire*—art. on Constantinople, Lamartine Cavaignac—Nicholas I (up to 1848).
- 4° Grinko, *Le plan quinquennal*
- 5° Yakovlev, *Les exploitations collectives et l'essor de l'agriculture*
- 6° Trotsky, *La Révolution défigurée*
- 7° *ibid.*, *Vers le capitalisme ou vers le socialisme?*

Panférof—*La Communauté des Gueux*—A novel
 Correspondence Marx-Engels. First 3 vols., ed. Costes
 Knickerbocker, *Il piano quinquennale sovietico* (Bompiani)

The notebook is made up of three blocks of materials: pages 2r to 34v (line 3) are devoted entirely to exercises in translation (which, for obvious reasons, are not reproduced in this edition), pages 34v (line 4) to 50v contain a cluster of sixty notes on various topics, and pages 51r to 73v comprise forty-eight notes under the general heading "Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism. Second Series"—the "First Series" of notes on this topic is in Notebook 4 (see 2:137–98). All the evidence suggests that Gramsci initially earmarked this notebook for his translations, but sometime around November 1930 he decided to use a substantial segment of it (from 51r onward) for the series of "Notes on Philosophy" he had started in Notebook 4. Indeed, the "second series" of these notes is a direct continuation of the "first series," and Gramsci probably decided to set aside space for it in this notebook the moment he ran out of pages in Notebook 4. Later on, when he stopped or abandoned his translations of extracts from the anthology of Marx's writings, Gramsci must have decided to use the remaining empty space (from line 4 of page 34v to 50v) for miscellaneous notes. Notwithstanding the collocation of materials in the manuscript, then, there is every reason to believe that the block of "Notes on Philosophy" was started before the sequence of notes on miscellaneous topics that occupies the middle segment of the notebook; hence, following Valentino Gerratana's edition, the "Notes on Philosophy" (§1–§48) precede the miscellaneous notes (§49–§108) in the reproduction of Gramsci's text in this volume.

Several pieces of external and internal information are germane to the dating of the material in this notebook. In a letter dated March 24, 1930, Gramsci asked Tatiana Schucht to "write to the bookstore" for a copy of *Lohnarbeit und Kapital*, the anthology from which he translated passages from Marx's writings. Later, in a June 1, 1931, letter to his wife, Julia, Gramsci wrote: "Aesthetic admiration can be accompanied by a certain 'civic' contempt, as in the case of Marx's attitude towards Goethe." When writing this, Gramsci was evidently thinking of the passage on Goethe he had translated (perhaps around the same time) from the Marx anthology. (As noted above, the editor of the anthology erroneously attributed the text on Goethe to Marx, whereas it was really Engels's.)

Since the first set of "Notes on Philosophy" in Notebook 4 were completed by the end of October or early November 1930, there is every reason to believe that the "Second Series," for which Gramsci set aside a substantial segment of this notebook, was started immediately or shortly thereafter. In §41, Gramsci refers to an article that was published in March 1931, so there can be no doubt that the last eight "Notes on Philosophy" were written after that date. Also, it is all but certain that §44 was written after July 26, 1931 (see the Notes to the Text). Furthermore, in §47, Gramsci explicitly refers to a book that he received at the prison in Turi on August 31, 1931.

Gramsci started using the available empty pages of this notebook for miscellaneous notes in August 1931 or immediately thereafter. In §49 (page 35v in the manuscript), he writes: "Recently (August 1931), I read . . ." Furthermore, §70, §75, §84, and §100 cite articles that appeared in print in December 1931. Also, in §98, Gramsci alludes to notes he had written in Notebook 6, specifically §183 and §188.

In *L'officina gramsciana: Ipotesi sulla struttura dei "Quaderni del carcere"* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1984), p. 142, Gianni Francioni offers the following chronology of the composition of Notebook 7:

- §§ 1-11: November 1930
 12-17: between November and December 1930
 18-22: between November-December 1930 and February 1931
 23-32: February 1931
 33-48: between February and November 1931
 49-54: August 1931
 55-59: between August and October 1931
 60-68: October 1931
 69: between October and December 1931
 70-108: December 1931

NOTES TO THE TEXT

Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism. Second Series§1. *Benedetto Croce and historical materialism*

1. Gramsci is referring to the pagination of his manuscript; see Notebook 7, §8.

2. See "Il congresso di Oxford" (The congress at Oxford) in the "Commenti e schermaglie" (Comments and skirmishes) section of *La nuova Italia* 1, no. 10 (October 20, 1930): 431-32. This short, unsigned article about the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy held in Oxford on September 1-5, 1930, also quotes a passage from a letter by "one of the participants" (almost certainly Croce himself) on Croce's intervention in the section on aesthetics, in which he expressed his disagreement with Anatoly Lunacharsky of the Soviet Union. The unnamed author of the letter wrote, among other things:

I would like to make an additional remark to Mr. Lunacharsky: contrary to his belief that historical materialism is a rigorously antimetaphysical and totally realist conception, this theory is theological even more than it is metaphysical because it divides the oneness of the process of the real into structure and superstructure, noumenon and phenomenon, and for its basis it has, as a noumenon, a hidden God, the Economy, that pulls all the strings and is the only reality behind the appearances of morality, religion, philosophy, art, and so on. (p. 432)

Gramsci wrote at length on this short article in a letter to Tatiana Schucht on December 1, 1930, where he made many of the same points he makes in this note:

I would be glad if in some bookstore in Rome you could find the October issue of the magazine *La Nuova Italia* directed by Professor Russo and if you could send it to Giulia. In it is published a letter about the courteous debate that took place at the International Congress of Philosophers recently held in Oxford between Benedetto Croce and Lunacharsky with regard to the question of whether there exists or can exist an aesthetic doctrine of historical materialism. This letter is perhaps by Croce himself, or at least by one of his disciples, and it is strange.

It seems that Croce answered a dissertation by Lunacharsky, adopting a certain paternal tone, part protective and part humorous banter, to the congress's great amusement. From the letter, it also appears that Lunacharsky did not know that Croce had given a lot of thought to

historical materialism, has written much about it, and is in any case deeply versed in the entire subject, and this seems strange to me, because Croce's books are translated into Russian, and Lunacharsky knows Italian very well.

From this letter, it also appears that Croce's position on historical materialism marks a return to the old . . . medieval theologism, to pre-Kantian and pre-Cartesian philosophy. A most extraordinary thing that makes one suspect that he, too, despite his Olympian serenity, is beginning to doze off too often, more often than happened to Homer. I don't know if he will write a special account of this subject; it would be very interesting, and I think it would not be difficult to answer him, drawing the necessary and sufficient arguments from his own works. I believe that Croce has had recourse to a very transparent polemical sleight of hand and that his opinion, rather than a philosophic-historical opinion, is only an act of will, that is, it has a practical purpose. That many so-called theoreticians of historical materialism might have fallen into a philosophical position similar to medieval theologism and might have made of "economic structure" a sort of "unknown god" can perhaps be proven, but what would it mean? It would be as though one were trying to judge the religion of the Pope and the Jesuits and were to talk about the superstitions of the peasants of Bergamo. Croce's position on historical materialism seems to me similar to the position of Renaissance men on Lutheran Reform: "Where Luther enters, civilization disappears," said Erasmus, and yet the historians and Croce himself today recognize that Luther and the Reformation stand at the beginning of all modern philosophy and civilization, Croce's philosophy included. The men of the Renaissance did not understand that a great movement of moral and intellectual renewal, inasmuch as it was embodied by the vast popular masses, as happened with Lutheranism, would at first assume coarse and even superstitious forms and that this was inevitable due to the very fact that the German people, and not a small aristocracy of great intellectuals, was the protagonist and the standard-bearer of the Reformation. If Giulia can do it, she ought to let me know whether the Croce-Lunacharsky polemic will give rise to intellectual manifestations of some importance. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 1:364-65)

Anatoly Lunacharsky (1875-1933), a Bolshevik revolutionary and a member of the party from its earliest days, studied in Switzerland and had a special interest in literature and the arts. He played a major role in safeguarding Russia's cultural treasures during the revolution. Lunacharsky was commissar of education from 1917 until 1929.

At the International Congress of Philosophy held in Oxford in 1930, Croce delivered a paper entitled "Antistoricismo" (Antihistoricism). He published this paper in a booklet together with another paper ("Punti di orientamento della filosofia moderna" [Points of orientation of modern philosophy]) he had delivered at the International Congress of Philosophy of 1926 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. See B. Croce, *Punti di orientamento della filosofia moderna: Antistoria* (Bari: Laterza, 1931). Gramsci asked for this booklet to be sent to him in his letter of January 25, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht.

3. Gramsci is referring to the praise lavished on Henri De Man's *Au delà du Marxisme* (Brussels: Églantine, 1927) in a review of the book by Benedetto Croce in *La critica* 26, no. 6 (November 20, 1928): 459–60. On this book and on Henri De Man, see Notebook I, §61, n. 13, and §132, n. 4.

4. See Notebook 4, §44, where Gramsci quotes Sorel's comments on Clemenceau at length.

5. In Notebook 4, §3, Gramsci transcribed a passage from Benedetto Croce's *Storia dell'età barocca in Italia* (1929) that quotes Erasmus: "Ubi-cumque regnat lutheranismus, ibi litterarum est interitus."

6. Gramsci is paraphrasing a Crocean position that is expounded most clearly in *Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono* (Bari: Laterza, 1932). In the Italian edition, the relevant passage is on pp. 31–32; it is quoted here from the English translation of the work:

The Catholic conception and the doctrines that set it forth in a system and defended it with arguments, were not, in the ideal sphere, an opposition likely to trouble liberalism. The surest proof of this lay in the renunciation it made of, and even in the repugnance it felt towards, the continuance of the warfare that had been waged during the preceding centuries with arms and writing—particularly by Voltaire and the Encyclopedists; the harvest of that had been reaped. But for that very reason it would have been as unbecoming as it was superfluous to persist in it; the rest would be left to the play of time. And more than unbecoming, it would have been vulgar and inhuman, because (Voltaire and his followers had overlooked this) the old faith was still a way, a mythological one if you will, to soothe and calm suffering and sorrows and to solve the painful problem of life and death, and it was not to be rooted out with violence or insulted with mockery. And it would not be very politic, either, because those beliefs and the consolation derived from them and their teachings were the basis, for many men, of the formula and the authority of social duties, and gave rise to foundations and institutions of social welfare and charity, and the motives of order and discipline—all forces and capacities to be assimilated and transformed gradually, but not to be struck down without knowing what to set in their places or

without replacing them at all. (Benedetto Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Henry Furst [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1933], pp. 24-25)

7. Giovanni Gentile's reform of education made religious instruction compulsory at the elementary school level. See Notebook 4, §53, n. 6, and §55, nn. 1-3.

8. Benedetto Croce was minister of education in 1920-1921 in the government of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti.

9. See Benedetto Croce's short essay "Religione e serenità" (Religion and peace of mind), in which he argues against the assumption that peace of mind can only be attained through religious faith. This is how the essay opens:

It is customary to assert that religion provides a kind of consolation and serenity that no philosophy can give. On considering the facts, however, I would not dare say that this is indeed the case. I look around me, or I collect my memories of religious men (by which I mean simply believers in a specific religion) with whom I have lived or whom I have come across, and I do not find them to be any more serene or any less troubled than the nonreligious persons (nonbelievers) whom I have also known. The manifestations of joy and of sorrow are the same in the ones as in the others.

This essay was first published in *La critica* 13, no. 2 (March 20, 1915): 153-55. It was later included in the first section, "Frammenti di etica" (Fragments on ethics), of Croce's *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931); see pp. 23-25. Gramsci had a copy of *Etica e politica* at Turi, but his familiarity with and admiration of the essay "Religione e serenità" goes back to at least 1917. That year, Gramsci published the single issue (February 11, 1917) of the publication he called *La città futura*, and in it he reprinted a slightly shortened version of Croce's essay. He reprinted the same shortened version again, under the title "La vanità della religione" (The vanity of religion), in *L'ordine nuovo* 2, no. 10 (July 17, 1920): 76. In his letter of August 17, 1931, to Tatiana Schucht, Gramsci alludes to the motivation of the essay (and the reason he admired it), but he does not refer to it explicitly by title:

When I was Cosmo's student, I did not agree with him on many things. . . . But it seemed to me that both myself and Cosmo, like many other intellectuals of the time (that is to say, during the first fifteen years of the century), found ourselves on a common ground that was as follows: we felt we were participating wholly or in part in the movement of moral

and intellectual reform initiated in Italy by Benedetto Croce, whose first point was this, that modern man can and must live without religion, and that means without religion, revealed, positive, mythological, or whatever else you may want to call it. The point seems to me even today the major contribution to world culture made by modern Italian intellectuals, I regard it as a civil achievement that must not be lost. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:56)

10. Mario Missiroli, "Il socialismo contro la scienza" (Socialism against science), in "La battaglia delle idee" (The battle of ideas) section of *L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 10 (July 19, 1919): 77–78. The article is followed by a "Postilla" (Note) by P.T. (i.e., Palmiro Togliatti).

On Mario Missiroli, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

11. Mario Missiroli, "Religione e filosofia" (Religion and philosophy), in the "Calendario" section of *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 12 (March 20, 1930). The emphases are Gramsci's.

12. Mario Missiroli, *Date a Cesare: La politica religiosa di Mussolini con documenti inediti* (Rome: Del Littorio, 1929). On this book, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 6.

13. Gramsci is referring to a book that is central to his critique of Croce's interpretations of Marx, a copy of which he had in Turi: Benedetto Croce, *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921). This book was first published in 1899. For an English translation, see *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914); this, however, is missing the second chapter of the Italian original.

14. The reference here is to Benedetto Croce's *Elementi di politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1929). This book was later reprinted as the second half of *Etica e politica*. The following passage is from the English translation of *Elementi di politica*:

Inasmuch as I was among the first to recommend the study of the concepts of historical materialism, which seemed to me quite effective for awakening the lazy philological historiography of the scholars of that time and for bringing it from words to facts, I wanted also to be among the first to recommend that we rid ourselves of its residual prejudices. This was all the more natural to me because I was on my guard against the supposed metaphysicists and naturalists of that doctrine, and advised that its dictates be treated as simple empirical rules of research. (Benedetto Croce, *Politics and Morals*, trans. S. Castiglione [New York: Philosophical Library, 1945], p. 96)

15. Benedetto Croce, *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo diciannovesimo*, 2 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1921). This work by Croce on nineteenth-century Italian historiography is not preserved among Gramsci's books, but the textual references to it in different notebooks (especially in Notebook 9, §106) indicate that he did have a copy of it during the Turi period.

16. In *Elementi di politica* (pp. 91-92), Croce wrote, "A kind of dialectics did follow . . . naturalism, but it happened to be in the form of historical materialism, which considered economic life a reality and moral life an appearance, an illusion or a 'superstructure,' as it was called" (Croce, *Politics and Morals*, p. 95.) On this, see also Notebook 4, §15, and n. 3 there.

17. Gramsci is alluding to the argument against Lunacharsky in the letter (which he correctly presumed to be by Croce) quoted in the *Nuova Italia* article that he mentions at the very beginning of this note.

18. In the third of his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845), Marx writes: "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 5, 1845-1847 [New York: International Publishers, 1975], p. 7).

19. See Notebook 4, §56, n. 3.

§2. *Translatability of scientific and philosophical languages*

1. At the Third Congress of the Third International, held in June and July 1921, one of the main topics of discussion was the structure and organization of the national political parties. For the pertinent formal document, see "The Organizational Structure of the Communist Parties, the Methods and Content of their Work: Theses," in *Theses, Resolutions, and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International*, ed. Alan Adler, trans. A. Holt and B. Holland (London: Pluto, 1983), pp. 234-61.

2. "Vilici" was Lenin.

3. In his report of November 13, 1922, to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (which Gramsci attended), Lenin criticized the Third Congress's resolution on party organization for being "too Russian":

At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the organizational structure of the Communist parties and on the methods and content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on Russian conditions. This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It is its failing because I am sure that no foreigner can read it. I have read it again be-

fore saying this. In the first place, it is too long, containing fifty or more points. Foreigners are not usually able to read such things. Secondly, even if they read it, they will not understand it because it is too Russian. Not because it is written in Russian—it has been excellently translated into all languages—but because it is thoroughly imbued with the Russian spirit. And, thirdly, if by way of exception some foreigner does understand it, he cannot carry it out. This is its third defect. . . . As I have said already, the resolution is excellently drafted; I am prepared to subscribe to every one of its fifty or more points. But we have not learned how to present our Russian experience to foreigners. All that was said in the resolution has remained a dead letter. If we do not realize this, we shall be unable to move ahead. (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 33, August 1921–March 1923 [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966], p. 430)

§3. *Philosophical and scientific “Esperanto”*

1. Volapük is an artificial language created around 1880 by a Catholic priest from Germany, Johann Martin Schleyer, that was meant to serve as an international medium of communication. By the turn of the century, it had been almost completely overshadowed by Esperanto.

More than once in his journalistic writings, Gramsci poured scorn on Esperanto and those who sought to promote it. See Notebook 3, §73, n. 4, and §76, n. 3.

2. It is very unlikely that Gramsci had access to a copy of Mario Govi's book on methodology, *Fondazione della metodologia: Logica ed epistemologia* (Turin: Bocca, 1929). He derived information about it from articles and reviews in periodicals. One review he probably read is Renato D'Ambrosio's in *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 1–2 (January–April 1932): 206. Gramsci mentions this book again in §86 of this notebook. He also brings it up again in Notebook 8, §184, and in that instance his source is an article, “Metodologia o agnosticismo?” (Methodology or agnosticism?), in *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (November 15, 1930): 331–43.

3. On the Popular Manual, see Notebook 1, §153, n. 3.

§4. *Moral science and historical materialism*

1. Gramsci quotes this statement from Karl Marx's preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* a number of times in his notebooks. For the general context, see Notebook 4, §38, n. 1.

§5. *The Popular Manual, science, and the instruments of science*

1. The observations in this note seem to be prompted by the following assertions in Nikolai Bukharin's *Historical Materialism: A System of*

Sociology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969): "The content of science is determined in the last analysis by the technical and economic phase of society. . . . While the problems have been put chiefly by technology and economy, their solution in many sciences depends on alterations in the scientific technique, whose instruments are of extraordinary importance in widening the horizon" (pp. 164-65). And: "The content of science is given by the content of technology and the economy [and] its development was determined among other things by the tools of scientific knowledge" (p. 169).

2. From the introduction in Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (New York: International, 1939): "In any case natural science has now advanced so far that it can no longer escape the dialectical synthesis. But it will make this process easier for itself if it does not lose sight of the fact that the results in which its experiences are summarized are concepts; but that the art of working with concepts is not inborn and also is not given with ordinary everyday consciousness, but requires real thought, and that this thought similarly has a long empirical history, not more and not less than empirical natural science" (p. 19).

3. Gramsci probably derived his information on Giuseppe Boffito's book *Gli strumenti della scienza e la scienza degli strumenti*, 2 vols. (Florence: Libreria Internazionale Seeber, 1929-1930), from an article, "Gli strumenti della scienza e la scienza degli strumenti" (The instruments of science and the science of instruments), in *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 1 (February 22, 1930): 415-21.

Giuseppe Boffito (1869-1944), a Barnabite priest who was involved in several major bibliographical projects, wrote on diverse subjects including the history of science.

§6. *The Popular Manual and sociology*

1. For the passage in Bukharin's *Historical Materialism* that Gramsci is referring to here, see Notebook 4, §13, n. 2.

2. Gramsci may be referring to either one (or both) of the books by Henri De Man that he had in Turi and on which he comments in various notes. See Notebook 1, §61, n. 13.

§7. *The metaphor of the midwife and Michelangelo's metaphor*

1. The opening lines of Michelangelo's sonnet ("Non ha l'ottimo artista alcun concetto") are quoted by Benedetto Croce in "La lirica del Cinquecento" (The sixteenth-century lyric), *La critica* 28, no. 6 (November 20, 1930): 428; this was probably Gramsci's source.

§8. *Benedetto Croce and historical materialism*

1. Benedetto Croce, *Storia dell'età barocca in Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1929), p. 49.

On Giovanni Botero, see Notebook 3, §141, n. 2.

2. For the pertinent quote from Sorel, see Notebook 4, §3, n. 6.

§9. *B. Croce and ethico-political history*

1. In *Cultura e vita morale*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926), Croce wrote:

The point is to find where the real state truly is in the actual world and in a given historical moment; where the ethical force is really to be found. Though the state is concrete ethicality, it does not necessarily follow that this ethicality is embodied in the government, the sovereign, the ministers, the houses of parliament; it may be embodied in those who do not directly participate in the government, by the enemies and adversaries of a particular state, by revolutionaries. The idea of the state, precisely because it is an idea, is extremely unstable; the effort to enclose it in this or that institution, or in an ensemble of institutions, runs the risk of getting hold only of its shadow or its actual negation. When addressing the practical issue, abstract or generic speculative research must transform itself into specific and historical research, and it must delve into the contingent. It is not unusual for a man of thought facing empirical states to exclaim: *L'État c'est moi*; and he may even be totally right. That is what Tommaso Campanella exclaimed (though in his case he was not quite right) when he contrasted the sovereigns of his time with himself and with the new type of sovereigns he envisaged: "Sham princes, as opposed to true, armed princes." (pp. 24-25)

2. See Benedetto Croce, *Storia del regno di Napoli* (Bari: Laterza, 1926); and *Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915*, 3d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1928), of which Gramsci had a copy in Turi. Both works have been translated into English: *History of the Kingdom of Naples*, ed. H. Stuart Hughes, trans. F. Frenaye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); *A History of Italy, 1871-1915*, trans. C.M. Ady (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963).

§10. *Structure and superstructure*

1. See the "Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism. First Series" in Notebook 4. See, especially, §§12, 38, and 45.

2. Gramsci is referring to Rosa Luxemburg's famous booklet on the general strike, which was originally published in German as *Massenstreik*:

Partei und Gewerkschaften (1906). Gramsci read the Italian translation (which was made from the French version), *Lo sciopero generale: Il partito e i sindacati*, with a preface by Cesare Alessandri (Milan: Avanti! 1919). For an English translation, see *The Mass Strike: The Political Party and the Trade Unions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

3. Although he was initially barred from having it (see the letter of August 25, 1930, to his brother Carlo), Gramsci was eventually able to read the Italian translation of a novel by Krasnov (first published in Russian in Berlin in 1921): P.N. Krasnoff, *Dall'aquila imperiale alla bandiera rossa* (Florence: Salani, 1929). For an English translation, see P.N. Krasnov, *From Double Eagle to Red Flag*, 2 vols. (New York: Duffield, 1926).

Peter Nikolaevich Krasnov (1869-1947), a Cossack, was a high-ranking officer in the Russian Imperial Army and a leader of the forces that supported Kerensky. Though captured when he sought to drive the Bolsheviks out of Petrograd, he was released and before long rejoined the armed effort to reverse the October Revolution. In the civil war, Krasnov commanded the anti-Bolshevik White Army, but in 1919, following a serious military setback, he left the country and moved to Germany. A Nazi collaborator, he was returned to the Soviet Union after the war and executed.

4. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith provide the historical context:

The Red Army under Tukhachevsky was halted at the gates of Warsaw in August 1920, in its counter-offensive following Pilsudski's invasion of the Soviet Union. The defeat was followed by controversy both concerning the viability of the entire attempt to "export revolution" without the support of the local population, and concerning the specific responsibilities for the defeat (Budyenny and Egorov, supported by Stalin, had not followed the orders of S. Kamenev, the commander-in-chief, and had marched on Lvov instead of linking up with Tukhachevsky before Warsaw). (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith [New York: International, 1971], p. 234n)

5. On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10.

§11. A judgment on Gentile's "actual idealism"

1. Bruno Revel, "Il VII Congresso di filosofia (The seventh Congress of Philosophy), *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 47 (November 23, 1930).

The Seventh National Congress of Philosophy, held in Rome in May 1929, was presided over by Giovanni Gentile. One of the highlights of the congress was a polemic between the Franciscan priest Agostino Gemelli, a

Thomist, and Giovanni Gentile. At one point, Gemelli stated: "No philosophical system negates the Christian foundation of life as thoroughly as idealism." (On Agostino Gemelli, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 7.) The proceedings of the congress were published in *Atti del VII Congresso Nazionale di Filosofia, Roma, 26-29 Maggio 1929* (Milan: Bestetti e Tuminelli, 1929).

On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1.

§12. *Man as individual and man as mass*

1. "Senators are good men, the senate is an evil beast."

2. On Robert Michels, see Notebook 2, §45, n. 2.

3. The quotation is from a review-article by Giovanni Faccioli, "Il volto del bolscevismo" (The face of Bolshevism), *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 35 (August 31, 1930). The review-article is about René Fülöp-Miller's book that appeared in Italian translation under the same title, *Il volto del bolscevismo*. Faccioli reiterates some of Fülöp-Miller's main points almost verbatim, and Gramsci's entire note is prompted by the topics touched on by Faccioli. Fülöp-Miller's book was of special interest to Gramsci; see Notebook 6, §133, n. 2.

§13. *Einaudi and historical materialism*

1. On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §11, n. 1.

2. See Benedetto Croce, *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921), a copy of which Gramsci had in Turi. This book has been translated into English as *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914), but without chapter 2, "Le teorie storiche del Prof. Loria" (Professor Loria's theories of history).

3. See Notebook 1, §11.

4. On Achille Loria, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 1.

Luigi Einaudi edited *La riforma sociale* from 1900 to 1935.

5. Gramsci does not remember the title precisely, but there can be little doubt which article of Loria's he is referring to. See Achille Loria, "Documenti ulteriori a suffragio dell'economismo storico" (Additional documents in support of historical economism), *La riforma sociale* 36, nos. 9-10 (September-October 1929): 409-48.

6. See Luigi Einaudi, "Il mito dello strumento tecnico ed i fattori umani del movimento operaio" (The myth of the technical instrument and the human aspects of the workers' movement), *La riforma sociale* 37, no. 6 (November-December 1930): 579-89. Einaudi's article discusses Rinaldo Rigola's autobiography, *Rigola e il movimento operaio nel biellese: Autobiografia. Saggio sulla storia del movimento operaio* (Bari: Laterza, 1930). Gramsci had a copy of this book in Turi.

Rinaldo Rigola (1868-1954), born in the town of Biella in Piedmont, was a founder of the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL), the national labor union established in Milan in 1906. Its major and most powerful constituents were the industrial workers of the north, but it also represented agricultural workers. Though it had a rather close relationship with the Socialist Party, the CGL remained autonomous, and Rigola, who remained its secretary-general until 1918, adopted a generally moderate course and was rather averse to confrontational politics. The CGL disbanded in 1927 in the aftermath of Fascist legislation that rendered labor unions impotent.

7. See Croce, *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, pp. 39-40. See also Notebook 4, §19, where Gramsci specifically discusses Croce's dismissal of Loria's concept of the "technical instrument."

8. Gramsci may have been thinking of two of Luigi Einaudi's books in particular: *Prediche* (Bari: Laterza, 1920) and *Gli ideali di un economista* (Florence: La Voce, 1921). Gramsci owned a copy of the latter volume, but he did not have it with him in prison.

9. Einaudi was one of the contributors to a set of tributes to Gobetti (who died in Paris in February 1926) published under the general title "Piero Gobetti nelle memorie e nelle impressioni dei suoi maestri" (Gobetti remembered by his mentors) in *Il Baretto* 3, no. 3 (March 16, 1926), a periodical that had been founded by Gobetti. In his contribution, Einaudi made a point of attributing (and thus of playing down) Gobetti's friendly relations with the communists and his sympathy with their struggle to his generous spirit and to the general social-political atmosphere of the times. The same point is made by Giuseppe Prato in his book on the socioeconomic effects of the war on Piedmont, *Il Piemonte e gli effetti della guerra sulla sua vita economica e sociale*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Bari: Laterza; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925); see, in particular, p. 233. Gramsci read Prato's book when he was being held in prison in Milan (see his letter of May 23, 1927, to Tatiana Schucht).

Giuseppe Prato (1873-1928) coedited *La riforma sociale* with Luigi Einaudi from 1908 until he died.

On Piero Gobetti, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 29.

§14. Testimonies

1. Luigi Volpicelli, "Per la nuova storiografia italiana" (For the new Italian historiography), *La fiera letteraria* 4, no. 5 (January 29, 1928). The parenthetical asides and interjections are Gramsci's.

Luigi Volpicelli (1893-1993), like his brother, Arnaldo (mentioned elsewhere in the notebooks; see Notebook 4, §53, n. 5, and Notebook 6, §§12

and 82), was an ardent fascist and follower of Giovanni Gentile. He was especially interested in questions related to education and contributed to several fascist cultural periodicals in the 1930s and 1940s.

§15. *The question of capitalism in antiquity and Barbagallo*

1. See Corrado Barbagallo, *Loro e il fuoco: Capitale e lavoro attraverso i secoli* (Milan: Corbaccio, 1927). Gramsci read this book when he was imprisoned in Milan awaiting trial. See also Gramsci's comments on this book in Notebook 3, §112.

On Corrado Barbagallo, see Notebook 1, §25, nn. 17 and 18. A letter from Gramsci to his wife, Julia Schucht, with a comment on Barbagallo is quoted in Notebook 2, §99, n. 2.

§16. *War of position and war of maneuver, or frontal war*

1. Gramsci is alluding to Leon Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution." In suggesting that Trotsky's theory may be the political version of the military strategy of war of maneuver (i.e., frontal assault), he is returning to an issue he had already touched on in the final paragraph of §44 in Notebook 1 and in Notebook 6, §138. (See also Notebook 1, §44, n. 53). The parallelism is debatable; in the view of Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, it is mistaken:

Paradoxically, in view of Gramsci's analogy here, in the military debate of 1920–21 Trotsky was the main *opponent* of war of maneuver, or the tactic of the revolutionary offensive, which was put forward by those civil war generals who supported the idea of a "proletarian military science"—Frunze, Budyenny and also Tukhachevsky. Moreover, he also delivered the main attack at the Third Comintern Congress on the "theory of the offensive" in the political sphere; its main supporters were the PCI . . . , the Left in the German party, and Bela Kun. It should also perhaps be noted that the reference to Foch's unified command being a possible military equivalent of the "united front" in politics was hardly a happy analogy, since Foch in fact had leanings towards Napoleonic offensive tactics. (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith [New York: International, 1971], p. 236n)

In his own summarization of the theory of permanent revolution—which, he points out, originated in 1905—Trotsky explains that its central thesis pertained specifically to the stages of revolution in "backward bourgeois countries." He then goes on to write:

While the traditional view was that the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat led through a long period of democracy, the theory of the permanent revolution established the fact that for the backward countries the road to democracy passed through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus democracy is not a regime that remains self-sufficient for decades, but is only a direct prelude to the socialist revolution. Thus there is established between the democratic revolution and the socialist reconstruction of society a permanent state of revolutionary development.

The second aspect of the "permanent" theory has to do with the socialist revolution as such. For an indefinitely long time and in constant internal struggle, all social relations undergo transformation. Society keeps on changing its skin. Each stage of transformation stems directly from the preceding. The process necessarily retains a political character, that is, it develops through collisions among various groups in the society which is in transformation. Outbreaks of civil war and foreign wars alternate with periods of "peaceful" reform. Revolutions in economy, technique, science, the family, morals, and everyday life develop in complex reciprocal action and do not allow society to achieve equilibrium. Therein lies the permanent character of the socialist revolution as such.

The international character of the socialist revolution, which constitutes the third aspect of the theory of the permanent revolution, flows from the present state of the economy and the social structure of humanity. Internationalism is no abstract principle but a theoretical and political reflection of the character of the world economy, of the world development of productive forces, and the world scale of the class struggle. The socialist revolution begins on national foundations—but it cannot be completed within these foundations. . . . In an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the internal and external contradictions grow inevitably along with the successes achieved. If it remains isolated, the proletarian state must finally fall victim to these contradictions. The way out for it lies only in the victory of the proletariat in advanced countries. Viewed from this standpoint, a national revolution is not a self-contained whole; it is only a link in the international chain. The international revolution constitutes a permanent process, despite temporary declines and ebbs. (Leon Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects* [New York: Merit, 1969], pp. 132-33)

Commenting on this passage from Trotsky, Frank Rosengarten concludes that "the divergence between Trotsky and Gramsci lies in their understanding of how the national and international dimensions of the socialist revolution are to be interrelated with each other" ("The Gramsci-Trotsky Question (1922-1932)," *Social Text* 11 [Winter 1984-1985]: 89). Indeed, insofar as Trotsky seems to be advocating a "frontal assault" (in the first of the

three points he makes in this passage), he is clearly thinking specifically of the situation in “backward bourgeois countries.” Gramsci’s main criticism, on the other hand, stems from his conviction that “frontal assault” is the wrong strategy in the West—that is, in advanced liberal democracies. The rest of Trotsky’s account of the theory of permanent revolution does not appear to contain anything that is significantly at odds with Gramsci’s views.

Elsewhere, Gramsci also criticizes Trotsky for adopting a “military model” in dealing with the organization of labor and industry; see Notebook 4, §52.

On Krasnov, see Notebook 7, §10, n. 3.

2. That is, Lenin.

3. In his autobiography, Trotsky wrote:

Writing afterward in the inexact and slovenly manner which is peculiar to him, Lunacharsky described my revolutionary concept as follows: “Comrade Trotsky held in 1905 that the two revolutions (the bourgeois and socialist), although they do not coincide, are bound to each other in such a way that they make a permanent revolution. After they have entered upon the revolutionary period through a bourgeois political revolution, the Russian section of the world, along with the rest, will not be able to escape from this period until the Social Revolution has been completed. It cannot be denied that in formulating this view Comrade Trotsky showed great insight and vision, albeit he erred to the extent of fifteen years.”

The remark about my error of fifteen years does not become any more profound through its later repetition by Radek. All our estimates and slogans of 1905 were based on the assumption of a victorious revolution, and not of a defeat. We achieved then neither a republic nor a transfer of land, nor even an eight-hour day. Does it mean that we erred in putting these demands forward? The defeat of the revolution blanketed all prospects not merely those which I had been expounding. The question was not of the dates of revolution but of the analysis of its inner forces and of foreseeing its progress as a whole. (Leon Trotsky, *My Life* [New York: Pathfinder, 1970], pp. 180–81)

Gramsci read the Italian translation of Trotsky’s autobiography, *La mia vita: Tentativo di autobiografia*, trans. E. Pocar (Milan: Mondadori, 1930), when he was in Turi. He went to great lengths to obtain permission to have the book, which was at first denied him; see Notebook 2, Description of the Manuscript.

4. From Guicciardini’s *Ricordi* (C:1):

The pious say that faith can do great things, and, as the gospel says, even move mountains. The reason is that faith breeds obstinacy. To have faith

means simply to believe firmly—to deem almost a certainty—things that are not reasonable; or, if they are reasonable, to believe them more firmly than reason warrants. A man of faith is stubborn in his beliefs; he goes his way, undaunted and resolute, disdaining hardship and danger, ready to suffer any extremity.

Now, since the affairs of the world are subject to chance and to a thousand and one different accidents, there are many ways in which the passage of time may bring unexpected help to those who persevere in their obstinacy. And since this obstinacy is the product of faith, it is then said that faith can do great things. (Francesco Guicciardini, *Maxims and Reflections*, trans. M. Domandi [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972], p. 39)

5. The “united front” strategy was officially adopted by the Communist International at its Third Congress, in 1921. It called on all Communist parties to work with other entities such as trade unions as well as other parties in order to form a mass proletarian movement for the long-term struggle against capital. This official strategy was reaffirmed by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. In the “Theses on the United Front,” adopted by the Executive Committee in December 1921, the “united front” strategy is defined unambiguously:

The united workers’ front must mean the unity of all workers willing to fight against capitalism—including those workers who still follow the anarchists, syndicalists, etc. In the Latin countries there are still many such workers, and in other countries, too, they can contribute to the revolutionary struggle. From the start of its existence the Communist International has adopted a friendly line in its relations with those elements among the workers who have gradually overcome their prejudices and are moving towards Communism. Communists must be all the more attentive towards them now that the united workers’ front against the capitalists is becoming a reality. (*Theses, Resolutions, and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International*, ed. Alan Adler, trans. A. Holt and B. Holland [London: Pluto, 1983], p. 408)

The official line adopted by the Comintern put the Italian Communist Party in an extremely difficult position, and most of its leaders, including Amadeo Bordiga (the most adamant of all) and Palmiro Togliatti, as well as Gramsci, opposed it; they could not envisage working alongside or in concert with the Socialist Party from which they had so recently (1921) broken away. That aspect of the problem was rendered moot when the Italian Socialist Party itself (in its 1923 national congress) excluded the possibility of fusing with the Communist Party. The Fascist seizure of

power after the March on Rome in October 1922, accompanied by a wave of violence against all leftist groups and formations but especially against the Communists (not to mention Bordiga's arrest), further rendered the Italian situation unique. In the end, Gramsci chose to emphasize the need for adapting and formulating political strategy in keeping with each specific situation. Addressing a meeting of the Italian Communist Party's executive committee held on August 2-3, 1926 (just three months before his arrest), Gramsci asserted: "Every capitalist country is faced with a fundamental problem: the problem of transition from the general idea of the united front tactic to a specific tactic that addresses the concrete problems of national life on the basis of the popular forces as they are historically determined." For the full text, see "Un esame della situazione italiana" (A study of the Italian situation), in Antonio Gramsci, *La costruzione del partito Comunista* (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), pp. 113-24; the quoted passage can be found on p. 123. An English translation (slightly different from the one here) is provided in Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Political Writings: 1921-1926*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), pp. 400-411; the comparable passage is on p. 410.

6. Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929) commanded the Allied forces in the final phase of World War I.

7. See Notebook 7, §10, n. 2.

8. In the course of his political and journalistic work in Turin, Gramsci kept himself informed of the activities of the French revolutionary syndicalists and read their periodical *La vie ouvrière*. His allusion to "Rosmer's articles on Germany," however, is vague and may have been based on a faulty memory, or else he means to refer to the articles that Alfred Rosmer published in his periodical. No articles by Rosmer on Germany have been located either in *La vie ouvrière* or elsewhere. Quite possibly, Gramsci may have been thinking about an article by Charles Andler, "Le 'socialisme impérialiste' et les ouvriers allemands," *La vie ouvrière* 5, no. 86 (April 20, 1913): 449-54. Andler criticizes the German social democrats for not going as far as they could go in their opposition to the war; in his view, they should have joined in a call for a general strike.

The bimonthly *La vie ouvrière* first appeared in October 1905 and continued publication until July 1914; this run is what Gramsci is referring to as the "first series." Alfred Rosmer (the pseudonym of André Alfred Griot, 1877-1964) started participating in the work of the periodical in 1910, and before long he became, together with Pierre Monatte, one of the most prominent leaders of the syndicalists. *La vie ouvrière* resumed publication in 1919 with Rosmer and Monatte as editors until it ceased publication in 1921. A founding member of the French Communist Party in 1920, Rosmer was also elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and he assumed the editorship of *L'humanité* in 1923. Rosmer,

a friend of Trotsky's, was expelled from the party in 1924 for joining the opposition to Stalin.

§17. *Croce*

1. On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1.

2. See Notebook 1, §132, n. 1.

3. On January 15, 1922, Gentile delivered a speech inaugurating the Scuola di Cultura Sociale in Rome. The speech, "Lavoro e cultura" (Work and culture), was later included in Gentile's book *Fascismo e cultura* (Milan: Treves, 1928), pp. 16-37. Gramsci had a copy of this book in Turi.

§18. *The unity in the component parts of Marxism*

1. The title of this note seems to echo Lenin's "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" (1913), an Italian translation of which was published (probably at Gramsci's suggestion) in *L'unità* of October 24, 1925. The content of the note, however, bears little resemblance to the line of exposition developed by Lenin, who in the introductory section of his piece wrote: "Marxist doctrine . . . is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism. It is these three sources of Marxism, which are also its component parts that we shall outline in brief" (*Collected Works*, vol. 19, 1913 [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966], p. 21).

§20. *The Popular Manual*

1. See Notebook 4, §38, n. 1.

§21. *The validity of ideologies*

1. In *Capital* (book 1, part 1, chap. 3), Marx wrote:

However, Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that in the form of commodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour of equal quality, by inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was founded on the labour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely the equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour because and in so far as they are human labour in

general, could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion. (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes [London: Penguin, 1976], pp. 151–52)

Benedetto Croce also mentions this passage from *Capital* in a long footnote (on p. 32) in *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921), a book that Gramsci had in Turi and that he mentions several times in the notebooks.

2. From Marx's "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction" (1844): "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3, 1843–1844 [New York: International, 1975], p. 182). Gramsci would have read this passage in the French edition of Marx's works that he had in prison: *Oeuvres philosophiques*, trans. J. Molitor (Paris: Costes, 1927), 1:205.

§23. *Graziadei's land of Cocaigne*

1. See Notebook 1, §63, nn. 1 and 2.

On Antonio Graziadei, see Notebook 1, §42, n. 3.

2. See Notebook 1, §63, n. 3.

3. See Antonio Graziadei, "Le teorie del valore di Carlo Marx e di Achille Loria" (Marx's and Loria's theories of value), *Critica sociale* 4, no. 22 (November 16, 1894): 347–49. Croce discusses this article by Graziadei in the essay that Gramsci cites in the opening sentence of this note.

4. Luigi Einaudi and Edoardo Giretti, "Le società anonime a catena" (limited liability company linkages), *Riforma sociale* 38, no. 42 (January–February, 1931): 78–106.

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §11, n. 1.

Edoardo Giretti (1864–1940), an antiprotectionist liberal, wrote a number of books on trade and on the effects of tariffs. A harsh critic of Giolitti and a staunch pacifist who vigorously opposed the Libyan war, he was elected to parliament in 1913.

5. This observation is in Luigi Negro, "L'ultima replica al prof. Graziadei sull'aumento del salario nella teoria marxista" (Final response to Prof. Graziadei on the rise of wages in Marxist theory), *Critica sociale* 11, no. 16 (August 16, 1901): 253–55. This was the last of a long list of articles and notes by the orthodox Marxist economist Negro against Graziadei, stretching back to 1897, which appeared in the following issues of *Critica sociale*: 7, no. 18 (September 16, 1897): 286; 8, no. 19 (November 16, 1899): 301–4; 11, no. 7 (April 1, 1901): 108–9; 11, no. 8 (April 16, 1901): 124–27; 11, no. 14 (July 16, 1901): 218–20.

§24. *Structure and superstructure*

1. All the works mentioned here are included in the French and Italian editions and anthologies of the writings of Marx and Engels that Gramsci owned. Engels is the author of *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, which consists of articles originally published in the *New York Tribune* (1851-52), but for a long time it was erroneously attributed to Marx.

2. On Ernest Bernheim's *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 6th ed. (Leipzig: Dunker und Humblot, 1908), see Notebook 4, §5, and n. 2 there.

3. The debate over the "procession of the Holy Spirit" is also known as the "filioque" controversy. The Western or Latin version of the Nicene Creed states: "I believe in the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and Son." The Byzantine Church never accepted the addition of the phrase "and Son." The issue dates back to the sixth century or even further back if one takes into account divergent theological currents in Trinitarian doctrine. The procession of the Holy Spirit was the doctrinal issue at the center of the dispute that resulted in the rupture between the Western and Eastern churches in the eleventh century.

4. "Il dumping russo e il suo significato storico" (Russian dumping and its historical significance), a long, meandering text with ramblings on history and observations on historical materialism, was published in six segments in the periodical *Problemi del lavoro*. The segments appeared in the following issues: 4, no. 11 (November 1, 1930): 7-9; 4, no. 12 (December 1, 1930): 8-10; 5, no. 1 (January 1, 1931): 8-11; 5, no. 2 (February 1, 1931): 7-10; 5, no. 3 (March 1, 1931): 7-11; and 5, no. 4 (April 1, 1931): 9-13. The periodical was the organ of the Associazione Nazionale Studi Problemi del Lavoro (National association for the study of labor problems), which was founded in 1927 by, among others, Rinaldo Rigola (see Notebook 7, §13, n. 7). The reformist trade unionist had by this time endorsed Fascism. Franz (or Francesco) Weiss was a regular contributor to the monthly.

§25. *The objectivity of the real*

1. See Notebook 4, §41, n. 1.

2. See Benedetto Croce's polemic with Anatoly Lunacharsky described in Notebook 7, §1, n. 2.

§27. *Graziadei and the land of Cocaigne*

1. Gramsci did not have a copy of Giovanni Papini's *Gog* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1930). This quotation is transcribed from an article by Ettore Alodoli, "Gog e la civiltà" (*Gog and civilization*), *Critica fascista* 9, no. 4 (February 15, 1931): 78-79.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

Gramsci makes a connection (in the title of the note) between this quotation and Graziadei because Benedetto Croce had written of Graziadei that "if he supposed that the machines would produce automatically a superfluity of goods for the whole of that society, then he was simply constructing by hypothesis a land of Cocaigne." See Notebook 1, §63, n. 1.

§29. *On the Popular Manual*

1. This is an allusion to the third of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* (1854); see Notebook 7, §1, n. 18.

§30. *On Graziadei*

1. See Antonio Graziadei's book on the industrial production of sodium nitrate in the late nineteenth century, *Saggio di una indagine sui prezzi in regime di concorrenza e di sindacato tra gli imprenditori: L'industria del nitrato sodico dal 1° gennaio 1880 al 31 dicembre 1903* (Imola: Paolo Galeati, 1909).

2. Between November 1909 and February 1910, *Il viandante* published responses to an inquiry it conducted on the question of "socialist participation in government." In his response, published in *Il viandante* 2, no. 28 (December 12, 1909), Graziadei stated:

I do not believe, in any way, that the participation of socialist representatives in the government conflicts in any way with the spirit and the methods of class struggle. Class struggle and class cooperation are not totally incompatible terms; they are not always and in all fields mutually exclusive. They are, rather, complementary terms. On certain issues (for example, national defense, the increase in social wealth, etc.), one cannot think in any terms but class cooperation. On the other hand, there are issues (such as the distribution of wealth) that can only be thought of in terms of class struggle.

3. See Antonio Graziadei, *Socialismo e sindacalismo* (Rome: Mongini, 1909). This is the text of a talk on socialism and trade unionism Graziadei gave at Imola on September 15, 1908.

4. See Notebook 1, §58, and n. 5 there.

5. As Derek Boothman explains: "This particular *obbligato* was a type of land tenure limited to the area around the town of Imola in what is now the region of Emilia Romagna; in return for a set number of days worked each year for the landowner, agricultural workers could build their houses on reclaimed land at favorable rates. By no stretch of the imagination could Graziadei's 'generalization' therefore be considered well-grounded"

(Antonio Gramsci, *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. D. Boothman [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995], p. 546 n. 35).

6. See Notebook 1, §48, n. 2.

7. On Enrico Ferri, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15; on Alfredo Niceforo, Notebook 1, §44, n. 22; on Cesare Lombroso, Notebook 1, §26, n. 1.

Giuseppe Sergi (1841-1936), born in Messina, Sicily, was the first professor of anthropology (or the natural history of man, as the chair was then called) at the University of Rome, where he also founded an anthropological museum. Sergi, a positivist, became well known for his research and theories on the racial origins of the Mediterranean people. (See, for example, his book *The Mediterranean Race: A Study of the Origin of European Peoples* [London: W. Scott, 1914].) He later became interested in Native American physical anthropology.

8. "Filthy Southerners" is an effort to translate "Sudici," a racist term used by anti-Southerners in Italy. "Nordici" means "Northerners," and "sudici" sounds as if it is its counterpart (people of the "sud," or south) but in fact means "filthy."

§31. *On literary criticism*

1. Francesco De Sanctis's "La scienza e la vita" (Science and life) is collected with his other critical writings in the three-volume *Saggi critici*, ed. P. Arcari (Milan: Treves, 1924); see vol. 3, pp. 222-42. Gramsci received a copy of this work during the period of his imprisonment in Milan.

On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

2. See Luigi Russo, "La scienza e la vita," *Leonardo* 4, no. 1 (January 20, 1928): 1-7.

On Luigi Russo, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 2.

3. When Luigi Russo's study on De Sanctis was first announced, its title was given as *Francesco De Sanctis e l'Università di Napoli*; when it was actually published, however, it had a different title: *Francesco De Sanctis e la cultura napoletana: 1860-1885* (Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1928).

§32. *Henri De Man*

1. Arturo Masoero, "Un americano non edonista" (A nonhedonist American), *Economia* 7, no. 2 (February 1931): 151-72.

2. Gramsci had copies of two books by Henri De Man in Italian translation: *La gioia del lavoro* (Bari: Laterza, 1930) and *Il superamento del marxismo* (Bari: Laterza, 1929). On these two works and on Henri De Man, see Notebook 1, §61, n. 13.

3. "Instinct of workmanship" is in English in Masoero's article and in Gramsci's manuscript. The phrase appears in the title of one of Thorstein

Veblen's major essays: "The Instinct of Workmanship and the Irksomeness of Labor," *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (1898-99): 187-210.

4. Gramsci writes the phrase "instinct of constructiveness" in English (as it appears in Masoero's article), after giving its Italian equivalent, "istinto costruttivo."

5. Gramsci is referring to the following passage in *Capital* (book 1, part 3, chap. 7):

We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [*verwirklicht*] his own purpose in those materials. (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes [London: Penguin, 1976], pp. 283-84)

This passage is quoted by Bukharin in the section "Teleology in the Social Sciences" in the first chapter of *Historical Materialism*.

6. Masoero, "Un americano non edonista," p. 163.

7. On the intricate relations between eighteenth-century concepts of sensation/sensualism and Marxist theory, see the entry "Sensation/Sensualisme" in *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, ed. Gérard Bensussan and Georges Labica (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1999), pp. 1046-48.

8. See Notebook 1, §132, n. 4.

9. Gramsci probably learned about this from an article by Massimo N. Fovel, "La nuova raccolta internazionale di economisti" (The new international collection of economists), *Critica fascista* 9, no. 3 (February 1, 1931): 45-47. The article announced the publication plans for what would become the book series of works by Italian and foreign economists (Nuova collana di economisti stranieri e italiani) under the general editorship of Giuseppe Bottai and Celestino Arena. The initial plans projected the publication of some works by Thorstein Veblen; in the end, however, no Veblen volume was included in the series.

§33. *Posing the issue*

1. That is, Lenin's position.

2. Karl Radek's pamphlet (in Italian translation), *L'evoluzione del socialismo dalla scienza all'azione: Gli ammaestramenti della Rivoluzione russa* (The evolution of socialism from science to action: The lessons of

the Russian revolution) was published in Milan in 1920 by Avanti! the publishing house of the Socialist Party. Gramsci had read this booklet at the time it was published, and he cited it in an article, "Soviet e consigli di fabbrica" (Soviets and factory councils), *L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 43 (April 3-10, 1920): 340-45.

Karl Radek (1885-1939), a militant member of the Polish Social Democratic Party, moved to Germany to avoid arrest and subsequently to Switzerland, where he was close to Lenin. After the October Revolution, he devoted much of his energy to the work of the Communist International. Expelled from the party in 1927 for opposing Stalin, he recanted and was readmitted into the party, only to be arrested in 1937 and charged with treason.

3. "The German working class is the inheritor of German classical philosophy." This is the final sentence in Fredrick Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (*Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*) (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1888).

4. See the final paragraphs of Notebook 4, §38.

5. Antonio Graziadei, *Prezzo e sovrapprezzo nell'economia capitalista* (Milan: Avanti! 1923).

On Graziadei, see Notebook 1, §42, n. 3.

6. Francesco Olgiati develops the comparison between Marx and Jesus in the final three pages of his book *Carlo Marx* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1918). The same publisher brought out a second edition of this book (which is cited by Gramsci in Notebook 10, II, §41.i) in 1920. Gramsci had published a rather long review of Olgiati's book by Zino Zini, under the title "Marx nel pensiero di un cattolico" (Marx in the mind of a Catholic), in the weekly *Grido del popolo* 23, no. 736 (August 31, 1918). The same review was reprinted, without its original title, in the "Battaglia delle idee" (Battle of ideas) section of *L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 18 (September 13, 1919): 141-42. It is also included (on pp. 169-79) in Zino Zini, *Poesia e verità* (Milan: Corbaccio, 1926), a copy of which Gramsci had in Turi. Zini discusses the Marx-Jesus comparison in the concluding paragraphs of his review.

On Francesco Olgiati, see Notebook 4, §3, n. 3.

7. See Graziadei, *Prezzo e sovrapprezzo nell'economia capitalista*, pp. 8-9.

§34. *The tendential fall in the rate of profit*

1. In this note, Gramsci is condensing some of the main points in *Capital*, book 3, part 3, entitled "The Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit." The opening chapter of the section is "The Law Itself," where Marx writes:

The same rate of surplus-value . . . and an unchanged level of exploitation of labour, is expressed in a falling rate of profit, as the value of constant capital and hence the total capital grows with the constant capital's material volume.

If we further assume now that this gradual change in the composition of capital does not just characterize certain individual spheres of production, but occurs in more or less all spheres, or at least the decisive ones, and that it therefore involves changes in the average organic composition of the total capital belonging to a given society, then this gradual growth in the constant capital, in relation to the variable, must necessarily result in a *gradual fall in the general rate of profit*, given that the rate of surplus-value, or the level of exploitation of labour by capital, remains the same. . . . With the progressive decline in the variable capital in relation to the constant capital, this tendency leads to a rising organic composition of the total capital, and the direct result of this is that the rate of surplus-value, with the level of exploitation of labour remaining the same or even rising, is expressed in a steadily falling general rate of profit. (We shall show later on why this fall does not present itself in such an absolute form, but more in the tendency to a progressive fall.) (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach [London: Penguin, 1991], pp. 317–19)

In the chapter that immediately follows, Marx discusses the “counteracting factors,” or what Gramsci calls the “variables.” The chapter is divided into six subsections, each of which deals with a different factor that can check or cancel the effect of the general law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit. The six factors treated by Marx are more intense exploitation of labor, reduction of wages below their value, cheapening of the elements of constant capital, the relative surplus population, foreign trade, and the increase in share capital (see *Capital*, 3:339–38).

§35. *Materialism and historical materialism*

1. Ludwig Feuerbach, “Das Geheimniss des Opfers oder Der Mensch ist, war er ißt” (The mystery of sacrifice, or man is what he eats), *Sämmtliche Werke* (Leipzig: Wigand, 1846–90), 10: 1–35. The epigrammatic “man is what he eats” recurred frequently in socialist writings, in part because it was taken to encapsulate the materialism Feuerbach supposedly espoused.

2. Gramsci is probably referring to some conversation he had with Amadeo Bordiga; the former leader of the Italian Communist party is not known to have written anything on the topic.

3. Massimo Bontempelli's defense of pasta against Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's denunciation of traditional Italian eating habits was brought

up in a short unsigned article, "La pastasciutta, Dante e la storia d'Italia" (Pasta, Dante, and the history of Italy), *Critica fascista* 8, no. 23 (December 10, 1930): 451. The article sided with Bontempelli.

On Marinetti and his antipasta "Manifesto of Futurist Cookery," see Notebook 6, §73, n. 2.

On Bontempelli, see Notebook 1, §136, n. 1.

4. Because of an error in the transcription of Gramsci's manuscript, the phrase "man is what he wears" ("l'uomo è il suo abbigliamento") is missing from the Gerratana edition of the *Quaderni del carcere*.

5. George V. Plekhanov's *Anarchism and Socialism* (1895) was published in Italian translation as *Anarchia e socialismo* (Milan: Avanti!, 1921). That book, however, has little to say on the topic discussed here by Gramsci. A more pertinent work by Plekhanov is *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: International, 1929); this work, Plekhanov's last, was first published in Russian in 1908, and Gramsci had an Italian translation of it.

On George Plekhanov, see Notebook 3, §31, n. 4.

6. See Notebook 4, §15, §20, §22, §35, and §40; and, in Notebook 6, §19, §21, §24.

7. See Notebook 7, §33, n. 3.

8. That is, Lenin's.

§36. *The Popular Manual. Metaphor and language*

1. See Notebook 4, §17.

2. Michel Bréal, *Essai de sémantique* (Paris: Hachette, 1897), which has been published in English as *Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning*, trans. H. Cust (New York: Dover, 1964).

3. On Giulio Bertoni and his book *Linguaggio e poesia* (Rieti: Bibliotheca Editrice, 1930), see Notebook 3, §74, and n. 1 there, and Notebook 6, §20.

4. Gramsci alluded to these issues earlier in Notebook 4, §18 and §42. In this instance, he is thinking specifically of Vilfredo Pareto's distinction, in his *Trattato di sociologia generale* (Florence: Barbéra, 1923), between "the language of the logico-experimental and non-logico-experimental science and ordinary language." Pareto also maintained that insofar as the meaning of words is embedded in common usage, language is conducive to error. The following extract is taken from the abridged version (in English translation) of Pareto's voluminous treatise:

The terms of common speech are lacking in definiteness, and it cannot be otherwise, for precision goes only with scientific exactitude. Every argument based on sentiment, as all metaphysical arguments are, must of necessity use terms lacking in exactitude, since sentiments are indefinite

and the name cannot be more definite than the thing. Such arguments actually rely on the lack of exactness in everyday language to mask their defects in logic and carry conviction. Logico-experimental arguments, being based instead on objective observation, tend to use words strictly to designate things and, therefore, to choose them in such a way as to avoid ambiguities and have terms as exact as possible. Moreover they equip themselves with a special, technical language and so escape the indefiniteness of common parlance. . . .

Experimental science . . . which envisages things exclusively, can, therefore, derive no advantage from words, but can incur great harm, whether because of the sentiment that words arouse, or because the existence of a word may lead one astray as to the reality of the things that it is supposed to represent, or finally, because reasonings based on words are as a rule woefully lacking in exactness. . . .

To avoid the danger, ever threatening in the social sciences, that meanings of words will be persistently sought not in the objective definitions but in common usage and etymology, we would gladly have replaced word labels with letters of the alphabet, such as a, b, c . . . or with ordinal numbers; and this, in fact, we shall do now and then. . . .

In this volume I shall use . . . a number of terms that are also used in mechanics, and I shall accordingly explain to the reader the exact senses in which I use them. (Vilfredo Pareto, *Compendium of General Sociology*, ed. E. Abbott, trans. A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980], pp. 14-15)

For an integral English translation of Pareto's *Trattato di sociologia generale*, see *The Mind and Society*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935).

Pareto also discusses this issue in relation to pragmatist theory (and with specific reference to Giovanni Vailati) in his three-volume collection of writings *I sistemi socialisti* (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1918).

On Vilfredo Pareto, see Notebook 4, §18, n. 6.

Apropos of the issue of language as a supposed source of error, Gramsci may have been thinking also of Giuseppe Prezzolini's work *Il linguaggio come causa d'errore: H. Bergson* (Florence: G. Spinelli, 1904).

§37. Goethe

1. Gramsci came across this maxim of Goethe's in André Maurois, *La vie de Disraeli* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), which quotes Goethe without providing a specific citation: "Comment un homme peut-il atteindre la connaissance de soi? Par la contemplation? Certainement non, mais par l'action. Essayez de faire votre devoir et vous trouvez pourquoi vous êtes fait. Mais quel est votre devoir? Ce que demande l'heure" (p. 314).

Gramsci had a copy of Maurois's book, which has been translated into English as *Disraeli: A Picture of the Victorian Age*, trans. H. Miles (New York: Appleton, 1928).

The source is Goethe's "Betrachtungen im Sinne der Wanderer" (Reflections in the spirit of the wanderers), in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (1821-1829): "Wie kann man sich selbst kennenlernen? Durch Betrachten niemals, wohl aber durch Handeln." For an English translation, see Goethe, *Conversations of German refugees and Wilhelm Meister's Journeyman Years*, ed. Jane K. Brown, trans. K. Winston (New York: Suhrkamp, 1983), especially p. 294.

§38. Examination of the concept of human nature

1. See Notebook 6, §82, and n. 16 there

2. Gramsci is referring to a passage in G. K. Chesterton's "The Invisible Man" in which Father Brown observes:

Have you ever noticed this—that people never answer what you say? They answer what you mean—or what they think you mean. Suppose one lady says to another, in a country house, "Is anybody staying with you?" the lady doesn't answer "Yes; the butler, the three footmen, the parlourmaid and so on," though the parlourmaid may be in the room, or the butler behind her chair. She says, "There is *nobody* staying with us," meaning nobody of the sort you mean. But suppose a doctor enquiring into an epidemic asks "Who is staying in the house?" then the lady will remember the butler, the parlourmaid and the rest. All language is like that; you never get a question answered literally, even when you get it answered truly. (G. K. Chesterton, *The Innocence of Father Brown* [New York: John Lane, 1911], p. 143)

Gramsci probably read *L'innocenza di padre Brown* (Milan: Alpes, 1924), the Italian translation of *The Innocence of Father Brown* (1911), sometime before his imprisonment. He also had copies of two other works by Chesterton; see Notebook 3, §153, n. 6, and Notebook 6, §17, n. 2.

§39. Croce

1. Benedetto Croce, *Cultura e vita morale*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926), p. 158. The passage occurs in a section entitled "La morte del socialismo" (The death of socialism), which is the text of an interview with Croce that was originally published under the same title in *La voce* 3, no. 6 (February 9, 1911): 501-2.

2. The chapter "Il partito come giudizio e come pregiudizio" (The party as judgment and as prejudice) in Croce's *Cultura e vita morale*, pp. 191-

98, was originally published as an article in Gaetano Salvemini's journal *Unità* 1, no. 17 (April 6, 1912): 66.

3. In "I partiti politici" (The political parties), the third chapter of his little book *Elementi di politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1925), Croce wrote:

The parties are means offered to the various personalities so that they may fashion for themselves and, with themselves, their own ethical ideals, and so that they may make efforts to accomplish them. This accounts for the importance in the parties of heads and leaders and also of the others who seem to have positions of secondary importance and modestly withdraw to the shadows, yet manipulate the wires of action. The important thing, then, is the vigor of the personality, in whom the ethical ideal is embodied and expressed; it is usually admitted that political parties are what the individuals who form and personify them are. (Benedetto Croce, *Politics and Morals*, trans. S. Castiglione [New York: Philosophical Library, 1945], pp. 38-39)

Elementi di politica was later reprinted as the second half of *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), of which Gramsci had a copy in Turi. On this topic, see also "Per una Società di cultura politica," a speech Croce delivered in May 1924 at the inauguration of a newly formed Society of Political Culture that was then reproduced as an appendix in *Etica e politica*, pp. 353-59.

§40. Nationalizations and state takeovers

1. All the information in this note about Manuel Saitzew's book on public enterprise, *Die öffentliche Unternehmung der Gegenwart* (Tübingen: Mohor, 1930), is derived from an unsigned book review in *Economia* 8, no. 1 (July 1931): 99-100.

§41. Economics

1. Henryk Grossmann's *Des Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems (Zugleich eine Krientheorie)* (Leipzig: C.L. Hirschfeld, 1929) was reviewed by Stefano Samogyi in *Economia* 7, no. 3 (March 1931): 327-32. For an abridged English translation of this book by Grossmann, see *The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being also a Theory of Crises*, trans. Jairus Banaji (London: Pluto, 1992).

2. On Gino Arias, see Notebook 6, §66, n. 1.

3. It appears that Gramsci never obtained a copy of Grossmann's book. He does mention it again, however, in Notebook 10, II, §33.

§42. *Elliptical comparison?*

1. In *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, Croce asserted that Marx's theory of value was based on an "elliptical comparison." See Notebook 1, §10, n. 2.

2. See Antonio Graziadei, *Sindacati e salari* (Milan: Trevisini, 1929), p. 16.

On Graziadei and his books (the titles of which Gramsci sometimes confuses), see Notebook 1, §42, n. 3, and §63, n. 2.

3. See Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours*, 5th ed. (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929). For an English translation, see *A History of Economic Doctrines from the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day*, trans. R. Richards, 2d ed. (Boston: Heath, 1948).

4. See Benedetto Croce, "Le due scienze mondane: l'Estetica e l'Economica," *La critica* 29, no. 4 (November 20, 1931): 401-2, specifically p. 404. This essay has been translated into English as "The Worldly Pair of Sciences: Aesthetic and Economic," and this is the relevant passage:

Now "sense" had two associated but distinct meanings, firstly, that which in knowledge is not logical and ratiocinative, but sensible and intuitive; and, secondly, that which in practical activity is not in itself moral and dutiful but pursued because liked and desired, useful and pleasurable. Consequently, the doctrine which rehabilitates sense developed on the one hand into a logic of the senses or poetic logic, science of pure intuitive knowledge or Aesthetic, and on the other hand into a logic of the pleasurable or useful, Economic in the widest sense, and all this was nothing more nor less than a theoretical "redemption of the flesh," as it is called, a redemption of life as life, of earthly love in all its aspects. (B. Croce, *Philosophy, Poetry, History: An Anthology of Essays*, trans. Cecil Sprigge [London: Oxford University Press, 1966], p. 753)

§43. *Reformation and Renaissance*

1. See Boris Souvarine, "Perspectives de travail," *La critique sociale* 1, no. 1 (March 1931): 1-4. Boris Souvarine was the name used by Boris Lipschitz (also spelled Lifschitz and transcribed as Liefscitz by Gramsci), born in Kiev in 1893, who became a naturalized French citizen in 1906. Between 1921 and 1923, Souvarine was the French Communist Party representative on the executive committee of the Communist International in Moscow. He was expelled from the party in 1924. It is quite likely that Gramsci met and came to know Souvarine in Moscow; at the very least, he came to know enough about him to have learned his original name and

remembered it (and which he uses here possibly as a precaution against a potentially inquisitive censor).

Apropos of *La critique sociale*, Gramsci wrote to Tatiana Schucht on July 27, 1931:

It's probably best if they don't send me any more new magazines, as they've done recently. I would like to continue reading only one of them: it is the bibliographic review of sociology published by Marcel Rivière and entitled *La Critique Sociale*, of which I have received the first issue dated March 19, 1931, and that comes out only six times a year. It isn't very well turned out, and indeed it is a sign of decadence that a justly accredited publishing house like Rivière's should publish a medley that is so disorganized and without a serious scientific orientation; nevertheless, just so as to have a French bibliographic review and since it isn't very cumbersome and expensive, I want to get it. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:48.)

2. On Maurice Barrès, see Notebook 3, §2, n. 6.

3. Gramsci is referring to Rosa Luxemburg's essay "Stillstand und Fortschritt im Marxismus," (Stagnation and progress of Marxism), first published in *Vorwärts*, on March 14, 1903. See Notebook 3, §31, n. 7.

§44. *Reformation and Renaissance*

1. The November 1, 1930, issue of *The Economist* contained a "Russian Supplement" that was devoted to an analysis (by an unidentified author) of the first Soviet Five-Year Plan. This note must have been written after July 26, 1931, since Gramsci could not have known the identity of the author of the supplement before then.

On June 29, 1931, Gramsci wrote to Tatiana Schucht: "You may write Piero that I am making rapid progress in the reading of English; I find it much easier than German. I read fairly rapidly, even though my small dictionary is not quite adequate and lacks many technical terms and idioms currently in use. I read the extract from the *Economist* on the Five Year Plan in two or three days, and I don't think a single word escaped me" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:44; translation slightly modified).

Tatiana Schucht, as always, passed the information on to Piero Sraffa, who wrote back to her on July 11, 1931: "I am delighted that Nino has been mastering English, which will make it easier for him to keep abreast of things. As for the dictionary . . . I'll have the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*

sent to him. . . . The author of the extract from the *Economist* that Nino read is Michael Farbman, former correspondent of the *Observer*, who now lives in London and concerns himself with the League of Nations. Published anonymously, it was much more authoritative than it would have been if the readers of the *Economist* knew that it was written by a journalist. A French translation of it has just been published" (Piero Sraffa, *Lettere a Tania per Gramsci*, ed. Valentino Gerratana [Rome: Riuniti, 1991], p. 14).

Tatiana Schucht, in turn, passed this information on to Gramsci (transcribing it verbatim) in a letter dated July 26, 1931. (See A. Gramsci and T. Schucht, *Lettere: 1926-1935*, ed. A. Natoli and C. Daniele [Turin: Einaudi, 1997], p. 740).

Michael S. Farbman (1880-1933) was the Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Observer* in the years immediately following the revolution. In 1917 he published a booklet entitled *The Russian Revolution and the War*. His other books include *Russia and the Struggle for Peace* (1918), *Bolshevism in Retreat* (1923), and *After Lenin* (1924). He conducted an interview of Lenin that was published in the *Manchester Guardian* on November 22, 1922 (reprinted in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 33, *August 1921-March 1923* [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966], pp. 383-89). His book *Piatiletka: Russia's 5-year Plan* (New York: New Republic, 1931) was also published in French, German, and Yiddish. He is not to be confused (as he has been in some editions of Gramsci's writings) with R. B. Farbman (b. 1893), also known by his pseudonym R. B. Rafail, who was Communist Party secretary in the Ukraine, belonged to the "democratic centralism" faction in the beginning of the 1920s, and was finally expelled from the party in 1933.

2. That is, the USSR.

3. Gramsci is referring to Thomas G. Masaryk's *Russland und Europa: Studien über die geistigen Strömungen in Russland, Erste Folge. Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie. Soziologische Skizzen*, 2 vols. (Jena: Diederichs, 1913).

Leon Trotsky published an article on Masaryk's book, "Professor Masaryk über Russland," in the Viennese social-democratic monthly *Der Kampf*, nos. 11-12 (December 1914): 519-27. Gramsci had Trotsky's article translated into Italian and brought it out under the title "La Russia pre-revoluzionaria" (Prerevolutionary Russia) in the last issue of *Il grido del popolo* 23, no. 743 (dated erroneously October 19, 1918, and actually October 26, 1918); he then published it again under the title "Lo spirito della civiltà russa" (The spirit of Russian civilization) in *L'ordine nuovo* 2, no. 6 (June 19, 1920): 43-45.

Masaryk's work was translated into English as *The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature, and Philosophy*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1919), and later into Italian as *La Russia e l'Europa: Studi sulle correnti spirituali in Russia*, trans. Ettore

Lo Gatto, 2 vols. (Naples: Ricciardi, 1922; Rome: Istituto Romane Editoriale, 1925). Gramsci calls it "Masaryk's book on Dostoyevsky" because, in Masaryk's own words, "the entire study is devoted to Dostoyevsky, but I lacked the literary skill requisite for the interweaving of all I wanted to say into an account of that author" (*The Spirit of Russia*, p. vii).

On Tomás Garrigue Masaryk, see Notebook 3, §40, n. 4.

4. Gramsci derived the bibliographical data on the French edition of Thomas G. Masaryk's book of memoirs, *La résurrection d'un état: Souvenirs et réflexions, 1914-1918* (Paris: Plon, 1930), and all the information about its contents from a review of it, signed F.R., in *La critique sociale* 1, no. 1 (March 1931): 22.

§46. *On the Popular Manual. Teleology*

1. Gramsci is alluding to the Marxist concept of the "historical task" or "historical mission" of the proletariat.

2. See Notebook 4, §16, and n. 1 there, and §27.

§47. *On the Popular Manual*

1. N.I. Bukharin, "Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism," in *Science at the Cross Roads: Papers Presented at the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology Held in London from June 29th to July 3rd, 1931 by the Delegates of the U.S.S.R.* (London: Kniga, 1931), pp. 9-33. Gramsci received a copy of this volume on August 31, 1931, as he informed Tatiana Schucht in a letter on the same day.

2. Bukharin wrote:

Nearly all the schools of philosophy, from theologising metaphysics to the Avenarian-Machist philosophy of the "pure description" and renovated "pragmatism," with the exception of dialectical materialism (Marxism), start from the thesis, considered irrefutable, that "I" have been "given" only "my" own sensations.

This statement, the most brilliant exponent of which was Bishop Berkeley, is quite unnecessarily exalted into a new gospel of epistemology. . . . Nevertheless, it is not only vulnerable, but will not stand the test of serious criticism. . . .

In point of fact, it is only in the case of the first-created Adam, just manufactured out of clay and *for the first time* seeing, again with eyes opened for the *first time*, the landscape of paradise with all its attributes, that such a statement could be made. ("Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism," pp. 11-12)

3. The page reference is to Mario Casotti's book on the philosophy of education, *Maestro e scolaro: Saggio di filosofia dell'educazione* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1930), but the quotation is taken from an article, "Il 'cogito ergo sum' di Cartesio e la nostra conoscenza dell'anima" (Descartes's "cogito ergo sum" and our knowledge of the soul), in *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (October 3, 1931): 30.

4. See Notebook 4, §47, n. 1.

§48. *Georges Sorel*

1. See Gaëtan Pirou, *Georges Sorel: 1847-1922* (Paris: Rivière, 1927); the bibliography is on pp. 62-67. There is no evidence that Gramsci had access to this book; his source of information may have been an article by Luigi Salvatorelli, "Georges Sorel," *Pègaso* 2, no. 1 (January 1930): 28-42.

§49. *Popular literature. Serial novels*

1. "Les illustres inconnus" was a series of ten articles by G. Cherenzol published in *Les nouvelles littéraires* between June 27 (no. 454) and August 29, 1931 (no. 463). When Gramsci wrote this note—sometime in August 1931, as can be confirmed by an observation he makes in §52 below—he had read six or seven of the articles.

The publication of *Arsène Lupin, gentleman-cambrioleur* in the magazine *Je sais tout*, in 1907, was such a huge popular success that Maurice Leblanc (1864-1941) spent most of the rest of his life churning out new Lupin stories. The supervillain Fantomas was the creation of Marcel Allain (1885-1970) and Pierre Souvestre (1874-1914). They introduced Fantomas to readers of pulp fiction in 1911, and by the time Souvestre died they had produced thirty-two books featuring the evil character; Allain produced eleven more on his own. The character of Fantomas seems to have been inspired by Zigomar, the mastermind and leader of a criminal gang of Gypsies. Zigomar, who made his first appearance in 1909, in the paper, *Le matin*, was the invention of Léon Sazie (1862-1939).

§50. *Popular literature*

1. See Notebook 3, §148, and n. 2 there.

2. All of Gramsci's information on Angelandrea Zottoli's critique of Manzoni's portrayal of the humble characters as compared to the powerful, *Umili e potenti nella poetica del Manzoni* (Rome: La Cultura, 1931), is derived from the article by Filippo Crispolti cited in the n. 3, below.

The literary critic Angelandrea Zottoli (1879-1956) was closely affiliated with the journal *La cultura*. In addition to two books on Manzoni, he was also the author of studies on Boiardo, Leopardi, and Casanova. A

consistent anti-Fascist, Zottoli was appointed director of the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana in 1944.

3. Filippo Crispolti, "Nuove indagini sul Manzoni: Lettera ad Angelo A. Zottoli" (New Manzoni studies: Letter to Zottoli), *Pègaso* 3, no. 8 (August 1931): 129-44.

On Filippo Crispolti, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 5.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 141. The emphases are Gramsci's.

5. The source of this epigram is most probably the following passage in chapter 5 of Octave Mirbeau's novel *Le journal d'une femme de chambre* (1900):

M. Paul Bourget was the intimate friend and spiritual guide of the Countess Fardin, in whose house I served last year as a chambermaid. I had always heard it said that he alone knew, even to its subsoil, the complex soul of woman. . . .

One day my mistress sent me to carry an "urgent letter" to the illustrious master. He handed me the reply himself. Then I made bold to put to him the question that tormented me. . . . M. Paul Bourget asked:

"What is your friend? A woman of the people? A poor woman undoubtedly?"

"A chambermaid like myself, illustrious master."

A superior grimace, a look of disdain, appeared on M. Bourget's face. . . .

"I do not occupy myself with these souls," said he. "These are too little souls. They are not even souls. They are outside the province of my psychology."

I understood that, in this province, one begins to have a soul only with an income of a hundred thousand francs. (O. Mirbeau, *Celestine, Being the Diary of a Chambermaid*, trans. Alan Durst [New York: W. Faro, 1930], pp. 76-77)

The information on this source was kindly provided to me by Derek Boothman.

On Paul Bourget, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 4.

6. Crispolti writes: "[Manzoni] therefore enthusiastically endorsed the theory on which Augustin Thierry was basing his historical researches, namely, the separation in the Middle Ages between the conquering and the conquered races, and he did so because this enabled the oppressed, the forgotten, and the humble to become once again the object of history" ("Nuove indagini sul Manzoni," p. 139).

Augustin Thierry (1795-1856), a great admirer of Saint-Simon, is often regarded as an exemplar of romantic historiography. His reading of history in racial or national terms is exemplified by one of his best-known

works, *L'histoire de la conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands* (1825; published in English translation that same year as *History of the Conquest of England by the Normans*), and his progressive views are very much in evidence in the booklet he coauthored with Henri Saint-Simon, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne* (1814) and in his *Essai sur l'histoire de la formation et des progrès du Tiers État* (1850).

At this point in the manuscript, there is a sentence, enclosed in parentheses, that Gramsci crossed out; however, it remains legible: "In this regard, Croce's assertion in *Storia della storiografia in Italia nel secolo XIX* is particularly strange: he states that only in Italy—and not in France—has there been research on racial conflict in the Middle Ages as the origin of the division of society into the privileged orders and the third estate—in fact, the opposite is true, etc."

Gramsci probably canceled this sentence because he realized that it does not accurately represent Croce's view. The pertinent text is Benedetto Croce, *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo decimonono*, 2 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1921)—specifically, vol. 1, p. 122ff.—in which Croce compares Manzoni's *Discorso sopra alcuni punti della storia longobardica* (Discourse on some aspects of Longobard history) with the theories of Augustin Thierry and François Guizot. Manzoni's *Discorso* is the product of the historical research he had conducted in the course of writing his play *Adelchi*, which deals with Longobard rule over the Romans in the eighth century; it is perhaps in this play that Thierry's influence on Manzoni stands out most clearly. Gramsci touches on the Manzoni-Thierry connection again in Notebook 14, §39.

7. See Angelo A. Zottoli, "Il Manzoni e gli 'umili': Lettera a Filippo Crispolti" [Manzoni and the 'humble': Letter to Crispolti], *Pègaso* 3, no. 9 (September 1931): 356-61.

§51. *History of the subaltern classes*

1. See §50, n. 3, above.

2. On Proudhon's so-called Gallicism, see Notebook 1, §44, and n. 35 there, and Notebook 16, §13.

On Eugène Sue, see Notebook 1, §27, n. 1.

§52. *Popular literature. Catholic section. The Jesuit Ugo Mioni*

1. Ugo Mioni, *La ridda dei milioni* (Milan: Artigianelli, 1908). There is no record of Gramsci ever having owned this book; he may have borrowed it from the Turi prison library.

On Ugo Mioni, see Notebook 3, §63, n. 17, and §100; and Notebook 4, §90.

§53. *Past and present. Germany's debts and payments to America*

1. This note may have been prompted by Mariano D'Amelio's article "Il piano Hoover" (The Hoover plan), in *Gerarchia* 11, no. 8 (August 1931): 550–58, in which D'Amelio makes reference to two earlier articles of his that Gramsci might also have read: "Dal piano Dawes al piano Young" (From the Dawes plan to the Young plan), *Gerarchia* 9, no. 6 (June 1929): 423–35; and "Il piano Young approvato" (Young's plan approved), *Gerarchia* 9, no. 9 (September 1929): 688–95.

The Balfour note was a proposal put forward in 1922 by the then acting foreign secretary of Great Britain practically to cancel the debts incurred by the World War European Allies among themselves and have Britain recover just enough of what it was owed to make its own debt payments to the United States; this was seen as an incentive for the Allies, and especially France, to agree to alleviating the burden of reparations imposed on Germany. The United States objected to the linking of the war debt issue with the question of reparations. At the first London Conference, in August 1922, France refused to endorse a moratorium on reparations payments. The second London conference, held in December of the same year, again failed to generate consensus on the debt and reparations issues. Two years later, a joint U.S.-British commission chaired by Charles Dawes, an American, produced a plan to provide Germany with some financial relief and restructure its reparations payments; the plan was approved by the Allies and by Germany in August 1924. In 1929 another committee, also chaired by an American, Owen Young, proposed yet another restructuring of reparations obligations and payments that was, once again, favorable to Germany. The plan was adopted the following year. Before long, however, the further deterioration of the German economy along with the world economic crisis altered the situation drastically. In June 1931, the U.S. president Herbert Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on all reparation and debt payments. Although Hoover's plan was approved, albeit very reluctantly, by Congress and the other leading nations, it had no effect on the economic crisis. In his articles, Mariano D'Amelio maintained that the Italian delegation at the London Conference had come up with the idea of resolving the debt and reparations issues in tandem even before the Balfour note.

§54. *Past and present. The land problem*

1. This note was probably prompted by Silvio Longhi's article "Il bene di famiglia" (Family property), in *Gerarchia* 11, no. 8 (August 1931): 651–54.

§55. *Past and present*

1. The first issue of the monthly *Gerarchia*, founded by Benito Mussolini, was published in January 1922. Although the masthead listed Mussolini as the editor-in-chief, he entrusted its direction to his mistress and confidante, Margherita Sarfatti.

§56. *The Hon. De Vecchi*

1. See Umberto Zamboni, "La Marcia su Roma: Appunti inediti. L'azione della colonna Zamboni" (The March on Rome: Previously unpublished notes. The action of the Zamboni column), *Gerarchia* 8, no. 10 (October 1928): 767-80.

In the build-up to the March on Rome, General Umberto Zamboni was in charge of the "reserves" assembled in Foligno.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 767.

On Cesare Maria De Vecchi, see Notebook 5, §132, n. 1; and on the quadrumvirate, see Notebook 6, §150, n. 1.

3. See Michele Bianchi, "Un documento" (A document), *Gerarchia* 7, no. 10 (October 1927): 955-56. In this article, the quadrumvir Bianchi asserts that on the night of October 27, 1928, he could not get in touch with the other quadrumvir, De Vecchi, who was in Rome, and that he sent him a letter—reproduced in the article—urging him to do "everything possible to be in Perugia" the following day.

On Michele Bianchi, see Notebook 3, §63, n. 4.

§57. *Past and present*

1. All the information up to this point is derived from an article by Carlo Foà, "La battaglia della soja" (The soybean battle), *Gerarchia* 9, no. 2 (February 1929): 157-61. Foà's article summarized the contents of a book by V. Ducceschi on soybeans and nutrition in Italy, *La soja e l'alimentazione nazionale* (Milan: Vallardi, 1928). The observations that follow are Gramsci's.

§58. *The popular novel*

1. On Eugène Sue's serial novel *Le juif errant* (1844-1845), see Notebook 3, §153, n. 1.

2. See Baccio M. Bacci, "Diego Martelli, l'amico dei 'Macchiaioli'" (Diego Martelli, friend of the Macchiaioli), *Pègaso* 3, no. 3 (March 1931): 297-323.

3. Diego Martelli (1838-1896), an art critic, was a promoter and patron of the Tuscan school of painters known as the Macchiaioli, many of whom spent time on the property he owned in Castiglioncello, where they pro-

duced some of their best-known work. The innovative treatment of light and color that typifies the Macchiaioli school has been described by some art historians as protoimpressionist. A frequenter of the legendary Caffè Michelangelo in Florence, Martelli was also a republican and an Italian nationalist and moved in politically progressive circles. His memoirs, *Ricordi della mia prima età*, mentioned in Bacci's article, exist only in manuscript, though they have been extensively quoted by critics and historians. Martelli's collection of Macchiaioli paintings is now housed in the Gallery of Modern Art at the Pitti Palace in Florence.

4. Atto Vannucci (1810–83), a teacher of Latin in Florence and a nationalist who played an active role in the political rebellions of 1848, wrote a four-volume historical work, *Storia d'Italia dall'origine di Roma all'invasione dei Lombardi* (1861), intended to show the roots of Italian national identity in classical antiquity. A friend and political ally of Giuseppe Mazzoni, he was also affiliated with the journal *L'alba*.

Giuseppe Arcangeli (1807–55), a fellow student of Vannucci's at the seminary in Prato, became a teacher of classical literature at the Collegio Cicognini and published translations of and commentaries on Cicero, Virgil, Callimachus, and Lucretius that went through many editions.

Vincenzo Manteri, one of the leading chemical engineers of the time, was brought from Livorno to Tuscany by the grand duke Leopold to help with a mining project meant to provide for the development of steel production in Tuscany.

Pietro Thouar (1809–61) worked for Gian Pietro Vieusseux's publishing enterprise for a while and then went on to become a major figure in the field of education, publishing a number of popular journals, including innovative newspapers for children, such as *Il giornale per i fanciulli*.

Antonio Mordini (1819–1902), a lawyer and statesman, played a leading role in the drafting of a liberal constitution in the short-lived effort to liberalize the government of Florence, and he was appointed minister of foreign affairs by the 1849 revolutionary triumvirate government.

Giuseppe Mazzoni (1808–80), Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi (1804–73), and Giuseppe Montanelli (1813–62) constituted the triumvirate that governed Tuscany for a few months following the flight of the grand duke Leopold in February 1849. On Guerrazzi, see also Notebook 1, §44, n. 37.

Vincenzo Salvagnoli (1808–61), a lawyer and liberal closely watched and harried by the police, was a member of Vieusseux's intellectual circle; he was also a member of the Tuscan parliament before 1848. Salvagnoli had a keen interest in literature and authored a posthumously published booklet on Stendhal, with whom he corresponded.

On Giuseppe Giusti, see Notebook 5, §42, n. 1.

5. On Gian Pietro Vieusseux, see Notebook 6, §171, n. 1.

6. Bacci, "Diego Martelli," p. 299.

§59. *Saint-Simonism in Italy*

1. On the same topic, see Notebook 3, §153, n. 1.

§60. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. See Girolamo Vitelli, "Ricordi di un vecchio normalista" (Recollections of an old educator), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1393 (April 1, 1930): 273-83.

2. Piero Vettori (1499-1585), a philologist and humanist considered the leading classical scholar in Florence of his time, produced translations and commentaries on a wide range of Greek and Latin texts. He also wrote poetry, orations, and other works in Latin, as well as a treatise in the vernacular on the cultivation of olives, *Trattato delle lodi e della coltivazione degli ulivi* (1569).

3. Vitelli, "Ricordi di un vecchio normalista," p. 282.

4. Robert Estienne (1503-59), whose father had established a print shop-publishing company in Paris, moved to Geneva to embark on a similar enterprise there. One of the most important pioneers of French lexicography, he gained renown with his *Thesaurus linguae latinae* (1531). His son, Henri Estienne (1531-98), a classical philologist, ran into trouble with the Geneva authorities for publishing a French commentary on Herodotus that was deemed offensive for its implied criticism of sixteenth-century beliefs and mores. Besides many editions of Greek and Latin texts, Estienne also produced a monumental lexicographical work, the five-volume *Thesaurus graecae linguae* (1572). He is also remembered for his defense and promotion of the French language.

Gramsci's comment that the Estiennes were Huguenots is probably based on his reading of Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.); see pp. 300-301. Lanson's literary history is not among Gramsci's books that have been preserved, but there is no doubt that he had direct access to it since he quotes from it verbatim in Notebook 8, §109.

§61. *Cultural issues. Libraries*

1. See Ettore Fabietti, "Per la sistemazione delle Biblioteche pubbliche 'nazionali' e 'popolari,'" (Organizing the "national" and "popular" public libraries), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1393 (April 1, 1930): 363-90.

§63. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. See Giuseppe Tucci, "Del supposto architetto del Taj e di altri italiani alla corte del Mogul" (On the supposed architect of the Taj and other

Italians in the Mogul court), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1395 (May 1, 1930): 77–90.

On Giuseppe Tucci, see Notebook 2, §86, n. 1.

§64. *Robert Michels*

1. See Alberto Giaccardi, "Il pangermanismo coloniale tra le cause del conflitto mondiale" (Colonial pan-Germanism as a cause of world conflict), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1396 (May 16, 1930): 233–47.

2. On Robert Michels, see Notebook 2, §45, n. 2.

3. See a letter to the editor by Alberto Giaccardi that appeared under the title "Una rettifica" (A correction) in the "Notizie e commenti" (News and comments) section of *Nuova antologia*, 65, no. 1399 (July 1, 1930): 136.

§65. *Feminism*

1. See Vittorio Cian, "Femminismo patriottico del Risorgimento" (Patriotic feminism in the Risorgimento), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1397 (June 1, 1930): 287–316.

On Vittorio Cian, see Notebook 2, §31, n. 3.

2. *Apologia del libro intitolato "Il Gesuita Moderno"* (Brussels and Leghorn, 1848) was the second of two polemical books against the Jesuits by Vincenzo Gioberti. The first, *Il Gesuita moderno*, was published in five volumes in Lausanne in 1846–1847. On Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

3. Cian, "Femminismo patriottico del Risorgimento," p. 288 n. 2.

§66. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. See Gioacchino Volpe, "Il primo anno dell'Accademia d'Italia" (The first year of the Italian Academy), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1398 (June 16, 1930): 490–96. The emphases in the quoted passage are Gramsci's. Gramsci also wrote about the publication of this speech by Volpe to the academy and the controversy it stirred up in Notebook 6, §16 and §38.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

§67. *History of Italian intellectuals*

1. Renaud Przewdziecki, "Ambasciatori veneti in Polonia" (Venetians ambassadors in Poland), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1399 (July 1, 1930): 93–108; the quoted passage is on p. 93, and the emphases are Gramsci's.

2. This passage recapitulates, at times almost verbatim, pp. 93–94 of Przewdziecki's article.

§68. *History of Italian intellectuals. Humanism and Renaissance*

1. Luigi Arezio, "Rinascimento, Umanesimo e spirito moderno" (Renaissance, Humanism, and the modern spirit), *Nuova antologia* 65, no. 1399 (July 1, 1930): 15-37.

2. See Notebook 5, §123, n. 19. In the penultimate note (i.e., §160) of Notebook 5, Gramsci quotes a passage from Toffanin's book, which means he had received a copy of it. The last two notes in Notebook 5 were probably written in January 1932. This note was obviously written earlier, probably around November or December 1931.

3. The Italian editions available in the 1930s of the works alluded to here were Georg Voigt, *Il Risorgimento dell'antichità classica, ovvero il primo secolo dell'Umanesimo* (Florence: Sansoni, 1888); Jakob Burckhardt, *La civiltà del secolo del Rinascimento in Italia* (Florence: Sansoni, 1876); and Ludwig Pastor, *Storia dei papi dalla fine del Medio Evo*, 19 vols. (Rome: Desclée, 1910-34).

4. This long paragraph is Gramsci's paraphrase (with direct quotations) of Luigi Arezio's article.

5. See, especially, Notebook 5, §123.

6. On Vittorio Rossi, see Notebook 5, §123, and n. 1 there.

The scholarly work of the historian Pierre de Nolhac (1859-1936) on humanism and the Renaissance included books on Petrarch, Erasmus, and Ronsard.

John Addington Symonds (1840-93) was the author of, among many other things, the exhaustive seven-volume study *Renaissance in Italy*, first published in London between 1875 and 1886.

Richard C. Jebb (1841-1905) was best known for his scholarly writings and commentaries on as well as his translations and editions of classical Greek writers, especially Sophocles.

§69. *Catholic Action*

1. A good part of Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* (issued on May 15, 1931) is devoted to the question of whether some forms of socialism (as opposed to communism, which is dismissed out of hand) could be considered compatible with Catholicism. While acknowledging some benign aspects of socialism, the pope nonetheless declared it irreconcilable with Catholicism:

One might say that . . . Socialism inclines toward and in certain measure approaches the truth which Christian tradition has always held sacred; for it cannot be denied that its demands at times come very near those that Christian reformers of society justly insist upon.

. . . We make this pronouncement: Whether considered as a doctrine, or an historical fact, or a movement, Socialism, if it remains truly Socialism, even after it has yielded to truth and justice on the points we have mentioned, cannot be reconciled with the teachings of the Catholic Church because its concept of society itself is utterly foreign to Christian truth. . . .

If Socialism, like all errors, contains some truth (which, moreover, Supreme Pontiffs have never denied), it is based nevertheless on a theory of human society peculiar to itself and irreconcilable with true Christianity. Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are contradictory terms; no one can be at the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist. (*The Papal Encyclicals*, ed. C. Carlen [Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath, 1981], pp. 433-34)

On Leo XIII and his encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), see Notebook 1, §77, n. 2.

Gramsci obtained his information about the speech by Cardinal Francis Bourne, the archbishop of Westminster, from two items that appeared in the June 19, 1931, issue of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (24, no. 25), which he received more or less regularly at Turi.

One item, entitled "Catholics and Politics: Cardinal Bourne's Ruling," appears in the "News of the Week" section. It consists of a brief report on the main points made by Cardinal Bourne in a speech he delivered on June 17, 1931, including the following:

Cardinal Bourne, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, made particular reference to the recent Papal Encyclical in an address on "The Church and Socialism" in Usher Hall, Edinburgh, on Wednesday evening.

The Catholic Church, he said, as such has nothing whatever to do with any political party. She had never enunciated a scheme of politics. There was nothing in the Gospel that told them to which political party they ought to belong. . . . If the political party was definitely based on non-Christian principles, no Catholic would be justified in belonging to that party.

"Happily we may safely say," proceeded the Cardinal, "that there is no political party at the present time in England which definitely takes its stand on non-Christian principles. . . ."

The Cardinal's general conclusions were, first, that in this country a man or woman is free to join the political party which makes the greatest appeal to his sympathy and understanding; secondly, that having done so, he or she must be on guard against erroneous principles which on account of the affiliations which affect these parties are to some ex-

tent at work within them; and thirdly, he may never deliver himself or his conscience wholly into the keeping of any political party.

The other item is the brief note "Catholics and Socialism" placed in the section "The Week":

Cardinal Bourne in a speech delivered in Edinburgh on Wednesday gave a reassuring interpretation of the Pope's recent encyclical. In his view there is nothing in it to prevent a Catholic from joining any English political party. The Labour party in Cardinal Bourne's view, apparently, is not a Socialist party or, at any rate, its socialism is not of the pernicious type that falls under the Pope's condemnation. This is a little confusing, because the summaries of the encyclical published in this country seemed to make it clear beyond a doubt that even the mildest brand of Socialism was incompatible with the faith of a true Catholic. The apparent inconsistency is perhaps explained by a distinction between the theory and practice of the Labour party. There is certainly no sign of a desire to turn the world upside down in the record of the Government, and what Cardinal Bourne probably intended to convey was that a Catholic by walking warily might generally support Labour without being stung by Socialism which undoubtedly coils itself around the roots of the Labour movement.

§70. *History of the subaltern classes. Italian intellectuals*

1. Alfredo Panzini, "Biancofiore," *Corriere della sera*, December 2, 1931.

On Alfredo Panzini, see Notebook 1, §13, n. 1.

Severino Ferrari (1856-1905), a litterateur and author of three books of poetry, was a follower of Giosuè Carducci, with whom he coauthored a commentary on Petrarch's *Canzoniere*. He wrote his satiric poem "Il mago" (The wizard) in 1884. Ferrari was drawn to the political circle of Andrea Costa, who came to socialism by way of anarchism, hence Panzini's allusion to the influence of Bakunin.

§71. *Intellectuals. On Indian culture*

1. See the following articles, all in *La civiltà cattolica*: "L'Induismo" (Hinduism) 81, no. 3 (July 5, 1930): 13-26; "Sistemi filosofici e sette dell'Induismo" (Hindu philosophical systems and sects) 81, no. 3 (July 19, 1930): 131-43; "Induismo e Cristianesimo" (Hinduism and Christianity) 81, no. 3 (August 2, 1930): 213-22.

§72. *Past and present. The rural bourgeoisie*

1. Alfredo Rocco, "La Francia risparmiatrice e banchiera" (France, a country that saves and banks), *Gerarchia* 11, no. 10 (October 1931): 790-97.

On Alfredo Rocco, see Notebook 2, §25, n. 1.

2. See Notebook 6, §75, n. 1.

3. See Arrigo Serpieri, *La guerra e le classi rurali italiane* (Bari: Laterza; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930). Gramsci had a copy of this book, which is a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

§73. *Catholic Action*

1. Gramsci's source of information on the Catholic annuals was *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (April 5, 1930): 68-69.

§74. *Past and present. Industrialists and the Catholic missions*

1. The information on the *Bollettino ufficiale del comitato nazionale industriali e commercianti per le missioni cattoliche* (Official bulletin of the national committee of industrialists and merchants on the Catholic missions) was obtained from an item entitled "Propagazione e preservazione della fede" (Propagation and preservation of faith), in the "Rivista della stampa" (Review of the press) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (June 7, 1930): 438.

2. See Notebook 1, §61, n. 8.

§75. *Popular literature*

1. All the information in this note is culled from a newspaper article by Antonio Baldini, "Tutta-di-tutti," in the *Corriere della sera*, December 6, 1931.

Paolina Leopardi (1800-69) was the sister of the poet Giacomo Leopardi; Monaldo Leopardi (1776-1847) was their father. "Tutta-di-tutti" was Monaldo's nickname for his daughter, Paolina. An inveterate reactionary and absolute monarchist, Monaldo Leopardi published the periodical *Voce della ragione* (Voice of reason) with the help of his daughter between 1832 and 1835, when it was suppressed. Prospero Viani (1812-92) corresponded with Paolina Leopardi, eager to learn every detail of the great poet's life. Viani published the earliest major editions of Giacomo Leopardi's letters. Camillo Antona Traversi (1857-1934), a playwright, essayist, and literary biographer, wrote extensively on Leopardi. On Giacomo Leopardi, see Notebook 5, §101, n. 3.

§76. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*

1. Gramsci certainly had firsthand knowledge of Maurice Block's *Dictionnaire général de la politique*, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Paris: Lorenz, 1873-74); he cites it in Notebook 1, §47 and §112.

2. The information on Charles Maurras's *Dictionnaire politique et critique* is derived from "La semaine bibliographique" section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 474 (November 14, 1931).

On Charles Maurras, see Notebook 1, §14, n. 1.

§78. *Catholic Action*

1. See Notebook 6, §140, n. 1.

2. "Una grave questione di educazione cristiana: A proposito del Primo Congresso Internazionale dell'Insegnamento medio libero di Bruxelles (28-31 July 1930)" (A serious problem of Christian education: On the first International Congress on teaching in the free secondary schools, held in Brussels, July 21-31, 1930), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (September 20, 1930): 481-90.

3. See *Codice Sociale (schema di una sintesi sociale cattolica)* (Rovigo: Istituto Veneto di Arti Grafiche, 1927), pp. 55-57. On this book, of which Gramsci had a copy, see Notebook 1, §1, n. 2.

§79. *Past and present*

1. Giovanni Gentile's publications on Vincenzo Gioberti include *Rosmini e Gioberti* (Pisa: Fratelli Nistri, 1898); a long essay, "Vincenzo Gioberti nel primo centenario della sua nascita" (Gioberti on the one-hundredth anniversary of his birth), *Rivista d'Italia* 4, no. 1 (April 1901): 691-723; a book on Mazzini and Gioberti, *I profeti del Risorgimento italiano* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1923); an edition of previously unpublished letters by Gioberti, *Lettere inedite di Vincenzo Gioberti e saggio d'una bibliografia dell'epistolario* (Palermo: Optima, 1910); and an anthology of Gioberti's writings, *Nuova protologia: Brani scelti da tutte le sue opere* (Bari: Laterza, 1912). Gentile also coedited (with Gustavo Balsamo-Crivelli) the eleven-volume "national edition" of Gioberti's correspondence, *Epistolario* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1927-37).

On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1.

On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

On the place of Gioberti in the Italian philosophical tradition, see also Gramsci's comments in Notebook 10, II, §41.x and §43.

2. On the Concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

Gramsci derived all his information on the two books mentioned in this note—F. Palhoriès, *Gioberti* (Paris: Alcan, 1929), and Ruggero Rinaldi,

Gioberti e il problema religioso del Risorgimento, intro. Balbino Giuliano (Florence: Callecchi, 1929)—from an article, "Revisione del pensiero giobertiano: F. Palhoriès and R. Rinaldi" (Revision of Giobertian thought), in *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (September 20, 1930): 525–32.

§81. *Types of periodicals. Foreign contributors*

1. See Gramsci's comments on Gian Pietro Vieusseux's initiatives in Notebook 6, §171.

§82. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Enrico Corradini*

1. Gramsci touches on Enrico Corradini's concept of "proletarian nation" in Notebook 1, §58, and Notebook 2, §§51 and 52, and its relation to the phenomenon of emigration in Notebook 3, §124.

On Enrico Corradini, see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3.

2. See Gramsci's comments in Notebook 5, §27 on the republication of Corradini's play *Carlotta Corday*.

§84. *Encyclopedic notions. Mysticism*

1. The School of Fascist Mysticism, founded in Milan in April 1930, was the brainchild of Niccolò Giani. Most of its members, who professed absolute faith in Mussolini and dedicated themselves completely to Fascism (which they equated with patriotism), came from the ranks of Fascist University Groups (GFU). Giani, who directed the school, also edited the Varese daily *Cronaca prealpina*; he died in combat in 1941. The Duce's brother, Arnaldo Mussolini, editor-in-chief of the *Popolo d'Italia*, was a patron and promoter of the school.

2. Arnaldo Mussolini, "Coscienza e dovere" (Conscience and duty), *Gente nostra* 3, no. 50 (December 13, 1931). An illustrated weekly, *Gente nostra* was probably made available to the inmates of the Turi prison.

3. The last sentence was probably added some time after the rest of the note had been written. It alludes to a book by Benedetto Croce, *Storia d'Europa del secolo decimonono*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1932), that Gramsci had not yet received when he finished writing this notebook.

In the first chapter of his *Storia d'Europa*, Croce writes:

Now he who . . . considers all these characteristics of the liberal ideal does not hesitate to call it what it was: a "religion." He calls it so, of course, because he looks for what is essential and intrinsic in every religion, which always lies in the concept of reality and an ethics that conforms to this concept. It excludes the mythological element which constitutes only a secondary differentiation between religion and phi-

losophy. The concept of reality and the conforming ethics were generated . . . by modern thought, dialectical and historical. Nothing more was needed to give them a religious character. . . . The religion of liberalism showed itself to be essentially religious in its forms and institutions and, since it was born not made, was no cold and deliberate device. Therefore at first its leaders even expected to be able to live in harmony with the old religions. . . . As a matter of fact it set itself against them, but at the same time summed them up in itself and went further. Beside philosophical motives it set the religious motives of the near and remote past. Next to and above Socrates it set the human and divine Redeemer Jesus. And it felt it had undergone all the experiences of paganism and Christianity, of Catholicism, Augustinianism, Calvinism and all the rest. It felt that it represented the highest demands, that it was the purifying, deepening, and power-giving agent of the religious life of mankind. (B. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. H. Furst [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1933, pp. 18-19])

§85. *Encyclopedic notions. Doctrinairism and doctrinaire*

1. François Guizot (1787-1874) and Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard (1763-1845) were doctrinaires, the early-nineteenth-century group of moderate conservatives who stood for constitutional monarchy, and thus were at odds with absolute monarchists and the sovereigns who attempted to bypass parliament and exercise autocratic power.

On this topic, see also Notebook 8, §28 and §73.

§86. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliographies*

1. See A. Amati and P.E. Guarnerio, *Dizionario etimologico di 21 mila vocaboli italiani derivati dal greco* (Milan: Vallardi, n.d. [1901]).

2. See Notebook 7, §3, n. 2.

§88. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists. Robert Bellarmine*

1. Gramsci culled this information from "Lettera apostolica con la quale S. Roberto Bellarmino è dichiarato Dottore della Chiesa Universale" (The Apostolic letter declaring St. Robert Bellarmine Doctor of the Universal Church), *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (November 7, 1931): 193-99.

Gramsci also comments on Robert Bellarmine's canonization in Notebook 6, §151.

On Robert Bellarmine, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 10.

2. "Lettera apostolica . . .," p. 194.

In Italian, the Society of Jesus (i.e., the Jesuits) is called the Compagnia di Gesù and, in Latin, Societas Jesu.

3. "L'ultima glorificazione di San Roberto Bellarmino Dottore della Chiesa" (The latest exaltation of St. Robert Bellarmine, Doctor of the Church), *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (November 7, 1931): 200-212.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 201. The bracketed comments are Gramsci's.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

§89. *Past and present. Religion in the schools*

1. On the reform of the national educational system masterminded by Giovanni Gentile (and commonly referred to as the "riforma Gentile") see, *inter alia*, Notebook 4, §50, nn. 1 and 2, and Notebook 4, §53, n. 6.

2. On the concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

3. See "Il buono e il cattivo nella pedagogia nuova" (The good and the bad in the new pedagogy), *La civiltà cattolica* 82, no. 4 (November 7, 1931): 239-50. The quoted passage is on pp. 240-41, and the emphases are Gramsci's. Though the articles in *La civiltà cattolica* were unsigned, the major contributors were known, and Mario Barbera, S.J., did in fact write on issues related to education in the Jesuit periodical. Mario Barbera, S.J., was also the author of *Libertà d'insegnamento: Principii e proposte* (Rome: Civiltà Cattolica, 1919) and *Il buono e il cattivo della riforma Gentile* (Rome: F.I.U.C., 1925).

§91. *Past and present. Postwar tendencies in the external organization of human productive factors*

1. This is a reference to the Jesuit-organized settlements of indigenous groups in Paraguay. Known as *reducciones* (i.e., concentrations), the settlements were started in the early seventeenth century and lasted until the suppression of the Society of Jesus in the 1760s.

2. In *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi, Benedetto Croce wrote: "The Jesuits taught the savages how to cultivate their fields; their supposed Campanella-type communism was ultimately a clever form of capitalistic exploitation and a great source of income for the religious order" (p. 211). This observation occurs in the chapter "Sulla storiografia socialista: Il comunismo di Tommaso Campanella" (On socialist historiography: The communism of Tommaso Campanella), which is not included in the English translation of Croce's book, *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914).

§92. *Risorgimento. Southern Italy*

1. On the Bandiera brothers, see Notebook 2, §69, n. 2.

On Carlo Pisacane, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 5.

2. Mazzini made this comment on Pisacane in a letter to Giuseppe Fanelli (one of the organizers of the 1857 Sapri expedition) that is quoted in an article by Aldo Romano, "Un anno critico pel mazzinianesimo: Il 1857" (A critical year for the Mazzinian movement: 1857), *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 11 [November 20, 1931]: 457-58. Romano's article is about the publication of volume 58 of Mazzini complete writings, *Scritti editi ed inediti*, edited by a government-appointed commission.

3. See, in particular, the posthumously published volume by Carlo Pisacane, *Saggi storici-politici-militari sull'Italia* (Genoa: Stab. Tip. Nazionale, 1858).

§93. *Political terminology. Privileges and prerogatives*

1. The Fascist Grand Council was created in December 1922, shortly after Mussolini's advent to power; it was conceived as an organ of the Fascist Party with a consultative function but no legal power. Six years later, however, an act of parliament transformed it into an extremely powerful body with the role of coordinating and integrating the activities of the Fascist regime. Presided over by Mussolini, its members included the quadrumvirs of the March on Rome (see Notebook 6, §150, n. 1), the most important cabinet ministers, the presidents of the senate and the Chamber of Deputies, the president of the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, the commander of the militia, the presidents of the national confederations of workers and employees, and some other very high-ranking or prominent figures.

§94. *The English Labour movement. The Archbishop of Canterbury*

1. The quotation is taken from a brief note that appeared under the title "Primate and Labour Party" in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* 25, no. 18 (October 30, 1931). The archbishop of Canterbury at the time was Cardinal Francis Bourne.

§95. *Political terminology. Reich, etc.*

1. On the same topic, see Notebook 8, §107.

§96. *Political terminology. Artisan workshop; small, medium-sized, and big industry*

1. The phrase "extended factory" (*fabbrica disseminata*) is used by Corrado Barbagallo in his book *L'oro e il fuoco: Capitale e lavoro attraverso i secoli* (Milan: Corbaccio, 1927); see p. 150. This note may have

been prompted by the data provided on pp. 221–28 of Barbagallo's book. Gramsci received a copy of this book when he was imprisoned in Milan awaiting trial.

§97. *Political terminology. Hierocracy-theocracy*

1. The source of this quotation has not been traced. Gramsci touches on the same topic in Notebook 6, §93.

§98. *Catholic Action*

1. See Notebook 6, §183 and §188.

2. See "Cesare D'Azeglio e gli albori della stampa cattolica in Italia" (Cesare D'Azeglio and the dawn of the Catholic press in Italy), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (August 2, 1930): 193–212; and "La fortuna del Lamennais e le prime manifestazioni d'Azione Cattolica in Italia" (The reception of Lamennais and the first manifestations of Catholic Action in Italy), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (October 4, 1930): 3–19. See also Notebook 6, §183, n. 1.

3. On neo-Guelphism, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 3.

On the Sanfedisti, see Notebook 6, §200, n. 3.

4. Antonio Capece Minutolo, prince of Canosa (1768–1838), monarchist and intransigent antiliberal, followed the Bourbon King Ferdinand to Sicily when the French invaded Naples in 1806. In 1816, one year after the restoration of Bourbon rule, and again in 1821, the prince of Canosa was appointed chief of police; on both occasions, his inflexibility and absolutist views quickly led to his replacement. After his second abbreviated stint as police chief, he left the Kingdom of Naples, moved to Modena, and became active in reactionary circles, making common cause with such figures as Cesare Taparelli D'Azeglio, Monaldo Leopardi, and the monsignor Giuseppe Baraldi, founder of the periodical *Memorie di religione, di morale, e di letteratura*. Baraldi's periodical and the prince of Canosa's affiliations with militant Catholic conservatives are mentioned in "La fortuna del Lamennais e le prime manifestazioni d'Azione Cattolica in Italia," one of the two articles Gramsci cites in the opening sentence of this note.

5. On Joseph De Maistre, see Notebook 1, §71, n. 1.

§100. *Past and present*

1. See Notebook 1, §44, nn. 20 and 21.

2. On Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, the organizer and leader of the Christian Army of the Holy Faith (the original Sanfedisti), see Notebook 1, §43, n. 6.

3. Alberto Consiglio, "Giro per l'Aspromonte" (A tour around Aspromonte), *Corriere della sera*, December 24, 1931.

4. See Eugenio Guarino, "I partiti di Napoli: I clericali" (The parties of Naples: The clericals), *Il viandante* 2, no. 1 (January 2, 1910). Guarino's article discusses the pro-Bourbon groups in Naples, but it makes no mention of the "leaflet" that Gramsci refers to here.

§101. *Journalism. Foreign correspondents*

1. See Notebook 7, §81.

§103. *Encyclopedic notions. Public opinion*

1. The phrase "confederation of the three oppressed" echoes Bukharin's derisive characterization of the kind of social (dis)order that would ensue if the anarchists were to prevail. The relevant passage occurs in Bukharin's booklet *Programma kommunistov (bolshevikov)*, first published in Moscow in 1918 (an English translation of Bukharin's pamphlet appeared the same year it was first published in Moscow; see N. Bukharin, *Program of the Communists [Bolsheviks]* [New York: Communist Labor Party, 1918].) Gramsci published substantial segments of it in Italian translation in several issues of *L'ordine nuovo*, under the general heading "Il programma del Partito comunista" (Program of the Communist Party). The following excerpt is from the segment subtitled "Società anarchica o comunista?" (Anarchist or communist society?):

The anarchists believe that people would be better off if all production were divided among small confederations of workers (communities). In other words, several small associations would be formed by spontaneous agreement, and they would start working at their risk and peril. These small confederations would then start entering into negotiations with one another and would gradually reach agreements and finalize noncoercive contracts. . . . Now, it is obvious that anarchist theory does not lead to an orderly organization of society but rather to division, because of the simple fact that small anarchic communities are certainly not large workers' bodies comprising many people but small groupings that sometimes may consist of two single individuals. There was one such group in Petrograd: "The group of the five oppressed," but according to anarchist theory one could even have a "league of the two oppressed." One can only imagine what would happen if every group of five or of two persons were to start requisitioning, confiscating, and working on its own. (*L'ordine nuovo* 1, no. 30 [December 20, 1919]: 239)

On the other segments of Bukharin's *Program of the Communists (Bolsheviks)* that Gramsci published in *L'ordine nuovo* and on the edition of the same work by the Avanti! publishing house, see Notebook 6, §167, n. 1.

§105. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Ardengo Soffici*

1. *Lemmonio Boreo*, a novel by Ardengo Soffici (see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1, and Notebook 1, §9), was first published in Florence in 1911 by the publishing house of *La voce*, the literary-cultural periodical with which he was closely associated at the time. A new version of the novel, twice as long as the original, was published by Vallecchi of Florence in 1921. *Jean-Christophe*, by Romain Rolland (1866–1944), is a roman-fleuve that was initially published serially in the *Cahiers de la quinzaine* between 1904 and 1912. The connection between the two novels and the gist of Soffici's *Lemmonio Boreo* is succinctly described by David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith:

According to Prezzolini [see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1], Rolland's novel made a great impression on the group of *La Voce*, which included Soffici. *Lemmonio Boreo* (1911) is the first volume of an unfinished novel in which the eponymous hero returns to Tuscany after ten years abroad, absorbs himself in books and newspapers which give him the measure of the intellectual and moral degeneracy of the country and embarks on a campaign of correction, attempting with the aid of a proletarian "strong man" and a petty-bourgeois intellectual to restore justice to the people. In one of the central episodes the trio joins with a group of anarchists and they violently disrupt a socialist rally. (The passage is translated in Adrian Lyttleton (ed.), *Italian Fascisms*, London [Jonathan Cape] 1973.) Piero Gobetti wrote in 1922 that *Lemmonio Boreo* had become the "Iliad of fascism" and Malaparte in 1923 called Soffici one of the "prophets of fascism." (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985], p. 332n)

Comparisons, both favorable and unfavorable, between *Lemmonio Boreo* and *Jean-Christophe* were made by some of the first critics to write on Soffici's novel. See, for example, the negative assessment in Giovanni Boine's "Don Chisciotte in Toscana" (Don Quixote in Tuscany) accompanied by Giovanni Papini's rebuttal in *La voce* 4, no. 8 (April 18, 1912).

Gramsci expressed his interest in and admiration for Romain Rolland (from whom he adopted the motto "pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will") in his preprison writings. In one of his editorials on the front page of *L'ordine nuovo* (1, no. 16 [August 30, 1919]: 111), Gramsci described Rolland as "the Maxim Gorki of Latin Europe." Elsewhere, he described *Jean-Christophe* as the symbol of the anxious search for meaning and for a sense of a shared humanity across cultures and nationalities during a period of spiritual crisis and general divisiveness (in the obituary of Ernst Haeckel, in the Piedmont edition of *Avanti!* 23, no. 221 [August 12, 1919]).

§106. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*

1. This information is extracted from the "Bollettino bibliografico" (Bibliographical bulletin) section of *Leonardo* 2, no. 11 (November 1931): 520.

§107. *Catholic integralists, Jesuits, modernists*

1. See Notebook 5, §11.

§108. *Risorgimento. Popular initiatives*

1. See "Cronache irpine del 1848-49" (Events at Irpinia in 1848-49) in the "Marginalia" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 30 (July 26, 1931). Nicola Valdimiro Testa's lecture, recapitulated in this article, was on the same subject as the book he published the following year, *Gli irpini nei moti politici e nella reazione del 1848-49* (Naples: Contessa, 1932), of which Gramsci takes note in Notebook 9, §129.

2. From "Cronache irpine del 1848-49": "Not a single feast day passed without the occurrence of some disturbance. One Sunday, in April 1848, an archpriest did not hesitate to say from the pulpit in church that he would be willing to lead the people and that [armed] 'with a sack of stones, hoes, and sharp knives [I] would stir up a riot because all was communism and all were brothers.'"

3. See Notebook 6, §158, n. 4.

NOTEBOOK 8 (1930-32)

DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

A ruled school notebook (14.7 x 19.8 cm) with hard black covers and a black spine. A label on the front cover carries the imprint of the stationer: "Gius. Laterza e figli, Bari." Inside the blank space of the label, Gramsci's prison number (7047) is written in black pencil; next to it, in ink and apparently in Gramsci's hand, is the number "I." After Gramsci's death, Tatiana Schucht glued another label on the upper right-hand corner of the front cover; on it, she wrote: "Completo da pg. 1 a 160. XXVIII" (Complete from p. 1 to 160. XXVIII). The Roman numerals indicate the number Tatiana Schucht assigned the notebook according to a cataloging system she had devised when organizing Gramsci's papers soon after his death. This notebook has the same physical characteristics as Notebooks 3, 5, 6, and 7.

The notebook consists of seventy-nine leaves with twenty-one lines on each side and unlined endpapers in front and back. The recto side of the front endpaper is stamped with the prison seal and with the seal of the prison warden. A signature underneath the latter is undecipherable; it is identical to the signature on the front endpapers of Notebook 5 and Notebook 6. The recto side of each leaf is numbered (1-79) in black ink and stamped with the prison seal: "Casa penale speciale di Turi" (Special Prison of Turi). The verso side of the last lined leaf is also numbered (80) in the same black ink and in the same hand, but it is not stamped with the prison seal. The recto side of the unlined endpaper at the back (which is neither numbered nor stamped with the prison seal)

contains—in addition to a short list of books (see below)—five short notes that are not preceded by the sign (§) with which Gramsci usually marks the beginning of each note. All five notes were subsequently crossed out by Gramsci when he integrated them in other notebooks. These five notes appear as <§241> to <§245> in this edition. These are in turn followed by what appears to be the beginning of another note, which is canceled by a wavering line that renders it somewhat difficult to decipher. The following is a tentative rendition: “5. The question of the language. Whether an Italian theater exists. Why Italian literature is not popular.”

All the pages of the notebook are fully used, except for the following: p. 1v (entirely blank except for the first line), p. 2r (bottom ten lines blank), p. 2v (entirely blank), and p. 50v (bottom eight lines blank).

In addition to a general note on the opening page, a one-line entry (on p. 1v), and a list of topics (on p. 2r), this notebook contains 245 notes or sections. Of these, 98 are entirely crossed out but remain clearly legible, and all but one were later incorporated by Gramsci in other notebooks; following Valentino Gerratana's denomination, these are called A texts. The sole exception is a short note on p. 51v in the manuscript (§168 in this edition), which was never integrated into any other notebook. Another 146 notes are B texts: they were neither crossed out nor used again in other notebooks. Further, there is one somewhat anomalous note (§214 in this edition): its first part is an A text, while the rest of it is a B text.

The manuscript of the notebook also contains some bibliographical notations. On p. 77r, Gramsci listed thirteen titles under the heading “Bibliography”:

Vincenzo Gioberti—*Pagine scelte edite ed inedite*—edited P. A. Menzies (Paravia), 20 lire

Vincenzo Cuoco—a booklet in the series “Scrittori italiani con notizie storiche e analisi estetiche di Domenico Bulferetti” (Italian writers, with annotations and aesthetic analysis by Domenico Bulferetti)—ed. Paravia—L. 5.50

Giuseppe Cesare Abba—same series, Paravia—L. 5.50

Antologia kantiana (a Kant anthology), selected and edited by Piero Martinetti (Paravia, L. 16.50)

J. Rousseau—*Il Contratto sociale e i Discorsi*, with an introd. by G. Perticone—Paravia, L. 16.80

T. Hobbes—*Lo Stato (Leviathan)*, edited by G. Perticone—Paravia—L. 11

Edmondo Cione—*Revisioni critiche*

Luigi Russo—*I narratori*—In the "Guide bibliografiche" of the "Fondaz. Leonardo," 1923

Alessandro Levi—*Il positivismo di Carlo Cattaneo*—Laterza—L. 14

Paolo Treves—*La filosofia politica di T. Campanella*—Laterza—L. 18

Antonio Monti—*L'idea federalistica del Risorgimento italiano*—Laterza—L. 8.50

Adolfo Omodeo—*L'età del Risorgimento italiano*—in 8°, 564 pp.—Messina—Principato, L. 40

Dostoyevsky—*I demoni*—Bietti—2 vols., 740 pp.—L. 7

At the top of the recto side of the endpaper at the back of the notebook, the following short list appears under the heading "Ediz. Utet—Torino":

Cesare Balbo—*Le Speranze d'Italia*—edited by A. Corbelli—L. 8

From *Conciliatore*—(P. A. Menzio)—L. 8

From *Caffè* (L. Collino)

Mach*avelli*. *Il principe* (Chabod), L. 6

The materials in this notebook are divided into two blocks, with a small break between the two (the blank lines at the bottom of p. 50v). The 165 notes that fill p. 3r to p. 50v are mostly B texts on miscellaneous topics, whereas the 80 notes from p. 51r to the end constitute the third (and final) series of "Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism" that Gramsci started in Notebook 4 (§1–§48) and continued in Notebook 7 (§1–§48).

Though it is not easy to determine with precision when Gramsci made the first entries in this notebook, there can be no doubt that the general observations and notations on the first page of the manuscript were written before (probably well before) the two large blocks of notes that start on p. 3r and p. 51r. The "Groupings of Subjects" on p. 2r, on the other hand, may have been among the last entries in this notebook. All indications are that the third series of "Notes on Philosophy" was started sometime during the last month or two of 1931. In §172 (p. 53v in the manuscript), Gramsci refers in passing to the death of Alessandro Chiappelli "this November 1931." The sequence of miscellaneous notes that starts on p. 3r of the manuscript could not have been started before mid-January 1932: §1 contains a reference to the *Corriere della sera* of January 9, 1932. It is also obvious that for a while the composition of the two segments of the notebook overlapped. In §222 (p. 73v in

the manuscript), Gramsci explicitly refers to a note on economics (§128) on p. 40 of the manuscript. The datable sources used in the block of miscellaneous notes stretch from January 1932 (see §1 and §18) to the end of April of the same year (see §162, where Gramsci alludes to a remark by Piero Sraffa that Tatiana Schucht had passed on to him in a letter dated April 27, 1932). As for the "Notes on Philosophy": they appear to have been completed sometime in middle or late May 1932. In §237 (p. 78v in the manuscript), Gramsci mentions Luigi Russo's edition of Machavelli's *Prince*, which was one of the books that he received in prison in early May 1932.

In *L'officina gramsciana: Ipotesi sulla struttura dei "Quaderni del carcere"* (pp. 142-43), Gianni Francioni offers the following chronology of the composition of Notebook 8:

"Scattered notes . . ." (p. 1r):

between November and December 1930

"Groupings . . ." (p. 2r):

between March and April 1932

§§ 1-18: January 1932

19-30: between January and February 1932

31-70: February 1932

71-76: between February and March 1932

77-118: March 1932

119: between March and April 1932

120-165: April 1932

166-176: November 1931

177: between November and December 1931

178-193: December 1931

194-199: February 1932

200-212: between February and March 1932

213-220: March 1932

221: between March and April 1932

222-236: April 1932

237-240: May 1932

241-245: between November 1931 and May 1932

NOTES TO THE TEXT

Loose notes and jottings for a history of Italian intellectuals

1. These remarks on the provisional character of the notebooks echo

the parenthetical caveat at the end of §16 in Notebook 4 and the prefatory statement on the first page of Notebook 11.

As the heading of this first entry indicates, Gramsci originally intended to use this notebook for his notes on intellectuals. As is obvious, he used it differently; later, however, he did devote a separate notebook (i.e., Notebook 12) to the topic of intellectuals.

2. On Gramsci's reformulation of his plans, see the introduction to volume 1, especially pp. 35ff.

"Groupings of subjects" is on p. 2r of the manuscript but was written about fifteen months after "Principal essays," which occupies p. 1r of the manuscript; see the Description of the Manuscript.

§1. *Risorgimento*

1. Gioacchino Volpe, "Una scuola per la storia dell'Italia moderna" (A school for the history of modern Italy), *Corriere della sera*, January 9, 1932.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

§3. *The formation and spread of the new bourgeoisie in Italy*

1. See Notebook 5, §55.

2. On Bernard Groethuysen's *Origines de l'esprit bourgeois en France*, vol. 1, *L'église et la bourgeoisie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), see Notebook 5, §55, n. 8.

3. On Alessandro Manzoni, see Notebook 1, Notes and jottings, n. 4.

On Ugo Foscolo and *Dei Sepolcri*, see Notebook 5, §32, n. 1. There is no specific work by Ugo Foscolo entitled *Discorsi civili* (Civil discourses); Gramsci is referring generically to Foscolo's miscellaneous writings on history, politics, and literature that have been collected and anthologized in many different editions. See, inter alia, *Discorsi storici e letterarii di Ugo Foscolo* (Milan: G. Resnati, 1843); *Discorsi sulla lingua italiana* (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1918); *Il pensiero civile e politico di Ugo Foscolo*, ed. F. Guardione (Milan: Alpes, 1928); and the national edition of Foscolo's complete works, especially volume 8, *Prose politiche e letterarie dal 1811 al 1816*, ed. Luigi Fassò (Florence: Le Monnier, 1933).

4. Manzoni and the French philologist Claude Fauriel (1772-1844) became friends during the Italian writer's stay in Paris in 1808. Fauriel would later translate Manzoni's tragedies into French.

5. See Alessandro Manzoni, *Opere inedite o rare*, ed. Pietro Brambilla and Ruggero Bonghi, 5 vols. (Milan: Rechiedei, 1883).

6. See Carlo Franelli, "Il Manzoni e l'idea dello scrittore" (Manzoni and the concept of the writer), *Critica fascista* 9, no. 24 (December 15, 1924):

478-79. Franelli's quotation from Manzoni's letter (which Gramsci transcribes) is on p. 478. As David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith point out, however, "This letter—of 2 June 1832—is in fact to Marco Coen, not Claude Fauriel" (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Boelhower [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985], p. 250n).

7. Franelli, "Il Manzoni e l'idea dello scrittore," p. 478; the parenthetical interjection is Gramsci's.

§4. *The cosmopolitan function of Italian intellectuals.*

In Hungary

1. All the information in this note is extracted from "Pippo Spano e le vicende di un oratorio" (Pippo Spano and the vicissitudes of an oratory), in the "Marginalia" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 40 (October 4, 1931).

Filippo Scolari (1369-1426), also known as Pippo Spano, moved to Hungary at the age of thirteen and fought in numerous campaigns for Sigismund of Luxemburg (king of Hungary from 1387 to 1437). Although he is best remembered for his many successful battles against the Turks, he also led a major military campaign against the Republic of Venice.

§5. *Risorgimento. The Action Party*

1. See "Una lettera politica inedita di Francesco De Sanctis" (A previously unpublished political letter by Francesco De Sanctis), in the "Marginalia" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 40 (October 4, 1931).

On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

Giuseppe Civinini (1835-71) joined Garibaldi during the southern campaign and was with him in Aspromonte in August 1862 when Italian troops fought Garibaldi and defeated him, aborting his march on Rome. Civinini was arrested and imprisoned with Garibaldi on that occasion. He was elected to parliament in 1865 as a member of the Left (La Sinistra); two years later, however, he successfully ran for reelection as a supporter of the Right and backed Prime Minister Bettino Ricasoli's failed attempt to negotiate a reconciliation of church and state. Civinini was also editor-in-chief of the Florentine journal *La nazione*.

2. On Antonio Mordini, see Notebook 7, §58, n. 4.

On Francesco Crispi, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 10.

3. The *consorteria* (i.e., cabal) was the loose political formation, or web of unstable alliances, produced by the split within the Right in the 1860s between the Piedmontese bloc and fractious members or small groups whose politics were guided for the most part by regional, local, and even personal affiliations and interests.

§6. *Jacobinism*

1. Alexandre Philippe Andryane, *Memorie di un prigionero di Stato allo Spielberg*, ed. Rosolino Guastalla (Firenze: Barbéra, 1916), p. 214. The emphasis of "used to be" is Gramsci's. See also Notebook 1, §44, n. 44.

Alexandre Philippe Andryane (1797–1863), a French member of the secret society of the *carbonari*, was arrested by the Austrian police in 1823. He was imprisoned for nine years in the Spielberg fortress, where he shared a cell with Federico Confalonieri. His two-volume *Mémoires d'un prisonnier d'État* was published in Paris in 1837–1838.

§7. *Journalism*

1. See "Stampa nostra" (Our press) in *Annali dell'Italia cattolica*, ed. Central Committee of Italian Catholic Action (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1926), pp. 435–90; the quoted passage is on p. 435. Gramsci had a copy of this volume of the Catholic annual publication, and it is preserved among the books he had during his time in prison.

2. See Silvio Benco, *"Il piccolo" di Trieste: Mezzo secolo di giornalismo* (Milan: Treves-Treccani-Tumminelli, 1931). Gramsci requested and received a copy of this book when he was at Turi; see his letters of January 5, 1932, and May 9, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht.

The Trieste daily *Il piccolo* was launched in 1881 by Teodoro Mayer (1860–1942), its owner and editor-in-chief, who supported the claim that Trieste was a part of "unredeemed" Italy. The paper was suppressed at the outbreak of the World War but resumed publication in 1919, and Mayer was later appointed to the senate by Mussolini.

3. Founded by Edoardo Sonzogno in 1866, the Milan daily *Il secolo* became the most widely circulated newspaper in Italy until it was overtaken by the *Corriere della sera* around the turn of the century. Initially critical of fascism, *Il secolo* shifted to a profascist position in 1923.

4. On the Popular Party, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 5

§8. *Catholic Action. Catholic periodical publications*

1. All these figures represent Gramsci's own calculations (with some inaccuracies) based on data culled from "Stampa nostra" (Our press) in *Annali dell'Italia cattolica*, ed. Central Committee of Italian Catholic Action (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1926), pp. 435–90. The same figures were written down at the end (p. 67v) of a section of the manuscript of Notebook 9 that Gramsci had originally set aside for translation exercises. See Notebook 9, Description of the Manuscript.

2. These numbers are Gramsci's calculations based on the information in two sections—"Le diocesi d'Italia" (Italian dioceses) and "Le giunte

diocesane d'Italia" (Diocesan councils in Italy)—of the *Annali dell'Italia cattolica*, pp. 401-27.

§9. *The absence of national-popular characteristics in Italian literature*

1. Quoted from a review of Umberto Barbaro's novel *Luce fredda* by Paolo Milano in *L'Italia letteraria* 3, no. 52 (December 27, 1931). The emphases and parenthetical interjections in the second sentence are Gramsci's.

2. On Giovanni Verga, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 28.

3. Renato Fucini (1843-1921), also known by his pseudonym Neri Tanfucio, wrote short stories that portray the vicissitudes of life among simple folk in a rural environment. The dialect of Pisa and the common spoken idiom of Tuscany are a prominent feature of Fucini's writings, including his poetry.

§10. *Risorgimento. Cavour's realism*

1. Gramsci is alluding to an episode recorded in Ferdinando Martini's memoirs, *Confessioni e ricordi, 1859-1892* (Milan: Treves, 1928). On this book, of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi, see Notebook 3, §38, n. 5; see also Notebook 6, §89 and §114.

On Francesco Crispi, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 10.

On Ferdinando Martini, see Notebook 2, §51, n. 2.

§11. *Risorgimento. 1848-1849*

1. On the neo-Guelphs, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 3.

On the Popular Party, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 5.

§12. *Popular literature. Bibliography*

1. All the information in this note is extracted from a bibliographical survey by Edmond Jaloux in the "Esprit des livres" section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 458 (July 25, 1931).

§13. *Past and present. Manzoni dialectician*

1. For an English translation (slightly modified here) of the entire episode, see chapter 8 of Alessandro Manzoni, *The Betrothed*, trans. Bruce Penman (London: Penguin, 1972), pp. 143-65; the quotation is modified from p. 148.

It is not entirely clear whether Gramsci had his own copy of Manzoni's *I promessi sposi* at Turi, but copies of the novel would have been available from the prison library or fellow prisoners.

§14. *Cultural topics*

1. Gramsci's source of information on the instructions for preachers contained in *De predicatore verbi Dei* was an article by Federico Chabod, "Giovanni Botero," *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 4, no. 5 (September–October 1932): 251–84; see, in particular, p. 268 n. 1.

§15. *Catholic testimonies*

1. "Il regno di Dio secondo alcuni filosofi moderni" (The kingdom of God according to some modern philosophers), *La civiltà cattolica* 83, no. 1 (January 2, 1932): 30–40; the quoted passage is on p. 40.

2. On the effort to portray Thomas Aquinas as Italy's "national philosopher," see Notebook 5, §120, and n. 1 there.

§16. *Past and present. Gentile's philosophy*

1. Although it is unlikely that Gramsci read Giuseppe Attilio Fanelli's attack on Gentile in the regional weekly *Roma fascista* of October 18, 1931, he was certainly able to follow the controversy it provoked through the major periodicals that he received and read regularly; see, for example, *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 11 (November 20, 1931): 458; *Critica fascista* 9, no. 21 (November 1, 1931): 404–5, and 9, no. 24 (December 15, 1931): 479; and *Educazione fascista* 9, no. 10 (October 20, 1931): 961–64.

Giuseppe Attilio Fanelli (b. 1895) was a prominent voice of the traditionalist, antimodern, and monarchist wing of the Fascist movement. Editor-in-chief of the periodical *Il secolo fascista* (which appeared between 1931 and 1935), he expounded his ultraconservative views in a number of books, including *Dalla insurrezione fascista alla monarchia integrale* (Rome: Stamperia Reale, 1925) and *Contra Gentiles: Mistificazioni dell'idealismo attuale nella rivoluzione fascista* (Rome: Biblioteca del Secolo Fascista, 1933). Another book of Fanelli's attracted Gramsci's attention, namely, *L'artigianato: Sintesi di un'economia corporativa* (Rome: SPES, 1929); see Notebook 5, §140, and n. 1, there.

2. See Notebook 6, §82, and n. 5 there.

§17. *Past and present*

1. Gramsci is alluding to a famous saying often attributed to Hegel. Referring to those who would diminish or qualify the stature of great men, Hegel pours scorn on:

the so-called "psychological" view, which—serving the purpose of envy most effectually—contrives so to refer all actions to the heart—to bring them under such a subjective aspect—as that their authors appear to have

done everything under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand—some *morbid craving*—and on account of these passions and cravings to have been not moral men. Alexander of Macedon partly subdued Greece, and then Asia; therefore he was possessed by a *morbid craving* for conquest. He is alleged to have acted from a craving for fame, for conquest, and the proof that these were the impelling motives is that he did that which resulted in fame. What pedagogue has not demonstrated of Alexander the Great—of Julius Caesar—that they were instigated by such passions, and were consequently immoral men?—whence the conclusion immediately follows that he, the pedagogue, is a better man than they, because he has not such passions; a proof of which lies in the fact that he does not conquer Asia—vanquish Darius and Porus—but while he enjoys life himself lets others enjoy it too. These psychologists are particularly fond of contemplating those peculiarities of great historical figures which appertain to them as private persons. Man must eat and drink; he sustains relations to friends and acquaintances; he has passing impulses and ebullitions of temper. “No man is a hero to his *valet-de-chambre*,” is a well-known proverb; I have added—and Goethe repeated it ten years later—“but not because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.” He takes off the hero’s boots, assists him to bed, knows that he prefers champagne, &c. Historical personages waited upon in historical literature by such psychological valets, come poorly off; they are brought down by these their attendants to a level with—or rather a few degrees below the level of—the morality of such exquisite discerners of spirits. (G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree [New York: Dover, 1956], pp. 31–32)

2. The section of the *Communist Manifesto* (“Bourgeois and Proletarians”) that points to the revolutionary achievements of the bourgeoisie was among the texts that Gramsci translated into Italian from a German anthology of the writings of Marx and Engels. See the Description of the Manuscript of Notebook 7.

Marx and Engels wrote:

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. . . . The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former exoduses of nations and crusades. . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. (*The Communist Manifesto*, intro. E. Hobsbawm [London: Verso, 1998], pp. 37–40)

§18. *Past and present. Lawyers in Italy*

1. All the data in this note are extracted from Mariano D'Amelio's article "La classe forense in cifre" (The legal profession in statistics), in the *Corriere della sera* of January 26, 1932, which does not, however, contain any direct reference to Pietro Calamandrei's book on the excessive number of lawyers. Calamandrei's *Troppi avvocati!* which Gramsci must have seen or learned about from another source, was published in Florence in 1921 by the publishing house of *La voce* in its book series "Quaderni della voce." The series was edited by Giuseppe Prezzolini, and Calamandrei's book is volume 46 in the fourth series.

§19. *Common sense*

1. In Alessandro Manzoni, *The Betrothed*, trans. Bruce Penman (London: Penguin, 1972), this sentence is on p. 603, but the phrase "senso comune" in the original Italian text is translated as "general opinion." On Gramsci's access to *I promessi sposi*, see Notebook 8, §13, n. 1.

§20. *Risorgimento. The Tuscan Moderates*

1. The text of Mario Puccioni's lecture "Uomini del Risorgimento in Toscana" (The men of the Risorgimento in Tuscany), first published in *Miscellanea storica della Valdelsa*, was reproduced in abridged form in the "Marginalia" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 46 (November 15, 1931). The quotations in this note are from *Il marzocco*; all the parenthetical interjections and the emphases are Gramsci's.

On Mario Puccioni, see Notebook 6, §2, n. 2.

2. Ubaldino Peruzzi (1822–91) was a member of the provisional government installed in Tuscany in 1859 following the popular revolt that compelled the grand duke, Leopold II, to flee. He was a strong advocate of national unification and played an important role in the incorporation of Tuscany into the Kingdom of Italy. Peruzzi was named minister of public works in the first Italian national government, which was constituted in March 1861, with Cavour as prime minister. A member of parliament for thirty years, he held a number of ministerial positions and was named senator in 1890.

§21. *The Modern Prince*

1. Gramsci employs the phrase "moderno Principe" (with "moderno" lowercased and "Principe" capitalized) in two ways: (a) as the title of a book that he is thinking of writing and that he conceives as the modern analogue of Machiavelli's *Prince*—in such instances, it is here rendered as "Modern Prince"; (b) as the political party (specifically, the Communist Party) that

he conceives as the collective modern analogue of Machiavelli's figure of the prince—in such instances, it is here rendered as “modern Prince.”

2. Georges Sorel expounded his theory of the general strike as the enabling myth of political action in *Reflections on Violence*, most particularly in the chapter “The Proletarian Strike,” where he wrote, among other things:

Experience shows that the *framing of a future, in some indeterminate time*, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths which enclose with them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. . . .

A knowledge of what the myths contain in the way of details which will actually form part of the history of the future is then of small importance; they are not astrological almanacs. . . .

The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. *It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important: its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea.* . . .

Thanks to [men who have taken a very active part in the real revolutionary movement amid the proletariat] we know that the general strike is indeed what I have said: The *myth* in which Socialism is wholly comprised, i.e., a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society. (G. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth [Glencoe, Ill., Free, 1950], pp. 142-45)

3. On Georges Boulanger, see Notebook 4, §38, n. 22.

4. On “the hundred cities” and the “cities of silence,” see Notebook 1, §43, nn. 4 and 5.

§22. *History of the intellectuals. Starting points for research*

1. Gramsci transcribed the quotation from Suetonius's *Life of Julius Caesar* from an article by Cornelio De Marzio, “Note sulla tredicesima confederazione: Professioni ed arti” (Notes on the thirteenth confederation: The professions and the arts), in *Gerarchia* 11, no. 12 (December 1931): 970-76. This article prompted some of the points made in this note.

The quoted sentence from Suetonius occurs in a passage wherein the Roman historian describes the measures taken by Julius Caesar to slow down a general drain of the population, as well as to encourage doctors and learned men already in Rome to stay and possibly entice others to move there: "To keep up the population of the city, depleted as it was by the assignment of eighty thousand citizens to colonies across the sea, he made a law that no citizen older than twenty or younger than forty, who was not detained by service in the army, should be absent from Italy for more than three successive years. . . . He conferred citizenship on all who practiced medicine, and on all teachers of the liberal arts, to make them more desirous of living in the city and to induce them to resort to it" (Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, trans. J.C. Rolfe [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951], 1:58-59).

§23. *Federico Confalonieri*

1. On Federico Confalonieri, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 42.

2. The preface (pp. v-xii) to Alexandre Philippe Andryane, *Memorie di un prigionero di Stato allo Spielberg*, ed. Rosolino Guastalla (Firenze: Barbéra, 1916), is the source of the bibliographical references recorded by Gramsci in this note. On Rosolino Guastalla's edition of selections from Alexandre Andryane's prison memoirs, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 44.

On Alexandre Andryane, see Notebook 8, §6, n. 1.

3. See Silvio Pellico, *Le mie prigioni*, ed. R. Guastalla (Livorno: Giusti, 1912).

Silvio Pellico (1789-1854) was the editor of the biweekly *Il conciliatore* (cofounded by Federico Confalonieri in 1818), which was suppressed by the Austrian authorities in October 1819. A year later, Pellico, who had joined the *carbonari*, was arrested. The notorious prosecutor Antonio Salvotti forced him to confess, and he was condemned to death. His sentence was commuted, and in 1822 he was sent to the Spielberg prison, where he spent eight years. After his release, Pellico renounced his liberal ideals, refrained from politics, and devoted himself to writing. *Le mie prigioni*, an account of his prison experiences, was first published in 1832.

4. See Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio, *Spilbergo e Gradisca: Scene del carcere duro in Austria* (Turin: Stamperia dell'Unione, 1856). Pallavicino's account of his experiences in the Austrian prisons was subsequently included in his posthumously published *Memorie*, 3 vols. (Turin: Loescher, 1882-95).

On Giorgio Pallavicino, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 44.

5. Federico Confalonieri, *Memorie e lettere*, ed. Gabrio Casati, 2 vols. (Milan: Hoepli, 1890).

6. On Alessandro Luzio and his monograph *Antonio Salvotti e i processi del ventuno* (Antonio Salvotti and the trials of 1821), see Notebook 1, §44, n. 45.

7. See the edition of Silvio Pellico's *Le mie prigioni* (Saluzzo: G. Bovo, 1907), with a commentary by Domenico Chiattonne, a preface by Costanzo Rinaudo, and "previously unpublished documents from the archives of Milan, Rome, Venice, Vienna, and Bruenn."

8. See the complete Italian translation of Andryane's prison memoirs by Francesco Regonati, *Memorie d'un prigioniero di stato nello Spielberg*, 4 vols. (Milan: Libreria di F. Sanvito, 1861), supplemented with "previously unpublished and rare documents not included in the French edition."

9. Gaetano Trombadori, "Il giudizio del De Sanctis sul Guicciardini" (De Sanctis's judgment on Guicciardini), *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 11 (November 20, 1931): 453-56; the quotation is from p. 455, and the parenthetical remark is Gramsci's.

10. Cesare Cantù (1804-95) produced, among many other things, an enormous *Storia universale* (Universal history) that appeared in numerous editions, some of them consisting of over fifty volumes. Benedetto Croce wrote about Cantù's massive history in his *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo decimonono*, 2 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1930); see, in particular, 1:204-14. Croce compared Cantù's work to a piece of furniture that is passed on from generation to generation and to the kind of still-life painting that one sees hanging on the walls of dining rooms.

11. Trombadori, "Il giudizio del De Sanctis sul Guicciardini," p. 455.

12. On Francesco De Sanctis and his essay "L'uomo del Guicciardini" (The man of Guicciardini), see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3, and Notebook 6, §86, n. 1.

13. Gramsci seems to be referring to Croce's essay "Intorno alle condizioni presenti della storiografia in Italia" (On the current situation of historiography in Italy) that was published in four parts in *La critica* 27, nos. 1-4 (January, March, May, June 1929) and later reproduced as an appendix in the second edition (1930) of his *Storia della storiografia italiana nel secolo decimonono*. Croce, however, does not discuss Luzio's work in this essay.

§24. *History of the intellectuals*

1. See Gaetano Mosca, *Elementi di scienza politica*, 2d ed. (Turin: Bocca, 1923). Although this is not among the books of Gramsci's that have been preserved, there can be little doubt that he had a copy of it, at least during some of the time he was at Turi. He quotes it directly and at length in §36 of this notebook. For an English translation, see Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).

Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), a professor of law at his alma mater, the University of Palermo and subsequently at the universities of Rome and Turin, is best remembered for his sociopolitical theory of elitism or, more precisely, of elite rule. "In all societies," he wrote in his most influential book, *The Ruling Class*, "two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power, and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first . . . and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism" (p. 50). Mosca was elected to parliament in 1908, served as undersecretary for the colonies between 1914 and 1916, and was named senator for life in 1919. Though by no means a promoter of liberal democracy and rather contemptuous of the principle of universal suffrage, Mosca was critical of Fascism, despite the fact that its theorists and apologists appropriated and made instrumental use of his work.

2. On Vilfredo Pareto, see Notebook 4, §18, n. 6.

§25. *Risorgimento*

1. What Gramsci calls Quinet's "formula" is stated most succinctly on the very first page of Edgar Quinet's *Les révolutions d'Italie* (Paris: Charmerot, 1848–52); the summary, placed directly under the heading of the opening chapter, includes the following point: "Ses révolutions sont de restaurations." Quinet also wrote: "Cette révolution communale qui, partout ailleurs en Europe, s'appelle affranchissement, innovation, s'appelle en Italie restauration" (p. 7).

The historian, poet, and political philosopher Edgar Quinet (1803–75) was stripped of his professorship at the Collège de France in 1846 when the ruling establishment could no longer tolerate the controversies he provoked with his critiques of religion and his exaltation of revolutionary principles. An enthusiastic supporter of the 1848 revolution, he fled France three years later when Louis-Napoleon seized power. Quinet returned to France in 1870 and was elected to parliament shortly afterward.

2. See Daniele Mattalia, "Gioberti in Carducci: Per una maggiore determinazione delle fonti storiche della cultura carducciana" (Gioberti in Carducci: For a more precise determination of the historical sources of Carduccian culture), *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 11 (November 20, 1931): 445–49; see especially p. 448. This was the first part of an article that was continued in the next two issues of *La nuova Italia*: 2, no. 12 (December 20, 1931): 478–83; and 3, no. 1 (January 20, 1932): 22–27.

On Giosuè Carducci, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 17.

On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

3. On Vincenzo Cuoco and his concept of passive revolution, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 2.

4. See Notebook 6, §86, n. 1, and the opening paragraph of Notebook 6, §89.

§26. *Past and present. The politics of Luigi Cadorna*

1. Fermi, "La Spagna cattolica ieri e oggi" (Catholic Spain yesterday and today), *Gerarchia* 11, no. 12 (December 1931): 1027-33; the quotation is from p. 1031.

On the Spanish Constitution of 1812, see Notebook 6, §199, nn. 1 and 3.

On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10, and §114, n. 1.

§27. *Conservation and innovation*

1. It appears that Gramsci's return to the topic of §25, above, is prompted by his reading of the second part of Daniele Mattalia's article, "Gioberti in Carducci: Per una maggiore determinazione delle fonti storiche della cultura carducciana" (Gioberti in Carducci: For a more precise determination of the historical sources of Carduccian culture), *La nuova Italia* 2, no. 12 (December 20, 1931): 478-83.

2. On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.

3. Gramsci is echoing views he had expressed many years before in an article he first published with the title "L'utopia russa" (The Russian utopia) in *Il grido del popolo*, July 20, 1918. The article was almost entirely blacked out by the censor, but Gramsci was able to reprint it under the title "Utopia" in the *Avanti!* issue of July 25, 1918, and again (under the original title) in the *Grido del popolo* of July 27, 1918. In that article, Gramsci wrote:

History is not a mathematical calculation; it does not possess a decimal system, a progressive enumeration of equal quantities amenable to the four basic operations, the solution of equations and the extraction of roots. Quantity (economic structure) turns into quality because it becomes an instrument for action in men's hands—men whose worth is to be seen not only in terms of their weight, their size, and the mechanical energy they derive from their muscles and nerves, but in the fact that they have a mind, that they suffer, understand, rejoice, desire, and reject. In a proletarian revolution, the unknown variable "humanity" is more mysterious than in any other event. (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings: 1910-1920*, ed. Quintin Hoare, trans. J. Mathews [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990], pp. 48-49)

§30. *History of Italian intellectuals. Gioberti*

1. On Vincenzo Gioberti, see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.
2. On Ugo Foscolo, see Notebook 3, §41, n. 1.
3. Gramsci is referring to §27 in this notebook.
4. On Vincenzo Gioberti's *Primato morale e civile degli italiani* (1843) and *Rinnovamento civile d'Italia* (1851), see Notebook 1, §46, n. 1.
5. Vincenzo Gioberti, *Prolegomeni del Primato morale e civile degli italiani* (Brussels: Meline, 1845) and *Il Gesuita moderno*, 5 vols. (Lausanne: S. Bonamici, 1846-47).
6. See Antonio Anzilotti, *Gioberti* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1922), a second edition of which was brought out by the same publisher in 1931.
On Antonio Anzilotti, see Notebook 1, §51, n. 2.

§31. *Risorgimento. "Carboneria" and Freemasonry*

1. All the information about books on Freemasonry recorded in this note is derived from Alessandro Luzio's article "Le origini della Carboneria" (The origins of the Carboneria), in the *Corriere della sera* of February 7, 1932.

The origins of the secret society known as the *carboneria*, which espoused liberal and nationalist ideals, are obscure. According to some accounts, it arose out of a schism within Freemasonry. Quite possibly, its genealogy goes further back, to the very beginning of the nineteenth century in France. There is little doubt, though, that its earliest cells were formed in southern Italy toward the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, during Joachim Murat's reign in Naples.

On Alessandro Luzio, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 45.

2. See Eugen Lennhoff, *Die Freimaurer* (Vienna: Amalthea, 1929) and *Politische Geheimbünde* (Vienna: Amalthea, 1930). *Die Freimaurer* has been translated into English as *The Freemasons*, trans. Einar Frame (London: Methuen, 1934).

3. On Giuseppe Mazzoni, who was a Freemason grandmaster, see Notebook 7, §58, n. 4.

4. See *Le assemblee del Risorgimento*, ed. Annibale Alberti, Giuseppe Marcora, and Camillo Montalcini, 15 vols. (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1911); *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, ed. Annibale Alberti, Roberto Cessi, L. Marcucci, and Camillo Montalcini, 6 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1917-27); *Atti del Parlamento delle Due Sicilie, 1820-1821*, ed. Annibale Alberti, 5 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1926-41).

5. See Renato Sòriga's article "Gl'inizi della Carboneria italiana" (The beginnings of the Italian *carboneria*), in *Il Risorgimento Italiano* 21, no. 1 (January-March 1928); and the entry "Carboneria" in the *Enciclopedia Treccani*. The writings of Renato Sòriga (1881-1939) on underground organizations in the period leading to the Italian Risorgimento have been

collected in *Le società segrete, l'emigrazione politica e i primi moti per l'indipendenza*, ed. S. Manfredi (Modena: Modenese, 1942).

6. See Alessandro Luzio, *La Massoneria e il Risorgimento*, 2 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1925).

7. See Notebook 2, §17, and n. 1 there.

8. Francis I (1777-1830), who became king of the Two Sicilies in 1825, was known to have liberal leanings before inheriting the Bourbon crown. Once enthroned, however, he became increasingly intolerant and repressive.

§33. *The 1848-49 historical nexus. The federalism of Ferrari—Cattaneo*

1. That is, the rebellion against Austrian rule that took place in Milan between the eighteenth and twenty-second of March 1848.

Carlo Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari, linked by Gramsci in the title of this note, were preeminent exponents and promoters of the idea of Italy as a democratic federal republic. They both regarded the 1848 revolutions as concrete expressions of the struggle for democracy.

On Carlo Cattaneo, see Notebook 2, §22, n. 4.

On Giuseppe Ferrari, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 11.

§34. *Past and present. Bibliography*

1. Gramsci obtained the information about this publication listing periodicals and multiple-author works from the "Libri ricevuti" (Received books) section of the *Corriere della sera* of February 9, 1932.

§35. *Risorgimento. Giuseppe Ferrari*

1. Giuseppe Ferrari articulated his views on the regulation of private ownership of land (*legge agraria*), in more or less programmatic terms, in *La federazione repubblicana*, which was first published in London in 1851. It is now available in Giuseppe Ferrari, *Scritti politici*, ed. Silvia Rota Ghibaudi (Turin: UTET, 1973). On Ferrari, see also Notebook 1, §44, n. 11.

2. On Carlo Pisacane, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 5.

3. See, in particular, Eugenio Rignano's book that argues for a socialist reform of inheritance law, *Per la riforma socialista del diritto successorio* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1920). On Rignano, see Notebook 3, §31, n. 1.

§36. *Risorgimento. Transformism*

1. See the note on Agostino Depretis and his politics of transformism: Notebook 3, §119, n. 1.

2. The Associazione Nazionale Italiana (Italian nationalist association) was formed in Florence in 1910 by Enrico Corradini (see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3) and Luigi Federzoni (see Notebook 2, §25, 1). It merged with the Fascist Party in 1923.

3. Quoted in Gaetano Mosca, *Elementi di scienza politica*, 2d ed. (Turin: Bocca, 1923), p. 316n. (The version of this passage in the English translation is incomplete; see *The Ruling Class*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939], pp. 312–13). On this book, its English translation, and Gaetano Mosca, see Notebook 8, §24, n. 1.

On Guglielmo Ferrero, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 17.

4. A royal decree, issued on November 24, 1913, named three socialists from Bissolati's group to the Italian senate: Francesco Lorenzo Pullé, Gerolamo Gatti, and Luigi Della Torre. On being nominated, Pullé declared to the Rome correspondent of the Neapolitan daily *Il mattino*: "I enter the Senate with my socialist flag unfurled, without folding back even an edge of it." Pullé's statement was widely reported in the newspapers on November 25, eliciting many wry comments.

On Leonida Bissolati, see Notebook 1, §157, n. 2.

§37. *The Modern Prince*

1. See Notebook 8, §24, n. 1.

2. See Gioacchino Volpe, "23 marzo 1919–27 ottobre 1922," *Corriere della sera*, March 22, 1932; and "Fascismo al governo: 1922–1932" (Fascism in government: 1922–1932), *Corriere della sera*, March 23, 1932. Gramsci probably inserted this reference into this note at the same time that he was writing §102 in this notebook.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

§39. *Croce's "historicism"*

1. See, in particular, §25 and §27 earlier in this notebook.

2. When Gramsci wrote this note (sometime around February 1932), Benedetto Croce's journal *La critica* was in its thirtieth year of publication. The first issue appeared on January 20, 1903.

§41. *Intellectuals*

1. Valeria Benetti Brunelli's *Il rinnovamento della politica nel pensiero del secolo XV in Italia* (Turin: Paravia, 1927) was reviewed by Felice Battaglia in *Leonardo* 4, n. 5–6 (May 20–June 20, 1928): 175–76. It is quite possible, though, that Gramsci learned about it from another source.

§42. *France—Italy*

1. On the Milanese paper *Il secolo*, see Notebook 8, §7, n. 3.

§43. *Machiavelli*

1. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, ed. and trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 164. Gramsci probably derived this quotation from Luigi Russo, *Prolegomeni a Machiavelli* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1931). Gramsci asked for Russo's book to be sent to him in his letter of November 23, 1931, to Tatiana Schucht, and it is preserved among the books he had at Turi.

§44. *A collection of Machiavellian maxims*

1. Ugo Foscolo, *Dei sepolcri*, lines 156-58.
On Ugo Foscolo and *Dei sepolcri*, see Notebook 5, §32, n. 1.

§45. *Encyclopedic notions. Commanding and obeying*

1. In the *Constitutions* (1554) of the Society of Jesus, the phrase "perinde ac cadaver" (just like a corpse) describes the degree of obedience and self-abnegation expected of members of the order.

2. Gramsci is here echoing a passage in Karl Marx's *Capital* (book 1, part 4, chap. 13): "All directly social or communal labour on a large scale requires, to a greater or lesser degree, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious co-operation of the activities of individuals, and to perform the general functions that have their origin in the motion of the total productive organism, as distinguished from the motion of its separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor: an orchestra requires a separate one. The work of directing, superintending and adjusting becomes one of the functions of capital, from the moment that the labour under capital's control becomes co-operative" (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes [London: Penguin, 1976], pp. 448-49).

§47. *American blacks*

1. Gramsci transcribed this quotation from Beniamino De Ritis, "Colonie a contanti?" (Colonies in cash?), *Corriere della sera*, February 18, 1932. This is a translation of De Ritis's rendition of a passage from an article by Stephen Leacock that appeared in the magazine section of the *New York Herald Tribune* of January 17, 1932.

Stephen Leacock (1869-1944), a professor of economics at McGill University in Canada, wrote numerous books on various topics, among them, *Back to Prosperity: The Great Opportunity of the Empire Conference*

(New York: Macmillan, 1932) and *The British Empire: Its Structure, Its Unity, Its Strength* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940).

§48. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince*

1. See Luigi Russo, *Prolegomeni a Machiavelli* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1931). Gramsci received a copy of this book at Turi sometime between December 1931 and January or February 1932.

On Luigi Russo, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 2.

§49. *Past and present*

1. See Notebook 2, §42, and n. 1 there.

2. The quotations are from Alessandro Levi, "Il pensiero politico di Giuseppe Ferrari" (Giuseppe Ferrari's political thought), *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931): 234. This article by Levi is cited again in §218 of this notebook.

On Giuseppe Ferrari, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 11.

3. See Notebook 2, §42, n. 1.

On Quintino Sella, see Notebook 2, §29, n. 2.

4. See Benedetto Croce, *Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915*, 3d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1928), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

In the passage that Gramsci refers to, Croce writes:

There was . . . the contention that Italy after 1870 fell short of her programme and of her true mission, and that she failed to justify her rebirth or to rise to her promised heights, thus proving herself to be mediocre rather than great. What her "true mission" was, remained for the most part unexplained. Some defined it as the duty of promoting and achieving the salvation of all the oppressed nations of the earth, because she herself had been numbered among the oppressed; others, because she had overthrown the temporal power of the Popes, saw it as the liberation of the world from the spiritual yoke of the Catholic Church, and the creation of a new religion of humanity; others again would have had her found a "third Rome," rivaling both ancient and Christian Rome as ruler of the world, and surpassing them in the domain of thought and achievement. These were but echoes and survivals of the aspirations and beliefs formerly associated with the names of Mazzini, Garibaldi, Gioberti and other leaders of the Risorgimento. Theodor Mommsen once, in a moment of excitement, asked Quintino Sella, "What are you going to do with Rome? It is making us all anxious. Rome is never without cosmopolitan projects." To this Sella replied that the cosmopolitan project which Italy then entertained for Rome was "knowledge." The story throws light upon the origins of an error of judgment common to writ-

ers of romantic history, who make imaginative generalizations about the past and assign peculiar missions to the various nations. . . . What should be attacked is the idea itself that nations are charged with "peculiar missions." (Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy: 1871-1915*, trans. Cecilia M. Ady [New York: Russell and Russell, 1963], pp. 3-4)

In the note to this passage, Croce writes: "The conversation between Mommsen and Sella is mentioned by A. Guiccioli, *Quintino Sella* (Rovigo, 1887-8), i. 353. This is not the place in which to enter into details about the 'missions' which the various nations ascribed to themselves in the course of the nineteenth century, although the mission assigned to Germany as the leader of the liberal movement by the liberal Gervinus . . . may be mentioned as a curiosity. A. Labriola had already issued a warning against the fantastic comparisons which promoted the opinion that 'Italy had failed to come up to expectations'" (ibid., pp. 290-91).

5. These sentences that Gramsci is quoting secondhand appeared originally in an unsigned article entitled "Torino l'unificatrice" (Turin the unifier) published in the Neapolitan daily *L'Italia* of December 22, 1864. The article was subsequently attributed to Francesco De Sanctis by Giuseppe Ferrarelli and Benedetto Croce, both of whom published editions of some of De Sanctis's writings. The article is now included in the edition of De Sanctis's complete works; see *Opere di Francesco De Sanctis*, vol. 15, *Il Mezzogiorno e lo stato unitario*, ed. Franco Ferri (Turin: Einaudi, 1960), pp. 407-9. Gramsci, however, found the quotation in an article by Paolo Orano, "De Sanctis giornalista" (De Sanctis as journalist) that appeared in the *Corriere della sera* of March 28, 1934. At some point after the publication of Orano's article, Gramsci inserted the quotation from De Sanctis at the end of this note, the rest of which had been written at least two years earlier. Orano's article is preserved among the newspaper cuttings that Gramsci kept during his years in prison.

On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

§50. *Encyclopedic notions. Epigoni and Diadochi*

1. In Greek mythology, the famous champions known as the Seven against Thebes led the army that assaulted the city in order to install Polyneices as king. They were defeated, and all but Adrastus died. Ten years later, the sons of the Seven, called the Epigoni, led by Adrastus, again attacked Thebes and destroyed it.

2. The term "Diadochi" (literally, "successors") refers to those of Alexander the Great's officers who, following his death, partitioned his empire and ruled over its various parts; they include Antigonus, Antipater, Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus.

§51. *Risorgimento*

1. Gramsci's source is Alessandro Levi, "Il pensiero politico di Giuseppe Ferrari" (Giuseppe Ferrari's political thought), *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931): 217-58; the quotation is from p. 253.

On Giuseppe Ferrari, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 11.

§52. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince*

1. On Gaetano Mosca and his major work, *Elementi di scienza politica*, 2d ed. (Turin: Bocca, 1923), see Notebook 8, §24, n. 1.

2. Mosca published his *Elementi di scienza politica* for the first time in 1895. The final version, modified and greatly amplified, was published in 1923.

3. See Notebook 1, §44, nn. 49 and 53.

4. See Notebook 1, §48, n. 3, and §133.

5. See Notebook 4, §15, n. 5.

6. See Notebook 7, §39.

§53. *Past and present*

1. Gramsci's source for this quotation from Bertrando Spaventa and for the observation that precedes it is an article by Felice Alderisio, "La politica del Machiavelli nella rivalutazione dello Hegel e del Fichte" (Machiavelli's politics in Hegel's and Fichte's reevaluations), *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931): 273-98; see, especially, pp. 287-88 n. 5.

On Bertrando Spaventa, see Notebook 4, §56, n. 5.

§54. *Past and present. Sardinia*

1. The three articles by Francesco Coletti that appeared in the *Corriere della sera* are: "Un'isola che risorge: La potenzialità della razza sarda" (A resurgent island: The potential of the Sardinian people), January 10, 1932; "La Sardegna che risorge: Redenzione agraria e sviluppo demografico" (Resurgent Sardinia: Agrarian revitalization and demographic growth), February 12, 1932; and "La Sardegna risorge: La grande opera che si compie" (Sardinia resurges: The great work that is being accomplished), February 20, 1932.

2. In one of his early articles, "Il Mezzogiorno e la guerra" (The South and the war), in *Il grido del popolo*, April 1, 1916, Gramsci had referred to one of Coletti's studies on Italian development and demography and described him as "a serious economist who does not indulge in paradoxes." At Turi, Gramsci also had a copy of one of Coletti's books on Italian demography, *Studi sulla popolazione italiana in pace e in guerra* (Bari: Laterza, 1923); the volume is preserved among Gramsci's books.

Francesco Coletti (1866-1940), a professor of statistics at the University of Sassari and later at the University of Pavia who spent many years in Sardinia, studied and wrote extensively on the economic conditions and major social issues of the island. He also produced important studies on emigration.

§56. *Machiavelli. The Modern Prince*

1. See Notebook 7, §39.

2. Gramsci's source of information on the views of the German general Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916) on the characteristics of military plans has not been traced.

§58. *Machiavelli*

1. Gramsci's source here is Benedetto Croce's observation in *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza: 1918): "With good reason, Schopenhauer compared political education as imparted by Machiavelli to that provided by the fencing master, who does indeed teach the art of killing but does not teach one to become a cutthroat or an assassin" (p. 79). Gramsci had a copy of this collection of essays at Turi.

§59. *Popular literature*

1. Commenting on Giambattista Marchesi's book on the eighteenth-century Italian novel, Croce writes:

Is it worth studying these second-rate works that later generations are likely to forget utterly? Yes, certainly. While there is good reason to exclude such a large volume of material from literary history, it is also true that the exclusion is done quite summarily, as in military court, following public opinion or allowing oneself to be guided by a certain intuition that is by and large sagacious. This generates the desire to reconsider the process, to rectify some possible injustice, to make sure that the exclusion is truly justified. Besides, that crude and disjointed body of work is nevertheless a document of history; it evinces tendencies, predilections, states of mind of past generations, and it provides information on events and customs; it sheds light on the history of civilization and thus even provides clues that converge to explain the things that preceded the great works of literature. (*Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. [Bari: Laterza, 1918], p. 238)

§60. *Types of periodicals. Book reviews*

1. See Notebook 8, §57.

§61. *Machiavelli*

1. On the "dialectic of distincts," see Notebook 4, §56, n. 3.

2. For Croce's critique of the Marxist conception of the structure as a noumenon and a hidden god and Gramsci's lengthy discussion of it in a letter to Tatiana Schucht, see Notebook 7, §1, n. 2.

3. From the first of the "Theses on Feuerbach": "Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as *objective* activity. In *Das Wesen des Christentums* [*The Essence of Christianity*], he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish [*schmutzig-jüdisch*] form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary,' of practical-critical activity" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 5, 1845-1847 [New York: International, 1975], p. 6). This is among the selections from Marx's writings that Gramsci had translated from the German; see the Description of the Manuscript of Notebook 7.

Gramsci's Italian rendering of the phrase "in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance" is: "nella sua raffigurazione (sordidamente) giudaica." In a letter of March 28, 1932, to his wife, Julia (whose mother was Jewish), Gramsci wrote: "I hope you will not misunderstand the expression 'sordidly Jewish' which I have used above. I remark on this because recently Tania and I have had an epistolary discussion about Zionism and I do not want to be considered 'anti-Semitic' due to those words. But wasn't their author a Jew?" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:157).

4. Though Gramsci makes specific reference only to *The Holy Family*, he is probably also thinking of the postface to the second edition of *Capital*, where Marx writes: "The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes [London: Penguin, 1976], pp. 103).

Marx makes a similar point in *The Holy Family*: "On the one hand, Hegel with masterly sophistry is able to present as a process of the imagined creation of the mind itself, of the Absolute Subject, the process by which the philosopher through sensory perception and imagination passes from one subject to another. On the other hand, however, Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real development within the speculative development misleads the reader into considering the speculative development as real and the real as speculative" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 4, 1844-1845 [New York: International, 1975], pp. 60-61).

§62. *Machiavelli*

1. On Enrico Ferri, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15. Ferri's major work, *Sociologia criminale*, is available in English translation: *Criminal Sociology*, ed. W.W. Smithers, trans. J.I. Kelly and J. Lisle (New York: Agathon, 1967).

2. On Eugène Sue and the "pillory of virtue," see Gramsci's comment in Notebook 3, §52.

§63. *Catholic Action*

1. This compendium of information on Catholic cultural and literary activity in Italy was reviewed by P.C. in *L'Italia che scrive* 15, no. 2 (February 1932): 52-53.

2. On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§64. *Past and present. The Pact of London*

1. Italy secretly signed the Pact of London on April 26, 1915, committing itself to join the war on the side of the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). Article 13 of the pact stated: "Should France and Great Britain extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, they will admit in principle Italy's right to demand certain compensation by way of an extension of her possessions in Erythraea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the colonial areas adjoining French and British colonies."

The text of the Pact of London is reproduced in its entirety in Antonio Salandra's *L'intervento (1915): Ricordi e pensieri* (Milan: Mondadori, 1930), pp. 156-60. Gramsci had a copy of this volume of Salandra's memoirs at Turi. This note may also have been prompted by an allusion to Article 13 of the Pact of London in an article by Carlo Calisse, "Mandati internazionali" (International mandates), *Gerarchia* 12, no. 6 (June 1932): 457-61.

On the Pact of London, see also Notebook 3, §131, and nn. 1-3 there.

2. Article 2 of the Pact of London states: "On her part Italy undertakes by all means at her disposal to conduct the campaign in union with France, Great Britain, and Russia against *all the powers at war with them*" (emphasis added). At the same time, however, other articles of the pact do seem to suggest that Italy would be in conflict most directly with Austria. Article 1 stipulates: "A military convention is to be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces against Italy. Russia should decide mainly to attack Germany." The focus of Article 3 is similarly on Austria: "The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render uninterrupted and active assistance to Italy until such time as the navy of Austria has been destroyed or peace has been concluded." Italy formally declared war against Austria on May 23,

1915, but refrained from doing the same against Germany until more than a year later, on August 28, 1916.

3. See Notebook 1, §116, and n. 8 there.

On Antonio Salandra, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 20.

On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10.

4. On Giorgio Sonnino, foreign minister in the cabinet presided over by Antonio Salandra, during the First World War, see Notebook 1, §114, n. 1.

5. Gramsci discusses this issue later in this notebook (see §83 and §96), and in Notebook 9, §103.

On Giovanni Giolitti, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

§65. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*

1. Gramsci obtained the information about Fausto Squillace's *Dizionario di sociologia*, rev. ed. (Palermo: Sandron, 1911), from a catalog of the Remo Sandron publishing house.

In addition to two large volumes on sociological theory, *Le dottrine sociologiche* (Rome: Colombo, 1902) and *I problemi costituzionali della sociologia* (Palermo: Sandron, 1907), Fausto Squillace (1878–1930) also authored a book on the southern question, *La base economica della questione meridionale* (Palermo: Sandron, 1905).

§66. *History of the subaltern classes. Bibliography*

1. As one can see from the list of book titles in this note (and the bibliographic entry in the previous note), Gramsci had in front of him a catalog of the Remo Sandron publishing house.

2. Gramsci's memory is inaccurate. Sandron of Palermo published an Italian translation of selections from *Capital*, edited by Paul Lafargue, with an introduction by Vilfredo Pareto, in 1894 and reprinted it in 1895. In 1915 the Socialist publishing house Avanti! (based in Milan) brought out a complete Italian edition of volume 1 of *Capital*, translated from the German by Ettore Marchioli, as volume 7 of the *Opere* (Works) of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, edited by Ettore Ciccotti. The first complete Italian edition of *Capital*—based on the French version reviewed by Marx—was published in Turin in 1886 in the book series "Biblioteca dell'economista" (The economist's library), directed by Gerolamo Boccardo.

3. Ivano Bonomi's *Le vie nuove del socialismo* (The new paths of socialism), which was reprinted many times and exists in various editions, was originally published by Sandron in 1907 in its book series "Biblioteca di scienze sociali e politiche" (Library of political and social sciences).

On Ivano Bonomi, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 21.

4. Adolfo Zerboglio (1866–1952), for many years professor of law at the University of Pisa, was named senator in 1924. Best known for his schol-

arly work on criminal law, Zerboglio was also interested in criminal sociology and delinquency. An admirer of Cesare Lombroso, on whom he wrote a short study, Zerboglio subtitled one of his booklets, *L'uomo delinquente* (Milan: Alpes, 1925), "critical notes of an up-to-date positivist." *Il socialismo e le obiezioni più comuni*, a response to the most common objections to socialism, was published by Sandron in 1895.

5. Enrico Ferri's booklet on positivist debates concerning socialism, *Discordie positiviste sul socialismo* (published by Sandron in 1895, with a second edition in 1899), was a polemical response to Raffaele Garofalo's *La superstizione socialista* (Turin: Roux Frassati, 1895).

On Enrico Ferri, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15.

6. Gerolamo Gatti's tome on socialism and agrarian economics, *Agricoltura e socialismo*, published by Sandron in 1900, appeared in French as *Le socialisme et l'agriculture* (Paris: V. Giard et E. Brière, 1901), with a preface by Georges Sorel. Gatti is also mentioned in passing by Gramsci in Notebook 8, §36.

7. *La fine della lotta per la vita fra gli uomini* (The end of the struggle for life among men), by the socialist and labor unionist Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani (1872-1940)—brother of the renowned artist Amedeo Modigliani—was published by Sandron in 1900.

8. Achille Loria's *Marx e la sua dottrina* (Marx and his theory) was first published by Sandron in 1902.

On Achille Loria and English translations of his books, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 1.

9. The first edition of *Il sindacalismo*, by the trade unionist and author of many books on politics and economics Enrico Leone (1875-1940), was published by Sandron in 1906. Leone was also the editor of the journal *Il sindacato operaio*.

10. The full title of Arturo Labriola's book on Marx's theory of value is *La teoria del valore di Carlo Marx: Studio sul 3° libro del "Capitale"* (Palermo: Sandron, 1899).

On Arturo Labriola, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15.

11. Enrico Bruni, *Socialismo e diritto privato* (Palermo: Sandron, 1907).

12. Carlo Francesco Ferraris (1850-1924), an economist and politician, taught at the University of Padua, was a member of parliament, served as minister of public works, and became a senator in 1913. He wrote extensively on economics and administrative science, as well as on a broad range of social issues. The second revised and expanded edition of his monograph on historical materialism and the state, *Il materialismo storico e lo stato*, was published by Sandron in 1897.

13. A search for this book by Francesco Piccoli has proved fruitless. The title suggests that it is the text of the speech delivered in his own defense by Nicola Barbato—a leader of the peasants' and workers' movement

known as the Fasci Siciliani—before a military tribunal in Palermo where he stood accused of fomenting the widespread disturbances that erupted in different parts of Sicily in the autumn of 1893. The trial took place in 1894, in the immediate wake of the violent repression of the movement ordered by Prime Minister Crispi. Barbato was found guilty and condemned to twelve years in prison.

§67. Education

1. Gramsci learned about Carlo Modesto Derada's book on the pedagogical and social reforms brought about by the French Revolution—*Gli uomini e le riforme pedagogico-sociali della rivoluzione francese: Dall'ancien régime alla convenzione* (Palermo: Sandron, 1904)—from the same publisher's catalog that was his source of information for the previous two notes.

§68. Reformation and Renaissance

1. See Domenico Guerri's study of popular cultural currents during the Renaissance, *La corrente popolare nel Rinascimento: Berte, burle, baie nella Firenze del Brunellesco e del Burchiello* (Florence: Sansoni, 1931).

2. The Italian translation of L. Ponnelle and L. Bordet's book on St. Philip Neri, *San Filippo Neri e la società romana del suo tempo: 1515-1595* (Florence: Fiorentina, 1931), was reviewed by Giulio Augusto Levi in *La nuova Italia* 3, no. 1 (January 20, 1932): 35-36.

3. Giulio Augusto Levi's brief history of aesthetics and taste, *Breve storia dell'estetica e del gusto*, 2d ed. (Milan: Vallardi, 1925), is a seventy-page booklet published as part of a series of literary, historical, and scientific manuals.

In addition to another work on aesthetics, *Studi estetici* (1907), Giulio Augusto Levi (1879-1951) wrote books on Giacomo Leopardi and Vittorio Alfieri.

4. Levi, review of *San Filippo Neri e la società romana del suo tempo*, pp. 35-36; all the emphases are Gramsci's.

§69. Machiavelli

1. Gramsci's source on Francis Bacon's characterization of the absolute monarchs is an article by M.R. Buccella, "Il mercantilismo come fase della vita storica europea" (Mercantilism as a phase of the historical life of Europe), *La nuova Italia* 3, no. 2 (February 20, 1932): 43-51; see especially, p. 45.

Very close to the end of his *History of the Reign of King Henry VII*, Francis Bacon wrote of the English monarch that "if a man should compare him with the Kings his concurrents in France and Spain, he shall

find him more politic than Lewis the Twelfth of France, and more entire and sincere than Ferdinando of Spain. But if you shall change Lewis the Twelfth for Lewis the Eleventh, who lived a little before, then the consort is more perfect. For that Lewis the Eleventh, Ferdinando, and Henry, may be esteemed for the tres magi of kings of those ages" (*The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath [London: Longmans, 1878], 6:244).

§70. *History of the subaltern classes. Bibliography*

1. This note is prompted by and contains information derived from an obituary of Filippo Lo Vetere in *I problemi del lavoro* 6, no. 2 (February 1, 1932): 13.

Filippo Lo Vetere (1870-1931) joined the Socialist Party when he was a law student at the University of Palermo and took an active role in the formation of the peasants' and workers' movement known as the Fasci Siciliani. In 1899 he helped found the Consorzio Agrario Siciliano and was elected to serve as its secretary-general. The consortium sought to bring together representatives of landowners, farmers, landless peasants, mine workers, and other social groups in an effort to implement a comprehensive program of reform and modernization in Sicily. Lo Vetere's idealistic attempt to elicit cooperation across class and party lines proved futile and short-lived. It is one of the things he wrote about in the book that Gramsci alludes to, *Il movimento agricolo siciliano* (Palermo: Sandron, 1903). *Problemi siciliani*, which Lo Vetere edited, was a monthly that started publication in 1924. Lo Vetere died on July 17, 1932 (not September).

2. On Rinaldo Rigola, see Notebook 7, §13, n. 6.

§72. *Past and present. The error of the anti-protectionists of the left*

1. *La voce* was edited by Giuseppe Prezzolini and *Unità* by Gaetano Salvemini. Going back to the prewar period, both periodicals had a "Southernist" orientation, and some of their contributors maintained that protectionism was responsible for the economic woes of the South. In his writings both before and after his imprisonment, Gramsci expressed his opposition to protectionism. In his view, it added to the burdens of peasants and workers, making them pay more for the goods they needed, while safeguarding the industrialists' ability to exact high prices for their products. From Gramsci's perspective, antiprotectionists like Prezzolini, Salvemini, and Einaudi were arguing for free trade from *within* a capitalist order, seeking to make it adhere more closely to classical liberal principles in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

On Giuseppe Prezzolini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

On Gaetano Salvemini, who sometimes used the pseudonym *Rerum Scriptor*, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 19.

2. See Gaetano Salvemini's book on the old tendencies and new needs of the working-class movement, *Tendenze vecchie e necessità nuove del movimento operaio italiano* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1922). Although this volume is not among Gramsci's books that have been preserved, there is little doubt that he had a copy of it for some time at Turi. It is listed in the manuscript of Notebook 1 (see Description of the Manuscript) among the books he consigned to his relatives between 1929 and 1930.

§74. *Lorianism. E. Ferri*

1. Benedetto Croce, *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), p. 314. Gramsci had a copy of this volume of *Conversazioni critiche* at Turi.

The short chapter on Alessandro D'Ancona from which this passage is quoted was originally published as a book review of Ancona's memoir, *Ricordi ed affetti* (Milan: Treves, 1902), in *Il marzocco* 7, no. 48 [November 30, 1902].

On Enrico Ferri, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 15.

2. Gramsci alludes to Ferri's musical "judgment" again in Notebook 9, §12.

§75. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Giulio Bechi*

1. Benedetto Croce reviewed Giulio Bechi's novel *I seminatori* (Milan: Treves, 1914) in the *Giornale d'Italia* of April 17, 1914, and later included it in his *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), pp. 348–51.

2. On Giulio Bechi and his book on Sardinian banditry, *Caccia grossa*, see Notebook 1, §50, and n. 6 there; Notebook 6, §2; and Notebook 23, §54.

§76. *Lorianism*

1. It is possible that Gramsci was reminded of Angelo Oliviero Olivetti by some allusion to his *Storia critica dell'utopia comunista* (Critical history of the communist utopia), the first volume of which, entitled *Psicologia, logica, etica del comunismo: Il comunismo nel mondo antico* (Psychology, logic, ethics of communism: Communism in the ancient world), was published in Rome by the Libreria del Littorio in 1930. Most probably, Gramsci was familiar with Olivetti's publications, such as his fascist treatment of syndicalism, *Il sindacalismo come filosofia e come politica: Lineamenti di sintesi universale* (Milan: Alpes, 1924). Before his turn to fascism, Olivetti had been a proponent of Sorellian revolutionary syndicalism, but as editor of the periodical *Pagine libere* he promoted a

version of militant syndicalism that was also nationalist, favoring Italy's war on Libya and its intervention in the Great War.

§77. *Lorianism. G. A. Borgese*

1. Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, "Psicologia della proibizione" (Psychology of prohibition), *Corriere della sera*, March 8, 1932.

Borgese's characterization of war as a conflict over "stolen buckets" is an allusion to the mock heroic poem *La secchia rapita* by Alessandro Tassoni (1565-1635) about a mighty struggle between citizens of Modena and Bologna over a stolen wooden bucket.

On Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, see Notebook 1, §93, n. 2.

2. The comment on historical materialism that Gramsci alludes to here is in Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, *Escursioni in terre nuove* (Milan: Ceschi-na, 1931), p. 73. In this booklet, which is an account of his experience at the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy at Oxford in 1930, Borgese also makes some observations on Arthur Stanley Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1928). Gramsci had a copy of Borgese's book and of the French translation of Eddington's work, *La nature du monde physique* (Paris: Payot, 1929); he cites both of them in Notebook 8, §170.

§78. *Machiavelli*

1. Physiocracy (i.e., the rule of nature, or the natural order) was the concept at the heart of the economic theory developed, primarily in France, during the second half of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the mercantilists, who placed foreign trade at the center of economic activity and measured wealth in terms of the accumulation of gold and silver, the physiocrats stressed the fundamental importance of agriculture and regarded the rural economy as the determining factor of a nation's wealth. The physiocrats, who some regard as the first economists in the modern sense of the term, had a significant influence on the thought of Adam Smith.

2. Gramsci is referring to an article by Gino Arias, "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli" (Machiavelli's economic thought), in *Annali di economia* (Milan: Università Bocconi, 1928), 4:1-31. On this article and Gramsci's related correspondence, see Notebook 6, §66, n. 1.

§79. *Machiavelli*

1. Gramsci's reflection in this note seems to have been prompted, at least in part, by chapter 10 of *The Prince*, "How the power of every principality should be measured."

§82. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. Gramsci appears to be conflating two novellas from Cervantes's *Novelas ejemplares*, namely *La gitanilla* (*The Little Gypsy*) and *La ilustre fregona* (*The Illustrious Kitchen Maid*), both of which have similar resolutions to convoluted plots. Preciosa, the incomparably beautiful young Gypsy in *La gitanilla*, is pursued by two lovers: Clement, a chivalrous gentleman who writes her delightful madrigals, and Andrew (whose real name is Don Juan), a young nobleman who turns himself into a Gypsy to prove his devotion. Through no fault of their own, they both end up committing murder. Clement is forced to flee Spain, whereas Andrew is released from jail when the aristocratic *corregidor* of Muncia discovers that Preciosa is in fact his only daughter, who had been abducted by Gypsies when she was a baby. The story ends with a description of the celebrations occasioned by the wedding that bound two noble families together. In *La ilustre fregona*, two close friends of noble birth, Diego and Thomas, fall hopelessly in love with Costanza, a humble maid at an inn in Toledo. They disguise their true lineage and get humble jobs at the inn in order to be close to their loved one. After many twists and turns in the plot, it turns out that Costanza, too, is of noble birth and is in fact Diego's sister. This allows for the happy ending in which Thomas and Costanza get married—a union of aristocrats.

§83. *Past and present. Events of 1917*

1. Having entered the war against Austria in May 1915, Italy declared war on Germany during the summer of the following year, on August 28, 1916. The prime minister at the time, however, was Paolo Boselli, not Antonio Salandra, who had resigned in June 1916 after several military setbacks.

On Antonio Salandra, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 20.

2. Following Salandra's resignation, Paolo Boselli (1838–1932), a liberal conservative who had held ministerial positions under three different prime ministers and had supported Italy's entry into the war, was entrusted with forming a government of national unity. The situation did not improve; on the domestic front, protests against the war and the severe privations it brought with it erupted in various parts of Italy, while the military effort continued to flounder, exacerbated by serious occurrences of desertion and mutiny. In early June 1917, three cabinet ministers—Ubaldo Comandini, Leonida Bissolati, and Ivanoe Bonomi—resigned in protest when they learned that the foreign minister, Giorgio Sidney Sonnino, had approved a promise of "independence under Italian protection" to Albania. At the end of the month, Boselli obtained parliamentary approval of a cabinet reshuffle. On October 16, when parliament reconvened after the summer break, the debate on the budget, on the military situation, and on

the government's increasingly severe repressive measures against the anti-war movement revealed the weakness of the Boselli administration, as socialists, Giolittians, and others formed a large, unified oppositional block. Finally, on October 25, the day after the army under the command of Luigi Cadorna was humiliated in Caporetto, an overwhelming vote of no-confidence in parliament dissolved Boselli's government. Vittorio Emanuele Orlando succeeded him as prime minister.

In August 1916, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930), a colonel at the time, wrote confidential letters to Bissolati and Sonnino that were harshly critical of the war effort and of Cadorna's command in particular. The documents were leaked; Douhet was court-martialed in October and received a one-year sentence. Vindicated by the events of Caporetto, Douhet was subsequently rehabilitated.

On Giovanni Giolitti, who had backed Salandra to become prime minister in 1914, only to see him pursue policies very different from his own, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

On Leonida Bissolati, see Notebook 1, §157, n. 2.

On Giorgio Sidney Sonnino, see Notebook 1, §114, n. 1.

On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10.

Gramsci discusses some of the same issues in Notebook 1, §116.

3. See Notebook 1, §116, n. 15.

4. See Notebook 1, §116, n. 14.

5. In the finger-pointing that followed the Caporetto debacle, the primary targets of the establishment were the socialists, who vigorously opposed the war, Pope Benedict XV, who actively and persistently sought to end the conflict, and, above all, Giolitti, who had openly advocated neutrality in 1915.

6. Giacomo Devoto, review of Giulio Douhet's *Le profezie di Cassandra*, ed. Gherardo Pàntano (Genoa: Tirrena, 1932), in *Leonardo* 3, no. 2 (February 1932); 86-87.

Gramsci had a copy of an earlier book by Giulio Douhet, *Probabili aspetti della guerra futura* (Palermo: Sandron, 1928).

7. Giacomo Devoto (1897-1974) became one of Italy's most distinguished linguists and lexicographers, as well as president of the Accademia della Crusca. It has not been possible to ascertain whether he was the author of the review of Douhet's book in *Leonardo*, the cultural monthly edited by Luigi Russo.

8. Giuseppe Canepa, who was indeed in charge of the commissariat for provisions and foodstuffs at the time of the Turin uprisings in August 1917, had actually used the phrase "try and try again" earlier in an interview published in the Roman daily *Il messaggero* on July 4, 1917. An article entitled "Approvigionamenti e consumi" (Provisions and consumption) that appeared in Gaetano Salvemini's *Unità* on July 17, 1917, commented: "in a time of war it is neither prudent nor licit to 'try and try again,' as the

Hon. Canepa says." During the Turin disturbances of 1917, the oppositional press cited Canepa's words as evidence of his insensitivity.

On Giuseppe Canepa, see Notebook I, §116, n. 16.

The Accademia del Cimento, founded in 1657, by Prince Leopold and Grand Duke Ferdinand II de' Medici, adopted the motto "provando e riprovando" (to try and try again). Its members, admirers of Galileo, sought to apply the methods of experimental science to the claims of natural philosophy in order to determine their validity. The results were published in *Saggi di naturali esperienze* (Florence: Giuseppe Cocchini, 1666). The Accademia del Cimento, considered to have been the first European scientific society, remained active for about a decade.

9. On August 11, 1930, Gramsci wrote to Tatiana Schucht: "Do you know that I had to laugh at your remark that you are 'always hungry'? You talk about it as if it were an illness and not a sign of good health. This is a point of view that the Neapolitans have humorously embodied in the figure of Monsignor Perrelli and the care he took of his horses to cure them of the disease of hunger. But at least Monsignor Perrelli was trying to cure his horses and did not apply the regime of abstinence to himself!" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 1:345-46).

Annotating this passage, Rosengarten explains: "The reference is to the Neapolitan Catholic prelate Filippo Perrelli (1707-1789), known by the name Monsignor Perrelli to the people of Naples, who made him into a legendary figure around whom turned many humorous anecdotes. One such anecdote described his attempts to cure his horse of excessive hunger by imposing on it a rigorous diet. The diet was so rigorous that the horse died of malnutrition" (*ibid.*, 1:346 n. 2).

Gramsci alludes to Monsignor Perrelli again in another letter to Tatiana Schucht, dated August 10, 1931: "You are my only correspondent for some months now, but I am afraid that if you continue to make dietetic experiments . . . you'll end up like Monsignor Perrelli's horse" (*ibid.*, 2:54).

10. Gramsci had described Paolo Boselli as the "chatterbox of the Italic tradition" in an article he wrote during the war deriding a nationalistic attack on the use of German grammar books for the teaching of Latin in Italian schools; see "La difesa dello Schultz" (In defense of Schultz), in the Turin and Milan editions of *Avanti!* November 27, 1917.

11. In a famous electoral campaign speech he gave at Dronero on October 12, 1917, Giolitti said:

Our internal political structure contains the strangest of contradictions. While it cannot spend a single lira or modify the administrative system in any way . . . without parliamentary approval, the executive branch can nevertheless negotiate treaties and, in the name of the country, assume the most dreadful obligations that inevitably lead to war. And it

can do this without parliamentary approval; indeed, it can do this without the parliament and the nation being informed or even having any way of being informed. This state of affairs must be radically changed by giving parliament the same authority in foreign affairs that it has in domestic and economic policy; in other words, it must be ordained that no international agreement can be entered into, no obligation can be assumed without parliamentary approval. The exclusion of the possibility of secret treaties ensures that the nation will be kept informed about foreign policy and thus be able to make its voice heard and its will prevail at the right time. Furthermore, treaties approved by the people's representatives are much more likely to be observed because the nation's conscience will rebel against their violation. In 1848, when article 5 of the statute was approved, diplomatic secrecy was the norm in all European states, and wars were fought by professional armies. Now, however, the political structures of civil states are radically different; wars have become conflicts between peoples who throw the entire mass of the population under arms against the adversary, using all the means of destruction at their disposal, and the conflict ends only when one of the sides is utterly ruined. There is therefore a genuine historical need to bring international relations under the control of the representatives of the people, for it is only proper that they should be the ones to bear these onerous responsibilities. (Giovanni Giolitti, *Discorsi extraparlamentari* [Turin: Einaudi, 1952], pp. 312-13)

Seven months after the Dronero speech, when the government of Prime Minister Francesco Saverio Nitti was in the midst of a deep political crisis, Giolitti again raised the issue of article 5 of the Statute in an interview published by *La tribuna* on May 27, 1920:

The general public's respect for parliament is seriously undermined by the complete absence of any legislative activity; since parliament abdicated its powers a long time ago, power is exercised by the government in the form of legal decrees. This nonconstitutional system that has stripped legislative work of every semblance of seriousness must be rejected. The full exercise of legislative authority, control of the public expenditure, and the organization of public services must be restored to parliament, and, furthermore, parliament must be given the same power over foreign policy that it has over domestic and economic policy, which will require the modification of article 5 of the statute and the establishment, in both houses of parliament, of permanent commissions to control foreign policy. (Giolitti, *Discorsi extraparlamentari*, pp. 328-29)

On the Albertine Statute, which became the constitution of the unified Kingdom of Italy, see Notebook 5, §70, n. 7.

12. On Francesco Saverio Nitti, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 12.

13. Nitti resigned on June 9, 1920, and Giolitti was asked to form a new government, which he did, becoming prime minister for the fifth time on June 15.

14. On the Popular Party, see Notebook 1, §38, n. 5.

15. See Luigi Ambrosini's book on the political orientation of the Popular Party, *Fra Galdino alla cerca: Per la coscienza politica dei popolari* (Milan: Vitagliano, 1920), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

An article entitled "Un presidente" (A president), consisting of a harsh attack on Luigi Ambrosini, published in the Piedmont edition of *Avanti!* on June 28, 1920, has been attributed to Gramsci by Sergio Caprioglio. Ambrosini was a supporter of Giolitti at the time and the "presidente" (i.e., chairman) of the executive committee of the League of Consumers; he would later join the Popular Party. On Ambrosini, see also Notebook 1, §44, n. 27.

§84. Machiavelli

1. Apropos of "effectual reality" (*realità effettuale*), Gramsci wrote to Tatiana Schucht on May 30, 1932:

In *Lessons in the History of Philosophy*, [Hegel] identified a connection between the French revolution and the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling and said that "only two peoples, the German and the French, as opposed as they may be to each other, indeed precisely because they are opposed, participated in the great epoch of universal history" at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, because in Germany the new principle "has erupted as spirit and concept" whereas in France it has expressed itself as "effectual reality." In *The Holy Family* we see how this connection postulated by Hegel between French political activity and German philosophical activity was appropriated by the theorists of the philosophy of praxis. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:178-79)

Gramsci is also echoing Machiavelli's distinction between the imagined and the real (and between what is and what should be) in the opening paragraph of chapter 15 of *The Prince*:

It now remains for us to see how a prince should govern his conduct towards his subjects or his friends. I know that this has often been written about before, and so I hope it will not be thought presumptuous for me to do so, as, especially in discussing this subject, I draw up an original set of rules. But since my intention is to say something that will prove of

practical use to the inquirer, I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in real truth [*verità effettuale*], rather than as they are imagined. Many have dreamed up republics and principalities which have never in truth been known to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation. (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1961], pp. 90-91)

2. See Paolo Treves, "Il realismo politico di Francesco Guicciardini" (Guicciardini's political realism), *Nuova rivista storica* 14, no. 6 (November-December 1930): 525-37. On this article, see also Notebook 6, §86, and n. 1.

3. See Luigi Russo, *Prolegomeni a Machiavelli* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1931), especially the first chapter, "Savonarola e Machiavelli." Gramsci had a copy of this book at Turi.

On Luigi Russo, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 2.

§85. *Past and present. Agrarian questions*

1. Antonio Marozzi's article "La razionalizzazione della produzione" (The rationalization of production), in *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1438 (February 16, 1932): 524-32, was the sixth in a series published under the general heading "Le condizioni presenti dell'economia agricola italiana" (The current economic state of agriculture in Italy).

§86. *Machiavelli*

1. The full resonance of the phrase "dual perspective" (*doppia prospettiva*), its background, and the crucial issues it was associated with for Gramsci are thoroughly explained by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith:

The term "*doppia prospettiva*" goes back to the Fifth World Congress of the Comintern. The Congress followed a long series of defeats for the revolution internationally, culminating in the German October of 1923. Zinoviev, who had succeeded in placing his protégés Fischer and Maslov at the head of the German Party and in laying the blame for the defeat at the door of Brandler, who was ousted from the leadership, was anxious to present the entire episode as not being of critical importance, and the German revolution as still being on the cards in the immediate future. Trotsky and Radek were arguing that the European bourgeoisie was moving in the direction of a "labourist" resolution of its post-war political crisis, witness events in England and France. Under Zinoviev's guidance, the Congress in effect adopted a compromise solution, allow-

ing both for the imminence of revolution and for a generalisation of the "labourist" solution. Section XIII of the Theses on Tactics was entitled "Two Perspectives." It stated:

"The epoch of international revolution has commenced. The rate of its development as a whole or partially, the rate of development of revolutionary events in any particular continent or in any particular country, cannot be foretold with precision. The whole situation is such that two perspectives are open: (a) a possible slow and prolonged development of the proletarian revolution, and (b) on the other hand, that the ground under capitalism has been mined to such an extent and that the contradictions of capitalism as a whole have developed so rapidly, that the solution in one country or another may come in the not distant future.

"The Comintern must base its tactics upon the possibility of both perspectives. The manoeuvres of the Comintern must be so arranged as to be able rapidly to adapt oneself to the changing rate of development, and in any case even with a prolonged rate of development of events, to remain the irreconcilable mass Communist Party of proletarian revolution which attracts the masses and trains them for the revolutionary struggle."

This dual perspective continued to characterise Comintern strategy in the following years; Zinoviev reaffirmed it, for instance, at the Sixth Plenum in early 1926. Although its original formulation by Zinoviev was due to mainly tactical considerations, Gramsci seems to have continued to see it as preferable to the "right" line of 1926–28 and the "left" line of the Third Period, and to have felt that its directives could be generalised for all periods when "frontal attack" was not immediately possible. According to Athos Lisa [who was imprisoned at Turi until March 1933], Gramsci spoke of the "two perspectives" during the discussions which took place among the prisoners at Turi. He said that of the two, the more likely was that of some form of transitional stage intervening between the fall of fascism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the party's tactics should take this into account. On the other hand, his criticisms here of those who "have reduced the theory of the 'dual perspective' to . . . nothing but two forms of 'immediacy,' etc." are directed against any strategy which separated the moment of force from the moment of consent. (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith [New York: International, 1971], p. 169n)

2. In chapter 18 ("How princes should honour their word") of *The Prince*, Machiavelli wrote:

You should understand, therefore, that there are two ways of fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to men, and the second to beasts. But as the first way often proves inadequate one must needs have

recourse to the second. So a prince must understand how to make a nice use of the beast and the man. The ancient writers taught princes about this by an allegory, when they described how Achilles and many other princes of the ancient world were sent to be brought up by Chiron, the centaur, so that he might train them his way. All the allegory means, in making the teacher half beast and half man, is that a prince must know how to act according to the nature of both, and that he cannot survive otherwise. (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1961], p. 99)

3. Gramsci is alluding to chapter 9, "Stato e chiesa in senso ideale e loro perpetua lotta nella storia" (State and church in the ideal sense and their perpetual conflict in history), in Benedetto Croce's *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931), of which he had a copy at Turi. See Notebook 6, §81, n. 1.

§87. *Brief notes on Japanese culture*

1. See Notebook 5, §50.

§89. *Brief notes on American culture*

1. This is not to be confused with the Progressive Party (better known as the Bull Moose party) formed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 after he failed to get the Republican Party nomination for that year's presidential election. The reference here is to the party formed by Robert M. La Follette (a Republican senator from Wisconsin) in 1924. In that year's presidential campaign, La Follette had the support of the Socialist Party of America and of the American Federation of Labor and ended up obtaining 17 percent of the popular vote in the election that resulted in Calvin Coolidge winning a second term. La Follette died the following year, but the Progressive Party remained a significant political force in Wisconsin until the late 1930s. La Follette's son, Philip, for example, won two gubernatorial elections (in 1931 and 1935) running as a Progressive.

2. This entire paragraph is a paraphrase of G. A. Borgese's article "Strano interludio" (Strange interlude), in the *Corriere della sera* of March 15, 1932.

On Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, see Notebook 1, §93, n. 2.

§90. *Encyclopedic notions. The machine*

1. In Italian, a typewriter is called a "*macchina da scrivere*" (writing machine).

2. Everything up to this point is a paraphrase of the article "La diffusione della macchina" (The spread of the machine), signed Metron, that appeared in the *Corriere della sera* of March 15, 1932.

§91. *Confalonieri*

1. On Federico Confalonieri, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 42.

2. Gramsci transcribed this passage from Silvio D'Amico's "Sulle orme d'un martirio: Visita alla prigione di Silvio Pellico" (Retracing the footsteps of a martyrdom: A visit to Silvio Pellico's prison), which appeared in the daily newspaper *Il resto del Carlino* of March 16, 1932. The parenthetical interjection is Gramsci's.

In Silvio D'Amico's book *Certezze* [Milan: Treves-Treccani-Tumminelli, 1932], the passage quoted by Gramsci is on p. 212.

3. Gramsci pursues this question in his letter of May 23, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht:

If you happen to write to Piero [Sraffa] tell him that in a passage of a chapter of Silvio D'Amico's recent book *Certezze* [Certainties], in the chapter devoted to the Spielberg there is mention of an appeal for clemency sent by Federico Confalonieri to the Emperor of Austria, which is supposedly preserved in the Italian Museum of the Spielberg. D'Amico does not reprint this appeal, but he refers to it as the writing of a man reduced to the nth degree of humiliation and abjectness. Perhaps Piero knows whether this appeal by Confalonieri has already been published in some publication about Confalonieri. I don't think that I ever heard any mention of it. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:176)

Almost a decade after Gramsci wrote this letter, Renzo U. Montini published the complete text of three petitions by Confalonieri under the title "Tre suppliche inedite di Federico Confalonieri" (Three previously unpublished petitions by Confalonieri) in *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 29, no. 1 (January–February, 1942): 83–90.

§92. *Past and present. Nationalizations*

1. Alberto De Stefani, "La copertura delle perdite" (Covering losses), *Corriere della sera*, March 16, 1932.

On Alberto De Stefani, see Notebook 2, §6, n. 2.

§93. *The Italian Risorgimento. The 1848–1849 nexus*

1. The year 1931 was the centenary of Carlo Alberto's accession to the throne of the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia, which occasioned many publications assessing and reassessing his historical significance.

2. See Pietro Silva's article "Carlo Alberto," which was published in two parts, "La preparazione al Regno" (Preparation for the throne) and "I

caratteri del Regno" (Characteristics of the reign), in *La cultura* 10, no. 8 (August 1931): 601-7; and 10, no. 9 (September 1931): 692-712.

On Pietro Silva, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 1.

§94. *Encyclopedic notions. "Homo homini lupus."*

1. "Man is a wolf to man, woman is even more of a wolf to woman, and priest is the fiercest of wolves to priest." Gramsci came across this expanded version of the well-known epigram *Homo homini lupus* in Albert Thibaudet's "Les mémoires d'Alfred Loisy," a review of Loisy's three-volume autobiography *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire religieuse de notre temps* (Paris: E. Nourry, 1930-31), in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 448 (May 16, 1931).

Homo homini lupus is a slight adaptation of a phrase in Plautus's play *Asinaria* (act 2, scene 4, l. 88). Thomas Hobbes uses it in the dedicatory epistle to the earl of Devonshire in *De cive* (1651): "To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; that man to man is a kind of God; and that man to man is an arrant wolf."

§95. *Catholic integralists—Jesuits—Modernists*

1. The actual title of Alfred Loisy's work is *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire religieuse de notre temps* (Paris: E. Nourry, 1930-31). Gramsci's source of information is a book review by Albert Thibaudet that appeared under the title "Les mémoires d'Alfred Loisy" in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 448 (May 16, 1931).

§96. *Past and present. Giolitti*

1. See Maurice Pernot, "Giovanni Giolitti," *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires* 140, no. 198 (July 18, 1928): 1. The passage from Maurice Pernot's article quoted by Gramsci was reproduced in a survey of articles that appeared in the foreign press following Giolitti's death that was published in the weekly *Rassegna settimanale della stampa estera* 3, no. 31 (July 24, 1928): 2069-73. The passage from Pernot's article is on p. 2070.

On Giovanni Giolitti, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

2. See Giovanni Giolitti, *Memorie della mia vita*, intro. Olindo Malagodi, 2 vols. (Milan: Treves, 1922), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi. The English translation of Giolitti's memoirs was first published in a limited edition (in London by Dodd and Chapman) in 1923 and has been reprinted: *Memoirs of My Life*, trans. Edward Storer (New York: Fertig, 1973).

3. On Giolitti's famous speech at Dronero (not Cuneo, as Gramsci mistakenly writes), see Notebook 8, §83, n. 11.

4. Giolitti, who had been prime minister four times before the war, headed the government one last time between June 1920 and July 1921.

§98. *Father Bresciani's progeny. G. Papini*

1. Gramsci discusses Giovanni Papini's article on Benedetto Croce later in this notebook, in §105.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

2. See Giovanni Papini, "L'Edipo di Gide" (Gide's Oedipus), in the *Corriere della sera* of March 10, 1932.

André Gide's three-act play *Oedipe* was published for the first time in 1931 (Paris: Pléiade).

§99. *Past and present*

1. Francesco Orestano (1873–1945), born in Palermo, studied law at the university of his native city and philosophy at the University of Leipzig. After completing his studies, Orestano joined the faculty of his alma mater and later moved to the University of Rome. Considered a major fascist intellectual, he was Giovanni Gentile's rival for the unofficial title of philosopher of the Fascist regime. Orestano, who also served as president of the Italian Philosophical Society, was inducted into the Accademia d'Italia in 1929. His earliest writings were on Kant and Nietzsche; later, he claimed to have moved beyond the Kantian notion of critique and formulated what he described as a philosophy of surrealism.

The source of the quotation from *Il Tevere* that Gramsci alludes to has not been traced; neither has the negative characterization of Francesco Orestano been located in *Il Tevere* itself. The Rome newspaper *Il Tevere*, which often functioned as Mussolini's unofficial mouthpiece, was founded in 1924 by Telesio Interlandi (1894–1965), who became one of the most vociferous promoters of Nazi-inspired racist ideology and anti-Semitism. The editorship of *Il Tevere* was subsequently passed on to Giorgio Almirante (1914–88), who would later serve as minister of popular culture in the Republic of Salò. After the war, Almirante was a founding member of the neo-Fascist party, Movimento Sociale Italiano.

§100. *Past and present. The belch of the parish priest and other supercountryisms*

1. On Luigi Credaro, minister of education between 1910 and 1914, see Notebook 1, §41, n. 1.

2. Cesare De Lollis, *Reisebilder e altri scritti* (Bari: Laterza, 1929), pp. 9–10. Gramsci had a copy of this book at Turi.

On Cesare De Lollis, see Notebook 6, §42, n. 6.

3. See Corrado Ricci, "I nomi delle strade" (Street names), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1439 (March 1, 1930): 22-30. Ricci refers to his own intervention in the senate debate at the beginning of his article.

Corrado Ricci (1858-1934) was the director of the Uffizi galleries and museum in Florence when in 1906 he was appointed Italy's general director of antiquities and the fine arts, charged with overseeing the preservation and restoration of the country's artistic patrimony. Several of his books on architecture and art history have been published in English.

4. A stock character created by the Milanese poet and dramatist Carlo Maria Maggi (1630-99), Meneghino is an unrefined but astute underling whose common sense and good humor help highlight the flaws of the upper classes. In Lombard carnivals, the figure of Meneghino in his commedia dell'arte-style mask and costume personifies the people of Milan.

§101. *Past and present. Italian parliament*

1. On the Albertine Statute, which became the constitution of the unified Kingdom of Italy, see Notebook 5, §70, n. 7.

2. The following extract from Stuart Woolf's *History of Italy* provides a succinct account of the convoluted political situation and constitutional crisis that developed in the wake of Piedmont's severe defeat by the Austrians in the battle of Novara on March 23, 1849—a defeat that represented a very serious setback in the war for Italian independence and induced the king, Carlo Alberto, to abdicate in favor of his son Vittorio Emanuele—and culminated in the proclamation of Moncalieri:

The survival of the Piedmontese Statute after Novara probably owed more to the traditional anti-Austrian policy of this dynastic state than to any other factor. The new king, Victor Emmanuel II . . . had opposed his father's renewal of the war against Austria, was authoritarian in character, and despised the democratic *canaille*. But Novara left him with a defeated army, a hostile nobility and senate, Genoa in revolt and a strongly patriotic democratic majority in the lower chamber. The revocation of the Statute would have led to civil war, even to a democratic revolution as in Tuscany or Rome. The king's main hope of regaining prestige and authority for the dynasty lay with [Prime Minister Massimo] D'Azeglio and the moderates, whose anti-Austrian patriotism was by now solidly welded to their belief in constitutionalism. The Statute could be used as a legal and peaceable instrument to curb the democrats, as the king explained to [the Austrian military commander and governor of northern Italy] Radetzky. . . . Radetzky's fear of provoking French intervention . . . , his (illusory) hopes of pacifying this most turbulent of all Ital-

ian states by drawing the young king within the Austrian orbit, explain the extremely lenient armistice he granted this twice-defeated enemy.

The protracted negotiations over a peace treaty revealed the contradictory pressures on the king. . . . In Piedmont, not only reactionaries . . . but even traditional liberals . . . saw an Austrian alliance and the abolition of the Statute as the only solution. But the moderates rallied alongside D'Azeglio. . . . General Dabormida, who was responsible for the negotiations with Austria, was convinced that revocation of the Statute would be catastrophic. . . .

The difficulty for D'Azeglio and his colleagues was that the democratic majority in the chamber refused to accept what it regarded as a humiliating peace. D'Azeglio called new elections in July 1849, in which the king appealed to the electorate; the apathy was such that only 30,000 of the 87,000 electorate voted, returning a democratic majority. The king accepted the peace of Milan (6 August 1849) as lay within his powers according to the Statute, but the democrats delayed its ratification. . . . Constitutional government, as interpreted by D'Azeglio and the king, had become impossible: the hostile majority in the chamber refused to approve the budget for more than a month at a time. Pressure for a coup increased. . . . D'Azeglio appealed constantly to the state of emergency, the "exceptional times," and threatened the opposition with a reactionary government if it did not give support. Finally he dissolved parliament again and stretched the Statute to its limit by issuing in the king's name from [the royal chateau of] Moncalieri a proclamation denouncing the opposition (20 November 1849): "With the dissolution of the chamber of deputies, the liberties of the country are not in any danger. . . . But if the country, if the electors deny me their support, the responsibility for the future will no longer fall upon me." . . . A massive vote returned a solid moderate majority.

The weakness of D'Azeglio's stand against the democrats was that it blurred the distinction between the constitutional moderates and the reactionaries. It also reinforced the autonomy of the king. (Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy: 1700-1860* [London: Routledge, 1991], pp. 432-34)

3. Gramsci had alluded to Sidney Sonnino's article "Torniamo allo statuto" (Return to the statute) in an article, "Il manifesto dei socialisti" (The socialists' manifesto), he published in *L'ordine nuovo* of April 13, 1921. His comments on the same article in this note, however, may have been prompted by Benedetto Croce's observations on Sonnino's position concerning the constitution:

Sonnino, who had been a minister under Crispi, believing that Italy was seriously threatened by two dangers, socialism and clericalism, and

declaring that he desired neither Caesarism nor any other form of autocracy but only to save the liberal tradition of Italy, pronounced in favor of a "return to the Statute," that is, the abolition of the parliamentary regime by which ministers were chosen by and dependent on the Chamber, and a return to the system which made them ministers of the sovereign, with the consequent strengthening of the power of the executive. His article, which appeared in the *Nuova Antologia* (1 January 1897), raised discussion, and it implied, in a sense, going beyond Crispi, who had contented himself with extraordinary and temporary measures, whereas Sonnino frankly advocated constitutional reform. (Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy: 1871-1915*, trans. Cecilia M. Ady [New York: Russell and Russell, 1963], pp. 203-4)

In the original Italian, this passage is on p. 333 of B. Croce's *Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915*, 3d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1928), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

On Giorgio Sidney Sonnino, see Notebook 1, §114, n. 1.

§102. *Past and present*

1. See Gioacchino Volpe, "23 marzo 1919-27 ottobre 1922" (March 23, 1919-October 27, 1922), *Corriere della sera*, March 22, 1932. His article covers the development of the fascist movement from the formation of the first "fascio" to the eve of the March on Rome.

On Gioacchino Volpe, see Notebook 2, §100, n. 3.

2. See Gioacchino Volpe, *Guerra, dopoguerra, fascismo* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1928), which is a collection of articles Volpe wrote between 1913 and 1927.

3. See Gioacchino Volpe, "Fascismo al governo: 1922-1932" (Fascism in government: 1922-1932), *Corriere della sera*, March 23, 1932.

§103. *On China*

1. Gramsci's source of information on M. T. Z. Tyau and the volume he edited, *Two Years of Nationalist China* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1930), is a review by Dario Sabatello, "Tre libri sulla Cina" (Three books on China), in *L'Italia letteraria* 3, no. 39 (September 27, 1931).

§104. *Father Bresciani's progeny. A. Luzio*

1. Alessandro Luzio, "La morte di Ugo Bassi e di Anita Garibaldi" (The death of Ugo Bassi and of Anita Garibaldi), *Corriere della sera*, March 25, 1932. In the quotations from this article that follow, all the emphases are Gramsci's.

On Alessandro Luzio, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 45.

2. On the Jesuit priest Antonio Bresciani, see Notebook 1, "Notes and Jottings," n. 6.

3. See Francesco De Sanctis, "*L'Ebreo di Verona* del padre Bresciani" (Father Bresciani's *Jew of Verona*), in *Saggi critici*, ed. P. Arcari (Milan: Treves, 1924), 1:91–115, of which Gramsci received a copy when he was in prison in Milan.

On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

Antonio Bresciani's novel *L'Ebreo di Verona*, first published in *La civiltà cattolica* in 1850–51, has been published in English as *The Jew of Verona* (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1854).

5. Antonio Bresciani's novel *Don Giovanni ossia il benefattore occulto* (Milan: Arcivescovile Boniardi-Pogliani di E. Besozzi, 1857) was first published in installments in *La civiltà cattolica*.

§105. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Papini as a Jesuit apprentice*

1. Giovanni Papini, "Croce e la croce" (Croce and the cross), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1439 (March 1, 1932): 4–21. In this article, Papini criticizes Croce's secularism and liberalism, especially as it manifests itself in his history of Europe after the French Revolution, *Storia d'Europa del secolo decimonono* (Bari: Laterza, 1932). Gramsci had already alluded to this article earlier in this notebook, in §98.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

2. The title of Papini's article is a play on words: *croce* is Italian for "cross."

§106. *Past and present. The Italian language in Malta*

1. See the unsigned article "Malta: Per concludere" (Malta: To conclude) in the *Corriere della sera* of March 25, 1932. The article discusses a speech by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the British secretary of state for the colonies, about restricting the teaching of Italian in Malta and the negative reactions it generated.

2. On the concordat, see Notebook 4, §53, n. 1.

The language question and the configuration of political parties on the island of Malta were thoroughly intertwined. In 1932 the British colonial rulers agreed to permit elections in Malta under a constitution that gave the country a limited form of self-government. The two major parties contesting the elections were the pro-Italian Nationalist Party and the pro-British Constitutional Party. The Nationalists won in a landslide, and the following year Britain revoked the constitution. Although the lingua franca on the island has always been Maltese, for centuries the dominant cultural influence in Malta, after the Catholic Church, was Italian, and

the two were, for the most part, inseparable. The advent of British rule obviously favored the spread of English and greatly increased exposure to British culture. Nonetheless, Italian remained the formal language used in the law courts and in ecclesiastical circles until 1934, when the British colonial minister's decree made English and Maltese (for which a uniform orthographic system had yet to be established) the official languages of the island. At the same time, Italy was trying hard to reinforce Italian culture on the island, especially since the Fascist regime considered Malta part of *Italia irredenta* (unredeemed Italy). Among other things, it funded the establishment and staffing of the Istituto di Cultura Italiana in the capital, Valletta, which opened with great fanfare in February 1932 with two members of the Accademia d'Italia—Ugo Ojetti and Angiolo Silvio Novaro—as special guests. As part of its promotion of Italian culture in Malta, the Istituto organized lavish events and sponsored numerous visits to the island by Italian artists, musicians, dramatists, and intellectuals, among them, Silvio D'Amico, Francesco Ercole, Arturo Stanghellini, Pericle Ducati, Luigi Orsini, Valentino Piccoli, and Gioacchino Volpe (to mention only those whose names also appear in Gramsci's notebooks). In July 1936, the British rulers of Malta ordered the Istituto to close.

§107. *Encyclopedic notions. Reich*

1. See, for example, the article by Werner von der Schulenburg, "Brüning, Hitler, Hugenberg," *Gerarchia* 12, no. 1 (January 1932): 55-60.

§109. *The intellectuals. Church Latin and the vernacular in the Middle Ages*

1. Gramsci translated this passage into Italian from Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.), pp. 160-61. The emphasis is Gramsci's. Although this book is not among Gramsci's books that have been preserved, he must have had access to it (and possibly owned a copy of it) at Turi.

2. The bibliographic data recorded here are from a note on p. 160 of Lanson's *Histoire*.

§110. *Journalism. Review of the press*

1. On Charles Maurras and *L'action française*, see Notebook 1, §14, n. 1.

2. "Scampoli" (Remnants, or Scraps) is the general heading under which Giacinto Serrati published his often polemical and sardonic articles in *Avanti!*

On Giacinto Menotti Serrati, see Notebook 1, §116, n. 5.

3. Mario Missiroli wrote a regular column, "Opinioni" (Opinions), for the daily newspaper of Bologna, *Il resto del Carlino*, which he also edited. Close to two hundred of these short pieces were selected by Giuseppe Prezzolini and published as a book: Mario Missiroli, *Opinioni* (Florence: La Voce, 1921), a copy of which is preserved with the books Gramsci owned before his arrest. Later, Missiroli published a regular column with the same title in *La stampa* of Turin.

On Mario Missiroli, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

§111. Religion

1. On Hippolyte Taine, see Notebook 5, §28, n. 1.

On Charles Maurras, see Notebook 1, §14, n. 1.

2. In *Pagine sulla guerra*, rev. ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1928), Benedetto Croce describes Paul Bourget's novel *Le disciple* as a "masterpiece in reverse" and as "a Stendhalian mess . . . made stupid by the infusion of a silly sense of moral-philosophical tragedy" (p. 188).

On Paul Bourget and his novel *Le disciple*, see Notebook 3, §37, n. 4.

§112. History as the history of liberty and liberalism

1. In all probability, Gramsci is referring to the text of what are now the first three chapters ("La religione della libertà," "Le fedi opposte," and "Il romanticismo" ["The Religion of Liberty," "Opposing Religious Faiths," and "The Romantic Movement," respectively]) of Benedetto Croce's *Storia d'Europa del secolo decimonono* (Bari: Laterza, 1932), first presented in the form of lectures and published in Naples in 1931 as a booklet entitled *Capitoli introduttivi di una Storia dell'Europa nel secolo decimonono* that was brought out by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences of the Royal Society of Naples. In a letter dated April 18, 1932, Gramsci informs Tatiana Schucht, apropos of Croce's *Storia d'Europa*: "I have already read the book's introductory chapters, because they had appeared in a separate booklet some months ago" (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:162). Gramsci would later receive a copy of Croce's *Storia d'Europa*. For an English translation, see Benedetto Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Henry Furst (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1933).

2. Before his arrest, Gramsci owned six of the seven volumes of Pietro Vigo's documentary record of late-nineteenth-century Italian history, *Annali d'Italia: Storia degli ultimi trent'anni del secolo XIX* (Milan: Treves, 1908-15). He had these volumes sent to him in prison (see his letter to Tatiana Schucht, December 27, 1926), and he had them at Turi. In this note, Gramsci is alluding to the following observation by Vigo: "Those

who espoused totally anticlerical ideas were called liberals, an appellation that, with the passage of time and the unfolding of events, acquired a broader meaning, so that the term "liberal" came to be applied to anyone who wanted to free public and private life completely from the influence and actions of the church" (1:22).

3. Benedetto Croce's *Eternità e storicità della filosofia* (Rieti: Bibliotheca Editrice, 1930) is a collection of short articles by Croce that was published as part of the "Quaderni critici" (Critical notebooks) edited by Domenico Petrini. Of special interest is the article "Interpretazione storica delle proposizioni filosofiche" (Historical interpretation of philosophical propositions) that Gramsci alludes to in Notebook 10, II, §41.ix. Gramsci asked Tatiana Schucht to send him a copy of this booklet by Croce (see the letter of December 1, 1930), and it is preserved with the books he had at Turi.

§113. *History of the intellectuals. Humanism*

1. See Notebook 1, §122 and §153. Gramsci revisits this topic later in this notebook, in §229.

§114. *Machiavelli. Jean Bodin*

1. Gramsci extracted this biographical and bibliographical information about Jean Bodin from Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.), p. 316. When composing this note, Gramsci may also have been looking at Federico Chabod's three-part article "Giovanni Botero" in *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 4, no. 5 (September-October, 1931): 251-85; 4, no. 6 (November-December, 1931): 341-69; and 5, no. 1 (January-February, 1932): 19-57.

Each of the three works by Jean Bodin briefly described in this note are available in English: *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, ed. Kenneth D. McRae (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); and *Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime*, trans. M. L. D. Kuntz (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

2. Antonio Panella in fact wrote a sequence of eight articles entitled "Gli antimachiavellici" (The anti-Machiavellians) that were published in *Il marzocco* 31, no. 47 (November 21, 1926); 31, no. 49 (December 5, 1926); 31, no. 51 (December 19, 1926); 32, no. 3 (January 16, 1927); 32, no. 6 (February 6, 1927); 32, no. 8 (February 20, 1927); 32, no. 10 (March 6, 1932); and 32, no. 11 (March 13, 1927).

On Antonio Panella, see Notebook 6, §13, n. 1.

§115. *Father Bresciani's progeny*

1. Luigi Tomacelli, "Profili: Pietro Mignosi" (Profiles: Pietro Mignosi), *L'Italia che scrive* 25, no. 3 (March 1932): 65.

On Pietro Mignosi, see Notebook 1, §75, n. 1.

On Luigi Tonelli, see Notebook 3, §73, n. 1.

§116. *Past and present. Phlipot*

1. The contents of this note are extracted from Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.), pp. 218 and 212n.

§118. *The Italian Risorgimento*

1. All the information in the note is derived from Giuseppe A. Andriulli's review of the first volume of Antonio Lucarelli's history of the Risorgimento in Apulia, in *L'Italia che scrive* 15, no. 3 (March 1932): 81.

2. The first Jacobin "clubs"—in effect, small French-inspired clandestine groups of republican and democratic idealists and militants—were formed in the Kingdom of Naples around 1792. Their conspiratorial plans to overthrow the monarchy were quickly thwarted, and many of the leaders were imprisoned or fled to other parts of Italy, such as Lombardy, Liguria, and Rome.

§119. *Past and present. The events of June 1914*

1. See Gaetano Salvemini (who used the nom de plume Rerum Scriptor), "Una rivoluzione senza programma" (A revolution without a program), *Unità* 3, no. 25 (June 19, 1914): 531.

On the "red week" of June 1914, see Notebook 3, §42, n. 9, and §143, n. 1.

On Gaetano Salvemini, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 19.

2. See Notebook 1, §44, n. 20.

3. On January 6, 1913, government troops fired on agricultural workers who were staging a peaceful demonstration at Roccagorda (in the Lazio region) demanding better living conditions. There were numerous casualties, including seven or eight dead. Around the same time, similar demonstrations in Comiso (Sicily) and Baganzola (Parma) were also violently repressed by government troops. Giovanni Giolitti was prime minister at the time.

4. See part 9 of Adolfo Omodeo's serial publication of "Momenti della vita di guerra: Dai diari e delle lettere dei caduti" (Moments in the life of war: From the diaries and letters of the fallen), in *La critica* 30, no. 1 (Janu-

ary 20, 1932): 27-42; the quotation is from pp. 29-30. This work was later published as a book with the same title (Bari: Laterza, 1934).

Ignazio di Trabia, a Sicilian aristocrat who pursued a military career, was the son of Prince Pietro Lanza di Scalea (1863-1938) of Palermo, who was first elected to parliament in 1897. A member of Giovanni Giolitti's cabinet between 1911 and 1914, Pietro Lanza was named minister of war by Prime Minister Luigi Facta in 1922. Two years later, he was appointed minister of the colonies, a position he held until 1926. Lanza was named senator in 1929.

On Adolfo Omodeo, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 7.

5. On January 7, 1913, Mussolini, who had just become editor of *Avanti!* published an article in the socialist paper under the headline "Assassinio di stato" (Assassination by the state) in which he described the bloody events of Roccagorga and elsewhere as the "slaughtering of proletarians." It was the beginning of a persistent and fierce antigovernment campaign carried out through the pages of *Avanti!* The authorities reacted by indicting Mussolini and five others affiliated with the paper (Eugenio Guarino, Giuseppe Scalarini, Francesco Ciccotti, Silvano Fasulo, and Aurelio Galassi). At the trial, which took place in Milan between March 26 and April 1, 1914, the witnesses for the defense included a number of individuals who had survived the violent onslaughts by the government forces. The testimony of the survivors was reported in detail in the pages of *Avanti!* and subsequently collected in a booklet, *L'eccidio di Roccagorga* (Milan: Avanti! 1914), with which Gramsci was certainly familiar.

Ten years later, Gramsci published a scathing attack on Mussolini, who by then had "seized power and [was] holding on to it by means of the most violent and arbitrary repression." In his article "Capo" (Leader), which appeared on the front page of the newly relaunched (third series) *Ordine nuovo* 1, no. 1 (March 1924), Gramsci recalled how Mussolini had taken advantage of the events of Roccagorga; it was, Gramsci maintained, a foreshadowing of the hollowness of his vaunted leadership qualities:

In Italy we have the fascist régime, we have Benito Mussolini as fascism's leader, we have an official ideology in which the "leader" is deified, declared to be infallible, prophesied as the organizer and inspirer of a reborn Holy Roman Empire. We see printed in the newspapers, every day, scores and hundreds of telegrams of homage from the vast local tribes to the "leader." We see the photographs: the hardened mask of a face which we have already seen at socialist meetings. We know that face: we know that rolling of the eyes in their sockets, eyes which in the past sought with their ferocious movements to bring shudders to the bourgeoisie, and today seek to do the same to the proletariat. We know that fist always clenched in a threat. We know the whole mechanism, the whole paraphernalia, and we understand that it may impress and tug

at the heartstrings of bourgeois school-children. It is really impressive, even when seen close to, and has an awesome effect. But "leader"?

We saw the Red Week of June 1914. More than three million workers were on the streets, called out by Benito Mussolini, who for about a year since the Roccagorga massacre had been preparing them for the great day, with all the oratorical and journalistic means at the disposal of the then "leader" of the Socialist Party, of Benito Mussolini—from Scalarini's lampoon to his great trial at the Milan Assizes. Three million workers were on the streets: but the "leader," Benito Mussolini, was missing. He was missing as a "leader," not as an individual; for people say that as an individual he was courageous, and defied the cordons and the muskets of the carabinieri in Milan. He was missing as a "leader," because he was not one. Because, by his own admission, within the leadership of the Socialist Party he could not even manage to get the better of the wretched intrigues of Arturo Vella or Angelica Balabanoff. [Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Political Writings: 1921-1926*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990], p. 211]

6. See Adolfo Omodeo, *L'età del Risorgimento Italiano*, rev. ed. (Messina: Principato, 1931), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

§120. *Past and present. 1915*

1. On Antonio Salandra, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 20.

On Giorgio Sidney Sonnino, see Notebook 1, §114, n. 1.

2. Italy formally declared war on Austria on May 24, 1915. On the negotiations that resulted in the Pact of London and Italy's entry into the war, see, inter alia, Notebook 3, §131, nn. 1-3, and Notebook 8, §64, nn. 1 and 2.

3. See Antonio Salandra, *L'intervento (1915): Ricordi e pensieri* (Milan: Mondadori, 1930), especially pp. 184-86 and 322-28. Gramsci had a copy of this volume at Turi. On Salandra's memoirs, see also Notebook 3, §131, n. 1.

4. Gramsci obtained the information on Count Ottokar Czernin's memoirs from an obituary published by the *Corriere della sera* on April 6, 1932, two days after Czernin's death. Ottokar Czernin's memoirs, *Im Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1919), have been translated into English: *In the World War* (New York: Cassell, 1919).

Count Ottokar Czernin (1872-1932), born in Bohemia, was appointed foreign minister of Austria-Hungary by the emperor Karl I in December 1916. Czernin had no choice but to resign in April 1918 when the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, revealed that in an effort to extricate Austria from the war, Czernin had participated in secret negotiations with the Entente in 1917. The negotiations had been brokered by Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma (brother of the empress Zita), and they broke

down because of Italy's firm demands for the ceding of territory, including Trieste (as stipulated in the Pact of London), that Austria deemed excessive and unacceptable.

5. On Luigi Cadorna, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 10.

§121. *Bibliographies. The Rivista Militare Italiana*

1. Mariano D'Ayala (1808-77), born in Messina, attended military school in Naples and served as an officer in the army of the Bourbon kingdom before he exiled himself from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and became an active participant in the movement for the liberation and unification of the country.

2. On Pietro Badoglio, see Notebook 2, §27, n. 1.

3. The information in this note is extracted from a note on the *Rivista militare italiana* signed by Varo Varanini and published in *L'Italia letteraria* 8, no. 10 (March 6, 1932).

§123. *Past and present. Balance sheet of the war*

1. See Camillo Pellizzi, "Libri inglesi sull'Italia: *The War on the Italian Front*" (Books on Italy in English: The war on the Italian front), in the *Corriere della sera* of April 7, 1932.

Luigi Villari (1876-1959), on whose lack of seriousness Gramsci makes a caustic comment in Notebook 5, §106, inundated British newspapers and periodicals with articles extolling Fascism. He also managed to get his books published in English by highly respected presses—for example, *The Awakening of Italy: The Fascist Regeneration* (London: Methuen, 1924), *The Fascist Experiment* (London: Faber and Gwyer, 1926), and *Bolshevism, Fascism, and Capitalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). He was also the author of the article "Fascism" in the 1926 supplement of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Gaetano Salvemini described Villari as "the most active propaganda agent of Fascism in the English-speaking world" (*Under the Axe of Fascism* [New York: Viking, 1937], p. 7).

On Camillo Pellizzi, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 20.

§124. *The economic-corporative phase in Italian history. The Lepanto enterprise*

1. Gramsci extracted the information on Alfonso Salimei's book *Gli italiani a Lepanto* (Rome: Velletri, Zampetti e Figlio, 1931) and on the battle of Lepanto from an item entitled "Gli italiani a Lepanto" (The Italians at Lepanto) in the "Biblioteca di cultura" (Cultural library) section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 49 (December 6, 1931).

2. A. Dragonetti De Torres's book on the diplomatic correspondence between Pius V's nuncio and Philip II of Spain concerning the Lepanto League was reviewed in the "Biblioteca di cultura" section of *Il marzocco* 36, no. 26 (June 28, 1931); this is the likely source of Gramsci's bibliographical annotation.

§125. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*

1. See Ugo Ojetti, "Dopo la fiera nazionale di Firenze: Arti e artigiani d'Italia" (After the Florence national fair: Arts and artisans of Italy), *Corriere della sera*, April 10, 1932.

On Ugo Ojetti, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 4.

2. The Italian word used here is "*compagno*."

§126. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*

1. Gramsci's source of information on Luigi Sorrento and his booklet on the Middle Ages as a concept is Oreste Trebbi's review in *L'Italia che scrive* 15, no. 3 (March 1932): 81.

2. On Carlo Cipolla, see Notebook 3, §46, n. 4.

§127. *History of the subaltern classes. La bohème. Charles Baudelaire*

1. In February 1848, Baudelaire launched a periodical, *Le salut public*, with the collaboration of, among others, Champfleury (pseudonym of Jules Husson). The periodical ceased publication after only one issue.

2. The relatively long quotation and the precise indication of where it is located in the unpaginated introduction leave little room for doubt that Gramsci had a copy of or direct access to this edition (which is not dated but was in fact published in 1930) of Baudelaire's *Les fleurs du mal* and other poems, with a previously unpublished introductory essay by Henri Régnier. It is not, however, preserved among his books, nor is there any mention of it in his letters.

§128. *Economic science*

1. Charles Gide and Charles Rist make the following observations on Ricardo's methods and Marx's in their *Histoire des doctrines économiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours*, 5th ed. (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929), a copy of which Gramsci had at Turi:

[Ricardo's] principal work is devoid of a plan, its chapters being mere fragments placed in juxtaposition. His use of the hypothetical method and the

constant appeal to imaginary conditions make its reading a task of great difficulty. This abstract method has long held domain over the Mathematical economists. . . . But obscurity of style has not clouded his fame. Indeed, it has stood him in good stead, as it did Marx at a later date. . . .

We have already had occasion to remark that Ricardo also owes a good deal more to the observation of facts than is generally believed, and his practice of postulating imaginary conditions is of course notorious. The impertinent Marxian who still wishes to defend some of the more untenable theories of Marx, such as his doctrine of labour-value, generally finds himself forced to admit that Marx had supposed (the use of suppositions is an unfailing mark of Ricardian influence) the existence of society wherein labour would be always uniform in quality. (C. Gide and C. Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines from the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day*, trans. R. Richards, 2d ed. [Boston: Heath, 1948], pp. 138-89, 466)

§129. *Catholic Action*

1. "The Center" refers to the Zentrumspartei, the Catholic party founded in Germany in 1870.

2. In 1886, when the Center Party rejected the German chancellor's demand for a seven-year military budget, Bismarck made a direct appeal to the Vatican seeking cooperation and support in exchange for a thaw in the Kulturkampf. Despite strong pressure from the Vatican, the Center Party, asserting its political autonomy, still refused to approve the military budget. Bismarck dissolved parliament and called new elections.

§130. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics. Statolatry*

1. Gramsci is referring to the page number in his manuscript; see §142 in this Notebook.

§131. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics*

1. The motto is translated into Italian as "Beato il popolo che ha Dio per suo Signore" (Blessed is the nation whose Lord is God) in "Ai nostri lettori ed amici" (To our readers and friends), *La civiltà cattolica* 83, no. 2 (April 2, 1932): 3-5.

2. Gramsci may have learned of Giovanni Luzzi's annotated translation of the Bible, *La Bibbia tradotta dai testi originali annotata*, 12 vols. (Florence: Società Fides et Amor, 1921-30), from a note by Giuseppe Ricciotti in the "Note e rassegne" (Notes and reviews) section of *La nuova antologia* 67, no. 1436 (January 16, 1932): 281.

§132. *Machiavelli. Passion*

1. See Notebook 7, §39.

§133. *Lorianism. Giuseppe De Lorenzo*

1. Giuseppe De Lorenzo (1871–1957), a professor of geology at the University of Naples, was named senator in 1913. De Lorenzo also had a deep interest in both Western and Eastern philosophy; in addition to numerous scientific papers and books, his publications include studies of Schopenhauer, Buddhism, and the religious tradition of India.

§134. *Past and present. A judgment on Paolo Boselli*

1. See Filippo Caparelli, "Paolo Boselli," *Gerarchia* 13, no. 3 (March 1932): 244–46. The parenthetical interjections are Gramsci's.

On Paolo Boselli, see Notebook 8, §83, nn. 2 and 10.

§135. *Popular literature*

1. Ernestina Brenna's book on popular educational literature in nineteenth-century Italy was reviewed by Emilia Formiggini-Santamaria in *L'Italia che scrive* 15, no. 3 (March 1932): 84–85.

2. That is, Alessandro Manzoni's classic novel, *The Betrothed* (1827).

3. On Massimo D'Azeglio, see Notebook 1, §121, n. 1.

4. On Giuseppe Giusti, see Notebook 5, §42, n. 1.

5. On Giovanni Pascoli, see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3.

On Ada Negri, see Notebook 2, §47, n. 1.

6. The *maggi* (singular "*maggio*," as in the month of May) are a form of popular dramatic poetry (with heroic motifs) sung to a simple melody by large groups. Customarily performed outdoors, the *maggi* are associated with celebrations of the arrival of spring.

7. The *cantastorie*, literally, singers of tales, were street performers who sang or narrated stories of chivalric and heroic deeds.

8. The parenthetical observations are Gramsci's.

9. The parenthetical comment is Gramsci's.

10. On Carolina Invernizio, see Notebook 3, §63, n. 11.

§136. *Characteristics of Italian literature*

1. Piero Rébora, "Libri italiani ed editori inglesi" (Italian books and English publishers), *L'Italia che scrive* 4, no. 11 (March 13, 1932): 69–70.

Piero Rébora, born in Milan in 1889, completed his postgraduate studies in Liverpool and later was professor and head of the Department of

English at the University of Manchester. Late in his career, he was appointed professor of English at the University of Milan.

§137. *Popular literature*

1. Gramsci learned of Ernesto Brunetto's article on serial novels and their authors from the "Rassegna della stampa" (Review of the press) section of *L'Italia letteraria* 4, no. 11 (March 13, 1932).

§139. *Risorgimento. Garibaldi and the phrase "cubic meter of dung"*

1. See Alessandro Luzio, *Profili biografici e bozzetti storici*, 2 vols. (Milan: L. F. Cogliati, 1927-28).

On Alessandro Luzio, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 45.

2. On Giuseppe Cesare Abba, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 27.

3. On Giosuè Carducci, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 17.

4. Alessandro Luzio, "Garibaldi e Pio IX" (Garibaldi and Pius IX), *Corriere della sera*, April 15, 1932. All the parenthetical interjections are Gramsci's.

§140. *Past and present. Malta*

1. Nerik Mizzi (1885-1950), son of Fortunato, the founder of the Nationalist Movement in Malta, was himself a founding member and coleader of the Nationalist Party that was formed in 1924. At the time Gramsci wrote this note, Mizzi was minister of education under the system of limited self-government that Britain conceded to its island colony. Mizzi, a promoter of Italian culture in his native country, had very close and extensive ties with Italy throughout his political career. In 1940 the British authorities arrested him and deported him to Uganda together with several other Italian sympathizers who were deemed to be a security risk in wartime. There is no evidence that Nerik Mizzi was among the founders of the Italian Nationalist Party, formed in December 1910; at the time, Mizzi was a twenty-five-year-old law student at the University of Urbino.

This note may have been prompted by something Gramsci read in the *Rassegna settimanale della stampa estera* or in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, both of which he was receiving at Turi.

2. On Enrico Corradini, see Notebook 1, §58, n. 3.

On Luigi Federzoni, see Notebook 2, §25, n. 1.

On Francesco Coppola, see Notebook 1, §35, n. 1.

§142. *Encyclopedic notions and cultural topics. Individual initiative*

1. Gramsci is referring to the pagination of his manuscript; see §130 in this notebook.

2. On the Perrone brothers, see Notebook 1, §116, n. 10.

3. Gramsci had a copy of Richard Lewinsohn, *Histoire de l'inflation: Le déplacement de la richesse en Europe (1914-1925)*, trans. H. Simondet (Paris: Payot, 1926). He refers to it as an "interesting book" in the letter he wrote Piero Sraffa from Ustica on January 2, 1927, and again in his letter of May 23, 1927 (from the prison in Milan), to Tatiana Schucht. Gramsci also took note of another work by Lewinsohn, *L'argent dans la politique* (Paris, 1931), in a short bibliographical list he jotted down on the back endpaper of the manuscript of Notebook 6 (see the Description of the Manuscript).

§144. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*

1. Gramsci extracted the bibliographical information on Giulio Rezasco's dictionary of Italian administrative and historical language (published by Le Monnier) from an article by Federico Chabod, "Giovanni Botero," in *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 5, no. 1 (January-February 1932): 29-57; see, in particular, p. 41 n. 5.

Apropos of Rezasco's dictionary, Gramsci wrote in his letter of September 5, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht:

I would like to know whether you intend to send [Giulia] any books, because I could suggest the titles of some of them. . . . For example, she ought in my opinion to have at her disposal a whole series of specialized terms. A dictionary that she should definitely have is Rezasco's, which is entitled something like *Dizionario (or Vocabolario) della lingua italiana*, indispensable for the reading of Italian historical-political literature because of its juridical, political, administrative, military, etc., terms. But this dictionary is out of print and can be found only in secondhand bookstores and is probably quite expensive. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:205)

He repeated many of these comments about six weeks later in another letter (October 17, 1932) to Tatiana Schucht.

2. See Luigi Einaudi "Del modo di scrivere la storia del dogma economico" (On how to write the history of economic theory), *La riforma sociale* 43, no. 2 (March-April, 1932): 207-19; the comments on Rezasco are on p. 208.

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §111, n. 1.

§146. *Encyclopedic notions. University*

1. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the obsolete meanings of "university" is "a body or class of persons regarded collectively." The "università israelitiche" (literally, the Israelite universities)

in fact refers to Jewish communities or the Jewish population; the now archaic term was used in various legal decrees pertaining to the civil, political, and economic rights of Jews living in Italy. The "università agrarie" were forms of association and cooperation in rural communities that enabled the communal use of land.

§148. *Encyclopedic notions*

1. Roberto Michels's introductory book on the history of economic and political theory was reviewed by Luigi Einaudi in an article entitled "Del modo di scrivere la storia del dogma economico" (On how to write the history of economic theory), in *La riforma sociale* 43, no. 2 (March-April, 1932): 207-19.

On Roberto Michels, see Notebook 2, §45, n. 2.

2. In his article "Del modo di scrivere," Einaudi alludes to the *Dictionnaire de l'économie politique* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1873) but does not provide the bibliographical details, which Gramsci derived from some other source and inserted here at a later time.

Einaudi also mentions a dictionary by Palgrave, again without providing any details. He must have been alluding to the three-volume *Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy*, ed. Henry Higgs (London: Macmillan, 1923-26).

3. See Luigi Cossa, *Introduzione allo studio dell'economia politica*, 3d ed. (Milan: Hoepli, 1892), which has been translated into English as *An Introduction to the Study of Political Economy*, trans. Louis Dyer (New York: Macmillan, 1893); and Giuseppe Ricca-Salerno's history of the theory of finance in Italy, *Storia delle dottrine finanziarie in Italia col raffronto delle dottrine forestiere e delle istituzioni e condizioni di fatto*, 2d ed. (Palermo: Reber, 1896). Einaudi mentions both these works in passing in "Del modo di scrivere," without providing any details—hence, also, the inaccurate title given for Cossa's book.

§149. *Cultural topics*

1. The information reproduced here in square brackets was inserted by Gramsci some time after he first composed this note. The rest of the information he probably derived from two sources: Giuseppe Bottai's introduction to the "Nuova collana di economisti" (New book series of economists), published by UTET of Turin, that appeared in *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 4, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931): 238-40; and Luigi Einaudi's article "Per una nuova collana di economisti" (For a new book series of economists), in *La riforma sociale* 38, no. 7-8 (July-August, 1931): 394-99.

Pietro Custodi's book series *Scrittori Classici Italiani di Economia Politica* (Italian classics of political economy) was published in Milan between 1803 and 1816.

Francesco Ferrara (1810–1900) and Gerolamo Boccardo (1829–1904) were, respectively, the first and second of four editors-in-chief of the book series *Biblioteca dell'Economista* (The economist's library) that was published in Turin over a span of many years (1859–1922).

The *Biblioteca di Storia Economica* (Collection of economic history), launched and directed by Vilfredo Pareto and Ettore Ciccotti, was published in Milan between 1903 and 1915. On Vilfredo Pareto, see Notebook 4, §18, n. 6; and on Ettore Ciccotti, see Notebook 3, §15, n. 1.

On Giuseppe Bottai, see Notebook 5, §157, n. 1.

Attilio Brunialti (1849–1920), who launched the book series *Biblioteca di Scienze Politiche e Amministrative* (Library of political and administrative science), published by UTET of Turin, also founded the *Giornale delle colonie* and was among the first to write systematically on Italian colonialism. His books on the subject included *L'Italia e la questione coloniale* (Milan: Brigola, 1885) and *Le colonie degli Italiani* (Turin: UTET, 1897).

§150. *Encyclopedic notions. Demiurge*

1. On Filippo Burzio and his conception of the demiurge, see Notebook 1, §28, n. 3.

§151. *Cultural topics. Unnatural, natural, etc.*

1. Gramsci may have been thinking of one of Blaise Pascal's *pensées* that is quoted (in a slightly modified form) on p. 469 of Gustave Lanson's *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.): "Quelle est donc cette nature sujette à être effacée? La coutume est une seconde nature qui détruit la première. Pourquoi la coutume n'est-elle naturelle? J'ai bien peur que cette nature ne soit elle-même qu'une première coutume, comme la coutume est une seconde nature" (What, then, is this nature that can be effaced? Habit is a second nature that destroys the first. Why is habit not natural? I truly fear that this nature is itself nothing other than a first habit, just as habit is a second nature.)

2. See §153 below.

§153. *Cultural topics. Unnatural, natural, etc.*

1. See §156 below.

§154. *Past and present*

1. Franz Weiss's collection of articles, *Nuovo revisionismo: Saggi di revisionismo socialista nella dottrina e nella prassi* (Milan: A.N.S. Problemi del Lavoro, 1932) was reviewed in the journal *Problemi del lavoro* 6, no. 7 (July 1, 1932): 13.

On Franz Weiss, see Notebook 7, §24, and n. 4 there.

2. On Giovanni Ansaldo, see Notebook 1, §24, n. 5; Notebook 1, §44, n. 30; and Notebook 9, §11.

3. See Gramsci's comments on "Franz Weiss and his proverbs" in Notebook 9, §14.

4. On Corso Bovio, see Notebook 4, §73, and n. 1 there.

5. This is an allusion to the farcical character Sor Panera; see Notebook 6, §60, n. 2.

§155. *Past and present. Fables. Ideas on religion*

1. Gramsci is alluding to a Crocean position that is expounded most clearly in *Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono* (Bari: Laterza, 1932). See Notebook 7, §1, n. 6.

§156. *Cultural topics. Unnatural, natural, etc.*

1. See §151 and §153 in this Notebook.

2. Immanuel Kant wrote: "There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: *act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. . . .* Since the universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called *nature* in the most general sense (as regards its form)—that is, the existence of things insofar as it is determined in accordance with universal laws—the universal imperative of duty can also go as follows: *act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature*" (Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], p. 31).

3. Gramsci is referring to the pagination of his manuscript; see §159 in this notebook.

§157. *Cultural topics*

1. The quotation is taken from the report on the previous day's parliamentary session, published under the headline "Gazzera parla sulla difesa del paese" (Gazzera speaks on national defense), in the *Corriere della sera* of April 23, 1932.

Pietro Gazzera (1879–1953) was minister of war from 1929 until 1933, when Mussolini brought the ministry under his direct control and Gazzera was appointed to the senate.

§159. *Cultural topics. Natural, unnatural, etc.*

1. This is a continuation of the reflections in §§151, 153, and 156, earlier in this notebook.

§160. *Father Bresciani's progeny. Papini*

1. On Guido Manacorda, see Notebook 1, §72, n. 1.

2. Giovanni Papini, "Il Faust svelato" (Faust unveiled), *Corriere della sera*, April 26, 1932. Papini's article was occasioned by the publication of Manacorda's new critical edition of Goethe's masterpiece: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Il Faust: Versione integra dell'edizione critica di Weimar*, ed. Guido Manacorda, 2 vols. (Milan: Mondadori, 1932).

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

§161. *The question of the intellectuals. Sicily and Sardinia*

1. Giovanni Lorenzoni was one of the experts engaged by a parliamentary commission that was set up to examine the condition of agrarian workers in southern Italy and Sicily. In 1907 Lorenzoni produced an exhaustive study of the socioeconomic situation in Sicily that was later published as volume 6 of the commission's report: *Relazione della Commissione d'Inchiesta Parlamentare per accertare le condizioni dei lavoratori della terra nelle provincie meridionali e in Sicilia* (Rome: Bertero, 1909).

2. Giovanni Molè conducted an official study on landownership in Sicily for a permanent committee on internal migration in the ministry of public works; see Giovanni Molè, *Studio-inchiesta sui latifondi siciliani* (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1929).

The source of the data recorded by Gramsci in this note is an article by Emanuele De Cillis, "L'agricoltura nella Sicilia e nella Sardegna" (Agriculture in Sicily and Sardinia), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1441 (April 1, 1932): 375–87.

§162. *Machiavelli*

1. See Gino Arias, "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli" (Machiavelli's economic thought), in *Annali di Economia*, vol. 4 (Milan: Università Bocconi, 1928), pp. 1–31.

On this article, Gramsci's correspondence about it, and Gino Arias, see Notebook 6, §66, n. 1.

2. Arias's "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli" refers, in a footnote (p. 2 n. 2), to an essay on Machiavelli's political thought by Vincenzo Tangorra, "Il pensiero economico di Niccolò Machiavelli," that appeared in *Saggi critici di economia politica* (Turin: Bocca, 1900).

3. See Federico Chabod's "Giovanni Botero," published in three parts in *Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica* 4, no. 5 (September-October 1931): 251-84; 4, no. 6 (November-December, 1931): 341-69; 5, no. 1 (January-February, 1932): 29-57.

On Giovanni Botero, see Notebook 3, §141, n. 2.

Federico Chabod (1901-60), born in Aosta, was a distinguished historian who taught at the universities of Perugia, Milan, and Rome and in 1948 assumed the editorship of the *Rivista storica italiana*. In addition to his many studies on Renaissance political thought, Chabod also wrote on late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century Italian and European politics. During World War II, he was a leader of the resistance in the Val d'Aosta region.

4. See the following works by Mario De Bernardi, *Giovanni Botero economista* (Turin: Istituto Giuridico della Reale Università di Torino, 1931); "Appunti bibliografici intorno a Giovanni Botero" (Bibliographical notes concerning Giovanni Botero), in volume 65 (1930) of the *Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* (Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science of Turin); and "Il concetto di 'ragion di Stato' in Giovanni Botero e la filosofia della politica" (The concept of *raison d'état* in Giovanni Botero and political philosophy), in volume 64 (1929) of the *Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*. De Bernardi also edited the republication of the 1588 edition of Giovanni Botero's *Delle cause della grandezza delle città* (Turin: Istituto Giuridico della Reale Università di Torino, 1930). All these publications were reviewed in Luigi Einaudi's review essay "Di un quesito attorno alla nascita della scienza economica" (On a question regarding the birth of economic science), in *La riforma sociale* 43, no. 2 (March-April 1932): 219-25.

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §11, n. 1.

5. On the physiocrats, see Notebook 8, §78, n. 1.

6. See Gramsci's letter of March 14, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht, quoted in Notebook 6, §66, n. 1.

7. See Tatiana Schucht's letter of April 27, 1932, to Gramsci, quoted in Notebook 6, §66, n. 1, in which she conveys Sraffa's response to a query from Gramsci.

In *Capital*, Marx makes several references to William Petty, including the following: "Let me point out once and for all that by classical political economy I mean all the economists who, since the time of W. Petty, have investigated the real internal framework [*Zusammenhang*] of bourgeois relations of production, as opposed to the vulgar economists who only flounder around within the apparent framework of those relations" (Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes [London: Penguin, 1976], p. 174 n.

34). See also K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, ed. S. Ryazanskaya, trans. Emile Burns (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1963), 1:179–82.

Sir William Petty (1623–87), physician, statistician, economist, and a founding member of the Royal Society, was the author of, among other things, *A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions* (1662) and *Quantulumcunque Concerning Money* (1682).

8. Gramsci is referring to Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, ed. Karl Kautsky, 3 vols. (Stuttgart: J.H.W. Dietz, 1910). Before his arrest, Gramsci had a copy of this work in French translation: *Histoire de doctrines économiques*, trans. J. Molitor, 8 vols. (Paris: Costes, 1924–25). It was among the works that Gramsci asked Tatiana Schucht to send him in his letter of March 25, 1929. The eight slim volumes are preserved among Gramsci's books, but they are not stamped with the prison seal, which means that they were never delivered to him—perhaps because of a prohibition by the prison warden. The work has been translated into English; see K. Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, ed. S. Ryazanskaya and R. Dixon, trans. Renate Simpson, 3 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969–72).

§164. *Encyclopedic notions. Bibliography*

1. The collection of technical terms by Carlo Porro, *Terminologia geografica: Raccolta di vocaboli di geografia e scienze affini per uso degli studi di geografia generale e militare*, was first published by UTET of Turin in 1902 and reprinted the following year.

Giovanni Davinci's legal encyclopedia "for use by businessmen and educated persons," *L'avvocato di tutti: Piccola enciclopedia legale*, was first published by UTET of Turin in 1927. A revised edition with a new supplement was published in 1931.

Since both these reference works were published by UTET, it is very likely that Gramsci learned about them from the publisher's catalog or from other publicity material enclosed with the books that were mailed to him.

§165. *Oriani*

1. On Alfredo Oriani, see Notebook 4, §68, n. 2.

2. See Alfredo Oriani, *La lotta politica in Italia: Origini della lotta attuale, 476–1887* (Rome: L. Roux, 1892).

3. In the 1920s and 1930s, the nationalists and the fascists exalted the memory of Oriani and made of him one of their illustrious spiritual precursors. Mussolini appointed himself editor of Oriani's *Opera omnia* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1923–33), and Giovanni Gentile wrote an introduction to a new edition of *La lotta politica* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1929), while the literary periodicals and scholarly journals published innumerable articles about him.

Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism. Third Series§166. *Graziadei*

1. On Achille Loria, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 1.

2. Gramsci is alluding to the questions raised by Antonio Graziadei, questions that he also discusses in Notebook 1, §63, and Notebook 7, §23 and §42. See also the related Notes to the Text.

On Antonio Graziadei, see Notebook 1, §42, n. 3.

Johann Karl Rodbertus (1805-75), a Prussian economist, held that the maintenance of social and economic stability required the government to play a role in regulating the economy. He argued, for example, that increases in productivity do not necessarily bring with them higher wages and an improvement in the general standard of living but tend rather to benefit disproportionately the minority of property owners. The imbalance could only be prevented or corrected by government intervention. In *Capital*, Marx cites Rodbertus's *Sociale Briefe an von Kirchmann: Dritter Brief* (Berlin, 1851) and comments that "in spite of its erroneous theory of rent, it sees through the nature of capitalist production." Marx provides a detailed critique of Rodbertus's theories in part 2, chapters 8 and 9, of the *Theories of Surplus Value* (on which, see Notebook 8, §162, n. 8). In the third German edition of *Capital*, Engels added a note in which he quotes a letter by Rodbertus that epitomizes both his view on wages and his disdain for Marx:

"Capital must be rescued not only from labor, but from itself, and that will be best effected by treating the acts of the industrial capitalist as economic and political functions that have been delegated to him with his capital and by treating his profit as a form of salary, because we still know no other social organization. But salaries may be regulated and may also be reduced if they take too much from wages. The irruption of Marx into society, as I may call his book, must be warded off. . . . Altogether, Marx's book is not so much an investigation into capital as a polemic against the present form of capital, a form which he confuses with the concept of capital itself" (*Briefe, etc., von Dr. Robertus-Jagetzow*, edited by Dr. Rudolf Meyer, Berlin, 1881, Vol. 1, p. 111, 48th letter from Rodbertus). The bold onslaught mounted by Rodbertus in his "social letters" finally dwindled down to ideological commonplaces of this kind. [Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 669n]

4. Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours*, 5th ed. (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1929), p. 504. Although this volume is not preserved among Gramsci's

books, this direct quotation and other allusions to it in the notebooks indicate that he had a copy of it that has been lost or had access to it during his time at Turi. In the English edition of this work, *A History of Economic Doctrines from the Time of the Physiocrats to the Present Day*, trans. R. Richards, 2d ed. (Boston: Heath, 1948), the passage quoted by Gramsci is translated as follows: "The difference between [Rodbertus's] attitude and Marx's is also interesting. Marx was thoroughly well versed in political economy, and had made a special study of the English socialists. His one object was to set up a new theory of exchange, with labour as the source of all value. Rodbertus, who drew his inspiration from the Saint-Simonians, focused attention upon production, and treated labour as the real source of every product—a simpler, a truer, but a still incomplete proposition. Rodbertus never definitely commits himself to saying that labour by itself creates value, but, on the other hand, he never denies it" (p. 423).

5. "In a letter written to R. Meyer on January 7, 1872, [Rodbertus] affirms the demonstration he had already given, 'that goods do not and cannot exchange merely in proportion to the quantity of labour which has been absorbed by them simply because of the existence of capital'; and he adds the significant words: 'a demonstration that might in case of need be employed against Marx'" (Gide and Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines*, p. 423 n. 2).

§167. *De Man's book*

1. The comments in this note were prompted by Guido De Ruggiero's review of Henri De Man's *Der Kampf um die Arbeitsfreude* (Jena: Diederichs, 1927), which had been recently published in Italian translation as *La gioia del lavoro* (Bari: Laterza, 1930). In his review—in *La critica* 29, no. 3 (May 20, 1931): 213–16—De Ruggiero referred to an earlier book of De Man's that is the target of repeated criticism in the notebooks, namely, *Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus* (Jena: Diederichs, 1926), that was translated into Italian as *Il superamento del marxismo* (Bari: Laterza, 1929). De Ruggiero wrote, on the opening page of his review: "Not long after the book on *Il superamento del marxismo*, we now have the Italian translation of this new work by De Man that specifically illustrates and reinforces the earlier one. Whereas the earlier book followed a primarily theoretical path, because it refuted the theories of historical materialism and brought into relief the psychological and ethical values of the proletarian movement, the present book . . ." (p. 213).

On Henri De Man and the different translations of the books mentioned here (of which Gramsci had copies at Turi), see Notebook 1, §61, n. 13.

2. Gramsci is alluding to a passage in Marx's preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*; see Notebook 4, §15, n. 7.

3. That is, the misguided pursuit of an argument that arrives at a conclusion that is irrelevant because it has no bearing on the matter being addressed.

§168. *Antonio Labriola and Hegelianism*

1. Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), who studied with Johann Gottlieb Fichte at Jena, succeeded Kant as professor of philosophy at Königsberg in 1808. He was primarily interested in philosophical psychology, or the philosophy of mind, and this led him to develop a theory of education that in the late nineteenth century gained wide currency among pedagogists and also influenced certain political philosophers who found in Herbart's work an especially useful approach to ethics and social psychology. Antonio Labriola's attraction to Herbart's ideas is clearly manifested in his theoretical writings as well as his correspondence.

On Antonio Labriola, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 51.

§169. *Unity of theory and practice*

1. See, in particular, Notebook 4, §38, and Notebook 7, §33.

2. Gramsci had been propounding some of these ideas since the beginning of his political career; see, for example, his article "Socialismo e cultura" (Socialism and culture), in *Il grido del popolo*, January 29, 1916, quoted in Notebook 6, §87, n. 2.

§170. *Scientific ideologies*

1. Arthur Stanley Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 1-2. Gramsci had a copy of the French translation of Eddington's book, *La nature du monde physique* (Paris: Payot, 1929), from which he translated this sentence into Italian. I quote the original in the text.

2. See Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, *Escursione in terre nuove* (Milan: Ceschina, 1931), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi. Commenting on Eddington's assertion, Borgese writes: "But can we be sure that, in the final analysis, such a speck endures and exists? Is it not possible that further analysis, a more penetrating method of investigation, would disperse even this minuscule positive element into the void? 'Matter abandons the universe'" (p. 40).

On Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, see Notebook 1, §93, n. 2.

§172. *Bibliographies*

1. That is, when major writings on Marx and Marxism by Antonio Labriola and Benedetto Croce were published.

On Antonio Labriola, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 51.

2. "Le premesse filosofiche del socialismo" (The philosophical premises of socialism) is the title of a paper by Alessandro Chiappelli, published in the *Atti della Reale Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli* (Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences of Naples) in 1896.

On Alessandro Chiappelli, see Notebook 5, §125, n. 2.

§173. *On the Popular Manual*

1. See, for example, the opening paragraph of Benedetto Croce's little article "Il non-filosofo" (The nonphilosopher): "I abhor the bad philosopher, presumptuous and amateurish: presumptuous in his easy way of dealing with difficult things, amateurish when it comes to sacred things. But I really love the nonphilosopher, unperturbed, indifferent to philosophical disputes, distinctions, and dialectics; he possesses truth in a few simple principles, in lucid statements, the dependable guides of his judgments and actions—the man of good sense and wisdom" (B. Croce, *Etica e politica* [Bari: Laterza, 1931], p. 195).

2. The quotation is from Henri Gouhier's review of Léon Brunschvicg's *De la connaissance de soi* (Paris: Alcan, 1931) in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 470 (October 17, 1931). The titles of the other books by the French idealist philosopher Léon Brunschvicg (1869–1944) are also culled from Gouhier's review.

§174. *The Popular Manual*

1. See Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), pp. 14–15; the relevant passage is quoted in Notebook 4, §13, n. 2.

§175. *Gentile*

1. Giovanni Gentile, "La concezione umanistica del mondo" (The humanistic conception of the world), *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1412 (June 1, 1931): 307–17.

On Giovanni Gentile, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1.

2. This is the third of Giuseppe Giusti's *Epigrammi* (1849); Gramsci is probably quoting from memory.

On Giuseppe Giusti, see Notebook 5, §42, n. 1.

3. Gentile uses the phrase "uomo sano," which can mean "healthy man" or "sane man"; it has been translated here as "sound man" in order to retain the ambiguity to which Gramsci points.

4. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), pp. 151-52, quoted in Notebook 7, §21, n. 1.

§176. *The "new" science*

1. See Mario Camis's short book review "Scienze biologiche e mediche: Gösta Ekehorn, *On the Principles of Renal Function*, Stockholm, 1931" (Biological and medical sciences: Gösta Ekehorn . . .), in the "Note e rassegne" (Notes and reviews) section of *Nuova antologia* 66, no. 1431 (November 1, 1931): 131.

2. On this topic and the booklet by Borgese to which Camis and Gramsci are referring, see Notebook 8, §77, n. 2, and Notebook 8, §170.

3. This is a direct quotation from Camis's brief review of Ekehorn's book; the emphasis is Gramsci's.

4. See §170 in this notebook.

§178. *Gentile*

1. "Cultura e filosofia del ignoto" (Culture and philosophy of the unknown), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 3 (August 16, 1930): 289-98. This is the second of three unsigned articles in *La civiltà cattolica*—probably by the same author (the second article contains a reference to the first)—that together constitute an extensive critique of Giovanni Gentile's philosophy. The other two articles are "Cultura e religione in un discorso di G. Gentile a Bologna" (Culture and religion in a speech by Gentile in Bologna), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 2 (May 3, 1930): 223-37; and "L'ignoto e la religione naturale secondo il Senatore Gentile" (The unknown and natural religion according to Senator Gentile), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (December 6, 1930): 422-33.

§179. *The ethical or cultural state*

1. In *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (§§257, 258), Hegel wrote:

The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea—the ethical spirit as substantial will, *manifest* and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements what it knows in so far as it knows it. It has its immediate existence [*Existenz*] in *custom* and its mediate existence in the *self-consciousness* of the individual [*des Einzelnen*], in the individual's knowledge and activity, just as self-consciousness, by virtue of its disposition, has its *substantial freedom* in the state as its essence, its end, and the product of its activity. . . .

The state is the actuality of the substantial *will*, an actuality which it possesses in the particular *self-consciousness* when it has been raised to

its universality; as such, it is the *rational* in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into its highest right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals [*die Einzelnen*], whose *highest duty* is to be members of the state.

If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the *interest of individuals* [*der Einzelnen*] *as such* becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also follows from this that membership of the state is an optional matter. But the relationship of the state to the individual [*Individuum*] is of quite a different kind. Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual [*Individuum*] himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. *Union* as such is itself the true content and end, and the destiny [*Bestimmung*] of individuals [*Individuen*] is to lead a universal life; their further particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of conduct have this substantial and universally valid basis as their point of departure and result. (G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 275–76)

§181. *Hegelianism in France*

1. All this information and the quotation are extracted from Guido De Ruggiero's review of the proceedings of the Hegel Congress of 1930, in *La critica* 39, no. 6 (November 20, 1931): 445–52.

Lucien Herr (1864–1926), philosopher and socialist activist, was appointed head librarian of the École Normale Supérieure in 1888. Together with Jean Jaurès, he helped found the journal *L'humanité*.

2. The citation and quotation from Andler's biography of Lucien Herr are derived from the "Revue des revues" section of *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 472 (October 31, 1931).

§183. *Dialectics*

1. This title (with the bibliographical details) is listed in the "Libri pervenuti" (Books received) section of *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 (November 13, 1930): 384.

§184. *Formal logic*

1. See Notebook 7, §3, n. 2.

2. Gramsci discusses Bertrand Russell in Notebook 4, §41, and Notebook 7, §25.

3. See "Metodologia o agnosticismo?" (Methodology or agnosticism?), *La civiltà cattolica* 81, no. 4 [November 13, 1930]: 331-43.

§187. *Intellectuals*

1. Gramsci is alluding to Hegel's scathing critique of the conservative and authoritarian political philosopher Karl Ludwig von Haller (1768-1854), specifically Haller's six-volume treatise on the "restoration" of political science, *Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft* (Winterthur: Steiner, 1816-20), in §258 of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, where Hegel describes Haller as "totally devoid of thought." See G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 278-81.

§188. *The intellectuals. The organization of cultural life*

1. The Società Italiana per il Progresso della Scienza (Italian society for the advancement of science), also known by its acronym SIPS, has a complicated genealogy, stretching back to pre-Risorgimento Italy. In 1839 a group of learned men, inspired by associations of scientists that had been formally established in Britain and Germany, organized a scientific congress in Pisa with participants from every part of the peninsula. Similar congresses were held in subsequent years (though not annually). Following the unification of the country, an effort was made, at a congress held in Palermo in 1875, to formalize the existence of a national scientific society; a statute was drafted and approved, but it was followed by a lull in activity. Finally, in 1906, at a congress in Milan, a new statute was drawn up and approved that formally established SIPS.

The British Association for the Advancement of Science (now known as the BA) was founded in 1831.

2. See Notebook 4, §50.

§190. *The concept of the state*

1. In *Technique du coup d'état* (Paris: Granet, 1931), Curzio Malaparte described the fascists as "worshipers of the state, the advocates of an absolute state," and he quotes Mussolini as saying, "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state." He then goes on to compare this with Lenin's "Where there is liberty, there is no state" (p. 9). It is difficult to determine how and where Gramsci learned of the contents of this particular work of Malaparte's since it was effectively banned by the Fascist regime. (Malaparte was expelled from the Fascist Party and had to spend some time in internal exile, first at Lipari and then at Ischia.) Malaparte's *Technique du coup d'état* was published in English

as *Coup d'État: The Technique of Revolution*, trans. Sylvia Saunders (New York: Dutton, 1932).

On Curzio Malaparte, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

2. Gramsci is referring to a passage in Frederick Engels's *Anti-Dühring* that is also found in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The relevant part of the text is quoted in Notebook 4, §40, n. 1.

§192. Originality and intellectual order

1. Gramsci's source of this quotation has not been traced. The maxims of Vauvenargues (1715–47) have been translated into English: *The Reflections and Maxims of Luc de Clapiers, Marquis of Vauvenargues*, trans. F. G. Stevens (London: Milford, 1940).

§193. Relations between city and country

1. The Italian translation of Mihail Manoilescu's book on protectionism, *La teoria del protezionismo* (Milan: Treves, 1931), was reviewed in many of the periodicals Gramsci read at Turi. The quotation, however, is from an article by Gino Arias, "La difesa doganale: Problemi economici e politici" (The defense of tariffs: Economic and political problems), *Gerarchia* 11, no. 12 (December 1931): 987–94, in which Manoilescu's book is discussed and quoted extensively; see, in particular, p. 989. A version of Manoilescu's book also appeared in English, *The Theory of Protection and International Trade* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1931).

Mihail Manoilescu (1891–1950) met Mussolini in 1926 and became an admirer; he would subsequently write a book on the fascist theory of corporativism, *Le siècle du corporatisme* (Paris: Alcan, 1934). In his native Romania, Manoilescu actively promoted restoration of the monarchy, for which he was temporarily imprisoned. His book on protectionism was first published in France: *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international* (Paris: Giard, 1929). Following the return of King Charles II, Manoilescu was appointed economics minister. He later served as foreign minister in the government of the profascist Ion Gigurtu.

§194. Formal logic

1. The French translation (published in 1931) of Tobias Dantzig's *Number: The Language of Science. A Critical Survey Written for the Cultured Non-Mathematician* (New York: Macmillan, 1930) is mentioned in an article by Emilio Radius, "Sua esattezza il Numero" (His Exactness the Number), in the *Corriere della sera* of February 4, 1932, which is the most likely source of this note.

§195. *The proposition that "society does not set itself problems for whose solution the material preconditions do not already exist."*

1. See Notebook 4, §38, n. 1.

§198. *Philosophy of praxis*

1. See the chapter "Marxismo e filosofia" (Marxism and philosophy) in Benedetto Croce's *Conversazioni critiche*, 1st ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), pp. 296-306, of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi. Among other things, Croce writes that Marx's "inversion consisted in replacing philosophy with practice and the philosopher with the revolutionary. . . . It was not just Hegelian philosophy that Marx turned upside down but philosophy in general, philosophy of any kind; and he replaced philosophizing with practical activity, which for him was in fact nothing other than the revolutionary activity of the proletariat" (p. 299).

"The *Glosses on Feuerbach*" denotes the *Theses on Feuerbach*. The specific focus here is on the eleventh thesis: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change it*" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 5, 1845-1847 [New York: International, 1975], p. 8).

2. In one of his footnotes in *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921), Croce writes: "From this point of view (that is, limiting the statement to the theory of knowledge), we might, like Labriola, speak of historical materialism as a *philosophy of praxis*, that is, as a particular way of conceiving and resolving, or rather of overcoming, the problem of thought and being" (p. 109n). The version in the English translation of Croce's book is somewhat different; see *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1914), p. 115n. Gramsci had a copy of *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica* at Turi.

On Antonio Labriola, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 51.

§199. *Unity of theory and practice*

1. In his *Summa theologiae* (I.79.11), Thomas Aquinas wrote: "The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical [*De Anima* iii, 10]. But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers." As Aquinas's citation indicates, the primary source of this maxim is the Latin version of Aristotle's *De Anima*. Gramsci probably came across this maxim in *La civiltà cattolica*, possibly in the article "Dopo un decennio: 1922-1932" (After a decade) in 83, no. 1: 193-200. In this article, however, the maxim is quoted

(p. 198) without any attribution. Gramsci added "by St. Thomas" sometime after he had initially composed this note.

2. Leibniz's aphorism "The more speculative, the more practical" recurs frequently in Croce's writings; see, for example, p. 226 of *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica*, 4th ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1921), and p. 19 of *Cultura e vita morale*, rev. ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1926). Gramsci had a copy of each of these books at Turi; he also had a book entitled *Introduzione allo studio delle opere di Benedetto Croce* (Introduction to the study of Croce's works) in which the author, Giovanni Castellano, states that Leibniz's aphorism was Croce's "favorite maxim" (p. 235).

3. Giambattista Vico establishes the principle of "verum ipsum factum" (the true and the made are the same) at the very beginning of the first chapter of *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia*: "For the Latins, *verum* (the true) and *factum* (what is made) are interchangeable, or to use the customary language of the Schools, they are convertible. . . . Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the ancient sages of Italy entertained the following beliefs about the true. 'The true is precisely what is made' (*Verum esse ipsum factum*). . . . Thus, science is knowledge of the genus or mode by which a thing is made, and by this very knowledge the mind makes the thing, because in knowing it puts together the elements of that thing" (*On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, trans. L. M. Palmer [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988], pp. 45-46). In the *Scienza nuova*, this principle becomes the basis of Vico's affirmation that history is made by men. In §331, he writes: "But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity . . . there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since man had made it, men could come to know." And in §349: "For the first indubitable principle posited above [§331] is that this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must therefore be found within the modifications of our human mind. And history cannot be more certain than when he who creates the things also narrates them" (*The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968], pp. 96, 104).

4. See Benedetto Croce, *La filosofia di Giambattista Vico* (Bari: Laterza, 1911), no copy of which is preserved among Gramsci's books but which Gramsci had almost certainly read. Gramsci, however, did have at Turi a volume of Croce's with extensive discussions of Vico, namely, *Saggio sullo Hegel*, 3d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1927); see especially the chapter "Fonti della

gnoseologia vichiana" (Sources of Vico's theory of knowledge), in which Croce rebuts criticisms of his book on Vico.

§200. Antonio Labriola

1. On Antonio Labriola, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 51.

2. "The Herbartian Professor" is Antonio Labriola, who, before turning to Hegel and Marx, was attracted to the philosophy (and especially the pedagogical theories) of Johann Friedrich Herbart (see Notebook 8, §168, n. 1).

3. Benedetto Croce, *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), pp. 60-61. Gramsci had a copy of this work at Turi. In his critical remarks on this quotation, Gramsci appears also to be thinking of the comments by Croce that immediately follow it: "Herein lies the problem. It is not so much a question of rejecting the concept of culture but of defining it accurately in order to find the proper and effective way to disseminate culture. And sometimes this might also require the method of *odi profanum vulgus* and of violently driving people back from the threshold of the temple of science, forcing them to stay outside until they make themselves worthy" (p. 60).

4. See Antonio Labriola, *Scritti varii editi e inediti di filosofia e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1906), pp. 432-41. The interview that Gramsci refers to was published under the title "Il ritardo storico della borghesia italiana e le vie dell'espansione coloniale" (The historical backwardness of the Italian bourgeoisie and the avenues of colonial expansion), in the *Giornale d'Italia* of April 13, 1902 (not 1903, as Gramsci surmises). Labriola favored Italian occupation of Libya, arguing that Italy should not refrain from an enterprise that other European countries were already engaged in and that would contribute to the development of backward nations.

5. On Giovanni Gentile and his educational reform, see Notebook 1, §15, n. 1; Notebook 4, §50, n. 1; and Notebook 4, §53, n. 6.

6. See Notebook 8, §53, and n. 1 there.

On Bertrando Spaventa, see Notebook 4, §56, n. 5.

7. In the introduction to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx wrote: "A school which legitimates the baseness of today by the baseness of yesterday, a school that declares rebellious every cry of the serf against the knout once that knout is a time-honoured, ancestral, historical one, a school to which history only shows its *posterior* as the God of Israel did to his servant Moses—the *historical school of law*—would hence have invented German history had it not been an invention of German history" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3, 1843-1844 [New York: International, 1975], p. 177). Gramsci had access to this text in the selected and collected editions of Marx's writings that he had at Turi.

8. This is probably an allusion to the "labor armies" formed in Russia in 1919–20, an experiment that was rather short-lived. In Notebook 4, §52, however, Gramsci is critical of Trotsky's adoption of a military model for the organization of labor.

§201. *The Popular Manual. On art*

1. On the question of form and content in art, Bukharin writes: "The content ("subject"), almost impossible to isolate from the form, is obviously determined by the social environment, as may be readily seen from the history of the arts" (*Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969], p. 194).

§203. *History and antihistory*

1. On this topic, see also Gramsci's observations on Adriano Tilgher's book *Storia e antistoria* in Notebook 1, §28, and Notebook 3, §135; and on Croce's "Antistoria" in Notebook 6, §10.

§204. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*

1. Gramsci inserted this internal cross-reference after he completed this note. He is referring to a page in a notebook he started later and that corresponds to Notebook 10, I, §17, in this edition.

§205. *Mechanistic determinism and action-will*

1. See D. S. Mirsky, "The Philosophical Discussion in the C.P.S.U. in 1930–31," *Labor Monthly* 13, no. 10 (October 1931): 649–56. This article was certainly of the greatest interest to Gramsci. It provided him with information about theoretical debates and conflicts in the Soviet Union that interested him directly, especially since they involved a clash between an idealist current and the "mechanicist" school of thought, against which his critique of Bukharin is in large part directed. The censorship system in prison made it nearly impossible for Gramsci to receive communist or socialist publications. The *Labor Monthly*, which he received thanks to Piero Sraffa's initiative, somehow slipped through—perhaps because the censor could not read English. Gramsci was understandably cautious: he does not write down the title of Mirsky's article (as a result of which it is misidentified in many editions of Gramsci's writings), and he refers to its contents in very vague terms. Still, as one can see from the following passages, Mirsky's account of the philosophical battles waged in the Soviet Union and their political implications was very relevant to Gramsci's own philosophical analyses and double-edged critique of materialism and idealism:

[The journal] *Under the banner of Marxism* became the organ of professional philosophers, headed by A. M. Deborin and who came to be known as the "philosophical leadership." . . . For some time his [i.e., Deborin's] philosophical supremacy remained unchallenged (except by the mechanists) and it was not till the great wave of Bolshevism in 1930 that it became generally clear that his position was to say the least by no means identical with genuine Marxism. . . . The "unity of theory and practice" continued of course to be recognized as a fundamental element of Marxism, but the practical workers had no time as it were to insist on this principle in a theoretical way, while theoreticians like Deborin were content to pay theoretical lip-service to it.

On the other hand the Deborinites did some good work combating the "mechanists," that is to say those unphilosophical materialists, recruited for the most part from scientists who had joined the C.P. . . . but who, like all the rank and file of bourgeois scientists, are constitutionally averse to all philosophy. Their slogan was "Science is its own philosophy." . . . Their inadequate philosophical equipment prevented them from realizing the political implications of their mechanistic theory and its essential identity with the mechanistic and anti-dialectical pseudo-Marxism of Bukharin. . . . Deborin and his followers did a great deal to show up the anti-Marxist character of the theories of the Mechanists [*sic*] as well as Bukharin. Their real services in this direction obscured for some time the fact that they had themselves deviated in the opposite direction, into something essentially different from Marxism.

If the mechanists had neglected or rejected dialectic and advocated a Materialism that was neither capable of explaining revolutionary practice nor consonant with the recent advances in physical science, Deborin by unduly emphasizing Dialectic as distinct from Materialism tended to substitute for dialectical Materialism a dialectical scholasticism that was devoid of material content and was thus virtually idealistic. . . . An uncritical attitude towards Hegel (whose dialectic stood on its idealistic head, and had to be placed on materialistic feet before it could be of any use for the cause of Communism) became a characteristic factor of the "philosophical leadership."

Both the mechanists and the Deborinites represented deviations from genuine Marxism which might be tolerated during the relative lull in class struggle, but which became intolerable in the conditions created by the great Socialist offensive of 1929-30. . . .

The signal for the overhauling of the philosophical, as of other ideological sectors was given . . . by Stalin's speech in December, 1929. . . . The young philosophers [of the Institute of Red Professors of Philosophy and Natural Science] had attacked Deborin for excessive abstractness of thought and a neglect of coordinating theory with practice. . . . The organizational outcome of the discussion was an overhauling of the editorial

board of *Under the Banner of Marxism*; the new board was composed of men capable of keeping in the general line and of replacing the abstract scholasticism of the Deborinites by the genuine dialectical materialism of Marx, Lenin, and the C.P. (pp. 651-53)

Gramsci also read two other articles by D.S. Mirsky: "Il posto di Dostoyevskij nella letteratura russa" (The place of Dostoyevsky in Russian literature), *La cultura* 10, no. 2 (February 1931): 100-115; and "Bourgeois History and Historical Materialism," *Labour Monthly* 13, no. 7 (July 1931): 453-59. Gramsci alludes to both articles and makes some general admiring comments on Mirsky in his letter of August 3, 1931, to Tatiana Schucht (and also, indirectly, to Piero Sraffa):

I have taken a quick look at Prince Mirsky's article on the theory of history and historiography and it seems to me that it is a very interesting and valuable essay. Some months back I read Mirsky's essay on Dostoyevsky published in the special issue of *Cultura* devoted to Dostoyevsky. This essay too was extremely acute, and it is surprising that Mirsky has with so much intelligence and penetration mastered at least a part of the central core of historical materialism. I feel that his scientific position is all the more worthy of notice and study inasmuch as he shows that he is free of certain prejudices and cultural incrustations that had parasitically infiltrated the theoretical studies of the theory of history as a result of the great popularity enjoyed by positivism at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one. (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:51)

Dimitri Petrovic Svyatopolk-Mirsky (1890-1939), a son of the aristocracy whose father served as Russia's interior minister between 1904 and 1905, fought in the First World War and the Russian civil war (on the antirevolutionary side), moved to England, and taught Russian literature at Kings College University of London from 1922 to 1932. He wrote extensively on literature and on the Russian situation, establishing many friendships with leading European writers and intellectuals of the time. His best-known work is *A History of Russian Literature*, first published in 1926. Mirsky, who had become a Communist, returned to the Soviet Union in 1932, was arrested in 1937, and died in the gulag.

§206. Lange's history of materialism

1. Gramsci is referring to the work of the German neo-Kantian philosopher and socialist Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75), *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, rev. ed.,

3 vols. (Leipzig: Baedeker, 1873-75), which was first published in 1866. Gramsci may have been familiar with the French translation (based on the second edition) of Lange's work: *Histoire du matérialisme et critique de son importance à notre époque*, trans. B. Pommerol, 2 vols. (Paris: Reinwald, 1877-79).

2. Gramsci is echoing a remark in George V. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: International, 1929): "F.A. Lange, who has done so much to spread among the general public and the scientific world a completely erroneous idea of the essence of materialism and its history, refuses to regard Feuerbach's humanism as a materialist doctrine. Lange's example has been followed by almost all subsequent writers on Feuerbach, whether in Russia or elsewhere" (p. 5). Plekhanov's book was first published in Russian in 1908; at Turi, Gramsci had a copy of the French translation, *Les questions fondamentales du marxisme* (Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1927).

On George V. Plekhanov, see Notebook 3, §31, n. 4.

3. The Italian translation of Lange's book announced by the Athena publishing house of Milan was never published. As Gramsci points out in a parenthetical addition to this note, a translation did eventually get published: *Storia critica del materialismo*, 2 vols., trans. Angelo Treves (Milan: Monanni, 1932).

§207. *Questions of terminology*

1. This is almost a direct quotation of Marx's affirmation in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* that "the anatomy of civil society has to be sought in political economy." See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Maurice Dobb, trans. S.W. Ryazan-skaya (New York: International, 1970), p. 20.

2. Here, too, Gramsci is echoing what Marx wrote in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*: "Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness" (p. 21). See also Gramsci's reflections on this same point in Notebook 1, §113, and Notebook 10, II, §41.xii.

§208. *The [mutual] translatability of national cultures*

1. The relevant passage from *The Holy Family* and Gramsci's lengthy discussion of it in one of his letters from prison are quoted in Notebook 1, §44, n. 38.

The quotation is from Giosuè Carducci's poem "Versaglia" (Versailles), lines 51-52, composed in 1871. The poem is in Carducci's *Giambi ed Epodi*, of which there are many editions going back to the 1880s.

On Giosuè Carducci, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 17.

2. Except for the parenthesis on Hegel as a source for ideas found in the *Holy Family* and the *Theses on Feuerbach* and the concluding sentences, the entire contents of this note are drawn from "La preistoria di un paragone" (The prehistory of a comparison), in Benedetto Croce's *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), pp. 292–94, of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

3. Derek Boothman points out that "the passage from Heine may be read in the Appendix (p. 267) to Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, ed. P. Carus, London, 1902: 'Mark this, ye proud men of action, ye are nothing but unconscious instruments of the men of thought who, often in the humblest seclusion, have appointed you to your inevitable task. Maximilian Robespierre was merely the hand of Jean-Jacques Rousseau'" (*Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. D. Boothman [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995], p. 560 n. 39).

4. The introduction to section 3, "Recent German Philosophy," of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, opens as follows:

In the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, the revolution to which in Germany mind has in these latter days advanced, was formally thought out and expressed; the sequence of these philosophies shows the course which thought has taken. In this great epoch of the world's history, whose inmost essence is laid hold of in the philosophy of history, two nations only have played a part, the German and the French, and this in spite of their absolute opposition, or rather because they are so opposite. The other nations have taken no real inward part in the same, although politically they have indeed so done, both through their governments and their people. In Germany this principle has burst forth as thought, spirit, Notion; in France, in the form of actuality. In Germany, what there is of actuality comes to us as a force of external circumstances, and as a reaction against the same. (G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. Haldane and F.H. Simson [London: Kegan Paul, 1892–96], 3:409)

5. In the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel writes:

The metaphysical process by which this abstract Will develops itself, so as to attain a definite form of Freedom, and how Rights and Duties are evolved therefrom, this is not the place to discuss. It may however be remarked that the same principle obtained speculative recognition in Germany, in the *Kantian* Philosophy. According to it the simple unity of Self-consciousness, the Ego, constitutes the absolutely independent Freedom, and is the Fountain of all general conceptions—i.e. all conceptions elaborated by Thought—Theoretical Reason; and likewise of the highest of all practical determinations [or conceptions]—Practical Reason, as free

and pure Will; and Rationality of Will is none other than the maintaining one's self in pure Freedom—willing this and this alone—Right purely for the sake of Right, Duty purely for the sake of Duty. Among the Germans this view assumed no other form than that of tranquil theory; but the French wished to give it practical effect. Two questions, therefore suggest themselves: Why did this principle of Freedom remain merely formal? And why did the French alone, and not the Germans, set about realizing it? (G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree [New York: Dover, 1956], p. 443; interpolations in the original)

6. The relevant passage is quoted in Notebook 1, §44, n. 38.

7. The reference is to the eleventh of the *Theses on Feuerbach*: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 5, 1845-1847 [New York: International, 1975], p. 8).

8. In the introduction to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx wrote:

The criticism of the *German philosophy of state and law*, which attained its most consistent, richest, and final formulation through *Hegel*, is both a critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the resolute negation of the *German political and legal consciousness as practiced* hereto, the most distinguished, most universal expression of which, raised to the level of a *science*, is the *speculative philosophy of law* itself. If the speculative philosophy of right, that abstract extravagant *thinking* on the modern state, the reality of which remains a thing of the beyond, if only beyond the Rhine, was possible only in Germany, inversely the *German* thought-image of the modern state which disregards *real man* was possible only because and insofar as the modern state itself disregards *real man*, or satisfies the *whole* of man only in imagination. In politics, the Germans *thought* what other nations *did*. Germany was their *theoretical consciousness*. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3, 1843-1844 [New York: International, 1975], p. 181)

9. Bertrando Spaventa's "Paolottismo, positivismo e razionalismo" (Bigotry, positivism, and rationalism) is reproduced in his collected philosophical writings, *Scritti filosofici*, ed. Giovanni Gentile (Naples: Morano, 1900).

On Bertrando Spaventa, see Notebook 4, §56, n. 5.

§209. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people*

1. Matilde Serao's novel *Il paese di cuccagna* (Milan: Treves, 1891) has gone through many editions and reprints, including recent ones; it was also translated into English as *The Land of Cockayne* (London: Heinemann, 1901).

The long novel is set in contemporary Naples and is about a lottery mania that pervades the city, ruining the lives of people from all social strata.

Matilda Serao (1856–1927) started her career as a journalist in Naples before moving to Rome, where she met and married Edoardo Scarfoglio (see Notebook 4, §68, n. 1). Together, they launched the *Corriere di Roma*, and in 1892 they started a daily, *Il mattino* of Naples. In 1904 Serao (who had separated from Scarfoglio) started yet another newspaper in Naples, *Il giorno*. In addition to her regular newspaper articles and columns, Serao wrote a number of novels and short stories, of which *Il paese di cuccagna* is arguably the most successful. Many of her works have been republished since the 1980s.

2. In the introduction to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx wrote: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3, 1843–1844 [New York: International, 1975], p. 175).

3. "This mania so generally condemned, has never been properly studied. No one has realized that it is the opium of the poor. Did not the lottery, the mightiest fairy in the world, work up magical hopes? The roll of the roulette wheel that made the gamblers glimpse masses of gold and delights did not last longer than a lightning flash, whereas the lottery spread the magnificent blaze of lightning over five whole days. Where is the social force today that, for forty sous, can make you happy for five days and bestow on you—at least in fancy—all the delights that civilization holds?" (Honoré de Balzac, *A Bachelor's Establishment*, trans. Eithne Wilkins [New York: Farrar Strauss, 1952], p. 50).

This passage from Balzac's novel is quoted in French in Benedetto Croce, *Conversazioni critiche*, 2d ser. (Bari: Laterza, 1918), cited by Gramsci in the opening sentence of the note.

4. Matilde Serao, *Il ventre di Napoli* (Milan: Treves, 1884). This little book is a collection of articles on the life and mores of Naples that portray without sentimentality the wretched aspects of the city (or "the belly of Naples," as the title calls it).

5. Croce's earlier essay "Matilde Serao," from which these passages are quoted, was published in the third volume of his collection of literary criticism, *La letteratura della nuova Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1915), pp. 33–72.

6. Paul Lafargue, "Karl Marx, souvenirs personnels," in *Karl Marx homme, penseur et révolutionnaire*, ed. D. Riazanov (Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1928), pp. 109–33; the quotation is from p. 114. In English, see Paul Lafargue, "Personal Recollection of Karl Marx," in *Karl Marx: Man, Thinker, and Revolutionist: Symposium*, ed. D.B. Ryzanoff (New York: International, 1927), p. 185.

7. Gramsci is referring to the page numbers in his manuscript; see §228 in this notebook.

§210. *History and antihistory*

1. In his essay "Sudden Changes in Nature and History," George V. Plekhanov quotes at some length from Hegel's *Science of Logic* in the course of a discussion of change and evolution:

"Gradualists" of one kind or another, those who make a dogma of moderation and of meticulous order, cannot understand this phenomenon, although it was long ago brought into relief by German philosophy. Here, as on many other occasions, we shall do well to quote Hegel, who certainly cannot be charged with a passion for "revolutionary activity." He wrote: "The ordinary notion of the appearance or disappearance of anything, is the notion of a gradual appearance and disappearance. Nevertheless, there are transformations of being which are not only changes from one quantity to another, but also changes from the quantitative to the qualitative; such a transformation is an interruption of 'gradual becoming' and gives rise to a kind of being qualitatively different from the preceding. Every time that there is an interruption of 'gradual becoming,' there occurs a jump in the course of evolution, after which the place of one phenomenon has been occupied by another. Underlying the theory of gradualness is the idea that that which makes its appearance already exists effectively, and only remains imperceptible because it is so very small. In like manner, when we speak of the gradual disappearance of a phenomenon, we represent to ourselves that this disappearance is an accomplished fact and that the phenomenon which takes the place of the extant one already exists, but that neither the one nor the other is as yet perceptible. . . . In this way, however, we are really suppressing all appearance and all disappearance. . . . To explain the appearance or disappearance of a given phenomenon by the gradualness of the transformation is absurdly tautological, for it implies that we consider as having already appeared or disappeared that which is actually in course of appearing or disappearing." (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. I, pp. 313-314, in the Nuremberg edition of 1812.) This is equivalent to saying that if you had to explain the origin of the State, you would simply imagine a microscopic organization of the State which, gradually becoming larger, would at length make people aware of its existence. . . . One of Hegel's greatest merits was that he purged the doctrine of evolution of these absurdities. (G. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul [New York: International, 1929], pp. 104-5)

Gramsci had a copy of this text in the French translation of Plekhanov's volume: *Les questions fondamentales du marxisme* (Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1927).

On George V. Plekhanov, see Notebook 3, §31, n. 4.

2. See Francesco De Sanctis's essay on Father Bresciani's novel *The Jew of Verona*, "L'Ebreo di Verona del padre Bresciani," in *Saggi critici*, ed. P. Arcari (Milan: Treves, 1924), 1:91-115, of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

On Francesco De Sanctis, see Notebook 1, §96, n. 3.

§212. *Studies in economic history*

1. See Notebook 1, §29, n. 5.

2. See Edwin R. A. Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1902). Gramsci may have been familiar with the French translation of this book that was published with an introduction by Georges Sorel: *L'interprétation économique de l'histoire* (Paris: Rivière, 1907). In this case, however, it appears that Gramsci's query about Seligman's book was prompted by a passage in the same book by Plekhanov he had just alluded to in §210. Apropos of Seligman, Plekhanov writes:

However, the advantages which every investigator can derive from the Marxian method are so great that they are beginning to be openly avowed even by persons who have in other respects succumbed to the "conventional lie" of our time. Among these persons I may mention, for instance, Seligman, the American author of a book entitled *The Economic Interpretation of History*, published in 1902. Seligman frankly admits that what made other scientific investigators fight shy of the theory of materialism was the socialist deduction drawn from that theory by Marx. He considers, however, that we can make the omelette without breaking the eggs; that "one can be an 'economic materialist' and yet remain an extreme individualist." He goes on: "The fact that Marx's economics may be defective has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his philosophy of history."

In actual fact, Marx's economic views are intimately intertwined with his historical views. . . . Let me add that Seligman, too, is sufficiently "respectable" to be afraid of materialism. This advocate of economic materialism considers that things are pushed to an intolerable extreme by those who have "sought the explanation of Christianity itself in economic facts alone." . . . Nevertheless, the very fact that Seligman's book has been written, and the nature of the author's reserves, give some ground for a belief that historical materialism—though it be in a truncated and "purified" form—will in the end be endorsed by the bourgeois ideologists who have not yet utterly renounced the hope of establishing order in their outlooks of history. (G. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul [New York: International, 1929], pp. 82-84)

Plekhanov also discusses Seligman in his essay "Karl Marx" (first published in *Iskra* on March 1, 1903) that was anthologized in *Karl Marx homme, penseur et révolutionnaire*, ed. D. Riazanov (Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1928).

2. In *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (pp. 69-70), Plekhanov quotes a letter by Engels that describes the historiographical work of Jacques Thierry, François Mignet, and François Guizot as an adumbration of the materialist conception of history that would be "discovered" by Marx.

On François Guizot, see Notebook 7, §85, n. 1.

On Jacques Thierry, see Notebook 7, §50, n. 6.

François Mignet (1796-1884) gave up a professorship at the University of Avignon to devote his energies to politics through journalism. Through the newspaper he helped found, *Le national*, he promoted the protests against the repressive measures of Charles X that culminated in the July revolution of 1830, resulting in the accession to the throne of Louis-Philippe. Mignet returned to scholarship and produced a large body of historical work, including a history of the French Revolution.

3. On Henri Pirenne, see Notebook 5, §68, n. 2.

In a letter from Ustica, Gramsci asked Tatiana Schucht to send him a copy of *Les principales puissances d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: Alcan, 1924), by Henri Busson, Joseph Fèvre, and Henri Hauser. At Turi, he had a copy of Henri Sée, *Matérialisme historique et interprétation économique de l'histoire* (Paris: M. Giard, 1927).

4. Friedrich List (1789-1846), a German economist who favored the imposition of tariffs on imported goods, moved to the United States in 1825, where he wrote *Outlines of American Political Economy* (Philadelphia, 1827). He returned to Germany in 1834 and after a series of financial setbacks moved to France and wrote his best-known work, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (1841), which was translated into English as *The National System of Political Economy* (Philadelphia, 1856).

5. The influence of Marxist thought is most evident in the earlier work of Werner Sombart (1863-1941), such as *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (1902). Sombart became increasingly conservative in the course of his career, and by the mid-1930s he had embraced Nazi ideology. In one of his most interesting works, *The Jew and Modern Capitalism* (first published in 1911 and translated into English in 1913), Sombart argued against Max Weber's thesis that the spirit of capitalism was the outgrowth of the Protestant ethic; rather, he claimed, it was introduced into the northern European Protestant countries by Jews who had moved there to escape Catholic persecution.

6. On Gian Domenico Romagnosi, see Notebook 6, §113, n. 3.

On Carlo Cattaneo, see Notebook 2, §22, n. 4.

§213. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*

1. "Individualismo pagano e individualismo cristiano" (Pagan individualism and Christian individualism), *La civiltà cattolica* 83, no. 1 (March 5, 1932): 409–23; the quoted passage is on p. 422.

2. See Benedetto Croce's "Religione e serenità" (Religion and peace of mind), in *Etica e politica* (Bari: Laterza, 1931). The opening paragraph of this little essay by Croce is translated in Notebook 7, §1, n. 9.

§214. *The Popular Manual. Points on aesthetics and literary criticism*

1. Gramsci is referring to Nikolai Bukharin's use of Goethe's poem "Prometheus" to reinforce a point he is making in the section "Society and Nature" in *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), the book that Gramsci consistently refers to as the *Popular Manual*. The pertinent passage opens with the statement, "A poetic expression of the growing power of man over nature, his *active* power, is given by Goethe in his poem 'Prometheus'" (p. 122). Bukharin then quotes the opening stanza of the poem (which Gramsci quotes later in this note) and then goes on to write: "It is therefore obvious that the differences in the natural conditions will explain the different evolution of the different nations, but not the course followed by the evolution of one and the same society" (p. 123).

2. This is a reference to Engels's letter of September 21, 1890, to Joseph Bloch; it is reproduced in Notebook 4, §26, n. 1.

3. In the rest of the note, Gramsci makes extensive use of Leonello Vincenti's article "Prometeo," in *Leonardo* 3, no. 3 (March 1932): 97–101. The emphases and parenthetical interjections that occur in quotations from the article are Gramsci's.

It is important to bear in mind that the "Prometheus" ode is one of the poems by Goethe that Gramsci translated from the German in one of the notebooks (Notebook C in Valentino Gerratana's classification) that he devoted to his translation exercises. Gramsci's translations are based on Goethe's texts reproduced in *Über allen Gipfen Goethes Gedichte im Rahmen seines Lebens* (Munich: Wilhelm Langewiesche-Brandt, 1922).

4. On Johann Kaspar Lavater, see Notebook 3, §75, n. 3.

5. J. W. von Goethe, *Selected Works*, trans. Michael Hamburger (New York: Knopf, 2000), p. 1069.

6. This translation is an adaptation (made to conform as closely as possible to Gramsci's Italian rendition) from two existing English versions: *Goethe's Autobiography: Poetry and Truth from My Own Life*, trans. R. O. Moon (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs, 1949), pp. 566–67; and *From My*

Life. Poetry and Truth (parts 1-3), trans. Robert R. Heitner (New York: Suhrkamp, 1987), p. 469.

7. The question is Gramsci's interpolation.

8. See p. 574 of R. O. Moon's translation and p. 470 of Robert R. Heitner's version.

9. Gramsci is probably referring to a passage on Goethe that he translated from a small anthology of Marx's writings, edited by E. Drahn, *Lohnarbeit und Kapital: Zur Judenfrage und andere Schriften aus der Frühzeit*, 2d ed. (Leipzig: Verlag von Ph. Reclam, n.d.), on which, see the Description of the Manuscript of Notebook 7. The text that Gramsci translated was in fact attributed to Marx erroneously. It is a relatively small extract from an article by Engels, "Karl Grün: Über Goethe vom menschlichen Standpunkte," first published in several parts in the *Deutsche Brüsseler Zeitung* between November 21 and December 9, 1847. Gramsci translated the following fragment:

In his works, Goethe evinces an ambivalent attitude toward contemporary German society. Sometimes he is hostile toward it; he attempts to escape from what he finds repulsive in it, as in *Iphigenie*, and especially during his Italian journey; he rebels against it as Götze, Prometheus, and Faust; like Mephistopheles, he turns against it with the most bitter scorn. At other times, he is friendly toward it, he "accommodates" himself to it, as in the majority of the *Zahme Xenien* and many prose writings; he celebrates it, as in the *Maskenzüge*, even defends it against the oncoming movement of history, especially in all his writings that touch on the French Revolution. It is not just a question of Goethe accepting some aspects of German while others are repugnant to him. More frequently, it is a question of the different moods he is in; there is a continuing battle within him between the poet of genius who is repelled by the meanness of his environment and the cautious offspring of the Frankfurt patrician or the Weimar privy councilor who feels compelled to come to terms with and accustom himself to it. Goethe is thus a towering figure one moment and petty the next; at one moment, a proud, mocking genius full of contempt for the world and, at another moment, circumspect, temperate, narrow-minded.

For the complete text in English of Engels's multipart article, see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 6, 1845-1848 (New York: International, 1975), pp. 249-73; the passage quoted above is on pp. 258-59.

10. Benedetto Croce, *Goethe* (Bari: Laterza, 1921), p. 63. Croce's book has been translated into English: *Goethe*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Methuen, 1923).

11. The final string of quotations is from Goethe's dramatic fragment *Prometheus*. See *Prometheus*, trans. Frank Ryder, in Goethe, *Early Verse*

Drama and Prose Plays, ed. Cyrus Hamlin and Frank Ryder (New York: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 239–50, especially pp. 240–42.

§215. *The Popular Manual. The reality of the external world*

1. Gramsci is referring to Nikolai N.I. Bukharin, "Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism," in *Science at the Cross Roads: Papers Presented at the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology Held in London from June 29th to July 3rd, 1931 by the Delegates of the U.S.S.R.* (London: Kniga, 1931), pp. 9–33. See also Notebook 7, §47, nn. 1 and 2.

§216. *Jottings on economics*

1. See Pasquale Jannaccone, "Scienza, critica e realtà economica" (Science, criticism, and economic reality), *La riforma sociale* 27, no. 6 (December 1930): 521–28. The book Jannaccone reviewed was Ugo Spirito, *La critica dell'economia liberale* (Milan: Treves, 1930).

On Ugo Spirito, see Notebook 1, §132, n. 2.

On Pasquale Jannaccone, see Notebook 6, §82, n. 8.

2. Gramsci is referring to three articles by Luigi Einaudi that appeared together: "Costo di produzione, leghe operaie, e produzione di nuovi beni per eliminare la disoccupazione tecnica" (Cost of production, workers' leagues, and production of new goods to eliminate technical unemployment); "La crisi è finita?" (Is the crisis over?); "Della non novità della crisi presente" (On why the current crisis is nothing new), in *La riforma sociale* 43, no. 1 (January–February 1932): 61–73; 73–79; 79–83.

On Luigi Einaudi, see Notebook 1, §11, n. 1.

§217. *Reality of the external world*

1. Gramsci's source of the quotation from Bernardino Varisco's book *Linee di filosofia critica*, 2d ed. (Rome: Signorelli, 1931) is an article by P. Dezza, "L'affermazione di Dio nella moderna filosofia italiana" (The affirmation of God in modern Italian philosophy), *La civiltà cattolica* 83, no. 1 (March 19, 1932): 497–513; the quotation is from p. 507.

Bernardino Varisco (1850–1933), a professor of philosophy at the University of Rome for almost two decades, started as a strict positivist but evolved into a religious philosopher who sought to prove and affirm the divine presence in the universe—he put forward the notion of God as the ultimate or unique monad. Varisco, who combined his reactionary nationalistic politics with his philosophical-spiritual views, was also a supporter of the Fascist regime.

2. The passage that Gramsci is referring to occurs very close to the end of chapter 19 of the "Boyhood" section of Leo Tolstoy's autobiographical book *Childhood, Boyhood, and Youth*. Gramsci quotes the passage verbatim in Notebook 11, §57. He had a copy of the two-volume Italian translation of the work, *Racconti autobiografici* (Turin: Slavia, 1930), which he had asked Tatiana Schucht to send him in his letter of September 22, 1930.

3. On Mario Missiroli's article "Religione e filosofia" (Religion and philosophy) in the "Calendario" section of *L'Italia letteraria* 2, no. 12 (March 20, 1930), see Notebook 7, §1.

On Mario Missiroli, see Notebook 1, §43, n. 12.

4. See the chapter "La psicologia positiva e i problemi della filosofia" (Positive psychology and the problems of philosophy), in Roberto Ardigò, *Scritti vari*, ed. Giovanni Marchesini (Florence: Le Monnier, 1922), pp. 85-135. See also Notebook 4, §6, and n. 1 there.

On Roberto Ardigò, see Notebook 3, §54, n. 2.

5. See Guido De Ruggiero's book review of Benjamin Constant, *Journal intime e Lettres à sa famille* (Paris: Michel, 1928) in *La critica* 27, no. 1 (January 20, 1929): 59-62.

On Guido De Ruggiero, see Notebook 4, §2, n. 2.

§218. *Alessandro Levi*

1. Alessandro Levi (1881-1953), who studied law at the University of Padua, was intellectually a follower of Roberto Ardigò and politically an admirer of the socialist leader Filippo Turati. He made his mark early when his thesis on crime and punishment in Greek thought was published by a prestigious publisher and reviewed by Georges Sorel in Croce's journal *La critica*. Levi was a militant antifascist, and, being Jewish, he was prohibited from teaching by the racial laws of 1938. After the war, Levi's philosophical work and intellectual stature received formal recognition when he was made a member of the Accademia dei Lincei.

On Rodolfo Mondolfo, see Notebook 4, §1, n. 2.

On Roberto Ardigò, see Notebook 3, §54, n. 2.

2. On Giuseppe Ferrari, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 11.

3. On Carlo Cattaneo, see Notebook 2, §22, n. 4.

4. Alessandro Levi, "Il pensiero politico di Giuseppe Ferrari" (Ferrari's political thought), *Nuova rivista storica* 15, no. 5-6 (May-August 1931): 365-97; the quotation is from p. 387.

§219. *The Popular Manual. Residues of metaphysics*

1. See the opening paragraphs of Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (New York: International, 1941), p. 10. Engels wrote this long essay in 1886.

2. See Notebook 8, §17, n. 2.

§220. *An introduction to the study of philosophy*

1. That is, Saint Dominic (1170–1221), founder of the Dominican order; Saint Francis of Assisi (1181?–1226), founder of the Franciscan Order of the Friars Minor; and Saint Catherine of Siena (1347–80).

2. See Giovanni Papini, “Il Croce e la Croce” (Croce and the cross), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1439 (March I, 1932): 4–21.

On Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

3. The source of this anecdote is quoted in Notebook 1, §93, n. 4.

§221. *Gentile*

1. On Luigi Volpicelli, see Notebook 7, §14, n. 1.

On Ugo Spirito, see Notebook 1, §132, n. 2.

2. Gramsci’s phrase is “secentismo filosofico,” which can be translated literally as “philosophical seventeenth-centuryism.” As the later version of this note makes clear, he is referring to the affectation and posturing associated with that period in which “witticisms and ready-made phrases pass for thought.”

3. In other words, Gramsci is suggesting, a critique of Gentile and his followers along the lines of Marx and Engels’s critique of Bruno Bauer and other superficial thinkers in *The Holy Family* (1845).

§222. *Introduction to the study of philosophy. On the concept of regularity and law in historical events*

1. Gramsci is referring to a page number in the manuscript; see §128 in this notebook.

§223. *Croce and Loria*

1. On Achille Loria, see Notebook 1, §25, n. 1.

2. This is the opening paragraph of the section “Della circoscrizione della dottrina del materialismo storico” (Concerning the limitations of the theory of historical materialism), in Benedetto Croce’s *Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica* (of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi): “Historical materialism, if it is to express something critically acceptable, can, as I have said elsewhere, be neither a new *a priori* notion of the philosophy of history, nor a new method of historical thought; it must simply be a *canon* of historical interpretation. This canon recommends that attention be directed to the so-called economic basis of society, in order that the forms and mutations of the latter may be better understood” (*Histori-*

cal Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx, trans. C. M. Meredith [London: Allen and Unwin, 1914], p. 77].

§225. *Points for an essay on B. Croce*

1. See Notebook 6, §107, n. 3, especially the quoted passage from Gramsci's letter of April 18, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht.

2. "Bernstein" refers to the German Social Democrat Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932). See also Notebook 4, §31, and n. 7 there.

3. The comparison of Croce with the great Italian novelist Alessandro Manzoni was made by Benjamin Crémieux, who wrote that "after Manzoni, Benedetto Croce is the greatest prose writer in Italian literature" (*Panorama de la littérature italienne contemporaine* [Paris: Kra, 1928], p. 190).

4. On the Catholic monsignor Francesco Olgiati and his Crocean reading of Marx, see Notebook 4, §3, n. 3.

Emilio Chiocchetti, a philosopher and Franciscan priest, wrote a book on Croce, *La filosofia di Benedetto Croce*, 3d ed. (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1924), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

5. Croce served as minister of education for a year between 1920 and 1921, in the cabinet of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti.

6. See Giovanni Papini, "Croce e la Croce" (Croce and the cross), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1439 (March 1, 1932): 4-21. On this article, see Notebook 8, §105, n. 1; and, on Giovanni Papini, see Notebook 1, §8, n. 1.

See Aldo Ferrabino, "L'Europa in utopia" (Europe in utopia), *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1441 (April 1, 1932): 341-52, an article that is critical of Croce's *Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono*, the second edition of which appeared in 1932.

7. See the first section of chapter 2 of Karl Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon*, in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 6, 1845-1848 (New York: International, 1975), pp. 105-213.

8. Gramsci is referring to point 6 of this list.

9. This, too, is an allusion to Papini's article "Croce e la Croce."

10. The allusion here is to some verse by the supercountry writer Mino Maccari. See Notebook 1, §141, and n. 1 there.

§226. *Cruder terms*

1. This quotation, which Gramsci probably derived from a secondary source, is from book 1 of Leon Battista Alberti's *De pictura* (1435). The translation adopted here is from Alberti, *On Painting and on Sculpture*, ed. and trans. Cecil Grayson (London: Phaidon, 1972), p. 37.

§227. *Points for an essay on Croce*

1. See Notebook 6, §81, n. 1.
2. On the *lazzaroni*, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 22.
3. Gramsci quotes this piece of doggerel, praising the last Bourbon king, Francis II, in Neapolitan dialect. The translation is by Derek Boothman; see Antonio Gramsci, *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Derek Boothman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 359.

§228. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people*

1. The reference is to the pagination of the manuscript; see §209 in this notebook.

2. Heinrich Heine's witticism about God possibly holding a "pleasant surprise" is mentioned by Croce in his short essay "Religione e serenità" (Religion and serenity), with which Gramsci was very familiar since he had reprinted it twice, first in *La città futura* and later in *L'ordine nuovo*. See Notebook 7, §1, n. 9.

Heine wrote: "God has not revealed anything that would lead us to believe there is life after death; nor does Moses say anything about it. Perhaps it does not sit well with God at all that the faithful are so thoroughly convinced that there is an afterlife. In his fatherly goodness, maybe he wants it to be a surprise" (Heine, *Aphorismen und Fragmente*, in *Werke und Briefe*, ed. Hans Kaufmann [Berlin: Aufbau, 1962], 7:402).

3. See Pietro Paolo Trompeo's collection of essays on Jansenism and literature, *Rilegature gianseniste: Saggi di storia letteraria* (Milan: La Cultura, 1930); see especially the first essay (pp. 1-62) in the collection, "Il 'Pari' del Manzoni" (Manzoni's "wager").

4. See Notebook 8, §209.

5. See Francesco Ruffini's book on religion in Manzoni's life, *La vita religiosa di A. Manzoni*, 2 vols. (Bari: Laterza, 1931).

§229. *The Popular Manual*

1. In the English edition of Bukharin's *Historical Materialism*, the preface is omitted. In the preface to the French edition that Gramsci was using in writing these notes, Bukharin explained that the book originated in discussions that took place during working meetings that he directed with J. Denikè: "Ce livre est né des discussions engagées dans les conférences de travaux pratiques que l'auteur dirigeait avec J. Deniké" (*La théorie du matérialisme historique*, 4th ed. [Paris: Sociales Internationales, 1927], p. 8).

§230. *Religion, the lottery, and the opium of the people*

1. Gramsci is referring to a letter that Engels wrote (sometime in early April 1888) to Elizabeth Harkness, author of the novel *City Girl* (published under the pseudonym John Low). A large part of the letter is about Balzac:

The more the [political] opinions of the author remain hidden, the better for the work of art. The realism I allude to may crop out even in spite of the author's opinions. Let me refer to an example. Balzac whom I consider a far greater master of realism than all the Zolas passés, présents et à venir, in "La Comédie humaine" gives us a most wonderfully realistic history of French "Society," especially of le monde parisien, describing, chronicle-fashion, almost year by year from 1816 to 1848 the progressive inroads of the rising bourgeoisie upon the society of nobles, that reconstituted itself after 1815 and that set up again, as far as it could, the standard of la vieille politesse française. He describes how the last remnants of this, to him, model society gradually succumbed before the intrusion of the vulgar monied upstart, or were corrupted by him; how the grande dame whose conjugal infidelities were but a mode of asserting herself in perfect accordance with the way she had been disposed of in marriage, gave way to the bourgeoisie, who horned her husband for cash or cashmere; and around this central picture he groups a complete history of French Society from which, even in economic details (for instance the rearrangement of real and personal property after the Revolution) I have learned more than from all the professed historians, economists, and statisticians of the period together. Well, Balzac was politically a Legitimist; his great work is a constant elegy on the inevitable decay of good society, his sympathies are all with the class doomed to extinction. But for all that his satire is never keener, his irony never bitterer, than when he sets in motion the very men and women with whom he sympathizes most deeply—the nobles. And the only men of whom he always speaks with undisguised admiration, are his bitterest political antagonists, the republican heroes of the Cloître Saint-Méry, the men, who at that time (1830-6) were indeed the representatives of the popular masses. That Balzac thus was compelled to go against his own class sympathies and political prejudices, that he saw the necessity of the downfall of his favourite nobles, and described them as people deserving no better fate; and that he saw the real men of the future where, for the time being, they alone were to be found—that I consider one of the greatest triumphs of Realism, and one of the grandest features in old Balzac. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 48, *Engels: Correspondence, 1887-1890* [New York: International, 2001], pp. 166-67)

2. This is a transcription of Lanson's direct quotation of Pascal's *Pensées*, section 3 ("Of the Necessity of the Wager"), §187: "Men despise religion; they hate it and fear it is true. To remedy this, we must begin by showing that religion is not contrary to reason; that it is venerable, to inspire respect for it; then we must make it lovable, to make good men hope it is true; finally, we must prove it is true" (Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. W. F. Trotter [New York: Dutton, 1958], p. 52). See Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.), p. 464. The sentences in the rest of the paragraph are a paraphrase of Lanson's comments on this passage from Pascal.

3. Arturo Marescalchi, "Durare! Anche nella bachicoltura" (Persevere! Even in silkworm cultivation), *Corriere della sera*, April 24, 1932. Earlier articles on agriculture by Marescalchi published in the *Corriere* were collected in a volume, *Agricoltura italiana: 1926-1927* (Milan: Treves, 1928), of which Gramsci had a copy at Turi.

4. Translated into English as *Artificial Paradises*, trans. Stacy Diamond (Secaucus, N.J.: Carol, 1996).

§231. *Introduction to the study of philosophy. The relation between structure and superstructure*

1. See the review of Arthur Feiler's *L'expérience du Bolschevisme* (Paris: NRF, 1931) by Guido De Ruggiero, in *La critica* 30, no. 2 (March 20, 1932): 131-38. The emphases are Gramsci's.

On Guido De Ruggiero, see Notebook 4, §2, n. 2.

2. *L'etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalismo*, the Italian translation of Max Weber's famous work *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (first published in 1904-05 and translated into English as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*) was published serially in *Nuovi studi del diritto, economia e politica*, starting in 4, no. 3-4 (May-August 1931) and ending in 5, no. 3-5 (June-October 1932).

3. On Arturo Carlo Jemolo's book on Jansenism in Italy and his critique of Antonio Anzilotti, see Notebook 1, §51, n. 2.

§233. *Points for an essay on Croce*

1. In a speech he gave in parliament on July 7, 1920, Benedetto Croce (who was minister of education at the time) said that "to affirm, as I have done, that Christianity has created the moral life by which we still live, and that in this sense we are all Christians, is to state the obvious; it is the same as saying that Rome created law and Greece the literary arts and that all of us, whether Italian, French, or German, are in this sense Roman and Hellenic" (Croce, *Pagine sparse* [Naples: Ricciardi, 1943], 2:268).

Gramsci's source, however, was probably an article by Mariano D'Amelio, "Società delle nazioni: Unificazione internazionale del diritto penale" (League of Nations: International unification of criminal law), in the "Note e Rassegne" (Notes and reviews) section of *Nuova antologia* 67, no. 1441 (April 1, 1932): 404-7. D'Amelio wrote: "We must recall, first and foremost, Croce's simple and profound reflection that after Christ we are all Christians" (p. 406).

2. See Notebook 7, §9, and n. 1 there.

§234. "Appearances" and superstructures

1. Lorenzo Stecchetti was one of the pseudonyms of the postromantic, mannered, and at times morbid poet and literary critic Olindo Guerrini (1845-1916). Some of his writings were considered shocking.

§236. Points for an essay on Croce

1. See Benedetto Croce, *Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono*, 2d ed. (Bari: Laterza, 1932), which has been translated into English: *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Henry Furst (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1933). When Gramsci wrote this note, sometime in late April or May 1932, he did not yet have a copy of the book. In August 1932, in fact, he drafted a petition (see Description of the Manuscript of Notebook 9) to be granted permission to read the book. Nevertheless, Gramsci had read the first three chapters of the book in *Capitoli introduttivi di una Storia dell'Europa nel secolo decimonono*, which was published by the Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli in 1931. He referred to it on April 18, 1932, in a letter to Tatiana Schucht; see Notebook 8, §112, n. 1. Additional chapters of Croce's *Storia d'Europa* also appeared in another publication of the Royal Society of Naples, *Le rivoluzioni del 1848, il compimento del moto liberale nazionale e la crisi del 1870* (Naples, 1931); Gramsci asked for a copy of it in his letter of January 25, 1932.

2. In his letter of May 9, 1932, to Tatiana Schucht, Gramsci wrote apropos of Croce's *Storia d'Europa*: "Is it possible to think of a unitary history of Europe that begins in 1815, that is, with the restoration? If a history of Europe can be written as the formation of an historical bloc, it cannot exclude the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that are the 'juridical-economic' premise of the entire European historical complex, the moment of force and struggle. Croce takes up the following moment, the moment in which the previously unleashed forces found an equilibrium, underwent 'catharsis' so to speak, making of this moment an event apart on which he constructs his historical paradigm (Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, trans. R. Rosenthal [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 2:171-72).

3. On Vincenzo Cuoco, see Notebook 1, §44, n. 2.

4. Gramsci is probably referring to §25 in this notebook. Valentino Geratana suggests that the reference is to §36, also in this notebook.

§237. *Introduction to the study of philosophy*

1. See Benedetto Croce, *La filosofia di Giambattista Vico* (Bari: Laterza, 1911). The second edition of this work was published, also by Laterza, in 1922. On this book, see also Notebook 8, §199, n. 4.

2. See Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. Luigi Russo (Florence: Le Monnier, 1931). This volume is not preserved among Gramsci's books, but in a letter dated May 9, 1932, he informed Tatiana Schucht that he had received it.

3. Annotating the word "*virtù*," Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith write:

Literally "virtue," but in connection with Machiavelli better rendered by a word without moral overtones, such as "prowess." In *The Prince*, Machiavelli sets up an opposition between *fortuna* (roughly—"circumstance") and *virtù*—the ability of the individual to act on and overcome the given world of circumstance. In Latin *virtus* meant an inherent quality such as (for example and in particular) military valour: Machiavelli tends to make it rather a quality of the will. The moral sense of the English word "virtue" evolved through an intermediary phase in Stoic and Early Christian thought where it meant "inner strength" and hence the ability to act well. (*Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith [New York: International, 1971], p. 413n)

4. This long parenthesis consists of an almost literal transcription of a passage in a note by Luigi Russo on p. 23 of his edition of Machiavelli's *Prince*.

5. This is from Russo's note on pp. 23–24 of his edition of the *Prince*. The emphases of "*naturalistic and mechanical character*" and "*true meaning*" are Gramsci's.

6. Giovanni Gentile's *Giordano Bruno e il pensiero del Rinascimento* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1920) and Francesco Ercole's *La politica di Machiavelli* (Rome: Are, 1926) are cited in Russo's note on pp. 23–24 of his edition of the *Prince*. Before his arrest, Gramsci owned a copy of Ercoli's book on Machiavelli. He twice asked Tatiana Schucht to send it to him (in his letters of December 27, 1926, and April 11, 1932), but there is no indication that he ever received it.

§239. *The Popular Manual*

1. See Notebook 4, §27.

2. Gramsci transcribed this quotation from an article by G.M. Ferrari, "Goethe naturalista" (Goethe the naturalist), *Nuova antologia* 68, no. 1442 (April 16, 1932): 478-90; the quotation is from p. 435 n. 1. The original source is Johann Peter Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe*; see the entry of April 11, 1827.

§240. *Points for an essay on Croce. Ethico-political history or speculative history?*

1. See Notebook 8, §236, and nn. 1-3 there.

2. The reference is to a page number in the manuscript; see §112 in this notebook.

3. The fourth series of Maurice Barrès's *Mes cahiers* was published serially in *Les nouvelles littéraires* (which Gramsci received in Turi) starting in October 1931. The Rodin quotation is in *Les nouvelles littéraires* 10, no. 474 (November 21, 1931).

On Maurice Barrès, see Notebook 3, §2, n. 6.

§241. *Pascal's Pensées*

1. This information on Pascal's *Pensées* is derived from Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 19th ed. (Paris: Hachette, n.d.), pp. 455 and 463n.

§245. *Popular literature*

1. The Corbaccio publishing house founded in Milan by Enrico dall'Oglio in 1923 published a substantial amount of fiction.

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