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**L. M. KAGANOVICH**

**Report on the  
Organizational Problems  
of Party and Soviet  
Construction**



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SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

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Organizational Problems of Party  
and Soviet Construction

By  
L. M. Kaganovich



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Comrades: Our Congress is discussing the organizational problems as the last item on the agenda. The legitimacy of this is quite evident because the discussion of organizational problems is like sharpening the tools for the successful fulfilment of the political and economic tasks which the Party has raised at the Seventeenth Congress. The nature of the organizational tasks can be fully understood only when the whole grandeur and sense of the path that we have travelled, the path of socialist victories, has been understood and appreciated, when the grandeur of the tasks which have been put to us, and which were so brilliantly illuminated as with a powerful searchlight in Comrade Stalin's report, is understood. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Every congress of our Party, the leading Party of the world proletariat, is a great historical landmark not only in the development of the proletarian revolution in our country, but also in the development of the international labour movement.

Our Seventeenth Congress, the great Congress of the great Leninist Party, marks a whole historical epoch, a short one from the point of view of time, but unprecedented in the richness of its content, which transformed the Soviet Union into a mighty state that now occupies the front positions in the political, technical-economic, military and cultural spheres.

The world-historical significance of the report Comrade Stalin delivered at this Seventeenth Congress lies in the

fact that it was a report on the leadership of the greatest transformation that the history of humanity has known, of the transformation that has broken down an old economic system and has created a new collective farm system based on the socialist industrialization of our country.

It was a report on the leadership of the movement of millions of the best, advanced representatives of mankind in their struggle for complete and final emancipation from the old world and for the victory of the new socialist society.

It is precisely for this reason that our great victories, our successes are concretely appreciated and felt not only by the vast masses of the Soviet Union, but also by the proletarians and the oppressed all over the world.

In an unprecedentedly short period of time, on the basis of the socialist industrialization of the country, the technical re-equipment of agriculture, the rout of the kulaks and of the agents of the class enemy in our Party, *viz.*, Trotskyism, the Rights, the "Lefts," and of all and sundry opportunists, we solved the most difficult task of the proletarian revolution.

In his report Comrade Stalin showed that we have transformed a land of scattered small and dwarf peasant economy into a land in which the collective farm system—the system of large-scale socialist farming—has finally conquered, in which the socialist form of economy is the fundamental form of economic life.

Indeed, what were we; and what have we become in the period of the few years that lies between the Sixteenth Party Congress and the present one?

We were one of the most backward industrial countries, we were one of the most agrarian countries in Europe. We have become one of the most industrialized countries in the world.



We were a land of small scattered and backward agriculture. We have become a land of organized, mechanized agriculture carried on on a larger scale than anywhere else in the world.

We were a land of the wooden plough. We have become a land of the tractor and the combine.

We were a land of patriarchalism, mediaevalism and illiteracy. We have become, or rather we are becoming, one of the most advanced countries in regard to literacy and culture.

We lagged behind the advanced capitalist countries very considerably in regard to military equipment and we were always in danger of having our interests encroached upon even by small countries. Now, as has been most strikingly revealed at this Congress, we have become a first-class, mighty, armed force and one of the decisive factors in the struggle for peace throughout the whole world. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, we achieved all this in the course of a fierce struggle against numerous class enemies, in the struggle against the last important capitalist class, *viz.*, the kulaks. The latter were supported by world capitalism which organized wrecking and counter-revolutionary groups; they were supported by the Rights, Trotskyists and "Left" opportunists in our own ranks. These we defeated. We routed the kulaks, routed the wrecking and counter-revolutionary groups and we routed the opportunists.

The kulaks had deep roots in the economy of our country; our Party tore up these roots while fighting. This was one of the most serious, if not the most serious, battles with capitalism. The seriousness and difficulty of this battle was brilliantly foreseen by Lenin. At the Eleventh Congress of our Party Lenin said:

"We had numerous paths and ways out of our political and economic difficulties. We can proudly boast of the fact that up till now we have been able to utilize all these paths and ways in various combinations in accordance with the different circumstances; but now we have no ways out. Permit me to tell you this without any exaggeration; in this sense it is really 'the last fight we must face,' not against international capitalism—against it we shall have many 'last fights to face'—but against Russian capitalism, against the capitalism which grows out of small peasant economy, against the capitalism which is fostered by it. Against this capitalism a battle will take place in the near future, but the date of which cannot be definitely determined. Here 'the last fight that we must face' is before us. Here can be no more political or other detours."

This last and decisive fight against Russian capitalism represents the main and fundamental stage in the great path that we have travelled. During these years we fought the last and decisive battle against Russian capitalism, the fight that Lenin foresaw. And this battle was brilliantly and victoriously fought by the great army of communism—by our Party, under the leadership of its leader Comrade Stalin. (*Loud applause.*)

And the outcome of this fight is the firm foundation of socialist economy in our country, the reinforcement of the positions of the international proletarian revolution.

At all stages of this fight, throughout all the difficulties that encumbered our path—no matter whether it was the struggle for the Leninist doctrine on the building of socialist society in a single country taken separately, or the question of concrete political slogans, or of building and mastering such giants of metallurgy as Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, of organizing Soviet farms, machine and tractor stations, collective farms, workers' supply departments, public dining rooms, etc.—our Leninist Central Committee, and primarily Comrade Stalin, armed and organized the masses for victorious battles,

In this struggle and work the Central Committee always emphasized the decisive significance of the subjective factor, the decisive significance of the state of organization, mobilization and preparedness of human beings, of those who were working for the cause of socialism.

Our Party, its Central Committee and Comrade Stalin represent a single inseparable force of Party leadership and it managed to raise the struggle for socialism to a really high level.

This is precisely what Comrade Stalin showed in delivering his report to the Congress, in which he clearly illuminated the path and the conditions of the victory of socialism, in which he analysed what had been done and at the same time outlined the militant concrete program of action for the advancing army of socialism.

Comrade Stalin's report brilliantly combines the problems of profound theory, of politics, and of practical organization. This unity of will and action, the unity of politics and practice, which characterizes the activities of our Leninist Central Committee, lies at the basis of the whole of the political and organizational work which the Party has carried on, is carrying on and intends to carry on under Comrade Stalin's leadership. (*Loud applause.*)

## THE SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL WORK OF THE PARTY DURING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD

In passing to the organizational problems I must say that the basis of the theses submitted to the Congress are the tasks which Comrade Stalin presented as far back as 1929 at the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., when, in exposing the Right deviation, he spoke of the essence of the Bolshevik offensive and of the reorganization of the levers of the proletarian dictatorship. Comrade Stalin also spoke about this in his report to the Sixteenth Congress of our Party, and also in his speech at the Conference of Business Leaders in 1931, which became known as the six historical conditions of our victory.

If the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan created all the material prerequisites for the successful fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, on which Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev reported here, then the organizational work carried out in the First Five-Year Plan period now enables us to proceed with the further reorganization and improvement of all the levers of the proletarian dictatorship in accordance with the requirements of the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan.

The whole of our enormous organizational work, the whole of the profound reorganization which the Party carried out during these years was wholly subordinated to the task of solving the decisive problems of the socialist offensive along the whole front.

In leading the Party our Central Committee did not confine itself merely to slogans, or to general political directives. In advancing the current slogans of our general line Comrade Stalin always immediately made provision for the fulfilment of these slogans by putting forward the practical plan of organizational activities and giving concrete instructions concerning the ways and means by which this or that task could be carried out.

In his report to this Seventeenth Congress Comrade Stalin emphasized that "victory never comes by itself—it must be dragged by the hand." In speaking of the organizational work of the Party, he, in fourteen concise points, practically exhausted the report of the organizational work of the Party, of the ways by which victory was organized and assured.

During these years the organizational work of the Party assumed truly unprecedented dimensions. The thousands of newly built enterprises, machine and tractor stations, collective farms and Soviet farms are the material expression of the political line and organizational guidance of the Party.

The slogan calling for Bolshevik tempoes of industrializing the country, the slogan calling for the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the slogan calling for the mastery of technique were carried out by the Party primarily by mobilizing the masses, by reorganizing all the transmission belts, primarily the trade unions, and in doing so it routed the opportunist craft union elements in the trade unions and turned the trade unions towards

shock brigade work and socialist competition, towards new socialist methods of labour.

The Party reorganized its own ranks in the factories and in the collective farms and persistently strove to get every Communist in the shop and in the field brigades to play the role of vanguard and organizer.

The fulfilment of the task of socialistically reorganizing agriculture was assured by mobilizing the masses for the purpose of liquidating the kulaks, for the purpose of overcoming the resistance of the remnants of the kulaks, by selecting many thousands of tried and hardened Bolsheviks for work in the rural districts and by improving the work of all our Party, Soviet and economic organizations.

Comrade Stalin mentioned the thousands of new enterprises that were built during the five-year period. That meant, comrades, that on the average, *every day* several new enterprises were completed and put into operation. In order to build these thousands of new enterprises it was not sufficient to put them into the Plan and to allocate funds for them; it was necessary to organize their construction, that is to say, to organize the building apparatus, to select the workers, and after the enterprises were built, to appoint new people to run them, to organize the management apparatus for them, to start the enterprises and to master them.

During the years 1929-33, 191,000 collective farms and about 7,000 Soviet farms (including non-trustified farms) were organized. That means that on an average 120 collective farms, two machine and tractor stations and four Soviet farms were organized *every day*. That is on an average; but you know that things progressed unevenly; there were days when not 120 but 500 and more collective farms were organized. To this must be added the organization of over 150,000 trading units and municipal

enterprises in the old towns on a scale unprecedented before the Five-Year Plan, and the creation on vacant spaces of scores of new towns and thousands of settlements around Soviet farms, machine and tractor stations and new works.

Elementary and middle schools to the number of 35,000 have been opened in addition to 2,000 factory trade schools, 1,000 workers' faculties, 2,500 technical schools, nearly 500 universities, more than 400 scientific research institutes, 23,000 club institutes and nearly 20,000 cinema installations. The press has grown from 1,189 newspapers in 1928 and 3,061 in 1930 to 10,535 printed newspapers in 1933, without counting several hundreds of thousands of wall newspapers.

All this work of construction was carried on, not in one spot, but throughout the whole of the vast territory of our great Soviet Union. Many towns, enterprises and collective farms were created, not in cultured districts where cadres were available and where the habits and definite experience of work existed, but in totally uninhabited places, on vacant land, in the wilderness. If you bear in mind that in all the remote corners of the U.S.S.R.—from Khibiny to Kara-Kum, from Igarka to Rion, from the White Sea Baltic Canal to Turksib, from the Dnieper Power Station to the Amur—intense work of construction has been carried on as a result of which during a few years the very face of our country has literally changed, if you realize that the building of all this demanded practical organizational measures to provide this gigantic construction with leadership and men, then the unprecedented scope of the organizational work of our Party and of its Leninist Central Committee will be fully appreciated. (*Loud applause.*)

Permit me to refrain from going into the details of all

the stages of the organizational work during these years. This would take up too much time, and besides, you can all see the results of this work. Every new building, every new factory, every machine and tractor station, every collective farm, speaks for itself. Permit me to take up the key problem of our organizational work, *viz.*, the problem of cadres, the training, the preparation, the selection and distribution of workers.

### *1. The Five-Year Plan Doubled the Number of Specialists*

You know that the problem of cadres proved to be one of the most difficult problems of socialist construction. A considerable section of the old cadres of specialists turned out to be incapable, no matter how much they tried, of adapting themselves to the new tasks and the new tempoes. You can picture it to yourselves: if in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, in the ranks of the old Bolsheviks, even in the ranks of the Central Committee people were found who were unable to keep pace with Bolshevik tempoes, people who lagged behind, people who became emasculated and who lacked sufficient stamina for the new great cause, then what happened to many old non-Party specialists, who in many cases came from an alien camp? The Party strove to enlist the best of the old specialists for the work of socialist construction, and in regard to the best of them this task was fulfilled. Many of the old specialists proved to be heroes, but a section deliberately sabotaged, while another section proved incapable of adapting themselves to new methods and rapid tempoes of work.

The task of creating our own commanding corps for socialist industry that would be akin to the proletariat was and remains the great historical task of socialism.



This task was set us in all its acuteness by Comrade Stalin as far back as 1928 in connection with the famous trial of the Shakhty wreckers.

The Shakhty trial showed that a considerable section of the old technical cadres was unreliable, and that in moments of difficulty they betrayed the proletariat. On the other hand the Shakhty trial, like all the subsequent trials, revealed that many Communist leading workers, who were ignorant of technique and did not try to master it, blindly placed their confidence in these specialists, worked like "commissars" of the worst type, signed documents without taking the trouble to read what was in them, and in this way facilitated the work of the wreckers.

Many people in 1928 failed to understand the great significance of the cadre problem. In the debates that took place here in this hall, at the Plenum of the Central Committee on a particular organizational problem, *viz.*, on the reorganization of our universities and technical universities and their transfer to the industrial commissariats, a number of comrades took an opportunist line. As they did not understand what a Bolshevik scale of socialist construction was, or did not want it, they opposed the solution of the problem of training cadres; I refer to the speeches delivered at that Plenum by Comrade Rykov and others. But there were also comrades who were in favour of socialist construction on a wide scale but did not then understand that this organizational problem contained within itself a most important condition for the success of the socialist offensive.

You all remember what decisions the Central Committee adopted in July 1928, and what decisions the Central Committee adopted in November 1929 in supervising the fulfilment of the decisions of 1928.

Throughout the whole period now under review the

Central Committee stubbornly and persistently reverted to the problem of cadres, and made more precise and improved the work of training and bringing up these cadres. The Central Committee occupied itself with this problem not only from the point of view of general principles but also from the point of view of improving the quality of the methods of teaching, of industrial practice, of the building of new technical universities and technical schools, of the selection of students, of sending the latter into industry on the conclusion of their studies, etc.

Permit me, comrades, to submit to you a table showing what we have achieved in regard to training our own Soviet industrial-technical intelligentsia.

#### TECHNICAL AND OTHER UNIVERSITIES

	1928	1933
Number of universities in U.S.S.R. (all branches)	129	600
Number of students (thousands) . . . . .	160	491

The percentage of workers among the students in technical and other universities has doubled, *viz.*, 1928—25 per cent; 1933—50 per cent. The percentage of Communists among the students in technical and other universities rose from 15 per cent in 1928 to 22 per cent in 1933, while the percentage of Young Communists rose from 19 per cent in 1928 to 30 per cent in 1933.

During the First Five-Year Plan period 170,000 specialists graduated from the technical and other universities, while in 1933 alone 37,000 specialists graduated.

As a result, the number of specialists with higher education in all branches rose from 179,000 in 1928 to 303,000 at the beginning of 1933.

#### TECHNICAL SCHOOLS

	1928	1933
Number of technical schools . . . . .	1,033	3,522
Number of students (thousands) . . . . .	188	672

The percentage of workers among the students in technical schools rose from 25 per cent in 1928 to 41 per cent in 1933, while the percentage of Young Communists rose from 36 per cent in 1928 to 42 per cent in 1933.

During the First Five-Year Plan period 309,000 students graduated from the technical schools, and in 1933 alone 153,000 graduated.

As a result, the number of specialists with a middle technical education in the U.S.S.R. rose from 313,000 in 1928 to 669,000 at the beginning of 1933.

These figures indicate enormous quantitative progress. But still more significant are the qualitative changes that have taken place in the training of our specialists, in the improvement in the quality of the training, in the technical qualifications and the political complexion of our industrial technical cadres.

In 1928 the majority of higher educational establishments were not technical. Politechnics were improperly interpreted and universal specialists were trained who very often knew everything, but least of all knew the technique of the particular job to which they were sent. We sharply changed the system of work of the technical universities and of industrial practice, and we specialized the technical universities. There were cases, of course, when things were carried to extremes. In some cases the limits of specialization were too narrow. But the main line of the reorganization was a correct one. I do not want to suggest that everything is as it should be in this respect. The quality of the training in the technical and other universities still suffers from defects. This applies particularly to the training of architects, who become particularly important in the Second Five-Year Plan period. At the present time we must stress the importance of the methods of education, of the quality of training.

If you bear in mind that the number of specialists graduating from our various educational institutions shows a definite rise, that in the years 1934 and 1935 we shall obtain the results of the enrolments organized in 1931 and 1932, it will be clear to you to what extent we have improved the quantity and the quality of the training of cadres.

Comrade Stalin's historical slogans: "In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything," "Bolsheviks must master technique," roused enormous enthusiasm and a tremendous desire for knowledge among Communists, among the advanced non-Party workers and among the collective farmers. As a result of the enormous organizational work carried on by our Party the Soviet Union has been transformed into a land of mass technical education. We are now beginning to reap the abundant fruits of these historical counsels of Comrade Stalin and we are entering the Second Five-Year Plan period with a strong body of young proletarian commanding cadres, particularly in industry.

In large-scale industry the number of specialists with a complete higher education rose from 13,700 in 1928 to 50,700 in 1933; the number with a complete middle education rose from 10,500 in 1928 to 71,800 in 1933; and the total number of specialists, including practical specialists, rose from 100,000 in 1928 to 331,000 in 1933.

Young specialists who graduated from the universities and technical schools during the First Five-Year Plan period represent more than half the total number of specialists. The figures for the various branches of industry are as follows: machine-tools—66 per cent, aeroplane industry—70 per cent, oil industry—68 per cent, coal industry—58 per cent, automobiles and tractors—60 per cent.

The percentage of young specialists occupying commanding positions in industry—shop managers, assistant shop managers and shift managers—in the various industries is as follows: iron and steel—65 per cent, automobiles and tractors—62 per cent, building industry—62 per cent, electrical industry and power stations—64 per cent.

At the Stalin Automobile Works 50 per cent of the commanding staff consists of workers who were promoted to these jobs during the First Five-Year Plan period.

At the present time we have whole factories and whole shops which are managed exclusively by young specialists; many of our young specialists do their work as well as and even better than the old specialists, and even better than some foreign specialists.

I could quote you an example of what we saw when Comrade Orjonikidze and I visited the Stalinogorsk Chemical Combinat on opening day. There we saw a young professor who graduated only in 1931. He really earned the title of professor and did not get it by bluff as some people do. (*Laughter.*) Well, this Comrade Gelperin worked at the Berezniki Nitrate Works before this and there he dismantled and renewed the catalizers, and installed and started one of the synthesizing tanks exclusively with the aid of Soviet specialists. The Americans who installed this tank were unable to start it because there were certain defects in its construction. Comrade Gelperin, in conjunction with the young engineer Monossovich, altered the construction of the tank and succeeded in starting it. It is now working properly. Comrade Gelperin received an invitation from Japan to act as consulting engineer in the construction of a new works. But this young Soviet professor politely replied that he was too busy as there was quite enough work to do at home. (*Laughter, applause.*)

I could quote a number of very striking examples of talented people who have grown up in the First Five-Year Plan period. I could tell you about Comrade Butenko, a member of the Party since 1931, who not long ago was a fitter, and graduated from the technical university in 1928. During five years, Comrade Butenko passed from shift engineer to assistant manager, to manager of a blast furnace, to chief engineer of the Stalin Works, and finally to the post of technical director of one of the greatest metallurgical works in the Donbas.

*Orjonikidze:* In addition, he is now taking the place of the director of the works, Comrade Manayenkov.

*Sarkissov:* He is managing the job quite well.

*Kaganovich:* In fact very well. Or take the director of the Accumulator Trust, Comrade Admiralsky, born in 1902, quite recently an active worker in the Young Communist League. This director graduated from the technical university in 1928, grew up in industry, and is now successfully managing a very complicated job as director of the Accumulator Trust.

I could quote thousands of examples of yesterday's unskilled labourers who are now brigade foremen, shop foremen, and technicians. This is the result of the struggle which the Party carried on for proletarian cadres.

## *2. How the Party Supplied Workers for the Collective Farm Villages*

It is particularly necessary to deal with the question of supplying cadres for agriculture. Here, too, as in industry, the training of our technical cadres has expanded.

## THE TRAINING OF CADRES FOR AGRICULTURE

	1928	1933
Number of agricultural universities and technical universities . . . . .	30	116
Number of agricultural technical schools	204	928
Number of students in universities and technical universities (thousands) . . .	29	99
Number of students in agricultural technical schools (thousands) . . . . .	30	121

During the First Five-Year Plan period 29,000 students graduated from agricultural universities, and in 1933 alone 6,000. The number graduating from agricultural technical schools during the First Five-Year Plan period was 67,000 and in 1933 alone, 31,000.

The result is that while at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan period, according to the returns of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., 18,000 specialists who had completed their agricultural education were employed in agricultural production, at the end of 1933 there were 126,000 specialists (including employees in District Land Departments) who had graduated from higher and middle agricultural institutes employed in agricultural production, that is to say a sevenfold increase.

Of course, the demand for technical cadres for agriculture is not satisfied by a long way yet, but the acute problem in agriculture during the last few years has been the problem of leading organizational cadres. Whereas industry itself could serve as a source for supplying its cadres, these possibilities were until recently, to say the least, very restricted for agriculture.

The town had to come to the assistance of the countryside that had come under the banner of socialism; and the Party succeeded in organizing this assistance. The formerly scattered countryside could not promote from its own

midst the required number of the new type of organizers for the large-scale socialist agriculture which the collective farms, the machine and tractor stations and the Soviet farms represent. Hence, the task arose of providing the countryside with forces from outside, of giving it capable workers from the proletarian towns who could create in the villages strong Party organizations, who could train Bolsheviks, train cadres and create reserves from among whom the leading staffs for socialist agriculture could subsequently be taken.

You all remember the sending of 25,000 workers into the country. That was the first step. As a beginning they were very helpful and played a useful role; but this proved to be an insufficient force for the purpose of consolidating the countryside on the new collective farm road.

And so Comrade Stalin in a Leninist manner, generalizing the situation in the countryside, set the task of creating a new organization in the rural districts, viz., the political departments, of sending tried and efficient men and women from the towns to the rural districts for the purpose of helping to solve the problems that confronted the Party.

When we set to work to organize the political departments, certain comrades were smitten with doubt. How will the peasantry react to this sending of workers to the rural districts from above? they asked. But today we hear the powerful voice coming straight from the hearts of tens of millions of peasants singing the praises of the political department workers as Bolshevik organizers, as those who have united the masses of the collective farmers for the fight for Bolshevik collective farms, for the fight for a well-to-do, cultured existence for collective farmers. (*Loud applause.*)



When we began to select workers for the political departments Comrade Stalin particularly warned us against an indiscriminate mobilization: select each one separately, he said; carefully study each candidate separately; select important people and pay no attention to the complaints of the institutions and organizations in which they are working; select the people very carefully, for you are sending them to carry out the great reorganization of the countryside.

In order to be able to select one political department worker we had to examine five and sometimes even ten persons. This is not because these people were bad in themselves, but because we selected the very best for the political departments. There were cases when people literally wept because they were rejected as candidates for the political departments. Why do you reject me for this work? each one said. You called me to be interviewed; well, if you cannot appoint me chief of a political department, then appoint me vice-chief or assistant, or instructor. A real movement arose among the Communists in connection with the sending of people to the political departments. We formed one group consisting of army workers. The army gave us the first group of chiefs of political departments to the number of 300. This was the first detachment of excellent, efficient men. (*Applause.*)

We sent to the rural districts over 18,000 political department workers; of these 58 per cent were workers, 35 per cent had joined the Party before 1920; the number of chiefs of political departments who had joined the Party before 1920 represented 79 per cent of the total; 45 per cent of the chiefs of political departments have a higher Party or higher general education; 46 per cent have a middle school education.

In addition to the political department workers, every

region sent people to work in the collective farms. According to incomplete returns, 23 regions sent from 40,000 to 50,000 workers to the rural districts. The fact that the Central Committee had sent workers to the political departments served to stimulate the regional organizations to send their workers into the villages.

Of the chiefs of political departments not less than half come from Moscow and Leningrad.

Moscow and Leningrad—the two capitals—fulfilled their duty to the country with honour. (*Applause.*)

### *3. The Central Committee Supplied Workers to the Agricultural and Remote Regions*

Special mention must be made of the assistance given to the local organizations in the way of workers. In the period between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses the Central Committee distributed 45,000 workers (between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses only 10,000 workers were distributed). The increase in the number distributed did not affect the quality of those sent. More than 70 per cent of those distributed had joined the Party not later than 1920; more than half were former factory workers; 62 per cent had graduated from higher or middle schools.

The regions that received workers from the Central Committee and the number they received are as follows: Urals—2,238; Western Siberia—2,242; Eastern Siberia—1,381; the Far East—1,913; Central Asia—1,927; Kazakstan—2,261. Thus, the Asiatic regions and republics received nearly 12,000 workers. The number taken from them (fluidity, transfers to other places, etc.) was 1,800.

Many workers were sent to the principal agricultural regions. Thus, the Ukraine received 5,581 workers; North

Caucasus—3,197; Lower Volga—2,140; Middle Volga—1,625; Central Black Soil Region—1,788. Taken as a whole these regions received more than 14,000 workers; 3,000 were taken from them. The region to which we did not send many workers is the Trans-Caucasus. The Central Committee is able to state that during the past few years all the Trans-Caucasian republics have been successfully training new workers. (*Applause.*)

The Central Committee took up the question of supplying skilled workers. In particular, under the guidance of the Central Committee, the Young Communist League and the trade unions carried out a great work in mobilizing workers for the new construction in the Urals. At the present time new textile combinats are being organized. And the Central Committee is mobilizing textile workers in the Moscow and Ivanovo regions who are to be sent to Central Asia and Western Siberia. In the past three years alone the Young Communist League mobilized 66,000 workers for factories in the Ural-Kuzbas, 36,000 for the Donbas, 7,000 for the Stalingrad Tractor Works, 10,000 for the Moscow underground railway, 6,000 for posts and telegraphs, 20,000 for lumber work, more than 3,000 for the Far Eastern Region, etc.

This is sufficient to enable you to get an idea of the enormous scope of the organizational work that has been carried on not only in regard to the training, increasing the number of, and distributing cadres, but also in regard to the organization of new enterprises, institutions, etc.

Of course there are still many defects in our work of training and distributing workers. The indiscriminate mobilization of workers has not yet entirely disappeared; the individual selection and the calculation of the personal abilities of each worker are still insufficient. The most important defects are: the absence of careful selec-

tion of personnel; appraising these people by the diplomas they hold and not according to the practical work they have done; the inability to raise and promote those people who deserve promotion; the unsatisfactory quality of the work of many universities, and particularly of the technical schools.

And the principal defect is the disease that was discovered by the Central Committee in the coal industry and on the railways, namely, the enormous number of people that stick in offices. The work of transferring specialists from the offices to the place of production in the coal industry and on the railways has already produced palpable results. Thus, for example, in the Donbas on March 1, 1933, 643 mining engineers were employed; of these only 26 were employed at the pits. On October 1, 854 mining engineers were employed and of these 350 were employed at the pits. The number employed at the pits increased thirteenfold. The number of engineers and technicians employed at the pits on March 1, 1933, was 228; on October 1, the number was 1,120—a fivefold increase.

The number of engineers employed in the principal railway depots on July 1, 1933, was 446; on October 1, the number had risen to 976. The total number of engineers employed in the depots, car sections, stations, track and service sections on July 1 was 1,012 and the number of technicians was 7,575; on October 1, the figures were 3,095 and 14,342 respectively, *i.e.*, the number of engineers working in the lower railway units increased threefold, and the number of technicians increased twofold.

Experience in the coal mines and on the railways reveals what enormous possibilities exist in all the other branches of national economy.

But it is not sufficient merely to transfer people to the lower units. Why were the results of cutting down staffs,

not effective enough in the past? Because although the staffs were cut down, there was no fundamental reorganization from top to bottom, there was no change in the system of organization and accounting. And it was only after the last cutting down of the staffs that was carried out by the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection on the instructions of the Central Committee that a change in the very structure of the apparatus was inaugurated, although it must be admitted that it was not done with sufficient determination.

*Roisenmann:* Quite true.

*Kaganovich:* If the organizational structure is wrong, if the functional system exists, the manager, not only of a whole enterprise but even of a shop and of a section, is unable to engage in serious business, in exercising technical guidance; all he can do is write reports, etc., which, unfortunately, is the case at the present time in a number of industrial enterprises, in the transport system, in machine and tractor stations and on Soviet farms.

It is not sufficient to send a worker to a lower unit. From the point of view of the further growth of the cadres, of giving them opportunities for learning socialist construction from practical experience, from the point of view of liquidating the type of honest chatterbox to whom Comrade Stalin so strikingly referred, it is of enormous importance to be able to liquidate the office-routine methods of leadership, to organize the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions and still further to reorganize the work in order to make it correspond with the line laid down by Comrade Stalin in his report.

When people are overburdened with office work and the writing of general resolutions, they overlook "trifles," they overlook human beings. They fail to see a new foreman, a new engineer, a new technician, they fail to see

new heroes of labour, they fail to see the Young Communists, who are growing up, who could be promoted to new work.

People say that we are short of men, but this is not true. We have the men, able men, but we must be able to promote them, to raise them, to put them into their proper place. We must be able to lead them properly. The man who is put into a job must be trained, must be raised in the process of his work; care must be taken that he does not become emasculated and dusty. From time to time we must take a rag and wipe away the dust that has accumulated on him. (*Laughter and applause.*)

#### *4. The Significance of the Organizational Problem At the Present Stage of the Building of Socialism*

We have passed through great years of glorious struggle and at this Seventeenth Congress we count up our victories. We do this not in order to become intoxicated with victories, of which we can legitimately be proud; we do this not from the academic historical point of view; we do it as an army of fighters and revolutionaries. We look back on the road we have travelled in order to learn the lessons of the past, and in order to overhaul and sharpen our weapons for the great battles that lie ahead.

Our achievements enable us to intensify the struggle against organizational defects. We must consolidate what we have won in the First Five-Year Plan period, we must improve the quality of our work, and supplement the fervour of construction with the fervour of assimilation.

The organizational scope of our work has been enormous. Mistakes were inevitable, just as in a newly constructed factory debris accumulates in some of the corners, the debris of a great construction. Now it is necessary to clean up and put everything in order.

We must sharply expose our defects. The criticism of these does not in the least diminish our achievements. On the contrary, it reveals consciousness of our own strength, firm conviction in the strength and stamina of the organism of the proletarian dictatorship.

In the theses submitted to the Seventeenth Party Congress it is stated:

“Now that the general line of the Party has conquered, that the policy of the Party has been tested by life, by the experience not only of the members of the Party but also of millions of workers and toiling peasants—the task rises in all its scope of raising organizational work to the level of political leadership. The organizational problem, while remaining a problem subordinate to problems of policy, nevertheless, in view of this, acquires *exceptional* significance for the further successes of socialist construction.”

Lenin and Stalin repeatedly stated that the crux of the organizational problem was the selection of men and the supervision of fulfilment of decisions. These two problems are inseparably connected with each other. They cannot be properly solved unless the structure, the system of work of our Soviet and Party organizations is reorganized.

Under the functional system, which gives rise to absence of individual responsibility, it is impossible to provide for distinct operative leadership, it is impossible to secure strict personal responsibility, and hence, it is impossible to secure systematic and careful supervision over the fulfilment of decisions. Under the functional system and a too confused structure of organization the middle and higher links of the organization become overstaffed. One day the workers are transferred to the place of production and another day they are brought back again to the overstaffed offices.

That is why we raise all the organizational problems as one integral problem, as a complex; we include the selection of personell, supervision over fulfilment of decisions, changes in the organizational structure, and the abolition of bureaucratic routine methods of leadership all in the one problem.

We must say quite frankly that bureaucratic routine methods of leadership, the reducing of leadership to the giving of general orders, the inability to combine administrative management with sound business management, the functional system—all these are the heritage of bourgeois methods of management. Many of our business managers and leaders, although honest and good managers, fail to understand the fundamental difference between the methods of management that we require and those that prevail in bourgeois countries.

Nowhere in the world is the organizational problem so acute and so wide, nor can it be so acute and wide as it is in our country. Capitalism is not interested in, did not, and does not, know the problem of organizing the economy of the country as a single whole, because this contradicts the very nature of capitalism. Even the state of organization of individual capitalist enterprises or trusts is extremely relative. It is precisely for this reason that all the utopian attempts of bourgeois ideologists like Robert Owen and others to introduce the elements of organization in capitalist economy without abolishing capitalism itself, failed; it is precisely for this reason that all the social-fascists and their abettors—our Right opportunists—failed in their attempts to establish the theory of “organized capitalism” on the basis of the development of monopolies, cartels and trusts. Actually, we see that the attempts of the capitalists to mitigate the anarchy of pro-



duction by the organization of monopolies, cartels and trusts lead to nothing.

The bourgeois state apparatus and bourgeois cabinets do not manage industry. The bourgeois state apparatus mainly plays the role of police-regulator, which protects the interests of the capitalists against the revolutionary workers. Each enterprise is managed by the capitalist himself. In our country, however, in socialist society, it is precisely the state that realizes the unity of political and economic leadership.

Our very methods of presenting the question of organization very sharply emerge from the content of the dictatorship of the proletariat, from the content of the tasks of socialist construction. Lenin and Stalin more than once emphasized that the principal, most difficult task after the victory over the bourgeoisie has been achieved and after the capture of power, is the task of organizing new social relationships, the task of organizing the planned production and distribution of products necessary for the existence of tens of millions of people.

Lenin said:

“In order to manage successfully, *in addition* to being able to convince, in addition to being able to conquer in civil war, it is necessary to be able *to organize*. This is the most difficult task because it is a matter of organizing in a new way the most profound economic foundations of life of tens and tens of millions of people. And it is the most grateful task because only *after* it is *fulfilled* (in its main and fundamental outline) will it be possible to say that Russia has become not only a Soviet, but also a socialist republic.” (*Collected Works, Russian ed., Vol. XXII.*)

Comrade Stalin at this Congress showed how acute the organizational problem is at the present moment, after we have created thousands of new big enterprises, after

the requirements of the masses have grown to an enormous extent, when every worker is called upon to know every detail of his work, when the socialist system "now has unchallenged predominance and is the sole commanding force in the whole of national economy."

Amidst conditions in which socialist economy stands out as the sole commanding force, not in individual sectors, but in the whole field of management, bad organization, bad management, bad supervision of fulfilment of decisions directly retard the development of productive forces, and hinder the fulfilment of the task of assimilating and technically reconstructing the whole of our national economy.

Just as in the First Five-Year Plan period history gave us no respite in regard to the industrialization of the country, so during the Second Five-Year Plan period we shall get no respite in regard to the assimilation, the mastery of new technique, the assimilation and consolidation of the new forms of life. And success in this depends entirely on our state of organization, entirely on the way in which we organize industry, transport, agriculture, trade, etc. Comrade Stalin stated at this Congress that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for failures and defects in our work will rest not on "objective" conditions, but upon ourselves, and ourselves alone.

The organizational problem occupied an important place at all stages of our construction, and now it assumes an even more profound and decisive character. It is precisely at the present time, in the epoch of the building of classless socialist society, that the organizational problem confronts us in all its scope. If the brigades in the collective farms or departments of Soviet farms are badly organized, if labour is badly organized in them, if the means of production are not properly utilized, and if the leaders

of these brigades and these Soviet farms do not understand their business properly, do not understand the construction of new modern agricultural machinery, if to them tractors and combines are "dark forces," then this will interfere with the consolidation of socialist agriculture, it will retard the organization of socialist forms of economy, will retard the construction of socialist society. The sense and content of the work of our Party at the present time, when we are engaged in erecting the edifice of socialism on the foundations of socialist economy, are, that we must directly organize this work of construction and organize the masses for this work.

To raise the organizational work of the Party to the level of political leadership means guaranteeing the necessary tempo of carrying out the Party line, the necessary tempo of building socialist society. The rapid assimilation of the new technique, of the new enterprises, the organizational consolidation of the collective farms and their transformation into centres of culture and well-to-do socialist life, depends precisely upon the elimination of the organizational lag.

Every Bolshevik must realize that the organizational problem is not presented as a means of eliminating minor defects in the mechanism. The organizational problem is presented by the Central Committee on the initiative of Comrade Stalin as broadly as was the struggle for the general line of our Party. The general line of our Party conquered. That is clear to all. Organizational work improved accordingly, but it still lags behind. It must be raised to the level of political leadership, to the plane of the great tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan.

We must examine the organizational problem not only from the point of view of reorganizing this or that superior organization, but also from the point of view of re-

organizing all our organizations, the factory, the collective farm, the machine and tractor station, the shop, the hospital, etc., *i.e.*, all the units in which material wealth, real life is created.

An example of this method of presenting the problem is the decision of the Central Committee on the coal industry.

## II

### THE REORGANIZATION OF SOVIET BUSINESS ORGANS OF MANAGEMENT

#### *1. Organizational Problems in Heavy Industry*

I will not deal in detail with the whole of the presentation of the problem in connection with the coal industry. One thing is clear, and that is, that in this case the connection between the political and economic task and the organizational fulfilment of this task was maintained to a greater extent than in any other.

The fulfilment of the political and economic task of overcoming a weak spot like the lag of the coal industry was guaranteed by the Central Committee by such organizational measures as eliminating bureaucratic routine methods of leadership, the transferring of qualified engineering and technical forces to the place of production, the fight against the functional system and lack of personal responsibility in management (depersonalization) and against equalitarianism in the wages system. As you know, these organizational measures extended far beyond the limits of the decision on the Donbas. These measures represent the main organizational link in the whole system of reorganization of our economic, state and Party work. That has been proved already. It is not only a matter of cutting down staffs and allowing them to swell again within six months. The whole system must be changed.

The Party was engaged with the Donbas for a very long time, but as it did not get down to fundamental organizational problems, no progress was made. The highly detailed rates of output assumed monstrous proportions. The number of these rates of output ran into tens of thousands. For example, the Krasnogvardeisky Pit had no less than 12,000. A handbook entitled *Rates of Output* provided for no less than 1,500 rates for hewers alone. Even for such a simple operation as transferring a conveyer more than 400 rates were drawn up. Of course, the workers could not know what their rate of output was and what they were getting for a ton or a carload of coal.

It was revealed that the brigadier, the foreman or the chief of the section had no authority; the various trades in the pit were split up so much and the functional system in the management was carried to such a degree as to make the whole thing ridiculous. If a foreman or a chief of a section had to have a coal cutter repaired he had to apply to the manager of the mechanization department of the pit, who was on the surface, and ask him to send down a fitter; if a car jumped the rails and damaged the track, the chief of the section had to apply to the manager of the track department, who was also on the surface, to send a repair gang down. The best engineers and technicians were employed in the offices of the trusts or mine managements. Good workers were "promoted" from the pits to the offices as an "encouragement" for good work.

You are familiar with the first decision passed by the Central Committee and the subsequently issued regulations on mine management and trusts. In these regulations we began with brigadiers and foremen, with the primary cells of production; we gave the chief of a section the right to decide questions himself, we settled the questions of out-

put, wages, repairs of machinery, etc. The organizational problems in the coal industry have been solved fundamentally. You know the results.

The example of the coal industry serves to illustrate how staffs should be reduced, how the structure of the organization should be changed and what results can be achieved. Take for example the Ilyich Pit (in the Kadiev Coal Trust). On March 1 it had 171 office employees but on January 1, 1934, it had 84; the staff had been cut by half. And thirteen more engineers and technicians were sent to work underground. With an office staff reduced by half the pit produced twice as much coal as it did in 1932. The output increased from 157,000 tons to 286,000 tons and exceeded its plan by 12 per cent.

The number of reports that have to be drawn up was greatly reduced. Before the decision of the Central Committee was issued the pit had to provide information on 64 forms and on 51,500 items per month. At the present time this has been reduced to one-seventh. *There are fewer scribes in the office, less paper is wasted, but more coal is produced.* In May the actual daily output of the Ukrainian Donbas was 121,000 tons, in November this had risen to 134,000 tons, an increase of 11 per cent. In May the output per miner was 36 tons, in October this had risen to 42 tons, an increase of 16 per cent. The wages of the workers have increased. In May they were 118 rubles, in October they were 150 rubles, an increase of 18 per cent. The abolition of the functional system sharply reduced the number of breakdowns of machinery. For example, in this same pit in 1932 there were 31 serious breakdowns of cutting machines, in 1933 there were only 19. In 1932 there were 14 breakdowns of the conveyor belts and in 1933 only 6, and most of these occurred in the first half of the year, hardly any occurred in the latter half. In this

pit there was a special dressing department. The chief of the section bore hardly any responsibility for the quality of the coal. Now this dressing department has been abolished. And the ash content of the coal has been greatly reduced. The abolition of the coal dressing department resulted in the coal getting dressed. We lost the dressing department, but our coal became better dressed. (*Laughter.*)

Of course, the reorganization is not complete even in the coal industry. Here too there are a number of pits and trusts concerning which it may be said: drive nature out of the door and it will come in through the window. I refer to bureaucratic nature. The fight must still go on, we must introduce supervision of fulfilment of decisions and we must be under no illusions about this. Nevertheless we can say that in regard to the organizational problem the coal industry stands in the first rank of all industries.

Have all the other industries learned the lesson of the coal industry? I must say that the lessons of the Donbas have been learned by our industries very badly and unsatisfactorily. It is true, of course, that our factories are working much better than the Donbas worked before it was reorganized. There is more culture in our factories and the workers are better organized. But there is a great deal of organizational confusion and lack of responsibility in management; the work must be immediately reorganized in all the industries on the same lines as was done in the coal industry. This will enable us to utilize the large productive capacity that is available to the utmost.

Taking the relations between the factory management and the various shops we must say that the functional system still prevails as it did in the coal industry. If a department of a factory can be compared with a section



of a mine we will find that the factory department does not occupy the place it should, and the place which the pit section now occupies. The factory managements are still so unwieldy that instead of assisting the work of the shops they actually hamper it. Endless correspondence goes on between the management, the functional sections and the shops, which hampers the shop manager in his work. More than that, very often purely formal relations exist between the chief of the department and his apparatus.

Take for example the Mytishchy Railway Car Works. There we have all the symptoms of bureaucratic routine methods of managing the works, *viz.*, the functional system in the structure of the apparatus and the overstaffing. The factory management is split up into 14 departments in which 367 people are employed. In addition, there are 234 office employees in the various shops. The total number of workers employed at these works is 3,832, so that the office staff represents 16 per cent of the total number of workers employed. In addition to the director there is an assistant technical director, an assistant director of the supply department, an assistant director of workers' supply, a production department, a preparatory production department, a chief engineer's department, technical control department, planning and economic department, a staff department, a special department, a department for the supervision of fulfilment of decisions, a central book-keeping department, a commercial department, which is divided into two sub-departments, namely: finance sub-department, and sub-department for supplies and sales, a general managers' department, stores department, building department, and workers' supply department.

Well, this apparatus receives salaries and therefore it "must" write. And so they go on writing and writing. For

example the carpenters' shop employs 57 workers and during the month of January it received 7,000 written orders. In many cases orders were written when no such written orders were required, and it is the engineers who are engaged on writing these orders. Many people think that all the engineers in the factory are engaged in production. This is not so. Many of them are given office work to do in the factory and in the shop. There are still few engineers at the place of production, at the place where parts are manufactured, and where they are assembled. Of the 55 engineers employed at the Mytishchy Works 36 are employed in the office, and 19 in the various shops. If you examine the state of affairs in other works you will find the same thing.

In most cases works directors have no direct contact with the chiefs of the shops, the only contact they have with them is through the functional departments. For example, the shop receives its plan from two departments, from the so-called production planning department, the function of which is to determine the concrete tasks, and from the planning economic department which gives the shop instructions in regard to all other items. It very often happens that the instructions given by these two departments contradict each other.

The existence of a large number of functional departments cannot but lead to the superfluous writing of documents, to lack of responsibility and to indefinite leadership. I could illustrate this by a number of very comical examples of how various departments of a factory enter into correspondence with the chiefs of shops, and how the latter merely shrug their shoulders. An old workman, now the chief of a shop in the Mytishchy Works, once said: "It can't be helped, all this writing comes of their sitting there nibbling their pencils." (*Laughter.*)

Here is an order sent to the chief of the foundry, Comrade Katkov. The manager of the Health Inspector's Department demands: "Information not later than 19/1/34 on the following points: the size of the shop in cubic metres; number of workers employed in each department and in each shift; on cutting—number of emery wheels and drums; on machining—number of emery wheels with screens; on auxiliary premises—the number of faucets in the wash-house and the number of seats in the lavatory; lighting in the shops in the evening and night shifts; in the foundry: the number of castings and the load of the furnaces; how regularly are overalls distributed and what arrangements are made for laundry and repair; machine shop: the number of motor driven machines and transmissions and total number of machines; in the forge: number of oil furnaces, number of steam hammers and furnaces," etc. These endless written questionnaires and documents from the functional departments prevent the chief of the shop from carrying out his proper function of directing the work at the shop.

If the chief of the shop has to apply to the management when he wants anything done, he has to apply to other departments: he has to apply to the Hiring and Discharge Department if it is a matter concerning workers; to the Energetics Bureau of the Machine Department if it is a matter of fuel; to the Supplies Department if it is a matter concerning materials; to the Preparatory Production Department if it is a matter of drawings; to the Production Department and Planning and Economic Department if it is a matter concerning the program of output; to the Wages and Economic Section if it is a matter concerning rates of pay and output, etc.

This functional system directly leads to the position that a director is relieved of the duty of directly guiding

the work of the shops and occupies himself with giving general orders. The following is an example of an order issued by this director on the organization of a medical-sanitary and chemical service in the factory. He starts out as follows:

"The capitalist world is suffocating in the clutches of the world crisis." (*Loud laughter.*) This is direct competition with Comrade Manuilsky. (*Laughter.*) "It is making furious preparations for a new world war. They are seeking a way out of the profound economic and political crisis by intensifying the exploitation of the workers and toiling peasants of all countries and are preparing for an armed attack primarily against the U.S.S.R. Therefore it is our duty to strengthen the might and power of defence of the U.S.S.R. a guarantee of which will be the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the industrial and financial plan of the factory."

This is not an accidental order. Comrade Khrunychev is not a bad worker; but, comrades, this is the style of his work. He has issued many orders like this.

Of course it is necessary to carry on agitation for the fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan and for the defence of our country. But when hot air and empty chatter is substituted for operative leadership we get neither business nor agitation. Evidently such leaders think that leadership means waving their arms about. (*Laughter.*)

A great deal was said here about fighting for quality. It is quite true, we must fight for quality. But if the functional system is preserved, the fight for quality will certainly be hampered. How many times have we been at a factory and have asked: Why have you got spoiled goods, why have you scrapped these parts? And the answer we get is: It is the fault of the designing department; or, the department for organizing production processes gave the wrong drawings. Then you go to the designing depart-

ment and you ask: Why were the parts scrapped? And they reply: It is the fault of the shop. This is the absence of responsibility that is created by the functional system, for it prevents the one who is responsible for spoiled work being discovered.

I think special attention must be paid to the organization of technological processes. In the majority of cases this is isolated from the shops. The Donbas comrades will remember the famous D.D.P.P.O.L. which existed in the pits, and how the miners smashed up this Department for Designing Production Processes and Organizing Labour. And yet, just imagine, this department still exists in another form in the factories.

In the factories we have departments for preparatory production, and the technological process is isolated from the shop. The chiefs of the shops, who are the principal commanding force in the factory, take no part whatever in this very important business, and their very rich experience is not utilized in any way in working out (the first and most important thing) the technological process which determines the drawings, the materials, the method of working up the materials, the time required for the machining of parts, etc. Of course, the shops must be brought in in working out the technological process. Evidently; the factory managements should have a definite designing bureau at which all the chiefs of the shops could receive their main instructions or to which they could give something in the nature of orders for what they require. The designer who designs a given part or a given section of the machine must be in the shop and help to get this part made. At the present time the majority of production departments entangle the organization of the technological process in miles and miles of red tape.

But here is the example of Comrade Likhachev, the

director of the Stalin Automobile Works, who reorganized the management of his factory and unlike the director of the Mytishchy Works, transformed his designing department into a sort of small technological bureau attached to the factory management. This bureau gives general direction to the technological process, while the designers were sent to work in the shops. All the parts are designed in the shops under the guidance of the chiefs of the shops and are produced there. The results of this will soon be seen, in fact they are seen already.

The example of the Stalin Automobile Works shows that not everywhere is the position the same as it is at the Mytishchy Works, but the functional system exists in the majority of our factories to some extent; the majority of office employees are employed in the functional departments, each of which gives its own separate orders to the chiefs of the shops. The system of relying upon the chiefs of the shops, and in the shops on the foremen, as the main commanding forces in production, has not been introduced seriously yet. And the task is to reorganize the work of the factory managements and of the shops—making allowances, of course, for the specific conditions of each branch of industry and avoiding stereotyped recipes—in order, like the coal industry, to cut down bureaucratic routine to the very utmost and increase the role of the foreman and manager of the shop.

This applies also to the building industry. As soon as any construction is undertaken numerous offices are set up. I personally have seen one such building operation which had no less than thirty departments. The workers had nowhere to live but the apparatus occupied huge premises.

The technical reconstruction of all branches of national economy, the construction of new gigantic enterprises, the

inculcation of mechanized and automatic technique calls for the greatest smoothness and symmetry in the whole of the production process. Hence, never has it been more necessary than now to secure the strictest introduction of individual management in all branches of the management of industry. The foreman is the authoritative leader of his section, the chief of the shop is the authoritative leader of the shop, the factory director is the authoritative leader of the factory having all the rights, duties and responsibility that accompany these positions:

Modern technique imperatively calls for the utmost strengthening of the technical leadership. Therefore the foreman, chief of the shop, and the director of the factory can be real commanders of production only when they lead, not only the business side, but also the technical side of the process of production. Simultaneously, the technical staff, and primarily the foreman and chiefs of shops, must guide not only machines but men, organize their labour, fix their rates of output and their piece-rates.

In the reorganization of industry, and not only of industry, the most important thing is to reduce the number of links in the management system. In place of the old four-link system it is necessary to establish a three-link, and what would be better, a two-link system, which has been introduced already in a number of branches of industry as a result of the liquidation of combines and of a number of trusts.

In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry has brought about a very considerable reorganization of the middle and higher links of the management system in heavy industry. A number of branch head offices have been split up into smaller units for the purpose of improv-

ing concrete leadership. A number of enterprises have been placed directly in charge of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Experience shows that the direct subordination of a number of enterprises to the People's Commissariats is the proper line to take. A number of trusts and nearly all the combines have been dissolved.

The possibilities that are opened up by the proper solution of the organizational problem from the point of view of reducing office staffs and improving the work of the offices is revealed by what took place in the aviation industry. The Chief Aviation Industry Board liquidated two trusts, namely: the Aeroplane Construction Trust and Aeroplane Engine Construction Trust. The Board has established direct connection with the factories. As a result the staffs of the two trusts, numbering 440 persons, were abolished. The management expenses of these two trusts amounted to nearly 3,000,000 rubles. Both these trusts have been dissolved, and the aeroplane factories are working just as well as they worked before, if not better.

Of course, a certain amount of work has been done in reorganizing the system of management of heavy industry, but especially after hearing Comrade Stalin's report we should least of all employ such phrases as: "There is a turn," "We can observe some progress." In spite of the fact that a number of chief boards under the control of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry have been split up in order to bring the leadership nearer to production and that a number of trusts have been dissolved in order to remove superfluous links in the system of management of industry, the system of organization in the trusts and in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry itself is still imperfect, there are still numerous functional sectors in it. It is not necessary to liquidate all the functional sectors. Some of them can and should re-



main. But in the first place, their number must be reduced to the utmost, and secondly, the functional sectors must be prohibited from operating over the heads of the chief boards and managements of production. There must be one boss to give the orders. The functional sector should be a small auxiliary apparatus of the People's Commissar but should not give any direct orders itself. Then, at all events it will do less harm. (*Loud laughter and applause.*)

We may express the wish that the heavy industry, which was the first to receive its lesson in the coal industry, will try to be the first in reorganizing all its branches.

## 2. *The Organizational Problems of the Light, Food and Lumber Industries*

The organization of the work throughout the whole system of light industries, from the People's Commissariat right down to the individual factories, is particularly bad and unsatisfactory.

Comrade Lubimov spoke here and tried to touch upon several organizational problems. But his criticism was extremely halting and narrow. Judging from his speech he only lightly knows the organizational problems of the light industries, and I will have to expose the defects somewhat more sharply than he did. (*A voice: Of course!*) In the light industries, a wrong system of organization, bureaucratic routine methods of managing factories, and the functional system are strongly entrenched. The functional system in these industries has assumed exceptionally wide dimensions. The output of the functional system and bureaucracy in the sectors and departments of the People's Commissariat for Light Industries is far more extensive than the work of producing the actual goods produced by the light industries. (*Laughter.*)

All textile workers very well remember the history of the functional system in the textile industry which embraced all branches of production and inflicted quite enough damage. I will not deal here with many organizational problems and in particular I will not deal in detail with the problem of organizing labour, because that would require a special report; but I will deal with this question in connection with the functional system in the textile industry.

What did the functional system in the textile industry represent? The sum and substance of it was the following: for scores of years there were skilled weavers and skilled spinners who in a way took pride in their skill. These were abolished. The duties of the spinner and of the weaver were divided up into a number of various functions and instead of having an integral process of labour three functions were created. This led to lack of responsibility, to bad work and a sharp increase of spoiled goods.

Comrade Stalin's instructions and the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee were required in order to abolish this functional system in the textile industry and to restore the skilled weaver and spinner with all the rights of skilled workers. In the factories in the light industries the functional system is not less markedly expressed, if not more so, than in the example I quoted of the Mytishchy Works.

Until very recently there was a large number of functional departments and sections in textile mills and the whole system of organization was unsatisfactory. For example, in the Proletarka Mills there were eighteen functional departments, and in the Sverdlov Mills there were thirteen functional departments and ten functional sectors. At the Proletarka Weaving Mills there were the following officials: 1) director; 2) vice-director; 3) assistant

director for workers' supply; 4) assistant director for mass work; 5) production manager; 6) manager of the Planning Department; 7) manager of the Rationalization Department; 8) manager of the Organization of Labour Department; 9) manager of the Technical Control Department; 10) manager of the Cadres Department; 11) manager of the Supplies Department; 12) head bookkeeper; 13) manager of the Finance Department; 14) manager of the Personnel Department; 15) general office manager; 16) manager of the Technical Propaganda Department; 17) manager of the Safety Measures Department; 18) chief engineer; 19) manager of the Control and Fulfilment Sector; 20) manager of the Building Department.

Obviously the functional system of production and the functional structure of the whole system of management, particularly in the factory, facilitated the output of goods of bad quality. The percentage of spoiled work (rejects and second quality) reached enormous dimensions. In certain factories it amounted to 30 and 40 per cent of the total output.

Spoiled work not only resulted from the bad system of management and from the functional system, but also from the absurd centralization of the auxiliary services. The People's Commissariat for Light Industries set up a trust of auxiliary enterprises and deprived the factories of the right to produce their own auxiliary materials. (The repair and production of spools and shuttles, etc.) This created and still creates additional difficulties in the work of the factories.

All these defects were brought to light at the Conference of Textile Workers of the Moscow Region that was held in Orekhovo. An old, non-Party engineer named Kopylov has related how the work was organized formerly and how it is organized now, and pointed out where the

mistakes were. He wrote an interesting letter in which he exposed the bureaucracy and routine in the work of the Drezna Mills. "We cannot develop the struggle against spoiled work," he wrote, "because we lack a number of auxiliary materials and parts which are necessary today. There is not that operative connection between the director and the technical director that there should be, nor is there proper connection with the chiefs of the shops." We see a similar picture of bad, non-operative management in the trusts, and in the Commissariat for Light Industries itself.

Taking the work of the central organizations and trusts I must say that planning is often reduced to a mockery. Take for example the Red Dawn Knitted Goods Mills. They worked throughout the whole of 1933 without a plan. The plan for these mills was examined in five organizations (the People's Commissariat for Light Industries of the U.S.S.R., the Head Knitted Goods Board, the Commissariat for Light Industry of the R.S.F.S.R., the Moscow Regional Board for Light Industries and the Moscow Knitted Goods Trust) and also in forty-six sectors.

The mills received nineteen different sets of instructions every one of which contradicted the others. The plans were altered over and over again as follows: the output plan—seven times; productivity of labour plan—four times; cost of production—eight times. The result was that the factory worked without any plan. The plan for 1933 was finally endorsed on January 4, . . . 1934. The plan for 1933 was only one year and four days late. (*Laughter.*) I could quote numerous examples of this kind of bureaucratic red-tape methods of leadership in the People's Commissariat for Light Industries.

The apparatus of the cotton industry consisted of nineteen to twenty-two functional departments. The appara-

tus of the Moscow Cotton Trust consisted of nineteen units, *i.e.*, sectors and groups having the rights of sectors. The Commission set up to reorganize the People's Commissariat for Light Industries proposes to leave eight departments and sectors out of the existing nineteen or twenty-two.

The People's Commissariat for Light Industries is exceptionally unwieldy. It has thirty-nine large units of management and sixty sectors. There are head management boards of branches of industry which have no production base of their own (such as the Chief Boards of the clothing industry, haberdashery industry, handicraft industry, printing industry, etc.). In the majority of cases the industries which these head boards are supposed to control are in charge of local authorities.

Management means the power to distribute material things, to appoint and discharge subordinates, in a word to be master of the particular enterprise. But if a given industry belongs to a republic or to a local authority, how can a central management board "manage" it?

Of course, it would be wrong to raise the question of transferring factories of national importance to local authorities. But now in so far as the question of developing local industry and the handicraft industry has been raised, more attention will have to be paid to the regional management boards, in order that these shall not be merely appendages but important organs of management through the medium of which the People's Commissariats and the local Executive Committees could manage local industries. At all events the desires of the People's Commissariat for Light Industries for conquest and expansion must be curbed. (*A voice: Quite right.*)

I do not want to say that we must satisfy the strivings of many local comrades to secure the control of enter-

prises that are undoubtedly of national importance. But the People's Commissariats should to a far greater extent rely on the assistance of the local soviets and Executive Committees. (*Voices: Quite right.*)

As for the management boards which control industries of national importance, they are so unwieldy that actually they do not manage the industries. Take for example the Chief Cotton Board. This management board combines 14 All-Union trusts and combinats having a total of 179 factories employing 350,000 workers. Its enterprises turn out goods to the amount of 2,500,000,000 rubles, which represents approximately one-third of the total output of the People's Commissariat for Light Industries. This Chief Board, if one may be permitted to call it that, cannot really lead the trusts and enterprises. And this gives rise to congestion and interruptions in the work of these trusts and enterprises. Why did not the People's Commissariat for Light Industries think over this question? Why did it not come to the Central Committee and raise the question? Evidently because it is occupied with "high matters," and does not concretely take up organizational problems; it leaves these to third-rate workers.

Would it not be better to split up this leviathan of a Cotton Board and set up businesslike, organized and really operative managements, which would know their factories, would lead them, would fight for the quality of their output and fulfil our decisions on the production of consumers' goods? (*Applause.*)

Comrade Lubimov did not in his speech expose all the defects. Comrade Lubimov must take his tasks more seriously and widely. He must understand that it is not a matter of minor defects in the mechanism, but of changing the methods of organizing the leadership of the light industries. It is a matter of liquidating routine and bureau-

crazy which has entrenched itself in the Commissariat, of liquidating the paper leadership that prevails in the People's Commissariat for Light Industries, of bringing the leadership closer to the factories and really putting these factories on their feet. It is a matter, comrades, of fulfilling the Five-Year Plan of expanding the output of consumers' goods which we have outlined here.

If we take other branches of industry like the food and lumber industries we will find very many organizational defects and confusion also. And if I do not examine them here it is not because the situation is better in them, but because I have not the opportunity or the time to examine all branches of industry in detail.

It is sufficient to recall the serious defects in the food industries which have led to the production of bad quality goods, to the detriment of consumers. It can be asserted without fear of contradiction that it was precisely the lack of attention and carelessness of the People's Commissariat for Supply with regard to organizational questions that led to this. In the food industries, in the fishing industries, in the canning industries, etc., there is a great lack of responsibility and a large amount of bureaucracy. How badly the oil and fat industry was organized can be seen from the following facts: the oil and fat industry was managed by the Chief Vegetable Oil and Fat Board, by the Vegetable Oil Board, the Chief Fat Industry Board, the Soap, Perfume and Cosmetics Trust, and three People's Commissariats, namely: the People's Commissariat for Supply of the U.S.S.R., the People's Commissariat for Light Industries of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Commissariat for Light Industries of the R.S.F.S.R. The four chief boards employed 493 office workers. Such a leadership of the oil and fat industry led to the irrational expansion and

loading of enterprises in some districts and to the under-supply of the market and cross transit of goods in others. As a result, the supply of fats, oil and soap was diminished.

Such a structure led to the squandering of our resources, to having to carry soap from North Caucasus to the Urals, while the factories in the Urals and in the adjacent districts lacked raw materials. Now all this has been liquidated by the decision of the Central Committee and the whole industry has been concentrated in the hands of the People's Commissariat for Supply. The Central Committee devoted considerable and serious attention to this matter and we are sure that things will now improve.

Take the Commissariat for the Lumber Industry. This Commissariat has its specific features. It is somewhat of a "forestry" Commissariat (*laughter*), but the contacts between it and real forests are very weak and unsatisfactory. (*Laughter, applause.*) There is an enormous gap between the Commissariat for the Lumber Industry and the lumber sections and floating centres. And this is due to the fact that its management of the local organizations is confused and lacks responsibility. Everybody who has a mind to give orders does so. Take for example the All-Union Lumber Supply Board. This organization controls 46 per cent of the total output of the People's Commissariat for the Lumber Industry. Yes, Comrade Lobov, nearly half the total output of the People's Commissariat for the Lumber Industry is controlled by this All-Union Lumber Supply Board. In the first place, this form of organization is absurd, because nearly half the output of the Commissariat should not be concentrated in the hands of a single board. But side by side with the All-Union Lumber Supply Board there is a multitude of functional departments.



But see how the All-Union Lumber Supply Trust leads the All-Union Northern Lumber Supply Board. The assortments of lumber to be supplied by the latter are not determined by the All-Union Lumber Supply Board but by a functional department of the Commissariat for the Lumber Industry, the so-called Material Balance Sector. One would think that since the All-Union Lumber Supply Board exists it would determine the kind of technical materials, equipment and tools to be supplied to the Northern Lumber Trust. It turns out, however, that this is determined by the functional department of the All-Union Lumber Technical Supply Board. Questions of raw materials, however, are decided by the All-Union Lumber Sales Trust. Thus, the All-Union Lumber Supply Board, while calling itself a production organization, does not determine questions either of material or men in connection with the supply of lumber. The question arises then, what kind of management is it that "manages" 50 per cent of the total lumber output, but controls nothing. Of course, from the organizational standpoint it is a jungle in which even a forester could not find his way. But the main thing is that the lumber supply suffers from this sort of thing. Such a Commissariat and such supply organizations must be immediately reorganized.

I will not quote other examples. Those who are working on the spot know what organizational confusion exists in the Commissariat and in the trusts, in the mutual relations with the factories, how this affects production and therefore how it affects the country and the improvements of the material conditions of the masses.

Our industries must give examples of reorganization that could be followed by other branches of national economy, particularly by agriculture.

If reorganization and organizational problems are difficult ones for industry, how much more so are they for agriculture?

### *3. Reorganization of Socialist Agriculture*

Owing to the lack of experience in the organization of large-scale production, organizational problems are far more acute in agriculture than in other branches of national economy.

Industry has far more experience in solving organizational problems. Workers in industry, in which there are now considerable cadres, could, by giving careful attention to the matter, study a number of fairly good examples of the organization of labour and the management of enterprises both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad. In the sphere of agriculture, however, this was not possible. In agriculture we came up against an entirely new form of production with a new technique and we had to start solving organizational problems in this sphere right from the beginning.

At the January Plenum of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission (1933) Comrade Stalin said:

"We all rejoice at the fact that the collective form of farming has become the predominant form in our grain regions. But not all of us understand that this circumstance does not diminish, but increases our cares and responsibilities in regard to developing agriculture. . . . As a matter of fact, the transition to collective farming, as the predominant form of farming, does not diminish, but increases our cares in regard to agriculture, does not diminish but increases the leading role of the Communists in raising agriculture to a higher level. Leaving things to themselves is now more dangerous than ever for the development of agriculture. Leaving things to themselves may prove fatal to the whole cause."

And the year 1933 was the year of organized struggle against letting things run by themselves, it was a year of the gigantic growth of the organizational role of our Party and of the proletariat in the rural districts.

The wealth of experience of 1933, after the organization of the political departments, of the machine and tractor stations and of Soviet farms, after the turn all the Party organizations took towards agriculture, revealed what gigantic possibilities are opening up before us by the solution of the problems of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture if the organizational problems are properly solved. Had the big state apparatuses like the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms paid proper attention to organizational problems, if they paid only half the attention to these problems that the Central Committee pays to them, they could do a great deal. But neither the Commissariat for Agriculture, nor the Commissariat for Soviet Farms paid the necessary attention to these problems. I will put it more sharply. Had organizational problems and the supervision of fulfilment of decisions and operative leadership not been in the background in the Commissariat for Agriculture, had it not been absorbed in writing "general directives" and in drawing up general declarations we would certainly have had fewer defects than we have now and it would not have been necessary for us to speak so sharply about the Commissariat for Agriculture as we have to do now.

The principal weakness in the work of the Commissariat for Agriculture is that it sent scores and hundreds of orders to its subordinate organizations, called for reports and accounts, distributed machinery, but did not take the trouble to see how things were actually being managed, did not take the trouble to enquire into the organizational

structure of the subordinate organizations and did not secure everyday leadership of all these organizations.

Comrades, the Commissariat for Agriculture has enormous material resources at its disposal, it distributes tractors and agricultural machinery. It is true that, particularly during the last few years, questions concerning agriculture, including questions concerning the distribution of tractors, machines and other material resources, are decided by the Central Committee and by the Council of People's Commissars. But it must not be supposed that the distribution of these resources by the Central Committee is by itself enough to guarantee the proper utilization of these resources. The decisions regarding the distribution of machinery must be *carried out*. The mere adoption of a decision to despatch so many tractors or so many spare parts does not mean that somebody cannot come along and sabotage the fulfilment of this decision. We know what an apparatus is. We know what carrying out decisions is. The best decision in the world can be distorted to such an extent that it becomes unrecognizable, and then those who do this can come along and produce "documentary" evidence to prove that it could not have been carried out in any other way.

Very often the apparatus of the Commissariat for Agriculture gives instructions in a mechanical manner, without taking into consideration the concrete conditions prevailing in the given locality. Owing to the existence of an infinite number of sectors and departments in the Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. the simplest question that is raised by the local organizations has to pass through an infinite number of departments. As a result the local organizations get no reply.

Local workers know this very well. Here is an example. On December 1, 1933, the People's Commissariat for Agri-

culture of Kirghizia wrote to the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. requesting that the latter supply it with seeds for twenty-eight different kinds of crops. First of all, this request was sent to the Grain Board, then it was sent to the Fodder Board, then it was sent to the Fruit and Vegetable Board, then to the Seed Board and from there it went to all the different sectors. In each board and sector the request was discussed by scores of officials and each official wrote a resolution. The letter travelled round in the Commissariat for Agriculture for forty days. During this period the only group that sent a reply was the Grain Group, and then only in connection with the seeds for a single crop. When the reply in connection with the remaining twenty-seven crops will be sent is not known. In all probability after the spring sowing. (*Laughter.*)

I could quote you a number of other striking examples, but I think this one is sufficient. It is sufficient to say that the People's Commissariat for Agriculture has 29 boards and 202 sectors. (*A voice: Oh, oh, oh!*) That's nothing. Each sector manages the whole of the U.S.S.R. (*Laughter.*) Consequently, in order to settle any question it is necessary to go through scores of sectors. In order to discover what the situation is in a given matter, say, for example, the state of the sowing in a given region, one has to enquire in at least 20-30 sectors, one has to pull 202 fine threads. Cannot you imagine, Comrade Yakovlev, that had you taken all these threads and twisted them into several strands of good strong rope, you would not have the Bedlam that exists in your Commissariat now? That is why you have bad management and bad leadership. (*Voice: Quite right!*)

In order to settle such an important question as the form of settlement of accounts in kind between the ma-

chine and tractor stations and the collective farms the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture spent 140 days discussing the question in 44 different departments. Finally, a form was decided upon and circulated to the local organizations on April 25. But this form was annulled by the Grain Tractor Centre. Then they began to revise the form, and until the middle of July 1933 neither forms nor instructions were sent to the local organizations although by that time grain deliveries were proceeding on a wide scale.

This is due to the bureaucratic approach to the organization and dynamics of the work of the apparatus.

As you see the functional system can boast of special "achievements" in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. (*Laughter.*) It would be fitting to recall here the heroes of Shchedrin's *Motley Letters*. You will remember Letter No. 2: In it three State Counsellors are mentioned: Semion Mikhailovich Neoslabny, Peter Samoilovich Prelestnikov and Nicodimus Lukich Peredryagin (what wonderful names!)\* Two of them were managers of departments: Semion Mikhailovich Neoslabny was the manager of the Knot Tying Department (*laughter*), and Peter Samoilovich Prelestnikov was the manager of the Knot Untying Department. (*Loud laughter.*) Shchedrin says that it was very convenient to have these two departments side by side because as soon as Semion Mikhailovich tied a knot, Peter Samoilovich immediately untied it (*loud laughter*), and immediately Semion Mikhailovich retied the knot, and then Peter Samoilovich again untied it. And while our two heroes were engaged in this work, Nicodimus Lukich paced up and down and counted: knot No. 1, knot No. 2, etc. (*Laughter.*) And when a large

\* Neoslabny means indefatigable; Prelestnikov—charming, and Peredryagin—quarrelsome—*Tr.*

number of knots had been tied and untied they drew up tables of statistics showing how many knots had been tied (*laughter*) and how many untied. And why all this was done nobody knew. (*Loud laughter and applause.*) Finally, says Shchedrin, a balance sheet was drawn up: the debit and credit accounts tallied, but there was no cash balance. (*Loud laughter and applause.*) All three lived together very amicably, all three were happy and worthy of promotion (*laughter*) in that magic world. . . .

In that world Peredryagin, Neoslabny and Prelestnikov not only felt as much at home as fish in water, but were quite convinced that any attempt to leave it would have been tantamount to rebellion against the existing order. (*Laughter.*)

Comment is superfluous. We only need emphasize that when today we speak about the functional system and the need for abolishing it, about tying and untying knots, there are certainly people who think that this is rebellion against the existing order. But we must say that this is the liquidation of the remnants of the old world.

That is why organizational problems are presented with such sharpness. That is why the People's Commissariats and primarily the Commissariat for Agriculture, must reorganize their whole structure.

Needless to say the organization of over 200,000 collective farms and about 3,000 machine and tractor stations is a much more complicated matter than organizing several thousand industrial enterprises. But precisely for this reason the Commissariat for Agriculture must organize the work of the Soviet farms, the collective farms, the machine and tractor stations, the District Land Departments, the Regional Land Departments and also its own apparatus in order that the system may work

smoothly, efficiently and operatively, in order that the work may go on without a hitch.

It is precisely because this work is difficult that it is necessary to establish proper relations with the Regional and District Land Departments, it is precisely for this reason that far more attention should have been paid to this matter. The apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture should have been organized in such a manner as to make relations with the local Land Departments as simple as possible.

We started on this work a few months before this Congress, but we did not finish it because it is not possible to solve organizational problems at one stroke, by merely endorsing this or that proposal. Every People's Commissariat, every department requires a special approach and its structure must be carefully thought out. While this Congress was being held we had a conference on this question with the local comrades and after the Congress a new form of organization of the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture as well as of other People's Commissariats will be endorsed.

All the hitherto existing tractor centres of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture will be abolished, and their functions will be transferred to management boards which will be directly in charge of the organization of production in the collective farms and the machine and tractor stations (boards will be set up for: grain, beets, cotton, flax and hemp). These boards will concentrate in their hands all the functions that were formerly scattered among various boards and departments. These new boards (grain, beets, cotton, flax, etc.) must be divided up into territorial sectors according to groups of districts (Southern and Eastern, Far and Near East, Central and Northern Zones).



Each of these boards will deal with *all the questions* concerning a given crop, such as sowing, distribution of tractors, spare parts, agricultural machinery, combating pests, etc., each in a given area.

Do the local comrades know what the P.C.S. is?

*Comrade Roisenmann and others:* Yes, yes!

*Kaganovich:* It is the Pest Combating Syndicate. But before we can combat pests in agriculture we must first of all destroy the conscious and unconscious sabotaging pests in the Pest Combating Syndicate itself. (*Applause.*)

Accordingly we must reorganize the regional apparatuses. There is no need whatever for the People's Commissariat for Agriculture to manage all details. The Regional Land Departments can do that.

It is wrong to think that the People's Commissariat for Agriculture can maintain direct operative connections with and lead the thousands of its local organizations. The local Executive Committees must to a larger extent than they have done hitherto, deal with operative questions, and supervise the fulfilment of decisions, not only of their own decisions, but also those of the organs of the government and of the People's Commissariats. The local Executive Committees must not limit their activities merely to giving instructions. They must operatively intervene in the work of the Regional Land Departments and in the course of the work secure the elimination of this or that defect; and they should regard it as a matter of honour to achieve the best results in the work of all the departments of the Executive Committees. Accordingly, the work must be less parliamentarism and more live operative work, more supervision of fulfilment of decisions.

The work must be organized in such a way that the People's Commissariat for Agriculture may concentrate

its attention on the fundamental and decisive levers so that it will really be able, when it is distributing funds, for example, to see whether these funds are being distributed properly. The situation in which the People's Commissariat for Agriculture automatically distributes the millions of rubles it obtains from the government according to dead statistical tables must be abolished. Things must be so organized as to make it possible to rectify mistakes in the process of distribution, so that the thousands of telegrams received from the local organizations reporting the lack of funds and the non-payment of wages to workers are replied to.

An integral working apparatus must be set up that should be relieved of all superfluous functions; and when that is done we shall have a real force in business leadership. Comrades of the Commissariat for Agriculture, we cannot tolerate the present situation any longer.

This year, the whole of our Party and the Central Committee were engaged in agricultural problems. The Party will continue to engage in these problems, the Party will continue to hold the key positions of agriculture in its hands, the Party will organize the collective farms and the Soviet farms. But bear in mind that practical, business, operative leadership must be provided by the Commissariat for Agriculture. We cannot have an enormous apparatus of Land Departments which spends millions and hundreds of millions of rubles and at least half of the work of which is wasted. The Party will not tolerate such a thing. The Land Department workers must decisively reorganize their whole work and in particular Comrade Yakovlev must seriously learn these lessons and learn them not by an outward show of "determination" but by spade work, by really penetrating into practical work.

The Central Committee, the members of the Political Bureau, the leader of our Party, Comrade Stalin, do not criticize the People's Commissariat for Agriculture in order that after the Congress things may remain as they were before. (*Applause.*) Either you really manage to mobilize the apparatus of the whole of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, these hundreds of thousands of people, in order to fulfil the task set by the Party, or the Party will do this over your head. (*Applause.*)

I would like to touch upon several organizational problems of agriculture that extend beyond the boundaries of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. I have in mind the District Land Departments, the machine and tractor stations, the collective farms and the brigades. Our District Land Departments are in a state of neglect, they are in an interregnum as it were, they do not seem to be able to grasp what their functions are. Very often the planning work of the District Land Departments resolves itself into their mechanically distributing the production quotas among the collective farms without taking into account their traction facilities, their labour power, and their economic possibilities. The District Land Departments must be organized in such a way that they may know the situation in every collective farm.

Comrade Stalin has stated that functions should not be imposed upon the machine and tractor stations which they are not supposed to perform. Everything must be done to strengthen the District Land Departments and to repel every attempt to dissolve them. The Land Departments are organs of the government and they must undertake the task of leading a number of agricultural operations particularly in livestock breeding. The tasks in connection with livestock breeding, which Comrade Stalin so sharply raised at this Congress, call for the thorough

reorganization of the whole system of leadership of livestock breeding. What is the position today? You know, comrades, that livestock breeding still bears traces of the old co-operative system of the special collective farm centres of the Union of Co-operative Unions, the so-called Collective Dairy Farm and Livestock Syndicate. The Collective Farm Board of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, and its local boards which are supposed to manage the collective dairy farms, spend 40,000,000 rubles per annum which is paid out of the funds of the collective dairy farms (*commotion in the hall*) and they are not of much use. Take the regional apparatus of the Commissariat for Agriculture, *viz.* the Regional Land Departments. They employ thousands of people. But how many of them are engaged with the livestock of the collective farms and collective farmers? At best a few score. And this, in spite of the fact that 85-90 per cent of the total livestock in the country is concentrated in the collective farms. The situation in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture itself is no better.

I must say that in the sphere of livestock breeding our Land Departments have restricted their work merely to the giving of general instructions and general guidance. The Ukrainian proverb about the cow: "She moos but does not calve," fully applies to them. (*Laughter.*) These people do moo, you cannot say they don't moo, (*laughter*) but they do not calve (*laughter*), they do not organize the work in a practical manner.

The agronomic and zoo-technical services are badly organized. See what is happening with the zoo-technical cadres. In 15 of the most important regions there is a total of 3,540 zoo-technicians; of these 2,600 are concentrated in the district offices and 300 in the regional offices; in the Soviet farms there are only 160, and not a

single one in the collective farms. This situation has got to be changed very sharply. We have got to reorganize in the sphere of livestock breeding.

Comrades, we must also raise the question of abolishing the functional system and multiplicity of departments in the collective farms and the machine and tractor stations. In the machine and tractor stations there are production sections. Between the machine and tractor station, the collective farm and the collective farm brigade there are superfluous links in the shape of these sections. The question is, are these sections necessary? (*Voices: No.*) The majority of local workers are of the opinion that the production sections are unnecessary. (*Voices: Quite right.*) We do not suggest that this question must be decided immediately, but it will have to be decided in the direction of abolishing the vast majority of these sections.

I will now turn to the structure of the collective farms. Our small collective farms copy the structure of our big ones. Sixty per cent of the collective farms in the country are farms which combine 60 to 70 households. Can one collective farm copy its structure from another? It cannot. You know what an enormous managing apparatus exists in the collective farms. We send out instructions to cut down the apparatus, but as the system of organization has not been changed, and as in addition to the chairman of the collective farm there are field cultivation managers, labour organizers, planners, agronomists, business managers and dozens of other officials, it turns out that a collective farm has an enormous functional apparatus. As a result the brigadier gets orders from a large number of people, while the chairman of the collective farm does not always know what the position is in the brigade. The

following, for example, is what the chief of a political department writes:

"If you ask the chairman of the board what the position is with today's quota of sowing, reaping or threshing, as the case may be, you can be quite sure of getting the reply: the field manager has not yet made his report."

You see, the field manager has not yet made his report. Our collective farmers are positively fed up with these reports. We have got to cut down these reports that are demanded from our collective farms from above; direct contact must be established between the chairman and the brigadier; the chairman must be made complete master who leads and gives orders (*voice: Quite right*) and who does not make the excuse that some official has not sent in his report.

*Postyshev:* Quite right.

*Kaganovich:* Similarly, there must be no functional system in the collective farm brigade. The brigadier must be given a definite production section and be fully responsible for everything: for the ploughing, for the sowing, for the reaping, for the machinery, for the horses—in short, he must be responsible for everything in that section. The brigade must be transformed into a real main production unit of the collective farm.

The question of the relations between the tractor brigade of the M.T.S. and the collective farm brigade is a very serious one. This question is settled locally in various ways. Of course, it is impossible to provide a common recipe to suit them all, but as it seems to me, in regard to the quality of the work to be done, the collective farm brigade should give orders to the brigadier of the tractor brigade. Take the brigadier of the tractor brigade. In order to plough a larger area he runs his tractor faster,

the plough jumps and patches are left. The brigadier of the collective farm brigade says: "Stop a minute, let's put this right." But in order to fulfil his quota quicker the tractor driver refuses to stop, but keeps going without any consideration for the quality of the work. The field brigadier ought to have the right to say: I am responsible for the quality of the ploughing, and as long as you are working on my section you've got to do as I tell you.

I have mentioned only a small part of the organizational problems that confront us in regard to improving the leadership of the M.T.S. and the collective farms, but it is sufficient to show how much attention we at the centre and in the localities must pay to organizational problems which are so difficult to solve in such a new sphere as socialist agriculture.

As for the Soviet farms, their lag in carrying out agricultural work is largely to be explained by the insufficient mastery of technique and by their unwieldiness.

Comrade Stalin has already stated here that the Central Committee has taken up the question of splitting up the Soviet farms. Comrade Yurkin travels about the country a great deal and knows what is going on. But when he comes back to Moscow he is so overwhelmed by the enormous functional apparatus, by the ocean of scribble that he has to wade through, that he finds it impossible to generalize this local experience. The main weakness of our Soviet farms is their unwieldiness and also the unwieldiness of the management apparatus both in the Soviet farms and in the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms. The functional system is no less developed in the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms than in the other Commissariats. Out of twenty-one production boards only six are production boards in the real sense of the word, the remainder are functional boards.

Permit me to quote an example to show what the functional system in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms leads to.

There is a Soviet farm known as "Molochnaya." Up to April 1933 this Soviet farm was under the control of the All-Union Dairy and Pedigree Livestock Trust. In accordance with the instructions of the Vice-Commissar for Soviet Farms, Comrade Gerchikov, on May 16, 1933, this Soviet farm was transformed into an independent economic unit. On June 11, 1933, one month after Comrade Gerchikov issued his order, Comrade Yurkin transfers this Soviet farm to the Northern Butter Trust. But on the very same day, on June 11, as Comrade Yurkin is signing the order to transfer the Soviet farm to the Northern Butter Trust, the Vice-Commissar, Comrade Grushevsky, issues an order to attach the Soviet farm to the Northern Scientific Research Institute. (*A voice: A nice state of affairs!*)

On June 21, 1933, Comrade Gerchikov receives information from the Political Board that his order of May 16 has not been carried out. Comrade Gerchikov did not know that his order had been cancelled by the People's Commissar and that the order of the Commissar in its turn had been cancelled by the other Vice-Commissar. (*Laughter.*) Comrade Gerchikov writes the following instruction on the communication he received: "Comrade Lyoy, please make very strict investigations yourself in order to discover who is sabotaging and disrupting the work of the Commissariat (*loud laughter*) and is misleading the Collegium. After your investigation drive the guilty one out of the apparatus (*commotion, laughter*) to teach a lesson to others and make them remember it for four Five-Year Plan periods." (*Loud laughter.*)



One tied the knot and the other untied it. (*Laughter and applause.*)

In fairness to Comrade Gerchikov it must be said that he is a great optimist; he thinks that it is possible in an apparatus like this to remember things for a period of four Five-Year Plans (*laughter*), whereas as a matter of fact, not only can one lose one's memory, but one can even lose one's reason in a single day there. (*Laughter, applause.*)

The upshot of the whole thing was, comrades, that the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection had to declare that this Soviet farm had been reduced to a disgraceful condition. Now Comrade Yurkin has informed us that the state of the Soviet farm is improving.

Thus, Comrade Yurkin and Soviet farm organizers, you must not only reorganize and diminish the size of the Soviet farms but you must also reorganize your Commissariat. We have a commission working, it has not yet finished its work. I hope that after the Party Congress we will take this matter up and I can assure you that there will be no more of this tying and untying of knots. (*Applause.*)

#### 4. *The Organizational Problem and the Improvement of Commodity Circulation*

At this Congress, and even before the Congress, Comrade Stalin sharply raised the questions of commodity circulation and transport.

The Central Committee fought against the over-stocking of goods, against the improper distribution of goods, against planning only in rubles which resulted in the assortment of goods being ignored and in the sending to one region under the item "haberdashery" of such

a large number of dog-collars as would be enough to clothe all the dogs in the region in collars from head to foot, and in the sending to another region of tons of lamp-burners, but without lamp-glasses, and of lamp-glasses without lamp-burners to still another region, etc.

The Central Committee took up the question of the organization of shops and stores and of expanding the trading system.

We fought against the bureaucratic system of distribution which brought trade to a standstill and which is a striking expression of the "Leftist" deviation in commodity circulation.

The organizational problems of commodity circulation have not been fully worked out even to the extent that they have been worked out in industry. Our task in the organization of commodity circulation is first, to secure the normal, quick and cultured serving of goods in the shops and second, to secure the proper regulation and planning of trade, the proper delivery of goods to the shops which will take into account the requirements of the consumers and the necessity of preferential supplies for those groups of consumers who are particularly important in our national economy.

What is the situation in the shops? One would imagine that in shops, where trade is carried on, the majority of the employees would be salesmen. But this is not the case, comrades.

The results of an investigation show that only 25 per cent of commercial workers are salesmen in the strict sense of the word; the others are managers, managers of sectors, managers of departments, vice-managers, assistant-managers, cashiers, etc. Of course these people are required, but not without end. Overhead charges are enormous, consumers are compelled to stand in queues,

goods are served to them carelessly, all because there is a shortage of salesmen.

The salaries of the salesmen are inadequate. And yet the auxiliary staffs are excessive, and overhead costs are enormous, because bureaucracy and document writing have permeated the sphere in which one would think there is least place for them, namely in commerce, in the shops.

An enormous number of documents are written in the shops. People are engaged in writing documents, while very often customers are compelled to wait in queues. This applies to the shops controlled by the People's Commissariat for Supply, and it applies particularly to the co-operative stores.

Shop managers must be released from petty tutelage and must be given more rights and more scope for initiative. Shop managers must be given the right to select the goods they want, to determine the assortment of goods within the limits of the general plan of commodity circulation. The shop manager must be given the right to select his own salesmen, to sharply cut down administrative and auxiliary staffs. And finally, shop commercial workers must be given the attention that an important section of commodity circulation deserves.

If the shop manager is given more rights he will on his own initiative find new sources of goods, he will stimulate the handicraft co-operatives, and influence the quality of the goods.

The state trading stores which were recently organized give us an example of what cultured trading can be. In these there is less red tape and documents, there are more salesmen and smaller queues. But even in these there are defects.

It must be emphasized that no attention has been paid to organizational problems of commodity circulation. All that people were concerned with was receiving, distributing and despatching goods. They were not in the least concerned with whether the goods got to their proper destination, to the proper warehouse, whether they got to the consumer, etc.

Take warehouses. The shop and the warehouse are the main links in trade. But no one bothered about warehousing, either wholesale or retail. This is a big and important business and we must organize it.

Sometime ago we sharply criticized the Moscow co-operatives. We have a large number of shops and yet there are queues. Why do you, co-operators, sit in your offices? Why don't you visit the shops, see what is going on there and eliminate defects? We had ourselves to go to the shops and show them how to go into the details of organizing trade.

We went into a shop. There was a large queue waiting for cucumbers. They had cucumbers but they were being served out of a small bucket. Each time the bucket was emptied the salesman had to run down into the cellar to get a new bucketful. Meanwhile people waited in the queue. We went into the shop incognito. We asked the salesman: Why is there a queue? Have you any cucumbers? First he said he had none, then he said he had cucumbers, but they were in the cellar, and he had no utensils with which to bring them up. We had to go down into the cellar with the shop manager. There we found a large number of barrels filled with cucumbers, and a large number of empty barrels. But it never occurred to the shop manager to take a few barrels of cucumbers up into the shop and so avoid having to run down into the cellar for one small bucketful at a time.

Workers' wives wait in queues and quite rightly abuse the system of organization of trade, but that does not help them much. We had to take our co-operators by the collars and push their noses into the business in order to make them take up these simple problems of organizing trade which so closely affects the interests of the masses.

If you take the planning of goods and the regulation of trade you will find that the congestion is enormous. In order to distribute the stocks of twelve assortments of planned goods you have to pass through twenty different organizations. You can imagine how many documents are written and how much time people spend in conference until the plan is endorsed. And finally the plan is endorsed, not at the beginning, but at the end of the quarter.

Hence, owing to the weakness of the internal organization of the Commissariat for Supply and of the Centrosoyuz we get the following: while people are pouring over plans the goods get distributed haphazardly.

In particular, we must emphasize that the village co-operative store must now become the focus of attention of the Centrosoyuz. Everybody must understand the enormous, not only economic, but political role which the village co-operative store now plays in the development of commodity circulation and in cultured Soviet trade in the rural districts. The village co-operative stores must be raised to the political plane. Work in the village co-operative store must be regarded as honourable as work in the management board of the collective farm or in the village soviet.

I will not deal in detail with the organizational structure of the People's Commissariat for Supply and of the Centrosoyuz, and of their regional branches. This struc-

ture also suffers from the functional system and over-staffing.

The extent to which the Centrosoyuz is overstuffed may be seen from the following: the number of employees for the third quarter of 1933 was fixed at 1,563 as against 2,855 in the fourth quarter of 1932; thus, there was a reduction of nearly a half (46 per cent). But the supply of goods has not suffered as a result of it, and the work of the Centrosoyuz should improve.

I am sure that if the apparatus of the Centrosoyuz and of the People's Commissariat for Supply were reduced and the internal organization were improved, things would go much better, and the People's Commissariat for Supply and the Centrosoyuz would then be able to go down to the shops, to the warehouses, and would be able to lead trade not in a formal manner, but really lead it. (*Applause.*)

*5. Secure the Application of the Decisions of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars on the Reorganization of Transport*

Much has been said about transport, and what was said was right and put very sharply. Comrade Stalin spoke about transport, so did Comrade Voroshilov and Comrade Kirov and other speakers. Comrade Andreyev also spoke about transport.

First of all I want to speak about water transport. Water transport is obviously underestimated. The water transport organization is of the simplest kind—steamers, jetties, backwaters, and repair yards. And yet it has the functional system and lack of individual responsibility.

Do you think that the steamship services control repairs? If you do, you are mistaken. The steamship

service only manages the running of steamships. But if they want to have their ships repaired they must apply to a special centralized organization in the People's Commissariat for Water Transport known as the Shipbuilding and Repair Board. The People's Commissariat for Water Transport is now undertaking to manage the repairs of every ship by means of functional orders. The Commissariat also has a Chief River Board. This Board controls approximately 70 per cent of our water transport. This is similar to the Chief Railway Board that we formerly had in the People's Commissariat of Ways and Communications which controlled 75 per cent of the business of this Commissariat. This Chief River Board must be dissolved and the management of the river transport system must be organized according to the river system. The Commission of the Central Committee proposes that four such boards of the Commissariat for Water Transport be set up, *viz.*, the Volga-Kama Board, the Northern Board, the Southern Board, and the Asiatic Board (Siberia and Central Asia). The functional sectors of the Commissariat for Water Transport must be dissolved and questions concerning ship repairs, backwaters, wharves, and river conservancy should be transferred to the River Steamship Service Trusts.

Bureaucratic routine methods predominate in other places, but they are particularly marked in the water transport service. Ask the Gorky comrades, for example, how difficult it is to get any business matter settled in the Commissariat for Water Transport. They will tell you: the Commissariat's boats float badly in the summer, but both summer and winter you will find the officials of the Commissariat for Water Transport floating helplessly amidst the bureaucratic debris of their offices. (*Laugh-*

ter.) Now we are going to put a stop to this. Evidently, after the Congress the Central Committee will have to take up the matter of the People's Commissariat for Water Transport much more determinedly than it has done up till now.

As for railway transport, the July decision of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars laid down a very definite line of reorganization. On the railways it is not a matter of making a new reorganization. If we start a new reorganizing now it will lead to new confusion. The present plan of organization is correct, it must be carried out properly. The decisive thing now is supervision of fulfilment of decisions, operative leadership and discipline. It is a matter of fully carrying out the plan of organization laid down in the decision of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars and of crushing all resistance to this reorganization.

In the Locomotive Board, for example, questions connected with boilers are dealt with in four sectors. In the sphere of heating technique the functional chain stretches from the People's Commissariat for Ways and Communications right down to the depot. In the locomotive depots there are still special instructors on heating technique who are subordinate not to the chief of the depot, but to the locomotive services of the given railway. Hence, the depot bears no responsibility for fuel consumption. The result is that there is a large excess of fuel consumption on all railroads.

If to this is added the fact that the coal dumps which supply the locomotives with coal are not controlled by the depot but by the Supply Service Department, and that locomotives have to wait hours, sometimes 10 to 12 hours, in line for coal, and that nobody bears



the responsibility for this, it will be perfectly clear to you that the functional system and lack of individual responsibility still flourish on the railways.

I will not mention the 180 (!) different orders, explanations, and instructions regulating the pay of railwaymen. To put it briefly, the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Ways and Communications has not yet broken down the resistance of the bureaucratic elements to the reorganization of the transport system.

The transport system still lacks Bolshevik organizing forces. Much greater effort is required to train and organize railwaymen than is required in industry; but the Communist railwaymen have not yet displayed these tenfold efforts. More than that, some railwaymen seem to be offended: they seem to say, why are you hitting us, why are you all criticizing us?

Comrades Voroshilov and Kirov were quite right in stating very sharply here that if the leaders of the transport system do not themselves take the lead in this sharp criticism, if they do not take the lead of the best men, then it will be very difficult to raise the transport system to the proper level.

We have excellent shock brigades in the transport system, many shock brigade heroes, we have excellent political departments which have already shown what they can do. In agriculture the problem was a much more difficult one than it is in the transport system. In agriculture we did not have to deal with industrial workers, but with peasants. How was the situation improved there? By rallying the best people, the collective farm shock brigade workers, by wagging a fierce struggle against the kulaks and their supporters, and, relying upon the masses, by setting to work to carry out the measures proposed by the Central Committee. In the

transport system, however, we do not yet feel this strong organizing hand. The workers in the political departments of the railways have not yet fully appreciated the difficulties and the seriousness of the front to which they have been appointed. (*Voices: Quite true.*) They have not yet developed their work to the same extent as for example the political department workers of the machine and tractor stations who went into the rural districts knowing that a difficult and great task confronted them. They even imagined that the task was much more difficult than it proved to be. But the workers in the railway political departments thought they had an easy job to tackle. That is why they have not yet overcome the difficulties. Some of the political departments on the railways have already achieved some successes in their work, but the political department army as a whole has not yet pierced the front, has not yet overcome the difficulties.

The Party Congress must call upon all railwaymen to carry out to the full the decisions of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars; the Congress must call upon the railwaymen to organize, at last, the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions and operative leadership.

Operative leadership and the supervision of the fulfilment of adopted decisions are more necessary on the railways than in any other branch of economy. Railwaymen must understand that this is no joke, that it is a matter of securing the normal circulation of the blood of national economy, for the railways are the arteries of our country. The working class and the Party are entitled to call upon all railwaymen and primarily upon the Communists and leaders, and upon the political department workers, to work in a Bolshevik manner and not

to be "kind" at the expense of the interests of the proletarian state!

In order to put the transport system on its feet it is necessary to proceed in the same way as the Party proceeded to overcome the difficulties on certain economic sectors. The masses must be rallied. Reliance must be placed on the best people, on the transport shock brigade workers, and victory will be assured. (*Loud applause.*)

Comrades, I am unable to deal with all the other Commissariats and all the other branches of national economy. Too much time would be required for this. But that does not mean that in the branches of national economy which I have not dealt with the defects I have mentioned do not exist to a greater or lesser degree.

I will deal with the question of supervising the fulfilment of decisions in the Soviet and business organizations.

## 6. *Supervising the Fulfilment of Decisions in the State Apparatus*

I have already spoken about the work the Central Committee has done in regard to the training of cadres. But I want to emphasize once again that we are dealing with human beings, with the training of new people, that this is a matter of helping every talented and capable man who is pushing up from below, to rise.

We must train cadres in the course of practical work from among Party people and non-Party people. The theses of the Central Committee emphasize the role of the non-Party people.

This is not a matter of "policy" in general. No, comrades, the experience of our socialist construction has shown that where a Communist works well, he is able

to rally the non-Party people, not only the workers, not only those who have always marched with us, but also the specialists who wavered and who doubted.

Our Party workers must master technique. There are directors who have mastered the technique of their jobs; but we cannot say that everything has been done in this respect. To master technique, to cease directing in general, to cease signing every document that the apparatus puts under one's nose—this is the decisive index of good work.

We must continue to transfer workers to the factory and to the shop. We must not underestimate the resistance that is put up to this. Many still fail to see that industrial life goes on in the factory, down below, in the shop, in the collective farm and in the machine and tractor station. We are working to organize this business. But some people still fail to understand that it is a great honour for every fighter, for every engineer and for every technician to go down into the factory.

In the Donbas we have succeeded in bringing about a change. There an engineer or an official would be ashamed to say that he does not want to go into the mine when he is sent there. We must bring it about that when an engineer or an official is sent to a factory, to a collective farm or a Soviet farm he should not only not resist this, but should regard it as an expression of the supreme confidence that is placed in him.

The supervision of the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance. If a decision is passed and no measures are taken to see whether it is carried out, then even a good worker becomes corrupted. He is given a decision to carry out, he messes around with it for a couple of days and then he is given another job. And so he sticks the decision in a file and forgets all about it.

The proper organization of supervising the fulfilment of decisions in the Soviet apparatus and in the business organizations raises and trains a man. It is necessary even to go to a man who works conscientiously and say to him: My dear fellow, you've become too much absorbed in one side of the business, your work is becoming lop-sided; turn around a little bit and rectify the mistake. But this can be done only when the leader knows his organization, knows the system, not only "in general," but knows every worker and systematically supervises him.

What is the position in regard to the supervision of fulfilment of decisions in the People's Commissariats and in the business organizations? Up till now there has been a prevailing prejudice that the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions is a sort of special function, separate from management and the selection of personnel. Large special apparatuses existed for the purpose of selecting personnel and for supervising the fulfilment of decisions. The result was that the very supervision of fulfilment of decisions became bureaucratic. This is strange but true. At best these sectors examined documents and correspondence. How can they, poor things, investigate real living things, if they themselves have not given the orders, if they themselves do not know the business and have not gone thoroughly into the questions?

Clearly all such a sector can do is to talk common-places, write documents or weave red tape. In a word, we must once again recall Shchedrin: he "saw nothing with his slumbering eye and saw only piffling things with the eye that did not slumber." (*Laughter.*)

Here is an example taken from the sector for supervising the fulfilment of decisions of the People's Commis-

sariat for the Lumber Industry. This sector was given the job of verifying whether the order of the People's Commissar to the Leningrad Lumber Trust to send thirteen specialists to Karelia *within five days* was carried out. And this sector slept on this job for *five months*. Suddenly it woke up, wrote a letter and then went to sleep again. But nothing happened. Only part of the workers were sent. It is not surprising that in the People's Commissariats even in official documents the Sector for the Supervision of Fulfilment of Decisions is referred to as S.L.E.E.P.\* (*Laughter, applause.*)

Verily the Sectors for the Supervision of the Fulfilment of Decisions in the People's Commissariats and the business organizations do sleep.

Take for example the question of serving the requirements of the masses of the workers. We all say that it is the sacred task of the Bolsheviks to serve the requirements of the workers.

In July 1932 the Council of Labour and Defence passed an order to build in certain places in the Far Eastern Region and in Eastern Siberia seven sanitary centres and fifteen public baths and laundries of the simplest type with the simplest equipment. Military people know that these can be built very quickly and easily. The Council of Labour and Defence gave the People's Commissariat for Municipal Affairs one month in which to carry out this order. Of course, the latter understood and, in all probability, speeches were delivered about the benefits of baths, shower baths, and cleanliness in general (*laughter*); but it took no measures to

\* The essence of this jest is that the Russian name of the Sector for the Supervision of the fulfilment of Decisions is "Sektor Proverky Ispolnenia," the initial letters of this would therefore be "S.P.I." which in Russian means "sleep."—Tr.

see whether this order was being carried out. And what do you think happened? Eighteen months have passed and a considerable number of these baths and sanitary centres have not been built yet. This is what the bad organization of the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions leads to when instead of immediately—without passing resolutions—taking measures to see that the orders are carried out, the orders are transferred to the S.L.E.E.P. sector or to somebody else. In order that they may carry on their work better these S.L.E.E.P. sectors have set up their own sub-sectors for the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions! (*Laughter.*) In a word we get the same thing that Gogol describes in his *Dead Souls*—“The Supervising Committee over the Building Committee.” (*Laughter.*) And so it is in some of the People’s Commissariats: they have a Supervising Committee over the Building Committee; there is a Supervising Sub-Sector in the Supervising Sector, but there is no proper Bolshevik supervision of the fulfilment of decisions. That is why in the theses the problem of supervising the fulfilment of decisions is linked up with the problem of reorganization and with the abolition of the functional system.

It is high time it was understood that the principal thing in the reorganization of the Soviet state apparatus is to turn the leading bodies towards the lower links, to establish close and living contacts with the lower links—the factory, the shop, the field section, the enterprise, the collective farm, the village, the machine and tractor station, the Soviet farm, etc. The factory does not exist for the People’s Commissariat, the People’s Commissariat exists for the factory. The collective farm does not exist for the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture, the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture exists for the col-

lective farm. The Soviet farm does not exist for the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms, the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms exists for the Soviet farms.

*Orjonikidze:* Quite right!

*Kaganovich:* The People's Commissariats must serve the lower links; the work must not be twisted in such a way that the collective farm exists for the People's Commissariat for Agriculture. The trouble is that the structure of the trust and of the People's Commissariats is built up mechanically, by bureaucrats, because the leaders do not deign to bother about such things. But the bureaucrats have not an idea about operative work. The trouble is that the trust blindly copies the structure of the People's Commissariat, and the factory blindly copies the structure of the trust, whereas the very opposite should be the case. First of all the factory must be properly organized, the collective farm and Soviet farm must be properly organized to suit the requirements of their work and then we must proceed to the higher links and organize them in such a way that they can properly fulfil their main functions, which are the functions of every commissariat, *viz.*, to secure an increase in production, the mastery of technique and improved management.

Only by correspondingly reorganizing our work will we be able to strengthen the lower links and lead them.

The business, Soviet and Party workers must, immediately after the Congress, without having to be reminded and pushed, proceed to remove all the organizational defects in their work; they must proceed to do this seriously without a lot of fuss, and submit their proposals for the reorganization of their respective apparatuses to the competent organizations for endorsement.

The Central Committee will very carefully watch the.



process of reorganization in all our organizations. In this work of reorganization we must not under any circumstances limit ourselves only to changing the structure, transferring people from one place to another and to changing signboards, which Comrade Lenin so ruthlessly ridiculed and which Comrade Stalin day after day ruthlessly ridicules. The Central Committee will not permit the work of reorganization to be degraded to the changing of signboards and to a formal reorganization.

Every leader must carefully think out the methods and the system of work, his own and that of the whole of his organization, introduce changes in the course of the work, cut down the writing business to the utmost, and particularly the writing of reports and statistics, which are far too inflated.

The supervision of the fulfilment of decisions must not be carried out formally, but must get down to the real nature of the work. It must see that a given order is actually carried out right to the very end. It is necessary to verify the results of the work done; formal paper measures are useless; you receive a report, scribble an order, and finished. Sometimes an order from above is received, it is slightly paraphrased and sent down to the next link, and they send it down still lower. And so the red tape is woven and woven.

*Stalin:* And then the document is put in the files.

*Kaganovich:* Quite right, and then the document is put in the files.

Undoubtedly our state apparatus has improved lately, the organs of the proletarian dictatorship have become stronger. The general economic development and the development and growth of the political consciousness of the broad masses of the workers and peasants could not but affect our state apparatus.

It is precisely this economic growth, this political development of the masses that enables our Party with the boldness and determination which the Central Committee has displayed and which I hope the Congress will emulate, to expose the defects of our organizations. It serves us as a guarantee that we will be able still further to improve our state apparatus which must serve the masses better and which must eradicate bureaucracy, routine and lack of individual responsibility.

We are convinced that the Party, its Leninist Central Committee and its leader, Comrade Stalin, will achieve this reorganization and strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship. (*Loud applause.*)

### III

## THE REORGANIZATION OF MASS WORK AND OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

### 1. *Organize the Energy and the Initiative of the Masses for the Purpose of Improving the Work of the State Apparatus*

At the January Plenum of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission Comrade Stalin asked what were the main forces that guaranteed the historical victory of the Five-Year Plan, and he replied:

"First of all, it is the activity and self-sacrifice, the enthusiasm and initiative of millions of workers and collective farmers who, together with the engineering and technical forces, displayed colossal energy in developing socialist competition and shock brigade work.

"Secondly, it is the firm leadership of the Party and of the government, which urged the masses forward and overcame all the obstacles that stood in the path to the goal.

"And finally, it is the special merits and advantages of the Soviet system of economy."

You saw how throughout the whole period of the Five-Year Plan these three forces really guaranteed our victory. All these three forces operated as a single force under the single leadership of the Leninist Central Committee of our Party. You will remember the remarkable formula Comrade Stalin gave in his speech which has

gone into the lives of millions as the six historical conditions, the formula that was decisive in securing the victories of economic construction. Comrade Stalin said:

"The reality of our Plan consists in live people, you and me, our will and our labour, our readiness to work in the new way, our determination to carry out the Plan."

The decisive feature in the activities of the Central Committee in the period under review was the power of leading the masses, the power of mobilizing the masses for the purpose of fulfilling the tasks of socialist construction.

The enthusiasm of the masses, the fervour of construction, the fervour of the struggle to improve and raise our economy guaranteed the reality of our plans and those great victories which we were able to report at this Seventeenth Congress of our Party.

Socialist competition and shock brigade work has developed on a wide front. On January 1, 1930, 29 per cent of the workers in industry were engaged in socialist competition, but on November 1, 1933, 71 per cent of the workers were engaged in socialist competition. According to incomplete returns in industry and transport alone, there are 5,000,000 shock brigade workers, not fictitious, but real shock-brigade workers. During these years about 2,000 persons have been given awards of honour. Of these 398 have been awarded the Order of the Banner of Labour, and 641 have been awarded the Order of Lenin. These people have earned special distinction in the struggle for the victory of socialism. It is not only a few individuals, but tens and hundreds of thousands who give examples of heroism on the front of labour!

Special reference must be made to the role of the Young Communist League in the struggle for socialist

competition and shock brigade work, in the struggle for the victory of the Five-Year Plan. At the present time the Young Communist League is supplementing the fervour for new construction with the fervour for mastering the new enterprises. In 25 large enterprises that were investigated, 42,000 persons, 54 per cent of the total number of young persons employed in these enterprises, are preparing for their social science and technical examinations; 18,000 have already passed their examinations. Of these 2,500 got "excellent," 5,000 got "good," 7,000 got "satisfactory," and 3,000 failed to pass.

Of the 7,000 Young Communist Leaguers who were mobilized for the building of the Stalingrad Tractor Works hundreds and thousands are now highly skilled workers.

Cases when yesterday's absolutely illiterate men and women coming from the country and literally within the course of a few months becoming models in the mastery of technique occur not in ones or twos, but in masses. Hundreds and thousands of heroes of this kind could be mentioned who are now employed in the enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, Donbas, Baku, the Urals, etc.

Take one of these workers as an example. Comrade Laptev left his village to go to work at the Molotov Automobile Works in 1931. He got a job side by side with an American who, in America, had for twelve years worked on a machine similar to the one he is working on now; for four years he had worked at Ford's. The American said that the Ford rate of output (65 parts in a working day) could not be exceeded. Comrade Laptev challenged the American to socialist competition and began to add five pieces to his output every day. And now he turns out from 130 to 140 per

day. The factory management, basing itself on Comrade Laptev's experience, fixed the rate of output at 112 per day, and the American was compelled to pull up to this rate. The curious thing is, however, that he still refuses to take up Comrade Laptev's challenge to socialist competition. "Never mind," said Comrade Laptev, "I will reach 200 per day, and then the American will understand what socialist competition means and will accept my challenge." (*Applause.*)

Comrade Laptev has finished his studies in a technical circle for machine regulator. He attends another circle for the study of the history of the Party. He is a serious reader and excellently masters his subjects. Now Comrade Laptev is not merely a skilled worker, but also carries on important social work.

Our collective farms have not yet thoroughly learned to handle combines, and the work of our tractor drivers is still poor. But as a result of the application of the decision of the Central Committee to organize the training and improvement of skilled workers in agriculture we now have hundreds and thousands of excellent examples of how yesterday's country lad, who had never seen a machine and certainly could not handle one, is now becoming a real fighter for socialism. He gets on to a tractor or a combine, masters it, and gives splendid examples of fulfilment of rates of output.

Our trade unions have grown enormously. During the first Five-Year Plan period, and in 1933, the membership of the trade unions increased by 6,000,000. Our trade union *active*, particularly the lower *active*, has grown. The factory committees that existed in the period of the old craft union leadership cannot be compared with the factory committees we have now. The number of members of factory committees and group organizers has

risen from 462,000 in 1929 to 1,200,000 at the present time.

The factory committees have considerably reorganized their work and the overwhelming majority of them consist of real shock brigade workers. These people do not suffer from craft union diseases, they work stubbornly and persistently to carry out the tasks of developing socialist competition and shock brigade work and for increasing output.

Of course, our trade unions still suffer from an enormous number of defects, and the Central Committee has raised the question of reorganizing the work of the trade unions. The main aim has not yet been achieved. The aim is to reorganize the work on an industrial basis, so that every central committee of a trade union may thoroughly know its industry and the requirements of its workers. The central committees of the trade unions have enormous opportunities for developing their work, and are in the position to generalize an enormous amount of excellent data. Why was the Central Committee of the Party able to receive from the workers excellent material in the sphere of technique, inventions, the reorganization of management and improvement in the organization of labour? Why was the Central Committee of the Party, on the initiative of Comrade Stalin, able to call conferences of pit committee members from the Donbas and in simple conversation, without all the fuss of formal meetings, formal speeches delivered by rote and without special resolutions, obtain excellent data on equalitarianism in wages, on the bad organization of labour, on the functional system, etc.?

It was precisely on the basis of these talks with a number of trade union members, and a number of business leaders, that the Central Committee was able to

draw important conclusions and generalize these proposals.

Relying on the initiative of every worker, of young workers and of new shock brigade workers, the trade unions have enormous opportunities of raising questions before the government and the Central Committee. Unfortunately, the trade unions have not yet made full use of their opportunities. They are unable to bring out what is most important and generalize facts. Empiricism is corroding the unions. They work, they bustle, they strive, but they have not yet learned to generalize and carry out what has been decided on. In the trade unions we have people who sincerely want to work, but they are unable to take the lead in the seething life, initiative and energy that is displayed in the factories and in the shock brigades.

Even the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions has not fulfilled the instruction of the Central Committee, the instruction of its own Congress to allow greater scope for initiative to the central committees of the industrial unions. It is still steering a course towards maintaining the leadership solely in its own hands.

The trade unions could have liberated themselves long ago from bureaucracy and the writing of documents and could have established connections with living people without the enormous waste of paper that goes on now. If you examine the meetings and the minutes of every trade union central committee you will see that these people do a lot of work, but the piles of documents that they have often prevents them from seeing the initiative, activity and real life that is pulsating in our factories. On the basis of the decisions of the Party Congress the trade unions must reorganize and improve their work, expel bureaucracy, and to a far larger extent than hith-



erto organize the creative activity of the shock brigade workers and of all the members of the trade unions.

It has already been stated at this Congress that our women have grown into a powerful active force both in town and country. Since the last Congress 3,500,000 women have been brought into industry. At the present time women comprise one-third of the total number of factory workers and office workers in the U.S.S.R.

In the collective farms there is a tremendous movement at the present time. With his exceptional power of penetration Comrade Stalin brought to light this new role of women in our collective farm movement, a role which has changed under the influence of a gigantic growth of economy. You will remember that at the beginning of collectivization women were very often hostile; it was very hard for them to break with the old habits and concepts.

Now things are vastly different. For example, last autumn we called a conference of flax swinglers in the Moscow region, at which 989 women delegates were present. Of these, 824 had come to Moscow for the first time, and 466 had travelled on a railway for the first time. I have seen many meetings but never have I seen such fervour as was displayed at this one. Only in the first years of the October Revolution was such enthusiasm witnessed. One felt that a huge real mass of virgin soil had been raised. An elderly delegate, sixty years of age, spoke of the difficulties she had experienced. On concluding her speech she turned to the Presidium of the Conference and said: "They say that you stand near to the government. May we ask the government to pass a decree to prolong life and put off death." (*Laughter, applause.*) "We would like to go on living; the Soviet government has made human beings of us."

Women have grown up to such an extent now that one hesitates to speak about specific work among women.

*Nikolayeva:* Quite right!

*Kaganovich:* Very soon we may hear the women say: We must intensify the work among the men. (*Laughter, applause.*)

A certain improvement is to be observed in the work of our soviets as mass organizations. Our soviets have enlarged their sections; the sections of the urban and rural soviets are no longer gatherings where people come together to talk. The sections have powerful material bases. Municipal development has assumed immense proportions. The mass work of the soviets has acquired a material content. The sections of our soviets and the deputy groups are becoming active leaders of definite sectors of our constructive work. This, of course, does not mean that there are no defects in the soviets and their apparatuses. The whole problem of reorganization applies fully to them.

In 1933 in the R.S.F.S.R. alone, 1,513,000 persons were drawn into the work of administering the state through the soviet sections, and 338,000 were drawn into this work through the deputies' groups. We have an entirely new form of participating in the administration of the state, *viz.*, the patronage which the workers of a particular factory exercise over a government institution. I could quote a number of improvements in the work of the state apparatus that have been brought about as a result of this factory workers' patronage over state institutions.

Moreover, socialist joint employment, *i.e.*, when a man works part time in the factory and part time in a government institution, has developed to a wide extent

lately. According to incomplete returns obtained from the State Employees' Trade Union alone, over 7,000 workers are members of patronage brigades, and in addition, about 7,000 work in joint employments. To this should be added that the so-called social proletarian *active* working in specific branches of work now numbers more than 2,000,000.

The trade unions should take the leadership of this work, particularly in view of the new functions of supervision that the theses propose to place upon the trade unions. The trade unions must seriously set to work to organize the lower organs of supervision, especially in the supply and trading organizations.

As for the Young Communist League, the theses of the Central Committee especially emphasize that the work of organizing the "light cavalry"\* has subsided. The Young Communist League must organize the work of the "light cavalry," but must carry on this work not sporadically but systematically. The Party stands in need of real assistance in order that the bureaucrats in the apparatus may not be lost sight of. We need public assistance in all corners of our work. Take the question of warehouses. Comrade Stalin has more than once said to us: You have passed resolutions to improve the material welfare of the toilers and yet you give the key of the warehouse to people whom you think are "little" people. These "little" people manage huge warehouses, they determine where goods are to be sent and how they should be kept, and often the proper distribution of these goods depends upon them.

We must tell our Young Communist League that it,

\* Groups of Young Communist Leaguers who pay surprise visits to administrative bodies with a view to bringing to light defects or abuses.—*Tr.*

too, suffers from defects, that it, too, spoils a lot of paper, it, too, suffers from bureaucracy and it, too, easily slips into the habit of drawing up long resolutions. The Young Communist League must be a far more active, operative force, not only in the factory, but also in the nucleus, in the district committee, in the regional committee and in the Central Committee of the Young Communist League. Everywhere the Young Communist League should make it its main aim to teach the young workers how to work and to test their revolutionary spirit by deeds. Of course, it is much easier to carry on general propaganda and pass resolutions than to perform painstaking work, to be the manager of a warehouse, etc. It would not be amiss if the secretary of the district committee of the Y.C.L. went to a warehouse, it would not be amiss if activists took up actual spade work, because it is in spade work that real commanders are trained. In the army it is the men who have passed through the platoon, company and regimental commands who become real commanders. If the Young Communist Leaguers want to become commanders they must pass through the spade-work school of practical work. Then they will become real Young Communist business and political leaders.

The task of our Party is, while improving the work of the public organizations, while improving the work of the trade unions, while improving the work of the Young Communist League, to raise the level of our political work among the masses and to rally these masses closer than ever around the Party.

2. *The Party is Strong in the Unity of Will and Action, in the Activity and Self-Sacrifice of the Party as a Whole and of Each Individual Member*

But in order to be able to do all this the Party itself must reorganize its ranks and continue to improve its work.

Comrades, our Party's responsibility for the future of socialist construction is not diminishing but on the contrary is increasing.

Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin more than once emphasized the great significance of the Party, of its leadership for the victory of the proletariat. The whole of the activity of our Party has been living proof of the truth of this postulate. What our Party has done during the past five years raises the whole question of the role and significance of the Party and of its leadership to a new and hitherto unprecedented level.

And the success of our cause, the success of our general offensive, is due to the fact that the great continuator of Lenin, Comrade Stalin, managed to fortify that which was most precious and most decisive in Lenin's heritage, *viz.*, our great Leninist Party. (*Applause.*)

I emphasize preserve and fortify, because after Lenin's death attempts were made to split up the Party into factions and groups, to split its ranks, to weaken it and in this way to send the proletarian dictatorship to its doom. It was necessary to have Lenin's foresight; to be able, in the same way as Lenin in 1903 foresaw in the disagreements on point 1 of the Party rules the future treachery of the Mensheviks, to foresee in 1923 that the Trotskyists would slip into the path of counter-revolution, and that all the other opportunist groups would

slip into the path of betraying the interests of the proletarian revolution.

It was not only necessary to foresee. It was also necessary to mobilize the Party for the purpose of defeating these schismatic groups and to bring the Party to the present Seventeenth Congress as a powerful united and monolithic force.

It is precisely this unity, it is precisely the whole lesson of our struggle for socialism that enables us to amend the rules of our Party and to make them read as follows:

“The Party represents a united militant organization bound by conscious, iron, proletarian discipline. The Party is strong in its compactness, its unity of will and unity of action, which are incompatible with departures from the program, violation of Party discipline and with factional groupings within the Party. . . . The Party leads all the organs of the proletarian dictatorship and guarantees the successful construction of socialist society.”

Our Party is not simply a ruling party. There are ruling parties in various countries; but in those countries the role of these parties is strictly limited to striving to consolidate the existing bourgeois system. Our Party is the ruling Party in a socialist state. The *raison d'être*, the sense of the work of our Party is precisely that it must build socialist society and be victorious. And this imposes upon every member of the Party, and upon the Party as a whole, special and exceptional duties. The principal symptom of the Party spirit of the Bolshevik is that he is a vanguard fighter for a socialist attitude towards labour, an organizer of the socialist method of production in industry and in agriculture. That is why the amended rules contain a new point on membership, on the duties of every member of the Party. In enumerat-

ing these duties, we have included, in addition to the duty of recognizing the program, of paying Party dues, and of taking part in the work of the Party, a number of new points which emphasize the duties of the Party member in relation to production, shock brigade work, the fight to consolidate the ranks of the Party and in relation to his duties in regard to Party discipline and the state. These points read as follows:

"It is the duty of a Party member:-

"a) To observe strict Party discipline, to take an active part in the political life of the Party and of the country and to carry out in practice the policy of the Party and the decisions of the Party organs.

"b) To work untiringly to raise his ideological equipment, to master the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the important political and organizational decisions of the Party, and to explain these to the non-Party masses.

"c) As a member of the ruling Party in the Soviet State to set an example in the observance of labour and state discipline, master the technique of his work, and continuously raise his industrial and business qualifications."

What is the meaning of these new points in the rules? They mean that every one who joins the Party must be prepared precisely and undeviatingly to carry out all the instructions of the Party, primarily those enumerated in the rules, while the leading organs of the Party must train the new member in such a way that he will be able not merely in words, but in deeds to fulfil these important duties of the member of the ruling Party. For our Party is strong in the activity and self-sacrifice of the Party as a whole and of each individual Bolshevik.

That is why, comrades, simultaneously with the increase of the significance and role of our Party in the present stage of socialist construction, the role and significance of every individual member of the Party in-

crease also. We very sharply raise the question of the procedure of adopting new members into the Party, of the procedure of giving ideological equipment to every Party member.

With the increase in the political activity of the masses of workers and collective farmers in the past years, the influx of members into our Party naturally increased also. Our local Party workers, however, have not been able properly to test, train and consolidate these masses. We must honestly admit this at this Seventeenth Party Congress. Not sufficient care has been exercised in adopting new members, and even carelessness has been displayed in this.

Of course, there is a great striving among the workers and a great activity to join the Party. The workers want to give organized form to this activity by joining the Bolshevik Party. But we cannot adopt members in the advanced vanguard Party only because the applicant is a good worker and an honest man. There are large numbers of honest non-Party workers in the country. When the brigade of the Central Committee visited the Donbas it discovered that the number of Communists on the register of the Lidiyevka pit nucleus was 391 (I remember this was mentioned at the district meeting in Stalino). But it turned out that they had only 250 members. They had adopted new members mechanically; and when a number of them left the pit they were not taken off the Party register.

Cases like the following occurred. During the Party purging at the Lysva Works it transpired that two shop nucleus secretaries—Kolossov, the secretary of the Party nucleus in tin shop No. 1 and Bronnikov, the secretary of the Party nucleus in tin shop No. 2—challenged each other in socialist competition to recruit 100 members to



the Party. Kolossov managed to recruit only 99 members and in order to save the face of his Party secretary one of the members of his nucleus joined the Party a second time. (*Laughter.*) Comrades, this is not an anecdote, this is a fact. When this was discovered and the Party member was asked why he did this, he replied: "We could not very well let our Party secretary down and prevent him from fulfilling the competition contract, and so I signed on a second time, so that our nucleus might win the competition." (*Laughter.*)

This shows to what lengths distortions can go. A careless and sometimes liberal approach to the question of adopting new members, as if to say—Well, if a fellow asks to be taken into the Party, why shouldn't we take him—sometimes leads to a position when in the stream of new members consisting of the very best people of our epoch, who join our Party in order to take part in the active struggle, are swept in, not only those who are theoretically and practically untrained but even those who are alien to the Party, careerists, self-seekers, people who do not believe in the victory of the Party, who cannot assimilate the iron proletarian discipline of the proletarian state.

You know that the Party is purging its ranks. Comrade Rudzutak dealt with this in detail in his report. We have expelled 182,500 Communists from the Party, which represents 16.8 per cent of the total membership. Of these, class-alien elements represent 2.7 per cent; those guilty of duplicity—0.9 per cent; violators of discipline—3.5 per cent, those who have become corrupted—1.5 per cent; careerists and self-seekers—1.4 per cent; social and moral degenerates—2 per cent; passive elements—4.2 per cent and miscellaneous—0.6 per cent.

The largest percentage of those expelled were recent members of the Party. About one half of those expelled joined the Party in 1929, and later.

Needless to say, the Five-Year Plan raised us all to a higher level. The working class and we ourselves were carried away with the fervour of construction. The workers joined the Party. We accepted them in thousands. But we did not exercise the necessary strictness in accepting them. The purging of the Party has produced great results, but it would have been far better had we been more strict in accepting members; then we would have had to expel fewer. (*A voice: Quite right!*) And it must be stated frankly that in the Party apparatus it was not only the secretaries but even the managers of departments who failed personally to regulate the acceptance of members into the Party. The acceptance of new members was managed by the Party worker who was in charge of the particular sector of Party work.

That is why, comrades, in the theses on the organizational question and in the amended rules a new course is laid down to secure a more serious approach to the question of adopting new members. We will continue to take new members into the Party. After the purging has been completed the best, advanced members of the working class, of the collective farmers and toilers will be given the opportunity to join the ranks of the Party, but we will have to enquire whether the given comrade is fit to join the Party. The theses and the rules first of all emphasize that new members are adopted individually, that workers, collective farmers, Red Army men, students, and office employees are eligible for Party membership if they have proved their worth in their work in the sympathizers' groups, in the trade unions, in the soviets, in the Young Communist League, in the

co-operative societies and in delegate meetings and if they obtain a recommendation from the organization in which they are working, *i.e.*, the people who have passed through the school of active social-proletarian work.

You have read in the rules what categories are established for applicants desiring to join the Party, that workers must have been in industry for not less than five years, that an increased number of recommendations will be required and that those eligible to give recommendations must have a longer Party standing. It is particularly emphasized that those who give recommendations will be held responsible for those whom they recommend and in the event of their giving recommendations to the undeserving they will be subjected to a penalty that may include expulsion from the Party.

But, comrades, we must remember that these points by themselves do not decide the matter. A man can find five recommendations and not only of people who have been in the Party five years, but even of those who have been in the Party ten years. What is required here is that the adoption of new Party members be made as serious a matter as the high standing of our Party deserves, and that every applicant for membership in the Party shall thoroughly understand what our great Party represents and what demands it makes upon every individual member.

In addition to this we are instituting sympathizers' groups. The Party is aware that in addition to the mass of non-Party workers and collective farm peasants who actively support the Party and the Soviet government, there are groups in the working class and among the collective farm peasants who are activists, who have raised themselves to a higher stage and have come closer to the Party than the rest.

We give these activists who are just one step below the

level of the Party the opportunity first to acquire the habits of organization and leadership in the sympathizers' groups. This is a very important and useful thing but care must be taken that it is not spoiled; the Party organizations must pay proper attention to the sympathizers' groups and really carry on among them skilful ideological and political work.

A man must become accustomed to Party discipline. But we do not lay down the rule that people must join the Party only through sympathizers' groups.

Thus, comrades, the first and fundamental conclusion to be drawn from this new task is that more serious attention must be paid to the acceptance of new members, and then there will be less occasion to expel people. The acceptance of new members is one of the most important functions in the work of the Party committees from below up, primarily of the secretaries whose duty it is personally to guide this very important work of accepting members into our great Party.

### *3. The Ideological Equipment of the Party Members*

The organization of the proper acceptance of members in the Party is only half the business. We must see to it that the newly adopted Party member, when he is already in our ranks, properly equips himself ideologically, that he grows, that he should feel everyday guidance in his activity, that he be actively drawn into the work of the Party, and that he become politically hardened. When we speak of Marxist-Leninist training, we not only mean class-room training, we mean the ideological equipment of the Bolshevik. The Party member must be trained in the Party school, but principally, he must be trained in practical political work. That means that we must raise the Marxist-Leninist training of the Party

members to a high level and improve the work of our Party organization.

During the past few years our network of Party circles and schools has expanded. In 1930 we had 52,000 schools and circles for Party education, which were attended by over 1,000,000 students. In August 1933, however, we had 210,000 schools and circles attended by 4,500,000 students of whom 2,260,000 were not members of the Party. We now have 130,000 propagandists, *i. e.*, five times the number we had in 1928. Of these, ten per cent have passed the Institute of Red Professors, Communist Universities and courses in Marxism, and 25 per cent passed through the standard Soviet-Party schools. Fifty-one per cent of the propagandists are workers (in 1928 only 8 per cent of the propagandists were workers).

We can report some progress in the extension of correspondence courses. We have a special institute that conducts correspondence courses by radio. But Comrade Kirov was quite right when he spoke sharply about the fact that our work of Marxist-Leninist training was lagging behind.

Bolsheviks cannot limit themselves merely to believing in socialism in the same way as a religious person believes in the kingdom of heaven. No, a Bolshëvik is a member of a Party, the program, politics and tactics of which are based on the strictly scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism. A Bolshevik is one who understands that the collapse of capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat which guarantees the victory of socialism are inevitable. Hence, every Party member must master the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Is this possible? Of course it is possible. Why, during the Party purging, when the question was raised of testing the political knowledge of the Communists, more was

done in six months in regard to the mastery of the principles of Marxism and Leninism, than was done in two ordinary years of cultural propaganda work. (*A voice: Quite right!*) The level of our work of equipping the members of the Party with the principles of Marxism-Leninism must be raised. We must publish Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist literature on a far wider scale than we have done hitherto.

We are now introducing knowledge tests in agronomy and technique. We ought to introduce knowledge tests in Party principles, so that there shall not be a single member of the Party who has not mastered the principles of Marxism-Leninism. (*Applause.*)

We heard Comrade Manuilsky's report here. In connection with the tasks of our brother Communist Parties and of the international Communist movement which he enumerated, we must intensify the international training of our Communists. Very often we discuss international problems only in connection with certain campaigns, from one plenum of the E.C.C.I. to the other. This is not enough. International training must be carried on systematically. The members of the Party must be familiar with all the important decisions and with the principal forces operating in the world arena.

You heard here the speech of the woman collective farmer Dobrova and you heard the speeches of a number of workers; every one of you knows from your own experience—you from Moscow, from Leningrad, from the Ukraine, from the Urals—that we have a number of excellent self-trained workers who have developed and grown up during the Five-Year Plan period. But what does the rural Communist complain about most, what does he require? He says: Give me the books, teach me in such a way that I may understand everything.

Comrade Stalin has often reproached our writers and our newspapers with the fact that they ignore the educational level of the broad masses and write all sorts of abbreviated words. For example, if they write about International Youth Day they always write I.Y.D.

We sent Comrade Shokhin of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee to the rural districts in order to investigate what books were in demand there and what was the educational level of the readers. He discovered that there were few books in the rural districts. In the course of conversation he asked: "Comrade, do you know what I.Y.D. is?" and the answer was: "I.Y.D., that is . . . Oh, it's a revolutionary holiday." "But what holiday? What does I.Y.D. mean?" "I don't know."

Take our newspapers. Very often you will come across E.T.W. This is the abbreviation for engineering and technical workers. But a village Communist reads E.T.W. and does not know what it means. In our newspapers you will find the abbreviation: 4th qtr. What does 4th qtr. mean? It is difficult for a village Communist, and not only for a village Communist, to guess that this abbreviation means fourth quarter. I am not saying this to ridicule those who do not know simple things. No, rather should we pour ridicule on those who write in this way for workers and peasants. (*A voice: Quite right! Applause.*)

Comrades, we have trained many Communists in the Institute of Red Professors, in the Communist Universities, and the courses in Marxism; these people have accumulated a definite amount of capital in the shape of knowledge. The overwhelming majority of them try to do their work well. The Party is entitled to demand of them that they should exert all their efforts and energy to develop Party political education and thus repay the debt they owe to the Party. But I must say that a number

of these people are not yet able to link up theoretical problems with practical problems.

Lenin always linked up theoretical problems with everyday practice. Stalin gives us examples of how to combine the most complicated theoretical problems with the everyday struggle. And yet many of our Red professors put theory into one compartment and practice into another, and are quite unable to combine these two compartments. Unfortunately, instead of combining theory with practice they, like the philosopher in the fable, write very profound treatises upon "The Nature of a Rope," and as Marx and Engels have not said anything on this subject, they think they are making a wonderful contribution to the treasury of Marxism. (*Laughter.*)

A number of our Soviet-Party schools suffer mainly from the fact that the education is organized precisely on school lines. A Bolshevik is not a schoolboy, he is being trained politically and his schooling should be combined with the everyday political and practical struggle. He must be ideologically equipped both at school and at Party meetings. Hence, as you have no doubt observed, the new draft of the rules does not simply speak about training, but about ideologically equipping the Communist. Every Party member must be equipped with the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

If we put these demands to every Party member, how much more so must we put this to the Party leaders. There must not be any sharp division between expert propagandists and expert organizers. Specialization is a very good thing, we are in favour of it, but we must not carry it to extremes. And excessive specialization is particularly unsuitable in Party work. Very often an organizer fails to carry on propaganda and agitation not only because he has not the time for it but, let us speak frank-



ly, also because he is unable to. We say that a director of a factory must master knowledge. All the more reason therefore why we should demand of every Party committee secretary, of every district committee secretary, and of every Party organizer that they acquire the ability to use the compass of Marxism-Leninism. A Party leader must not only be an organizer and administrator in the best sense of the term, but he must also be a propagandist and an educator of the Party members.

We know that the level of our Party meetings has risen. Party members learn and should learn bolshevism at Party meetings not less, if not more, than in the Party school. Everyone understands that.

Internal Party democracy and self-criticism have been and are the most important pivot of our whole Party work and education of the Party members. Internal Party democracy has risen to a new stage. Internal Party democracy is now understood in quite a new way. When you attend meetings of Communists now, you realize that they cannot be compared with what the position was a couple of years ago.

The various oppositions tried to utilize internal Party democracy for the purpose of disintegrating the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The Party delivered a crushing blow at these abettors of the kulaks, expelled them from its ranks and raised the Party organizations to a higher level.

Take any primary Party organization, any Party meeting now. You will see how the members of the Party have risen to the level of understanding the political nature of the tasks, how the fundamental questions of the life of our country and of international politics are dealt with in the speeches of rank-and-file Party members. In discussing their production or general Party problems they quote figures running into billions, they speak about the in-

dustrial-financial plan and technique. It goes without saying that from this point of view, every Communist has risen, has grown enormously.

We cannot deny, however, that we could have done much more had we succeeded in combining the work of the organizers and the propagandists. This would have raised the Marxist-Leninist ideological equipment of the Communists to a new stage. Cases occur when Party meetings are carried on in a stereotyped manner without serious preparation. People are called together and they are told: Comrades, we have tasks, we must fulfil so-and-so. Or they discuss some campaign or anniversary. In such cases, of course, all you get is mere tub thumping, or else mere "business," and naturally, such meetings do not help to educate the Party members. And yet, every Party meeting should help to raise the ideological level of the Communists. The discussion of internal Party questions, of questions concerning the politics and practice of building up socialism, raises the intelligence of the Party members to the level of understanding the vanguard role of the Bolsheviks, as the organizers of the masses.

The Party member grows, becomes educated and hardened in the conditions of internal Party democracy, amidst the free and business-like discussion of all the questions of Party policy. At the same time he becomes hardened and educated in the struggle against all those who depart from the fundamental problems of Party policy, who want to take advantage of the discussion of these problems in order to sabotage this policy, in order to undermine the Party leadership, and in order to shake its iron ranks. The experience of our internal Party life shows that our Party ranks have grown up, have become strong and hardened in the struggle against all those who depart from the policy of the Party, from Leninism.

in the struggle for the compactness and unity of our Party ranks.

That is why we must continue to raise and harden these Party members in the struggle against the slightest manifestation of opportunism in our ranks.

The growth of the Party member depends upon the way internal Party work is organized, it depends upon the amount of attention that is paid to the Party member, and on the way he is led. That is why in the theses we have concisely put the question of the primary organizations of the Party.

#### *4. The Reorganization and the Improvement of the Work of the Primary Party Organizations in the Factories*

Our primary Party organizations have grown up organizationally and politically. They have undoubtedly risen to become active factors in the industrial life of the factory.

Internal Party life in the primary organizations has become richer. During the past years an entirely new stratum of leading workers has arisen. The Party *active* has been renewed, the circulation of the blood is good, it is pulsating, new people are growing up. I can give you data concerning 1,500 shop organizations in 85 of the largest enterprises in which a total of 700,000 workers are employed, of whom 94,000 are Communists. Almost half the number of secretaries of shop Party organizations in these enterprises joined the Party after 1929, and only one-fourth joined the Party before and in 1925. But although these are not Party members of long standing, they are workers of long standing; 60 per cent of these secretaries have been employed in industry for more than ten years.

Of course, these people must be given assistance in their Bolshevik training and particularly in their leadership of our primary Party organizations.

What is the position now in our primary Party organizations? What do we now call our Party nuclei, and what should we call them?

Our Party, as the militant revolutionary Party of the proletariat, has always been organized on the basis of production, its units were based in the factory. But, in the first place, this was not the case in the rural districts, and secondly, even in the factories our organization did not always bear a sharply expressed production character.

The industrial role of our primary Party organizations began to develop mainly during the past three or four years. It was only at the last Congress that we had to declare that the majority of our Party members were not yet engaged in socialist competition and shock brigade work. There were factory organizations in which only 10 to 20 per cent of the members of the Party and Young Communist League were engaged in socialist competition and shock brigade work. At the present time nearly 100 per cent of the Communists are shock brigaders; our factory Party organizations go thoroughly into all questions of the industrial life of the factory.

At the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress the number of primary Party organizations and candidate groups was 54,000; by October 1, 1933, the number had risen to 139,000. In a number of enterprises the factory Party organizations are huge organizations having a thousand and more members.

The character of the work of the lower Party organizations has changed very sharply. As a matter of fact the Party nuclei have outgrown the limits of the old type of

nuclei, in their composition, as well as in the tasks that confront them.

Hence, they are no longer nuclei, they are the primary organizations of our Party. The role of such organizations in the sphere of production as the leading force in the factory and the collective farm must rise still higher.

The Party rules impose on the primary Party organizations much wider tasks than those they had before. The rules say:

"The primary Party organization links up the masses of the workers and peasants with the leading bodies of the Party. Its tasks are:

"1) To carry on agitational and organizational work among the masses in favour of the Party slogans and decisions;

"2) To enlist sympathizers and new members and give them political education;

"3) To assist the District Committee, the City Committee or the Political Department in their everyday work of organization and agitation;

"4) To mobilize the masses in the factories, in the Soviet farms, collective farms, etc., for the purpose of fulfilling the plan of production, of tightening up labour discipline, and developing shock brigade work.

"5) To fight against slackness and mismanagement in the factories, in the Soviet farms and collective farms and to be daily concerned with improving the conditions of life of the workers and of the collective farmers;

"6) To take an active part as a Party organization in the economic and political life of the country."

I call your attention particularly to points 4 and 5.

The primary Party organizations in the state institutions, while making no claims to leadership, must also fight against slackness if it exists<sup>ly</sup> in the particular institution.

In order that they may be able to carry out these tasks the primary Party organizations must reorganize their

work. We could quote many striking examples of good work carried on by primary Party organizations.

Comrades, you all lead the work of Party organizations and you know that we have many good primary Party organizations. We have submitted this question for discussion to the Congress principally in order to lay down the tasks for the future. In this connection also we must say that there is much that is unsatisfactory.

It would be wrong to ignore the fact that elements of bureaucracy and of the functional system have penetrated our Party work. And there are some Party workers who fail to understand that the central and principal task of a Party leader is to lead the members of the Party and through the mass of the membership to lead millions of workers and peasants. That is why the Party member must be the focus of the work of the Party organizations. There are a number of bad sides in the structure of our Party organizations. There are too many organizational links between the Party committee in the factory and the individual Party member.

This can be tolerated to some extent, by way of exception, in big factories where there are real shop organizations and a large Party membership, as for example at the Putilov Works, where there are about 6,000 members, or at the Lugansk Locomotive Works, where there are over 4,000 Communists, or at the Moscow Electroavod. But even these big organizations should not make a practice of having these numerous links, still less should the medium and small factories do so.

In addition to providing for shop Party organizations the new rules provide also for the organization of Party groups in the brigades and machine units. But these groups must not imitate the shop organization. They must be militant groups, and should least of all occupy them-

selves with holding meetings, issuing orders, writing resolutions, etc.

We must frankly admit that the functional system and the writing of general resolutions exist in our Party organizations. Endless minutes, resolutions and reports are written and very often it is we, the leading Party organizations, who are responsible for this. When an instructor visits the secretary of a primary organization and begins to investigate his work, the first thing he does is to take the minutes, to see whether this or that particular question has been discussed by the organization. In a word, the secretaries of our primary Party organizations make every effort to keep a stock of every possible form of resolution in order to safeguard themselves against reproaches. *(Laughter.)*

Take for example the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, the largest works in Rostov. The Party organization has an unwieldy apparatus. The Party Committee has five departments. It has no less than twenty full-time workers. *(A voice: More.)* If you include the full-time workers in the shop committees then of course it will be more. An enormous amount of time was wasted at meetings. There was a case when this Party Committee was in session for two days and discussed 120 questions. *(Laughter.)*

Or take the Petrovsky Works in Dniepropetrovsk. When a representative of the Central Committee investigated the work there he found that the Party committee and the shop nuclei employed no less than 75 full-time workers.

There are too many links. For example, the blast furnace department had a shop Party committee, four shift Party nuclei, twenty link nuclei, which were subordinated to the shift nuclei, and the link nuclei had their Party groups. Thus you get a five-stage organization.

Here is a list of eleven sectors that exist in the factory Party Committee and in all the shop nuclei: 1) culture and propaganda sector; 2) mass agitation sector; 3) cadres sector; 4) supervision of fulfilment of decisions sector; 5) work among the non-Party *active* sector; 6) work among Party candidates sector; 7) the registration of the vanguard role of Communists in production sector (*laughter*); 8) work among the Young Communist Leaguers sector; 9) work among women sector; 10) co-operative sector; 11) Party duties sector.

Things reached such a pass that the link nucleus in the rolling shop, which had seven members and four candidates, set up a nucleus bureau to which all the seven Party members belonged. (*Laughter.*) And this group of seven Party members in the link nucleus had ten sectors (*laughter*); these were: a sector for supervising the payment of Party dues, a mass agitation sector, a cadres sector, a supervision of fulfilment of decisions sector, S.L.E.E.P. (*laughter*), a work among the non-Party *active* sector, a work among Party candidates sector, a registration of the vanguard role of the Communists in production sector (*laughter*), a work among Young Communist Leaguers sector, a work among women sector, and a Party duties sector. As a matter of fact, it was just sheer mockery, and no work was done. The link nucleus in the blast furnace department having sixteen members, had sixteen sectors.

*Stalin:* Still it was less than they have in the Commissariat for Agriculture.

*Kaganovich:* Yes. They could not keep up with the Commissariat for Agriculture.

They have a peculiar way of selecting leaders of sectors. For example, Borodenko, a student in the elementary politics school, was in charge of the Party education sector,



and he himself was absent from the Party school fourteen times. (*Laughter.*) Sokolenko was in charge of the supervising of the Party dues sector, and he himself had not paid Party dues for nine months. (*Laughter.*) Of course, we have not very many freakish cases of this kind.

*Stalin:* Still, they are not so few.

*Kaganovich:* Of course not few. I quoted this case as a striking illustration of the fact that there are disgraceful tendencies in the work. If you will, this is a bureaucratic distortion of the line of our Party. That is why we must strike very hard at these distortions.

We are asked: Why do we propose to abolish the bureau of the shop nucleus? As you know, the new rules provide for a shop organizer instead of a shop bureau. At the present time the bureaus hold too many meetings, while general meetings of the Party members in the shop are not called often enough. When shop Party organizers are elected general meetings of Communists in the shop will be called more frequently. The Party organizer must be the militant representative of the Party in the shop. He must, without violating the principle of individual management, fulfil the tasks which the rules impose upon the Party organization, fight against slackness and secure real iron proletarian discipline.

Some primary Party organizations complain that the Party committees and the district committees compel them to do an enormous amount of writing. The Central Committee has received a large amount of correspondence on this subject. This is true, and we, the leading Party organs, must sharply reduce their demands. And in order to avoid all this writing and wasting of paper we must improve the apparatus and in particular abolish the departments in the district committees. (*A voice: Quite right!*)

Of course a certain amount of reporting is necessary; particularly the strict registration of members must be organized. And it is precisely this very important business that is unsatisfactory. The registration of Party members is very badly organized, and a number of organizations do not bother about this.

We are sure that the reduction in the number of meetings and in the amount of writing general resolutions will undoubtedly improve our work. It will enable the lower Party workers to concentrate on really urgent questions. If the Party committees are relieved of a lot of office routine, they will find sufficient time and men to do the work. (*A voice: Quite right.*) The primary organizations in Soviet institutions now acquire very great significance. We must not think that it will be possible to carry out all the work of reorganizing the state apparatus without strengthening and improving the Party organizations in the Soviet institutions. Some people wrongly adopt a supercilious attitude towards the primary Party organizations in Soviet institutions. But who is going to secure the reorganization of the state apparatus and the improvement in its work if not the Party members in the Soviet institutions? That is why more attention must be paid to the Party organizations in Soviet institutions.

#### *5. The Primary Party Organizations in the Villages Must Be Raised to the Level of Their New Tasks*

Permit me to deal with the primary Party organizations in the collective farms and villages. You will remember that at the time of the Sixteenth Congress of our Party, the village Party organizations were extremely weak. We only had 30,000 village nuclei with a total membership of 404,000 Communists. Of these, 263,000 belonged to territorial nuclei, 115,000 belonged to collective farm nuclei,

and 26,000 belonged to Soviet farm and machine and tractor station nuclei. On October 1, 1933, instead of 30,000 village nuclei we had 80,000 primary Party organizations and candidate groups, and instead of the 404,000 Communists that we had at the time of the Sixteenth Party Congress, we now have 790,000. In addition to that we have 22,000 Party-Y.C.L. groups and 38,000 solitary Communists.\*

At the present time we have 30,000 collective farm lower Party organizations, 20,000 candidate groups, 22,000 Party-Y.C.L. groups and 38,000 solitary Communists. Thus, about 50 per cent of the collective farms have no Communists.

In the regions where the largest collective farms exist (North Caucasus, the Ukraine, Lower Volga) the percentage of collective farms in which there are no Communists ranges from three (Lower Volga) to twenty-two (Ukraine).

In the regions where the smaller collective farms exist (the Western Region, Ivanovo) the percentage of collective farms in which there are no Communists ranges between fifty and seventy.

In regions like the Lower Volga, Middle Volga, North Caucasus, Urals and the Ukraine it is easy, by sending workers from the district centres and by attaching regional and district workers directly to the collective farms, to have Communists in the majority of collective farms. In those districts where the collective farms are small ones it is more difficult to do this.

In order to educate the Communists in the rural districts and to be able to select suitable persons who desire to join the Party, the practice of permanently attaching regional and district leading workers to collective farms

\* Individual Communists working in collective farms where there are no Party organizations.—*Tr.*

may acquire considerable importance. This means that leading workers must be attached to the collective farms, not only for the purpose of organizing campaigns, but also for the purpose of carrying on political and mass organizational work.

On the basis of the decision of the Central Committee, village nuclei have been reorganized on an industrial basis, and the composition and complexion of the primary Party organizations in the villages have completely changed. Here is an example of a Party organization in the former Yaropolye volost, Volokolamsk uyezd, in the Moscow Region. Compare what it was before with what it is now. Formerly, the membership of the nucleus consisted of administrators: the chairman of the village co-operative, members of the management boards of co-operative societies, chairmen of village soviets, the milk inspector, the manager of the dairy farm, the chairman of the credit society, the district judge, the volost militiaman, the salesmen in the co-operative store, the village teacher, two chairmen of collective farms and one rank-and-file collective farmer. Now in this region there are two collective farm Party organizations, one candidates' group in the collective farm and there are Party-Y.C.L. groups in eight collective farms. The composition of the membership has entirely changed. It now includes chairmen of collective farms, brigadiers, rank-and-file collective farmers—men and women, the agronomists, etc. As you see there is an enormous difference between the former volost nucleus and the present collective farm Party organization.

Should we accelerate the adoption of new members in rural Party organizations? Some think that as there are no Party organizations and Communists in many collective farms then we ought to accelerate the enlistment of members in the Party. But that is a mistake. There is no

need to set up Party organizations in every collective farm artificially. If people grow up in them, become worthy of membership of our Party then by all means let them join. We must help them to grow up. We must devote attention and efforts to this. But if there are no such people, we certainly must not artificially force the pace and accept people indiscriminately. We must strengthen the Y.C.L. organization and the Y.C.L. groups, create a strong non-Party *active*, so that the organization in one collective farm may be in a position to help several adjacent collective farms.

Of course, comrades, we must devote more attention to each individual collective farm and to each individual collective farmer. We must not be disturbed by the fact that some collective farm Party organizations are numerically small. Their strength should not lie in numbers, but in their leadership of the non-Party *active*, in their ability to rally this non-Party *active* around the numerically small collective farm Party organization, around the Party-Y.C.L. group, or around the solitary Communists.

We must not forget the serious significance of the territorial village Party organizations, because they are directly connected with the village soviets and the co-operative society. And we know that the role of the village soviets and of the co-operative societies, far from diminishing, is continuously increasing. Now, even those who wanted to liquidate the village soviets and to merge them with the collective farms realize that this was "Leftist" stupidity.

To all this we must add that if the question of Marxist-Leninist education is very acute in the towns, it is a hundred times more acute in the rural districts. Village Communists, and primarily secretaries of Party organizations, chairmen of collective farms and chairmen of village soviets, very sharply feel the need of raising their cultural

and political level. And here, perhaps, we ought to employ a form of work such as organizing short term courses for secretaries of collective farm Party organizations. I can quote the example of the Moscow Region where in December last year 900 secretaries of collective farm organizations were called to Moscow to undergo a short-term course of instruction. This course proved to be very useful indeed and gave a great impetus to the desire of secretaries of collective farm Party organizations to still further raise their political level. The need for this is colossal.

Permit me to read an extract from a letter written by a secretary of a collective farm Party organization who had attended these courses. He writes:

"I have just come to Moscow to attend a ten-day course which is very useful and what is most important, stimulates one to continue one's studies, to study the program of our Party, to study the tenets of Lenin and Stalin, to study agriculture and the international situation. I tried to study at home, but what came of it? As soon as I sat down to read something by Comrade Stalin, to prepare for my lessons, or even to read a novel, I was disturbed by quarrels, the babies' crying, etc. I thought to myself, I will go to the Party rooms and lock myself in. Suddenly there was a knocking and shouting: 'Why do you lock yourself in, are you afraid of thieves?' I ask, 'What is the matter?' They shout: 'Open the door.' I plead with them: 'Boys, I am preparing for my lessons.' And they say: 'Open the door, we've got some secret business with you.' Well, I open the door and they say: 'Last night the watchman at the mill stole some grain.' I took a note of it and they went away. I locked the door again and sat down to read. Suddenly again knocking and shouting. Somebody shouts: 'Come quick to the farm, something has happened there!' and I had to rush off. And this happens many a time. As soon as you sit down to read, somebody arrives from Moscow. A representative from some newspapers. He enquires for the secretary. What's the matter? He says: 'We would like to get some information about your farm; come, let's look over it.' And you go."

Such are the difficulties our lower Party workers have to contend with in their efforts to educate themselves. And yet, the secretary of the primary Party organization, including that of a village organization, must be a propagandist and be politically well equipped.

The growth of the collective farm primary Party organization and the consolidation of the collective farm system make new demands upon the Party leadership. And these demands first of all raise the question of strengthening the leading cadres of the lower organizations in the rural districts.

This problem can and ought to be solved in various ways. During the period under review about 50,000 workers were sent into the rural districts, and directly into the collective farms. This is not enough. While maintaining the course towards training and developing a local collective farm *active*, we must for some time continue to send workers from the districts and the towns directly into the collective farms.

The everyday and systematic leadership of the village Party organizations must be strengthened, and the collective farm Bolsheviks must be trained on concrete practical questions affecting the collective farm, and on the political slogans of the Party. If we inquire into the number of Party organizations that are covered by a single political department and district committee we will find that after all it is not so difficult for the political department and district committee to test and know every secretary and every collective farm Party organization. Strictly speaking, it is precisely in order that the work of the collective farms in the villages may be strengthened that the political departments were created.

As for the work of the primary Party organizations themselves, I must say that they have not yet risen to the

level of work of a real industrial Party organization. We have made enormous progress compared with the past. The work of the primary Party organizations has improved, particularly as the result of the creation of political departments. Nevertheless the Party organizations have not yet poured the real content of their work into the new form of collective farm and Soviet farm organization based on production.

Everybody points out that the establishment of the political departments has enormously raised the level of the rural districts, has raised the Communists and has strengthened the primary Party organizations. At the Sixteenth Congress of our Party we said that the village Party organizations lacked a strongly welded leading nucleus; but today we can say that this nucleus already exists, but it is still weak. We must raise it to a higher level, strengthen it, without artificially accelerating the enlistment of new members; we must select the best people, so as to have our own Communists, Young Communist Leaguers and Party nuclei in the collective farms.

#### *6. The Experience of the Political Departments and the Reorganization of the Work of the District Committees*

The political departments played an important role precisely because they established direct contacts with the villages. It was found to be much more difficult to set up Party organizations in the villages than it was in the towns. And so in order to create these organizations, in order to cement them and to harden them, the Party, on the initiative of Comrade Stalin, sent into the rural districts over 18,000 workers for the political departments in the machine and tractor stations and Soviet farms, men and women who had been tested and Bolshevistically



hardened. At the foundation of this organization, Comrade Stalin laid the same principles that Lenin developed in his book, *What Is To Be Done?* Comrade Stalin has more than once emphasized that had we not done this we would have had to wait decades before workers of this calibre could have been developed out of the local cadres in the rural districts.

Today, after the political departments have been in existence for little over a year, we can say that they have fulfilled the task imposed upon them with honour, and they have justified the confidence our Party placed in them. (*Applause.*) We hope that our political departments in the machine and tractor stations and in Soviet farms will show in 1934, already this spring, not only that they will not allow their work to subside, but that they will raise it to a higher level. We would like our railway political departments to study the methods of work of the political departments of the machine and tractor stations, methods which were hammered out literally in the midst of battle, in the midst of the struggle, and apply them in what is one of our most acute sectors, *viz.*, in the railway transport system.

Many people ask: why have the political departments succeeded in organizing their work properly, and why have the district committees not succeeded so well?

First of all it must be said that in the persons of the political department workers we sent to the rural districts cadres of fresh people who went into the country, into a definite atmosphere, into a definite set of circumstances for the purpose of carrying out definite, distinct, and clear tasks. The district committee workers, however, have been living in the country for many years; many of them failed to observe the new class process in the rural dis-

tricts, and some of them fell victims to alien class influences.

Secondly, comrades, it is a matter of the system of work.

Let us hear what Comrade Gussev, who has been secretary of a number of district Party committees (Korsakovo, Griaz, Kursk) and who was appointed chief of the political department of the Kirsanov Machine and Tractor Station, has to say. This is what he writes:

"When I was in the district committee, my work was influenced by the existence of an apparatus—I could not concentrate. I knew the district, the collective farm—I will not mention the brigade—only in general outline, and that is why my leadership was just general leadership. If I had a particular job to do I passed it on to the apparatus, to the District Executive Committee, or to the District Land Department and I had no time to investigate the fulfilment of this work. In the District Party Committee we had many meetings and conferences and although we discussed urgent questions they did not reach beyond the confines of our apparatuses.

"In the political department things are entirely different. As soon as any question arises, either I myself, or somebody in the apparatus, immediately goes into it and gets it settled one way or another. The conferences which we convene every Saturday are of an entirely different character. At these political department conferences, we usually sum up the concrete work we have done during the week, point out the weak sides of the work and suggest concrete measures for removing these defects. After these conferences we all disperse once again to our particular districts to carry out the decisions we have adopted. During the course of the week we manage to visit the weakest places in the area of the machine and tractor station and take measures to remove the defects on the spot. Later, we investigate the results these measures have produced. We have no resolutions, and no written instructions. All we do is to keep a diary of our work."

Comrade Gussev is quite right. If we compare the work of a chief of a political department with that of the secretary of the district committee, we will find that the

former spends twice as much time on the collective farm as the latter. And this of course is not because the district committee workers do not want to visit the villages. No, they do a lot of travelling, and they are quite ready to travel—I am not hurling any reproaches at the district committee workers—these people do a lot of work and very often work under difficult conditions. But that is not the point. The point is the approach to and the organization of the work. The district committee workers have more meetings, write more minutes, write directives; but there is no real supervision of the fulfilment of decisions.

The chiefs of political departments, however, mainly work directly in the collective farms and carry out the instructions Comrade Stalin gave when the political departments were organized.

We have interviewed many secretaries of district committees and they all complain about the unwieldiness of the district apparatus, about the enormous number of district institutions they are obliged to lead. In the districts there are as many as twenty-six organizations, and as many as twelve inter-district organizations. The leadership of this unwieldy apparatus takes up an immense amount of the district workers' time, and this prevents them from visiting the collective farms.

In the methods of work of the district committees and of their departments there is much office routine and writing of documents, but there is no business-like supervision of fulfilment of decisions. Even if we take the departments of the district committees—the organizing instructors' department and the culture and propaganda department, which should send their workers into the villages—we will find that they visit the villages far less than do the assistant chiefs of political departments. That is why, comrades, we must, while preserving and streng-

thening the political departments, reorganize the district committees. The district committees must become more flexible, more mobile and more operative. That is why we propose to abolish the departments of the district committees and have in their place travelling responsible instructors. These instructors will not be the instructors of the old type who travelled about the district and read the minutes of the Party organizations without having any right to take the necessary measures on the spot; they will be instructors who will have a definite group of Party organizations in their charge and will be responsible for their work.

In regard to urban districts, here too, even in such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, where the district committees are as large as some city committees and even some regional committees, we have agreed to abolish the departments and leave only the cultural and propaganda department. Here, too, we are introducing the system of instructors.

We are pursuing the course of giving the district committees which have received many rights, opportunities to exercise them. But many people are interested to know what will become of the political departments and district committees, and they point to a certain contradiction between them. From the point of view of formal logic, of course, there is some contradiction. There was even some contradiction in the very creation of political departments. The political department is not the usual type of Party organization, it is a special type of Party organization based on production, having special functions.

Some people ask with surprise: how is it, the political department works in the district, all the Party organizations are subordinate to it, but it is not subordinated to the district committee? But had we subordinated the polit-

ical departments to the district committees I assure you the political departments would not have managed to cope with their tasks as successfully as they have done. (*A voice: Quite right!*)

Right from the outset the political departments were placed in special conditions. When the Central Committee received information to the effect that certain district committees were displaying conservatism and were resisting the new methods of work, we regarded it as an attempt to hinder the carrying out of the decisions of the Central Committee, to hinder the fulfilment of the new tasks that were presented by the Party and in Comrade Stalin's speech on the work in the rural districts. We struck hard at these tendencies. Where the line of the district committees coincided with that of the political departments in carrying out the decisions of the Party—and after all that is the most important thing for Bolsheviks—the district committees and political departments began to work in harmony, and we can say today that in the overwhelming majority of cases, in spite of the fact that the political departments are not subordinate to the district committee, fairly friendly and businesslike relations have been established between them.

What do we propose for the future? Are we changing the relationships between the two bodies that existed in the past years? No, comrades, we are not changing them. We are leaving them in the state of team work in which they have been carrying on up to now. The political department is an unusual form of Party organization.

As you have observed, the political departments have not been included in the Party rules among the main permanently operating organizations there enumerated. In the section dealing with the central organs of the Party we have included a point empowering the Cen-

tral Committee to set up political departments when and where required. That means that we do not determine beforehand where such political departments are to be set up, what conditions may cause them to be set up, or dissolved, on definite sections of our socialist construction.

The political departments have justified their existence and it would be harmful to raise the question of dissolving them. See what authority the political departments have won among the peasantry. Such authority could not be won artificially. Such authority is won by practical work. We raise the question of the prospects of the work of the political departments on a much wider scale. New economic and political centres are springing up in the rural districts, *viz.*, the machine and tractor stations and the Soviet farms. The old district centres sprang up on an entirely different basis: the trading villages and the administrative centres. Now, in connection with the formation of machine and tractor stations, Soviet farms and new enterprises, new centres of attraction are springing up, around which the collective farms are grouping themselves.

Two paths of development are possible: the political department in an area served by a machine and tractor station which it may be considered expedient to transform into a separate district, may become a district committee; if the district remains unchanged, the political department may become a sub-district committee. The question as to which will be the "sub" and which the "super" is a question of secondary importance for Bolsheviks. The most important thing is the substance of the work.

Comrade Sheboldayev said here that it would hardly be expedient to transform the political departments into district committees. I don't think it is worth guessing, and

we ought not to give schematic recipes on the organizational problem. The question must be decided in each given case according to the circumstances in which the given district committee or the given political department is working; and that is how the Central Committee will proceed.

For the time being, comrades, we are allowing the political departments to exist in their present form. They must energetically continue their work. We must not create a liquidationist atmosphere around the political departments. The point we have got to bear in mind is that our tasks in the rural districts have not been completely fulfilled, that we are still confronted with the very serious work of strengthening the collective farms and of transforming them into genuine Bolshevik collective farms. We must consolidate the victories achieved. There is a danger of people getting giddy with success, a danger of being carried away by victory, a danger of allowing this spring to slip by, of neglecting the repair of tractors. That would be a crime.

We are leaving the political departments and the district committees in the state of friendly relationship they have been in up till now. Of course, we must not interpret friendly relations as a moral category. We interpret it organizationally and politically as it exists today on the basis of the directives of the Central Committee, on the basis of the struggle that has been waged for the victory of the socialist forms of agriculture, and we are sure that the political departments in conjunction with the district committees will continue successfully to consolidate the collective farm system in the countryside. (*Applause.*)

## 7. *Production Branch Departments of Regional Committees and of the Central Committee*

Our organizational measures in the sphere of Party construction would be incomplete if we limited ourselves only to the primary Party organizations and the district committees. The work of all the Party organizations to a considerable extent depends upon the work of the regional committees and their apparatuses.

You all remember that at the January Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission (in 1933) Comrade Stalin subjected the work of a number of regional committees and of the central committees of national Communist Parties to severe, but deserved criticism.

The okrugs\* were abolished in order to bring the regions nearer to the district. In view of the fact that not all the necessary organizational conclusions were drawn from the enormous reforms which the liquidation of the okrugs represented, not only republics like the Ukraine and Kazakstan with their enormous territories and large number of districts, but also many other regions, became even more widely separated from the district than before.

The regional organizations did not study their districts, did not know the district workers, did not know what was going on in the districts. And in our times if a district is given a plan of grain deliveries, or a sowing plan, and if one does not know how much arable land it has, what rotation of crops is practised, what its traction facilities are, how much seed it has, and what must be done to help the district, the plan will be transformed into a blank sheet of paper, and sometimes even into a hindrance to the work. This is the case, for example, when some dis-

\* Formerly sub-divisions of regions.—Tr.



districts are given a grain delivery plan in excess of their possibilities and other districts are given a plan below their abilities. As a result, some districts find themselves in difficulties, and others in a privileged position. This once again goes to show the connection that exists between policy and the proper solution of organizational problems.

At the January Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission Comrade Stalin sharply exposed the political and organizational defects in our work in the rural districts. The struggle waged against these defects, the work done to remove them, primarily by the regional committees, central committees of national Communist Parties and political departments to a decisive degree determined the successes that were achieved last year. Now the work has improved, the people have united together in the struggle to overcome difficulties, they have learned to know the districts better, but not enough.

The defects in the district committee leadership are due very largely to the wrong, functional system of organization of the Party apparatuses of the regional committees, and of the central committees of the national Communist Parties. Properly speaking, comrades of the regional committees, if this question is put bluntly we must say that during the past two or three years the work of the departments of our regional committees has been very bad. They were knocked out of their accustomed channel because life had surpassed the functional system of organization of the apparatuses.

"Functionalism" in the apparatuses of the regional committees, of the central committees of the national Communist Parties and in the apparatus of the Central Committee hindered the work. "Functionalism" prevented the fundamental questions of life from being seen and

taken up, and the Central Committee very often received less material from its departments than it received from other organizations.

We do not set the task of reorganizing the apparatus of the departments of the regional committees, of the central committees of the national Communist Parties and of the Central Committee itself, as a purely technical task. We propose to set up integral departments based on production. That means that instead of having a mass agitation department that deals universally with agitation and mass work on all questions and in all branches of industry, transport, in the rural districts, etc., instead of a functional Organizing Instructors' Department which also carries on work in all branches, we shall set up departments based on the various branches of industry. What we need are integral departments which shall direct the Party work, the primary Party organizations, mass agitation, the selection of cadres, the distribution of workers, investigate the qualities of these workers, trade union work, etc.

The regional committees will have the following departments: agricultural, industry and transport, soviet and trade, culture and the propaganda of Leninism, leading Party organs department (city and district), and a Special Sector.

In the Central Committee the transport departments and the trading departments will exist as separate departments.

What will these departments do?

The *Agricultural Department* already has experience of directing the work of the Party apparatus in the sphere of agriculture. Its sphere of operations will include the collective farms, the machine and tractor stations, the Soviet farms, the purchasing organizations, all the agricul-

tural scientific research institutes and educational institutions, the press that deals with agriculture, and all other questions concerning Party and Soviet work in the rural districts. This department will supervise the primary Party organizations in the rural districts and direct their work; it, too, will select cadres and distribute workers.

These functions will also be carried out by the other departments in their respective branches.

The *Industrial Department* will handle the heavy industries, the light industries, the lumber and food industries, the work of municipal government, the local industries and the handicraft co-operative societies.

The *Transport Department* will handle the work of the railways, the water transport system, civil aviation, automobile and horse transport. The importance of this department will grow particularly in view of the urgent task that confronts it of securing a change for the better in the transport system and of raising the transport system to a higher level corresponding to the requirements of the Second Five-Year Plan.

The *Planning, Finance and Trade Department* will handle the work of the planning, finance and trading organizations, including the organizations engaged in foreign trade.

The *Political-Administrative Department* will deal with the work of the Soviet organizations (Regional Executive Committees, District Executive Committees and Urban Soviets), of the Red Army (in conjunction with the Political Administration of the Republics), the Public Prosecutors' Departments, etc.

The *Culture and Propaganda of Leninism Department*, in addition to its ordinary functions, must to a far larger extent than has been done hitherto supervise the whole of the activities of the institutions of the People's Commis-

sariat for Education, of the People's Commissariat for Public Health and of all the cultural and scientific organizations which train cadres. In regard to the propaganda of Leninism it will serve the whole Party; and in the primary Party organizations in cultural institutions, it will direct the whole of the organizational Party work.

The *Leading Party Organs' Department* will supervise the work of the leading Party organs of the regional committees and of the central committees of the national Communist Parties. But from time to time it will investigate the work of the district committees. In the regional committees, these departments will concentrate mainly on the city and rural district committees and in order to investigate the work of the district committees they will from time to time dive into the affairs of the primary Party organizations. This department will also deal with questions connected with Party cadres.

A large *active* is growing up at the present time, but sometimes one finds oneself in a difficult position when selecting workers for leading Party work. It is time to put a stop to the state of things in which, when a worker of given qualifications is required, one has to rush about looking for one. We must have a permanent reserve of workers whose qualifications should be known, not merely from questionnaires but from the actual work they have done. In order to know what a worker is like he should be called up to the Party office once or twice and interviewed, his work should be investigated from various aspects, the information available concerning him should be studied. This is a very complicated business.

The establishment of a *Leading Party Organs' Department* of the Central Committee means increased control and supervision of the work of the regional committees by the Central Committee. The same thing can be said

concerning the supervision of the work of the district committees by the regional committees. The supervision of the fulfilment of decisions must be developed in connection with all knotty problems, only there must be no "tying" and "untying" of knots. (*Laughter.*) Operative supervision of everyday current work must be organized.

Every production department will supervise the fulfilment of decisions in the People's Commissariats according to its particular sphere of action. But, as Comrade Stalin said in his report, the Party and its Central Committee must have its own authoritative organ of supervision, an important organ that will supervise and establish control in the local districts, in the People's Commissariats, in the trade unions, and in all other organizations to which the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party are addressed.

8. *The Leninist Line, Supervision of Fulfilment of Decisions and Operativeness in the Leadership of the Central Committee Guaranteed and Will Guarantee Victory*

The theses of the Central Committee call for operative supervision of the fulfilment of decisions. They demand that this supervision be exercised by the leading workers themselves because this is the main function of a leader.

Supervision of fulfilment of decisions must be systematic and everyday supervision, and not episodic, from case to case. It should be clear to everybody that this supervision cannot be allowed to remain in the state it has been in up till now, because operative leadership has outgrown it. Supervision must be raised and made to catch up with operative leadership, otherwise we shall have a gap between leadership and the fulfilment of decisions.

In order that real concrete and operative supervision may be exercised a Committee of Soviet Control and a Committee of Party Control are being set up in place of the present Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Committee for Supervision of Fulfilment of Decisions.

The theses and the draft of the new rules provide for the election of the Committee of Soviet Control by the Party Congress. We propose that the following amendment be made to the theses and rules: "The members of the Committee of Soviet Control are nominated by the Congress and endorsed by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R."

What will be the nature of the work of Party and Soviet Control? Of course, the regulations governing the work of the commissions will have to be carefully worked out in accordance with the tasks and requirements of Party and Soviet supervision of fulfilment of decisions. We can depict it in the following way: The committees are elected at the Congress but no local committees are to be elected. Members of the committees elected at the Congress are sent to the republics and regions in the capacity of representatives of the centre. From the point of view of internal Party democracy, it is clear that election at the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union covers local elections.

The members of the committees who are sent as representatives to the localities will, firstly, supervise the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of the Central Committee. Secondly, they will take proceedings against all those guilty of violating Party discipline and Party ethics. The members of the committees will be responsible only to the centre. It will be their duty to report to the

Central Committee on all affairs, on all defects and violations of the decisions of the Central Committee in their respective republics and regions. Thus, you see, comrades, it is not proposed to relax, but to increase control.

*Lubchenko:* Noticeably!

*Kaganovich:* The Committee of Party Control will have at the centre a group of people who will systematically supervise the way in which the central organizations fulfil the decisions of the Central Committee. If a decision is adopted, then be good enough to exercise daily supervision as to how it is carried out, and report to the Central Committee.

The Committee of Soviet Control will also have a group of workers at the centre. The rest of the members of this Committee will go out to various parts of the country as representatives. I can "console" you with the information that instead of having one chairman of a Control Commission the regions and republics will have two representatives of the new bodies (*laughter*) but, of course, it is not a matter of numbers. The main thing is that operative supervision should be exercised.

The proper organization of Party and Soviet supervision may result in our having to resort to punishments to a far less extent than we had to do when the supervision was poor. (*Applause.*)

*Stalin:* Supervision is a preventative.

*Kaganovich:* That is so, as Comrade Stalin quite rightly remarked, good supervision prevents the violation of the decisions of the Party and of the Soviet government. The knowledge that this is not a casual raid, but systematic supervision, real supervision, not supervision of a problem "taken as a whole," but of the concrete decisions of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars will induce everyone to carry out these decisions

more quickly. I will give you an example. Last year when the manufacture of spare parts was in a bad way, the Central Committee intervened in the course of supervising the fulfilment of decisions, ordered the cessation of departmental duels, and called for the fulfilment of the orders for spare parts on definite dates. As a result of the operative mobilization of all forces, industry pulled itself together, got down to the job in a real political manner, and fulfilled the order.

The Committees of Party and Soviet Control, and not only they, have a great deal to learn from the Central Committee of the Party. By studying the work of the Central Committee, its operativeness and its methods of supervising the fulfilment of decisions, one can learn how operative leadership and supervision should be organized. Very important decisions of the Central Committee concerning a number of branches of our national economy, those that have been published in the press, and others that were not published, were in the majority of cases adopted in the course of operative supervision of the fulfilment of decisions.

As an example I will quote the well-known decision of the Central Committee concerning the Donbas. You know that many decisions were adopted in connection with coal. The question of the work of the Donbas was raised in the course of supervising the fulfilment of decisions, not formal supervision, but supervision from top to bottom. Were not the interviews at the Central Committee with representatives of the trade unions and of the lower business organizations from the Donbas mines, supervision? It was in the process of this supervision that the historical decision which played and will play an important role in the whole of our state and economic construction, was born.



This decision has its history. I could relate to you in detail how the first investigation commission that was elected brought a resolution on the Donbas of the usual type. The second commission also brought a draft resolution that failed to correspond to the tasks of the day; it was a general resolution that repeated what we have discussed more than once. And it was only after a thorough and profound investigation had been made, after the facts had been studied and generalized in a manner that only Comrade Stalin is capable of doing, that we received the resolution that today lies at the basis of the whole of our reorganization. (*Applause.*)

But that is not all. After this decision was adopted, the Central Committee of the Party organized a number of investigations. Investigation is now going on. At one time it seemed that the Donbas would never extricate itself from the lag. But now we see that it has done so, and its work has improved.

The comrades who are working in all other branches of industry know how the Central Committee works. They know how it supervises the fulfilment of decisions. Whether it is a matter concerning the Taguil Railway Car Works, or the work of the Krivoy Rog Basin, the munitions industry, or oil—the Central Committee systematically supervised the fulfilment of these decisions. You probably remember that in connection with the Stalingrad Tractor Works the Political Bureau in 1931 heard the reports on the situation every five days.

The Moscow and Leningrad comrades very well remember the case of the Moscow and Leningrad meat supply. In view of the interruptions in the meat supply for Moscow, Leningrad and the Donbas, Comrade Stalin raised the question very sharply. All our resources and possibilities, all the quotas were investigated. Instead of

the former equal distribution in which everybody got something and nobody got anything, definite quotas of meat were set aside for the workers. As a result of the measures taken, of the attaching of particular Soviet livestock farms to particular enterprises, removing fictitious persons from the supply list and establishing fixed quotas, the toilers of Moscow, Leningrad and the Donbas are now being regularly supplied with meat in fixed rations.

Or take the work of the Central Committee in connection with the supply of consumers' goods. When the Central Committee began to receive information to the effect that these goods were not getting to the rural districts, a committee was set up with Comrade Stalin as the chairman, which went thoroughly into all the details of the manner in which the so-called non-market consumers were absorbing a considerable share of the market stocks. It was necessary to overcome the resistance of the non-market consumers and you know that these non-market consumers are rather "influential" bodies. It was necessary to cut down the extra goods they were getting and to send them into the rural and industrial districts. After adopting these decisions, the Central Committee frequently investigated the manner in which they were being carried out. The consumers' goods question was discussed at the September Plenum, 1932, in the form of a report, and only very recently the Central Committee again investigated the position in regard to the fulfilment of the decision concerning woollen fabrics.

The Political Bureau has been engaged on the question of railway transport for several years. It is sufficient to recall the conferences that were held in January 1931. The Plenum of the Central Committee again discussed the question of transport in June 1931. These conferences in 1931 were attended by engine-drivers, directors, district

chiefs, and service chiefs. The Central Committee investigated all the fundamental problems in the transport system.

The recent decision of the Central Committee on transport was the outcome of a concrete study of every detail. Recently the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars set up a special Transport Committee to assist the transport workers to improve the work of the railways.

After the criticism that was justly levelled at the People's Commissariat for Ways and Communications at this Congress this Committee will no doubt develop its work to a still wider extent. It will operatively control, investigate and assist the fulfilment of the decisions of the Central Committee on transport.

Comrades who are working in the localities are very familiar with the operative work of the Central Committee, and of Comrade Stalin himself, in the sphere of agriculture. They know how the Central Committee, day in and day out, supervised the sowing, the harvesting and the general consolidation of the collective farms. And this supervision was not mere abstract supervision. Last year the Central Committee convened a number of businesslike conferences at which local workers attended and at which all the practical problems affecting the various districts and regions were examined. You know how the Central Committee guided the sowing and supervised the fulfilment of its own decisions. Day in and day out the Central Committee watched to see whether the sowing of cotton and the harvesting of the cotton, the weeding of sugar beets and the harvesting of sugar beets was going badly or not, and gave practical advice as to how to remove defects.

Or take the question of agricultural machinery. It be-

came a very serious and acute question. You remember what a lot of talk there was about cultivator-tractors, and how the discussion about this dragged on and on in the apparatuses until at last in the course of supervising the fulfilment of decisions the question was taken up by the Central Committee. It turned out that the matter had been strangled by red tape. After the type of tractor had been decided on, the production of the "Farmol" cultivator-tractors was commenced at the Putilov Works.

Questions concerning fertilizers, fertilizers for cotton, and questions concerning increasing the yield of crops were discussed concretely in relation to each particular sphere. Had the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms and other People's Commissariats exercised half the concrete and operative leadership and supervision of fulfilment of decisions that is exercised by the Central Committee we would certainly have had far greater achievements to record.

Out of the supervision of the fulfilment of decisions emerged a number of big organizational questions. This is the special feature of the style of work of the Central Committee, the style of work of Comrade Stalin. All decisions are directly linked up with everyday operative life and with organizational problems. The whole style and method of work of the Central Committee is—unity between word and deed, unity between decision and fulfilment. Our Political Bureau is an organ of operative leadership of all branches of socialist construction.

Nearly every day Comrade Stalin convenes business conferences, invites workers to visit him in order to discuss operative questions, to investigate whether decisions are being fulfilled, or to discuss questions affecting the needs and requirements of the localities. Many questions

which in other places are discussed for hours, and on which long resolutions are adopted, are settled in the Central Committee quickly and operatively. You know that if a secretary of a regional committee or a chairman of an executive committee sends a telegram to the Central Committee, he receives a reply within one or two days.

(*Applause.*)

*Voices:* Quite right!

*Kaganovich:* I could quote numerous examples to show how very often, out of what at first sight seems to be a small question, a simple communication or a letter, a great important historical decision affecting all branches of our activity arises. Comrade Stalin learned that education in a certain school was proceeding badly: there was no discipline, the teachers were not respected, and the whole system of teaching the children was badly organized. Out of this single fact arose a whole skein of questions concerning the schools and the decision on the schools was passed, which later the educational workers themselves quite justly described as a really historical decision.

Or take the question of textbooks. I will not relate the whole story of this business to you.

*Stalin:* About the "loose-leaf" textbooks.

*Kaganovich:* Shall I tell it?

*Postyshev:* Tell it, because some people here are offended.

*Kaganovich:* The Central Committee learned that the children had no textbooks. Comrade Stalin invited responsible comrades to see him and he asked them what the position was in regard to textbooks. Later, when the matter was discussed at the Political Bureau, it transpired that we had no permanent textbooks.

*Stalin:* The textbooks were changed every year.

*Kaganovich*: Precisely. The textbooks were changed every year; and every year the curriculum was changed. The "Leftist" advocates of the theory of the "withering away" of the schools argued that if we issued textbooks to last several years it would drag us back and they failed to observe that because of the lack of textbooks our children were remaining semi-literate.

The term "loose-leaf" textbook is not used in mockery, is not a nickname, it is the official name given by the People's Commissariat for Education to this form of "text-book." As far back as 1930 the All-Russian Conference on Textbooks resolved that the principal textbooks shall be "the regional textbook, particularly in the form of loose-leaf books, the regional newspaper-textbook, and the all-republic textbook, particularly in the form of loose-leaf books."

The "loose-leaf" textbook did indeed consist of separate pages, dealing with all the sciences together, or as the experts put it, "in their complex."

Do not imagine that the pages of these "loose-leaf" textbooks gave any systematic knowledge. No. They simply consisted of scattered information, *i.e.*, on one page problems in arithmetic, lessons in Russian, information on geography, physics, social science, etc., were all jumbled up together. How on earth could a child get any systematic knowledge out of the "loose-leaf" pages of this textbook?

Every year the Commissariat for Education issued an enormous number of textbooks. An enormous amount of money and enormous quantities of paper were wasted on these "loose-leaf" textbooks. And yet every year there was a lack of a standard textbook.

Since the question was settled and the matter of the textbooks was taken up the situation of our schools has

undoubtedly improved. The situation regarding textbooks is still bad, but it is better than it was last year.

*Bubnov:* But have we done anything, or not?

*Kaganovich:* Yes, Comrade Bubnov, something has been done, but only after the Central Committee had raised the question sharply and took measures to see that its decisions were carried out.

*Stalin:* Now we have standard textbooks.

*Kaganovich:* There is still a large number of problems that have to be solved, but the work of the Commissariat for Education has undoubtedly improved and we now have standard textbooks.

I will quote an example from a sphere that would seem to be least operative, I refer to the sphere of literature. What has the Central Committee done in this sphere? I have in mind the case of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers. As you know a group of Communist writers, utilizing the organizational instrument of the R.A.P.W. exercised their Communist influence on the literature front in a wrong way, and instead of enlisting broad cadres of writers and uniting them around the R.A.P.W., this group of comrades hindered the development of creative literary forces. In this case the Central Committee came up against the wrong political line of a number of Communist writers on the literary front who had an organizational apparatus, the R.A.P.W., at their disposal.

Of course, a long resolution could have been drawn up enumerating the tasks of the Communist in the field of literature and the R.A.P.W. could have been instructed to change its line. But this would have only remained a pious wish. Comrade Stalin raised the question in a different way. He said: The situation must be changed organizationally. And then the question of dissolving the

R.A.P.W. and of forming a single Writers' Union was raised. After this organizational solution of the problem, the writing forces in the country developed and the situation in the field of literature is improving. Thus, the solution of an organizational problem secured the correct carrying out of the Party line in the field of literature.

I could quote many more examples of how the Central Committee works but what I have said is sufficient to present to you a clear picture of the Leninist-Stalinist style and method of work of the Central Committee.

Day in and day out Comrade Stalin teaches us to see the content behind the form, to subordinate the organizational forms, the selection and distribution of workers to the purposes of the tasks, to combine general directives with concrete tasks; to combine supervision of fulfilment with personal responsibility; to be exacting towards oneself and exacting towards others when it is a matter that affects our cause; to multiply the forces of the Bolsheviks by winning the broad masses to our side—primarily the non-Party activists, the workers, office employees, the specialists—to organize the work in such a way as not only to work oneself but to manipulate all the levers to set all the workers around one in motion and to train them honourably to fulfil the tasks which the Party imposes upon one.

The Seventeenth Congress of our Party and our whole Party knows that the whole of the leadership of the Central Committee of our Party and of its Political Bureau, and the leadership of Comrade Stalin, is a single indivisible whole, which guarantees great victories for us. (*Loud applause and cheers.*)

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Comrades, we have passed through great years of glorious struggle. At this Seventeenth Party Congress we



sum up our victories not in order to become intoxicated with success, not in order to rest on our laurels; we sum up our victories like an army of revolutionary warriors. We look back on the road we have travelled in order to learn the lessons of the past, in order to sharpen our weapons for the battles that still lie ahead.

We are now discussing the organizational problem. The organizational problem is the sharpening of weapons. Its importance and seriousness is not to be underestimated. Nowhere in the world has the organizational problem stood so sharply and seriously, nor can it stand so sharply and seriously as it stands in our country where socialism is being built.

The organizational theses indicate the line of our work and they solve the fundamental connecting problems. After the Congress all our Party and Soviet organizations must in practice apply these principles of reorganization.

The Seventeenth Party Congress has adopted the report of the Central Committee as the decision of the Congress and a Party law, as a program of great socialist work. By that the Congress expressed unbounded confidence in our Leninist Central Committee and in our great leader who has rallied millions of toilers in our country and throughout the world.

We have all the prerequisites, all that is necessary for the victorious fulfilment of the fighting program that has been adopted by the Congress. But does the fact that we have a firm basis, a firm foundation on which to build socialist society, the fact that all the conditions of victory are available, mean that the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan will be fulfilled by themselves, automatically? Does it imply that we can even for a moment relax our attention towards the task of overcoming difficulties,

towards the problems of the class struggle, towards the problems of reinforcing the proletarian dictatorship? No, not in the least. On the contrary, in his report Comrade Stalin particularly clearly proved that in order to completely abolish the survivals of capitalism in economics as well as in the minds of men, it is more than ever necessary to be vigilant, to be on the alert, to be persistent and maintain the state of class mobilization that the Party was in on the opening of the Seventeenth Congress.

We have achieved great successes in mastering our factories and in Bolshevizing our collective farms. But we must not close our eyes to the fact that we are confronted with many difficulties, that we suffer from many defects, that the enemy has not been entirely crushed. We must not close our eyes to the fact that it is precisely on the basis of the contradictions of our growth that all sorts of relapses into petty-bourgeois opportunist moods, into all sorts of Right and "Left" deviations will inevitably occur against which the Party in the future will have to wage a determined and irreconcilable struggle.

People have come onto this platform and recanted, people who have realized that they had fallen, who have realized our victories. This is a reflection of our victory. We will not say that we were displeased to hear these people who only yesterday hurled insults at our Party and slandered the leadership of our Party and who today come on their knees admitting their mistakes and asking that the Party forgive them. But, comrades, this must not quieten us and lull our vigilance. Relapses are possible. We are living in a country in which socialism has not yet completely conquered; we are surrounded by capitalist states; we have and will have difficulties, and

we can say to all—let the world know that the Bolsheviks and the Seventeenth Party Congress know the price of the struggle for unity, know what difficulties we had to overcome in order to achieve the unity of the Party; and let the world know that the slightest attempt at factionalism, the slightest attempt to disturb unity will meet with the crushing defeat at the hands of the Party, of the Bolsheviks, that every anti-Leninist has met with up till now. (*Loud applause.*)

Armed with the fighting program adopted by our great Congress, the Party will march firmly along its Bolshevik path, the path of heroic struggle for the Bolshevization of the collective farms, for technical reconstruction, for a well-to-do living for the toiling masses, for the mastery of new technique, for the eradication of bureaucracy and routine, for the Bolshevik supervision of the fulfilment of decisions and for the ideological equipment of its ranks with the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

Preserving its state of mobilization, guarding against getting swelled head, self-pacification and giddiness from success, the Party will smash the remnants of the class enemy, fight opportunism, rally new millions of the masses and raise them to new great deeds and sweep from its path to socialism all obstacles, no matter whence they may arise, from within or without.

Our victories were due to the fact that at the head of our Party stands a man who was able to mobilize the masses with the determination and indomitableness that Lenin displayed, who was able to safeguard the purity of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, who was able still further to enrich these doctrines, who was able to hold aloft the banner in the struggle for socialism, to discern the agents of the class enemy in our Party, to ignite

the flame of enthusiasm in the Party, in the working class and among the toiling peasantry, and to lead this great army of labour to storm the last stronghold of capitalism in our country, to the building of victorious socialist society. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Our Congress has drawn upon itself the attention of millions and tens of millions, not only in our country, but all over the world. And our Seventeenth Party Congress can confidently declare to these millions of workers and peasants that under the unfurled banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, our great Communist Party, which is ideologically united, hardened and tested in battles for socialism, will continue under the direct fighting leadership of our foremost great organizer and teacher, Stalin, to lead the millions to further great victories for socialism!

Long live our great Communist Party!

Long live our own great Stalin!

(*Loud applause, cheers. The delegates, standing, sing the International.*)

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